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UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARDS
THE ARAB-ISRAELI ARMS RACE,
1950 - 1966

AHMED R. ELKASHEF



P. L. O. RESEARCH CENTER

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With a Supplement on

ARAB VIEW OF WESTERN AID

by
Dr. Hassan Saab



P. L. O. Research Center
Beirut — Lebanon
September 1969

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CHAPTER I

THE UNITED STATES STAKE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The United States had traditionally considered the Middle East and, indeed, the whole Mediterranean basin, as an area of primarily British interests and responsibility. In 1820, the United States entered the area through academic, missionary, and philanthropic activities sponsored by both church and private organizations and, in some cases, by interested individuals.¹ First, the American missionaries founded a network of hospitals, schools and colleges in Syria, Egypt and Lebanon, helping to spark the cultural revival heralding the birth of Arab nationalism.² The few Americans residing in the Middle East were mostly Jews living in Jerusalem under the capitulation system and protected by British and American consulates in Constantinople.³

(1) Jacob Hurewitz, *Middle East Dilemmas* (New York: Harpers, 1962), pp. 106 - 107.

(2) George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening* (London : Hamish Hamilton, 1954), pp. 35 - 43. See also, Nadav Safran, *The United States and Israel* (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 36.

(3) Frank Manuel, *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, D. C. : Public Affairs Press, 1949), pp. 133 - 144.

By the end of World War I, however, the United States became more concerned with this area's political future and with the general peace settlement. President Wilson's declaration on self-determination led to the general belief among the Western allies and the American public that his country was then willing to accept a large measure of responsibility for achieving peace in the Middle East. The American missions, which had been sent between the Autumn of 1918 and January 30, 1919, to inquire about Palestine and the Arab problem, encouraged this belief.⁴ Furthermore, suspicion of British and French intentions in the area prompted the American Government to send the King-Crane Commission on May 31, 1919, to ascertain the desires of the native population in the Middle East.⁵ At the Peace Conference, an American Zionist delegation persuaded President Wilson to urge the implementing of the Balfour Declaration, which favored establishing a "national home" for the Jewish people in Palestine.⁶ At the same time, however, the House Committee on Foreign Affairs gave support to the Balfour Declaration only as an expression of "moral interest". The Committee stated that its resolution supporting the Declaration "... commits us to no

(4) John C. Campbell, *Defense of the Middle East* (2nd ed., New York: Harper, 1961), pp. 29-30; Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 36; Manuel, *ibid.*, pp. 211, 219, 222-224 and 227.

(5) Campbell, *ibid.*, p. 29; Manuel, *ibid.*, pp. 236, 238-241, 244-246, 243 and 252.

(6) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-38; Campbell, *ibid.*, p. 30; Manuel,

foreign obligations or entanglements. ”7

After the failure of Wilson's internationalism and the return to isolationism, the United States accepted the British mandate in 1924 and, for the next two decades, viewed Palestine as a British problem. Yet, by 1924, the United States' concern with the area had expanded beyond educational and missionary activities and the protection of the private interest of American citizens there.⁸ America's concern in the Middle East now included growing economic interests, notably oil. American companies were pressing for free entry into the new and promising fields in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia.⁹ The British, Dutch and French competitors were anxious to keep these areas to themselves. The State Department responded to the oil companies' appeal and pressed the powers controlling the Middle East to obtain open-door privileges for American companies.¹⁰ This policy was outlined in the Anglo-American Treaty of December, 1924, which regulated rela-

ibid., pp. 216, 226, 231-234, 237, 239 and 242-244.

(7) Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-88. (From United States 67th Congress, 2nd Session, House Committee on Foreign Affairs Report No. 1038, accompanying H. J. Res. 322, p. 1, 3rd ed.)

(8) George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs* (Ithaca, New York : Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 669; Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

(9) Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

(10) William R. Polk, *The United States and the Arab World* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 262; Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 670-71; Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 270-72.

tions between the two countries connected with the Palestine Mandate and secured protection for American businesses and missionaries in Palestine, giving the United States the right to have a say in any change in the Mandate.¹¹

In addition to these economic issues, the United States Government's attention was again, in the 1930's, drawn to the Palestinian problem.¹² As the persecution of Jews in Hitler's Reich intensified in the 1930's and Britain restricted Jewish immigration to Palestine, American Zionists put pressure on the United States Government to persuade England to change her policy. A majority of the House Foreign Affairs Committee and twenty-eight senators protested against these restrictions, calling the defense of Jewish interests in Palestine " ... a moral obligation of the United States."¹³ But, until 1939, many factors prevented America's being actually involved in the Palestinian problem. First, the International Zionist Organization rested in the hands of British (and not American) Jews, who were anxious to work with Britain. Secondly, until 1939, Britain had not drastically limited Jewish immigration into Palestine.¹⁴ And, although American Congressmen were more sensi-

(11) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 38; Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 379, 389; Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

(12) Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 671.

(13) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-39 ; Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304, 307-308.

(14) Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 671.

tive to the electoral implications of their sympathy with Zionist aspirations, the legislature was not directly responsible for American foreign policy.¹⁵ Thus, President Roosevelt, particularly during his first three terms, and the State Department resented American Zionists' intervening in the conduct of foreign policy, and did not see the Jewish cause as an "American interest." This view was strongly held by Roosevelt's Administration in the 'thirties.¹⁶

Even the increasing American oil concessions in Iraq, Bahrein and Saudi Arabia did not materially change this attitude of neutrality. Washington preferred not to engage in conflicts among the Western or Axis powers, or between Western democracies and the Soviet Union for control of strategic areas and for support of Middle Eastern governments and people.¹⁷ Beginning with World War II, however, growing involvement in Middle Eastern oil and knowledge of its importance in the war increased American interest in that area.¹⁸ The war brought the United States into the Middle East. American troops appeared in Iran to maintain the lend-lease supply line to Russia, and American arms and goods flowed into Egypt and Palestine to strengthen the Middle East Supply Center.¹⁹ The United States made lend-

(15) Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 307-309; Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

(16) Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 305-07, 318.

(17) *Ibid.*, pp. 308-309; Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 671.

(18) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

(19) Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 671.

lease agreements with Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. She also built air bases in Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran to establish a chain of bases linking North Africa with the Far East.²⁰

During the war, the American Government showed a renewed deep concern over oil supplies serving American strategic needs in the Far East, and with the desire to continue the air base agreement with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the Palestine problem was brought home to the American public by the Zionists both when they adopted the Biltmore Program on May 11, 1942, and later, during the 1944 Presidential Campaign.²¹ As a result, President Roosevelt held to the position that although he favored the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine, he would not support a final decision affecting the "basic situation" in Palestine without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews.²² Essentially, the military concern for defeating the Axis was the basis for actual American involvement in the Middle East.²³ The United States aimed to win the war and withdraw, because of its deep involvement in Europe and the Far East, its people's desire to return to their homes,

(20) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

(21) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 39; Ephraim A. Speiser, *The United States and the Near East* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), pp. 132-240-241; Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 309-310.

(22) Manuel, *ibid.*, pp. 311-318.

(23) Joseph B. Schechtman, *The United States and the Jewish Movement* (New York: Herzl Press, 1966), p. 13; Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

and its conviction that Britain had both the power and experience to handle the problems of the Middle East.²⁴

In August, 1945, immediately after V-E Day, the United States appeared ready to leave the Middle East under British direction as before. But, drained by the war, the latter was no longer equipped for the task, either in resources or resolution, and under pressure of local nationalisms, the decline of British control was indeed swift.²⁵ Coupled with increased American economic interest in the post-war Middle East, the alleged Soviet "menace," oil, and the Palestine "Problem", the United States Government saw three avenues of approach to that area.²⁶ American intervention in the Middle East, responding to the threat of Soviet encroachment and control, first took place in Greece, Turkey and Iran under the so-called Truman Doctrine. Gradually, then, the United States became concerned over the Communist Civil War in Greece and the Soviet pressure on Turkey to cede two north eastern provinces and to share control of the Straits. The United States was further concerned over the prolonged stay of Soviet troops in Iran (after the evacuation deadline set for 1946 and after American and British troops had departed), the Soviet acquisition of an oil concession from Iran by coercive measures, and

(24) Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

(25) Marian D. Irish, *World Pressure on American Foreign Policy* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice Hall, 1964), pp. 62-63.

(26) Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 672

the establishment of Communist puppet regimes in north western Iran.²⁷

America feared that Soviet influence in Iran, Greece, and Turkey would seriously threaten the security of its oil and strategic interest, which had developed in the Middle East during the war.²⁸ In his Army Day Address of April, 1946, President Truman thus referred to

“... the Near and Middle East [as an area which] presents grave problems ... contains vast natural resources ... lies across the most convenient route of land, air, and water communication ... might become an arena of intense rivalry among outside powers, which rivalry might suddenly erupt into conflict.”²⁹

To counter the growing Soviet influence in the area, Britain took up the financial and diplomatic burden of support in Greece and Turkey, while the United States challenged the Soviet Union in the first session of the Security Council, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran. After three weeks of crisis, these troops withdrew, the puppet regime in Iran collapsed, and the Iranian Parliament repudiated the Soviet oil concession extracted during the occupation.³⁰ Meanwhile,

(27) Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 263; Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

(28) Halford L. Hoskins, *The Middle East* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), pp. 254-58.

(29) Speiser, *op. cit.*, p. 123; Department of State *Bulletin*, April 21, 1946, p. 622.

(30) Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-34; Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 672.

Soviet pressure on Turkey intensified. Fearing invasion, Turkey kept its army mobilized, causing inflation and near bankruptcy. Simultaneously, Soviet-sponsored guerillas in Greece were gaining ground against the government. In February, 1947, the British government informed Washington that it would have to discontinue its military and economic support to Greece and Turkey.³¹ On March 12, 1947, President Truman agreed to assist both countries by granting them four million dollars for economic and military purposes.³² So, by the end of 1947, the United States had suddenly become a major participant in Middle Eastern affairs — committed to preventing any Soviet invasion of the non-Arab part of that region.³³

The Truman Doctrine marked a shift in America's defense policy against the Soviet threat. American strategists clearly saw that the concept of "Fortress America" could not work against the Communist threat, and that United States strength would have to be derived from associating with other nations to defend the "common interest of world society." Secretary of State Dean Acheson summed up this policy :

"In the complex world of today, the security of the United States cannot be defined in terms of boun-

(31) Lionel M. Celber, *America in Britain's Place* (New York Praeger, 1961), pp. 37-38; Schechtman, *op. cit.*, p. 14; Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 263.

(32) *Ibid.* ; Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 673-74.

(33) Gelber, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-46.

daries and frontiers. A serious threat to international peace and security anywhere in the world is of direct concern to this [U.S.] country. Therefore it is our policy to help free peoples to maintain their integrity and independence, not only in Western Europe or in the Americas but wherever the aid we are to provide can be effective."³⁴

Middle Eastern political stability and protection of its resources became vital to the United States national interest and security, as well as to world peace, because of the importance of the area's oil to NATO, its strategic position between three continents, and the establishment of American air bases in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Morocco, and lend-lease in Turkey after the war. Some government departments — Navy and Interior — outlined the politico-strategic implications of Middle Eastern oil for American interests there. At a Cabinet meeting in January, 1948, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal insisted that, without access to the Middle Eastern oil pool, the United States could not wage a war nor even maintain the tempo of its peace-time economy.³⁵ On January 21st, Vice-Admiral Robert B. Carney, then Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, testified before the House Armed Services Committee that :

(34) United States Department of State, **The Military Assistance Program** (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 4-5.

(35) Walter Millis (ed.), **The Forrestal Diaries** (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 358; Manuel, *op. cit.*, p. 341.

"In the event of serious disturbance in the Middle East, there is cause of grave concern for the fortunes of American oil facilities throughout that area, and to those who might desire to deny the oil of the Middle East to us, such disturbance could afford opportunities for interference."³⁶

Explaining the strategic importance of Middle Eastern oil to the United States' national security, Mr. John Badeau pointed out that oil was not merely a commercial resource for the American companies but also an instrument of war and defense. To him, therefore, any threat to the Middle East, thereby closing the oil fields to the United States, would directly challenge American defense strategy.³⁷ After the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in 1949, adequate supplies of petroleum at all times and under any circumstances became necessary for Western Europe's military security. Assuming that, in time of war, all the oil which could be extracted from United States domestic fields, plus supplies from Canada, would not equal the war demand, the availability of oil from other areas became a matter of vital concern to the United States. Recalling the deeds of German submarines in World War II, it is doubtful that oil would flow steadily from Mexico or the Caribbean countries to the European allies or to the United States throughout a third world war. The weaning of

(36) John S. Badeau, *America's Stake in the Middle East* (Washington, D. C. : Department of State, 1947), p. 4.

(37) *Ibid.*, pp. 4-6.

Western Europe from American oil thus transferred the responsibility for supply to the Middle East.³⁸

This linking up of economic life and activity in Western Europe with the resources of the Middle East through the aid of American funds, pipe lines, and oil tankers became a principal feature in bolstering the strength of the North Atlantic Alliance. In other words, the United States Government saw Middle East oil and access to it as strategically essential for preserving Western Europe's military security and economic strength.³⁹ Statements of American Presidents and Secretaries continually point out this fact. President Truman affirmed :

“ Traditional American cultural interests in the Near East have in recent years been reinforced by expanding economic and commercial ties and by recognition of the important role of that historical cross road between three continents in the maintenance of peace and security of the world of today. This steady expansion of our relations with the Near East has given rise to a natural interest on the part of this government in the welfare of the governments and peoples of that areas. In so saying, however, I wish to emphasize that now as in the past we have no ax of special privilege to grind. We do, however, have an obvious community of interest with

(38) Hoskin, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

(39) United States Department of State, *The Military Assistance Program* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 4.

the countries of the Near East, and it is proper that we should give that relationship the careful and understanding consideration which it merits.”⁴⁰

“ In the free nations of the Middle East lie half of the oil reserve of the world. No part of the world is more directly exposed to Soviet pressure. There is no simple formula for increasing stability and security in the Middle East. The program I am now proposing is a balance program for strengthening the security of the Middle East. It will make a solid contribution to our hopes for peace.”⁴¹

Secretary Acheson reiterated :

“This the Near and Middle East is a region of great importance to us, because of its people, its resources, strategic position, and vital communications arteries.”⁴²

Secretary Dulles emphasized the area's importance both for national security — “The Near East is one of the main cross roads of the world and has great strate-

(40) President Truman, August 26, 1949, Statement on Gordon P. Clapp as Chairman of U.N. Economic Survey Mission to Near East, *Bulletin*, September 5, 1949. p. 333.

(41) President Truman, May 24, 1951, Message to Congress : Recommendations for a Mutual Security Program, *Bulletin*, June 4, 1951, p. 887.

(42) Secretary Acheson, December 30, 1951, address before the Jewish War Veterans at New York, *Bulletin*, January 7, 1952, p. 4.

gic importance"⁴³ ... and, for national economic interests — "This area contains important resources vital to our welfare — oil, manganese, chrome, mica, and other minerals."⁴⁴ He also noted the area's religious aspects:

"This is a region sacred to three religions: Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. This area, the Middle East, has great significance to the free world from the standpoint of communications, land, sea, air, and because of its resources."

"The United States has long been interested in the course of events in the Near East. The people of the United States and its government have many interests and objectives there."⁴⁵

These were but some of the increasing indications that the Middle East had indeed erupted into America's national interests and security. It was, and still is, a fulcrum in American-Soviet relations.

As this general line of policy was developing for the

(43) Secretary Dulles, May 5, 1953, statement made before House Foreign Affairs Committee and Senate Foreign Relation Committee, *Bulletin*, May 25, 1953, p. 738.

(44) Secretary Dulles, June 1, 1953, Radio and Television address on the Near East, Department of State Publications 5088, Near and Middle East Series 12, pp. 3-4.

(45) Secretary Dulles, February 24, 1956, statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 2-18.

whole area, one particular issue signified the United States' increasing involvement in the Middle East. This was Palestine. When Britain indicated that it could not resolve the Palestine conflict and intended to turn it over to the United Nations, the United States played a major role in pushing through the General Assembly a modification of the United Nations' partition plan. But the United States could not lend the United Nations the forces which might have made partition possible without war. Because the United States military forces were depleted, those planning American policy believed that they could not count on congressional or party support for an active United States role in Palestine.⁴⁶ On March 19, 1948, unable to move forward with any confidence, the American government suggested at the United Nations that action on the partition plan, already approved by the United Nations, be suspended and that a trusteeship be established instead over all of Palestine. While the United Nations was discussing the Trusteeship Plan, the Zionists in Palestine occupied by force most of the territory allocated to them by the partition plan, and on May 14, 1948, proclaimed the State of Israel.⁴⁷ Ten minutes later, President Truman awarded de facto recognition to the new state, and the trusteeship proposal was buried.⁴⁸

(46) Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 35-37; Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 264.

(47) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

(48) Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 36, 100; Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43; Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 298-300; Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 349-50.

America's support for Israel's founding and growth represents the first substantial political involvement of the United States government in the Arab part of the Middle East. Some of those concerned with American security, such as Secretary of Defense Forrestal, were indeed aware of the hazards involved, but such views were castigated as "anti-Semitic" or "oil-mongering" and had little effect.⁴⁹ Some have argued that the Zionist policy was partly a projection of domestic politics by political leaders and parties competing with Zionist attitudes and promises for the so-called "Jewish vote." President Truman was most sensitive to that vote, especially in 1948, the year he was predicted to lose to Dewey. Throughout the period of acute Zionist pressure, up to May 15, 1948, when Israel was declared, Truman systematically disregarded the advice of his Secretary of State, Middle East experts, Secretary of Defense and Joint Chief of Staff.⁵⁰

Under a policy announced by the State Department on December 5, 1947, and maintained until the recognition of Israel in 1948, the United States had discontinued licensing the sale of arms to all Middle Eastern countries, with the exception of Greece, Turkey and Iran. This arms

(49) Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 340-44, 356-57 ; Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 375-76, 416-21.

(50) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42; Manuel, *op. cit.*, pp. 358-59; Schechtman, *op. cit.*, pp. 367-78, 404-22, 303-05, 313, 341-42; Chatham House Study Group, *British Interests in the Mediterranean and Middle East* (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), p. 14.

embargo policy was instituted under the authority of the U.S. Neutrality Act of 1939 and the Export Act of 1940, and was in response to the United Nations' request for cooperation in discouraging the Arab-Jewish conflict in Palestine.⁵¹ But, as a result of strong protests and appeals from American Zionists and Jews, Congressmen and other politicians, and American public opinion, President Truman, on May 15, 1948, considered lifting the embargo on arms shipments to the entire Middle East. However, no initial decision was taken.⁵²

On May 25, 1948, Dr. Chaim Weizmann, during a meeting with President Truman, appealed for a loan of ninety to one hundred million dollars " ... first of all for military purposes, " because Israel then needed some tanks, planes, anti-tank guns, and " ... a good deal of military tackle. " ⁵³ Meanwhile, the State Department approached Czechoslovakia on July 28, 1948, to urge the cessation of shipments of airplanes and arms to Israel.⁵⁴ However, the smuggling of arms, ammunition, food and other articles to Israel by American individuals and associations had not been considered by many American courts as illegal action violating United States law and policy.⁵⁵

(51) Schechtman, *ibid.*, p. 318.

(52) *Ibid.*, pp. 318-23.

(53) *New York Times* (Henceforth, N.Y.T.), May 26, 1948. Quoted in Schechtman, *ibid.*, p. 324.

(54) *Ibid.*, Note (x), p. 325.

(55) *Ibid.*, pp. 225-28.

The shooting between the Arab states and Israel ended in July, 1949, when Israel concluded its last armistice agreements with its immediate neighbors. Israel did not abide by these agreements and its troops violated the armistice terms thousands of times. This made the Arabs more concerned about securing the essential arms for self-defense and for the restoration of peace and justice in Palestine.

CHAPTER II

ARMS AID AND THE " ARMS RACE "

The most important thing to note about the conventional race between the Arab states and Israel is that both depend greatly on outside supplies of arms. Because of indigenous armament factories, especially in Egypt and Israel,¹ developed since 1956, this dependence has lessened to some degree. But, in 1949, both sides depended totally on outside suppliers for arms — the only significant ones at that time being Britain, France and the United States.²

Soon after the signing of the armistice agreement between Israel and the Arab states bordering her, Britain and France resumed shipment of arms to Jordan, Iraq and Egypt. Having no previous treaty commitments to her, they did not send arms to Israel. This evoked pro-

(1) Sections on Middle East by Lt. William A. Kirby, Jr., in Center for International Studies, MIT, **Regional Arms Control Arrangements for Developing Areas; Arms and Arms Control in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa**, September, 1964, Chapter III, pp. 18, 19, 24. Done for U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

(2) Edgar O'Ballance, **The Sinai Campaign of 1956** (London : Faber and Faber, 1959), p. 15.

tests from the American Zionist organisations, and America called for a Foreign Ministers' Conference, which, on May 25, 1950, issued the famous Tripartite Declaration.³

In this declaration, the three governments recognized that both the Arab states and Israel needed armed forces to insure their internal security and maintain legitimate self-defense. Such forces would also permit them to participate in defending the whole area. The three governments reaffirmed their "... opposition to the development of an arms race between the Arab States and Israel, demanding assurance ... in any arms deal that the purchasing state does not intend to undertake any act of aggression against any other state." They also agreed that :

"The three governments, should they find any of these states involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict were preparing to violate frontiers or armistice lines, would, consistent with their obligations as members of the United Nations, immediately take actions, both within and outside the United Nations, to prevent such violation."⁴

(3) *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

(4) Quoted in J. D. Hurewitz (ed.), *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East* (Princeton, New Jersey : Van Nostrand, 1956), Vol. II, pp. 308-309; *The Situation in the Middle East*, Hearings before U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations (Henceforth, SCFR), 84th Congress, 2nd Session, February 24, 1956 (Washington : G.P.O., 1956), pp. 2-3; *Statement Regarding Security in the Near East*, May 25, 1950, Department of State Bulletin (henceforth *Bulletin*), June 5, 1950, p. 866.

The United States Government's part in the Tripartite Declaration emphasized its desire, according with national interest, to promote the maintenance of peace in the Near East.⁵ This desire was, in concrete terms, a guarantee of Israel's alien existence in the Middle East. Although the Declaration never had the effect of a binding treaty commitment, it laid down fundamental principles to guide the three governments in their dealings with Israel and the Arab States on questions of arms deliveries and frontier violations. The Declaration was also designed to nip the "miniature arms race" of 1949-50 in the bud and to dampen the conflict.⁶ But it was not entirely successful. In the first place, the Arabs discounted it entirely, thinking it little more than an extension of the so-called "truce" period of the 1948-49 war, during which the great powers had declared embargoes on arms and supplies to both sides but had failed to halt clandestine arms shipments to Israel.⁷ "The Israelis remained cynically silent. Neither side took it seriously nor paid very much heed to it in spite of pompous repetitions whenever there was a large-scale armed clash on the frontiers..."⁸

(5) President Truman, May 25, 1950, Statement, *Bulletin*, June 5, 1950, p. 886; see also President Truman, August 26, 1949, Statement on Gordon R. Clapp as Chairman of UNE Economic Survey Mission on Near East, *Bulletin*, September 5, 1949, p. 333.

(6) Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Near and Middle East*, p. 308.

(7) Michael G. Ionides, *Divide and Lose; the Arab Revolt of 1955-58* (London: Jeffrey Bles, Ltd., 1960), p. 89.

(8) O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

Moreover, the Tripartite Declaration soon clashed with United States policy objectives in the Middle East. Only a month after it was declared, the Korean War broke out, and with war, American policy-makers envisaged an encircling of the Soviet bloc by a series of pacts and expressed great anxiety over a " ... gap in this circle in the Middle East. "9

"Along the southeastern reaches of Europe and into the Near East the aims of our foreign policy are to make even stronger the existing strong points, and to help other countries to strengthen themselves against the dangers which they face ... "10

"What we are trying to do now is to make sure that what happens in this part of the world, the Middle East, doesn't jeopardise the security of all the rest of us. These people live in an area that is of critical importance to the security of the whole world. "11

The United States became increasingly concerned with the need for regional defense organizations to protect the Middle East from alleged Soviet aggression, an objective which was important to the security of the

(9) Chatham House Study Group, *British Interest*, p. 15; Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

(10) Secretary Acheson, July 26, 1951, Statement in Support of Proposed Mutual Security Program before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Bulletin*, August 6, 1951, pp. 211-12.

(11) Secretary Acheson, October 21, 1951, Statement made in answer to question on "Battle Report" over NBC Television, *Bulletin*, October 29, 1951, p. 686.

United States. The governments of the United States, Britain, France and Turkey, in a statement on November 10, 1951, declared : "The defense of the Middle East is vital to the free world and its defense against outside aggression can be secured only by the cooperation of all interested states. "12 Secretary Dulles put it as follows :

"Our basic political problem in this vitally important region of the Near East is to improve the attitude of the Muslim States toward the Western democracies, including the United States, because our prestige in the area has steadily declined since the war. In order to attain our objectives, we must put great emphasis on a regional approach to the problems of the area ... We consider these programs, although relatively small in dollar cost, to be vitally important in terms of their contribution to our security. "13

Secretary Acheson said :

"The military assistance to Israel and the Arab states is of critical importance to the defence of the free nations and the immediate increased ability of the recipient country to defend itself, contributes to

(12) The Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, France and Turkey, November 10, 1951, Statement on the Middle East Command, *Bulletin*, November 19, 1951, p. 817.

(13) Secretary Dulles, July 9, 1953, Statement before the Senate Appropriation Committee on the Mutual Security Program, *Bulletin*, July 16, 1953, p. 90.

the preservation of the peace and the security of the Near East area and is important to the security of the United States ... We cannot allow the forces of neutralism and extremism to gain further ground in the Near East. The strategic position of the Middle East is too important to allow its conquest through Soviet subversion as a result of our indifference or inaction. The Soviet intention of dominating this area is all too clear. ”¹⁴

According to its defense policy, the United States was to furnish military assistance to the Middle Eastern countries, thereby contributing to the Arab-Israeli arms race and to the problem of maintaining the military balance of power among them. United States defense policies in the Middle East first manifested themselves in a 1951 proposal for an Allied Middle East Defense Organization linking the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Turkey and the Arab States in a defense system based on the Canal Zone Treaty of 1936. The proposal was presented to Egypt at the height of the dispute between Egypt and Britain over the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. Though the proposal intended to take full account of local sovereignty, the Arabs saw the United States as not only the champion of Israel, but fully in league with the hated imperialist powers of Europe.

(14) Secretary Dean Acheson, July 26, 1951, **Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 82nd Congress, 1st Session, July 26 — August 9, 1951** (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 319.

Therefore, Egypt rejected the proposal. ¹⁵

Despite the Egyptian rejection and Soviet protests that the United States was trying to draw the Middle East into the Atlantic bloc, the Government tried to keep the defense alliance policy alive until the May, 1953 visit of Secretary Dulles to the Middle East. He suggested an alliance of the "Northern Tier" states which included, later, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Iraq. The "Northern Tier concept" seemed to offer the opportunity to strengthen those nations that wanted to be strengthened, without permitting troublesome problems like Suez and Palestine to hold up progress where it could be made. The step-by-step approach would mean putting aside for a time any joint planning for regional defense, but cooperation could be expanded when and as individual states made their choice for it. ¹⁶ The United States was to remain aloof from membership, yet provide military aid to build up local forces. The alliance sought to prevent Soviet-Arab friendly relations. ¹⁷

Returning from that trip, Mr. Dulles indicated that it was not then feasible to create a Middle East bloc parallel to NATO. He found that " ... the Arab people were more fearful of Zionism than of the communists, " believing " ... the United States will back the new State

(15) Georgiana C. Stevens (ed.), *The United States and the Middle East* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 157; Polk, *op. cit.*, pp. 269-270; Campbell, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-45.

(16) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

(17) Grant E. McClellan (ed.), *The Middle East in the Cold War* (New York : The H. W. Wilson Company, 1956), p. 28.

of Israel in aggressive expansion. ”¹⁸ He also found “ ... a vague desire to have a collective security system, but no such system can be imposed from without. It should be designed and grow from common destiny and common danger. ”¹⁹ Nevertheless, Mr. Dulles still had the idea of some sort of association with an emerging “southern tier” as a vestige of the Middle East Command Organization. This being the case, the United States at least heard appeals for arms.

In fact, it gave several hearings. Very soon after the July, 1952 revolution in Egypt, General Naguib sent a representative to Washington to ask for arms. Such appeals continued until the summer of 1955. ²⁰ At least until the spring of 1955, Egypt’s desire for arms does not seem to have been primarily motivated by a desire for a “second round” with Israel. The Free Officers asked for arms mainly to erase the black mark on the Egyptian army resulting from their poor equipment and organization in 1948. ²¹ Although arms may have ultima-

(18) Secretary Dulles, June 1, 1953, Radio and Television Report on the Near East, *Bulletin*, June 15, 1953, p. 831.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 835.

(20) Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Mandate for Change* (Garden City, New York : Doubleday, 11963), p. 159; Keith Wheelock, *Masser’s New Egypt* (New York: Praeger, 1960), pp. 214-28; *New York Times*, April 13, 1960, p. 23.

(21) McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 133 ; President Nasser, previously Prime Minister, stated that “our revolution stemmed from the need in Egypt for arms. If there are no arms coming, there will be another revolution here.” Quoted from “Where War Now?” *U.S. News and World Report*, No. 39, November 4, 1955, pp. 48-50.

tely been used for a second round, the main reason the Free Officers asked for them seems to have been to bolster the prestige of their new regime and army domestically. ²²

Likewise, the United States seems to have dismissed the dangers of a possible "second round." Rather, it was concerned with Britain's interest in the area, the possibility of some sort of regional defense pact, and the stipulations of the Mutual Security Act. ²³ Until June, 1953, the United States refused to consider sending arms to Egypt unless she became formally committed to a Western defense agreement, a condition Egypt refused. ²⁴ Nevertheless, while the Iraqi government made no formal commitments with respect to regional defense, the United States agreed to supply arms to Iraq on April 21, 1954, because both governments understood that Iraq would play its part in regional defense. ²⁵ America's tentative agreement to arm Egypt was also unfulfilled because the Egyptians were fighting an undeclared war with British troops in the Canal Zone, and the United States felt it could not go against its ally by sending

(22) Charles D. Cremeans, *The Arabs and The World* (New York; Praeger, 1963), p. 144; Mr. Jernegan, Economic Advisor, Bureau of Near East, May 5, 1953. Statement Before U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, on Mutual Security Act of 1953, Hearings, 83rd Congress, 1st session, May, 1953 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 274-75.

(23) *Ibid.*, pp. 265-66.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 264.

(25) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 52.

arms to Egypt. America also withheld aid to pressure Egypt to accede to the British conditions it demanded in return for withdrawing from Suez. ²⁶

In October, 1954, Britain and Egypt signed an agreement for the evacuation of the Suez Canal, and thus, one obstacle to an American-Egyptian arms deal was eliminated; others remained, however. Under the conditions of the Mutual Security Act, any country receiving military aid had both to promise not to use the arms for aggressive purposes and to accept an American military mission. ²⁷ But Nasser, the Prime Minister, could not accept a military mission on Egyptian soil just after seventy-two years of occupation had ended. ²⁸ There were stumbling blocks to agreement, but they were not unsurmountable, or so it seemed to some. Turkey's Prime Minister Menderes was rounding up the Middle Eastern countries for a "northern tier" defense organization, and the West hoped Egypt might join this new alliance. ²⁹ President Nasser, opposing the alliance system, attacked the Baghdad Pact as soon as it was signed, on the ground that it was bound to split the Arabs and draw them into a Western-dominated alliance. On March 2, 1955, a week after the signing of the Pact, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria signed an agreement for a joint military command in reprisal; Saudi Arabia, Syria and Yemen sided with

(26) Wheelock, *op. cit.*, p. 214; *New York Times*. July 12, 1954 p. 2, (Hereafter, NYT).

(27) McClellan *op. cit.* p. 133.

(28) *Ibid.*, pp. 133-34.

(29) *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28, NYT, November 27, 1955, p. 5.

Egypt, while Jordan and Lebanon remained aloof. ³⁰ More important, on February 28, 1955, Israel launched a massive retaliation raid on Gaza, killing thirty-eight Egyptian soldiers and wounding thirty. It was the largest military action since the 1948 war. ³¹

Shocked by the heaviest casualties since the war of 1948, Nasser could no longer delay seeking more and better arms wherever he could get them. He had to stop the wave of nervousness in Egypt and to answer his officers' demand. ³² Even after the Baghdad Pact was signed, however, Prime Minister Nasser continued to prefer Western arms ³³ and to negotiate with Britain and America for them. ³⁴ Negotiations proceeded in the spring of 1955 and, in June, it seemed that the United States had agreed "in principle" to sell Egypt \$27 million worth of military equipment, including aircraft, tanks and artillery. ³⁵ In July, the British government agreed to sell Egypt two destroyers. ³⁶

Israel had achieved victory over the Arab States in

(30)NYT, p. 30; Cremeans, *op. cit.*, pp. 140-43.

(31) Statement in the Department of State, *Bulletin*, April 18, 1955, pp. 659-61.

(32) Cremeans, *op. cit.*, p. 144; Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 72; McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

(33) David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin*, (New York, J. B. Lippincott Co., 1961), pp. 387-396.

(34) Lenczowski, *op. cit.*, p. 511.

(35) Wheelock, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

(36) Ionides, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

the 1948 war and imposed an armistice on them in 1949. As a result, it had a military advantage in 1949 that could hardly have been considerably diminished by 1950. From 1951 to the end of 1954, Britain imposed an arms embargo on Egypt ³⁷ which was lifted with the sale previously mentioned, but only after selling an equal number of destroyers to Israel in June, 1955. ³⁸

During the same period, the United States received many requests for arms from both the Arab states and Israel. Purchases of arms and military equipment had been made either through ordinary commercial channels or from the American government under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1954. ³⁹ The American sales were subject to the agreement of the purchasing country that the arms would be used only for purposes of internal security and self-defense. All sales required export licenses. ⁴⁰

Limited arms deliveries to the Arab states and Israel had, from time to time, been authorized by the United States Government. Although the first tentative agreement in this respect was to send tanks to Saudi

(37) Wheelock, *op. cit.*, p. 229.

(38) *Ibid.*

(39) *The Situation in the Middle East*, Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, February 24, 1956. (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 8.

(40) *Ibid.*

Arabia in June, 1951, no delivery was taken. ⁴¹ The first military assistance actually delivered was to Israel on July 1, 1952. ⁴² In the spring of 1955 the United States sent Iraq some arms for use under the recently signed Baghdad Pact. Israel protested that this violated the Tripartite Declaration and endangered her security since Iraq had no armistice agreement with Israel, even though it had been participating in the war of 1948. The United States gave Israel assurances that the arms would not be used against her ⁴³ and refrained from joining the Baghdad Pact, even though she had initiated it. ⁴⁴ She also brought pressure to bear on Spain to stop a projected arms shipment to Egypt and authorized France to divert some Mystere jet fighters from NATO production for delivery to Israel. ⁴⁵ With the growing friction between Egypt and France over Algeria in 1954-55, France was drawing closer to Israel and welcomed the authorization.

On April 28, 1955, the Saudi Arabian government, pointing out that it had no tanks, repeated her request of June 1, 1951, to the United States to sell her a limited number to be used for training purposes. Negotiations lasted for several months and resulted in the United States' decision on August 25, 1955 to sell eighteen light

(41) *Ibid.*, pp. 33-37.

(42) *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

(43) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

(44) John R. Beal, *John Foster Dulles* (New York: Harper Company, 1959), p. 250.

(45) *Ibid.*, p. 257.

reconnaissance M-41 tanks to Saudi Arabia. ⁴⁶ She paid for them on November 26, 1955, and was informed that the shipment would take place in mid-February, 1956. This sale was carefully examined to determine that it complied with the Mutual Security Act and pertinent laws and regulations. ⁴⁷ On the evening of February 16, 1956, just before this shipment sailed from New York Harbor, it was decided to suspend all outstanding export licenses for the area in question. While the State Department stated that the suspension was effected to ascertain that such exports conformed with the pertinent laws and United States policy in the Middle East, ⁴⁸ the press thought differently. Mr. Chalmers Roberts, in an article entitled "Brief Ban on Tanks ... Shipment is Laid to Hagerty and Hoover," said that :

" State officials say Hagerty played an influential part in the decision to slap on embargo, and that Hoover gave in. As one of them put it, the administration panicked because of domestic political problems involved in the Israeli request for arms. "⁴⁹

Regarding the same matter, Mr. Walter Lippmann, in his article, stated that : " With nobody at the top in

(46) Under Secretary of State, Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Statement Before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing on **The Situation in the Middle East**, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, February 24, 1956 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1956), p. 7.

(47) *Ibid.*, p. 9.

(48) *Ibid.*, pp. 8, 12.

(49) *Ibid.*, pp. 13, 14.

Washington who can or will take new decisions, our diplomacy is almost everywhere fighting an unattractive rear guard action."⁵⁰ Both writers attributed the suspension of shipping the tanks to Saudi Arabia to the influence of American Jews upon some officials in favor of Israel. Whether they were right or wrong, the suspension of the sale of tanks was effected.

As for the other Middle Eastern states, Israel did not have a great cause for alarm in the spring of 1955, since it had procured more arms abroad than the neighboring Arab States.⁵¹ Egypt, on the other hand, did feel alarmed. With the exception of small arms shipments from East Germany, Egypt had received no arms since the announcement of the Tripartite Declaration. As we have seen, after the Gaza raid on February 28, 1955, Nasser could not delay the issue of obtaining arms for long. This led him to purchase the two destroyers from Britain.⁵² Although in July, the same month, he had reached agreement "in principle" with the United States, according to the press, in fact, no agreement had been reached. The American government still demanded that a military mission was the condition for arms shipment.⁵³

The growing tensions along the Arab-Israeli frontiers, coupled with United States unwillingness to supply

(50) *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.

(51) Statement by Secretary Dulles; *Ibid.*, p. 49.

(52) Wheelock, *op. cit.*, p. 223; Cremeans, *op. cit.*, p. 114.

(53) *Ibid.*, p. 229.

arms on terms acceptable to Egypt, caused Nasser to negotiate with the Soviet Union for arms.⁵⁴ He told Secretary Dulles and Ambassador Byroade that they had forced him to negotiate with the Russians.⁵⁵ On September 27, 1955, President Nasser announced the arms deal between Egypt and Czechoslovakia. To the Arab world, this move was an historic change in Egypt's policy and a master stroke by which Nasser had broken the West's monopoly of arms.⁵⁶ With one move, the Soviet bloc had vaulted the "northern tier" and established a bridgehead at the center of the Middle East. Soviet Russia thus abandoned her policy of supporting first one side then the other in the Arab-Israeli conflict and sided with the Arabs.⁵⁷ Russia's purpose coincided with Nasser's — to undermine the Baghdad Pact and to weaken the West in the area. Moreover, Russia wanted a voice in the future of the Middle East and to win the Arabs to side with her against the West.⁵⁸

Unable to make any decision, United States policy-makers had defaulted to Russian initiative at the beginning, but responded later. Secretary Dulles commented on the Czech arms deal on October 4th, noting that the

(54) Cremeans, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

(55) Quoted in John M. Mackintosh, *Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 123; from Royal Institute of International Affairs, *The Baghdad Pact*, February, 1956, p. 8.

(56) Cremeans, *op. cit.*, p. 146; O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 15.

(57) Chatham House Group, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18.

(58) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

Arab States were free to buy arms wherever they wished. He declared, however, that from the standpoint of Soviet-American relations, " ... such deliveries of arms would not contribute to relaxing tensions, " and added :

"It is difficult to be critical of countries which feeling themselves endangered, seek the arms which they sincerely believe they need for defense. On the other hand, I doubt very much that, under the conditions which prevail in the area, it is possible for any country to get security through an arms race, also it is not easy or pleasant to speculate on the probable motives of the Soviet bloc leaders."⁵⁹

The Secretary of State repeated his August 26, 1955, proposal for a security guaranty under the United States:

"President Eisenhower has authorized me to say that, given a solution of the other related problems, he would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors. I hope that other countries would be willing to join in such a security guaranty, and that it would be sponsored by the United Nations."⁶⁰

(59) *Bulletin*, October 17, 1955, p. 560.

(60) Secretary Dulles, August 26, 1955, Address made before the Council on Foreign Relations, New York City, *Bulletin*, September 5 1955, p. 378.

Since Mr. Dulles did not know the precise character or extent of the Czech arms deal, or whether it might "seriously upset the balance of power" in the Middle East, he could not say whether or not the United States would ship arms to Israel. Meanwhile, he pointed out that it had been American policy "to avoid participating in what might become an arms race," and that he still hoped it would be possible "to avoid getting into that situation."⁶¹

The problem was soon complicated by Soviet promises of extended economic and technical assistance to the area, and the situation became more tense. Secretary Dulles touched upon the matter again on October 18th,⁶² indicating that no "very certain conclusions" could be drawn from the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, which had been based on the broad concept of avoiding both a serious imbalance of powers and an armaments race in the Middle East. Nor could he yet judge the military significance of the Czech arms deal, since the "business of second hand arms" was "very difficult to appraise accurately" and the value of these arms was not always easy to judge.⁶³

On November 15th, in a message read at a rally in New York City, President Eisenhower said that he considered the tensions along the Arab-Israeli boundaries to

(61) *Ibid.*, October 17, 1955, p. 560.

(62) *Ibid.*, October 31, 1955, p. 688.

(63) *Ibid.*, November 28, 1955, p. 894.

be a threat to Middle Eastern peace and thus a threat to world peace. ⁶⁴ However, the Czech arms deal was, in the United States' eyes, the beginning of a Soviet involvement in the Arab Middle East section which could lead to an uncontrolled arms race between the Arabs and Israel and, in turn, jeopardize United States' national interest in the area. The American response to the Russian move came later when Israel appealed for arms from the Western powers in 1956, and when Egypt negotiated with the United States to finance the Aswan Dam project in December, 1955. ⁶⁵

As far as Israel was concerned, the Czech arms deal threatened to upset the balance between the Arab states and herself. To such a possibility, she responded vigorously. On October 118, 1955, Premier and Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett, in a statement of government policy before the Knesset, emphasized " dangers the like of which we have not known since the War of Independence, " ⁶⁶ and described the threat of the widening gap between the military power of the Arab States and Israel, concluding with an appeal for arms for Israel. ⁶⁷ Estimates of the worth of the arms involved in the Czech arms deal range up to \$ 320 million. These arms included approximately one hundred MIG fighters, fifty Ilyushin 28 bombers, 300 tanks, 500 guns of different sorts, two

(64) *Ibid.*

(65) *Situation in the Middle East*, p. 71.

(66) Hurewitz, *op. cit.*, p. 408.

(67) *Ibid.*

destroyers, four minesweepers, twenty motor torpedo boats, and a few other odds and ends, including some radar equipment. ⁶⁸ Whatever the exact amounts involved, they had all been delivered by July, 1955, causing great concern in Israel. According to Prime Minister David Ben Gurion.

“The Czech-Egyptian arms deal transformed Israel’s security position for the worse at one stroke. The quantitative inferiority of our military equipment which had existed ever since the war of independence became a dangerous position of qualitative inferiority as well.”⁶⁹

Israel went shopping for arms. In February, 1956, when the temporary embargo was lifted, the Israeli government stated that the United States authorized the purchase of \$ 100,000 worth of military materials by Israel. In the period from August 17, 1955, until February 18, 1956, the American arms sale to the Arab States and Israel totalled \$ 16 million. ⁷⁰

On March 18, 1956, Mr. Sharett, the Israeli Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, warned that Israel might soon have to launch a preventive war if she did not get arms. In the following month, Mr. Sharett resigned both positions after having failed to obtain more heavy arms

(68) *Ibid.*, p. 412.

(69) David Ben Gurion, *Israel’s Security and Her International Position*, Jerusalem: The Government Year Book, 1959-60), p. 25.

(70) *Situation in the Middle East*, pp. 61-62.

for Israel from the West. " In Israel, a serious political crisis brewed up, centering around Mr. Sharett, the Foreign Minister, who had failed to convince the Western Powers of Israel's need for more heavy arms. He resigned from office. "71

In May, 1956, the United States State Department agreed to advise Canada to sell Israel a small number of jet planes. 72 In the same period, another ten planes were delivered to Israel from the United States off-shore procurement, Mysteres manufactured in a French factory with the consent of the American government. 73 In July, the United States cancelled her offer to finance the Aswan Dam project because of the commitment of additional or large Egyptian resources to Russia for arms. 74 But the pressure inside Israel for " preventive war " mounted, particularly after an impressive display of Soviet arms at the annual July 24th parade in Cairo.

"The Herut Party campaigned in the last election on a line calling for expansion and were returned to

(71) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 237; O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 28.

(72) Beal, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-80. These planes had not been delivered due to Sinai Campaign which led to its cancellation.

(73) Mr. McGuire, June 19, 1956, **Statement on Mutual Security Appropriation for 1957**, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 84th Congress, 2nd Session, June 19, 1956 (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 325-26.

(74) **Foreign Policy**, Hearing before the U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, May 2-12, 1958 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1958), pp. 531-32.

Parliament with more representation than they had before. (Herut, with 15 seats in the 1955 election, is second to Mapai with 40 in the 120-seat Knesset.) They are constantly making threats. ⁷⁵

On August 26, 1956, in a speech to the annual Mapai Congress, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion said that Israel would not undertake a preventive war, but only because forces from "outside the Arab World" might prevent an Israeli victory. ⁷⁶

On October 3, 1956, France agreed to sell Israel 200 half-tracks, 100 Super-Sherman tanks, twenty tank-transporters and 300 6 x 6 trucks which arrived at the end of that month. This deal was negotiated two days earlier in a secret meeting in Paris between the French Chief of Staff, General Elmy, and General Moshe Dayan, then Israel's Chief of Staff. ⁷⁷ The reasons behind this French move are many, but prominent among them are the following :

1. Annoyance over the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the manner in which it took place.
2. Egypt's continued support of the Algerian revolution and the seizure of a Yugoslav ship (Atoa), loaded with arms from Egypt en route to Alge-

(75) George Lenczowski, "Suez and Its Consequences: The Israeli View," *World Today*, April, 1957, p. 155.

(76) *New York Times*, September 22, 1956, p. 1.

(77) Moshe Dayan, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign* (Jerusalem : Steinatzky's Agency, Ltd., 1966), pp. 30-32 and 34.

ria to be delivered to the rebels.

3. France's desire to update its weaponry, which meant disposing of the outdated stock.

On October 29, the Israeli Army invaded Sinai in collusion with Britain and France after a secret treaty signed at Sévres on 23 October, 1956.⁷⁸

(78) Rodinson, Maxime. *Israel & the Arabs*. London : Penguin, 1968, p. 75.

CHAPTER III

THE SUEZ CAMPAIGN AND

ITS AFTERMATH: 1956-1958

On the eve of the Suez Campaign, the United States objected to Arab or Israeli military action and wanted both sides to seek settlements of disputes through the United Nations. Secretary Dulles said in January and February, 1956 :

“I would think that, if it is at all practicable, we would seek action through the United Nations, or at least explore and try to exhaust the possibilities of action in the United Nations, before we took individual or independent action. Whether or not United Nations action would be feasible is, of course, a somewhat difficult question in view of the present attitude of the Soviet Union ... But certainly we would in the first instance consider, I believe, the possibility of action through the United Nations.”¹

“It would seem that Israel’s security could be better

(1) Secretary Dulles, January 24, 1956, Transcript of News Conference, *Bulletin*, February 6, 1956, p. 196.

assured, in the long run, through measures other than the acquisition of additional arms in circumstances which might exacerbate the situation.”²

These other measures include reliance on the United Nations...

Dulles and Eisenhower reaffirmed these views in later months :

“... I emphasized my thought that the United Nations had a very peculiar responsibility toward Israel and the maintenance of peace, because the State of Israel had to an extent been sponsored by the United Nations and the truce and armistice agreements had been sponsored by the United Nations.”³

“... We will do all in our power — through the United Nations whenever possible — to prevent resort to violence there. We are determined to support and assist any nation in that area which might be subjected to aggression. We will strive untiringly to build the foundations for stable peace in the whole region. In these and many other constructive ways, our Nation must help to build an environment congenial to freedom.”⁴

(2) Secretary Dulles, February 24, 1956, Statement made before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, **Bulletin**, March 5, 1956, p. 369.

(3) Secretary Dulles, April 8, 1956, Transcript of News Conference, **Bulletin**, April 16, 1956, pp. 639-40.

(4) President Eisenhower, April 21, 1956, address made before the American Society of Newspaper Editors and broadcast over radio and television, **Bulletin**, April 30, 1956, p. 703.

When reports of an Israeli mobilization reached President Eisenhower, he sent two letters (October 27th and 29th) to Premier Ben-Gurion expressing his anxiety and renewing his recommendation that any forcible initiative on Israel's part would endanger the peace and the growing friendship between the United States and Israel.⁵ The United States cabled to Israel toward the close of America's 1956 Presidential campaign. Gelber suggests : " Did Jerusalem think that the Washington administration would be influenced by their (Americans) quest for Jewish votes ? That was a theory against which, at the request of President Eisenhower, Secretary Dulles may have warned the Israeli Ambassador."⁶

After Israel invaded Sinai on October 29th, with the Anglo-French ultimatum following the next day, the United States took the issue to the Security Council. In a national address, President Eisenhower said :

"... The actions taken can scarcely be reconciled with the principles and purposes of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed. And beyond this, we are forced to doubt even if resort to war will for long serve the permanent interests of the attacking nations ... There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends. In the past the United Na-

(5) Moshe Dayan, *op. cit.*, pp. 71-73.

(6) Gelber, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

tions has proved able to find a way to end bloodshed. We believe it can and will do so again.”⁷

On November 1, at the General Assembly, to which the United States had taken its resolutions after a veto in the Security Council, Secretary Dulles said :

“We speak on a matter of vital importance, where the United States finds itself unable to agree with three nations with whom it has ties ... The United Nations may have been somewhat laggard, somewhat impotent in dealing with many injustices which are inherent in this Middle Eastern Situation.”⁸

The vigorous and determined leadership of the United States became a central factor in the General Assembly's success in stopping the invasion. ⁹ The United States had to support the principle of justice for practical as well as moral reasons. Eisenhower said :

“... We would have, I fear, torn this Charter into shreds and the world would again be a world of anarchy. And all the great hopes that are placed in this organization and in our charter would have vanished, and we would be, as we were when World War II began, with only another tragic failure in

(7) President Eisenhower, October 31, 1956, address delivered to the Nation over radio and television, *Bulletin*, November 12, 1956, pp. 745-46.

(8) *Bulletin*, November 12, 1956, pp. 752-55.

(9) John W. Spanier, *American Foreign Policy Since World War II*, 3rd ed. (New York : Praeger, 1966), p. 127.

place of what we hoped would be — and still can hope will be — a barrier against the recurrence of a world war which, as our preamble says, has ‘twice in our lifetime ... brought untold sorrow to mankind’ ... ”¹⁰

And, in his November 7th letter to Ben-Gurion, Eisenhower expressed his “ deep concern ” at the Israeli government’s refusal to withdraw its army from Egyptian territory.

“It is our belief that as a matter of highest priority peace should be restored and foreign troops, except for United Nations forces, withdrawn from Egypt, after which new and energetic steps should be undertaken within the framework of the United Nations to solve the basic problems which have given rise to the present difficulty. The United States has talked in the General Assembly two resolutions designed to accomplish the latter purposes and hopes that they will be acted upon favorably as soon as the present emergency has been dealt with.” (sic)¹¹

The Soviet Union seconded the United States’ efforts in the United Nations and sent a series of notes to the attacking powers brandishing the implicit threat of using rockets against them. In the face of strong American pressure, Ben-Gurion agreed to withdraw the Israeli army from Sinai. ¹² America’s active opposition to Fran-

(10) *Bulletin*, November 12, 1956, pp. 752-55.

(11) *Ibid.*, November 19, 1956, p. 797.

(12) Spanier, *op. cit.*, pp. 127-28; Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 242-43.

ce, England and Israel sprang from her fear that a direct attack against President Nasser might jeopardize the Western position and interests in the Middle East and give Russia a chance to pose as the sole supporter of the Arab States. ¹³ But, in opposing aggression, even by friends and allies, the United States still viewed Nasser as an obstacle to her policy objectives, to be discredited in all ways. In contrast to its humanitarian assistance to the Hungarian refugees, the United States did not send relief supplies to Port Said victims, refused to release frozen Egyptian dollars, and despite the urgency of Egyptian needs, stopped the CARE program and wheat sale to Egypt in 1956. So the United States erased the good effect of its November stand.

As far as the Arab-Israeli arms race was concerned, Israel's invasion of Egypt led Canada to suspend her agreement to send Israel a squadron of jets with United States' consent. ¹⁴ However, Israel more than made up this loss with the Soviet arms she captured in Sinai. ¹⁵

Israel's assurance of arms supplies from France, prompted a relatively stable competition for arms. Tables

(13) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 243-44; Gelber, *op. cit.*, p. 250.

(14) Beal, *op. cit.*, p. 281.

(15) Rouhollah K. Ramazani, "Soviet Military Assistance to the Uncommitted Countries". *Midwestern Journal of Political Science*, Vol. III, No. 4, (November, 1959), p. 366; Ben-Gurion, *op. cit.*, *Israel: Years of Challenge* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), pp. 122, 123, 127, 130, 141. Although not specific, his statements support these evaluations.

I and II show that Egyptian and Israeli defense expenditures, both as a percentage of the GNP and absolutely, increased sharply in 1957.

TABLE I

Egyptian Defense Expenditure and GNP, 1955-1962 ¹⁶

Year	Defense Expenditures (Fiscal Year Ending June 30)			Defense/ GNP (%)
	MIL (Egypt Pounds)	MIL (\$)	GNP* (est.)	
1955	64	147	—	6.5 (est.)
1956	66	152	—	6.5 (est.)
1957	87	200	1086	8.0
1958	85	194	1188	7.1
1959	84	191	1260	6.7
1960	88	203	1326	6.6
1961	104	239	1384	7.5
1962	120	276	1465	8.6

*million Egyptian pounds.

(16) Table compiled by Lieutenant William Kirby from "official published Egyptian military budgets, and figures supplied by the U. S. Department of State" for Center for International Studies, MIT, **Regional Arms Control**. (Hereafter abbreviated as CIS, then chapter number (ex. III), then page : this reference then is CIS, III, p. 15).

TABLE II

Israeli Defense Expenditure and GNP, 1955-1962¹⁷

Year	Defense Expenditures			Defense/ GNP (%)
	(Fiscal Year Ending March 31)	MIL	MIL	
	(Israel Pounds)	(\$)	(m.I.p.)	
1955	139	75	2148	6.5
1956	191	100	2603	6.9
1957	393	218	3033	13.0
1958	293	163	3466	8.0
1959	324	180	4009	8.0
1960	348	193	4506	7.7
1961	384	213	5323	7.2
1962	443	246	6345	7.0

Although no testimony relating to these defense expenditures is available, the Israeli defense spending can

(17) Table compiled by Kirby from "official Israeli defense budgets. These budgets do not include those portions of expenditures that are classified, portions that vary from year to year." CIS. III, pp. 17, 20. As the compiler notes on page 17, the figures in Tables I and II are based on public sources, and should be regarded as illustrative rather than either complete or wholly precise. The figures for defense expenditures do not include "special" or classified military budgets which can be considerable.

be generally explained. Israel could have rested contentedly with her gains, while Egypt spent considerable sums to cover her losses in the Sinai Campaign. But Israel increased her defense expenditures to keep up with her expansionist designs.

The Suez crisis, the debacle of Britain and France, and the advance of Soviet influence had prompted a change in the United States policy. President Eisenhower proposed his doctrine on the Middle East early in January, 1957. The Congress approved it two months later in March. The joint resolution of Congress, later known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, declared that the United States considered preserving the independence and integrity of Middle Eastern nations vital to world peace and American national interests and security.

"It is now essential that the United States should manifest through joint action of the President and the Congress our determination to assist those nations of the Middle East area which desire that assistance."¹⁸

"Today in the Middle East our acceptance helps to preserve the integrity of one of the most vital regions in the world as well as the independence of

(18) President Eisenhower, January 5, 1957, Request to Congress for Authorization for U.S. Economic Program and for Resolution on Communist Aggression in Middle East, *Bulletin*, January 21, 1957, p. 86.

some of the nations in that area.”¹⁹

“For all these reasons, the United States must do whatever it properly can to assist the nations of the Middle East to maintain their independence.”²⁰

“We all, I know, recognize that the Middle East is a vital part of the free world.”²¹

“The assistance we provide to help friendly nations through critical periods when violent political change, natural disaster or other circumstances threaten both their stability and our own national interest (sic).”²²

(19) President Eisenhower, May 21, 1957, Message Transmitting Mutual Security Program for 1958 to Congress, **Bulletin**, June 10, 1957, p. 921.

(20) Secretary Dulles, January 7, 1957, Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, **Bulletin**, January 28, 1957, p. 127. Also **Economic and Military Cooperations With Nations in the General Area of the Middle East**, Hearings on H. J. Res. 117, U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 85th Congress, 1st Session, January 7, 1957 (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1957), p. 4. (Hereafter referred to as House Hearing on the Eisenhower Doctrine).

(21) **The President's Proposal on the Middle East**, Hearings on S J. Res. 19 and H. J. Res. 117, U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and Armed Services, 85th Congress, 1st Session, January 14, 1957 (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1957), Part I, p. 5. (Hereafter referred to as Senate Hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine), **Bulletin**, February 4, 1957.

(22) President Eisenhower, May 21, 1957, Message Presenting 1958 Mutual Security Program to the Congress, **Bulletin**, June 10, 1957, p. 922.

“Under the resolution’s provisions the U.S. Government continues active pursuit of policies aiding world peace and the security of the United States.”²³

The Doctrine expressed the American fear that the Middle East would pass to the Soviet orbit, thereby materially upsetting the American defense position and effort. Secretary Dulles stated before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, January 7, 1957 : “The vast sacrifices the United States has made for the economic recovery of Europe and military defense of Europe would virtually be nullified if the Middle East fell under the control of international Communism.”²⁴ America’s leaders thought such a change might spring either from direct Soviet military action, or from internal subversion developing out of the social and political instability of the area and its governments. ²⁵ Direct entry of the Soviets into the area, therefore, was to be met by force. According to Section 2 of the Eisenhower Doctrine, the President was authorized to undertake military assistance programs with any nation or group of nations in the Middle East desiring such assistance. Furthermore, the United States was prepared to use American armed forces to help any nation or nations requesting aid against

(23) **Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East**, Message from the President to the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, February 15, 1960, p. 1.

(24) **House Hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine**, p. 4.

(25) **Senate Hearings on the Eisenhower Doctrine**, Part I, pp. 45-50.

armed aggression from any country controlled by international Communism. ²⁶ To combat the indirect Soviet action to gain control of the area, the Doctrine authorized the President to cooperate with and assist any nations or groups of nations in the Middle East desiring such assistance to develop its economy for maintaining its national independence and integrity. ²⁷

The Eisenhower Doctrine, from an Israeli view, directly affected the Arab-Israeli arms race and permitted some Arab states (who were actually not involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict) to get arms from the United States. King Saud of Saudi Arabia was one of the first Arab leaders whom the United States tried to win over. In January, 1957, en route to the United States, King Saud stopped in Cairo and, under pressure from Nasser, signed the Arab Solidarity Agreement with Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The four states agreed to replace the British subsidy to Jordan with an Arab one, if Hussein promised to abrogate his treaty with Britain and not to join the Baghdad Pact. They also affirmed a common opposition to the Eisenhower Doctrine. To the Arabs, the Doctrine offered protection against Communist aggression, which they did not fear, and said nothing about Israel, an enemy whom they did fear. It also opposed the Arabs' attitude toward neutralism and non-alignment. ²⁸ Three

(26) *Ibid.*, pp. 46-57, 192-195 and 287-291.

(27) *Ibid.*, p. 46.

(28) Fayez A. Sayegh (ed.), *The Dynamics of Neutralism in the World* (San Francisco, California : Chandler Publications Company,

weeks after the Arab (or Cairo) Solidarity Agreement, King Saud agreed in Washington to renew the American air base lease in Dhahran for five more years in return for \$50 million in economic and military aid. ²⁹ The King also praised the Eisenhower Doctrine and tried to impress the other Arab rulers with its usefulness and advantages. Back in Cairo again, however, he was rebuffed by Nasser and the Arab Solidarity Agreement ended

1964), pp. 195, 197 and 200; *Senate Hearings on Eisenhower Doctrine, Part I*, pp. 390-94. The Arab leaders, because of the United States very sympathetic support of Israel, wondered if American troops were not really intended to further protect Israel from her Arab neighbors. They also objected to placing American Armed Forces within their respective countries, because this might provoke a similar request from Russia and result in Arab lands being devastated and loss of lives beyond imagination.

The United States policy, then, particularly between 1955-1958, opposed the emerging attitude of positive neutralism in the Arab World, especially in Egypt. For, believing that "He who is not with me is against me" and that, therefore, "Neutrality is immoral," Mr. Dulles came to give unwavering application to the maxim, "I am against those who are not with me," which, translated in practical relations, meant, "No pacts - no aid." Neutralism was attacked by the United States. Mr. Dulles, in a news conference, June 23, 1956, said : " ... I believe that countries which denounce genuine collective security pacts are seeking to promote a somewhat wrong view of neutrality." (Quoted in Sayegh, *op. cit.*, p. 234.) After the "Eisenhower Doctrines" was proclaimed, Mr. Dulles tried to deter or defeat Nasser's positive neutralism, resulting in U.S. failure to recruit allies in the Arab States.

(29) Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 165-66; Cremeans, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-59; *Mutual Security Act of 1959*, pp. 595-96.

without further agreement. ³⁰

The Eisenhower Doctrine was first applied in Jordan, where King Hussein dismissed the pro-Nasser government headed by Prime Minister Suleiman Al-Nabulsi. The dismissal prompted a general strike, massive street demonstrations and riots. Hussein charged, on April 24, 1957, that international Communism was responsible for the efforts to overthrow him. ³¹ At the height of the crisis, President Eisenhower considered the possibility of invoking the Middle East Resolution (Eisenhower Doctrine) if Jordan was attacked. ³² Secretary Dulles told the press :

“... We have great confidence in the regard for King Hussein, because we really believe that he is striving to maintain the independence of his country in the face of very great difficulties and he does not want to see Jordan fall under the domination of other countries which have indicated a desire to work contrary to what the King considers to be best for his country. It is our desire to hold up the land of King Hussein in these matters to the extent that he thinks that we can be helpful.”³³

The next day the Sixth Fleet was ordered to the Eastern Mediterranean with warnings that United States

(30) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

(31) Spanier, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

(32) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 129.

(33) Secretary Dulles, April 23, 1957, News Conference, **Bulletin**, May 13, 1957, p. 768.

paratroops were ready to protect "the integrity and independence" of Jordan against international communism as King Hussein had stated. A few days later Washington awarded Jordan \$10 million to support her army and economy, ³⁴ a grant which affected the Arab-Israeli arms race.

The "Syrian Crisis" of August and September, 1957, provided another avenue through which the Eisenhower Doctrine extended American arms to the Arab states. Since January 10th, the Syrian government had opposed the Eisenhower Doctrine, disputing the view that economic interests gave any power a right to intervene in the Middle East. Meanwhile, events inside Syria were adding to American apprehensions. Newspapers in many countries reported massive deliveries of Soviet aircraft and tanks to Syria, the arrival in force of Soviet officers and technicians, and the establishment of secret desert bases. ³⁵ Evidence for these reports was scant, but they had helped form the climate which led to the Eisenhower Doctrine. In mid-March, the Syrian government awarded a contract for its oil refinery to the Czechoslovak Techno-Export Company. ³⁶

During the latter stages of the Jordanian crisis in the Spring of 1957, events in Syria began moving toward

(34) Spanier, *op. cit.*, p. 130.

(35) Patrick Seale, *The Struggle for Syria* (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 288-89.

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 290.

a climax. By the summer, relations between Syria and the United States had worsened. People and ideas sympathetic to Nasser came into increasing favor and power within Syria. A political crisis put in power an uneasy coalition headed by Khalid al-Azm, which included some Ba'th party leaders and a group of army officers. Khalid Bagdash, the chief of the Syrian-Lebanese Communist party, was said to be very close to the coalition. ³⁷ On August 6th, the Soviet Government agreed to provide large amounts of economic aid and military shipments to Syria to counter America's pressure on the Khalid al-Azm government. A week later, on August 13th, three diplomats of the United States Embassy in Damascus — Lieutenant-Colonel Robert W. Malloy, the military attache, Howard E. Stone, a second secretary, and the vice-consul, Francis Tetton — were declared *personae non gratae* on charges of plotting to overthrow the Syrian regime. ³⁸ This move was closely followed by the retirement of a dozen senior army officers. Also, the Commander-in-Chief, Nizam al-Din, was replaced on August 17th by Brigadier Afif al-Bizri, who was suspected of being a Communist. ³⁹

Washington immediately responded by expelling the Syrian ambassador and sending Loy Henderson, Under-Secretary of State, to a Baghdad Pact meeting at Ankara

(37) *Ibid.*, p. 291.

(38) *Ibid.*, p. 293.

(39) *Ibid.*, pp. 294-95.

where he discussed the Communist gains in Syria with Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey, King Feisal of Iraq, and King Hussein of Jordan.⁴⁰ On his return, Henderson reported the "deep concern" existing in the Middle East lest Syria should become "a victim of international Communism and, as such, become a communist base to further threaten the independence and integrity of the region."⁴¹ It was widely believed in Washington that the Soviet involvement in Syria's affairs would turn it into a Russian Satellite. Allegedly, Henderson said :

"I have talked with Dulles and Eisenhower and they both regarded the situation as serious ... Early this week, the White House and the State Department received a number of cables all expressing concern over developments in Syria..."

"We have analyzed the situation and it is our belief that the present state of affairs in Syria tends toward gradually handing Syria over to Russia in the name of Arab patriotism, progress and neutrality."

"We believe that within a few months of this supposed neutrality, many arms and experts will come from Russia and that Syria will gradually become a

(40) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

(41) Seale, *op. cit.*, p. 296 (from U.S. Department of State, *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents* (Washington : G.P.O., 1957), p. 1037.

(word indistinct) Russian Camp."⁴²

The President thereupon intended to actualize the national policy expressed in the Eisenhower Doctrine. Orders were given for the speed-up of arms deliveries to Jordan (by airlift). Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and for Sixth Fleet to maneuver off the Syrian coast.⁴³ Mobilization of Turkish forces with American officers on Syrian borders created a strong impression in the Arab world that the United States, with the help of Turkey, was out to crush Syria.⁴⁴ It became, then, impossible for the pro-Washington Arab governments to take a public stand supporting this move. Arab states which had received hurried American arms shipments presumably against the Syrian danger now supported Arab solidarity, believing any conflict would benefit no one but Israel.⁴⁵ Thus, the application of the Eisenhower Doctrine in the Syrian crisis succeeded only in supplying arms to some Arab states and failed to combat the so-called "growing communist influence" in Syria.

The setback to the United States helped the new leaders in Damascus to deprive the moderate and right-

(42) *Ibid.*, p. 298. At the trial of Ahmed Mukhtar Baban, a minister in Nuri As-Said Cabinet in Iraq, the President of the Military Court ordered the reading of these quotations as a part of notes said to have been made (in Arabic) by the Chief of Staff, Robig' Arif, when Henderson was addressing the Ankara meeting.

(43) Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 281; Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 249.

(44) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

(45) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-50.

wing politicians of their power or to win them into uneasy coalition. The civilian elements in the ruling group, and the leaders of the Ba'th Party, had their fears about the Communists as a result of the Soviet connection with the autumn crisis. The crisis had strengthened the hands of the latter group, and of Khalid Bagdash, leader of the Syrian Communists.⁴⁶ A series of meetings between President Nasser and the Syrian Ba'thist leaders, who insisted on unifying the two nations lest the Communists take over Syria, created the United Arab Republic on February 1, 1958. Soon after, Nasser had the Syrian Communists ruthlessly suppressed, forcing Khalid Bagdash to flee to Prague.⁴⁷ As a result, in 1957-1958, Russia reduced its arms sales to \$150 million to Egypt and \$110 million to Syria.⁴⁸

In Lebanon, the establishment of the U.A.R. and the great appeal of President Nasser's leadership to a large section of the population, at a time when President Chamoun had welcomed the Eisenhower Doctrine and seemed to be taking the country into the Western camps, increased the pressure to a dangerous point. On May 8, 1958, the internal political struggle under the impact of Nasser's success in neighboring Syria, developed into

(46) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 135; Seale, *op. cit.*, pp. 315-20.

(47) *Ibid.*, pp. 323-24.

(48) Catherine McArdle, *The Role of Military Assistance in the Problem of Arms Control: The Middle East, Latin America, and Africa* (Cambridge, Massachusetts : Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956), p. 31.

violence and civil war, threatening to sweep away the Lebanese government.⁴⁹ On May 13th, President Chamoun told the British, French and American ambassadors that his opponents were receiving arms, money and men from Syria, and propaganda assistance from Egypt. When the disorders produced extensive armed conflict, Chamoun publicly warned that he might call for American armed forces under the Eisenhower Doctrine.⁵⁰ The United States responded on May 14th by ordering the Sixth Fleet to the Lebanese waters, thereby increasing the available marine units in the Mediterranean,⁵¹ and by accelerating a \$1.3 million arms shipment to Lebanon from the excess stocks of Mutual Security Military Program.⁵² She also maintained her offer to send troops if required.

After the coup d'Etat of July 14, 1958 in Iraq, the United States suspended all military aid to all Arab states, except to deliver three small shipments of spare parts en route to Iraq when the revolution occurred. Further training for Iraqi personnel in United States' installations was suspended except for those then in the United States. America had to honor the moral commit-

(49) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 250-51.

(50) Cremeans, *op. cit.*, pp. 163-64.

(51) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

(52) **U.S. Foreign Administration and Assistance From International Organizations : July 1, 1945-June 30, 1960.** International Cooperation Administration, Office of Statistics and Reports, p. 49. (Henceforth ICA.)

ments already made to "traditional governments" of such pro-Western Arab states in which the United States had oil interests (Saudi Arabia) or oil pipe-lines (Lebanon). After the coup, Iraq never formally asked the United States to resume military aid.⁵³ The United States noted the political repercussions of the Iraqi revolution, because she regarded it "... as vital to the national interest and world peace, the preservation of the independence and integrity of the nations of the Middle East"⁵⁴ for which "... under the resolution's provisions (Eisenhower Doctrine,) the U.S. Government ... pursued policies aiding ... the security of the United States."⁵⁵

The Iraqi revolution also affected her neighbors, as well as the United States. Under this impact, the Lebanese government could not contain the spreading disorders in its country. Convinced that the coup in Iraq was part of a Nasserite-Soviet plot which might engulf Lebanon, President Chamoun invoked the Eisenhower Doctrine and asked for military support.⁵⁶ The United States could not seriously maintain that Communist sub-

(53) **Mutual Security Act of 1959**, Hearings before U.S. 86th Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations, 1st Session, Part I, May 14, 1959, p. 594. (Henceforth MSA of 1959).

(54) President Eisenhower, July 15, 1958, Message to Congress, **Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Security in the Middle East**, U.S. 86th Congressional House Committee on Foreign Affairs, February 15, 1960 (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1960), p. 2.

(55) *Ibid.*, p. 1.

(56) *Ibid.*

version caused the coup in Iraq.⁵⁷ Believing it another Nasserite coup, it responded to the Lebanese government's request by landing 14,000 Marines in Lebanon on July 15th.⁵⁸ Jordan also felt the repercussions of the fall of the Western-oriented Iraqi government that was previously tied to her in the "Arab Union," the Hashemite reply to Nasser's United Arab Republic. Thus, the British troops landed in Jordan to help her maintain her internal security. Subsequently, the American Department of Defense, on request of the Jordanian Government,⁵⁹ sold Jordan \$8.2 million of arms shipments.⁶⁰ Apart from the United States moral commitment to Jordan, Russian influence challenged America's interest in the Arab world. Therefore, America's support of King Hussein meant that as Britain lost her prestige after the Suez Campaign (1956), the West's position in that area depended not on Britain but on the United States. The Eisenhower Doctrine — as the Truman Doctrine had in the Balkans (1947) — made the United States again Britain's heir ; as happened a decade earlier, when the United States was called in to shore up Greece and Turkey against Soviet pressure, the United States found herself, by 1957, the sole champion of Western interests in much of the Arab world. Since then, the Eisenhower Doctrine put the United States in the role of a committ-

(57) Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

(58) Spanier, *op. cit.*, p. 130; Joint Resolution, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

(59) MSA of 1959, *op. cit.*, p. 595.

(60) ICA, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

ed active participant in Middle Eastern affairs.

Because of her Sinai victory, France's assurance of arms supplies,⁶¹ and the deterioration of Russo-Egyptian relations, Israel, in 1958-59, enjoyed a "greater sense of security."⁶² Thus, despite complaints from pro-Israelis against military assistance to the Arab states,⁶³ America still gave no arms to Israel between 1957-58.⁶⁴ Even though Israel had approved the Eisenhower Doctrine in 1957, the United States did not send her arms because, in the State Department's view, she was "quite substantially armed and not in danger."⁶⁵ Admiral Arthur W. Radford, Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, affirmed this view, stating that "Israel had pretty good military capabilities ... Militarily, Israel is stronger than any of her neighbors ... That is our estimate."⁶⁶ Moreover, the United States could not be a major supplier of large-scale military equipment, for fear of jeopardizing her position in many parts of the Arab World. Thus, American supply to Israel has been confined to small-scale ship-

(61) *Review of Foreign Policy, 1958*, Hearings before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, Part 2, May 9, 1958 (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1958), p. 581.

(62) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

(63) Stated by Senator Morse, May 14, 1959, *MSA of 1959*, p. 626.

(64) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

(65) Secretary Dulles, September 11, 1957, Statement at press conference, *Bulletin*, September 30, 1947, p. 527; quoted in Campbell, *ibid.*

(66) *Senate Hearings on Eisenhower Doctrine, Part I*, January 30, 1947, pp. 437-38.

ments and deals through third parties.⁶⁷

However, America's economic aid and contributions made by American citizens to Israel indirectly increased the Israeli defense expenditure. Between 1957-58, the United States government gave Israel \$127.5 million as economic aid compared with \$301.9 million in the same period to all the Arab states.⁶⁸ Also, Americans contributed privately to organizations providing money to Israel, a country to which donations are tax exempt.⁶⁹ Assistant Secretary Rountree asserted : "United States' assistance has played its role in fostering the economic and human development of that country (Israel)."⁷⁰ Mr. Leland Barrows added that United States economic assistance :

"... has been of unquestioned value to Israel in the rehabilitation and development of its economy. Such

(67) Campbell, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

(68) International Cooperation Administration, **U.S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance From International Organizations : Obligations and Other Commitments**, July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1960. (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1961), pp. 42-48; see also Table III, p. 85 of this work.

(69) In answering a question asked by Senator J. W. Fulbright as to whether private contribution made by American citizens to countries other than Israel are tax exempt, Assistant Secretary Rountree said : " Not to other countries, " **MSA of 1959**, May 14, 1959, pp. 625-26.

(70) Assistant Secretary Rountree, May 8, 1958, Statement before U.S. Committee on Foreign Relations, **Review on Foreign Policy**, 1958, p. 526.

aid has enabled the purchase of supplies and equipment for development purposes, and of consumption imports which Israel could not otherwise have afforded... U.S. aid has been of material assistance."⁷¹

Again Rountree added :

"Private contributions are ... a factor that is extremely important in Israel, and are of particular significance there because of the special complexities of the Israeli economic requirements and the reasons for those requirements."⁷²

This aid and these contributions so strengthened the Israeli economy that, between 1957-58, she increased her defense expenditure. As Assistant Secretary Rountree stated :

"... the present economy, which is a dynamic economy providing a substantial GNP is nevertheless an economy which at the moment is sustained and being expanded by virtue of substantial foreign aid in the form of U.S. governmental loans and grants, private contributions of American citizens and people of other countries, both grants and bonds, German reparations, and so forth, so that anything expended for military purposes would probably reflect at least

(71) Mr. Leland Barrows, Regional Director, Office of Near East and South Asia Operations, International Cooperation Administrations, Statement before Senate Committee on Appropriations, August 12, 1959, *Mutual Security Appropriations for 1960*, p. 355.

(72) Mr. Rountree, *MSA of 1959*, p. 624.

some degree of reliance upon external assistance directly or indirectly for that purposes.”⁷³

This is influenced by the fact that “... the preservation of the State of Israel is one of the essential goals of the United States foreign policy.”⁷⁴

The United States' policy between 1956 and 1958 failed to contain President Nasser's influence in the Arab states and to create a loose pro-Western Arab bloc to counter the Cairo-Moscow axis. The United States had, however, created an obvious harmony with Israel. As a result, America's stand in the Suez campaign became a questionable one once she had sided with Israel and, meanwhile, the Soviet influence appeared to increase in the Arab states.

(73) This statement was in answer to a question of Senator Morse about whether “Israel is a country that is supporting a military establishment somewhat beyond the present ability of her economy to support?”, *MSA of 1959*, p. 623. Israel entered into the mutual defense assistance agreement with the United States on July 1, 1952.

(74) Secretary Dulles, February 24, 1956, Hearing before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Situations in the Middle East* (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1956), p. 25.

CHAPTER IV

THE POLICY OF DISENGAGEMENT : 1958-1962

By 1958, the United States had become convinced that containing Communism in the Middle East required a neutral approach toward the Arab states and Israel, favoring neither but supporting the integrity of both and avoiding an imbalance in the Arab-Israeli arms race. The new approach included the recognition of President Nasser as the dominant Arab leader; the maintenance of non-Communist Egypt as a buffer against the spread of Soviet influence in Africa ; and the continuance of America's friendship with, and protection of, Israel.¹ This policy was affected by the events which took place in the Middle East late in the 'fifties and in the beginning of the 'sixties and by the implications of these events for the United States and the U.S.S.R., as far as the Arab-Israeli arms race was concerned.

With the formation of the United Arab Republic of Egypt and Syria on February 1, 1958, the Soviet Union began to run into policy conflicts with President Nasser

(1) Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 118-119.

which also affected the arms sale. The U.A.R. was not formed with Israel in mind, but primarily to prevent the Syrian Communists from taking over Syria.² When Egypt and Syria united, the Syrian Communist Party condemned the unification in December, 1958, turning its propaganda against President Nasser.³ By mid-December, the Cairo weekly, *Akhbar al-Yawm*, accused the Iraqi Communists for the first time of attacking Arab unity and the U.A.R. And, in response to the Syrian Communist leader, Khalid Bakdash, and his public criticism of the U.A.R., Radio Damascus attacked Communist tactics.⁴ President Nasser had the Syrian Communists ruthlessly suppressed and responded heatedly in a speech at Port Said on December 23rd, saying that :

“The Communist Party knew that Arab nationalism would destroy opportunism; so reactionaries and the Communist Party declared themselves against Arab nationalism and Arab union...”

“During these last days, since the creation of the U.A.R., I have proclaimed that the nation must constitute a National Union. We must unite our efforts

(2) Seale, *op. cit.*, pp. 323-324.

(3) *United States Foreign Policy : Middle East*, U.S. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, Pursuant to S. Res. 336, 85th Congress, and S. Res. 31 and S. Res. 250, 86th Congress, No. 13, June 9, 1960 (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1960), p. 22. (Henceforth USFP.)

(4) George E. Kirk, *Contemporary Arab Politics* (New York : Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), p. 151.

so as to destroy Zionism and crush imperialism. We shall not be able to struggle against Zionism or against imperialism if we are struggling against ourselves. But the Syrian Communist Party refused that ... Still more, it has rejected Arab nationalism and Arab union. Some of its members last week preached in favor of separation and rejected any union of the Arab nation. That is what Zionism preaches.”⁵

One month later, Khrushchev attacked Nasser’s anti-Communism position before the Twenty-first Communist Party Congress.⁶

Russia’s and Nasser’s interests began to diverge. The Soviets had been willing to support Nasser’s efforts to extend his influence over Syria, Jordan and Iraq, even if this meant sacrificing the local Communists, in order to abolish Western power in the Middle East. But once the Kassem regime in Iraq proved that it could serve the same purpose but with the help of the Communists, the Soviets had every reason to favor Kassem over Nasser.⁷ In March, 1959, Khrushchev accused Nasser of imperialist ambitions in Iraq and of adopting the anti-Communist tactics of the imperialist: “The President of the U.A.R. has rather gone off the handle. He is still young for his position, he’s impulsive. He wants to take upon

(5) *Ibid.*, p. 152.

(6) *USFP*, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

(7) *Safran*, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

himself more than he can carry.”⁸ To this, Nasser replied on April 17th, in an interview with the editor of the Indian magazine, **Blitz** :

“The Arab Communists have sold themselves to foreign influence and forfeited their standing as Arabs. They are tools in the hands of Russia and that country’s agents in Iraq, Syria, and all parts of the Arab world. That is why we cannot trust them as Arabs. Because of their behavior in Iraq and Syria we can wait no longer. I did all I could to convince them, but they decided to turn against their fatherland. It was therefore my duty to draw my fellow-citizens’ attention to this new danger and arouse them against this threat. As for us Arab nationalists we have no ally either in the Communist or in the imperialist camp. Similarly, the arms we possess are neither those of the Communists nor of the imperialists. That is why I turned to my people. My people is my army and my strength, and the armor of my faith...”

“The stand I took against the Iraqi Communists was an Arab matter and had nothing to do with the Russians; but Khrushchhev ... accused me of using the language of the imperialists ... I had therefore no other course than to tell the Russians that we did not like this kind of imperialism ... Russia lost in less than three weeks all the good reputé she had

(8) USFP. *op. cit.*, p. 22; Kirk, *op. cit.*, pp. 157-58.

gained among us in three years.. ”

“Until quite recently Khrushchev supported us. For every move on his part in favor of the Arabs, we have been grateful ten times over. But for every blow that he levels against us, we will give him ten in return. The Communists and the imperialists must understand that we are the masters in our own country and that... neither Eisenhower nor Khrushchev has the right to behave in this way in our country.”⁹

The Egyptian-Soviet dispute was accompanied by another one between the U.A.R. and Communist China over an official reception given in Peking, for the Syrian Communist leader Khalid Bakdash, who publicly attacked President Nasser on September 28, 1959.¹⁰ With Nasser's rejection of the Soviet offer to protect the U.A.R. borders in case of attack¹¹ and the withdrawal of U.A.R. students from the Soviet bloc countries, the honeymoon between the Soviets and the Middle East was almost over.¹²

The Russo-Egyptian rift led to considerable strain, which was partly reflected in Soviet arms sales. Whereas in 1957-1958 the U.S.S.R. sold Egypt \$150 million worth

(9) Kirk, *op. cit.*, 150-160.

(10) USFP, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

(11) *Ibid.*, p. 23, note (1) quoted from *New York Times*, March 28, 1960, pp. 1, 7.

(12) Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

of arms and Syria \$110 million, in 1959-1960, she sold both only \$110 million worth of arms combined.¹³ However, it is doubtful that Nasser would have ordered more immediately if he could have obtained more arms from Russia. That Russia was selling Egyptian cotton in Europe at a discount, thereby displacing direct sales by Egypt, was an unpleasant discovery for Egypt.¹⁴ Moreover, Syria was a continuous headache that took up a great deal of Nasser's time. He also was introducing measures of socialism, culminating in the nationalization decrees in Egypt during the summer of 1961.¹⁵

The United States responded to the Russo-Egyptian rift and renewed interest in the Western alternative by becoming more reconciled to seeing the Arabs as neutral. Having adopted a policy of maintaining friendly relations with them, the United States approached them economically so as to prevent them from being highly dependent on Moscow and to keep the door open for a more positive association.¹⁶ Besides her economic approach to the area, the United States sought to prevent an imbalance in the Middle Eastern arms race.¹⁷

As Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot stated :

(13) McArdle, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

(14) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 171.

(15) Malcolm Kerr, "The Emergence of a Socialist Ideology in Egypt," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Spring, 1962), pp. 127-144.

(16) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 254-55.

(17) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 116.

"We do have the problem of meeting the interests and demands often, of our allies, and also of the nonalliance countries, in maintaining a balance which is most effective and useful for the health of the region and therefore for our own national interest. And so we are attempting in this area to resist Soviet encroachments, to build up the viability of these countries, and to help with modernization of them, and to ameliorate the area disputes."

"In this area we have a variety of instruments of foreign policy. And of these instruments, the economic and military assistance which we give to these countries constitutes one of the most important."¹⁸

However, in 1959, the United States agreed to the British arms sale to Kassem's regime.¹⁹ In response to the Soviet arms sold to Iraq in the same period, the United States furnished arms to Kassem on grant and sale basis²⁰ in an effort to "... salvage some shred of influence in Baghdad,"²¹ and to make it impossible for the Soviet bloc to achieve noticeable new gains in Iraq as well as the rest of the Middle East.²² Also, because of

(18) **Foreign Assistance Act of 1962**, Hearings before U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, April 5, 9 10, 11, 12, 13 and 18, 1962 (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1962), p. 174. (Henceforth FAA of 1962).

(19) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

(20) **MSA of 1959**, pp. 202-06 and 207.

(21) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

(22) **FAA of 1962**, p. 168.

Saudi Arabia's strategic importance to the United States and its oil resources,²³ the United States extended its training activities to Saudi Arabia under the provisions of the grant-aid agreement signed in 1957 and provided it with limited military assistance over this period.²⁴ In 1962, the United States also aided both Lebanon and Jordan militarily, to maintain their existing "friendly governments."²⁵

Given the perilous state of inter-Arab relations, the poor state of Russo-Egyptian relations, and Nasser's preoccupation with internal matters, Israel enjoyed a "greater sense of security"²⁶ in the late 'fifties and "... could afford to remain relatively passive while the future of the area around her was being contested."²⁷ In 1959, she continued an extensive costly military program to keep her bulwark strong against possible attack from her neighbors.²⁸ Nevertheless, the United States cut off her arms sale to Israel, except when it was needed to balance a breakthrough by the United Arab Republic.²⁹ In 1959 and 1960, the United States government also reduced her economic assistance.³⁰ This affected the

(23) FAA of 1962, Part I, March 14-16 and 19, 1962, p. 160.

(24) MSA of 1959, pp. 595-96.

(25) FAA of 1962, p. 160.

(26) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

(27) *Ibid.*, p. 256; Ben-Gurion, *Israel's Security*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

(28) MSA of 1959, p. 626.

(29) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

(30) MSA of 1959, pp. 590-622.

Israeli defense spending shown in Table II.³¹ It did this to improve Israeli per capita income, believing that more use would be made of non-United States government sources in the form of loans, gifts, German reparations, German restitutions, and Israel's export earnings.³² Table III shows that, until 1960, United States governmental economic aid to Israel amounted to \$708.1 million compared to \$1087.9 million for all of the Arab States.

In 1960, it became known that the United States had previously helped Israel develop a small five-megawatt atomic reactor at Nachal Sorek near Tel Aviv.³³ In the same year, Washington was deeply concerned by Israel's construction of a large French-sponsored twenty-four-megawatt reactor at Dimona in the Negev.³⁴ America's apprehension that Israel, with the help of France, would develop the atomic bomb, was eased by Ben-Gurion's assurance that the reactor was "directed exclusively toward peaceful purposes."³⁵ Despite Israel's refusal to put her reactor under International Atomic Energy inspection,³⁶ the United States resumed the sale of arms to her again and increased economic support. According to

(31) *Ibid.*, p. 626 and Table II.

(32) Stevens, *op. cit.*, pp. 590-625.

(33) Leonard Beaton and John Madox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons*, pp. 170-171; Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

(34) *Ibid.*

(35) *NYT*, December, 1960, pp. 1 and 8; December 20, 1960, pp. 1 and 15; December 22, 1960, p. 5; January 12, 1961, p. 4. See p. 100.

(36) *Ibid.*, December 23, 1960, p. 18; December 26, 1960, p. 2; April 19, 1964, p. 5.

TABLE III

U. S. Economic Assistance to Israel and the Arab States : 1946-1960

(Millions of Dollars)

Country	1946-1949	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960 Total
Iraq	0.9	—	—	—	0.5	2.1	2.2	2.9	3.0	4.0	3.1	1.6	19.2
Israel	—	100.0	—	35.1	86.4	73.6	74.7	53.0	51.0	40.4	87.1	52.7	708.1
Jordan	—	—	—	0.1	5.1	2.9	12.9	8.9	8.1	22.1	37.1	64.8	213.3
Lebanon	1.6	—	—	0.1	1.7	3.0	8.8	7.7	7.7	12.1	13.0	19.9	77.4
Saudi Arabia	14.3	—	—	4.9	0.3	1.7	0.9	0.3	—	—	25.0	—	46.6
United Arab Republic	18.1	—	0.2	0.1	1.6	12.9	4.3	66.3	33.4	1.2	0.8	51.9	107.4
Yemen	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5.1	11.3
Libya	—	—	—	0.2	1.6	1.4	3.0	13.5	15.2	25.4	28.9	28.7	151.1
Morocco	—	—	—	—	0.3	—	0.3	0.1	0.3	25.8	34.5	48.3	194.7
Sudan	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	0.4	30.8	44.1
Tunisia	—	—	—	—	0.2	—	0.1	0.1	0.1	17.3	27.2	33.4	135.2
Syria	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

Sources : International Cooperation Administration, U. S. Foreign Assistance and Assistance from International Organizations : Obligations and Other Commitments, July 1, 1945 through June 30, 1960 (Washington, D.C. : 1961), pp. 46-49, 52-55, 87, 88, and 91.

Professor Nadav Safran, after the Sinai War, the United States was committed morally to defend Israel's security and integrity.³⁷ In 1962, it supplied Israel with arms "sold far below cost"³⁸ as "an indirect military subsidy."³⁹ Moreover, it provided a "very large"⁴⁰ amount of economic assistance to Israel "which made it possible for Israel to purchase military equipment."⁴¹ Of this United States economic assistance to Israel, \$84 million was in governmental loans and grants and \$200 million was in gifts during the year 1961 and 1962. Thus, United States Government economic aid to Israel from 1948 to 1962 totaled \$487 million from Israeli bonds sales, \$792 million in government loans and grants and about \$620 million in tax-deductible private contributions.⁴²

(37) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

(38) Statement of Deputy Assistant Secretary, Mr. Zablocki, March 14, 1962, **Hearings on Foreign Assistance Act of 1962**, U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, Act of 1962, March 14, 15, 16 and 19, 1962 (Washington, D.C. : U.S.G.P.O., 1962), p. 164.

(39) *Ibid.* This treatment was not only for Israel but also for India in the same period.

(40) Statement of Howard R. Cottem, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, *ibid.*

(41) Mr. Zablocki, *ibid.*, p. 163.

(42) Statement of Mr. Gaud, **Hearings on Foreign Assistance Act of 1962**, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 87th Congress, 2nd Session, April 2, 18, 1962 (Washington, D.C. : G.P.O., 1962), pp. 180-185.

CHAPTER V

THE MILITARY BALANCE AND THE MISSILE-NUCLEAR RACE : THE UNITED STATES POSITION SINCE 1962

Influenced by military-strategic considerations since the beginning of the 'sixties, the Arab-Israeli arms race entered a dramatic phase which has had its implications for the general Arab-Israeli military balance as well as for United States policy. The figures in Tables IV and V indicate that Egypt had more to spend in absolute terms on armaments, while Israel has had to increase her defense spending by much higher percentages than Egypt each year just to keep in the race.

This forced Israel to delay or eliminate many development projects.¹ On a per capita basis, Israel surpassed Egypt, having an estimated per capita income in 1964 of \$700 compared to \$120 in Egypt² Israel insisted on maintaining a much higher per capita level of income than that of Egypt and had a smaller tax base. Moreover, Egypt received more foreign currency (perhaps rubles) to pay for her armaments. For Israel, the posi-

(1) Yigal Allon, "Arab-Israeli Conflict — Some suggested Solutions," *International Affairs*, April, 1964, Vol. 40, 212.

(2) *Ibid.*

TABLE IV***Egyptian Defense Expenditures and GNP, 1962-1965³**

(Year Ending January 30)				
Year	L.E. Mil.	\$Mil.	GNP	Def./GNP
1962	120	276	1465	8.6
1963	138	317	—	8.8 (est.)
1964	153 (est.)	351		
1965	172 (est.)			

*All figures above only estimate the amount to be spent in the ensuing fiscal year.

(3) Figures for 1962 and 1963 are from CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, p. 20; figures for 1964 and 1965 are calculated from official budgets published in *Statistical Abstract of Israel*, 1964, p. 469.

TABLE V***Israeli Defense Expenditures and GNP, 1962-1964⁴**

(Year ending March 31)				
Year	L.I. Mil.	\$Mil.	GNP	Def./GNP
1962	443	246	6345	7.0
1963	580	193	6998	8.2
1964	565	188		
1965	700	233		

*All figures above only estimate the amount to be spent in the ensuing fiscal year.

(4) Figures for 1962 and 1963 are from CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, p. 15; figures for 1964 and 1965 are from Simba Flapan, "Development vs. Militarism in Egypt," *New Outlook*, Vol. 7, No. 6, July-August, 1964, p. 6 (an Israeli publication).

tion differed. Mrs. Golda Meir mentioned that, since 1963, Israel has complained of the increasingly large sums she has had to pay just to cover the increased prices of armaments.⁵ According to the 1964-65 Israel Government Yearbook :

"Israel ... bears unaided the heavy load of defense expenditure and pays in full, at steeply-climbing prices, for what she can buy, whereas the Arab States, and notably Egypt, get first-rate armaments and material on infinitely easier terms. Israel's defense bill is much costlier than theirs, enjoying as they do, as well, a sevenfold (sic) advantage in area, manpower, and natural resources."⁶

But, as Table VI shows, the Arab states annually spent roughly five times as much as Israel on defense.

Tanks

In terms of tanks available to both sides, a United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency study stated that Egypt, until the spring of 1964, had "... over 1,000 pieces of armor composed mainly of Soviet T-34 and T-54 medium tanks and the JS-111 heavy tanks."⁷ Israel had

"... more than 600 pieces of armor including a few renovated and locally improved Sherman tanks,

(5) NYT, March 6, 1964, p. 19.

(6) Israel Government Yearbook, 1964-65, p. 83.

(7) CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, p. 17.

Defense Expenditure : Arab Staes and Israel⁸

Country	Year	GNP (\$MIL.)	Defense (\$MIL.)	Def./GNP (Per Cent)	Armed Forces	Total	
						Forces Deployment	Force for Employment
Egypt	1962	\$3,370	\$317m	8.6	100,000 active 60,000 reserve	110,000	45,000
Syria	1962	620	79	12.7	70,000	40,000	25,000
Iraq	1961	1,464	126	8.6	70,000	30,000	12,000
Jordan	1962	330	75	22.8	40,000 regular 40,000 nat. grd.	25,000	15,000
Arabia	1963	590*	295(?)	50.0(?)	65,000(?)	10,000	7,000
Lebanon	1962	598	21	3.4	10,000	2,000	1,000
Kuwait	1964	741	34	4.5	3,000	—	—
TOTALS		7,713	947	12.2	458,000	217,000	105,000
Israel	1963	2,333	193	8.2	70,000 standing 200,000 reserve	200,000	100,000

*Total Government Expenditure.

French AMX tanks, and a few dozen British Centurions. The armored corps is due for renovation : Israeli missions are currently shopping for the latest and best models now in testing or preparation in NATO countries.”⁹

Israel succeeded in getting sixty United States-made M-48 tanks from Germany but, in February 1965, as a result of pressure from Cairo, Chancellor Erhardt cut off all military and naval aid to Israel, leaving 150 M-48's bound for Israel stranded on the docks at Southampton.¹⁰ In 1966, she also received some new American-built Patton medium tanks, utilizing a 90-mm gun.¹¹ Table VII estimates the armor level in the spring of 1966.

TABLE VII
Egyptian and Israeli Tanks, Spring, 1966¹²

Weapon	Egypt	Type	Israel
T-54	300	M-48	60
T-34	400	Centurions	32
JS-III, others	600	AMX, Sherman, etc.	568
Totals	1,300		660

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 22.

(10) NYT, February 27, 1965, p. 3; *Der Spiegel*, No. 9, February 28, 1965, p. 29.

(11) NYT, April 27, 1966, p. 10.

(12) Figures assembled from Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance, 1964-65*, November, 1964, pp. 32, 34; (hereafter ISS); NYT, March 16, 1965, p. 12; *Der Spiegel*, *loc. cit.*

Since the T-54 compared with the best American medium tank, the M-60, and was superior to the M-48,¹³ and, since Egyptian tanks generally outnumbered those of Israel by 2 to 1, Egypt maintained a marked superiority in this area. Israel had placed a "... more powerful engine, wider treads, and a French turret assembly..." in her old Sherman Tanks.¹⁴ But this hardly seemed adequate to meet the Egyptians' power.

Navies

Egypt seemed to have forty PT boats, fourteen minesweepers, eight Komar-class rocket torpedo boats, seven or eight destroyers, and ten or eleven Soviet W-class submarines.¹⁵ According to the United States arms control study in 1964 :

"In terms of equipment the Israeli navy is inferior to the Egyptian, being comprised of only two former British destroyers, one frigate, and two old submarines in addition to a number of motor torpedo boats and coast vessels. In view of the crucial importance of Israeli sea connections with the outside

(13) NYT, March 16, 1965, p. 12.

(14) NYT, May 7, 1965, p. 6; NYT, April 26, 1966, p. 10.

(15) ISS, *op. cit.*, p. 35; CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, p. 17; NYT, March 16, 1965, p. 12.

world it is safe to predict substantial acquisitions of naval equipment in the near future."¹⁶

Nothing implied that Israel's naval inferiority had changed.¹⁷

Missiles

Until 1965, Egypt had eight Komar rocket-firing torpedo boats,¹⁸ an indeterminate number of air-to-air infra-red equipped missiles and air-to-ground missiles (fifty-to-one hundred-mile range), ten batteries of SA-II Soviet-built ground-to-air missiles placed around Cairo, Aswan, and the Suez Canal, and about 250 ground-to-ground "Egyptian" missiles.¹⁹ The Israelis seemed to have only one battalion (eighteen missiles) of Hawks, brought from the United States in 1962 and 1964.²⁰ Generally, as I will explain later, it seemed Egypt had the advantage as far as missiles were concerned.

(16) CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, p. 22.

(17) Spiegel, *op. cit.*, p. 29; NYT, April 26, 1966, p. 10.

(18) CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, p. 17; NYT, March 16, 1965, p. 12.

(19) CIS, *ibid.* ; NYT, *ibid.* ; ISS, pp. 34-35.

(20) FAA of 1963, *op. cit.*, Part III, p. 398, FAA of 1964, Part IV, *op. cit.*, pp. 618-619; NYT, September 27, 1962, p. 1; NYT, May 7, 1965, p. 6; April 26, 1966, p. 10; ISS, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

Air Forces

By the spring of 1964, Egypt had "350-400 aircraft," mostly MG-21 fighters, and "two squadrons of bombers equipped with II-28 light bombers."²¹ At the same time, the Israeli Air Force was supposed to have several hundred aircraft, mainly the French Mystere, Super-Mystere, Mirage, and Vautour fighter bombers, considered to be more than a match for the MIG-16, MIG-19, MIG-21, and IL-28 held by Egypt.²² Table VIII roughly outlines the air power situation in the spring of 1965. With the Dasseau Organ's low speed, the fighter levels of the two countries were roughly equal, although Egypt had a few more bombers than Israel. It was reported in December, 1964, that Moscow had agreed to supply Egypt with additional MIG-21's, the new all-weather MIG-23's, and the TU-16's armed with 50-100 mile range air-to-ground missiles. In March, 1965, Israel said they were being sent.²³ At the beginning of 1966, Israel purchased the new French Super Frelon helicopters to be used for carrying stretcher cases or soldiers and their equipment.²⁴ From

(21) CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, p. 17.

(23) NYT, December 27, 1964, p. 20, March 3, 1965, p. 3 March

(25) NYT, December 27, 1964, p. 20, March 3, 1965, p. 3, March 16, 1965, p. 12.

this comparison, we may conclude that Israel fell below Egypt in quantitative arms levels.

When one considered the overall arms balance between Israel and her neighboring Arab states, the picture becomes even gloomier for Israel. Table IX shows the Arab states surpassed Israel in arms. The table does not include what Saudi Arabia was negotiating to buy from the United States, France and Britain : \$100 million to \$200 million worth of supersonic airplanes, aircraft missiles, and radar and communications equipment, in March, 1966.²⁵ Moreover, according to the *New York Times*, the United States announced in December 23, 1966 the shipping of thirty-six F-104 Starfighter jets to Jordan which the United States agreed to sell to the latter in the spring of 1966. These were promised after an Israeli attack on a Jordanian village, "... to strengthen the defensive capability of the Jordan armed forces."²⁶

(26) *NYT*, April 26, 1966, p. 10.

(25) Foreign Assistance Act of 1965, Hearings before U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Congress, 1st Session, Part IV, March 9, 11, 12 and 15, 1965, p. 652; *NYT*, February 27, April 13, 28, 1965; *FAA of 1966*, Hearings before U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Congress, Part V, March 16-19, 1965, pp. 731-32.

(26) *NYT*, November 27, 1966, p. 1; December 23, 1966, pp. 1 and 5, *Newsweek*, December 12, 1966, p. 61.

TABLE VIII

Egyptian and Israeli Air Forces, Spring, 1965²⁷

Aircraft	Type	Egypt	Type	Israel
Fighters	MIG-21	50	Mirage III	96
	MIG-19	110	Super-Mystere	24
	MIG-17	150*	Mystere	60
	(Operational 17's	75)	Dasseau Organ	85
OPERATIONAL TOTAL		235		265
Bombers	TU-16	25	Fiaton Vautour	25
	IL-28	75	Foga Magistere	60
			Glou. Meteor	10
OPERATIONAL TOTAL		100		75

*According to the estimate of the Institute for Strategic Studies, only half of the original 150 operational were utilized, while the other half were used for spare parts, or crashed.²⁸

(27) The figures assembled from CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch., III, pp. 17. 22; ISS, *op. cit.*, pp. 32, 34.

(28) ISS, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

TABLE IX

**Overall Arms Levels, Arab States
and Israel, Spring, 1965²⁹**

Country	Armor			Planes				Total
	T-54	T-34	Other	Total	Fighters	Bombers	Others	
Egypt	300	400	600	1,300	235	100	65	400
Syria		300	100	400	60	25	some	100
Iraq		200	100	300	150	25	25	200
Jordan			150	150	50			c50
Arabs	1,200		950	2,150	c500	150	100	750
Israel				600	265	75	110	450

Besides having to contend with highly vulnerable borders, Israel had to face a large population disadvantage. The neighboring Arab states outnumbered her by a ratio of 25 to 1. But the question might well be asked if one could add up the armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Saudi Arabia and treat them as a unit. The Arab States' reluctance to rely on their manpower advantage has arisen from numerous sociological and historical factors.

(29) Table from previous tables, CIS, *op. cit.*, Ch. III, pp. 12, 22, 30, 31, 33; and NYT, March 16, 1965.

Having little success in forming efficient national armies, for years the Arab states could not even achieve any meaningful inter-Arab military cooperation. According to an article in the February, 1957 issue of the **Egyptian Economic and Political Review**.

“A major lesson of the Palestine War was the danger of multiple command... It is to avoid a repetition of similar tragedies that the Arab countries signed, first, the Collective Security Pact (1950), and now, the Syrian - Saudi - Egyptian Military Agreement (1955).”³⁰

But, because the Arab states gave no military support to Egypt during the Suez crisis, these agreements had more of a moral than a military effect. After the Sinai invasion, further attempts were made at military cooperation. Although not formed mainly for military purposes, the United Arab Republic agreement did express intentions to form a joint military command. The subsequent “United Arab States” agreement, which included Yemen, also called for military cooperation, as did the abortive Iraqi-Jordanian 1958 unity agreement. The Iraqi-Jordanian union dissolved after the July, 1958, revolution in Iraq. Subsequently, the U.A.R. split after the September, 1961 secession of Syria. Neither resulted

(30) “The Strategy of Egyptian Defense,” **Egyptian Economic and Political Review**, Vol. 3, No. 6, (February, 1957), p. 8.

in any effective military cooperation.³¹ In February, 1960, resolutions calling for Arab action against Israel over the Jordan water diversion had been passed in Arab League meetings, but like the calls for military cooperation, they were not implemented.³² Egypt and Syria engaged in a bitter feud, while relations between Nasser and Kassem in Iraq worsened. Matters climaxed in December, 1963, when Syria accused Nasser of being "soft" on the "Palestine question." Nasser had little interest in getting involved in a possible "third round" with Israel at a time when 50,000 of his troops were engaged in the war in Yemen.³³ In a speech delivered on December 23, 1964, Nasser declared :

"We will not overbid. I am not ashamed to say that I cannot fight if I feel that I cannot really. If I cannot fight and then go out and fight. I will only lead you to a disaster. Shall I bring my country to disaster ? Impossible. I shall not bargain in this matter ..."

And President Nasser had made many other statements renouncing immediate war.³⁴

At the January, 1964 summit, the Arab heads of states met to set up a unified military command headed

(31) *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

(32) President Gamal Abdul Nasser's Speech, January 14, 1964, *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, January 15, 1964, p. 1. (Hereafter, Nasser's Speech).

(34) Nasser's Speech, Radio Cairo, Domestic Service, October 3, 1963, July 3, 1962, February 24, 1964, December 24, 1963.

by the Chief of Staff, Lieutenant General Ali Amer,³⁵ to divert the headwaters of the Jordan River.³⁶ But, in June, Israel began diverting water from the Jordan — taking upon itself the right to carry out a plan drawn up by the American envoy Eric Johnston, even though the Arabs rejected it and the Israeli action had no legal standing. However the Arabs took no military action against this Israeli provocation. Since the third Arab summit meeting held in January, 1965, these decisions of the Arab League Council had had less effect.³⁷ This resulted partly from the dispute over Bourguiba's peace overtures to Israel, the Kurdish problems in Iraq, and the rift between President Nasser and King Faisal over Yemen. From this account, we might assume that the Arabs seemed to have certain military advantages over Israel, yet some factors neutralized these advantages. Militarily speaking, the Israeli army officer, if not the soldier, was said to possess more skill, know-how and better training.

Unquestionably, morale dominated in Israel, often called a "garrison state." Ben-Gurion's observations about arms levels are interesting :

" We shall never arrive at quantitative superiority either in manpower, equipment or material resources. But we have been endowed with spiritual advantages, and these must enhance to the limits of our intel-

(35) NYT, January 18, 1964, p. 5.

(36) Ibid., January 23, 1964, p. 8.

(37) Ibid., September 11, 1964, p. 9; September 12, 1964, p. 4.

lectual and moral capacity, for it is in our power to be numbered with the foremost civilized nations in the world³⁸ ... the greatest of our prophets, Moses, was the commander in the first war in the history of our people, immediately after its departure from Egypt. And when we are forced to fight, the Israel Defense Forces must always be able to win ... guided by one aim and one criterion: the will and the capacity to win³⁹ ... as the people of Israel is not satisfied to be like all the other peoples, and is called upon to develop higher spiritual, so the Israel Defense Forces do not fulfill their task by being no more than the defenders of the State, but they must also set an example to the nation in pioneering spirit and fraternity to other Jews and to all men."⁴⁰

But, again, if skill was high in Israel, could Israel continue indefinitely with that advantage ? What if Arab training improved ? To solve her defense problem, Israel had used her "skill" in mobilizing her available human and material resources with great efficiency. To counteract the population disadvantage, Israel needed an army of 200,000 to 250,000 for all-out defense, but this included between forty and fifty per cent of her working force. Since her economy could not stand such a burden, Israel had maintained a core of 12,000 officers and a reserve

(38) Quoted from Ben-Gurion, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

(39) *Ibid.*, p. 84.

(40) *Ibid.*, p. 85.

system capable of mobilizing 200,000 to 250,000 troops in forty-eight hours.⁴¹ This draft encompassed all men from the ages of seventeen to forty-nine and all women from nineteen to thirty-four, the only exceptions being for the physically unfit. Boys from fourteen to seventeen were organized in a quasi - military *Gadna*, or "Youth Battalion." Military service did not end with the draft. Often, it was the reservists who were sent on border reprisal raids.⁴² One may conclude that a certain balance existed between the two sides, however fragile and capricious it may have seemed. It could have been a balance of power, terror, or pressure. But, in the end, neither side had a clear-cut advantage that might have tempted it to tip the balance and play with fire. No matter how high Israeli's morale and skill, it could not be known with certainty whether this could tip down the Arab superiority in human resources and equipment.

As with her population, Israel had mobilized her economy for security, considering almost any projects first from the standpoint of national defense.⁴³ Especially with agriculture, when the choice arose between developing good land "inside" Israel and poorer land on the borders, the latter gets priority, since all agricultural

(41) John J. Sparkman, *The Middle East and the Far East*, U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 86th Congress, 2nd Session, November 30, 1960 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1960); Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-197.

(42) *Ibid.*

(43) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 188-92.

settlements can be armed as frontier-type outposts. The defense authorities hoped that these settlements could hold off an invasion until the army was mobilized. Since there was no regular standing army as such, this was vital to Israel's security.⁴⁴

Israel's defense policy, however, was definitely not to stand and wait for an attack. Everything useful in a war was immediately mobilized — planes, trains, trucks, buses, cars, private garages, repair shops, etc. Israeli tacticians believed that

“...any war in which Israel might be involved is bound to be short, calling for a maximum concentration of fighting force to achieve a favorable political-strategic posture before the imposition of a cease-fire through international intervention.”⁴⁵

This strategy arose from Israel's experience in the 1948 war, when she gained chunks of territory until a cease-fire was declared, then regrouped and gained more ground until the next cease-fire, regrouped, etc... Essentially, the strategy was one brief, but devastating attack. Although having a small population, Israel could rely on such a strategy because of her remarkably high “teeth” to “tail” (combat-non-combat) ratio. While in most armies the ratio is twenty per cent “teeth” to eighty per cent “tail,” Israel claimed a fifty-to-fifty ratio.⁴⁶ She

(44) O'Ballance, *op. cit.*, p. 62.

(45) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

(46) *Ibid.*

could do this, she claimed, because supply sources were never far from her borders, and projected campaigns were short.

Until now, Israel's strategy has revolved around a policy of "active defense."⁴⁷ This has implied that defense forces should be "...prepared, if a war should break out, to carry the war into enemy territory and to decide the battle in the first few days."⁴⁸ This may well, in the words of General Allon, have involved "..." a strategy of preemptive defense against forces drawn up for attack against her [Israel]."⁴⁹ It had already brought about an Israeli threat of "preventive war"⁵⁰ against her Arab neighbors should they divert the headwaters of the Jordan.⁵¹ Israel had even used a modified form of this policy in "peace" time. To execute its policies of aggression, and expansion, Israel devised a policy of "massive retaliation" in which well-organized army squads, sometimes near-battalion strength, attacked the Arab village or refugee camp from whence an attack came.⁵² The Syrian-Israeli clash on April 7, 1967 exemplified this policy.⁵³ From 1954 to the present, Israel has resorted to this policy extensively.⁵⁴

(47) Allon, *op. cit.*, p. 213.

(48) *Ibid.*, pp. 207, 209; Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

(49) Allon, *ibid.*

(50) *Ibid.*, p. 111.

(51) *NYT*, November 14, 1964; pp. 1 and 4.

(52) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

(53) *NYT*, April 8, 1967, pp. 1, 8.

(54) *Ibid.*, December 2, 1964, p. 6; December 4, 1964, p. 6.

On the other hand, this policy had serious implications for both the United States' policy in the area and Israel's whole strategic position. The United States was bound to "defend the territorial integrity" of any state in the area " against aggression " and to help maintain the political stability. She wanted to prevent the Soviet's exploiting any opportunity to break into an area important through its oil to United States national interest and security. As Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot stated :

" The United States is interested in the integrity and well-being of the states of the area [The Middle East], and our bilateral relations are premised on the need for impartiality and objectivity as between them. As Americans we would not, nor can we, stand aloof from their aspirations to remain free, improve their living conditions, and at the same time face up courageously to the threats of the Communist world. The stakes are very high. The security of the free world will be strengthened if these countries progress toward their goals... For the West, it is of signal importance that the nations of the area continue to maintain their strength to resist subversion, that Soviet domination or subversion be thwarted, that the West have peaceful passage through and intercourse with the area, that there be a continuing flow of oil from the Persian gulf, that the Palestine prob-

lem be contained. ”⁵⁵

General Paul Adams put it :

“The objectives of military assistance in the Middle East addresses the security of those free and independent countries, and thereby strengthens the security of the United States and the free world ... by : First: maintaining internal security and stable governments oriented to the free world, and to assure that U.S. objectives in the area are attained.”⁵⁶

Assistant Secretary Talbot again states : “It is the objective of non-polarization of the region which we pursue as the most effective way we can see to keep the Soviet from moving in very strongly there [The Middle East].”⁵⁷ To prevent mutual retaliation between the Arab states and Israel, the United States sought to maintain a

(55) **FAA of 1963**, *op. cit.*, pp. 393, 404-405; Statement by Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot, **Foreign Assistance Appropriations, 1964**, Hearings before U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, June 30, 1964 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 465.

(56) Statement by General Paul D. Adams, U.S. Army, Commander in Chief, **Foreign Assistance Act of 1964**, Hearings before U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 88th Congress, 2nd Session, Part IV, April 21, 1964 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 602. (Hereafter, **FAA, 1964.**)

(57) Statement by Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot, **Foreign Assistance Act of 1965**, Hearings before U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 89th Congress, 1st Session, Part II, February 17, 1965 (Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 206. (Hereafter, **FAA, 1965.**)

"sufficient balance" of armaments in the area,⁵⁸ making no arms sales to Israel except to balance a break-through by the United Arab Republic.⁵⁹ At the same time, the United States had to honor her promise to support the Arab kings in Saudi Arabia and Jordan, particularly King Hussein, lest his overthrow affect the Arab-Israeli dispute. As Mr. Grant stated :

" In Saudi Arabia and Jordan, whose stability is important to the stability of the region, the governments are moving ahead on programs of modernization... It is important that we continue assistance to Jordan and assure its continued progress towards economic and political vitality. Jordan's stability is important to maintenance of the relative peace and security of the entire Middle East."⁶⁰

Accordingly, the United States sold Saudi Arabia one squadron of F-86 aircraft in 1965.⁶¹ In the spring of 1966, she agreed to sell Jordan thirty-six supersonic F-104 planes, delivered in December, 1966, after the November 13th Israeli attack on the Jordanian borders. The State Department said the military assistance was "... to strengthen the defensive capability of the Jorda-

(58) Statement of James P. Grant, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, *FAA*, 1963, Part III, p. 439.

(59) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 118.

(60) Mr. Grant, *FAA*, 1963, Part III, *op. cit.*, p. 405.

(61) Secretary McNamara, statement before U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Part IV, March 9, 11, 12 and 15, 1965, *FAA*, 1965, p. 652.

nian armed forces." "This additional equipment is being provided as a means of enabling Jordan to assure its security, and thus to contribute further to the area. "62

As for Israel, the United States cut off arms sales to her except in case of military imbalance caused by a Soviet arms delivery to the U.A.R.⁶³ Washington believed Israel was strong enough to "chew them [the Arab states] up."⁶⁴ But it continued to repeat its deep concern about Israel's security as "a very strong interest" for United States :

" During the past year the United States has made amply clear its interest in Israel's security. "65

" Our policy toward Israel and toward the region was stated effectively by President Kennedy and by others in this government since President Johnson has taken office ... We are still concerned about the security of Israel ... without any question. "66

"We have a very strong interest, which was stated by President Kennedy and which has been repeated, in seeing that Israel is not aggressed against, and that our policy will reflect that strong interest."⁶⁷

(62) Quoted in *NYT*, December 23, 1966, pp. 1 and 5.

(63) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 118; *FAA*, 1964, *op. cit.*, p. 254.

(64) It was a confirmation by Deputy Assistant Mr. James P. Grant to Mr. Farbstein, a member of the House of Representatives, *FAA*, 1963, *op. cit.*, p. 439.

(65) *Ibid.*, p. 398.

(66) Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot, Statement, *FAA of 1964*, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

(67) *Ibid.*, p. 254.

Not only did the United States identify Israel's security with her own national interest, but said that if Israel's security were threatened, the United States would come to her aid. Talbot referred to a statement in a recent Cairo newspaper saying that :

"... if any Arabs should think of taking on Israel militarily, they should remember that they would have to face not only Israel [security deletion] ... the United States is very strongly of the view that these deterrent influences must continue to be effective."⁶⁸

Moreover, the United States indicated that Israel's interest, as well as her own, depended on America's presence in the area : " Our views ... are, very strongly, that the removal of our presence would be injurious to our interests and to the interests of Israel. "⁶⁹ For Israel, the strategy of "active defense" or massive retaliation had proven quite effective and decisive, in short conflicts. In a prolonged war, where no one party gains a decisive military advantage in the first hours of fighting, the Arabs could count on more resources, both human and material.

Israel-Egypt's missile development ushered in a new phase in the Arab-Israeli arms race, after Israel began

(68) *Ibid.*, p. 255.

(69) Assistant Secretary Phillips Talbot, Statement before U.S. House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, **Foreign Assistance Act of 1965**, 89th Congress, 1st Session, Part II, February 17, 1965, pp. 206-207.

developing missiles to counterbalance her precarious position in the Middle East and to further her safety against air attacks. In July, 1961, Israel sent the Shavit II, a solid rocket, fifty miles up, in what was termed a "meteorological experiment."⁷⁰ Exactly a year later, Egypt announced that she had launched two rockets, **Al-Kahir** (The Conqueror) and **Al-Zafir** (The Victor), which could supposedly reach targets "somewhere south of Beirut."⁷¹ After Egypt's announcement of the rocket firings, Radio Cairo, in Hebrew, stated :

" The Mapai [Israeli government party] rulers began the race ... [They] borrowed a rocket from France and called it 'Shavit II' and boasted that they have produced a rocket of their own. In view of this development, the Arabs could not remain indifferent and live at the mercy of the Mapai rulers."⁷²

According to Field Marshal Abdul-Hakim Amer, Chief of the Egyptian armed forces, " Egypt developed its rockets partially in response to the atomic reactor Israel has so mysteriously obtained. "⁷³

The day after Cairo's announcement, Israel downplayed the significance of the Egyptian achievement when the Israeli Chief of Staff, Major General Zvi Tzur, said, " The military value of the new Egyptian missiles

(70) CIS, Chapter III, *op. cit.*, p. 22.

(71) NYT, July 22, 1962, p. 4.

(72) Radio Cairo, in Hebrew, to Israel, July 23, 1962.

(73) Radio Cairo, Domestic Service, July 23, 1962.

is today still small. "74 Premier and Defense Minister David Ben-Gurion stated that " ... the deterrent power of the Israeli defense army, which is supplied with the best weapons, will insure the security of the state of Israel."75 But, in September, after a study of the military balance in the area, Mr. Ben-Gurion admitted that the appearance of the Egyptian rockets had shaken the balance of forces in the area.76 The rocket launching was not the only factor that concerned the Israelis. In the spring of 1962, relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United Arab Republic improved, and Russia began sending the newest MIG-21 jets and TU-16 bombers to Egypt.77 Some Israelis considered these shipments more of a threat than the rockets. The day after the Egyptian launchings were announced, the Israeli Chief of Staff said : " The danger lies in the fact that these missiles may overshadow the large quantities of conventional weapons which are flowing into Egypt. I am speaking of the bombers, fighters, and tanks. "78

Despite President Kennedy's renewed pledge to defend Israel in case of an Arab attack, Mr. Ben-Gurion felt this insufficient in case of a surprise Egyptian air attack on Israeli cities. 79 As a result:

(74) NYT, July 22, 1962, p. 4.

(75) Ibid., July 27, 1962, p. 13.

(76) Radio Jerusalem (Israel), Domestic Service, September 4, 1962. (Hereafter JIDS.)

(77) NYT, September 18, 1962, p. 2; September 27, 1962, p. 3.

(78) John H. Hoogland, Jr., and John B. Teeple, "Regional Sta-

^ ... careful evaluation of the equipment recently furnished by the Communist bloc to the UAR, Iraq, and Syria ... aroused concern in the Defense Department that the Middle Eastern balance of power would begin to tip in the Arabs' favor. Washington feared that such an imbalance would encourage either an attack upon Israel or a 'preventive' war by Israel to destroy some of the Arab offensive power."⁸⁰

On September 27, 1962, the United States responded by selling Israel a battalion of Hawk ground-to-air missiles,⁸¹ for about \$25,000,000.⁸² Both the *New York Times* and the *Economist* called this a reversal of the policy that the United States " ... should not be a major source of weapons for any nation in the Middle East. "⁸³ Whatever the value of the United States decision to Israel, the State Department quickly pointed out that Israel would get only one shipment of Hawks, and that these were meant for purely defensive purposes and could only be used as such.⁸⁴ These statements tried to placate Arab public opinion, which feared Israeli "expansionism." On

bility and Weapons Transfer : The Middle East," *Orbis*, Fall, 1965, Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 720.

(79) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

(80) *NYT*, September 27, 1962, pp. 1, 3.

(81) *FAA of 1963*, *op. cit.*, p. 399.

(82) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

(83) *NYT*, September 27, 1962, p. 1.

(84) *Ibid.*, September 28, 1962, pp. 1, 2.

the whole, Arab reaction was relatively mild. America was criticized, but no riots ensued, and Nasser, having been informed that the Hawk shipment would be the only one, said nothing.⁸⁵

While grateful for the United States agreement to sell her Hawks, Israeli officials pointed out that Hawks were anti-aircraft, but not anti-missile missiles.⁸⁶ The *New York Times* said the Hawks " ... were not designed to deal with the ground-to-ground rockets that the UAR has been developing with the help of German technicians." Secretary McNamara, testifying before the House Armed Services Committee, stated that the Hawks were given to Israel " ... to offset the large deliveries of modern fighters and bombers to the UAR."⁸⁷ In the Spring, 1964, the United States sold Israel another undisclosed amount of Hawks.⁸⁸ Although not designed as anti-missile missiles, army tests proved the Hawks could "...intercept at least three types of offensive missiles."⁸⁹ Whether these three would include the Egyptian missiles is an interesting question. However, until the Spring of 1965, it remained largely academic, because the Hawks were not set up in Israel until that time.⁹⁰

(85) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

(86) *NYT*, October 3, 1962; p. 5.

(87) Statement by Secretary McNamara before House Armed Services Committee, quoted in *NYT*, April 4, 1963, p. 9.

(88) *FAA of 1964*, *op. cit.*, pp. 618-19.

(89) *NYT*, September 27, 1964, p. 3.

(90) Institute for Strategic Studies, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

To counter Egypt's rocket break-through, Israel had resorted to an extensive campaign of intimidation, propaganda and diplomatic pressure. Indeed, Tel Aviv had begun long before Cairo announced the launching of **Al-Zafir** and **Al-Kahir**. German scientists had scarcely signed a contract with the Egyptians when Israel put pressure on Bonn through France to prompt the German government to prevent the flow of scientists and technicians to Cairo. Bonn responded, but only succeeded in convincing a few of the departing scientists to stay in Germany. Bonn's failure to thwart its "brain drain" to Egypt seems to have stemmed from its inability to offer its missile experts attractive alternatives.⁹¹ Although the Bonn government adamantly maintained that Germans were allowed to work where they pleased under the German constitution so it could legally do nothing against the Germans working in Cairo, the Israeli campaign apparently had some effect since Germany indirectly put pressure on the scientists. On October 19, 1964, the *New York Times* reported " ... scores of German scientists, engineers, and technicians working in the UAR's rocket and aircraft programs ... " were being "... lured away by offers of higher-paying positions from West Germany and other Western countries."⁹² Supposedly, they were to leave by the beginning of 1965. But such reports were somewhat premature. Even after Nasser had threatened

(91) *Ibid.*

(92) *Ibid*; *NYT*, October 19, 1964, p. 11; January 9, 1965, p. 1; March 18, 1965, p. 3.

to recognize East Germany, and four months of extreme tension between Cairo and Bonn had culminated in May, 1965, with the severing of diplomatic relations, only some of the Germans working on Egyptian aircraft and missiles had left.⁹³

Briefly, Israel's failure to oust many Germans from Cairo seems based on the following factors :

1. The belief, apparently held in United States government circles, that if the Germans left, they would be replaced by Russians.
2. Bonn's ability to buy off Israel with military aid.⁹⁴
3. Bonn's tacit interest in having the possibility of withdrawing the German scientists as a bargaining counter to use against Nasser, in the last resort.

Thus, Israel's efforts against the German scientists had, on the whole, produced little results (aside from "mobilizing world opinion"), and the continuing presence of a considerable number of German scientists and technicians in Egypt seemed assured. How important the German contribution to Egypt's military effort has been is a paramount but difficult question.

As stated above, we know two kinds of rockets had been developed, capable of reaching central Israel, and at least one of carrying a ton of explosives. The rockets

(93) NYT, May 15, 1965, p. 5.

(94) Ibid., October 30, 1965, p. 7.

were apparently very inexpensive, costing only \$50,000 a piece.⁹⁵ Until 1965, about 250 had been produced.⁹⁶ Some Israeli officials and the United States Department of State publicly disparaged the effectiveness of the "Egyptian" missiles, saying that they are little more than souped-up V-2's, with little or no guidance systems, designed mostly for propaganda purposes."⁹⁷ However, "qualified military quarters" thought the missiles had "... sufficient accuracy to hit within two miles of a target."⁹⁸ Even if the range of accuracy was less than this, it seemed that the Egyptian rockets posed a real threat to Israel's highly concentrated population in the vulnerable central corridor, especially around Tel Aviv. And if, as the Israelis alleged, Egypt was developing a "garbage bomb" warhead composed of radioactive waste, great accuracy would not be necessary.⁹⁹

Nothing had been made public to indicate any rocket development in Israel since the first Shavit flight in 1961. Impressed by the possible threat from Egyptian missiles, Ben-Gurion repeated the military significance of population dispersion in Israel. He pointed out that the Negev and Upper Galilee would be the weakest points in Israel's defense unless settlement occurred.¹⁰⁰ However, popul-

(95) Sulzberger, in *NYT*, August 6, 1963, p. 24.

(96) *Orbis*, *op. cit.*, p. 722; *ISS*, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

(97) *CIS*, *op. cit.*, p. 17; *NYT*, May 31, 1964, IV, p. 4.

(98) *NYT*, March 16, 1965, p. 5.

(99) Sulzberger, in *NYT*, November 20, 1963, p. 42; June 11, 1963,

(100) Ben-Gurion, *Israel : Years of Challenge*, *op. cit.*, pp. 201-07.

ation statistics showed a disproportionate increase in town and city population, especially in the central corridor. By the end of 1963, this area contained seventy-five per cent of Israel's total population and over eighty per cent of her Jewish population.¹⁰¹ Population dispersion as a policy had utterly failed in Israel.

One could well ask : " What prevented Egypt, which considered herself at war with Israel, from having launched a rocket attack on Tel Aviv ?" Israel's General Allon implied that it was Egyptian fear of a retaliatory attack on the Nile Valley.¹⁰² However, Israel's population was confined to an area roughly forty miles long by fifteen miles wide, while the population of Egypt was — and still is — concentrated on the Delta, 140 miles long and from sixty to twenty-five miles wide. After the completion of the Aswan high dam, Egypt's population should cover a larger area. Moreover, the loss caused by retaliatory attacks would not affect the Egyptian population of almost thirty million, as much as it would the Israelis of only two million. With the addition of manpower from other Arab states, the relation became more unfavorable to Israel. Even if we assumed that both sides were equally vulnerable, the facts indicate that, although Israel started the missile race, she did not have as good a retaliatory rocket force as did Egypt. One may ask : " Is the atomic bomb an answer to Israel's security ?" In other words, if an overwhelming Arab fighting force

(101) Safran, *op. cit.*, pp. 80-81.

(102) Allon, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

emerged and were supported by a great power in her fight with Israel, would it be inevitable that Israel would develop nuclear weapons as a possible guarantee of her existence ?

Israel does seem to be developing a nuclear military capability. Shortly after the end of the 1948 war, Israel set up an Atomic Energy Commission under the Ministry of Defense, and sent six scientists abroad for study.¹⁰³ This group later formed the core of a nuclear physics division at the Weizmann Institute at Rahavoth.¹⁰⁴ In 1953, Israel made substantial progress in nuclear research. In the same year, France had acquired an Israeli patent for the cheap production of the heavy water.¹⁰⁵ By 1962, the Weizmann Institute had sixty nuclear Scientists, and a " nuclear engineering center " had been established.¹⁰⁶ In 1964, Israel completed a large French-sponsored twenty-four-megawatt reactor at Dimona in the Negev.¹⁰⁷ This was put into operation in 1965, using the heavy water to produce the fissionable plutonium used in nuclear bombs.¹⁰⁸ Capable of producing about six

(103) Leonard Beaton and John Maddox, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* (London : Oxford University Press, 1962), p. 170; *Israel Government Yearbook, 1964-1965* (Government Publication, 1965), p. 88.

(104) *Ibid.*

(105) *NYT*, November 20, 1963, p. 42.

(106) Beaton and Maddox, *op. cit.*, p. 170.

(107) Leonard Beaton, *Must the Bomb Spread ?* (Middlesex, England : Penguin Books, Ltd., 1966), pp. 78-79.

(108) *Ibid.*, p. 79.

kilograms¹⁰⁹ of plutonium a year, Israel could have more than enough plutonium for one bomb annually.¹¹⁰

But, according to Beaton and Maddox, Israel was not developing a bomb because, if she did, the Russians would somehow make it available to the Egyptians.¹¹¹ Was this very likely ? Russia had sold the U.A.R. large amounts of conventional military equipment, and it seemed that these sales would continue.¹¹² Even sales of conventional arms to Egypt, however, had been attacked in the U.S.S.R. Moreover, Uri Ra'anán suggested that Khrushchev was criticized for extending \$227 million in credit to Egypt, since he acted unilaterally without consultation with his colleagues in the Kremlin.¹¹³ At the time of his ouster, a charge leveled against him was that he had awarded Nasser the highest Soviet decoration, " Hero of the Soviet Union, " when Nasser was not even a Communist or head of a Communist state.¹¹⁴ If there was considerable opposition to giving away a medal, one can only imagine the reaction to giving away an atomic bomb. All in all, nothing indicated that the U.S.S.R. had even considered the possibility of giving, selling, or otherwise parting with any sort of nuclear device to any country,

(109) *Ibid.*

(110) *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

(111) Beaton and Maddox, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

(112) *NYT*, October 21, 1964, p. 4, November 10, 1964, p. 1, December 27, 1964, p. 20, January 2, 1965, p. 1 and 3.

(113) Uri Ra'anán, "Moscow and the "Third World", *Problems of Communism*, Vol. XIV, No. 1, January-February, 1965, pp. 22-31.

(114) *Ibid.*, p. 30.

much less Egypt. If the U.S.S.R. tended to such action, it might have given a bomb to North Viet Nam, yet it had refrained from even giving her much conventional military aid.¹¹⁵ Russia had been willing to aid some Arab countries, especially Egypt, in beginning nuclear research and technology. The U.S.S.R. had given the U.A.R. a two-megawatt thermal reactor (at Inchase) and technical assistance for its operation.¹¹⁶ According to reports in 1964, the U.A.R. was interested in building a nuclear power station and was negotiating with a British firm for its purchase. But, as the 1964 arms control study indicated, neither the present reactor nor the envisaged nuclear power station could produce enough fissionable material to give the Egyptian authorities an option for making a bomb.¹¹⁷ Moreover, it seemed very improbable that the U.S.S.R. would give U.A.R. militarily significant nuclear aid in the future.

The threat of Russian nuclear aid to Egypt being negligible, several possible limitations to Israeli atomic bomb development remained. One, as mentioned by Ben-Gurion,¹¹⁸ was the problem of testing. Israel had no space to test in, and she also signed the nuclear test ban agreement.¹¹⁹ But this did not significantly lower the possibi-

(115) Flapan, *New Outlook*, *op. cit.*, p. 12.

(116) *NYT*, July 29, 1962, p. 6; Moscow Radio, in Arabic, 24 February, 1964.

(117) *CIS*, III, p. 18.

(118) *NYT*, Sulzberger, November 16, 1963, p. 26.

(119) U.S. Department of State *Bulletin*, August 9, 1963, p. 349.

lity of an Israeli bomb since, as Beaton and Maddox note, "The Arabs believe that the Israelis are a determined and ruthless people who will stop at nothing to survive."¹²⁰ Also, France might have allowed Israel to secretly use its Pacific atomic testing site — or, at least, give Israel access to its own test results.¹²¹ Another possible limitation to Israeli bomb development was fear of an Arab attack, a postulated reason for the initial Israeli deception about Dimona.¹²² A day after the true nature of Dimona became public, Nasser indicated that, if Cairo discovered that Israel was producing an atom bomb, the U.A.R. would not wait for it to be manufactured but would first invade Israel.¹²³ But how could the Arabs ascertain that Israel was developing a bomb, unless they could inspect the reactor regularly? They could have conceivably attacked the reactor, since it had the capacity to produce fissile plutonium, but this would have been a rather difficult act to justify, especially if it involved a risk of defeat.

In fact, the only real barrier to Israel's developing an atomic bomb immediately appeared to be the construction of a chemical separation plant. After plutonium is produced in the reactor it has to be purified, and this requires a plant that would take about two years to

(120) Beaton and Maddox, p. 177.

(121) CIS, VIII, p. 5.

(122) NYT, December 22, 1960, p. 5.

(123) Ibid., December 24, 1960, pp. 1, 2; Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

(124) Beaton and Maddox, *op. cit.*, p. 172.

construct.¹²⁴ According to one expert, "A nuclear reactor and chemical processing plant are ... somewhat conspicuous and, in addition, are liable to release characteristic products into the environment."¹²⁵ Moreover, "... enough people are watching, [for the construction of an Israeli chemical separation plant] to make it most unlikely that it could be built secretly in the small area of Israel."¹²⁶

Presumably, if they discovered that Israel was building a chemical separation plant, the Arab states would attack. But Israel could possibly avoid this by using France's chemical separation facilities. In the past, Israel had had very close ties with France, especially in the atomic field. With the ending of the Algerian war (which, initially, was the main reason why France supported Israel against Egypt), this situation had changed. De Gaulle ended direct relations between various French and Israeli ministries (Israel was the only country in the world to have a branch of its Atomic Energy Commission attached directly to the French Ministry of Defense).¹²⁷ In April, 1963, diplomatic relations between France and Egypt, broken in 1956, were resumed.¹²⁸ When it was originally disclosed that France was helping Israel to develop the reactor at Dimona, some said, possibly,

(125) Marvin Kalkstein, "Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons," in *Proceedings of the Thirteenth Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs*, Kerlovy, 1964, p. 357.

(126) Beaton and Maddox, *op. cit.*, p. 173.

(127) Flapan, *Atlas*, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

(128) NYT, April 3, 1956, p. 6.

France did not have enough plutonium-producing reactors and nuclear experts for the number of bombs she wished to produce, and might have agreed to help Israel construct the reactor in return for a percentage of the fissile plutonium produced.¹²⁹ If this was true, we might assume that, in return for the percentage, Israel would ask for access to French separation facilities in the future. Certainly, there was little to indicate that France was overly concerned about the danger of nuclear proliferation. Indeed, much French literature justified the "necessity" and "inevitability" of nuclear proliferation.¹³⁰ It was not unlikely, therefore, that France might have let Israel use her chemical separation facilities, thereby, in effect, giving Israel the bomb. Such an act would not hurt France's relations with the Arabs since five kilograms of plutonium could easily be concealed on an Israeli ship, sent to France, processed, and returned. After making her bomb, Israel could announce that it had been "domestically" produced with the aid of a chemical separation plant hidden in Israel. Moreover, it was not impossible that Israel may have been able to construct a small and well-hidden chemical separation plant underground. Experts considered this difficult, but this was usually with regard to a plant capable of processing plutonium sufficient for ten or more small bombs. Israel

(129) *Ibid.*, December 19, 1960, p. 8.

(130) Cf. General Pierre Gallois, *The Balance of Terror: Strategy of the Nuclear Age*, American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Summer Study on Arms Control, pp. 194, 196, 197.

really only needed to separate enough plutonium for one bomb.

As far as the United States was concerned, it was known in 1960 that America had helped Israel, sometime before that date, to develop a small five-megawatt atomic reactor at Nachal Sorek near Tel Aviv.¹³¹ In the same year, Washington was deeply concerned by Israel's construction of the large French-sponsored twenty-four-megawatt reactor at Dimona in the Negev.¹³² She was aware that Israel, with the help of France, could develop the atomic bomb, a suspicion which caused President Nasser to observe that if Israel obtained the bomb, so would the United Arab Republic.¹³³ When the United States asked Israel what it was building at Dimona, she received no accurate explanation.¹³⁴ Publicly, Israeli officials said a textile plant was being constructed.¹³⁵ Confronted with "long range pictures" which "revealed the true nature of the plant," Ben-Gurion admitted Israel was building a nuclear reactor and eased Washington's worries by assuring that the reactor was directed exclusively toward purely peaceful purposes.¹³⁶

Although Israel and the United Arab Republic refus-

(131) Beaton and Maddox, *op. cit.*, pp. 171-72.

(132) *Ibid.*, p. 169.

(133) Stevens, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

(134) Beaton and Maddox, *op. cit.*, p. 169.

(135) *NYT*, December 20, 1960, pp. 1, 5.

(136) *Ibid.*, December 19, 1960, pp. 1, 8; December 22, 1960, p. 5; January 12, 1961, p. 4.

ed to comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency regulations (India and the Communist states still do) from 1960¹³⁷ to June, 1964,¹³⁸ the United States resumed the sale of arms to Israel and increased her economic support. In 1962, the American government had supplied Israel with arms at prices "far below cost"¹³⁹ as "an indirect military subsidy."¹⁴⁰ Although Prime Minister Eshkol had said, "It is hoped that Israel would not be the first in the region to join the rush for atomic weapons,"¹⁴¹ this had no implications for America's policy toward the race.

(137) *Ibid.*, December 23, 1960, p. 18; December 27, 1960, p. 2; April 19, 1964, p. 5.

(138) *Ibid.*, June 9, 1964, p. 6.

(139) Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Mr. Zablocki, *FAA of 1962*, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

(140) *Ibid.*

(141) *JIDS*, July, 1964.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

To evaluate the United States policy toward the Arab-Israeli arms race, one might consider it chronologically. Therefore, America's political response will be divided into three periods :

1. from 1950 to the Suez Campaign of 1956;
2. from 1956 to 1960; and
3. from 1960 to 1966.

The United States' first move in the Arab-Israeli arms race was the 1950 Tripartite Declaration with Britain and France which intended to control the transfer of military hardware to both the Arab States and Israel, thus preventing any potential clash between them. It was agreed by these three powers to maintain the balance of power in the Arab-Israel zone. Fearing Soviet expansion in the troubled area after the Korean War in 1950, the United States defense policy reverted to the policy of the maintenance of the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel. Israel was not invited to participate in any pact. Thus, America thought that it could control the balance between both sides by having all the Arab States

in some pacts.¹ When the Baghdad Pact membership was introduced to the Arab Countries, all except Iraq rejected it, because they did not regard the Soviet Union as a threat. Their concern was Israel.² At about that time, Egypt was negotiating for the British withdrawal from the Suez Base. Consequently, Nasser opposed the American proposal to supply Egypt with arms, if the latter accepted an American military mission to the Egyptian army.³ At a time when Nasser had just succeeded in getting the British to evacuate Egypt after seventy-two years of occupation, he was not receptive to new foreign influences. This lack of understanding and Egypt's military inferiority (it did not equal half of Israel's) made Nasser turn to the Soviet Union for arms and economic aid, after the West's refusal to finance the Aswan High Dam Project and to supply arms to Egypt. Thus, America's policy to maintain the military balance of power between the Arabs and Israel brought conflicting results. On the one hand, it proved that the United States miscalculated in thinking an Arab country, Egypt, traditionally Pro-West, would never turn to the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, it brought the Soviet Union to the Arab side, causing an uncontrolled arms race, and bringing the Middle East into the Cold War arena. Thus, neither the Tripartite Declaration nor the United States defense po-

(1) Safran, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

(2) See Chapter II, pp. 32-34, Notes 19-27.

(3) Statement of Mr. Henry Byroade, former Ambassador to Egypt, Senate Hearings on Eisenhower Doctrine, February 7, 1957, p. 756.

licies were able to control the arms race between the Arabs and Israel.

During the Suez Crisis, the United States was about to remedy her shaky prestige resulting from her withdrawal of financing the Aswan Dam Project in 1955 and from the growing Soviet influence. But, although the United States supported Egypt by opposing Israeli aggression, Washington temporarily froze Egypt's assets in the United States, so Egypt's economy had to depend more heavily on Soviet credits. Had the United States not refused to reconsider its abandonment of financing the Aswan Dam, the Soviets would not have underwritten the Project. While the United States tried to punish Nasser, the U.S.S.R. frustrated these efforts by helping him and also increased her involvement in the Middle East.

The Eisenhower Doctrine of 1957 put the United States increasingly in the midst of inter-Arab conflicts, for the support of States such as Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan against Communism was in effect a support for Arab reactionary regimes and an opposition against Nasser and radical Arab Nationalism. By regarding Communism and Arab Nationalism as two sides of the same coin, Washington tried to combat both at the same time. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, by supporting the Arabs against Israel, sending arms to Egypt and Syria at a critical moment and supporting Nasser's neutralism, forged an alliance of convenience by which both parties could advance their respective interests. The United States responded by supplying arms to pro-Western regimes. The Eisenhower Doctrine, then, could be

both abused and misconstrued by being applied to the inter-Arab disputes, thus identifying the United States with the conservative forces, advancing the Soviet influence in the area, and contributing indirectly to the Arab-Israeli arms race. In the early sixties US-Arab relations improved somewhat. For the United States, the situation offered a chance to regain some influence with the Nationalist Regimes. The opportunities for American diplomacy lay within the framework of disengagement from inter-Arab alignments and disputes, and by maintaining some influence in Cairo as a balance against that of the U.S.S.R., as well as discouraging Egyptian moves against Israel.

Whereas the United States, to maintain the balance between the Arabs and Israel, gave Israel a "small scale" arms purchase, yet American's economic aid and grants worked against that objective. Since the United States' economic assistance and contributions were a substantial part of the Israeli GNP, representing thirty-five per cent of Israel's imports,⁴ its defense expenditures relied to a large degree upon Washington's economic aid, whether directly or indirectly for military purposes. Israel, with a population percentage ratio of 1-30 to the Arab States, received from ten to twenty times more aid than any Arab country.⁵ One may realize how this partiality forced

(4) Polk, *op. cit.*, p. 265; MSA, 1959, *op. cit.*, p. 57, Note 76.

(5) FAA, 1962, *op. cit.*, p. 184; to this, Senator William Fulbright added, "But Israel is the only country that has this unique situation here. The Poles in this Country can't contribute to Poland and deduct it from their income tax."

the Arabs to increase their defense spending to keep in the race. By supplying this intensive economic assistance and private gifts to Israel, Washington released Israel's funds for arms purchases from countries other than American, such as France. Therefore, by pumping all this economic aid and arms to both the Arabs and Israelis, the United States did not maintain the balance of power between them, but made it easy for them to re-stock their arsenals and upset that balance.

At the beginning of the 'sixties, in spite of Washington's repeated intention to maintain the military balance between the Arabs and Israel, the manner in which the United States pursued that policy encouraged the arms race. By providing Israel with arms at a price "far below cost" as an "indirect military subsidy," in addition to a "very large" amount of economic aid grants, the United States "made it possible for Israel to purchase military equipment,"⁶ and released funds for missiles and nuclear developments. Therefore, America's policy since the beginning of the 'sixties up to 1966 did not maintain a balance of power between the Arab States and Israel, but a balance of terror.

The maintenance of the balance of power did not assure stability and security, nor freeze the arms race, since any amount of arms which Israel could buy from the United States could have been balanced on the Arab side with more arms from the Soviet arsenals. Rather,

(6) See Chapter IV, p. 85, Notes 38-42.

it encouraged the arms race which Israel was not assured of maintaining in the long run, despite her conceivably superior morale and technology, because of her limited natural resources and vulnerable geographic position. The inflow of outside capital, especially in the form of grants and contributions, was apt to dwindle sooner or later. Egypt and other large Arab countries, however, received their arms on credit, creating a heavy burden on their national economies. And, the Soviets might demand favors in return for aid. Therefore, arming Israel, the Arabs, or both, to maintain a balance between them was a stop-gap policy to buy time and did not solve the problems involved. Rather, it created new ones.

One of the important factors which affected the United States policy toward the Arab-Israeli arms race was the Soviet involvement beginning in 1955, with some Arab States such as Egypt, Syria and Iraq. As a matter of fact, Russia traditionally sought a role in the Middle East. British diplomacy and naval supremacy prevented the Tsars from reaching that objective. When the Communists came to power, Soviet interests in the area increased tremendously. They especially wanted to deprive the West of the area's natural resources.⁷ After World War II, the Soviet Union intervened in the Palestine dispute by supporting the Partition Plan in 1947, believing that the partition would take the territory out

(7) Rais A. Khan, "Israel and the Soviet Union : A Review of Post-war Relations," *Orbis*, Vol. IX, No. 4, (Winter, 1966), pp. 999-1004.

of British hands. When the establishment of Israel was declared, they extended their *de jure* recognition to the new state hoping that, through the immigrants who came from the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries, they might influence the future of the new state and gain a foothold in the Middle East.⁸ Subsequently, when the Arabs and the Jews of Palestine clashed, Russia was the first to supply the Jews with arms hoping to influence Israel's policy.⁹ But Israel leaned toward the West in 1952 and thwarted this plan. Later, when Nasser opposed Western defense policies, particularly the Baghdad Pact of 1954, the Soviet Union's hope was revived. To take advantage of Washington's antagonism toward Nasser, Russia concluded its first arms deal with Egypt on September, 1955, financed and undertook the execution of the High Dam, poured in experts for several Egyptian projects and, finally, as a matter of general policy, supported Arab Nationalism. Therefore, the United States' refusal to supply arms to Egypt was the opening the Soviet Union needed to stimulate the arms race.

The Suez Campaign of 1956, was another opening for the Soviet Union. It is difficult to know whether the Soviets would have carried out their threat of the use of rockets on French, British and Israeli cities, if a cease-fire had not been enforced in time. In view of Soviet involvement in Hungary at that time, the threat would seem to have been a propaganda play rather than a

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 1006.

(9) Chapter I, p. 22, Note 49.

reality. In spite of America's associate role in halting the attack on Egypt, the Soviet Union — and not the United States — was to reap the benefits from America's opposition to Israel and her allies, France and Britain. After America's opposition, the Soviet Union did threaten the aggressors with possible rockets dropped on their capitals. After the cease-fire, the U.S.S.R. and Communist China also threatened to send "volunteers." Subsequently, after the war ended, when the United States refused to sell oil or surplus wheat despite the urgency of Egyptian needs, Russia responded at once and provided Egypt with medicines, oil, and wheat. By actions such as these, the United States erased the good will of its stand in November, whereas the Soviet Union, risking nothing to deliver these threats, received most of the credit from the Arabs for saving Egypt by her threats to exterminate Israel and to attack France and Britain.

Although the Russian threats of intervention during the Suez Crisis had given the Arabs the impression that, in a crisis, the Soviets would come to their rescue, American and British intervention in Lebanon and Jordan in 1958 dispelled this idea. Despite the Russian threat to send volunteers to oppose the intervention, we have seen that both Britain and America sent troops and supplied arms to the pro-West Arab governments.¹⁰ The failure of Russia to react showed that the West could counteract threats, and that there were limits to Soviet willingness to help the Arabs.

(10) See Chapter III, Notes 42-47.

It is, however, safe to say that the Soviet involvement and military aid to some Arab States were factors that affected the United States policy response toward the Arab-Israeli arms race, and that it was the chain of the West's mistakes which pushed Nasser to the Communist bloc to buy arms in 1955. Moreover, the Soviet presence in the Middle East was a fact, though an exaggerated danger to the United States if the national forces in the Arab States are to be understood.

Another obvious factor in the United States policy toward the Arab-Israeli arms race was the protection of her presumed national interests in the Middle East. These appeared to include the prevention of the Soviet expansion in that area (which was discussed above), the economic interest such as oil, and the protection of the independence and territorial integrity of Israel. As far as oil was concerned, American oil companies in the Middle East have netted \$1 - \$1.4 billion a year in profits, which equalled over half of the United States balance of payments deficit for recent years.¹¹

Although the oil imports of the Middle East have accounted for only three per cent of the American oil supply, it was still strategically important, since the United States' allies in Europe drew most of their oil needs

(11) Stephen H. Longrigg, "The Economics and Politics of Oil in the Middle East," *Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. XIX, No. 1 1965, pp. 113-116; information from research of T.R. Stauffer, Harvard University; and an interview with Professor A. J. Meyer, Harvard University, November 13, 1966.

from Middle East sources.

Besides being prejudicial to United States oil interest in the Middle East, selling arms to maintain a balance between the Arabs and Israel may have proven not feasible as a policy for the preservation of the independence of the territorial integrity of the states concerned. No doubt there were some reasons for the United States' selling arms to these states: to Jordan, in order to soften an Israeli raid on her borders; to Saudi Arabia, because she supported the United States and feared Egyptian attack on her territory; to Lebanon, because she feared an Israeli attack and because of her avowed pro-Western stand ; to Iraq, to wean its close ties to the Soviet Union. All of these are perhaps valid reasons for United States selling arms to the states concerned. Yet the amounts of arms sold to the Arabs were small and did not significantly alter the balance of power between Israel and the Arab States.

The United States also was committed to sell arms to Israel, but this did not prevent any clash with her neighbors. Moreover, it was questionable whether Israel could offset the tactical advantage of Jordan without conquering and annexing the Western bank in a " preventive " Israeli action. Thus, this policy had reduced the threat to the independence and territorial integrity on both sides. Also, the possibility of "preventive" attacks by Israel raised considerable difficulties for the United States, for, under the Mutual Security Act, she could only ship arms to friendly countries for "defensive"

purposes; arms for "aggressive" purposes were prohibited.¹² Yet, Israel's whole strategy of "active defense" depended on action (or at least the threat of action). Israel had threatened to invade Egypt if the Straits of Tiran were closed, to invade Jordan if an unfriendly regime came to power, and to attack Lebanon if she diverted the Hasbani River. Since invasion (motivated by the consistent expansionist policy of Israel) is usually considered an aggressive act, it would appear difficult for the United States to support openly (although it did in the 5th of June 1967 aggression) such actions by sending Israel large arms shipments.

Has United States policy been motivated by national interest or, rather, by her so-called "moral commitment" or by "the West's moral commitment" to Israel? National interest may include :

- a. political interest in terms of establishing a strong presence and carrying great influence in different countries of the region ;
- b. economic interest through investment in oil and other industries, as well as non-European markets for American goods.
- c. strategic interest through military bases and re-fueling stations.

Superficially, national interest does not demand allegiance with either the Arabs or Israel. Different con-

(12) McClellan, *op. cit.*, p. 133.

siderations negate each other. If economic interest dictates a more pro-Arab stand because of the oil investments that return an estimated \$1-1.4 billion a year to the United States, political as well as grand imperialist considerations might favor a pro-Israeli policy. The Arab countries, or the important ones among them, have recently voted with the non-aligned bloc in the United Nations. Israel stands firmly with the West, and it would be unpolitical for the West to betray this friendship. As for strategic advantages, the United States has bases in Libya, Morocco and Saudi Arabia, but only the first base is of real importance. Moreover, the concept of military bases outside the United States has been de-emphasized lately, because of the advanced developments in non-conventional weapons, and an assumption that any war with the Soviet Union will have to be a nuclear one. The United States is not now as anxious to maintain bases abroad, or to secure new ones. Nor is the domestic situation in these Arab countries stable enough to guarantee a continuation of these bases. Thus, this element is greatly reduced in impact and importance taking into consideration that Israel itself is a large military base for the United States.

Perhaps the more convincing reason for supporting Israel militarily is the argument that since the United States helped set Israel up as a state, it has some sort of a "moral commitment" to support her. If the United States did not support her, the argument runs, the world would think that she is unable or unwilling to honor her commitments. However, some people feel that the moral

element in United States policy toward Israel is centrally irrelevant to the American national interest. Accordingly, the United States' "supreme interest" includes protecting national territories from domination by hostile powers threatening the United States or any coalition she can build. It also requires protecting Eurasia from totalitarian dictatorships, which would threaten democracy both in the United States and elsewhere.¹³

In answer to the first argument, Soviet involvement in the Middle East did not occur through domination. More than Western miscalculations or Soviet cleverness, it was the radical Arab nationalist powers exploiting of favorable circumstances that set the direction and the pace of the events. The Soviet Union did not push or bribe its way into the Middle East; it was invited in on terms set by Arab leaders. The Western powers were not physically thrown out of their positions there; they were maneuvered out because they neglected the Arab States' national aspirations.

The other part of the argument indicates the indifference of the United States' policy-makers to the sociological facts of the Arab world. It extols the moral superiority of the American political culture over all others. America sees its achievement of high level material and political culture through a free enterprise and democratic system as the object to be emulated by

(13) Walt W. Rostow, *The United States in the World Arena* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1960), pp. 543-550.

peoples of the developing areas. The treatment of this expectation by the Soviets, and the preference in these areas for socialist measures and governmental intervention in the economic and political life of the people have encouraged other approaches besides Western democracy.

It appears that United States policy toward Israel is based partially on the United States' own failure to accept European Jews before and after World War II because of an inflexible policy restricting the immigration of Jews to the United States. The establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine was, in part, a substitute for admitting Jewish immigrants. It committed many Americans, Jewish or otherwise, to helping Israel financially. As a United States Senator put it. " If we do not want to take our share of them into our own country, we ought to have been willing at least to assist with dollars to help settle them in Israel. "14

The fact remains, however, that the United States' policy did not contribute significantly to the solution of the Palestine problem. It seemed more concerned with countering the Soviet initiative in the area than with seeking a lasting solution acceptable to both parties without duress or coercion. Perhaps the fault of United States' policy in the Middle East stems from a false premise that the maintenance of the status quo will eventually lead to a solution. This premise does not pro-

(14) Senator Morse, Statement before U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, MSA, 1959, *op. cit.*, p. 628.

vide for the inevitable accumulation of tension, hatred and frustrations. An illustration of this policy is the American stance vis-à-vis the Arab refugees. On the one hand, the United States has been consistently voting in the United Nations' bodies, namely the General Assembly and the First (Political) Committee, in favor of requiring Israel to compensate the Arabs for the loss of their property and livelihood and the return of whomever opts to return. But, on the other hand, the United States appears to be condoning the perpetuation of Israel's present practice (i.e., keeping the refugees in camps of charity). No pressure has been brought to bear on Israel to accept the return of any refugees. The United States, however, both on the governmental and non-governmental levels, has given extensive aid to the Arab refugees. UNRWA, the United Nations body entrusted with the relief aspect of the refugees problem, received a sizeable portion of its budget from American sources. Such private organizations are setting up relief and training programs that are designed to improve the lot of the refugees and make their life more bearable.

A most unfortunate aspect of United States' policy in this connection has been improper timing. Arms shipments to the area have been apt to take place when this act provokes the most violent reaction. Stressing the necessity of reaching a peaceful settlement has occurred when emotions are so high and people, not only leaders, are least prepared for settlement.

The Russians, on the other hand, discovered most

of the gaps in the United States' policy in the Middle East, seized every opportunity to alienate the United States' mistakes to make headway in the area.

Throughout my research, I have confined myself to the period ending December, 1966. Thus the factual and analytical data contained in the work reflect the situation to that date. However, a drastic and far-reaching change took place in June, 1967, following the Israeli large-scale aggression on the Arab States. Israel occupied vast territories on the West Bank of Jordan, in Sinai and in the Syrian Heights that had harassed the Israeli plain for so long. This military victory changed the picture dramatically, at least for a short period of time. Israel is apt to maintain a military superiority in order to insure its continued, alien existence in the Middle East.

Politically, the military victory put Israel in a much clearer position in regard to its expansionist designs. This has been evident from the tone of Israeli statements relative to the status quo and new boundaries that should be taken into consideration in any peace settlement.

This operation had, and is still having, a very heavy impact on the policy of both the East and the West in the Middle East. The Soviet Union, though, lost prestige and good will in the Arab World, because it failed to back the Arabs militarily and to secure any United Nations resolution more favorable to the Arabs. It has tried to regain its influence by rearming the shattered

Arab armies. The Soviet Union, together with five other Communist countries, severed all diplomatic relations with Israel and seems to be solidly committed to sponsoring the Arabs (i.e., short of intervening militarily or risking a confrontation with the United States). The United States, while declaring its neutrality in the war, pushed its drive to bring both sides to the peace table in the hope that they might reach a solution to the dispute. Again, it finds itself dragged into the arms race in the light of these factors :

1. Russia's massive re-equipment of the Arab armies ;
2. France's announced embargo on arms to the Middle East, an embargo in effect against only Israel, since she received the bulk of her war planes from France.
3. The dilemma of the still pro-Western regimes of Jordan (or what is left of it) and Saudi Arabia.

The United States supplied Jordan with light armaments that are very suitable for internal usage and has, on the other hand, decided to supply Israel with 50 Phantom jet fighters.

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ARAB VIEW OF WESTERN AID

BY DR. HASSAN SAAB

1. The West and the Arab World

The Arab World has contributed six civilizations to world history : The Egyptian, the Sumerian, the Babylonian, the Syriac, the Orthodox Christian, and the Arabic civilizations.¹ It was the cradle of the three monotheistic religions : Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Many of the spiritual values, the moral ideals, and the scientific concepts of Western civilization may be traced back to these civilizations and religions which originated in the Arab world.

In modern times, Arab renaissance has taken place under the impact of the West. Since the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Arab response to the challenge of Western civilization has manifested itself through two major processes : a process of rediscovery of the Arab cultural legacy and a process of integration of the Arab world in the modern world. The two processes have been guided by Western concepts and techniques of historic and scientific research as well as by Western concepts and techniques of social organization. Until the post-war

(1) Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, Vol. 1, Oxford University Press, 1956, p. 133.

period of the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948, modernization in the Arab world was identified with Westernization. Democratization corresponded to a liberal or to a conciliation of the liberal with the Islamic mode of organization of the state.²

The West was the only colonizer, and the only imperialist exploiter in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. But it was also the only modernizer and even the liberator. Patterns of modernization were sought in France, Great Britain, and the United States. The models for national revolution were the English, American, and French revolutions.³ The West was the center of imperialist power but it shone also as the center and the prime mover of world history towards liberty and progress.⁴

This Arab outlook on the West started to change as Soviet military and economic assistance found its way to the Arab world. The acceptance of this assistance by Arab socialist regimes, which emerged in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, following the Palestinian Disaster⁵ of 1948, was primarily the result of the failure to obtain assistance

(2) See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, 1798-1939, Oxford University Press, London, 1962.

(3) See Arnold J. Toynbee, *The World and the West*, Oxford University Press, London, 1953, p. 18-34.

(4) See Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1964.

(5) See Constantin Zuraik, *The Meaning of Disaster*, translated from Arabic by R. Bayly Winder, Khayat's, Beirut, 1958.

which was requested from the West. Soviet assistance did help to break the monopoly of power which the West held over the Arab world for a century and a half. But it did more than that. For the first time in their modern history, it gave to the Arabs concrete evidence of the existence of world centers for progress outside the West.

Dulles miscalculated when he withdrew the Western offer to assist in the building of the Aswan Dam, thinking that the Soviets would not have the will nor the ability to undertake such a project.⁶ It appeared to him

“... necessary to call Russia’s hand in the game of economic competition. Dulles firmly believed the Soviet Union was not in a position to deliver effectively on all her economic propaganda offers ...”⁷

In withdrawing the Western offer of assistance, Dulles was not defying the Soviets or humiliating the Arabs as much as he was closing an old and opening a new era in Western-Arab relations. The West was no longer the only provider of “civilizational aid”, i.e., of patterns for modernization and models for national revolutions. This new turn in Western-Arab relations shows that aid has a historic and civilizational — not only a political, military or economic — significance. Hence, it cannot be considered only as a new dimension in international

(6) See Alfred M. Lilienthal, *There Goes the Middle East*, The Devin-Adair Company, New York, 1957, p. 175-203.

(7) John Robinson Beal, *John Foster Dulles, A Biography*, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1957, p. 258.

relations, a new instrument of foreign policy, a manifestation of the power or affluence of a state, a humanitarian act from the rich to the poor. It must also be properly appreciated as a symbol of the will and the ability of a community to contribute to human progress.

Therefore, what really matters in our study of Western aid to the Arab world is a reassessment of the ability and the will of the West to contribute to human progress in general and to Arab progress in particular. Not only Western politics, economics, and strategies, but the whole Western outlook on the world is at stake. The sound basis for proper aid is not

“... a change in policy so much as a change in point of view. We must lift ourselves out of our accustomed American frame of reference and catapult ourselves across a distance wider than the oceans that separate us from the continents in which the struggle for development is taking place ...”⁸

2. The Developmental Objective of Aid

Arab renaissance has moved from a political into a developmental revolution. Today, most Arab countries are sovereign and independent, but all Arab states are underdeveloped. The common goal of these states is to make

(8) Robert L. Heilbroner, *The Great Assent, The Struggle for Economic Development In Our Time*, New York, Harper Torchbooks, 1963, p. 145-8.

the transition from under-development to development. The will to achieve this great but trying transition as fast as possible is at the root of most Arab upheavals. At stake

"... is not merely the rate of economic growth. An impressive growth rate has been achieved by a number of Middle Eastern countries during the past decade."⁹

Indeed the Arab developmental revolution expresses not only an urge for economic change but a general striving for a new way of life. It is a revolution

"... which includes, altogether and in telescoped time, the crumbling of a traditional way of life ... the rise of new social classes, the rise of new political elites, the pressure for choice among a new range of ideologies, the availability of new institutions and instruments for developing new systems of power and for producing and distributing new ideas and new resources..."¹⁰

True aid is what the West has contributed and will contribute to this developmental revolution. It is Western appreciation of the Arab will to change, to develop, and

(9) Manfred Halpern, "The Character and The Scope of Social Revolution In The Middle East," in **The Development Revolution, North Africa, The Middle East and South Asia**, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1963, p. 7.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 8.

to catch up with modern civilization. Any form or amount of aid — military, technical, or economic — would be wasteful for both the donor and the recipient, unless it was oriented toward the proper promotion of this developmental revolution. Since it is now clear

“... that modernization is a social process, neither capital increments nor technical changes alone account for the difference between underdeveloped and modern industrial societies. **To have a continuing impact, foreign aid has to concern itself deeply with the social, political, cultural and total economic context in which it operates overseas.**”¹¹

3. Arab View of Aid

To meet this “developmental” objective, the donor of aid should approach its recipient as a “developer” not as an exploiter nor as a benefactor. There should be

“... general agreement that long-term development of the recipient country is the over-riding objective of economic assistance. It is not necessary to eliminate the variation in donor preferences for individual countries so long as the criteria for amounts and forms of aid are based on developmental considerations.”¹²

The motives of the donor may be altruistic or utili-

(11) John D. Montgomery, *Foreign Aid In International Politics*, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1967, p. 46. [Emphasis added.]

(12) Hollis B. Chenery, *Why Aid, The Effectiveness of Foreign Assistance*, Background Paper Submitted to Overseas Studies Committee Conference 1966, University of Cambridge, p. 26.

tarian, but the objective of aid, whatever its motives, should aim directly to "... contribute to the development of the recipient countries ..."¹³

This "developmental" objective for aid is advocated by most Arab economists who have written on the subject :

"... Aid should be strictly aimed at economic development and the raising of the standard of living."¹⁴

A general strategy of development should be adopted by the recipient country, which would integrate foreign aid in the national policy for financing development :

"The internal and external sources for financing development should not be artificially separated. A sound look at the situation would reveal the complementarity of these sources. The flow of capital from each of the two sources should be purposefully regulated in the light of the prerequisites of developmental strategy..."¹⁵

(13) Oran Ohlin, *Foreign Aid Policies Reconsidered*, Development Centre OECD, Paris, 1966, p. 100.

(14) Elias Saba (Professor of Economics at the American University of Beirut). "A Lebanese Point of View, General Assessment," in *International Cooperation for Development*, Development Studies Associations, Beirut, Lebanon, 1966, p. 93.

(15) Youssef Sayagh (Professor of Economics at the American University of Beirut), "Financing Development in the Developing World," in *Al-Mawarid al-Malia wa al-Inma fi Lubnan* (Financial Resources and Development in Lebanon), The Proceedings in Arabic of the Second Development National Conference of the Development Studies Association, Beirut, Lebanon, 1967, p. 88-9.

The donors of aid can buy the political loyalty of the recipient country neither with dollars nor with rupees. Therefore, "developmental" objectives should transcend political considerations. Political eligibility must be ruled out.

"... It is now abundantly clear that political loyalty transcends any pecuniary advantage. It is equally erroneous to think of aid as an instrument to promote trade. Such a consideration undermines the confidence of the recipient in the ultimate aims of aid. The only relevant consideration should be simply and exclusively the economic development of the recipient."¹⁶

The governments of the fourteen member states of the Arab League have had a great variety of experiences with foreign aid. The Arab world has unity in the midst of variety. The Arab countries have had different political and socio-economic conditions. They have had different relations with foreign powers. Therefore, although they have all received foreign aid in one form or another, their needs and their reactions to it have not always been the same. Arab states, like Jordan and Libya, before the discovery of oil, needed budgetary aid for the sake of survival. Lebanon receives multilateral rather than bilateral aid. Egypt has received multilateral as well as

(16) Said El-Naggar (Professor, Faculty of Economics and Political Science, Cairo University), *Foreign Aid to United Arab Republic*, Cairo, 1963, p. 76-7.

bilateral aid from both the West and the East. Syria has generally received Eastern aid.

This variety of conditions makes it difficult, if not misleading, to speak of an official and common Arab view of foreign aid. A common Arab view of aid may be inferred only from a more general view of aid as expressed by the "club of 77" underdeveloped states at the United Nations Trade and Development Conference in Geneva in 1964 as well as at the special meeting of the "club" in Algeria in 1967 (in preparation for the New Delhi conference in February 1968). The discussions and conclusions of these meetings spell out what may be called "the doctrine of the underdeveloped on foreign aid." This doctrine is based on the rejection of the present world conditions for the flow of capital between the developed and the developing countries through both aid and trade. In spite of all aid supplied by the developed countries, the general balance of payments between the developed and the developing countries is still in favor of the donors. The rich are becoming richer and the poor poorer. Thus, the gap between the rich and poor is widening. Aid is falling short of the objective of the United Nations Development Decade of one per cent of the national product of the developed. The growth of the underdeveloped is not attaining the minimum rate of five per cent.

This worsening situation calls for

"...a revolution in the organization of world economic relations ... The underdeveloped countries ... are

not ... to ask for charity but to try to introduce new ethics in economic relations. They appeal to international solidarity ... They seek a world economy to be founded on more human bases and to replace with its human objectives and means the present mechanisms which have aggravated inequality among nations."¹⁷

This revolution in the organization of international economic relations should have as its ultimate goal a fair redistribution of income among nations along the lines of the redistribution of income among the citizens of a nation. It should be achieved through a dialogue between the developed and the underdeveloped countries.¹⁸ It should lead to the reformulation of aid policies. The volume of aid should increase. Its terms should be softened. Its channels should become more multilateral than bilateral. New terms should be set for the payment of debts. Aid should be free from any political, economic, military or other conditions unacceptable to the developing countries. Both bilateral and multilateral aid should aim

“... at strengthening the economic and political independence of developing countries ... supplement and

(17) Declaration of Bachir Boumaza (Minister of Economy of Algeria), delivered at the Geneva Conference, *Le Commerce et Le Developpement Economique, Actes de la Conférence des Nations Unies*, Geneve, 1964, 2, Declartions de principes, Nations Unies, New York, p. 110-11.

(18) Gerard Viratelle, *Le Cri d'Alarme de la Conférence d'Alger*, Croissance des Jeunes Nations, December, 1967, p. 10-13.

facilitate 'their' efforts ... to ensure the steady and uninterrupted growth of their national economy through industrialization, the development of agriculture and the diversification of production and foreign trade ..."19

These developmental aspirations of the underdeveloped took their final expression in what is called the "Algiers Charter for Economic Human Rights" for the promotion of a new and just economic order.²⁰

The developed and the underdeveloped countries may not agree on what are the premises and the conclusions of this aid doctrine. They do agree that, after twenty years of trial and error, the policies of aid of the donors and the recipients require a fundamental reassessment. Aid has reached a state of crisis in both the developed and the developing countries. The awareness of this crisis is reflected in Mr. Wood's call for an international conference on aid :

"... to eliminate the mistrust, the sense of frustration, and the misunderstandings which are now prejudicing the cause of aid for development, the most outstanding world experts should meet to study the

(19) *Ibid.*, Annex A, IV. 3, **Aims of International Financial and Technical Cooperation**, p. 87.

Also see Document de politique générale pour la réunion des ministres des 77, **Projet de chapitre concernant le financement**, 77/22/18, 18 Juillet 1967.

(20) **Le Commerce du Levant**, Beirut, October 21, 1967, p. 1.

results of twenty years of aid to development, to recognize past mistakes and to suggest more efficient policies and procedures for the future.”²¹

4. The Politics of Western Aid to the Arab States

Mr. Wood's suggestion would be very useful if applied to Western aid to the Arab states. A conference of Western and Arab experts on aid should undertake the reappraisal of the shortcomings, the achievements, and the premise of this aid. To our knowledge, such a general reappraisal has never been attempted either in the West or in the Arab world. This is the more necessary as the whole structure of political and economic relations between the West and the Arab world was put to a critical test during the third Arab-Israeli war of June 1967.

This time also aid was indirectly or directly a determining factor in the crisis. The state of tension in the area, which preceded the explosion of the war, was partly, at least, due to the deterioration of American-Egyptian relations as a result of American failure to continue to supply Egypt with surplus agricultural commodities.

“... Since 1965, two events provoked Nasser's suspicion ... a plot attributed by his intelligence service to the C.I.A. in cooperation with the organization of

(21) «Discours du Président de la Banque Mondiale le 13 Novembre 1967 au Conseil Economique et Social de l'O.N.U.», *Ibid.*, December 15, 1967, p. 45-49.

extreme right, the Muslim Brotherhood and the suspension by Washington of the food aid which, during ten years, allowed Egypt to save one billion dollars of hard currency. This measure was interpreted by Cairo as an act of war ..."²²

The events, which led to the Suez Campaign of 1956 or the second Arab-Israeli war, were also triggered by Dulles withdrawal of the Western offer to assist in building of the Aswan Dam. These wars, which shook world peace twice in a period of less than eleven years, were connected either with Western aid to the Arab states or with Western aid to Israel. The breaking by some Arab states of their diplomatic relations with the United States and Great Britain and the suspension of the flow of Arab oil to the West were prompted by the alleged charges of American-British military aid to Israel in her surprise attack of June 5, 1967. Diplomatic relations with Bonn had been broken earlier in 1965 by ten Arab states because of West German military aid to Israel. In 1955 Soviet aid started coming to the Arab world as the result of Washington's refusal to extend military aid to Cairo. In North Africa, French aid has always suffered from the fluctuations of political relations between Paris, Tunis, Algiers, and Rabat.

These tragic happenings should explain why foreign

(22) Eric Rouleau, "Le Régime Nassérien en Question," *Le Monde*, Paris, December 27, 1967, p. 4. See also the statement of Mr. David Ness, former member of the American Embassy in Cairo, *Al-Hayat*, Beirut, February 9, 1968.

aid is generally considered more political than developmental in the Arab world. They also show the inseparable link between Western aid and Western policies toward the Arab world. The year 1967 was the most critical year in the history of American and British aid to the Arab states. But it was the most propitious year for French-Arab economic cooperation. The major cause lies in Arab reaction to the different attitudes of the three Western countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict. There are different Western policies toward the Arab world as there are different Arab policies toward the West. Yet, there is a basic question concerning the policy of aid, which lies behind all these policies : Should the West extend its aid to a free or to a subservient Arab world ?

Indeed, Western-Arab experience in aid is another proof that

“Foreign aid is a political force abroad and a political issue at home, irrespective of its successes and failures. Its purposes and its achievements, its origins and its operations, its giving and its receiving, all involve conflicts of ideology and power.”²³

The prevailing impression in the West is that the Arabs in general, and Nasser in particular, in their aid transactions, have played off the West against the East. Voices are often heard from the American Congress accusing Nasser of arrogance, ingratitude, and belligerency.

(23) John D. Montgomery, *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, Praeger, New York, 1962, p. 3.

"Some Arabs may stigmatize the political aspects of American aid, but they are the first to play the most uneconomical politics with both foreign aid and Arab oil."²⁴

It is very significant that most of the politics of Western aid in the Arab world have revolved around Egypt. Egypt, with a population of thirty million, is the largest Arab state. She suffers from overpopulation, which makes her need for foreign aid greater than that of any other Arab state.²⁵ She occupies a central geographic position between the Asian and African parts of the Arab world. With the Al-Azhar religious university, she became a world center for Islamic learning and Arab culture. Next to Lebanon, she was the first Arab country to be opened to Western civilization. This enabled her to be ahead of other Arab states in the formation and training of her intellectual and administrative elite.²⁶ From Muhammad Ali, at the turn of the nineteenth century, to President Nasser, Egypt has played a leading role in modern Arab renaissance. Assuming this leading role within the Arab League, Egypt could be the greatest influence in orienting the Arab world toward unity or

(24) George Liska, *The New Statecraft, Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1964, p. 14.

(25) See Charles Issawi, *Egypt in Revolution, An Economic Analysis*, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963.

(26) See Malcolm Kerr, "Egypt", in *Education and Political Development*, edited by James S. Coleman, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1965, p. 169-195.

disunity, toward alignment or non-alignment with either the West or the East, and toward peace or war with Israel.²⁷

Nasser's charismatic appeal to the Arab masses is simply the newest manifestation of this leading Egyptian position in the Arab world. This position has made Egypt the major protagonist and the main target of the international and regional contest over foreign aid to the Arab world. Egyptians, like all Arabs, see clearly all the political implications of Soviet military and economic aid. But they feel that they have seldom been left with much choice by the West. The Arabs realize fully that

"Each donor has a goal which is both economic and political in context. Nasser is fully aware of each goal. But for him foreign aid is as vital to Egypt as the Nile. Both must be harnessed and made to work for a developing Egypt. Without either, he could not survive."²⁸

Nasser and his associates feel that the West in general, and the United States in particular, have played "a school teacher's game of punishments and rewards" with aid. Thus Egypt was denied American aid until she reached an agreement with Great Britain in 1954. She was then offered some economic aid but she was denied mili-

(27) See Dayan's statement, *L'Orient*, Beirut, January 20, 1968.

(28) Patrick Kennedy Robins, *A Case Study in Non-Alignment, Nasser's Policy in Seeking Foreign Aid for Egypt, 1952-1960*, M.A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, Summer, 1965, p. 164.

tary aid because of her refusal to sign the Mutual Security Act or make peace with Israel. Egyptian officials claim that they went to every quarter to get weapons for the army — to Britain, to France, to America — but all

“... wanted to arm the troops after we had signed a document or after we had signed a pact ... We declared that even though we had wanted and had decided to arm our troops, we would never sign a document. We declared that we would not arm our troops at the expense of our freedom.”²⁹

Egypt concluded a commercial arms agreement with the East but was anxious to continue on friendly terms with the West, without involving herself in a Western-oriented Middle East regional pact. Upon his meeting with Nasser to finalize the Western offer in the building of the Aswan Dam, Mr. Black, the former president of the International Bank

“...left with the impression that Nasser was not leaning toward the Soviet Union : Nasser is friendly to the United States. **Friendly perhaps, but not subservient...**”³⁰

The punishment for non-subservient friendship, i.e.,

(29) Carol A. Fisher and Fred Krinsky, *Middle East In Crisis, A Historical and Documentary Review*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 1959, p. 131.

(30) Robbins, *op. cit.*, *New York Times*, February 13, 1956, p. 3. [Emphasis in the original].

for Egypt's opposition to the Baghdad Pact was Dulles' decision to withdraw the offer to assist in the building of the Aswan Dam. This opposition convinced Dulles that Nasser was an irredeemable enemy of the United States. Dulles seems to have said in an official meeting in Washington :

"I do not like Nasser and do not believe that he will ever be our friend. We should not allow him to get away with what he seized. We should cut him to size and keep him in the proper size until we get rid of him..."³¹

In the Suez crisis of 1956, the United States firmly opposed the tripartite attack against Egypt. But, during and after the crisis, Washington exerted heavy economic pressure on Egypt which undermined the favorable effect of her stand. She appeared to be striving to achieve by peaceful means what others failed to achieve by war.

"We cannot forget the stand of the United States during the time of the aggression ... but unfortunately this position changed ... the United States had ... a plan of pressure against Egypt by stopping the sale of wheat and oil. This plan was to realize by peaceful means what the aggression had failed to realize by force."³²

Finally food aid was discontinued under President

(31) Muhamed Hassanein Heykal, *Nahnu wa America, We and the United States*, Dar Al-Asr Al-Hadith, Cairo, 1967, p. 111.

(32) President Nasser, *New York Times*, July 27, 1957, p. 1.

Johnson. This was interpreted as another attempt at starving the Egyptian people in order to influence Egyptian policy.

"... because we expressed our view on Israel... nuclear development ... and China as we feel, the American government has decided there is to be no aid to the United Arab Republic unless there is a certain American national interest."³³

This political manipulation of aid may be either denied by Western observers or justified as a necessary check on Cairo's anti-Western policies. This would call for the drawing of a clearer line between anti-Western and neutralist attitudes, which are dictated by genuine concern with freedom of action and national independence. There is a link between military and economic assistance to the Arab states, which has affected and continues to affect the relations of the West with its most proven Arab allies — not only with non-aligned Arab leaders. Nuri Al-Said, former prime minister of Iraq, signed the Mutual Security Act. He took the initiative in the conclusion of the Baghdad Pact with Turkey. But he also suffered greatly from the ordeals of Western military and economic assistance. He was leading Iraq's policy between 1954 and 1958 against great odds at home, in the Arab world, and in the West. The story of American-Iraqi relations in this period "is essentially a story of failure." In the end, Nuri

(33) President Nasser, *New York Times*, July 22, 1966, p. 2.

"... was killed by his own people. Did we contribute to this tragic denouement ? I think we did ... If we had a clear conception of what we were trying to do with our military aid : if we had been prompt in meeting requests for technicians and specialists ... Nuri would have been strengthened and his chances of survival, to pursue the constructive things he had embarked on in the closing years of his life, would definitely have been brighter."³⁴

Aid has also been used as an instrument in inter-Arab politics. It served to play one Arab leader against another. This was a part of the system of punishments to anti-Western and rewards to pro-Western leaders. In 1957, Nasser appeared as the prototype of the anti-Western and King Saud the prototype of the pro-Western. Saud was invited to Washington because

"At the time as the Suez experience showed, Colonel Nasser of Egypt was not only trying to improve his own position by working with the Kremlin; he was striving to get himself recognized in the Arab world as its political leader ... To check any movement in this direction, we wanted to explore the possibilities of building up King Saud as a counterweight to Nasser..."³⁵

(34) Waldemar J. Gallman (former American Ambassador to Iraq), *Iraq Under Nuri, My Recollections of Nuri Al Said, 1954-1958*, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1964, p. 197.

(35) Dwight D. Eisenhower, *Waging Peace, 1956-1961*, Doubleday, New York, 1965, p. 115-6.

The same leader may appear in a different light at different times. He would look at one time anti-Western, at another time anti-communist, and at a third time pro-Western. Aid would follow the fluctuations of these images. This was the case with Nasser as he engaged in conflicts with the communists and in public polemics with Soviet leaders after 1958. The reward came in large aid under Public Law 480.

“During 1959 the attitude of President Nasser seemed to become progressively less aggressive. From October 1958 to the end of 1963, stability in the Middle East and North Africa improved remarkably. President Nasser has continued to run the Suez Canal in a way satisfactory to all users...”³⁶

Should aid continue to be subordinated to the fluctuations of Arab and Western politics or should it be “depolitized” and “liberated” in the mutual interest of the Arabs and the West ? Could the West and the Arabs agree on general and fundamental objectives for aid which would transcend political changes ? Would aid as an investment in long-term development prevail as the best political achievement ? Would this be a better policy for the future or the policy which involves

“... the danger that our entire foreign aid program could become nothing more than a reactionary force built around United States response to political

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 288-9.

situations ... that were not complementary to the goals of the United States?"³⁷

5. Patterns of Western Assistance to the Arab States

Political factors which inhibit the functioning of aid should be sought in the Arab world as well as in the West. Arab suspicion of the imperialist character of Western aid, the confusion of a positive non-aligned outlook with a negative isolationist outlook, the failure to grasp the mechanism of Western institutions concerned with aid, governmental instability, administrative inefficiency, inter-state rivalries, and lack of planning on a national and regional level have handicapped the Arab absorptive capacity for foreign aid.

The Arab states vary greatly in their per capita income, in their need for aid and in their capacity to absorb it. The lowest per capita income is in the Yemen which it is \$90 and the highest is in Kuwait where it attains \$3,290. Oil-producing Kuwait is an exception. The real gap is between \$90 in the Yemen and \$390 in Lebanon. (See Table 1)

Between 1945 and 1967 American bilateral aid to the Arab states, in all its forms, amounted to 3,741 million dollars. The greatest beneficiaries have been :

(37) Paul R. Wineman, **Some Economic and Political Approaches Toward Future American Policy in the Middle East**, M.A. Thesis, American University of Beirut, May, 1967, p. 183.

The U.A.R.	1,146 million dollars
Morocco	591 million dollars
Jordan	562 million dollars
Tunisia	516 million dollars

The smallest beneficiary has been the Yemen with no more than \$43,600,000. (See Table 2) In 1966 American aid to the Arab states was 81 million dollars. With the suspension of aid to Jordan in 1967, it fell to 37 million dollars. (See Table 3) British bilateral aid to all Arab countries amounted in 1966 to 15,553,000 pounds. The greatest beneficiaries were :

South Arabia	10,403,000 pounds
Jordan	2,605,000 pounds
Sudan	1,321,000 pounds

(See Table 4).

French aid to Algeria fell from 2,097 million French Francs in 1963 to 945 million French Francs in 1966.³⁸

These figures representing the major Western donors of aid show the decline of their bilateral aid to the Arab states in 1967. Most of what remains of it is for technical assistance. A brief review of some of the patterns of this aid would help to assess its impact on Arab economic development.

Egypt, the greatest recipient of American aid,

(38) *L'Aide de la France aux pays en voie de Développement*, Année 1966, Ministère de l'Economie et des Finances, Services de l'Information, p. 7.

established what a student of foreign aid has called a "triangular pattern," which has allowed her to benefit from Western and Eastern aid.³⁹ American aid to Egypt by 1967 amounted to \$1,146,100,000. Soviet assistance amounted to one billion dollars. American assistance under Public Law 480 amounted to \$914,000,000. Consequently very little American aid has been directly allocated for development purposes.

"Of the total of non-P.L. 480 assistance, about 85 million was obligated for the industrial sector, 50 million for agriculture and 31 for electric power facilities."⁴⁰

Most Soviet aid has been directed toward the building of the Aswan Dam and the industrial sector. Some 26% of the investment in the Five-Year Plan of 1960-65 was drawn from foreign loans and credits. With the foreign exchange saved by aid through Public Law 480

"... foreign aid expenditures in the U.A.R. were equivalent to 45% of total investment during the plan."⁴¹

The annual rate of growth achieved by the plan attained an average of 7%, which is better than the rate of growth, during the same period, in most developing countries.⁴² A second Seven-Year plan was interrupted by

(39) See Robbins, *op. cit.*

(40) Leo Tansky, *U.S. and U.S.S.R. Aid to Developing Countries, A Comparative Study of India, Turkey and the U.A.R.*, Praeger, New York, 1967, p. 147.

(41) *Ibid.*, p. 156.

the June 5 war with Israel. The financing of the plan would have required \$1.8 billion in foreign investment. Egypt was hoping that the increase in her earnings from oil would diminish her reliance on foreign aid for the financing of the plan. These earnings were expected to reach 100 million Egyptian pounds by 1970.⁴³

The war and the continuing Israeli occupation of Sinai and the eastern side of the Suez Canal has deprived Egypt of major sources of foreign currency such as the revenues from the Suez Canal and from tourism. To compensate for these losses, it was decided at the Summit Conference of the Heads of the Arab States at Khartoum in August 1967 that the oil-producing countries of Kuwait, Libya, and Saudi Arabia would extend to the Arab states, directly affected by the war, an annual financial grant of 135 million pounds, 95 to Egypt, and 40 to Jordan.⁴⁴ In 1967, the total amount of credits received from "friendly countries" in the West and the East reached \$253 million.⁴⁵ There seems to be a recent request for short-term commercial loans from Great Britain.⁴⁶

As a result of the large volume of foreign aid,

(42) Abdul Mounaim Al-Kaissouni, "The Egyptian Economy in the Battle," in Arabic, in *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, June 1, 1967.

(43) Ibrahim Nafi, "A Look at the Economic Problems before and after the Agression," in Arabic, in *Al-Ahram*, July 27, 1967.

(44) *L'Orient*, Beirut, September 2, 1967.

(45) Middle East Information Agency, which is Egypt's official agency, reported in *L'Orient*, Beirut, August 10, 1967.

(46) *The Daily Telegraph*, January 26, 1968.

Egypt's external debt amounts to \$1.3 billion. Egypt favors an international agreement, which would allow her and all developing countries with large external debts to obtain better terms for repayment.⁴⁷

The impact of aid under Public Law 480 has received special attention from Egyptian economists. The analysis of this impact has led some of them to suggest a reconsideration of this law

"... if it is to serve the purpose of promoting economic development. The real aid elements will have to be given greater weight whether in the provisions or in the administration of the law. Furthermore, the law should not have the effect of reducing dollar earnings of the less developed countries ... the use of the counterpart funds in local loans should not be deemed as aid, nor should they be regarded as a substitute for other forms of aid."⁴⁸

Egypt is struggling to recover from the political and the economic effects of the "setback" of the war with Israel. She has transformed her economy to a "war economy." Western aid contributed to the success of her first development plan. It can still contribute to her economic recovery as well as to her future development

(47) Muhammad Hassanein Haykal, "The Search for New Thought in New Delhi," in Arabic, in *Al-Ahram*, Cairo, October 21, 1966. See Dragoslav Auramovic and Associates, *Economic Growth and External Debt*, The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1964.

(48) Naggar, *op. cit.*, p. 27-35.

plans. In spite of all the ups and downs of her relations with the West, aid does appear to her as a " ... symbol of cooperation ... and as an investment in the future of Egypt. "49

Jordan has established a pattern of complete reliance on the West and the Arab world for budgetary and development aid. She has not yet received any aid from the East. The June 1967 war with Israel may open the way to Soviet-Jordanian cooperation. As has happened before with other Arab countries, the sale of Soviet arms may be the first step toward economic cooperation. King Hussein of Jordan stated in December 1967 in New York that, " His country would turn to the Soviet Union if the United States refuses to replace the arms lost by Jordan in the war with Israel. "50

Prior to this war, Jordan set for herself the year 1970 as a deadline for ending her reliance on budgetary foreign aid. She adopted a seven-year plan (1964-1970)⁵¹ which would allow her " to start cutting on the aid received by 1967, and that it would be possible to cut aid almost

(49) Mahmoud Fawzi, Counselor on foreign relations to the President of the U.A.R., as quoted in Robbins, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

(50) *L'Orient*, Beirut, December 10, 1967. The U.S. decided to resume the delivery of arms to Jordan. — *L'Orient*, Beirut, Feb. 15, 1968.

(51) See Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, *Investment Opportunities Under the Seven Year Plan, 1964-1970*, Jordan Development Board, Amman.

completely by 1970. ”⁵² The estimated budget for the plan was 209 million Jordanian Dinars with a foreign contribution of 74 million Jordanian Dinars consisting of loans from Kuwait, the United States, Great Britain and international organizations.⁵³

The Israeli occupation of Old Jerusalem and the Western Bank has deprived Jordan of 38% of her resources. She also lost 40 million Jordanian Dinars of her earnings in foreign currency. This has been compensated by Arab financial assistance.⁵⁴ The granting of this assistance led to the cutting of American and British budgetary aid. Development aid has continued.⁵⁵ American and British aid began to decline in 1957 at a much faster rate than was expected by the Jordanian Government.⁵⁶

This may be due to the unexpected high rate of growth achievement by Jordan in her hard struggle for self-reliance. This rate attained 11% in 1965. The per capita income attained then 90 Jordanian Dinars, i.e., twice what it had been in 1955.⁵⁷

(52) Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Jordan Development Board, *The Economic Delegation to Germany, England and U. S. A. — Minutes, September — October, 1962, Conference with Mr. Gaud, Assistant Administrator for the Middle East and South Asia, USAID.*

(53) *L'Orient*, Beirut, May 6, 1967.

(54) *L'Orient*, Beirut, January 20, 1968.

(55) Official statement of the British Embassy in Amman, *Al-Hayat*, Beirut, January 24, 1968, *L'Orient*, Beirut, February 9, 1968.

(56) A statement of a spokesman for the Jordanian Government, *Al-Hayat*, Beirut, December 9, 1966.

(57) *L'Orient*, Beirut, May 6, 1967.

Jordan's land is mostly desert. The most fertile part of her territory is now occupied by Israel. Half of her population are Palestinian refugees. Of all the Arab states, she has the longest frontier with Israel. She has had a shaky political position in the Arab world. Yet, prior to the war with Israel, with a remarkable educational progress⁵⁸ and a rational development of her natural resources in agriculture, industry, and tourism,⁵⁹ she was about to turn Western aid from an instrument for survival into a means toward self-sufficiency.

"With any luck says one economist, Jordan will become self-supporting viable nation. Fingers crossed, U.S. observers figure another decade should do it."⁶⁰

Tunisia has set a pattern for a successful "dialogue" between the donor and the recipient of foreign aid. The United States has been the major donor of aid to Tunisia. There has been a continuing dialogue between Americans and Tunisians :

"... on the best possible methods by which the recipient can advance his development and on how the donor can best contribute not only in material re-

(58) See Fahim I. Qubain, *Education and Science in the Arab World*, The Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1966, p. 320-40.

(59) See Elian Marar, *Financing Economic Development in Jordan*, Planning Division, Jordan Development Board, Amman, 1960.

(60) *Time*, December 21, 1962.

sources but also with advice and suggestions.”⁶¹

The United States extended aid to fill the vacuum left by France. France suspended her financial aid to Tunisia for political reasons. French aid was resumed this year. Tunisia received a loan of 400 million French Francs and concluded with France several agreements on economic and technical assistance.⁶²

Most aid to Tunisia has been from Western countries, but it has been also received from Eastern countries. The total aid received from fourteen Western and Eastern countries as well as from international organizations amounted between 1962 and 1965 to \$367.9 million. (See Table 5)

Tunisia has had close cooperation with the United States, but she has also had friendly relations with the Soviet Union. She has been grateful to the United States for backing the Tunisian people in their struggle “ for liberation as well as for the assistance which they granted us since we achieved independence.”⁶³ She has also been able to cultivate relations with the Soviet Union, which “ have always been based on perfect understanding and proven good will.”⁶⁴ Misunderstandings with France

(61) Andrzej Krassowski, *The American Experience in Tunisia*, University of Cambridge, Overseas Studies Committee Conference, 1966.

(62) *Al-Amal*, Tunis, January 14, 1968.

(63) President Bourguiba, *L'Orient*, Beirut, August 7, 1967.

(64) An article in *L'Action* of Tunis, as reported in *L'Orient*, Beirut, March 5, 1966.

resulted mainly from the Tunisian policy of "decolonization". As the French reaction to this policy was the suspension of French financial aid, the Tunisians thought that "French assistance was not disinterested. It was tied with political strings."⁶⁵

Tunisia's Four-Year plan 1964-68 should be financed with 280 million dinars of domestic savings and 175 million dinars of external assistance. The need for this assistance may increase effectively to 470 million dinars.⁶⁶ This is Tunisia's second development plan, which followed the first Three-Year Plan for "decolonization". The long-range objectives of the two plans have been :

1. Decolonization and integration of modern and traditional sectors.
2. An average growth rate of 6% per annum and a minimum income per head of \$120 by the end of the plan period.
3. Increased internal savings (from 8% to 26% of GDP) and the phasing out of foreign aid.
4. Longer life expectancy and vastly improved education (including universal primary school enrollment).

(65) President Bourguiba's statement as reported in Charles Debasch, *La République Tunisienne*, Librairie Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 1962, p. 95.

(66) Krassowski, *op. cit.*

Oil has already been discovered and Tunisia hopes to be able to extract uranium from her phosphates.⁶⁷ In 1966 Tunisia inaugurated an atomic research center which has concentrated on research on cancer and blood diseases.⁶⁸ She is striving for an increase in her savings and a reduction in her reliance on financial foreign assistance. In 1957, national savings contributed only 20% to the financing of all investment. The percentage has gradually increased. At the economic level, an operation " ... verite et severite ... will allow the country to assume her responsibilities and to mould a better destiny."⁶⁹

Lebanon provides a pattern of reliance on multilateral aid. With a per capita income of about \$400, Lebanon falls in "between the top three and the bottom three groups"⁷⁰ of underdeveloped countries. Therefore, she is not eligible for bilateral aid. Per capita income rose from \$200 in 1950 to about \$400 in 1967.⁷¹ This has been due to private initiative rather than to governmental planning.

(67) *L'Orient*, Beirut, May 6, 1966.

(68) *L'Orient*, Beirut, May 30, 1966.

(69) Moncef Guen, *La Tunisie Indépendante Face à Son Economie*, Publications du Cercle d'Etudes Economiques, Tunisie, 1961, p. 300.

(70) Charles Issawi, "Economic Development and Political Liberalism in Lebanon", in *Politics in Lebanon*, edited by Leonard Binder, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1966, p. 76.

(71) See *Rapport sur les Comptes Economiques, Republique Libanaise*, Ministère du Plan, Direction Centrale de la Statistique.

The government has concentrated on the building of the infrastructure and on educational expansion. Multilateral aid has been mostly directed toward projects in these two fields. Its annual amount, during the last five years, varied between 35 million Lebanese pounds and 58 million Lebanese pounds.⁷² This amount has been constituted of loans and grants accorded by the International Bank, the United Nations Development Program, the Food and Agriculture Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the World Health Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Liberal policy has encouraged the flow of private capital to Lebanon. From 1961 to 1965, foreign capital flowing into Lebanon amounted to 825 million Lebanese pounds, of which 92% was private. Most of this capital has been deposited in banks or invested in the services sector. Very little of it was invested in the sectors of agriculture or industry.⁷³ This has helped to create a great disparity between these three sectors, which has widened the gap between Lebanon's classes and provinces. To meet the challenge of this situation, the state adopt-

(72) Edmond Asfour, "Lebanon : Development and the Grants and Loans of International Organizations", in *Development and Financial Resources in Lebanon*, op. cit., p. 402.

(73) Elias Saba, "Development and Private Foreign Capital in Lebanon", in *Development and Financial Resources in Lebanon*, op. cit., p. 367.

ed since 1961 a development policy.⁷⁴ This policy is still at its beginning. Its promotion has been hampered by social, political, and administrative factors.⁷⁵ Thus, so far " The economic impetus to development (in Lebanon) has come from the private sector. " ⁷⁶

6. Arab Contribution to Western Development

These patterns illustrate the contribution of Western aid to Arab development. This contribution has involved capital, know-how, and technology. Most private Western capital has been invested in Arab oil. In 1966, the net income of oil companies in the Middle East, in Iran and the Arab countries including Libya⁷⁷, was estimated at \$3,180 million⁷⁸. Moreover, the commercial balance (excluding oil) between the West and the Arab states has been to the advantage of the Western states. In 1965, the deficit in American-Arab trade amounted to \$449,200,000⁷⁹. All these have been Arab sources of capital for Western

(74) See *The State and Development in Lebanon*, published in Arabic by the Development Studies Association, Beirut, 1966.

(75) See *Le Liban Face A Son Développement*, Etudes et Documents, Institut de Formation En Vue du Développement, Beyrouth, 1963.

(73) Edward S. Mason, "Introduction", Yusif A. Sayagh, *Entrepreneurs of Lebanon*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1962.

(77) *Petroleum Press Service*, July 1967.

(78) See Edmond Asfour (Professor of Economics at the American University of Beirut), *Aid and Financial Investment*, an unpublished report in Arabic, Beirut, 1967.

(79) *Direction of Trade, Supplement to International Financial Statistics*, Washington, 1961-65.

development. In the general context of a Western-Arab balance of payments, financial aid would appear reciprocal if not more advantageous to the West than to the Arab world.

7. Western Aid to Israel

Since the end of the Second World War, Israel has been the greatest problem in Western-Arab relations. This problem has affected aid policies, and was mostly responsible for the introduction of Soviet military and economic aid into the Arab world. Zionist pressure groups in the West have conducted a systematic campaign against Western military and economic aid to the Arab states.⁸⁰ Pro-Zionist congressmen have been the most active in blocking aid and trade with the U.A.R.⁸¹ Electoral considerations have played a determining role in presidential and congressional responses to Israeli requests for aid.²⁸ There has been an uneven balance between Western policies toward the Arabs and the Israelis, which has found one of its most concrete expressions in aid. According to American sources, United

(80) *The New York Times*, November 8, 1954. *The Washington Daily News*, November 26, 1954.

(81) *Al-Hayat*, Beirut, January 2, 1968.

(82) *International Herald Tribune*, January 9, 20, and 21, 1968. Also see Alfred Lilienthal, *What Price Israel*, Henry Regnery Company, Chicago, 1953.

States aid to Israel from 1945 to 1967 amounted to \$1,088 million. (See Table 2) If we add to it private United States contributions, American aid to two million Israelis would be equal to American aid to 100 million Arabs. The aid received by an Israeli would be fifty times the aid received by an Arab. Between 1954 and 1956, the per capita aid to an Israeli was estimated by the United Nations at \$83.00 while the per capita aid to an Egyptian citizen was \$2.10. With the addition of private contributions and non-United States sources of aid per capita aid to an Israeli citizen could be \$179.⁸³

This uneven balance of aid has been justified with the great Israeli adventure in development. A tough-minded economist would be in a better position to distinguish between the myths and the realities of Israeli economic performance. Indeed, the great uproar about Israel's swift victory, in the so-called Six Days War, has helped to spread additional myths about this performance. The result of this victory has been the occupation by Israel of all Palestine and parts of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. Since the Arab world views the West as the protector of Israel and as a major source of her strength, the Israeli occupation is equated with a Western occupation of Arab lands.

To Arab observers, whatever may be the intrinsic merits of Israel's developmental performance, its high

(83) Sayagh, *op. cit.*, p. 60-1.

cost has been paid by the Arabs and the West. In fact, the price of the whole Israeli adventure has been paid by the Palestinian community, which until the emergence of Israel in 1948, was one of the fastest developing Arab communities.

“Had history come to a stop sometimes in the early 1940s, we might have cited the case of Palestine as an example where the result of economic development had been of substantial and proven benefit... the population of Palestine was moving forward along lines which had substantially ameliorated the economic lot of the Arab and had enabled him in large numbers to join in an educational movement which resulted in high percentage of literacy⁸⁴.”

The tragedy of the dispossession of this community of its homeland has been at the heart of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It stands as a stumbling block, not only in Arab-Israeli relations, but also in the relations of the Arab world with the West. Western support for Israel has persuaded the Arabs that Western policies toward the Arab states have been made to serve Israeli rather than Western or Arab interests. This has opened a

(84) Arthur Z. Gardner, “Economic Evolution”, in *Evolution in the Middle East, Reform, Revolt and Change*, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1953, p. 48. See also Sami Hadawi, *Palestine, Loss of a Heritage*, San Antonio, Texas, 1963.

widening gap in Western-Arab relations, which has been filled by Eastern states. To widen the gap further, Western Zionist and pro-Zionist political and economic writers keep talking about the anti-Western character of the Arab developmental revolution. This fallacy has been eloquently refuted by the new atmosphere of French-Arab cooperation, which has been generated by France's neutral position during the last Arab-Israeli war. As President De Gaulle explained it in his correspondence with Mr. Ben Gurion, former prime minister of Israel, France is not siding with the Arabs against Israel. France does not underestimate the merits of Israel's performance, but France believes that the Arabs also have the right

"... to develop in spite of all obstacles opposed by nature, by the serious and humiliating setbacks of many centuries of foreign domination, and by their own dispersion."⁸⁵

The Arabs believe rightly or wrongly that because of Israel, the West has curtailed its aid to the Arab states and has abstained from giving aid to inter-Arab regional development. Obviously, the Arabs should take the initiative in such a development. The Arab Economic Unity Treaty and the project for an Arab development Fund are two steps in this direction.⁸⁶ The West has not

(85) Text in extenso in *Le Monde*, January 10, 1968. Summary in *International Herald Tribune*, January 10, 1968.

(86) See *Les Marchés Communs*, l'Association Libanaise des Sciences Politiques, Beirut, 1967.

shown any sign of encouragement or support for such Arab regional schemes. The West has suspected that the Arab movement toward integration is a threat to the security of Israel or is a menace to Western interests. These suspicions have been encouraged by the revolutionary socialist orientation taken by Arab nationalism. The national and regional foundations of the movement have been overshadowed by its ideological outlook. Conscious of the national character of the movement, the communists opposed it vehemently in Syria and Iraq. Thus, the opposition of the West and the East and the rivalries between Arab leaders have contributed to the failure of the movement toward Arab regional integration. The sense of frustration and the feeling of insecurity generated by this failure is greatly responsible for Arab political instability. An integrated Arab world would approach Israel uninhibited by inferiority complexes :

“Had the great powers helped to promote, since 1947, the efforts of the Arab league toward economic integration instead of playing off Arab progressives against conservatives, Arab royalists against republicans, and oil states against sand states, the Fifth of June was could have been avoided⁸⁷.”

Instead of encouraging Arab economic integration,

(87) Robert Bruon, former President of the Development Centre at the OECD, *Al-Ra'smal*, Beirut, January 27, 1968.

the West has encouraged Israel to present regional economic cooperation as a substitute for the proper settlement of the fundamental issues which are at stake in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since the creation of Israel in 1948, Western proposals for regional development have been directed toward Arab-Israeli integration rather than toward inter-Arab integration. This is true of the proposals for a regional authority for the Jordan River,⁸⁸ for the nuclear desalinization of sea water, and for a European Marshall plan for the Middle East.⁸⁹

The only Western proposal to support Arab regional cooperation was made in 1958 by President Eisenhower before the United Nations General Assembly :

“We favored an economic development plan to accelerate improvement in the living standards of the Arab peoples, and suggested consultations between the Secretary-General and the Arab nations of the Near East to devise a regional development organization. Its task would be to accelerate progress in such fields as industry, agriculture, water supply, health and education ... The institution would be set up to provide loans to the Arab states as well as technical assistance required ... The institution

(88) See Gordon R. Clapp, “Technical and Economic Partnership”, in *Americans in the Middle East, Partners in the Next Decade*, The Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 1950, p. 23-30.

(89) *Le Monde and L'Orient*, February 1, 1968.

should be governed by the Arab states themselves..."⁹⁰

8. Prospects for the Future

The reconsideration of such a bold proposal for Western aid to Arab regional development and the exploration of the whole future of Western aid to the Arab states should take place within the general context of Western-Arab relations as well as in the light of future Western policies on aid to the developing world. The future of Western-Arab relations in general and of American-Arab relations in particular depends much on the outcome of the efforts which are made under the United Nations auspices to reach a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, in implementation of the Security Council Resolution of November 22, 1967. So far, American sponsorship of the Israeli thesis at the United Nations has forced a greater Arab reliance on diplomatic, military and economic Soviet assistance. This has happened, despite a new trend stimulated in the Arab world by the international ordeals of the Fifth of June war, which is rather a trend toward self-reliance. This trend has found its concrete expression in financial aid from the oil-producing countries to Egypt and Jordan and in the new emphasis on the Arab Fund for Development. In adopting a less partisan attitude

(90) Eisenhower, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

towards Israel, the West would help to promote such a healthy trend. France has, this time, set out on the right path, which has been followed by Great Britain, and which may be followed by the United States if concern with the future of the West could transcend any other concern. The settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict will determine the future of Western-Arab relations much less than the "settlement" in the Arab mind of its worries about Western partiality toward Israel. As long as these worries are not dissipated, in one way or another, the Arabs will continue to conceive of Israel as a new form of Western imperialism and will persist in their thinking that her major function is to frustrate Arab development and to block Arab integration. This belief would inhibit the policy of aid and economic cooperation between the West and the Arab states.

Indeed, the West feels that it is deeply committed to Israel. Nevertheless, this commitment should not preclude a new Western outlook on Western Arab relations, which should reflect a new Western outlook on the developing world. These times of crisis in Western aid to the Arab world and of decline in Western aid to the whole developing world are the best times for a bold and wise reappraisal of Western policies. The West should decide whether it would like to play a leading and active role in the liberation of mankind from underdevelopment or whether it should limit itself to a classic policy of power or of self-defense toward the new changes and the new forces which are shaping the

future of mankind. Scientific and technological superiority is a decisive determinant of this future but it cannot be the only determinant. The real question is whether and how the West should share its miraculous scientific and technological progress with others, and whether others may be able to share creatively in this progress :

“Scientific and technological progress offers impressive perspectives to the Third world provided that it opens itself resolutely to this progress...”⁹¹

The causes for the current decline of Western aid are much more structural, political, and psychological than economic.⁹² The West is readjusting itself to a new world revolutionary situation, in which its historic mission is not to dominate but to share and work with others. The West has been the first promoter of this revolutionary change. True to its own historic self, it should be able to see its own image and to recognize its own humanistic and universalistic spirit in the revolution for social liberty in the communist world and in the revolution for national liberty in the Third world. Hence, the real task

“Confronting the Western nations is not to maintain

(91) Raul Prebisch, Rapport to the Second U.N. Conference on Trade and Development at New Delhi, *Le Monde*, January 30, 1968.

(92) See Pierre Drowin, “Le Nouveau Nom de la Paix”, in *Le Monde*, January 30, 1968.

but to regain their historic identification with freedom to win it anew in the eyes of the world.”⁹³

There is, behind all the immediate differences between Western concern with individual liberty, Eastern concern with social liberty and Afro-Asian concern with national liberty, a common human concern with social justice, which originated in the West and could be properly fulfilled only with Western assistance.

“The West can legitimately claim substantial credit, for it has not only conceived the ideal of social justice; it has also conjured up the material means for translating this ideal into practice. During the millenia before the modern Western marriage of technology with science, the surplus produced by society, beyond what was required for more subsistence, was so small that it sufficed only to give a privileged minority a share in the amenities of civilization. The modern Western increase in productivity through the application of science has been so enormous that it can now give the same amenities to the whole of mankind unless, of course, we use our new material power for committing mass suicide.”⁹⁴

For one century and a half, the Arab world has

(93) Hellbroner, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

(94) Arnold J. Toynbee, *The Present Day Experiment in Western Civilization*, Oxford University Press, London, 1962, p. 41.

sought Western science and technology for the sake of power but it has sought them also for the sake of progress, liberty, and social justice.⁹⁵ The real test of Western aid to the Arab world is whether the West would like to share its science and technology with the Arabs and whether it really believes that the Arabs can do so.

So far, technical assistance has been the most successful aspect of Western aid to the Arab world and the least vulnerable to political crisis. Syria, which has declined Western aid, has welcomed Western technical assistance.⁹⁶ In spite of all the fluctuations of French-North African political relations, the flow of French teachers, experts, and administrators to Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria has continued.⁹⁷ Arab students in Western universities number more than thirty thousand. This is far more than the number of Arab students in Eastern universities.⁹⁸

This may demonstrate that know-how is the essential problem for aid :

"... It dominates ultimately all other problems not only on the economic level but also on the level of

(95) See George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, Khayat's College Book Cooperative, Beirut, 1955.

(96) Summary of U.S. Economic Assistance to Syria, July 1959-November 1964. Economic Section, American Embassy, Damascus, Syrian Arab Republic, November 1964.

(97) Hayter, *op. cit.*, p. 106 and 136.

(98) See Qubain, *op. cit.*

the promotion of men. It is a common problem, though under different forms, to all countries. It is the problem of most of us as well as it is the problem of the developing countries.”⁹⁹

It is a problem of particular importance for the Arab states, which are called upon in the long run to rely on their human, much more than their natural, resources. In the short run, inter-Arab regional cooperation would promote the flow of oil capital from one Arab country into another. This would happen at an increasing rate, which would enable the Arab states to do gradually without foreign financial assistance. But they will continue to need to learn the know-how, which would allow them to utilize oil, not only for capital formation or for consumption but also for industrialization.

This may be an indication of the desirable course for Western aid to the Arab world. Technical assistance is much in harmony with the historic framework of the uninterrupted civilizational exchange between Western and Arab countries.

Educational aid was the beginning of modern Western aid to the Arab world. For a century American private capital has invested in the American University of Beirut one hundred million dollars. The material assets of the University are now worth two hundred mil-

(99) Michel Debre, French Minister of Economy and Finances, Statement given before the OECD Council, November 25, 1966.

lion. But its human assets have been fifteen thousand graduates who enjoyed the opportunity

“... for a favorable appraisal and assimilation of the principles of freedom and democracy that identify the American way of life and thought...”¹⁰⁰

There have been other thriving American and French colleges, faculties, and institutes in the Near East and North Africa.

Bearing in mind the basic function of education and training in development, educational aid would be the best Western investment in Arab development as long as it is properly and permanently re-adapted to Arab changing and growing needs. The Arabs need to eradicate illiteracy in all their countries, and to give better training to their farmers, workers, and administrators but they also need a better participation in scientific research at all levels.

Aid is obviously given with the hope of obtaining from all peoples a more favorable outlook on the West. Science, technology, know-how, training, and education may be transferred only in a given ideological context. Should this be necessarily a Western or an Eastern context ? In other terms, are Western liberalism and Eastern Marxism imperative ingredients of development or are there some “ universal developmental incen-

(100) Address by Trustee Shukri Shammas to Trustees Centennial Dinner, New York, 1966.

tives, " which may be stimulated in peoples, without a prior conversion either to liberalism or to Marxism? If development is not subject to any ideological determinism, the best ideological assistance, which the West could extend to the Arab world as well as to all developing countries, is to help stimulate in peoples "the developmental incentives" while recognizing their right to choose their own ideology. The world would, then, learn how to appreciate the authenticity of Western traditions of pluralism, tolerance, and freedom.

Such a new spirit permeating and guiding aid would be the most creative Western contribution to human progress. In my humble opinion, this would also be the best policy for the promotion of Western interests throughout the world.

TABLE 1

**Per Capita Income in the Arab States
in U.S. Dollars (1966)¹**

Iraq	240
Kuwait	3,290
Lebanon	390
Morocco	170
Sudan	95
Syria	180
Tunisia	180
U.A.R. (Egypt)	150
Yemen	90

(1) Croissance, Paris, November, 1967.

TABLE 2**American Aid to the Arab States and Israel¹ 1945-1967**

Algeria	\$ 202,500,000
Iraq	59,300,000
Jordan	562,200,000
Kuwait	50,000,000
Lebanon	103,000,000
Libya	208,600,000
Mauritania	3,400,000
Morocco	591,000,000
Saudi Arabia	47,400,000
Sudan	127,800,000
Syria	80,000,000
Tunisia	516,200,000
U.A.R. (Egypt)	1,146,100,000
Yemen	43,600,000
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Total	3,714,400,000
Israel	1,088,900,000

(1) American Embassy in Beirut

TABLE 3

American Aid to the Arab States in 1966¹

Jordan	\$ 44,000,000
Morocco	3,000,000
Sudan	14,000,000
Tunisia	17,000,000
U.A.R.	1,000,000
Yemen	2,000,000
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Total	81,000,000

(1) **Asfour**, unpublisher report.

TABLE 4**British Aid to the Arab States 1966 - £ thousand¹**

Aden and South Arabia	10,403
Bahrein	316
Iraq	26
Jordan	2,605
Lebanon	14
Morocco	2
Muscat and Oman	220
Saudi Arabia	1
Sudan	1,321
Syrian Arab Republic	59
Trucial States	463
Tunisia	23
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Total	15,553

(1) **British Aid**, Ministry of Overseas Development, 1967.

TABLE 5**Financial Aid to Tunisia, July 1962 - June 1965****Commitments in Millions of \$¹**

United States	196.2
France	29.6 ²
Kuwait	28.0
West Germany	20.0
Italy	10.0
IBRD	7.0
IDA	5.0
Denmark	1.5
Netherlands	1.4
Sweden	1.2
Russia	33.0
Poland	10.0
Czechoslovakia	10.0
Yugoslavia	15.0
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Total	367.9

(1) Krassowski, *op. cit.*

(2) French financial aid was made available in 1963 after an interval of several years and suspended again soon thereafter.

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