

PALESTINE BOOKS — No. 30

SETTLER COLONIALISM
IN SOUTHERN AFRICA AND
THE MIDDLE EAST

By

GEORGE JABBOUR



PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
RESEARCH CENTER

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Beirut — Lebanon
August 1970

This book was published at the expense of the University of Khartoum

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Introduction

This essay is an attempt at interpretation. It does not claim to make any real contribution to the present state of research regarding the three cases under study, namely South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel. It is not the result of a research undertaken in the field. Instead, it is an ambitious attempt at relating basic facts, already known, in such a way as to discern through them a pattern of behaviour that is claimed to be constantly existent in the three experiments which are the subject of this essay.

Underlying this essay is an assumption that there is a pattern of behaviour which is identical in its general lines exhibited by those European settlers who have formed political entities in non-European lands; that this pattern of behaviour is quite recognizable in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel; and that it is therefore warranted to study those experiments within the framework of this pattern of behaviour. It is the author's contention that such an approach to the study of settler colonialism is not only essentially valid, but is also useful in comprehending the past and rewarding in attempting to predict the course which events may take in the future.

* * *

The pattern of behaviour, claimed to be constantly existent and easily recognizable in the three experiments which are the subject of this essay, could be expressed in ordinary non-technical words as follows : From the first colonial era following the age of modern geographical discoveries, till the age of imperialism in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, non-European lands were considered vacant enough to allow Europeans to settle there on a permanent basis; indigenous cultures were considered far too inferior — in comparison to European culture — to earn the Europeans' respect for the indigenous population. The main concern of those Europeans who desired to settle permanently on lands that were not theirs was to secure a physical — that is geographical — basis for their settlements; thus they were invariably pre-occupied with the question of acquiring land. For their process of settlement to be "legally" secured — and this was important because legal security means not only legitimizing their acquisition of the natives' lands but also legitimizing their own political institutions — certain colonial, imperial acts were adopted or issued. These acts placed the settlers as a recognized entity in the orbit of colonialist-imperialist traditions. Once established in their new settlements, the settlers, as befits all colonialists, used to deal with the natives inhumanly. As settler colonialism is

different from traditional colonialism because the settlers are permanently there, and permanently in contact with the natives, this discriminatory inhuman treatment of the natives has been more systematic, intense and brutal than that which the natives were subjected to by overseas colonialist authorities. Declared espousal of discrimination, on the basis of race, colour or creed, without the need to feel apologetic about it, is the distinguishing feature of settler colonialism. Because the settlers are well-entrenched in the lands they acquire, settler colonialism is not as easy to dismantle as traditional colonialism. The colonialists here were not overseas agents who came to the colonies on duty; they were permanently stationed in the colony, permanently in control of the natives and permanently fortifying their positions of strength. Hence the anti-colonialist revolution after the Second World War did not affect them directly. They were and still are able to hold on stubbornly, and they will continue to hold on as stubbornly for some time to come in the future. This, however, does not mean that they are not being challenged, by the natives, by the countries in the regions in which the settler states are implanted, and by the world at large. Notwithstanding all these challenges, settler colonialism is at present far from being about to give up. The future still seems uncertain, and there is little doubt that it will be marred by fear and blood. What is the future of settler colonialism ? of the discriminatory practices of the settlers *vis-à-vis* the natives ? of the native liberation movements ? These are some of the most important questions of our present historical era.

* * *

Studies of comparative political developments have advanced steadily in recent years. Methods remarkable for their sophistication have been evolved. All sorts of quantitative and qualitative data are currently being employed to test, prove or disprove a "theory". In the pages that follow there is no effort whatsoever to formulate a neat, tight and coherent theory; and there is no effort to adopt or devise a methodology of the type students of comparative politics feel is necessary. The main reason lying behind this "short-coming" is that settler colonialism has not so far been adequately treated as a subject quite distinct from traditional colonialism. There are too many books written on South Africa, on Southern Rhodesia, on Israel and Algeria; yet there has not been enough attention paid to comparing the static and dynamic mechanisms that have shaped settler colonialism in its recognizable form. Little effort has been made to abstract a "model", rough as it may be, common to all experiments in settler colonialism.

The pages that follow do not present a meticulous study of the subject. They seek to draw no final, irrevocable and definite conclusions. Rather, the intention is that of sketching a "perspective" through which one can view the development of settler colonialism and its present condition, a thought-provoking

perspective that can be elaborated and refined in future studies, an attempt at understanding the three experiments, hitherto treated independently of each other, viewed in a new and essentially valid focus.

* * *

One of the motives of writing this essay is a personal bias. It has always seemed to me unjustified for the world to unequivocally condemn the discriminatory practices of the settlers in South Africa, to unequivocally condemn the usurpation of power by the settlers in Southern Rhodesia, and at the same time to be more lenient in respect of the crimes the Zionist settlers have committed and are still committing in Palestine, when the basic lines of all these regimes are identical to one another, when the three regimes are but manifestations of the same colonialism, settler colonialism. There are of course many causes that explain why the world was most indignant at the Smith regime's declaring its independence in 1965, while it was generally favourable to a similar act by Ben-Gurion less than two decades earlier. Such causes will be adequately dealt with below. The personal bias that was, in part, responsible for my writing this essay has prompted me to present a reasonably coherent interpretation of the similarities between the three settler regimes in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel. This essay, I hope, will help bring about a better understanding of the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict, in the light of its similarities to what is taking place in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

The basic thesis of this essay can explain many phenomena that require special studies. Of these phenomena, one may mention Israel's reserved attitude towards African independence movements until recently; the equivocal Israeli stand on apartheid at the UN; the flourishing Israeli trade and economic relationships with the settler regimes in Southern Africa; and — most importantly — the Israeli neo-colonialist policy in many African countries — especially those which are not in the vanguard of the battle against the settler regimes. But the most important of these phenomena and, indeed, the most deserving of detailed study are the effects of the structural similarities inherent in the South African, Southern Rhodesian & Israeli regimes on Israel's African policy on the one hand, and on the Middle Eastern policies of South Africa & Southern Rhodesia on the other.

**EUROPEAN SETTLERS ON NON-EUROPEAN LANDS :
PRETEXTS AND REALITIES**

Western civilization is generally considered to be dynamic. It is sometimes alleged to be more dynamic than any other previous civilization. It is not our aim here to analyze those factors in Western civilization that could be held responsible for such dynamism, nor is it our aim to detail the history of this dynamism. What will be attempted in this chapter is a presentation of an important manifestation of this dynamism, namely, territorial expansionism, especially as regards the three cases under study : South Africa, Zimbabwe (Southern Rhodesia)¹ and Palestine (Israel). In order to do that, a brief account of the atmosphere of colonialism and imperialism that prevailed in Europe during that epoch is necessary.

1. The Atmosphere of Colonialism and Imperialism.

Colonialism and imperialism are two terms that meant different things on different occasions. There is no real value in trying to define them. Both of them, however, connote a tendency exhibited by certain countries to dominate other countries and peoples. Both of them entail one or another form of expansion at the expense of others. Imperialism, however, is held to be a more self-conscious effort at expansion, emerging, as it did, as a result of the industrial revolution, the subsequent accumulation of capital, and the desire to export it.

European expansion began on the heels of the geographical discoveries that changed the time-honoured concepts of the extent of the earth. The explorers of the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries reported to their countrymen on the existence of lands not known to them before. Merchants and politicians seized on the new "discoveries" and started thinking of ways to utilize them for a variety of purposes. Economic, strategic, political and other purposes were involved. But one of the dominant themes, declared by politicians time and again, was the "white man's burden" of civilizing others, the "altruistic" desire to spread civilization among barbarians. The assumptions on which this "burden" was based, were pretty clear: the great European powers are the most civilized

(1) Zimbabwe is the African name for S. Rhodesia. The name Zimbabwe should have been used throughout this study, but for purposes of clarity, the European name was used instead.

because of their espousal of certain ideals : Christianity, democracy, good and organized government, and their development of modern technology. The rest of the world, the non-European world, was considered to be essentially barbarian. Motivated, but only outwardly and in part, by the Christian faith to save the heathens through preaching the Gospel, forces ready for adventure and to conquer the lands of the barbarians were set into motion after the explorers and missionaries. Economic profits, the assertion of superior racial qualities, the desire to further national interests through expansion — all interacted together under the general banner of the civilizing mission to provide the theoretical bases, the pretexts, for colonialism and then for imperialism. In the atmosphere that prevailed then, the non-European lands were generally considered as “vacant” — vacant, that is, not necessarily in terms of people (though this was the belief of many) but primarily in terms of civilization. The white man’s burden was to fill the gap, to develop the lands, and to bring the natives, whenever their existence was not denied, to a better order of things; to teach them how to appreciate the western values, believed to be “universal” values revealed for the first time through western civilization.

It was always presumed that civilizing the barbarians would ultimately be to their own benefit, though the barbarians would not be in a position to appreciate these benefits at first. This meant that the natives had to be brought to civilization against their will, if and when necessary. In this context, argued Treitschke, the German historian, “the great strides which civilization makes against barbarism and unreason are only made actual by the sword.” It was also presumed that commerce is bound to play an important role in civilizing the natives, as commercial relations would entail a “meaningful exchange” between the natives and the Europeans.

The vacant, non-European lands, were then conceived to be ready for the Christian gospels and European enterprises. European powers felt it legitimate to extend their domains into lands that were not their own. The fifteenth century witnessed the Europeans expand toward the south and the west. The Portuguese opened up Eastern trade with India. The Spaniards were also curious to discover new routes to India and in the process discovered what was to be called America. Vacant lands were thus opened up in the fifteenth century, mainly through the efforts of the Portuguese and the Spaniards. Local inhabitants were driven back, clearly put on the defensive, while the ardent propagators of Christianity found it convenient to divide the “spoils” of their conquest. What seemed important at the time was not to chart out a coordinated course on how to civilize the natives, but to work out agreements precluding the possibility of collision between the colonizing European states. A brilliant example of such agreements to divide up the lands conquered was the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, whereby Pope Alexander VI, acting as an arbiter for Christendom between Spaniards and Portuguese, divided the American continent according to his famous North-South line.

The sixteenth century witnessed the advent of new-comers to colonialism: Britain, France and Holland. Competition between European powers in their energetic expansionism grew keener. This pattern of competition was also further complicated by a multiplicity of other factors. The ultimate effect of all these factors was that by the end of the eighteenth century, the Westerners had already spread themselves over almost all the globe.

What was the attitude of the natives ?

It is beyond the scope of this essay to detail the natives' reactions to European expansion. Two points, however, could be made in this respect. The first point is that the Europeans were more advanced technically, and stronger militarily. The second point is that Europeans found it convenient — in order to substantiate their announced aim of civilizing the natives — to picture the natives as real barbarians belonging to primitive, almost sub-human races.

It is a fact that the natives were no military match for the new-comers. But this military non-competitiveness is not to be confused with primitiveness. Many of the non-European communities were quite well-developed culturally, such as India, China and the indigenous communities in what is now Latin America. In the case of Africa, certain archaeological remnants points to the long existence of a culture that had been well advanced prior to European expansion. In fact, one of the main concerns of many African nationalists at present is to rewrite the history of Africa in a fashion free from the traditional European distortions of that history. What should be emphasized, then, is that the Europeans, immersed as they were in the atmosphere of colonialism and imperialism, presented to themselves a picture of non-European lands and peoples that fitted them well in their self-appointed role as missionaries for Christianity and civilization. The natives' opposition to the invaders was generally described as an attack on civilization, while the systematic European penetration, accompanied by untold brutalities committed against the natives, was hailed as a civilizational triumph.

* * *

One of the most spectacular results of the atmosphere of colonialism was the legitimacy given by European powers to groups of European adventurers to settle on conquered non-European lands. European settlements on non-European lands represent one of the major events in world history, and their effects on future developments were and continue to be immense and far-reaching. The two continents whose existence was not known to the old world, America and Australia, had been for a long time settled by Europeans in a fashion not widely questioned at present. Other comparable experiments, such as those subjected to study in this essay, continue to be open not only to questioning, but are the sources of friction that threatens international peace and security. What are the

factors that made for the general acceptability of the U.S.A., Canada, the countries of Latin America, Australia and New Zealand, and the general questioning that surrounds the European settlements in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine ?

The experiments that are generally accepted now took place in areas that were — comparatively speaking — thinly populated, where the process of driving the natives back was fairly well accomplished before the advent of the twentieth century, and where the geographic conditions were such that they allowed the settlers to “clear” the whole area of the continents involved of native strong-holds. In the case of the experiments under discussion in this essay, the settlers did not penetrate far enough into the regions in which they settled. Groups of natives, of the same stock as those natives who had been driven back by the settlers, continued and will continue to surround those pockets of European settlers in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine. The natives’ resistance to the settlers, in the experiments under discussion, was not successful insofar as it did not prevent the settlers from achieving their temporary objectives, but it continued to be alive throughout the history of the European intrusion. The natives’ resistance was thus successful in keeping the case — so to speak — open until such time as ours with its ideals of freedom of self-determination for all the peoples of the world.

These are then the factors that worked against any possible general acceptance of the European settlements in Africa and the Middle East as a “closed case” similar to what took place in America and Australia. Let us turn now to a discussion on how Europeans started their settlements in the experiments under study.

* * *

European expansion in Africa started, at first, as a result of the drive to reach India by sea. The first European contacts with the “experiments” under discussion came in the year 1652, when the Dutch East India Company established a midway naval station at the Cape (South Africa), where Dutch sailors could rest half-way on their long trip Eastward. It should be recalled that the Dutch East India Company was established in 1602, when its Charter was approved by the United Provinces of the Netherlands. This company in a little over twenty years succeeded in ousting Portugal from large East Asian islands such as Java and Ceylon. The early Dutch comers to the Cape were Company servants. There they met the Bushman and the Hottentots and later the Bantu. The Bushmen and the Hottentots, generally not war-like tribes, posed no serious difficulties to the Europeans, especially in the early years, when Europeans were confined to the coast, restricting themselves to naval servicing.

The naval station was soon however to expand into a colony of farmers, who found themselves in a constant need of more land. With their superior tech-

nology, the Europeans were able, gradually, to drive the natives back and were able to make "herdsmen and servants of the Hottentots, whose tribal organization was broken by the double attack of colonists and smallpox." The luck of the Bushmen was no better than that of the Hottentots, and today there are no more than ten thousand of them left, while the number of the Hottentots is even less than that.

It is of importance to note at this point that Holland was Protestant in the traditions of Calvin, with all that these traditions involve: belief in predestination and strict adherence to the Bible. The bulk of the farmers, then called Boers, were Dutch. But later, some French came along. France was predominantly Catholic. The Edict of Nantes, however, proclaimed in April 1598, guaranteed for the French Protestants (usually called Huguenots) their religious freedom. In 1672, France attacked Holland and in October 1685 the Edict of Nantes was revoked and was followed by terrible religious massacres in France. French Protestants fled to neighbouring countries. The Dutch East India Company, in its quest to increase the number of European settlers in South Africa, seized on the opportunity and offered the Huguenots good conditions for settling there: free transportation and large lots of land. Thus, in 1688, for instance, the Cape Colony received a wave of immigrants larger in numbers than any other wave before the 19th century. The French (Huguenots) immigrants were dispersed by the company among the Dutch, so as to preclude the establishment of any special French colony. The Dutch language triumphed, and gradually a rather homogeneous European "community" developed.

The colony did not advance rapidly in the 18th century, due mostly to the increasingly weakened political position of Holland, and its Dutch East India Company. The company finally went bankrupt in 1794, the same year in which revolutionary France invaded Holland again. British power, on the other hand, was gathering momentum, and was becoming increasingly aware of the strategic value of the Cape. The Cape then was to become a bone of contention between rival European powers. When the Dutch William of Orange fled to England and proclaimed his Government-in-exile there, after the establishment in Holland of the French-Supported Batavian Republic, England decided to occupy the Cape in order to prevent revolutionary France from doing so. British occupation took place in 1795 and lasted for eight years. In 1803, after signing the Treaty of Amiens between England and France, and in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, England had to withdraw her forces from the Cape and give it back to Holland, then an ally to France. But again tempted by the Cape's strategic position and immense potentialities, England found in the renewed war between herself and Napoleon a pretext to re-occupy the Cape once more. This was done in 1806, and was not regarded as temporary occupation. The British control, and their influence in South Africa, was to last till the proclamation of the Republic of South Africa in the early 1960's, as will be seen later on.

When Britain took over, there were some 20,000 European settlers in South Africa, their lands extending hundreds of miles from Cape Town. The century and a half that they (or at least some of them) spent over there moulded them together as a rather homogeneous community. They even developed certain special linguistic characteristics : their language deviated from the original Dutch. They could be classified according to the degree of their proximity to Cape Town: those in the city were mostly company servants. On the periphery of the Cape Town were farmers or Boers, many of whom had large numbers of slaves and Hottentots to work their lands. Still further from Cape Town lived the pastoral, semi-nomadic farmers known as the Trek-boers, who comprised half of the white population.² The Boers and the Trekboers (later known as the Trekkers) were to constitute the hard-core of what came to be called Afrikaners. They were strictly Calvinists, who regarded themselves as predestined to occupy South Africa and settle there. "Like the children of Israel seeking the promised land, the seventeenth century Dutch settlers removed themselves to the promises of the Cape."³ In the Bible they justified their colonialism, and their treatment of the natives as slaves whom they likened "to the Amalekites, heathens who could rightfully be 'smitten before the Lord'." Their boundaries were not defined except for those along the Ocean. Into the interior of Africa they found it possible to penetrate gradually.

The history of South Africa under the British occupation was distinguished by two consecutive lines of development. First the British tolerated the Boers' advances northward, at the expense of the Bantu tribes. The imperial government wanted essentially to anglicize the territory, and to abolish slavery and slave trade that was predominant among the Boers. The Boers were in no mood to forsake their traditions and found it better to trek north, in an attempt to move out of the British sphere of influence. But the half-hearted British efforts to carry out their schemes resulted in a sort of *modus operandi*, whereby, by the second half of the 19th century, the existence of settler (Boer) states was tolerated within the general framework of British control. Later, with the beginning of diamond and gold mining in the last quarter of the 19th century, British as well as the Boers' appetites for further economic profits were whetted to a degree that the latent seeds of conflict between the European settlers and the imperial authorities began seriously to emerge. This conflict culminated in the second Anglo-Boer war of 1899.

The Boers who trekked northward, especially after 1836, were then ideologically determined people, so to speak, set on reading the Bible, and seeing through it a temporal guide for them. Their clashes with the natives, which were bound to ensue, were considered as their religious ordeal and duty. The

(2) W. Henry Vatcher, Jr.: *White Laager: The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism* (N. Y., 1965) p. 4.

(3) *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Afrikaaners' sense of mission never failed them; in 1955 a hard core Afrikaaner leader interpreted history in this way: "The Afrikaaner nation was placed in this country by God's hand and is destined to remain as a nation with its own character and its own mission."⁴

This "manifest destiny" was less clear in 1867, when diamond was discovered in the Orange river, and later in the adjacent areas. Soon diggers-for-wealth and fortune-hunters came from everywhere. Claims were advanced by persons as well as by states and confusion followed. Out of this confusion emerged the personality of Cecil Rhodes. With the emergence of Cecil Rhodes, a new chapter in the history of Southern Africa, especially Rhodesia, was opened; as will be explained later.

Less than twenty years after the diamond discovery came the gold discovery in 1886 — the gold was discovered in Witwatersrand (in the Transvaal Boer Republic, then officially known as the South African Republic). Again fortune-seekers flocked to the country. Again a confused and subsequently tense situation developed as gold dominated all Southern African politics. Soon after the discovery of gold, British interests led by Cecil Rhodes had the upper hand in the gold-fields, notwithstanding the attempts of the Boer republic to keep its riches for its own people.

Cecil John Rhodes, an Oxford educated Englishman with inherited contacts in South Africa, was a man of unlimited imagination and determination. An imperialist dreamer, a schemer of the first order, he envisaged bringing the territory from Cape to Cairo under the British Crown, linking the two ends of Africa by rail. In the 1870's and 1880's he assembled his wealth, which had come from African diamond and gold. In 1889 he secured a charter for his British South Africa Company — as will be seen later when discussing Rhodesia. In the 1890's he was the Prime Minister of the Cape colony. His energies were then devoted to schemes of uniting the African territories over which his actual and potential financial interests extended. He always pleaded to the Boers "to work together" but on British terms. The nascent Afrikaaner nationalism was however stronger than the temptations Rhodes offered. His schemes, notwithstanding certain successes, met a great failure in the abortive Jameson raid in 1895 — a raid organized by Rhodes and his friend Leander Starr Jameson with the consent of the imperial authorities, the aim of which was to take over the Transvaal by force. Cecil Rhodes was obliged subsequently to resign the premiership of the Cape colony. The British then took the matter into their own hands and fought the Boers in 1899. The Anglo-Boer war was to last some three years, when Peace was restored on British terms by the Treaty of Vereeniging (31 May 1902). It took eight years of reconciliation and maneuvering till the Union of South Africa was formed in

(4) *Ibid.*, p. 149.

such a way as to satisfy the Boers and the British. Thus came to a close, in 1910, the conflict between the European settlers and their rulers, as a result of a settlement that assured the settlers of "rights" acquired at the expense of the natives, who were conquered in a series of Kaffir wars extending over a century.

* * *

The history of South Africa from the days of the naval station at the Cape to the days of the Union seems complicated by the richness of its events and the diversity of interests that were brought into conflict. The politics of South Africa during those two centuries and half was the result of many interweaving factors: strategic, political, economic and financial. The principal actors were not two sides, the settlers and the natives, as one is initially led to assume, but three: the imperial government in addition to the settlers and the natives. As we will see in other "experiments", those three principal actors make themselves felt wherever there is an attempt at permanent European settlement. From the view point of each of the principal actors the enemies are, theoretically, the two other actors, together. It should not be overlooked, however, that the two principal actors are always Europeans — and for their mutual relationship to reach a climactic degree as in the Anglo-Boer war of 1899 was the exception. Against the natives, the two principal European actors always felt a degree of superiority that allowed them to disregard their interests and to justify brutalities and atrocities committed against those natives. It was also axiomatic that the natives detested and resisted the two principal European actors, and regarded them as intruders.

In the case of South Africa one can detect a major policy line that dominated European endeavours there during the first two centuries and a half; this line is reducing the natives to subjugation, driving them "back" as far as possible, and denying them rights that they had inherited for centuries. All European differences could be regarded as minor conflicts resulting from minor policy-lines, compared to this all inclusive, dominant policy line.

* * *

The case of Southern Rhodesia is more illustrative of a consciously pursued imperialist policy. This policy reached its climactic point in 1889-1890, as a result of efforts started over more than half a century before.

It was not long after the British took over the Cape that they started, through missionaries, to extend their contacts with the interior of Africa. In 1830, Robert Moffat, a British missionary, visited Matabele land (or what is now the eastern part of Zimbabwe). Negotiations between Moffat and the tribal chief, conducted (symbolically) at the Cape led to the conclusion of a "treaty"

whereby the Matabele pledged an alliance with the Cape colony. This treaty, which we know about from western sources, was of importance only in as much as it allowed British missionaries to penetrate into the interior of Africa. But missionary activities were only a prelude to further interests. Dr. David Livingstone, also a British protestant missionary and the son-in-law of Moffat, was by the middle of the 19th century advancing his belief that "geographical, scientific and medical exploration of Africa would in turn open the continent to 'commerce and Christianity', to western economic enterprise and thought."

Dr. Livingstone's advocacy bore fruit in 1858 when the British government sent him as a head of an expeditionary team "for the purpose of exploring the Zambezi basin from its mouth to the interior, to prepare the way for trade, navigation and white settlement"

It was shortly before this time that the Trekkers started developing their contacts with the Matabele. These contacts led to the 1853 agreement between the Transvaal state and Um Ziligazi, giving the Transvaal certain advantages. Also, at the time when diamond was discovered in South Africa, a European explorer, the German Carl Mauch, wrote a letter to *Cape Argus*, a Cape journal, describing the treasures he claimed to have found in the interior of Africa which was to become Southern Rhodesia:

"The vast extent and beauty of those goldfields are such that at a particular spot I stood as it were transfixed, riveted to the place, struck with amazement and wonder at the sight, and for a few minutes I was unable to use the hammer. Thousands of people here might find ample room to work in this extensive field without interfering with one another."

It was a clear call for Europeans to flock to the interior of Africa. Another of Mauch's discoveries was to come a few years later, when he discovered the "Stone House" at Great Zimbabwe. This discovery of a sophisticated Stone House in the interior of Africa did not conform with the general conviction of the primitiveness of Africans. Hence, speculations grew wild in an effort at interpretation. Speculations linking Southern Rhodesia to the Bible were advanced and generally accepted. Many thought of Southern Rhodesia as the Ophir of the Bible and the source of much of antiquity's gold. It was around this time that Rhodes, and others, started envisaging the possibility of linking Cape to Cairo through the opening up of the interior of Africa.

It should be recalled at this point that the last part of the 19th century was the golden age of imperialism. Industrial Western European countries were vying for spheres of influence and control over the non-European world. Belgium and Germany were new-comers to the imperialist game, but were, by the latter part of the 19th century, becoming increasingly interested in extending their influence over some parts of Central and Southern Africa. Hence, in order to avoid a violent clash of interests among the European

imperialist powers, a Congress was called in Berlin and began its deliberations in December 1884. The Congress of Berlin defined in clearer terms the imperial powers' interests in Africa, and the frenzied scramble for Africa began.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to tell the story of the "scramble", but it could be safely said that, relative to Southern Rhodesia, the stage was well set for the British to pursue their expansionist schemes. In September 1885 Bechuanaland came under their control. Their agent for the opening up of the interior of Africa was Cecil Rhodes, well-launched, by the mid-1880's, in his imperial career. What he needed to put into operation his imperial dreams was a "charter", an imperial charter for his British South Africa Company. This he got in 1889.

* * *

Southern Rhodesia is a clearer case of imperialism than that of South Africa where the white settlement started with company servants for servicing ships. As we have seen, back in 1858 the British thought of exploring the area to prepare it for white settlement. In Southern Rhodesia, the white settlement was well within the general framework of British designs, unlike South Africa where the settlement was prior to British occupation. However, the lesson of the utility of white settlements in Africa, after the South African example, was not lost on the British. In fact there is ample evidence to suggest that Britain was well aware of the usefulness of controlling Africa through British — and European — settlers. Economic and strategic considerations pointed clearly in that direction.

* * *

The third experiment under study in this essay, Israel, could be better understood in the light of two phenomena: the feeling among some Jews, in modern times, of the so-called Jewish nationality, and the development of the British interests in the Middle East. Both phenomena belong to the general atmosphere of colonialism and imperialism.

The age of colonialism, a result of the geographic discoveries, the recognition of the modern national-state system, and the emergence of a nationally based bourgeois leading-class, brought a feeling of national awareness to the Jewish minorities in the countries of Europe. Those Jews who felt that they did not belong to their European countries followed the traditions of European colonialism, and started thinking of setting up for themselves a separate community in any part of the non-European world, then considered vacant. The Western colonial nations also felt that their Jews would be of benefit to them if they assigned them a piece of "vacant" land for them to settle on.

It is indicative that when colonial Holland was booming, when the Dutch

East India Company was expanding its activities and setting up the Cape naval station, the same Dutch East India Company granted in 1652 (the same year in which the Cape station was established) a large tract of land in the island of Curacao, off the coast of Venezuela, to Joseph Nunez da Fonseca and others to found a colony of Jews in that island.

Holland was not alone in putting forward non-European lands to be settled by Jews. Many colonial powers took an active interest in using some Jews loyal to them as settlers in the newly discovered areas. In 1654 "a project was formed for a settlement in Surinam, then a British colony, with Jewish fugitives from Brazil"; while in 1659 the French East India Company granted to David Nasi, a Portuguese Jew, a charter authorizing him to establish a Jewish colony in Cayenne.⁵

Attempts at systematic Jewish settlements then were part and parcel of the colonial policy of each colonial European state. These states, most probably, looked to the Jews as an additional potential or reserve to that sector of their population which is interested in settling on non-European lands.

The materialization of European (Jewish) settlement in Palestine was the result of a factor additional to the factor discussed above. This newer factor is the development of British interest in the Middle East. As will be shown later, imperial Britain allied itself with Zionism (the 19th century expression of the feeling of nationality among some Jews) and as a result of this alliance, a non-European land, Palestine, was chosen for settlement because it was advantageous to British interests to do so. This choice was also convenient to the Zionists who interpreted controversial Biblical pronouncements as promising them Palestine.

Britain started to develop her interests in the Middle East in the early part of the 19th century. Bible societies were established pursuant to vague but intense religious sentiments. Practical motives, however, were not very late in coming. Britain became actually involved in the affairs of the Middle East when she rallied to the support of the Ottoman Sultan against Muhammad Ali during the latter's invasion of Syria. The "Eastern Question" was formally opened then. The European powers interested in the settlement of the Question to their advantage developed a pattern of intervention in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire under pretext of protecting the minorities. The Russians used to act as protectors to the Christian Orthodox Communities, while the French did the same for the Catholics. Britain then felt she could champion the cause of the Jews. This she formally did when she established a consulate in Jerusalem in 1840 for the protection of British Jews in particular, and Jews in the Ottoman Empire in general. Real motives for opening the British consulate were however more complex than the simple protection of a religious

(5) For these and similar projects see: N. Sokolow, p. 57 and after.

minority. Britain was thinking in terms of a strategy to thwart any attempt by Muhammad Ali to threaten the Ottoman Empire, then a British ally. In a letter dated 11 August 1840 sent from Palmerston to Ponsonby, then British Ambassador to Istanbul, Palmerston stated that the "Jewish people if returning [to Palestine] under the sanction and protection and at the invitation of the Sultan, would be a check upon any future evil designs of Mehmet [Muhammad] Ali or his successor."⁶

This was the first step. Soon there followed, with the beginning of the second half of the 19th century, clearer conceptions about the strategic importance of the Middle East (Syria — including Palestine — and Egypt) to the British colonial interests. In an address delivered on 25 January 1853, Colonel George Gawler, former Governor of South Australia, mixed strategic with "civilizational" motives in advocating British supremacy in Egypt and Syria:

"Divine Providence has placed Syria and Egypt in the very gap between England and the most important regions of her colonial and foreign trade — India, China, the Indian archipelago and Australia... She does most urgently need the shortest and the safest lines of communication to the territories already possessed... Egypt and Syria stand in intimate connection. A foreign hostile power mighty in either, would soon endanger British trade and communications through the other. Hence the providential call upon her, to exert herself energetically for the amelioration of the condition of both of these provinces. Egypt has improved greatly by British influence and it is now for England to set her hand for the renovation of Syria..."

Gawler then went on to recommend that the Jews would be the best servants of the British interests in this regard.

By the second half of the 19th century, then, the theme that Syria should be occupied by Britain or be brought under her influence was a dominant theme in British strategic thinking. Let us mention further illustrations.

In 1853, Colonel Charles Henry Churchill, who was a staff officer in the British expedition to Syria that compelled Muhammad Ali to withdraw from Palestine, published a book about his experiences in the Middle East, entitled *Mount Lebanon: a ten years residence from 1842 to 1852*. He wrote in this book after referring to Britain's civilizing mission and her strategic needs: "... it must for obvious reasons be clear to every English mind that if England's Oriental Supremacy is to be upheld, Syria and Egypt must be made to fall more or less under her sway or influence." From there he went on to say: "I call upon my countrymen, therefore, to adopt this political doctrine and nail it to the National Colours — that when Palestine ceases to be Turkish,

(6) Albert M. Hyamson (ed.) *The British Consulate in Jerusalem* (London, 1929) in two volumes. Vol. I, p. 34.

(7) Reported by Sokolow, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 138.

it must either become British or else form part of a new independent state, which... shall yet be able... to promote the great object for which it will be called into existence... that of creating, developing and upholding a commercial intercourse in the East..."⁸

Sir Austin Henry Layard, an authority on the Orient and a member of the British House of Commons, declared in a speech in the House : "We should not forget that, although Egypt is a high road to India, Syria and the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates form *the* high road, and any power holding these countries would command India."⁹

The same considerations prompted another contemporary of those quoted earlier, Dr. Thomas Clarke, to make the following statement in his book *India and Palestine or The Restoration of the Jews in relation to the Nearest Road* (1861) : "If England is ... relying on its commerce as the corner stone of its greatness; if one of the nearest and best channels of that commerce is across the axis of the three great continents, and if the Jews are essentially a trading... people, what so natural as that they should be planted along that great highway of ancient commerce; and were the Ottoman power to be displaced, that old commercial route would immediately re-open."¹⁰

To add credence to all those pronouncements, Lord Shaftesbury wrote in 1876 :

"Syria and Palestine will before long become very important ... The country wants capital and population. The Jews can give it both. And has not England a special interest in promoting such restoration ? It would be a blow to England if either of her rivals should get hold of Syria. Her Empire reaching from Canada in the West to Calcutta and Australia in the South East would be cut in two ... She must preserve Syria to herself. Does not policy there ... exhort England to foster the nationality of the Jews and aid them ... to return as a leavening power to their old country ? ... To England then, naturally, belongs the role of favouring the settlement of the Jews in Palestine."¹¹

Such ideas, mixing together the mission of England to civilize others, her strategic and commercial interests, the vague biblical belief that Palestine is somehow promised to the Jews, dominated British thinking about the Eastern Question. In 1879, General Sir Charles Warren included all these considerations in his proposal for "the formation of a chartered company which should

(8) Reported by *Ibid.*, p. 156 from pp. v-x of the book.

(9) Reported by *Ibid.*, p. 157 from *the Turkish Question*, speeches delivered in the House of Commons on August 16, 1853, and February 17, 1854 by A.H. Layard Esq. M.P. (London, 1854) p. 10.

(10) Reported by *Ibid.*, p. 139.

(11) Reported by *Ibid.*, p. 207.

obtain a concession from the Sultan to permit a Jewish settlement with a view to self-government.”¹²

The movement to colonize Palestine was then advanced essentially by advocates of British colonialism — but it was not confined to those advocates. The feeling of discrimination among Jews in East and Central Europe during the 19th century, the golden age of nationalism, prompted some Jews to think in terms of Jewish nationality. The advocates of Jewish nationality, especially in East and Central Europe, were attracted by the British championing of their cause, and by the existence of rich British Jews, some of whom were members of the British nobility, who turned toward their British co-religionists in order to help them — morally and financially — to settle in Palestine. Conscious efforts at Jewish settlement in Palestine took place at the time Britain was getting increasingly interested in the Middle East. In 1861, an Orthodox German Rabbi, Hirsch Kalischer, published a book entitled *In Quest of Zion* in which he agreed “that a society of rich Jews should be formed to undertake the colonization of Palestine; that many Jews from Russia, Poland and Germany should be helped by the society to settle on the land, and that a guard of able-bodied young Jews should be trained to protect the settlers from attacks by the Bedwin.”¹³ Rabbi Kalischer succeeded, in the same year in which his book was published, in establishing a “Society for the Colonization of the Land of Israel.”

Also, in the same year in which Sir Charles Warren proposed a chartered company for the colonization of Palestine (1879) another distinguished British Christian personality, Lawrence Oliphant (member of parliament), visited Constantinople and tried, without success, to obtain a concession from the Turkish Government for special facilities for the settlement of Jews in Palestine.

Shortly after Oliphant's visit a wave of anti-semitism was unleashed in Czarist Russia (1881-1882) with the result that many Jews emigrated from Russia, to the U.S.A. and Britain mainly, but also to Palestine where the British Consulate helped them immensely. The “Lovers of Zion” movement was established in Russia with branches in Britain and other European countries. In 1891 a Jewish Colonization Association was founded in Britain for the purpose of establishing Jewish “colonies in various parts of North and South America and other countries for agricultural, commercial and other purposes”. The Association was the result of the efforts of Baron de Hirsch, who considered, after lengthy investigation, that the Argentine was the place most suited for Jewish settlement.

The advocates of Jewish nationality were till then not quite determined

(12) Israel Cohen, *The Zionist Movement* (London, 1945), p. 49.

(13) Israel Cohen : *A Short History of Zionism*, (London, 1951), p. 21.

as to where and how to settle. Their schemes at settlement were still at large. It could be Palestine but it could also be the Argentine. In 1896 Theodore Herzl, the philosopher of political Zionism, published his pamphlet *The Jewish State*, in which he outlined a "modern solution to the Jewish Question". Again Herzl was not determined on where to build the Jewish state.

The Jewish State ushered in a new era of Zionism. What is interesting and suggestive in the pamphlet is its underscoring of the particular role to be played by European powers. Herzl envisaged the creation of a Society of Jews "who fell in with our idea of state." The Society would put itself "under the protection of the European Powers" in its efforts to secure Palestine or Argentina. As to the question on how to build the state Herzl was convinced that private infiltration of Jews ought to be stopped. Instead, immigration has to be "based on an assured supremacy."¹⁴

Herzl was the embodiment of the refined European secular colonial spirit. He has nothing to do with the oft-spoken-about historic attachment of the Jews to Palestine. The founder of modern Zionism was convinced that his state could be anywhere. "...I shall now tell you everything about the 'promised land' except its location. This is a purely scientific question." He harbours no biblical illusions on the promised land and he does not look into the Bible to see where its boundaries lie. To him the location is a scientific question to be determined by scientific means: "We must have regard for geological, climatic, in short natural factors of all kinds with full circumspection and with consideration of the latest research."¹⁵

Up to 1896 then there was no clear and definitive Zionist commitment to Palestine. The role of Britain in the Zionist scheme was still that of a potential rather than actual supporter. On one thing, though, Herzl was definitive: European powers, experienced in matters colonial as they were, have to be rallied for the support of the Jewish state project.

For some two years Herzl tried, without much success, to rally the European powers' support for his project. He thought in terms of chartered companies, concessions and other means. In his role as a self-appointed political leader of the "Jewish people" he met many sovereigns. He proposed all sorts of agreements to "serve" the interests of the European powers. Later, he came to the conclusion that in order to buttress his prestige, he would call a congress and work through an organization.

In 1897, the First Zionist Congress met in Basel and adopted the Basel programme. The aim of Zionism, as defined by this congress, was to erect for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law. Now the choice of Palestine was definitive. Argentina was forgotten.

(14) Theodore Herzl, *The Jewish State*, pp. 29-30.

(15) Herzl, *Diaries*, Vol. I, p. 133.

It is perhaps appropriate, at this juncture, to recall how Herzl felt about Palestine in his pamphlet, *The Jewish State*. A spokesman for colonialism-imperialism as he was, he thought in terms of a European-Zionist civilizing mission in Palestine: "We should there form a rampart of Europe against Asia, an outpost of civilization as opposed to barbarism. We should as a neutral state — that is, neutral among European powers — remain in contact with all Europe, which would have to guarantee our existence."¹⁶

The choice of Palestine has to be secured by public law, that is, European public law, which, in the age of imperialism, found it acceptable to interfere anywhere in the non-European lands, and to prescribe, as it wished, the future course of any of the lands belonging to other peoples without regard to the wishes of those peoples.

The efforts of Herzl, now leader of the Zionist Organization, continued to take different directions, visiting one sovereign after the other. But he was well aware of the increasing British interest in the Middle East. He confessed, notwithstanding all his European endeavours, that "from the first moment I entered the movement my eyes were directed towards England", as he wrote on 22 February 1898.¹⁷

It is no wonder that Herzl felt from the first moment that his eyes were directed toward England; British and Zionist interests coincided in colonizing Palestine. The Fourth Zionist Congress was held in London, in 1900; from that date on, successive British governments constantly showed interest in Zionism. In his inaugural speech before the London Congress, Herzl publicly announced what he expected from England:

"England, the great, England, the free, England with her eyes roaming over all the seas, will understand us and our aims. From this place the Zionist idea will take a still further and higher flight: of this we can be sure."¹⁸

Britain took cognisance of Herzl and his movement. In 1902 he was invited to testify before the Royal Commission on Immigration, subsequent to agitation caused by a large influx of Russian Jews into the East End of London. During that year, he suggested to Lord Rothschild that either Cyprus or Sinai be given to the Zionists to create a colony — both Cyprus and Sinai were then under British rule. Herzl became increasingly committed to London. On 22 October 1902 he met the British Prime Minister, Joseph Chamberlain, "who told me that a Jewish settlement in Cyprus would be opposed by the local population and that the question of the Sinai peninsula must be discussed with the Foreign Secretary."¹⁹ The Sinai question was subsequently discussed in detail

(16) *The Jewish State*, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

(17) Reported by Sokolow, Vol. I, p. 295.

(18) Reported by Israel Cohen, *The Zionist Movement*, *op. cit.*, p. 76.

(19) *Ibid.*, p. 78.

and was investigated "scientifically" — but it was finally decided that the peninsula was not suitable as it lacked water. Zionist-British contacts were not to stop there; instead, they grew stronger.

It was early in 1903 that Chamberlain, having returned from a visit to East Africa, offered this territory to Herzl. The so-called East-Africa project — the area covers what is now Kenya — was another departure from Palestine, but Herzl accepted the offer preliminarily — the final acceptance to be secured from the Zionist Congress. Chamberlain's proposal was for a Jewish autonomy in the proposed territory within the general framework of the British Empire. The lesson of the East-Africa offer should be emphasized. Imperial Britain felt that "Zion" could be anywhere, the Zionists could be made to settle in any part of the Empire as long as they were serving the Empire. Herzl's preliminary acceptance also underlined this understanding. Even the Sixth Zionist Congress, which discussed the offer, was not wholly negative, notwithstanding the fact that East and Central European Zionists, who were ardently committed to Palestine through their own understanding of the Bible, were heavily represented in the Congress. The Congress which met in August 1903 did not reject the offer outright, thus negatively affirming the fact that Palestine was at least "negotiable" — so to speak. Instead, the Congress decided to establish a committee of enquiry whose task was to study the territory scientifically and report on its suitability. Herzl died in July 1904, before the committee had enough time to turn in its report. As it turned out, the committee found out that the proferred territory was not suitable. On the basis of this report, the Seventh Congress which met in Basel in July-August 1905 turned down the offer — not without a loss to the Zionist Organization: a splinter group of Zionists, led by the British Israel Zangwill, continued to advocate the acceptance of the East-Africa offer or any other offer anywhere in the world.

Israel Zangwill shared Herzl's secularist approach and keen attachment to imperial policies. After the so-called "Practical Zionists" dominated the Zionist Organization following the death of Herzl, and motivated by his enthusiasm for the East-Africa project, he established his own association: The Jewish Territorial Organization (ITO). The ITO's objective was "to procure territory upon an autonomous basis for those Jews who cannot or will not remain in the lands in which they at present live". The ITO was the apex of Zionist colonialism: its adherents were ready to go anywhere under imperial protection. Zangwill's contention was that there was "room for many millions of people in underdeveloped, underpopulated parts of the world and notably in the British dominions."²⁰ He viewed the Zionists as potential volunteer-settlers who could help Britain in establishing white settlements in her territories:

(20) Joseph Leftwich, *Israel Zangwill*, (London, 1957), p. 227.

"There are not enough British settlers to go out to the Transvaal or Canada, countries much further developed ... The whole white population of the British colonies is only some twelve millions. So that if Britain can attract all the Jews of the world to her colonies, she would just double their white population ... A far better statesman than the Sultan, Mr. Chamberlain sees that although we need a land, East Africa needs a population." 21

The activities of the ITO are too enormous to summarise. At different times they considered Zionist colonisation of Surinam, Rhodesia, Mozambique, Angola, Cyrenaica and a host of other places. The ITO appealed especially to the whites of South Africa — for obvious reasons. Lord Selborne, the High Commissioner for South Africa, spoke at an ITO meeting at Johannesburg in 1906 in favour of the ITO objectives, describing them as "wise, noble and practical". Also, it was reported in the *Jewish Chronicle*, at about the same time, that the famous South African, General Smuts, had joined one of the local branches of the ITO in South Africa.²²

The ITO existed till 1925. But already in 1923, Zangwill, a first class colonialist, had to confess that he had discovered that the population of the world was mostly dog-in-the-manger. "In so late an age of history, where every place in the sun has its ferocious claimants, and earth hunger has passed from an appetite into a greed, the prospects of acquiring a territory are not rosy."²³ A sad discovery for a colonialist, one has to admit !

After the death of Herzl, and the ITO's break-up, the Zionist Organization was dominated by the Practical Zionists who favoured cultural and practical penetration into Palestine, even without a charter or any public document secured by "public law". But Britain kept her eyes open on the Middle East and especially Palestine. At the same time, the Zionists never wavered in their conviction that in Britain they had their best ally. The Ottoman government was on the verge of collapse, and any settlement on what to do with Palestine and other Ottoman territories would certainly involve European and notably British intervention. As it happened, the Ottoman Empire sided during the First World War with the Central Powers. Britain was then an enemy of the dying Empire and as such was rather certain to have a major say regarding the future of the Ottoman territories in the Middle East.

* * *

It is a hazardous enterprise to attempt in a few pages to summarise the background and early history of the European endeavours to establish white settlements in non-European lands. Yet this was the objective of the preceding pages. It is even more hazardous to attempt a comparison between the early European involvement in the three experiments under study in this essay. Yet

(21) Address to the Sixth Zionist Congress (London, September 1903), in *Speeches, Articles, Letters of Israel Zangwill* ed. by M. Simon, (London, 1937), p. 193.

(22) Leftwich, *op. cit.*, p. 227.

(23) *Ibid.*, pp. 227-228.

one can discern through the multiplicity of events covered certain parallel lines of development, certain underlying concepts that manifested themselves equally strongly in the three experiments discussed. A rudimentary comparison would reveal how the atmosphere of colonialism and imperialism generated certain themes that dominated the scene, and provided an unquestioned justification for the European colonialists to think of lands that did not belong to them as suitable for their endeavours. The white man's burden together with economic considerations, commercial interests, and strategic purposes, prompted the European colonialists to spread themselves over almost all parts of the globe. Allegedly altruistic (religious and humanitarian) purposes allied themselves with down-to-earth materialistic considerations and worked together in such a way that the world in the late 19th and early 20th century was split into colonisers and colonised. Where "scientific" investigations proved that a certain region of the globe was fit for European settlements, and where economic, commercial, political and strategic considerations pointed favourably to the value of settlement, such settlements were established without any regard to the wishes of the natives. The pattern was clear : explorers first, followed by missionaries, followed by conqueror-settlers; the latter's advent accompanied by a sort of "document in conformity with public law". Adventurers and dignified imperial authorities would work hand-in-hand to achieve the aim of spreading civilization and enhancing commerce at the expense of the disregarded natives. In the meanwhile "scientific research" would be brought into the picture again to prove that those areas scientifically suitable for white settlement were demographically underpopulated, economically underdeveloped and culturally deprived, so much so that historical necessity would force the Europeans to go there in the interest of humanity and universal cultural values.

Actual European practice in penetrating South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine might differ at one point or another. South Africa and Southern Rhodesia came under European control at a date prior to the date on which Palestine came under European control. The establishment of settlements in Southern Rhodesia followed rather than preceded the British control of the area, as was the case with South Africa and Palestine. The Boers and the European Jews settled and expanded in the territories they respectively occupied without the active — or even, in the case of Palestine, effective — consent of a European power. In Southern Rhodesia Britain not only looked sympathetically on the European settlers — as in Palestine — but also provided the settlers with an effective imperial shelter which could have been — theoretically at least — invoked any time the settlers felt endangered. Yet, in the three cases, the overall imperial design was there, and was not to be prejudiced by separate incidents that took place from time to time.

The atmosphere of colonialism and imperialism justified the "experiments". A second step was to "legalize" such experiments within the broad Western European "legal" concepts of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In this res-

pect the charter of the British South Africa Company and the Balfour Declaration fit neatly into the pattern. The establishment of the Union of South Africa does so to a lesser extent. Yet it could be broadly said that in the space of a little over quarter of a century (1889-1917), British imperialism gave a "legal title" to the establishment of three white-settler entities in Africa and the Middle East.

e. *In Search of Legitimacy : Charter, Union and Declaration*

As mentioned above, "legal titles" were issued by Britain authorizing the establishment of white entities in Africa and the Middle East. It was mentioned also, that the charter granted to the British South Africa Company and the Balfour Declaration fitted neatly into the pattern, while the establishment of the Union of South Africa had a rather different authorization due to special circumstances. We propose now to deal with the establishment of the Union first and briefly and then to tackle in a more detailed form the Charter and the Declaration.

In South Africa, Boer republics were an early, mid-19th century phenomenon and the Boers themselves bore the chief responsibility for seizing the land from the natives. The Boer republics were real political entities; they exercised their authority over territories under their control and they handled their foreign relations on a basis of quasi-independence. But the position of Britain, as the supreme over-lord, could hardly be ignored. When the chips were down and the scramble for South Africa's gold started, Britain was able to subdue the Boers and assert her sovereignty over all South Africa. South Africa was, as a result, unified under the British flag. The Treaty of Vereeniging, notwithstanding the incorporation of certain clauses favourable to the Boers, definitely acknowledged British supremacy in South Africa.

The period between 1902, when the Treaty of Vereeniging was signed, and 1908, when the National Convention met in Durban, was a period of closing ranks among Europeans : the British and the Boers. During this period, the British treated the Boers generously — as befits a European authority dealing with conquered European rebels. The Imperial authorities undertook relief and rehabilitation work for the benefit of the Boers. In July 1907, the British High Commissioner and Governor, Lord Selborne, reflecting the general feeling of kinship among Europeans in South Africa, observed :

"Where two nationalities ... are so generally mixed together throughout the sub-continent as are the British and the Dutch ... the fusion between them is merely a matter of time, as it was with Saxons and Normans, who were related to one another in a similar degree of kinship."²⁴

(24) Quoted by Vatcher, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

Comparable attitudes were advocated by the Boers, under the leadership of Hofmeyr and Botha. Finally, English-Boer *rapprochement* for the white-man's cause in Southern Africa culminated in the National Convention that opened on 12 October 1908 in Durban. Delegates from the Cape, Natal, Orange and Transvaal gathered together in order to discuss the future of South Africa. They finally opted for a unitary form of government, rather than a federal one. It is beyond the scope of this essay to go into the details of what took place, but one point should be emphasized : the settlers were well satisfied with the Union Constitution which in many ways represented a triumph for the frontier Boer. Their practices (especially in relation to withholding the right to vote from the Africans) and their methods of operation were legitimised in the new constitution. In August 1909, the British Parliament approved the South Africa Act, and the Union actually came into being on 31 May 1910.

The Imperial authority and the settlers were then at one in allotting South Africa wholly to the settlers, except for certain entrenched clauses that meant that London would keep an eye over certain internal developments. The Union was to become a dominion within the framework of the British Empire. It is indicative of the free hand that Britain allowed to the settlers that all the Union's Prime Ministers were Afrikaaners, that, notwithstanding the entrenched constitutional clauses, the "Coloureds" of the Cape were removed from the common roll of the voters' list and placed on a separate voters' list in 1936, and that finally, in 1948, extreme Afrikaaner nationalists with an avowed adherence to the policy of Apartheid came to power, thereby preparing the stage for the gradual separation from Britain and the Commonwealth that was finally achieved in 1961. Thus, the far-reaching consequences of the Union's constitution were such that they put the settlers firmly in the saddle with no regard whatsoever to the natives' wishes and interests.

If the South African unionist constitution had the effect of legitimizing an already existing *fait accompli* with respect to the Europeans' relations toward the natives, the Charter that was granted to Cecil Rhodes' British South Africa Company in 1889 had the effect of endorsing (to use a better word : encouraging) the establishment of a European settlement in Southern Rhodesia and legitimising the settlers' rule at the same time. It was a clear case of granting a non-European land to an imperialist adventurer in order to open it up for the benefit of imperial interests.

Cecil Rhodes was the imperialist adventurer. Born in 1853 of a respected English family, he went to Africa for the first time in 1871 where he stayed and worked with his elder brother at Kimberly. Fortune-seekers were then rushing into the area and Cecil did well for himself by taking part in the rush. After some years, he returned to Oxford where he secured his degree. Back in Africa again, he was elected a member of the Cape parliament in 1880. There, he was quite effective in mobilizing the settlers' public opinion in the direction of annexing Bechuanaland. He made a sizeable fortune by exploiting diamond

mines. Later, he was able, with the help of Bany Barnato — a wealthy Jewish diamond explorer — to unify small diamond companies and individual explorers into four large companies, one for each of the four mines then in operation. In agreement with Barnato, he established shortly after a bigger enterprise : De Beers Consolidated Mines.

Getting increasingly influential, financially and politically, he used this influence to further advance his expansionist schemes. His deeply-held desire was to expand northward and build "a great African Empire which would linger on the Cape and one day rival the Indian Raj and all its splendor."

In 1880 he started contacts with Lobengula, chief of the Matabele, and got — in dubious circumstances — what was usually referred to as the Rudd Concession, after the name of his lieutenant who actually negotiated the concession. But he wanted firmer imperial backing for his enterprise. For this reason he set up the British South Africa Company and started his meticulous efforts at getting an imperial charter for his company.

* * *

The 1880's witnessed the development of an official British policy line of sponsoring the activities of chartered trading companies as a means for opening up remote non-European lands and developing them. Such charters were a grant from the Crown and had to be debated in parliament. The idea of granting charters to commercial trading companies in order to develop distant regions fitted well into the schemes of the British Empire: with minimal obligations incurred by the Crown, it was possible to utilize the dynamic efforts of private — but capable — individuals in order to extend the overall domain of the Empire. As to the companies, they thought of the charter as a means of getting imperial backing and protection, especially with respect to possible conflicts with other powers. In the 1880's many charters were granted: The Royal Niger Company (1886), the British North Borneo Company (1881) and the British Imperial East Africa Company (1888). Rhodes's hopes were pinned on something similar.

The aims of the British South Africa Company, as specified in the petition requesting the Crown to grant a charter, included *inter alia* the extension of railway and telegraph lines northward, the encouragement of emigration and colonization, the promotion of trade and commerce and the development of mining. In exchange for those services to be rendered to the Crown, the company was to enjoy certain characteristics of government, such as keeping its own security forces.

In order to get the charter, Rhodes had to resort to all sorts of manipulations in London, ranging from advancing reasonable explanations of his company's aims, to outright manipulation by using financial interests. His efforts finally bore fruit, when a Charter of Incorporation was granted by the Queen

to the British South Africa Company on 29 October 1889. The Charter provided Rhodes with a right (valid in public law) to advance northwards. His financial power, coupled with his influence and the influence of his supporters, created a state of public enthusiasm in Britain for the new project. Advertisements published in the British newspapers to get subscribers to the Chartered Company stressed the company's unique claim to the territory to be opened up. In 1890, one year after the Charter was granted, Rhodes and his aides organized the famous Pioneer Column, and on 12 September 1890 the British flag was hoisted at a site named by the pioneers as Fort Salisbury. The site was to become the future capital of Rhodesia.

A commercial company was now in charge of a territory. Rhodes was riding high in the first half of the 1890's as the most influential man in the whole of Southern Africa. In South Africa proper, there was some governmental framework within which he had to operate. But in Rhodesia the company was the government with its own legitimate force: the British South Africa Police. Imperial restriction on the company's activities was minimal and only existed in theory. In reality the company and the settlers it brought to Rhodesia were the acknowledged — and legitimate — masters of the land. This state of affairs was to last for years, until Rhodesia was granted the status of a Colony in 1923. Proper governmental machinery was to be set up — but what happened was that the company officials were transformed into a government: the stamp of imperial legitimacy was, once more, affixed to the settlers' set-up.

* * *

The legal position of Palestine presented the British Government with a difficulty distinct from those encountered in the case of Rhodesia. Palestine belonged to an Empire, the Ottoman Empire; while Rhodesia had no claims laid upon it by the recognized established powers of the time. True, in Palestine, starting from the 1870's, there were some European-Jewish colonial settlements — but such settlements were established on individual bases: settlers were allowed in individually, thanks to the British Consulate in Jerusalem and to the pressure the British Government was able to exercise sporadically on Constantinople in favour of the European Jewish settlers. Moreover, modern political Zionism led by Herzl was quite set against the practice of individual secretive immigration into Palestine. In *The Jewish State* Herzl pronounced himself in favour of immigration based on "assured supremacy". The Basel programme of 1897 was for the establishment of a Jewish national home "secured by public law". Legitimacy for the Zionist endeavour had to be sought, had to be granted by one or more of the powers recognized at the time.

The practice of granting charters to trading and colonizing companies, prevalent in the 1880's, made quite an impact on Herzl. Seeking such a charter

or concession was the main theme of his activities from 1895 till his death in 1904. The glaring example of a successful chartered company that caught the imagination of Herzl was Rhodes' British South Africa Company. Herzl's choice of protectors was admittedly larger than Rhodes'. His was an all-European enterprise in contrast to Rhodes' specifically British circumstances. Herzl could address himself to any colonial European power. *The Jewish State* outlined a project for a company similar in many ways to the British South Africa Company and to other chartered companies at the time, except that it was more international i.e. European in orientation. After some seven years of activity seeking a charter, he found, as he wrote on 23 September 1901, that:

"The figures in my chess game now are Cecil Rhodes (with whom I am to meet after his return from Scotland); Roosevelt the new President (through Gotthiel); the King of England (through the Bishop of Ripon); the Czar (through General Von Hess); etc..."²⁵

But his flirting with Rhodes and with Rhodesia-type plans dates from an earlier time. On 1 March 1899, some ten years after the charter incorporating the British South Africa Company was granted, he likened himself to Rhodes in a letter that he wrote to the German Kaiser. He wanted the Kaiser to sponsor a Jewish Chartered Company, even if such sponsorship was not to be clearly expressed: "No express declaration on the part of the Imperial government is required for this." Then, in a clear reference to the Jameson raid (1895) sponsored by Rhodes to annex the Transvaal, which the British government — after the failure of the raid — denounced, notwithstanding the fact that it had tacitly consented to it before, Herzl continued: "... in fact, we could be disavowed without further ado, as operating on our own; just as the English government was able to do with Cecil Rhodes at any time. Naturally, there are big differences between Sir Cecil Rhodes and my humble self, the personal ones very much in my disfavour, but the objective ones greatly in favour of our movement."²⁶

The image of Cecil Rhodes was looming larger in Herzl's imagination; his feeling of the similarity in outlook and practice between himself and Rhodes prompted the Zionist leader, in his own words, to take steps "to enable me to meet Cecil Rhodes" in order to discuss business with him. He was never to meet Rhodes, but he did not know it at the time. On July 28, 1901, Herzl received a reply from Mr. W.T. Stead, one of Sir Cecil's aides, sent to Mr. J. Cowen (one of Herzl's aides). It was an affirmative reply to Herzl's request to meet Rhodes. Herzl quoted the following extract from the reply in his diaries:

"I [Stead] told him [Rhodes] that Herzl would come and see him any

(25) Herzl, *Diaries*, Vol. III, p. 1179.

(26) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 793.

day that was convenient; that he wanted to discuss with the one founder of States that modern times had produced. Rhodes said: 'If he wants any tip from me, I have only word to say: let him put money into his purse.' — which was very characteristic of Rhodes." *

The meeting never came through, due to some conflicts of schedules. But Herzl never tired of seeking the help and advice of "the one founder of States that modern times has produced". On July 11, 1902 he wrote a long letter to Rhodes in which he mentioned the following:

"You are the only man who can help me now... it is a big — some say, too big — thing. To me it does not seem too big for Cecil Rhodes."

He goes on expressing his admiration to Sir Cecil in these words:

"You are being invited to help make history. This cannot frighten you, nor will you laugh at it. It is not in your accustomed line; it does not involve Africa but a piece of Asia Minor, not Englishmen but Jews.

"But had it been in your path, you would have it done yourself by now."

The thing, then, is out of Sir Cecil's path, but Sir Cecil is involved because it is something *colonial*. That is how Herzl proceeds:

"How then do I happen to turn to you since this is an out-of-the-way matter for you ? How indeed ? Because it is something colonial, and because it presupposes an understanding of a development which will take twenty to thirty years."

Colonialists should understand each other well. Herzl then proceeds to praise Rhodes as an empire-builder, a practical visionary:

"There are visionaries who look past greater spaces of time, but they lack practical sense. Then again there are practical people like the trust magnates in America, but they lack practical imagination. But you, Mr. Rhodes, are a visionary practitioner or a practical visionary. You have already demonstrated this. And what I want you to do is not to give me or lend me a few guineas."

What is it then ?

"... but to put the stamp of your authority on the Zionist plan and to make the following declaration to a few people who swear by you: I, Rhodes, have examined this plan and found it correct and practicable. It is a plan full of culture, excellent for the group of people for whom it is directly designed, not detrimental to the general progress of mankind and quite good for England, for Greater Britain."²⁷

It is Herzl's hope then, that Rhodes, the imperialist expert that he is, should put the stamp of his authority on the Zionist plan.

The letter was not sent to Rhodes; instead, Herzl sent a letter to Israel Zangwill advising him to discuss with a South African Zionist (Kessler)

* *Ibid.*, Vol. III, p. 1169.

(27) *Diaries*, Vol. III, pp. 1193-1194.

his offer (Kessler's) "to win over the big South African Cows". Herzl, however, never despaired of meeting Rhodes but in the meantime Rhodes died in March 1902. Herzl deplored the fact that he "did not manage to get together with him. My helpers in England proved a failure in this instance."²³

* * *

Herzl's life was full of activity, especially in his tireless efforts to secure European protection for his plans. He died however in 1904, in the midst of discussions regarding the East Africa project. His death left the Zionist organization under the influence of the practical Zionists, mostly East and Central Europeans, who rejected the East-Africa offer and concentrated instead on practical colonization work, undertaken semi-clandestinely in Palestine. Some ten years were to pass before a favourable climate — through the circumstances of the First World War — could be created in order to secure by means of public law the establishment of a national home for the Jews in Palestine.

The document sought did not take the shape of a charter, it was more advanced than that, befitting the growing sophistication of imperialism. It was a declaration known as the Balfour Declaration, after Arthur Balfour, the then British Foreign Secretary, and dated the 2nd of November, 1917. The Declaration was a letter from Balfour to Lord Rothschild expressing the sympathy of the British government for the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jews and committing the government to use "their best endeavours" to achieve that aim.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to go into the details of Balfour's Declaration and to investigate the circumstances in which it was given. Some points however have to be emphasized:

1 — The Declaration was timed to be of the utmost value to Britain and her allies during the war. Other than the far-reaching advantages for Britain which were to ensue from the establishment of a European-Jewish settlement in Palestine, references to which were made above, the Declaration was intended, in its timing, to direct the attitudes of Zionist Jews toward a more favourable stance *vis-a-vis* the war effort of the British and their allies. British political leaders in subsequent pronouncements attributed to the Declaration a great deal of importance in the favourable turn the war was to take. It is indicative of this importance that texts of the Declaration in large quantities were thrown from low-flying planes over German towns.

2 — The Declaration was issued after extensive negotiations with the Zionists, European and American, and after consultations with many European

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 1265.

governments and with the U.S.A. The Palestinians were not consulted at all. Even Sherif Hussain, with whom the British were negotiating when the Declaration was assuming its final shape, was not consulted and was not informed of the matter till after the Declaration was issued.

3 — The Declaration was issued at a time when the British did not even control Palestine. Their armies were then still engaged in battles in the southern end of Palestine. They promised the land to the European-Zionist potential settlers even before Palestine was under their military control.

4 — The Declaration was issued by Britain but was an all-European affair: France and Italy approved it shortly after it was made public. The United States followed suit later on. The significance of these approvals of the Declaration should not be taken lightly. Underlying them was a feeling that the Zionist colony in Palestine would be of service to the whole of Europe, a real European outpost in Afro-Asian surroundings.

* * *

The Balfour Declaration was more "advanced" and ambitious than the Charter Rhodes got in 1899, in that it committed Britain far more strongly to helping the Zionists than the Charter had committed her to helping Rhodes' company. But like the Charter it was issued after the Europeans (Britain, France, Italy, and Russia) had divided the Ottoman Empire in secret agreements in a fashion not altogether dissimilar to the Berlin Congress and the subsequent scramble for Africa.

1917 is the year when the Zionists received their European legitimacy. It was a rudimentary one: the legitimacy of a project in its infancy. Moreover, the Declaration was a declaration of sympathy. It was clear that the burden of actual work would be mainly that of the Zionists, but there was only a passing reference to the Zionist Organization in the letter Rothschild received. Hence, more legitimacy was to be forthcoming. The machinery of the League of the Nations provided the framework. In the international organization the allies were setting up after the war, there was to be a mandate system to which the territorial possessions of the defeated powers would be subjected. The final stage in legitimizing the project came in 1922 when the League's Council approved the Palestine mandate agreement with Britain. The agreement not only incorporated the Balfour Declaration, but also recognized the settlers' machinery, the Zionist Organization (and later the expanded Jewish Agency), as a co-ruler of Palestine. In the years that followed the settlers' machinery developed in Palestine, as the British South Africa Company developed in Rhodesia, into a semi-government with its own institutions, its own traditions and even its own forces.

* * *

Thus in a time-span of shortly over a quarter of a century the European settlers in the experiments under study reached quite a measure of legitimacy. This was bestowed upon them primarily by Britain according to the imperialist spirit and aspirations of the time. South Africa achieved an almost independent status within the framework of the British Empire. The British South Africa Company was in charge of Rhodesia, while the Zionist Organization was a partner to Britain in ruling Palestine. The natives were effectively barred from the governmental machinery in all three territories. But while in the case of South Africa and Rhodesia the general intention of the settlers was to exploit the natives, the continued existence of the natives in Palestine conflicted with a substantial body of opinion among the European Zionist settlers who insisted that the National Home policy meant turning Palestine into a Jewish state in the same way that England was English and France French. Also, while the legitimacy of the settlers' machinery in South Africa and Rhodesia came about as a result of a unilateral British action, the legitimacy of the settlers' machinery in Palestine was the creation of the League of Nations, the international organization of the time. Hence one could conclude that, through the League of Nations which was under the spell of the European imperialist powers, the techniques of implanting a European settlement in a non-European land were perfected. The Zionist settlement in Palestine was the most recent and the most refined of the European settlements in Africa and the Middle East.

3. *Systematic Acquisition of Land*

A settlement requires land. European settlers in Africa and the Middle East were at one in being land-hungry people. Also, the larger the land acquired, the better-off the settlement would be, and the more the immigrants would come in. The battle, the series of battles, that the settlers had to fight were for the land. The natives realized this. But in the confrontations which were to ensue between the Europeans and the natives, the former had the advantage first of superior technology, and second of the imperial backing — actual or potential, tacit or declared — which was also the source of legitimacy.

In this frenzied endeavour to acquire land and more of it, there was no essential dichotomy between the settlers and the imperial element. In fact it could be generally said that there was basic understanding between the two sides with regard to this issue. Admittedly at times there were certain discrepancies between the settlers and the imperial authorities, but these discrepancies were never very serious, especially when regarded in their historical perspective. The discrepancies were generally in relation to the approach — the principle was never questioned. The settlers, understandably,

were violent and brutal in applying the principle. Imperial authorities had to be more careful, paying at least some attention to a feeble but increasingly growing pressure from the moralists, the humanitarians, and the lofty principles announced during the First World War and before.

It was in a partial submission to those evolving standards of morality in the age of liberalism that the Imperial letters patent incorporating the British South Africa Company contained certain provisions regarding the minimal rights that had to be preserved for the natives. Along the same lines the Balfour Declaration contained the famous clause that nothing in it should prejudice the civil and religious rights of the natives. It was also along the same lines that the Union of South Africa's Constitution contained the entrenched clauses that were meant as a means for a certain measure of supervision over developments in the Union. Notwithstanding all these clauses and provisions, it could be generally said that damages to the natives' rights were done with the full knowledge of the Imperial authorities. The protection-of-the-natives clauses were quite ineffective as the Imperial authorities were always prone to lean toward the interests of their kith and kin — the settlers.

Another point must also be made in this context. The Imperial authorities and the settlers, while keen on acquiring land, at times paid some attention to securing, from a position of strength, a minimum agreement with the natives. The settlers especially feel quite enthusiastic in pointing to such dubious agreements as the Lobengula-Rudd agreement or the Feisal-Weizmann agreement as justifications for their legitimacy — legitimacy allegedly given this time by the natives not the imperialists. No effort will be made here to refute in detail the settlers' allegations regarding such agreements. It is sufficient to mention that a close examination would show such agreements, if not totally unsupportable, at least reasonably dubious, and open to serious challenge. That they were negotiated by the natives under duress, psychological, military and otherwise, is quite evident if one cares to examine the method through which they were concluded. Moreover, there could be no doubt that whether such agreements were concluded or not, the settlers were well set on a course of action which they would have followed, and which they did follow, in any case. Nobody would maintain that had the Lobengula-Rudd agreement not taken place, the white settlement in Southern Rhodesia would not have been established. The natives' consent, whenever it was ever sought by the settlers, was thought of as a formal but not a necessary pretext; something to be happier with, but not to be sad without.

The settlers' systematic acquisition of land enabled them to secure the material (geographic) basis of their states. As to the natives, they were either pushed away to parts of their original lands "reserved" for them (South Africa and Southern Rhodesia) or else driven out of their lands rather completely (Israel).

In the case of Southern Rhodesia and Palestine, the acquisition of land

was, more than in the case of South Africa, an organized and fully deliberate action, envisioned and officially sanctioned in the terms of the British South Africa Company's Charter and in the terms of the Balfour Declaration. In the case of South Africa, it came in a more haphazard fashion, especially in the beginning; and there was no document conforming to public law from which one can deduce that the systematic acquisition of land was a basic policy for the authorities in charge. Notwithstanding the differences mentioned above between the three experiments discussed, the European settlers, once there, conducted themselves in a comparable, even an identical, manner.

* * *

When the first Europeans arrived in the Cape, they wanted only a supply station. The few Europeans who landed there were solely devoted to the service of ships and their interest in the soil was transitory. "A peasant nurseryman was the only company servant dedicated wholly to the soil."²⁹ But soon after, in 1657, the company was convinced of the advisability of allowing some company servants discharged from service to be allotted lands by the commander of the garrison, in order to become free burghers selling their products solely to the company. At that time, there was no elaborate system of individual land holding among the Hottentots — land was held communally. The tribe's cattle used to graze freely all over the land. The Hottentots at first did not seem to mind the few farms established in the first few years, and used to trade their cattle with the Europeans. But soon the settlers, especially the farmers who started breeding their own cattle as well, were beginning to feel land-hungry and the Hottentots started to feel that they were becoming increasingly restricted in their freedom of movement. It soon became apparent to the Hottentots that the foreigners were there to stay and expand — the conflict was imminent.

In 1658, six years after the initial landing, the conflict between the Europeans and the natives over land became pronounced. Out of this conflict — and subsequent similar ones — emerged a pattern of acquiring land and "settling" it by force.

1658 witnessed a limited-scale war between the Europeans and the natives; a limited-scale war which was to become the first in a series in the history of European expansion in South Africa. Describing the "incident" to the Directors of the Company, the Commander of the garrison reported the viewpoint of a wounded Hottentot prisoner in the following terms:

(29) M. Whitting Spilhaus : *South Africa in the Making : 1652-1806* (Capetown, 1911), p. 1.

"The prisoner... who could speak Dutch fairly well, having been asked why they caused us this trouble, declared, for no other reason than that they saw that we kept in possession the best lands, and grazed our cattle where they used to do so, and that everywhere with houses and plantations we endeavoured to establish ourselves so permanently as if we intend never to leave again and take permanent possession of this Cape land (which had belonged to them during all the centuries) for our sole use. Yea ! to such an extent that their cattle could not come and drink at the fresh water without going over the corn lands which we did not like them to do.

"He asked finally what we would have done had the same thing happened to us. Moreover, he added, they observed how we were strengthening ourselves daily with fortifications and bulwarks, which according to their way of thinking could have no other object than to bring them and all that was theirs under our authority and domination."

As regards the conditions of peace, the commander of the garrison summarized the views of the Hottentots as follows:

"They pressed this point so hard that their lands should be evacuated by us, that we were finally compelled to say that in consequence of the war made against us, they had completely forfeited their rights and that we were not inclined to restore them, as the country had been the property of the company by the sword and rights of war."³⁰

This long quotation, notwithstanding the disadvantage that the viewpoint of the native is reported by an involved European, is of primary importance, as it summarizes not only the history of South Africa, but the history of all the settlers who settled in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine. Especially significant is the clear European argument at the end: by causing us trouble, the natives "forfeited their rights and we were now not inclined to restore them as the country had been the property of the company (i.e. Europeans) by the sword and rights of war."

It is also significant to note that even the Europeans who advanced the argument mentioned above were not quite convinced of its validity. Some twenty years after the initial European landing in the Cape, the settlers were still conscious that the land was not theirs. At that time a high-ranking British judge visited the Cape and advised — in a personal capacity — that the land should somehow be purchased legally from the natives. Subsequently, a conference between the settlers and the native chiefs was arranged. An agreement, embodied in a document, was reached whereby the native Hottentot chiefs ceded to the Dutch East India Company a large area and received in return goods for a nominal value of £1600. However, according to the accounts furnished to the company directory, the actual value of the articles transferred to the chiefs in exchange for the land was calculated at £9 12s. 9d.³¹

(30) Quoted by Leo Marquand, *The Story of South Africa* (London, 1966), pp. 38-39, from *The Early Cape Hottentots*, Van Rieberck Society Publications, No. 14, pp. 14-16.

(31) George McCall Theal, *South Africa*, (London, 1900), p. 43.

The Europeans, as was mentioned above, were now turning into farmers and, in particular, cattle-breeders, as there was an increasing demand for meat. Those trekboer farmers did not own the huge ranches where their cattle grazed, because the company was unwilling to spend money on surveying the land and handing each farmer a delineated freehold. Hence, farmers were encouraged to pursue a sort of nomadic life, always moving to new pastures, further and further away from the government at the Cape. Again difficulties with the natives ensued, and the second Hottentot war broke out in 1673. About one century later, in the middle of the 18th century, an outbreak of smallpox swept over the territory and resulted in the almost complete destruction of the Hottentots and other smaller tribes. The Europeans, thanks to their more advanced methods of protection, suffered from the epidemic to a much lesser degree.

In the course of their expansion, the Europeans were bound to encounter other native tribes, such as the Bushmen. Those tribes also did not like the European intrusion into their lands, but the Europeans were determined. "The cattle farmers organized hunting parties which killed adult Bushmen and captured their children where they were used as herdsmen. In one such party 250 Bushmen were killed."³²

Hottentots and Bushmen were thus subdued and their lands "settled"; but the ever-expanding settlers' frontiers were soon to clash with the areas occupied by the Bantu tribes who were then moving South. Fighting with the Bantu tribes first broke out in 1779 in what subsequently came to be called the first Kaffir War. Kaffir Wars, which were really frontier wars between the expanding Europeans and the retreating natives, lasted for over a century, until the time when England entered into her war with the Boer republics. But, from the mid-19th century on, the British authorities at the Cape thought of another alternative to driving the Africans back, while at the same time keeping them under control. After all, the whites' hunger for land was by now less demanding than before. The new alternative was to keep Africans in occupancy of a part of the newly-won territories, while the government sent some of her agents to take charge of certain administrative tasks — thus keeping the Africans within the range of its control. This alternative was the origin of the current South African and Southern Rhodesian practice of maintaining native reserves.

With the establishment of the Union of South Africa the external frontiers of the new political entity were fixed. The climax in the South African settlers' drive to acquire more lands was reached shortly after the Union was born. The Union was now able to carry out the ambitions of the settlers through law —

(32) Leo Marquand, *The People and Policies of South Africa*, 2nd ed. (Capetown, 1960), p. 5.

not only through brutal force. The Natives Land Act of 1913 set aside some twenty-two and half million acres of land as reserves for the Africans — and prohibited them from acquiring land outside those reserves. This area represented some 7% of the territory of all of South Africa. The area reserved for Africans was subsequently increased in 1936 (The Native Trust and Land Act), and now this area represents some 13% of total South African territory, on which some three-quarters of the inhabitants of South Africa are supposed to live. The Africans' land in South Africa was then almost totally acquired by the settlers — the material (geographical) basis for the white settlement there was now effectively secured.

* * *

What happened in Southern Rhodesia was similar in its general pattern to what happened in South Africa, though in Southern Rhodesia there was more systematization. In 1890 a pioneer column was organized by the British South Africa Company to carry out systematically with clear imperial backing what the trekboers did almost on their own. The imperial backing was further assured — beyond the charter of incorporation — by the composition of the Pioneer Column. The recruiters for the Column preferred to select “the sons of the leading families in each district of the Cape... The expedition might be massacred; at least they might be surrounded and cut off. What would save the Pioneers ? Only Imperial intervention ! How would this be secured ? Only by agitation on the part of worried and influential fathers.”³⁴

The majority of the Column was made up of Englishmen and Afrikaners, but its “professional” composition was more varied :

“Sons of Peers served next to street Arabs, prospectors mingled with soldiers. Clerks jostled with cow punchers and one group was known as the gentlemanly troop because the majority were brokers.”³⁵

The Column was also escorted by a police force from the British Bechuanaland police which formed the nucleus of the British South Africa Police. Thus composed to carry out military and civilian tasks, the column set out in June 1890 moving north into Mashonaland. The Africans, faced with a new, well-organized expedition, realized that they were not an equal match. Lobengula, chief of the natives, reacted to the advancing column “diplomatically”

(34) Reported by Lewis H. Gann, *A History of Southern Rhodesia*, p. 90 from F.W.F. Johnson, Commander of the Pioneer Column, in his book *Great Days : Autobiography for Empire-Builders*, (1940).

(35) Reported by Gann, *ibid.*, p. 91 from A.G. Leonard, *How We Made Rhodesia*, (1896).

from a weaker position. He sent letters expressing his feeling of betrayal and asking, naively as it appears, whether any whitemen had been killed by him or whether "whitemen had lost anything they are looking for."³⁶

But the Column was not to be deterred by diplomacy. On 11 July 1890 they entered what is now Southern Rhodesia, and on 12 September 1890 the Column decided to halt its advance having reached its destination at a sight now known as Salisbury. Fort Salisbury was soon built over the site.

The Pioneers were now ready for the scramble for land and mines. Each member of the Column was given a claim for 15 mining sites as well as a farm — a large one. Their arms were left to them and a combination of garrison and settlement was now firmly established in the heart of Southern Rhodesia.

The land acquired, European immigrants were encouraged to settle in the newly conquered territory. Fortune-seekers flocked into the new settlements with zeal and expectation. The administration of the company responded favourably to the interests and demands of the settlers. The company offered every new immigrant a large farm and several mining claims. In order for the company to have more of the natives' land at its disposal a variety of means were applied.

The company was interested in two things at the same time : acquisition of the natives' land and the exploitation of the natives as a cheap labour force. In 1894 an "incentive" for the Africans to leave their land and turn into wage earners was introduced : a poll-tax of ten shillings was imposed on every African in respect of each hut he occupied. Other than this "incentive", brutal and naked force was used to bring the Africans away from their lands and turn them into workers. The black man "was often spoken of as though he was a natural — if intractable — resource : something to be exploited in the same way that one exploited the land or the minerals beneath it."³⁶

The resources that whetted most of the Europeans' appetites were the allied mineral riches of Southern Rhodesia. These, however, turned out to be insubstantial. From 1907 on, farming was given serious attention, and immigrants were encouraged to turn into farmers.

Following the practice adopted in South Africa of assigning the natives to "reserves" on which they were supposed to live, the Imperial authorities prodded the company to delineate certain reserves for Africans for the "protection" of them and their lands. This the company did in 1898, assigning to approximately one million natives less than a quarter of the whole Southern Rhodesian territory. The European settlers, whose number was then some 20,000, were given a free hand in another one third of the territory. The re-

(36) Rayner : *The Tribe and Its Successors : An Account of African Traditional life and European Settlement in Southern Rhodesia* (London, 1962), p. 151.

(36) *Ibid.*, p. 180.

maining land, some 45 million acres — a bit less than half of the total territory — was kept as “unalienated land” theoretically open for black and European purchasers. The Africans of course were in no position to buy lands, due to their meagre resources, but the European settlers resented even the possibility of Africans being able to buy land in the unalienated areas and thus becoming the white farmers’ neighbours.

The question of the ownership of the unalienated land was a complex question which was to be the predominant theme in the first two decades of the 20th century. It is indicative of the spirit of the time that the dispute was mainly between the settlers and the company — each party to the dispute affirming that the unalienated land was his. Hardly any view was expressed to the effect that the land really belonged to the natives. And finally, when the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decided on the issue, the ruling was that the land belonged to the Crown ! The company however, as an agent for the Crown, was empowered to deal with the land; i.e. to sell it to the settlers in order to defray expenses incurred by it in administering the country.

The official theory behind creating native reserves was that such practice aimed at protecting the natives. In practice, however, the reserves fitted nicely into the segregationist theory that was being slowly developed in South Africa. As the number of European immigrants to Southern Rhodesia increased, it became convenient to think of the unalienated land as a land “promised” to the white man who had the ability to develop it. In many cases, then, it was necessary — in order to allow the settlers to develop the land — to shift the natives from their ordinary dwellings and pastures so that room could be provided for the incoming settlers.³⁷ Also, with the agricultural revolution and the spread of mechanized agriculture that “caught on” in the second decade of the 20th century, the whites developed a general feeling of profound dislike for their African neighbours who, they claimed, endangered “good farming work”. “White farmers blamed Africans for breaking down fences, for stealing cows and implements, and for abusing their roads with sledges.”³⁸

In 1914, pursuant to an imperial suggestion, a Commission was set up to study the question of the reserves. The Commission’s recommendations were for a reduction in the area of the native reserves by over one million acres (from 20 million acres and a half to about 19 million acres and a half). The reason advanced for this reduction was that ample land had to be provided to the incomers. The Commission’s recommendations were accepted in 1917.

(37) Gann, *op. cit.*, p. 185.

(38) *Ibid.*, p. 186.

The fact that the reserves were already overcrowded was not readily conceded by the whites. However, even when this fact was conceded, the "advantageous" aspects of this phenomenon were asserted: "If they are crowded out so much the better; for then they will come out and work so they will be able to get a fair wage and fine food."³⁹

But the settlers were still too few in number to settle all the land available to them. This gave rise to what was called "Kaffir farming" — whereby the white would let his farm or part of it to Africans in exchange for an agreed rent. From the African view-point this meant that the native's original land was taken from him but he was allowed, later on, to "use" it provided he paid a certain sum of money !

When Southern Rhodesia attained the status of responsible government in 1923, it was clear that the new government would further enhance the settlers' interests : now there was a responsible government for and by the settlers. The Crown still retained certain controls — such as the right to veto laws — but such controls were theoretical. Practically, it was always possible for the government of Salisbury to get along well with London so much so that these controls were never used.

The unalienated land was still the problem. The legal question was settled in the ruling made by the Privy Council, as mentioned above, but the practical problem was still there : Africans were still allowed — at least theoretically — to buy pieces of the unalienated land adjacent to the lands that Europeans had. The settlers' government soon established a commission to study the question, and the commission found an easy solution : Part of the unalienated land, totaling some 44 million acres, was to be divided into native purchase areas where only Africans could hold land on an individual basis; while other parts of the land would be kept exclusively for European farmers. The commission, however, reflected the public feeling of the settlers when it noted wryly that "a firm determination to do justice" [between natives and Europeans] would mean apportioning to the natives areas which "will seem to many Europeans a generous and perhaps over-generous provision for the natives."⁴⁰

The commission recommended that the Native Purchase Areas be less than 7 million acres, while it recommended that 17,400,000 acres be kept available to Europeans. The rest, some 19 million acres, was, for the time being, to remain unassigned. The commission also recommended that a native should not — individually — hold more than 1000 acres, while Europeans were not restricted regarding the extent of their individual holdings.

The commission's recommendations were received favourably in the all-white Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, though, due to some proce-

(39) Phillip Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma : The Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia*, (London, 1962), pp. 99-100.

(40) Reported by Mason in R. Gray : *The Two Nations*, (London 1960), pp. 43-44.

dural difficulties, the final promulgation of what was to be known as the Land Apportionment Act did not come about till 1930, and was not to become effective till 1 April, 1931. What South Africa's Union Government did in 1919, the responsible government of Southern Rhodesia did in 1931. The pattern was clear in both cases : systematic acquisition of the natives' land, now carried out by "legal means", not by naked brutal force.

The views expressed during the debates on the draft are not of special importance to this essay, but some "samplings" of the views expressed regarding "perhaps the greatest of all problems of this country" — to use the words of the then Prime Minister H.V. Moffat — would be useful.

In the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly Max Danziger criticized the basis on which the report was developed in that it assumed that the natives were, and would remain, interested only in pastoral and agricultural work. The native, Danziger believed, was quite capable of skilled industrial work. He criticized the report's over-generosity toward the natives, saying that if they continued to sell land to the natives in any quantities "we can say that in fifty to 100 years Rhodesia will no longer be a white man's country, the natives being a million strong to 50,000 whites." The only solution, according to Danziger, was then complete political separation : "all African reserves to be added together in order to make a solid African State which would lie to the West of Bulawayo and to which one day a benevolent British Government would add Bechuanaland."⁴¹

Similar views were voiced by H.H. Davies, also a member of the Legislative Assembly.⁴² The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister argued against complete separation, contending that such complete separation could only be carried out by force and through bloodshed, as it would involve moving Africans from their present reserves. It is interesting to note in passing, that the Southern Rhodesian Government is now — and has been for years — involved in moving the natives by force and through bloodshed. It is also noteworthy that similar practices took place, and are still taking place, in South Africa and Palestine.

In the British House of Commons the bill was approved without much discussion. Only a few voted against it though its discriminatory clauses against the natives were obvious. Among those few who voted against it was Colonel J.C. Wedgwood who maintained the proposed Legislation would deprive the natives of the opportunity of living in their own country.⁴³

(41) Mason, *Ibid.*, p. 51.

(42) Gann, *op. cit.*, p. 277.

(43) Reported by Gann, *Ibid.*, p. 280 from the H.C. *Debates*, V. 237, 26 March, 1930.

The Land Apportionment Act is a landmark in the style the European settlers adopted toward the natives. A contemporary British liberal writer, Thomas Franck, described the Act as an instrument of "a policy of Apartheid well advanced in implementation years before the South African Nationalist Government gave the concept a name. The Act seeks not so much geographic separation of races — for that is economically suicidal to the Europeans who depend on African labour — as the fullest possible control over such integration as is unavoidable or expedient."⁴⁴

Since 1931 the Act has been implemented steadily with brutal force whenever necessary. The Africans, whose number now stands at approximately four million, still live in an area less than one third of the whole of Southern Rhodesia, and their movement is restricted in the rest of the territory. The European settlers, who number only some one third of a million — despite all sorts of encouragement to immigration — control the rest of Southern Rhodesia. As late as September 1969 some natives were still in the process of being evacuated by force whenever it suited the settlers' interests to do so, as is the case with the Tangwena people. Even the ultra-rightist American *Time* magazine had this to say on the most recent application of the Land Apportionment Act:

"Most white Rhodesians dismissed the eviction [of the Tangwena people] as a simple matter of slum clearance. Internal Affairs Minister Lana Smith attacked those whites who protested accusing them of being Communists or fellow travellers. Said Hammer [the Director of a "European" ranch recently established on the Tangwena Land] 'people should mind their own business and not incite uneducated people to resist the law of the land.' "⁴⁵

* * *

Individual Zionist infiltration into Palestine started toward the middle of the 19th century after the British established their Consulate in Jerusalem. Real colonization work however began only in the 1880's. The first Zionist colony was founded in 1882 near Jaffa by a group of Russian settlers — but with the help of British and French money. It was named "Rishon le zion" (First in Zion). Other colonies followed but at a slow pace.

It should be remembered that Palestine at the time was not a British Colony, but formed a part of the Ottoman Empire. It is true, however, that Britain was entertaining some designs over Palestine, and was carrying them out slowly and silently. Colonization was to proceed not through the forcible acquisition of land, but through individual purchase. In Palestine, then,

(44) Thomas Franck, *Race and Nationalism : The Struggle for Power in Rhodesia-Nyasaland*, (London, 1966), p. 68.

(45) *Time* Magazine, 26 September, 1969.

before the Zionists had their "charter" they were carrying out colonization work though without the "assured supremacy" on which Herzl was later to insist.

The Zionist Colonization in Palestine, then, had to be accomplished, at first, within the legal framework of the Ottoman Empire, thus it could not be as violent as was the case with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. It had to conform to a minimum of legal requirements. The natives after all were subjects of a recognized, though dying, Empire. Nevertheless, friction between the settlers and the natives was bound to develop. The settlers were by then in occupancy of lands where the native Bedouin used to graze their cattle, and first clashes between the Europeans and the natives developed in the late 1880's. As the colonialists expanded their settlements, and as most of the land the settlers bought used to belong to big landowners who did not care about the fate of the peasants who were working the land and living on it, and because of the Zionist insistence on their doctrine of working the land by their own hands, the question of the displaced peasantry started to emerge.

The Jewish Company which Herzl dreamt of and described in his pamphlet *The Jewish State* "is partly modelled on the lines of a great land-acquisition company".⁹⁶ But all the activities that were undertaken by several Jewish-Zionist Colonization Societies did not amount to very much in the long years before the British mandate was imposed on Palestine. In 1920, when the British started applying the Balfour Declaration, there were less than two thousand settlers in Palestine (some 5000 Jews in total) while there were some 700,000 Arabs.

From the early days of the mandate, land acquisition witnessed an upward trend. The first British administrator of Palestine was a committed Zionist. In Article 6 of the Mandate Agreement it was stated that the administration of Palestine... "shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage ... close settlement by the Jews on the land including state lands and waste lands not required for public purposes." The British authorities thus turned from the beginning to surveying the land, and deciding what could be given to the Zionists.

The administration was, of course, quite cooperative with the settlers, but again as was the case with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the settlers wanted even more and did not care whether peasants were thrown out of their lands or not. For instance, the Ghor Mudawwara lands were legally considered a state land, but thousands of peasants had been living on those lands and working them for generations. The Zionists wanted the administration to dispossess all those peasants, under the pretext that the land was legally a state land, and as such it should be turned over to Zionist settlers. When the administration took a more moderate view, the settlers carried out a long series

(46) Herzl, *The Jewish State*, p. 33.

of protests and charged the administration with favouring the natives!⁴⁷

At any rate, the settlers' land purchases, even when they met legal requirements, resulted in increasing the number of the landless natives. An extensive study of the land problem in Palestine, conducted by the mandatory authorities, and made public on 20th October, 1930 revealed the plight of the natives. The study "calculated that, even if under present conditions, all the cultivable land in the country not already in Jewish occupation had been divided up amidst Arab husbandmen, yet there would not be enough plots to maintain them and their families in a decent standard of life".⁴⁸ It also emphasized the lack of any attempt to deal with the grazing claims of the Bedouin.

Another official inquiry into the condition of land in Palestine was made by yet another British envoy, Mr. Lewis French, a capable administrator and expert in land problems. His report, which was made in two sections between December 1931 and April 1932, was the result of a good investigation. He warned in his report that "[If] the process of dispossession continues in another three or four decades the Arab peasant-proprietor will have become extinct"; and that "[The] chief and ever-present risk is that the progress of comparatively large growers, backed by plentiful financial resources which weight the scale so heavily against the independent Arab proprietor, will mean the entire and permanent displacement of the latter from the soil."⁴⁹

Mr. French's warning, one has to note in passing, proved to be an understatement of what was to happen later. It took less than two decades to displace the whole native population of Palestine, except for a tiny minority which was and continues to be subjected to discrimination.

There is no need to go into the details of what happened after those warnings were published. Zionist settlers heavily increased starting from 1937 and they intensified their efforts to acquire lands either through purchase or through state grants. The settlers advanced their claims for the necessity of establishing a Jewish settler state in Palestine by pointing to Nazi Germany's crimes against the Jews. But the natives, who certainly were not Germans, continued to suffer, not only through displacement and dispossession, but also through international misunderstanding of their plight.

When Britain turned the Palestine problem over to the United Nations in 1947, the number of Jewish settlers in Palestine had already reached some 700,000 or something like one third of the population. They held also a good deal of the fertile land of the country, though their total holdings did not reach over 7% of the whole territory. In the United Nations, and through the

(47) Sir Albert Hyamson, *Palestine Under the Mandate* (London, 1950), pp. 82-83.

(48) J.M.N. Jeffreys, *Palestine : The Reality*, (London, 1939), p. 623.

(49) Reported by *Ibid.*, pp. 645-646.

efforts of the U.S. especially, the stage was set for the establishment of a settler state in Palestine.

The formal basis of the Zionist settler state was provided by the U.N. partition resolution adopted on 29 November, 1947. The Partition resolution envisaged the division of Palestine into a Jewish state, an Arab state, and the internationalized city of Jerusalem. It is of course beyond the scope of this essay to discuss the circumstances and the results of such a resolution. What is important to note is that the Jewish state was to include some 48% Arabs. It is also important to mention that Britain, shortly after the partition resolution was adopted, announced its intention of withdrawing from Palestine by mid-May 1948.

The two points mentioned above were of immense importance in view of what was to happen between December, 1947 and May, 1948. The Zionists, bent on expansion in accordance with their oft-repeated declarations, and well-armed for the purpose, had a clear idea of what they needed to do: exploit the circumstances of the British withdrawal, and drive as many Arabs as possible away from the would-be boundaries of the Jewish state. Organized and premeditated terror was a useful method to apply in order to get rid of the natives, and acquire their lands. Here, we find a situation similar to what took place in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia: the settlers were handling the natives without any moderating influence from an external authority.

The Zionist intentions were so clear that they themselves did not care to hide them. It is instructive, in this respect, to quote what Sir John Bagot Glubb mentions about the Zionists' intentions in his book, *A Soldier with the Arabs*:

"In December 1947, a senior British officer in the Arab Legion [the Jordanian army] was one day visiting a British district commissioner in Palestine. A Jewish district officer employed under the district commissioner was also present. The UNO Partition plan had already been published. The British officer asked the Jewish officer whether the new Jewish state would not have many internal troubles in view of the fact that the Arab population would be equal in number to the Jews.

" 'Oh, no !' replied the Jewish officer, 'that will be fixed. A few calculated massacres will soon get rid of them !'

"The speaker was not a terrorist . . . he was a responsible, moderate Jewish official, employed in the mandatory government."⁵⁰

There is no need to describe the Zionist terrorism against the natives at its height, between December 1947 and mid-May 1948.⁵¹ It should only be noted that as a consequence of the Zionist terror, some one million Palestinians were forced to evacuate their homes thus bringing into existence the Palestine

(50) (London, 1957), p. 81.

(51) Much has been written on the subject. For a recent work see : B. Bishouty, *The Role of the Zionist Terror in the Creation of Israel*, (Beirut, 1969).

refugee problem. The new state of Israel also expanded through bloodshed the territory allocated to her by the UN partition resolution from 56 percent to 77 percent. The number of the natives who were left in Israel totalled some 170,000 in 1948.

With the establishment of the state of Israel the settlers' position was now fully legitimized. Now they had a full and unshared power to enact laws, to advance their interests in legal terms. They utilized this new power to legalize the usurpation of the natives' land: those natives who left the country, as well as those who stayed on. Outright arbitrary confiscation of the natives' property, which was prevalent in the early days of the establishment of the state of Israel, gave way gradually to legalized expropriation. But the legal cover was always thin. In the words of a native lawyer living in Israel, Sabri Jiryis, "these laws, the first series of which was promulgated in 1948 and the last in 1958, gave the Zionist government the possibility of sacking about a million donums* from the lands of the Arabs who continued to stay in Israel after the establishment of the state."⁵²

The Absentees' Property Law of 1950 is the main law by which the Zionists "legalized" the acquisition of the natives' land.⁵³ The law has its origins in the articles on absentee property in the Emergency Regulations. Those articles came into force in 1949, and they were promulgated as a law in 1950. This law considers as absent proprietors a good many natives who could not be considered absent under any circumstances. They were characterized as absent as a necessary prelude to the confiscation of their properties. In the words of Jiryis again: "It is difficult to justify a legal text so arbitrary and contrary to logic, except perhaps by taking into consideration the limitless appetite of the Israeli authorities to grab Arab lands".⁵⁴ The Arabs who were left in Palestine (Israel) knew from the beginning what this law meant. A native member of the Israeli Knesset, representing the Communist Party, declared on 16 January, 1951: "This law is a symbol. It illustrates the discrimination practised against the Arab citizens of this country. Thousands of Arab citizens in the country, residing in it, were transformed on the basis of this law into 'absentees'... The real task of the administrator of the absentees' properties was to steal more and more land."⁵⁵

Other "legal" means for acquiring land is Article 25 of the Emergency Regulations which authorises the Military Government to expel the inhabitants

(*) A donum is 1000 square meters.

(52) Jiryis, Sabri, *The Arabs in Israel*, (French Ed.) PLO Research Center p. 117. 144.

(53) For the text of the law see : J. Badi (ed.) *The Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel*, (New York, 1961), pp. 129-150. For a discussion on the law see Jiryis, *op. cit.*

(54) Jiryis, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

(55) Reported by *Ibid.*, p. 123, from *Compte Rendu des Débats Parlementaires*, Vol. 8, pp. 789-790.

of certain villages from their village for security reasons. Their lands are then taken against as little a price as the government cares to give. Other articles of the Emergency Regulations or the Regulations Concerning Security are also used to obtain similar results.

In addition, regulations concerning the utilization of waste lands, regulations concerning forests, and regulations concerning the acquisition of land for purposes of public utility are subtly used to acquire more of the natives' land.

The discrimination against the natives, even though put in legal terms, was so obvious that it prompted some Israeli university professors and scholars to criticize and reveal the discriminatory bearing of many laws dealing with land. A publication named *Ner* was started in 1952 to express their viewpoint.⁵⁶

The June 1967 Israeli aggression against three Arab States resulted in the placing of large Arab territories under Israeli control. We will not concern ourselves here with the aggression or its consequences except as they touch on our subject : the acquisition of the land. In this regard, the Israeli settlers' record is rich indeed.

Israel unilaterally, and contrary to clear UN resolutions, annexed the Arab city of Jerusalem to its territory on 27 June, 1967. Other occupied territories, which according to international law, are considered "enemy occupied territories" were frequently described as "liberated territories". The government tacitly approved this appellation when on 29 February 1968 it was decreed that such territories should no more be considered as enemy territories. On the same day the government changed the name of the West Bank of Jordan to the Jewish names of Judea and Samaria.

Acquisition of additional Arab lands in the occupied territories is a daily affair now. Already in September 1967, barely 100 days after the day Israel "was obliged to fight in defence of her territory" as Israeli sources claim, this same Israel was engaged in the establishment of Zionist settlements in the occupied territories. And as in any settler state, which tries to attract immigrants by pointing to the vastness of the lands it controls, no less prominent an Israeli figure than Levi Eshkol found it wise to point to the new territories while expressing his belief that "the central problem of the state and the people of Israel is copious aliya (wave of immigration) from the affluent provinces." "Even before June," Levi Eshkol wrote in his foreword to the *Israel Government Yearbook* of 1967/68 "we could have absorbed tens of thousands more Jews. To carry out now what we must, as victory challenges us, we must be thicker on the ground."⁵⁷

Even before June, Israel could have absorbed more settlers, according to Eshkol. After June, then, the capacity for absorption, on lands acquired by

(56) Jacob Landau, *The Arabs in Israel*, (London, 1968), p. 117.

(57) *Israel Government Yearbook 1967/68*, p. 13.

force, was much higher. And the Israeli Government did not waste time discussing whether it was internationally or diplomatically advisable to open the newly occupied territories to settlers. As with other settler states, international considerations do not count when it comes to stealing more of the natives' lands.

Let us have a quick look at the Zionist efforts to "settle" the Arab city of Jerusalem. Early in January 1968, Israel announced that 883 acres from the Arab sector of Jerusalem had to be "expropriated" by the Israeli government. Later, the Moroccan and Jewish Quarters [for a long time occupied by Arabs] were levelled by bulldozers and about 3,000 inhabitants were rendered homeless. The homeless Arabs were subsequently transferred to the East Bank of the Jordan river. On 18 April 1968, a new order for confiscation was published; it covered 28 acres right inside the city. The area covered is populated by some 5,000 inhabitants. Also, as Jerusalem became to the Israeli government a part of Israel proper, the Absentees' Property Law was applied to it; this simply means that the Israeli government would be able "legally" to put its hands on numerous properties.

Let us also have a quick look at the Zionist efforts to set up settlements in the newly occupied territories. The number of such settlements established in the occupied territories between September 1967 and March 1969 reached over 20. According to the Deputy Director of Settlement Affairs in the Jewish Agency, this number will be doubled in the near future. The Deputy Director also acknowledged that many of those settlements were not established for security or strategic purposes, but in response solely to settlers' pressure.⁵⁸

The Zionists' systematic acquisition of land is still then a going concern. Moreover, the Zionists want the lands empty, they want to force the natives out. Already in 1948 there were voices that cried stridently for a completely pure Jewish state, that wanted the tiny Arab minority that was left in Israel sent to the neighbouring states.⁵⁹ Voices similar to those 1948 voices are certainly more vociferous now, especially as "Greater Israel" includes some one and a half million Arabs. What is important, however, is to note that the present government of Israel is now more sympathetic to such voices : it is trying its best to "induce" the Arabs of the occupied territories to leave.

* * *

"The territorial ambitions of Zionism are not a matter of conjecture : throughout the history of the movement, those ambitions were clearly and unmistakably expressed", Alan Taylor, a student of Zionism, wrote in 1959.⁶⁰

(58) *Al-Ittihad* (an Arab bi-weekly published in Israel), 25 March, 1969.

(59) Landau, *op. cit.*

(60) *Prelude to Israel*, (New York, 1959), pp. 107-108.

Ben Gurion, the armed prophet of Israel, very recently expressed those territorial ambitions once more. The *Jewish Observer* published, on 13 June 1969, an interview with the former Prime Minister of Israel, in the course of which he talked about Israel in these terms : "Today it (Israel) still is not complete, since only 20 percent of its land is settled..."

* * *

Notwithstanding certain differences between the South African, Southern Rhodesian and Israeli experiments, the same pattern of development can be clearly observed. First there was the atmosphere of colonialism and imperialism, pregnant as it was with possibilities that were to affect the whole globe. In practice, and to a great degree in theory, Europe was held to be supreme, the rest of the globe was considered a booty, a prize, to be treated at Europe's pleasure. One of those pleasures was to implant European outposts in Africa and the Middle East : it was easier to operate an Empire from a closer distance. European settlers were empire builders and empire servants. In the course of their work for the Empire (in the three cases, it was the British Empire) they were granted a certain measure of legitimacy, an imperial legitimacy. Based on that legitimacy, their efforts at expanding their settlements acquired another "legalized" dimension, a dimension which was utilized to the full against the natives. The result was that in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia the natives were assigned to reserves whose areas represent only a small fraction of the total of the natives' original territory, while in the case of Israel the treatment of the natives was harsher : they were expelled outright from their homeland. The Zionist settlers, however, bent as they are on expansion, in June 1967 went beyond the areas they already controlled as a result of their previous assaults on the natives and not only did they capture new territories, but also a larger number of the natives fell under their control.

Europe was considered superior to the rest of the world in the general atmosphere of colonialism and imperialism. Certainly European conquerors of non-European lands were to "transport" European supremacy with them to the newly conquered lands and use it *vis-à-vis* the natives. In this respect, they were especially encouraged by the fact that the natives had been conquered. Now the stage was set for them to practise racism.

II

EUROPEAN CONQUERORS AND DEFEATED NATIVES : RACISM IN PRACTICE

Though it is difficult to define racism in theory, it is easy to identify manifestations of it in practice. Like any other social phenomenon, racism is a result of many interwoven factors. It can vary from a vague feeling of group-distinctiveness, to an elaborate theory expressed in scientific terms. It has been looked upon differently at different historical stages. But it is fair to say that it has been generally tolerated throughout history, except by a few philosophers or institutions with a universal outlook. Of late, however, with the advent of the liberal outlook of the modern era, racism has been systematically attacked by the powerful appeal of the concept of equality : equality of men, nations and races. This does not mean that racism has been totally defeated, or that it has become an abhorrent concept to maintain. As a matter of fact, the concept of European superiority, smacking as it does of racism, was in the 19th century an accepted and powerful concept. Only in the 20th century has the concept of protection of minorities (an aspect of racism) gathered enough momentum to become a matter of international concern. The protection of minorities — first European minorities, then minorities in general — was one of the accomplishments of the League of Nations. It was however during the League's life-span that racism achieved its highest status as an important theory — an official theory espoused by a powerful state: Germany. The Second World War resulted in a total defeat of the concepts of racism, but only in Europe, and in those areas that came under Hitler's or his allies' sway. The United Nations Charter was more daring in its espousal of the concept of equality. But the settlers in Africa and the Middle East were ideologically and emotionally rooted in concepts that were remnants from the age of colonialism and imperialism. European superiority was a commonplace with them and they practiced it *vis-à-vis* the natives. At times they "legalized" their discriminatory treatment of the natives, at other times they did not.

1. *The Problem of the Natives*

The settlers, similar to most Europeans in the age of colonialism and imperialism, thought of the non-European lands as vacant, or at least underpopulated. When the settlers were confronted with the natives, they treated them almost as a subhuman species. It is a historical fact that the settlers

were interested scientifically in all aspects of their future environments: the soil, the climate, the natural resources and so forth, but they never devoted enough attention — or any attention for that matter — to the natives, the owners of the land !

In South Africa, right from the early days of the Dutch landing “a number of records written by Dutch officials and by other European travellers (described) the habits and customs of the Hottentots and (reflected) the interest and scorn, amusement and disgust” with which the Europeans regarded the natives.⁶¹ The natives were constantly described as “dull, stupid, lazy and stinking”.

At that time slavery was a recognized institution, and the settling Afrikaaners not only made excellent use of it but gradually elevated it to the status of a religious belief. The Afrikaaners' Church, the Dutch Reformed Church, relying on some passages in the Old Testament, holds the belief that the inequality of races is a God-ordained institution, and that the blacks, whom the church considers as descendants of Ham, are destined to serve the whites, the descendants of Sham. When the British Parliament abolished slavery in 1834, and the British government attempted to apply this abolition to South Africa, the Boers regarded this attempt as a betrayal which was contrary to biblical concepts.

It was then that the Dutch Reformed Church provided the religious justification for degrading the natives. An offspring of this degradation was the theory of Apartheid, or Separate Development, which was officially espoused in 1948 when the Nationalist Party Government took over under the leadership of Dr. Malan. The theory of Apartheid was “modernised” — that is, expressed in modern scientific terms, by SABRA, the South African Bureau for Racial Affairs, which was founded in 1947. SABRA now is the modern ideological tool for rationalizing the settlers' feeling of superiority towards the natives.

The practical problem posed by the existence of the natives is now the result of the great numerical superiority of Africans and non-whites in comparison with the settlers. The proportion of non-whites to whites is more than 4 to 1. It is obvious that any democratic system of government would entail the predominance of the natives and their allies over the whites. Thus, the settlers' government does not enfranchise the non-whites; instead it tries to set up for them what are usually called “Bantustans”, special political entities within the framework of the political control of South Africa. This is the concrete expression of the doctrine of Apartheid. The question, however, is further complicated by the desire of the settlers to keep enjoying the cheap labour force which the non-whites can supply and are actually supplying.

(61) Marquand, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

In Southern Rhodesia, the situation in general is similar to South Africa, except for some points. In Southern Rhodesia, the settlers are not predominantly Afrikaaners, but English; and the Dutch Reformed Church does not enjoy the same hold over them. Also, the economic aspect of exploiting the natives as cheap workers was more pronounced in Southern Rhodesia. Back in 1894 a "Hut tax" was imposed whereby every African had to pay ten shillings in respect of each hut which he occupied. At that time, this represented several months' labour for the African workers. Forced labour was widely practiced. The proportion of Africans and non-whites to the settlers in Southern Rhodesia now stands at about 15-20 to 1. Hence, democracy based on majority rule could not be accepted by the settlers. Racial discrimination has been practiced from the very beginning, but outright segregation has not been an official policy though this possibility has been more seriously discussed in recent years. In fact, as we will see later, the concept of segregation is now gaining ground and is a possibility which the Smith government does not like to rule out for the future.

In the case of Palestine, the "ordinary" European superiority toward the natives is reinforced by the Zionist ideology and the whole religious-historical concept of the Jews being a chosen people. The concept of the chosen people, when incorporated into a political doctrine, can be very dangerous indeed, as was the case with Nazi Germany. We will not discuss the different meanings given to this concept, but one should always be aware of the relevance of this concept to the theory and practice of racial discrimination. As a matter of fact one can detect in the Afrikaaner's ideology, in its desire to establish white supremacy based on biblical premises, an attempt to emulate the Zionist ideology.

The natives, in the Zionist schemes for settling some non-European land, were treated as menials. Little attention was paid to them except in such cases as this one which Herzl envisaged: "If we move into a region where there are wild animals to which the Jews are not accustomed — big snakes, etc. — I shall use the natives, prior to giving them employment in transit countries, for the extermination of these animals. High premiums for snake skins etc., as well as their spawn."⁶²

In this paragraph, Herzl points to another way in which he envisages treating the natives: giving them employment in transit countries. What does that mean?

Due to their special status, resulting particularly from their neighbours' attitudes toward them, European Jews have mainly occupied themselves with such activities as banking, commerce and the intellectual professions. Working the land was not one of their fields of activity. When the idea of

(62) *Diaries*, Vol. I, p. 98.

Jewish Nationality, vehemently espoused and advanced by political Zionism, gathered momentum among European Jews under the impetus of the credo of nationalism that swept Europe in the 19th century, Zionist thinkers paid increasing attention to the necessity of acquiring land to serve as a material basis for the concept of Jewish nationality. Zionist thinkers also felt it imperative, in order to assert their claim that the Jews formed a nation, that this Jewish nation should have its own peasants and workers. Bankers and merchants were not enough to build a full-fledged nation. There was a need for people whose occupation would be physical work, especially farming. The Zionist ideology thus extolled the value of "Jewish Work" and considered it an essential ingredient for establishing the Jewish national identity. The Zionists accordingly insisted that in their settlement schemes they would do all the work by themselves; henceforth the natives, when their existence was not denied, were not needed anyway; they should be cleared out.

In this respect Zionist settlers were much harsher to the natives than the settlers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, as it was axiomatic to the former that the natives should be expelled outright and by whatever means. The existence of a Zionist settler state precluded the existence of any substantial body of natives. The Zionist ideology insists not only on downgrading the natives in their own lands, but on depriving the natives of their lands altogether. Herzl was quite clear regarding this point. The natives would be first given the extraordinarily difficult job of exterminating wild animals, then:

"We shall try to spirit the penniless population across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying employment for it in our own country."

This process, the process of removing the natives "must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly".⁶³

It should be mentioned here that Herzl was talking about natives in the abstract. He was not then considering the natives of Palestine.

These were then the theoretical bases developed by the Zionist ideology in respect of natives. Let us have a look at how the Zionist settlers regarded and dealt with the problem of the Palestinian natives.

First there was the outright denial of the existence of Palestinians. Israel Zangwill's statement that Palestine is a land without a people which must be given to a people without a land, was a rallying cry not only for Zionists but also for their European supporters. Martin Buber reports that Max Nordau, the prominent Zionist leader, having learned for the first time of the existence of an Arab population in Palestine, ran to Herzl and

(63) Herzl, *Diaries*, Vol. I, p. 88.

exclaimed, "I did not know that before, but then we are committing injustice".⁶⁴ Nordau's exclamation however did not affect the course of Zionist thinking. Perhaps it bothered his conscience to know of the existence of Arabs in Palestine, but this did not entail anything further.

As a matter of fact, only a short time ago, Golda Meir, the Israeli Prime-Minister, in an interview published by the *Sunday Times* (London) on 15 June 1969 reiterated the same theme of the non-existence of the Palestinian people:

"It was not as though there was a Palestinian People in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian People and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist."

When the existence of Palestinians was conceded, the argument the Zionists adopted was that Palestine was very much underpopulated and that substantial parts of it were undeveloped. Even in 1916, Norman Bentwich, a rather enlightened Zionist, was speaking about Palestine in these terms: "... the Greater Palestine... cries for a population to redeem it from the neglect and decay of centuries".⁶⁵ There was no heeding of the factual findings of the cultural Zionist, Ahad Ha'am, who asserted, after a field-trip to Palestine which he undertook in 1891, that there was "little untilled soil in Palestine except for stony hills or sand dunes."⁶⁶

What Ahad Ha'am found out in 1891 was to become an obvious fact in the early days after the Balfour Declaration was issued: The Palestinians were there and Palestine was not an underpopulated country which badly needed new-comers. What to do then with the Palestinians? Israel Zangwill discovered the fallacy of his proclamation that Palestine was a land without a people, but now he was strongly in favor of having Palestine without its people. In February 1919 Zangwill was for a "race redistribution" so that "the Arabs would gradually be settled in the new and vast Arabian Kingdom Only thus can Palestine become a Jewish national home."⁶⁷

Vladimir Jabotinsky arrived on the scene at a time when the conflict between the settlers and the natives was very much in evidence. He was familiar with what had taken place in South Africa. He dreamt of a settlers' experiment similar to what had happened in South Africa. On the South African experiment he had this to say: "If the Jewish people had been given such a country with an administration favouring colonialism — what would the Jews not have achieved in forty years?"⁶⁸ He was familiar with and

(64) Reported by R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, "Israel et Eretz Israel" in *Le Conflit Israelo-Arab*, (Les Temps Modernes), p. 391.

(65) *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, ed. by H. Sacher, (London, 1916), p. 202.

(66) Quoted by Hans Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea", in his *Reflections on Modern History*, (New York, 1963), p. 196.

(67) See : *Speeches ... op. cit.*, p. 341.

(68) Reported by J.B. Schechtman in *Fighter and Prophet : The Vladimir Jabotinsky Story : The Last Years*, (New York, 1961), p. 135.

sympathetic to the South African experiment, and he saw its similarities with what was taking place in Palestine, so he advocated a treatment for the natives of Palestine similar to the treatment the settlers inflicted on the natives of South Africa: driving them back and taking over their lands. He "believed that the same methods must be applied there (in Palestine) as in other schemes of European Colonization in backward lands".⁷³

* * *

The problem of the natives was then similarly viewed by the settlers in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine. However in Palestine the treatment was harsher as the settlers did not want anything to do with the natives: they did not want them as cheap labor but as evacuees. Palestinians were evacuated in 1948 — but not fully. Some 12% of the Israeli population after 1948 and up till 1967 were natives. After the June 1967 aggression the number of the natives under Israeli control totalled over a million, thus representing some one third of the total population of the areas under Israeli control. In Israel, it was safe to play democracy, to enfranchise every citizen including the natives. But discrimination against the natives still took place in a variety of ways; as will be seen later.

* * *

The problem of the natives, which was taken so lightly by the settlers in their early days, has emerged after some time as the most serious and the most intricate of the problems posed by the existence of the settlers. The settlers know for the time being that their superiority *vis-à-vis* the natives can be sustained by force. What they do not appreciate is the fact that the natives have emerged nowadays as able activists whose share in deciding the future cannot be denied any longer.

* * *

The problem of the natives was present from the very beginning. However, a crucial development in the history of the problem was to occur when the settlers' existence was "legitimized" enough to enable them to make laws, and apply them. This stage was reached at different times and with differing degrees in the three experiments under study.

In South Africa, the stage of law-making by the settlers was definitely reached in 1910, but Apartheid was not officially espoused till 1948. In

(73) Hans Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 192.

Southern Rhodesia the settlers were able to make their own laws from the very beginning, but this was especially true after 1923; and another stage in asserting their sovereignty was reached in 1965 with the unilateral declaration of independence. In Palestine the settlers were not official law-makers till 1948, but their geographic control was greatly enhanced after June 1967.

In the subsequent discussion we will dwell briefly on the legal controls over the activities of the natives, especially as they are applied now; and then will also briefly discuss manifestations of discrimination against natives that are not legally provided for, and other tendencies in dealing with the natives.

2. *Legal controls over the Activities of the Natives*

Legal controls imposed by the settlers over the activities of the natives smack of discrimination against the natives, and aim at the extension of the settlers' power. Such legal controls are well-known in the cases of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where the natives form the majority of the population and where colour constitutes a clear criterion of discrimination. In Israel, legal discrimination in a variety of ways is practised against the non-Jewish population which means the natives. This is not say that there is no effective discrimination between European and Oriental Israelis. As a matter of fact, such discrimination between European and Oriental Israelis is a widely recognized phenomenon in Israeli society, and has been treated at length by many.⁷⁰ However, we are concerned in this essay with discrimination against the natives, not with discrimination within the framework of the settlers' community.

Legal controls over the activities of the natives are practised, as has been said, in a variety of ways. We will tackle here only some of those controls which may give us a clearer idea about the characteristics of settler states.

The first characteristic of the settler states is their desire to increase the number of the settlers — immigrants qualified by the discriminatory criteria employed to make a common cause with the settlers already there. South Africa and Southern Rhodesia need white (European) immigrants, while Israel needs Jews from the advanced countries. An all-out effort to secure new immigrants is and has been undertaken by the settler regimes in many different ways. Public relations firms have been contracted to depict in glowing terms the life settlers lead. Advertisements echoing the same concepts are published in the newspapers, and immigration bureaux have been set up in many Euro-

(70) See for instance one of the recent examinations of this phenomenon in Michael Selzer, *The Aryanization of the Jewish State*.

pean and American countries. Nationality is granted to the immigrants on more or less easy terms. In the case of Israel this hunger for immigrants is the most obvious. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel states that the State of Israel "will be open for Jewish immigration". The Emergency Land Requisition (Regulation) Law of 1949 states that an order for land requisition could be issued if this "is necessary for the defence of the state, public security, the maintenance of essential supplies or essential public services, *the absorption of immigrants or ...*" (Emphasis supplied). The Law of Return (1950) and the Nationality Law (1952) proclaim the right of every Jew to come to Israel as an Oleh [an immigrant Jew] (Art. 1 of the Law of Return) and state that "every oleh under the Law of Return shall become an Israeli national" (Art. 2a of the Nationality Law) and that "Israeli Nationality by return is acquired by a person having come to Israel as an Oleh after the establishment of the state with effect from the day of his Aliyah" (Art. 2b2 of the Nationality Law).⁷¹

The preference of the Israeli authorities for immigrants from the advanced countries has been stated on several occasions. It is sufficient here to mention again Levi Eshkol's introduction to the 1967/68 edition of the *Israel Government Yearbook* where he expresses his belief "that the central problem of the state and the people of Israel is copious aliya from the affluent provinces."

South Africa's and Southern Rhodesia's immigration and nationality laws are also very liberal in conferring nationality on their qualified immigrant-settlers, though they do not match Israel in this respect. All three settler-states condone the practice of double nationality since in their enthusiasm to increase the number of the settlers they do not care about the generally-accepted legal principle that for a person to become the national of another country he should renounce his previous citizenship.⁷²

These easy terms for the granting of nationality to immigrants who meet the requirements of the settler regimes are matched by the simple ways through which the natives are deprived of their nationality. The policy is clear : increase the number of immigrants and decrease the number of natives.

The South African Citizenship Act of 1949 gives the Minister of the Interior the right to deprive any South African citizen of his nationality especially if this citizen has been condemned by the South African authorities on a charge of treason, sedition or public disorder. Again, citizens who leave South Africa without valid passports are not allowed to return to the country — and an automatic deprivation of their nationality follows. Though those provisions do not seem to be directed openly against the natives, it is generally against

(71) See texts in Badi, *op. cit.*, p. 156 and p. 255.

(72) On Israel and double nationality see Marc Hilleol, *Israel en danger de paix*, (Paris, 1968), pp. 129.132.

the natives that charges of treason, sedition and public disorder are brought — and substantiated within the framework of the settlers' justice. Also, it is the natives who are denied passports by the racist regime and thus find themselves compelled at times to leave the country without valid passports.

The Southern Rhodesian authorities follow similar practices of depriving their citizens of nationality. In 1966, for instance, many Africans were deported from the Southern Rhodesian territory on account of their political activities; others were refused passports, while still others could not re-enter the country. Citizenship could also be legally withdrawn from a person indicted for violation of the Southern Rhodesian Security Laws and for violations of other existing laws.

In Israel the Absentees' Property Law, referred to above, had the effect of considering as absentees many natives who were actually living in Israel. In considering many natives as "absent" from Israel, this law, as Rashid Hussein, an Israeli journalist of native origin, puts it, has no equivalent even in South Africa or Rhodesia.⁷³

Israel, of course, followed, and continues to follow, an extra-legal means of depriving the natives of citizenship. This means is well-known: forcible expulsion of the natives to areas not under Israeli control, and total refusal of any effort aiming at their readmittance. This was the case in 1947-1948 and then in 1967 and after. Despite various United Nations resolutions, which consistently called for the return of the Palestinian refugees to their homelands in what is called Israel, the Israeli authorities have stubbornly refused to apply these resolutions, thus depriving those natives of the citizenship to which they are legally entitled.

Another similarity in the legal practices pertaining to nationality applied by the three settler states is the primary importance attached to the genealogy of the would-be settlers. Typical to the practices of racist regimes, such as the Nazi German regime, Israel, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia subject the pedigree of prospective settlers to a meticulous examination in order to find out whether such settlers meet the discriminatory criteria employed. Here the prospective settler is not evaluated on the basis of his merits, but also, and most importantly, on the basis of his inherited blood, whether it is real white blood in the case of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, or real Jewish blood in the case of Israel. Citizenship itself in these settler states is not an irrevocable right which can be withdrawn only in certain cases when the *citizen himself* is charged with certain violations of the Law. Instead, citizenship can be withdrawn when it is proved that the *citizen's ancestors* were not the right ones. Cases of the sort are commonplace in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel. In South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the "grade" of

(73) *Ibid.*, p. 227.

citizenship can be lowered (from the status of a white citizen to that of a coloured or African) or revoked. In the case of Israel, sometimes citizenship can be revoked completely, but the "ancestral evidence" can lead to other difficulties involving the career or the status of the person involved. We will cite only one illustration of an actual case that took place in Israel; the case of Mrs. Rita Eitani, summarized from a narration by J.L. Talmon, an Israeli professor.

Mrs Rita Eitani was an active and very dynamic member of the municipal council of Nazareth, where she represented the Mapai, the right wing of the ruling Labour party. Although the Mapai and the Social-Religious party were allies at the national level, relations between the two parties at the local Nazareth level were tense. Mrs. Eitani is a German immigrant who arrived in Palestine clandestinely and illegally after the start of the Second World War. She subsequently served in the Israeli army in which she distinguished herself. When the tension between the two parties in Nazareth reached a high pitch, a rumour went around that Mrs. Eitani was born of a non-Jewish mother, that she was never converted to Judaism, and that therefore she was not a real Jew.

The Orthodox activists started to work. The local employee in charge of civil status, because of the division of offices between the parties of the coalition, was a member of the National-Religious party. In order to add credence to the rumour he sought documentary proof. Thus, he addressed a request for information on the origins of Mrs. Eitani's mother to the German registration bureau, and received information welcome to him. Hence, he requested Mrs. Eitani to give back her passport on the grounds that she had obtained her Israeli nationality by fraud, according to the laws that automatically confer nationality upon the Jews. Her marriage with a Jew was found invalid as civil marriage is not recognized in Israel. She could have become converted to Judaism by going through a religious ceremony, but the rabbis would have had little inclination to allow her to do that, as such a conversion would not seem inspired by real faith. Finally Mrs. Eitani was dismissed from her work.⁷⁸

This case illustrates clearly the discriminatory practice of Israel with regard to its citizens. Israel and other settler states abound with such examples. The purity of blood which was the catch-word of the Nazi German regime, is also the catch-word of the settler regimes in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel.

* * *

The three settler states claim to be democratic in the well-established traditions of parliamentary-constitutional democracies. There is an executive responsible to the legislature, which in turn is elected by the eligible voters.

(78) Cited by : *Ibid.*, pp. 192-194.

But this democracy is again the privilege of the settlers and is not fully enjoyed by the natives. It is not a democracy practiced by all and for all, but it is a democracy for and by the settlers.

In South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, where the natives constitute the majority of the population, the right to vote, that is to participate in the elementary stage of the democratic process, is denied to the natives. Restrictions on the enfranchisement of the natives in those two settler states are well known and need not be detailed here. In Israel, where the natives who are still in their homeland constitute only a small fraction of the total population (some 12%), there was no need to deny them the right to vote. But in all three settler states, basic elements of the democratic process are not provided for the natives, especially as regards the freedom of expression and the freedom of association.

The legal forms restricting freedom of expression vary in the three settler states. On the surface, such forms do not seem to be discriminatory, but in application they almost always work against the natives.

Freedom of expression is curtailed in South Africa by a variety of laws. A comprehensive system of censorship was introduced by the Publications and Entertainment Act of 1963. The Act prohibits the publication, production, importation or distribution of any "undesirable" publication or object. A publication or object is undesirable if, *inter alia*, it is harmful to the relations between any sections of the Republic or is prejudicial to the safety of the state, the general welfare, the peace or good order. This seems to be rather reasonable, but the way it is applied could be harsh and discriminatory. Any published criticism could be banned as it might be deemed to affect the good order of things.

Let us, for instance, look into a complementary act restricting freedom of expression : the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. This Act provides in Section 6 for the prohibition of the printing, publication or dissemination of any communist periodical. Communism is defined in this Act in such a way as to include any doctrine "which aims at bringing about any political, industrial, social or economic change within the Union by the promotion of disturbance or disorder, by unlawful acts or omissions or by the threat of such acts or omissions." This definition is very broad, and clearly curtails the democratic process. If we consider that the native opposition to the settlers' discriminatory regime is regarded as operating under the spell of communism, we can appreciate the wide extent of suppression that this Act provides.

There are still other restrictions. For instance, it is illegal to publish any false information concerning the behaviour or experience in prison of any prisoner or ex-prisoner or concerning the administration of any prison, knowing the same to be false, or without taking reasonable steps to verify such information. It is also illegal to publish or communicate any material or information relating to "any military or police matter" — police matter being any matter

related to how the police preserve the internal security of the state. All these prohibitions reflect the special sensitivity of the authorities toward the way in which democracy is practiced.

In order to illustrate how widely such Acts are applied, it is sufficient to mention that under the Publications and Entertainment Act 7,500 publications were banned in 1963 and more publications were banned in subsequent years.⁷⁵

In Southern Rhodesia, the Law and Order Maintenance Act performs functions similar to those performed by the Acts mentioned above. Section 44 (21) is especially pertinent. The key-word in the Act is "subversion". Thus any person who "writes, prints, or causes to be printed any subversive statement, distributes or circulates any subversive statement among the public or any section of the public, displays any writing conveying any subversive statement in such a position that it is visible from any place to which the public has access; utters... any subversive statement; ... (or) has in his possession any subversive publication... shall be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment for a period not exceeding five years."

On 19 March 1967, the state launched a new type of institution named "Guard against Gossip Campaign". This Guard was simply another variety of the internal secret service. What is important in the South African and Southern Rhodesian cases is that most of this harshness in restricting the freedom of expression is practiced against the natives by the white authorities.

In Israel, the natives' freedom of expression is effectively curtailed through similar — though more discreet — laws. We will cite one example to illustrate how the natives' freedom of expression is curtailed.

Toward the middle of 1959 a group of natives established an organization called "Al-Ard" (The Earth), which tried to be registered officially but was barred from doing so (we will consider this later on, when discussing freedom of association). It tried to get permission to issue a publication, but again the grant of a permit was delayed. Subsequently, the leaders of Al-Ard decided to issue a publication which appeared each time under a different name so as not to contravene Israeli laws that prohibit the issuance of a periodical without a valid permit. The publication carried each time different names as editors, again in order not to contravene Israeli laws. In this way, while waiting for the grant of an official permit, the publication was well in order. The authorities "tolerated" some 13 issues of this publication, but as they noticed that the publication was acting as a catalyst for the natives' feelings of frustration they decided to crack down on it. Thus Samuel Dibon, the then Prime Minister's Adviser on Arab Affairs, held a press conference on 31 January 1960 in the course of which he attacked the activities of Al-Ard group. Two weeks

(75) From a U.N. Publication : *Apartheid and Racial Discrimination in Southern Africa*, (New York, 1968), p. 10. Most of the information on discrimination in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia mentioned in this chapter is taken from this publication which will be referred to as *UN : Apartheid*.

later the publication was suspended and the editors whose names appeared on each issue of the publication were fined while one of them, Salih Baransi, was sentenced to a term in jail.⁷⁶ The lesson was clear : no independent publication issued exclusively by and for the natives could be allowed.

* * *

The natives' freedom of association in the settler states is as effectively curtailed as the natives' freedom of expression, despite all verbal attachments to the forms of democratic processes. The keyword in curtailing the natives' activities in this regard is again the fear of *subversive* activities.

In South Africa, following the Sharpeville massacre in March 1960, the government enacted the Unlawful Organization Act of 1960. This Act empowered the Governor-General (now the Republic's President) to declare the African National Congress and the Pan-African Congress (the two main native parties at the time) unlawful if he was satisfied that the safety of the public or the maintenance of public order was, or was likely to be, seriously threatened as a consequence of their activities. He was also empowered to declare any organization to be unlawful on the same grounds if in his opinion it was established for the purpose of carrying out, directly or indirectly, any of the activities of any body declared previously as unlawful.

Immediately after the Act was promulgated, the ANC and the PAC were declared unlawful organizations and were forced to go underground. The leaders of both these organizations were silenced through prison sentences, through restriction of their freedom of movement, or through prohibiting them from becoming members in any new organization. Some of the leaders have gone into exile. Hundreds of the militants of those organizations were convicted on charges of continuing their "subversive" activities.

Along the lines of Apartheid, the Prohibition of Improper Interference Bill was enacted in September 1966. The provisions of the new Act prohibit members of one racial group from taking part in the activities of political parties or organizations of another racial group. As for policies not so far embodied in legal terms, steps have also been taken to discourage multi-racial students' organizations. Also, while there are no general provisions restricting freedom of assembly, the holding of meetings in African areas or at which Africans are present is regulated by a number of provisions which enable local authorities and the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development to exercise far-reaching control over them.

In Southern Rhodesia there is also an Unlawful Organization Act promulgated in 1960. This Act empowered the Governor to declare unlawful any organization if it seemed to him that its activities or the activities of its

(76) See : Jacob Landau, *The Arabs in Israel*, (London, 1969), p. 96.

members were likely to endanger public safety, disturb or interfere with public order, or prejudice the tranquility or security of the colony (now the state); or if it seemed to him that such activities were dangerous or prejudicial to peace, good order or constitutional government, or likely to stir up disaffection among the inhabitants of the colony, or likely to promote feelings of ill-will or hostility between or within different races of the population. Also, the Act empowered the Governor-General to declare unlawful any organization controlled by or affiliated to or which participated in the activities of or promoted the objects or propagated the opinions of: the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Council of Peace, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, the Women's International Democratic Federation, the International Union of Students and the African National Congress of the Union of South Africa.⁷⁷

The Act also declared the African National Congress — at that time the leading African political party in the country — to be unlawful. African political parties formed subsequently to meet the requirements stipulated by the law were successively banned since then after more or less short periods of lawful existence.

The Law and Order Maintenance Act imposes certain restrictions on the freedom of gatherings and meetings. Special provisions of this Act, however, are explicitly concerned with the Africans' right to assembly. Thus Section 46 (1) of the Act provides that no person shall hold, preside or address any meeting, gathering or assembly at which twelve or more Africans are present .. without the permission in writing of the district commissioner given after consultation with the chief of the tribal area concerned. Such enactments forced all native political organizations to go underground, as it became obvious that the natives' freedom of association could be tolerated only if it fitted the schemes of the racist group in power.

In Israel, there are practices curtailing the natives' freedom of association similar to those applied in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. We mention here some examples published by Israeli sources. In the academic year 1958-1959 an Arab Students' Committee was founded in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, but it was denied recognition by the University administration and the Israeli Students' Federation. Its secretary was sentenced to a term in jail on charges of "subversive activities". The committee, which vehemently espoused an anti-racial line, sent letters to the UN Secretary-General protesting against the South African policy of Apartheid, and also against discrimination practiced by the settlers against the natives of Palestine. It also took an active part, in 1965, in the campaign against the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia. Perhaps what the authorities resented

(77) UN : *Apartheid*, pp. 55-56.

most was the close fraternization that developed between the Arab Students' Committee and the African students of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. The common denominator was the anti-racist line of the African and Arab students. Because of such anti-racist activities, the Arab Students' Committee was prohibited from using the university facilities and its active leaders were prosecuted.⁷⁸

Attempts by the natives of Palestine at establishing independent Arab parties were also frustrated. In the early fifties, some natives attempted to establish a "people's party" based in Jaffa to fight against the laws and regulations governing the absentees' property, but such attempts were doomed to failure because of the hostile attitude of the government. But perhaps it is instructive to mention in detail the latest and most powerful native attempt to form a native political party that was undertaken in 1958 by some nationalist groups.

The attempt dates back to the first of May demonstrations in 1958. The demonstrators on that occasion clashed with the Israeli police forces in the city of Nazareth, the largest Arab city in Israel. A number of the demonstration leaders were imprisoned or exiled. Subsequently, an Arab Public Committee for the Protection of the Imprisoned and Exiled was formed. This committee was soon to expand its scope so as to include the defence of the natives' rights. In July 1958 it changed its name to become the Arab Front, and then to the Popular Front. Between July 1958 and February 1959 the Front gathered momentum among the Arab population and established branches in various towns and villages. As the Front was becoming a catalyst for Arab grievances, "the Israeli authorities for their part took steps to discourage the political activities of the Front which they regarded as potentially subversive. The military administration refused to grant some Front activists travel permits ... a few were even detained for investigation."⁷⁹ Also, the authorities refused to register it as an association.

Crippled by such state intervention, a group of the Front activists organized themselves in a cultural society named Al-Ard Company, Ltd. In mid-1960 this cultural organization tried to register as such with the Israeli authorities but the registrar of societies refused them registration. The group then took its case to the Israeli Supreme Court, which after some two years' delay, agreed that Al-Ard Company Limited could register as a cultural organization. But the limited company did not succeed in realizing a similar victory when it came to the problem of issuing a weekly publication. Here the Supreme Court endorsed the decision of the Governor of the region. The Governor did not specify the reasons for his denying the group the right to

(78) Landau, *op. cit.*, pp. 54-56.

(79) *Ibid.*, p. 94.

publish a weekly periodical, and the Supreme Court upheld the Governor's decision. But Al-Ard group was not to be stopped: it expanded its activities by opening branches in the regions inhabited by the Arabs. In September 1961 it sent a letter to the UN Secretary General describing the discriminatory practices to which the Arabs of Israel were subjected, and sent another memorandum on the same subject in July 1964.

In the early months of 1964 the group tried to get registered in the association of journalists under the name of Al-Ard Movement. It sent a declaration of its intentions and a copy of its constitution to the authorities but the answer was soon to come, in the negative. Thus Al-Ard group carried its case again to the Supreme Court. It petitioned the Court, presenting its constitution and explaining that it aimed at realizing all or some of the following objectives:

1- To improve the educational, wealth, economic and political level of its members.

2- To realize total equality and social justice among the different classes of Israeli society, including the abolition of the discrimination and persecution to which the Arabs of Israel are being subjected.

3- To find a just solution to the Palestinian problem, bearing in mind that the problem is indivisible — in other words, finding a just solution which will take into account all aspects of the problem.

4- To support by legal means the movements of liberation in the Arab World.

5- To struggle to bring about peace in the Middle East, and in the World.

6- To support all progressive movements in the world which fight imperialism, and support all the peoples who struggle to liberate themselves.⁸⁰

The Supreme Court refused to accede to the demands of Al-Ard group, on the pretext that certain points of the programme deny the existence of the Israeli state. Al-Ard leaders maintain that this decision deliberately misrepresented the views expounded in the declaration submitted to the Court.⁸¹ Only a few days after the Court's ruling, three leaders of Al-Ard group were arrested, including Sabri Jiryis, the native lawyer of Israeli nationality whose book on the Arabs in Israel has been referred to several times in this study. According to press reports, as the Israeli professor of the Hebrew University Jacob Landau mentions "they were arrested as a result of the capture of infiltrators from across the border with orders to contact the leaders of Al-Ard, who had been seized in Israel. At the end of November

(80) For details see : Jiryis, *op. cit.*, (Beirut ed.) pp. 235-237.

(81) For the details of the judgement and for comments on it see : *Ibid.*, pp. 238-245.

1964, an order signed by the Israeli Minister of Defence was published in Reshumot [the official gazette] ... in it he banned Al-Ard group..."⁸² Thus, the Israeli authorities effectively prohibited the establishment of a politically conscious native group, proving that the natives' freedom of association in Israel is far from being democratically secured.

Legal controls over the activities of the natives were not restricted to Al-Ard group. The Israeli authorities even refused to accept the registration of certain Arab electoral lists in the Knesset (Israeli Parliament) election. In the 1965 election for example an Arab Socialist list was presented but the Central Election Committee refused to register the slate. Members of the slate again carried their case to the Supreme Court, but the Court confirmed the ruling of the committee. The Supreme Court's decision stated that the slate members were a "group liable to sabotage the state by attempting to exploit any loophole in the law for the realization of its political aims."⁸³

Even native sports and cultural clubs were subjected to close scrutiny by the Israeli authorities, and a number of them were closed by the police. It is a typical illustration of the natives' freedom of association in Israel that the Military Governor of the Central Region once declared a village in the Triangle a "closed area" in order to impede the holding of a football match between the football teams of Galilee and the Triangle.⁸⁴ Some members of the native sports and cultural clubs have even been detained, investigated and sentenced to terms in jail, as the Israeli sources themselves point out.⁸⁵

It is clear then that the Israeli authorities were completely against any independent native movement attempting to organize the natives in a democratic form. Instead, the Israeli authorities, like the South African and Southern Rhodesian authorities, were all in favour of assembling native collaborators and supporters, and giving them full backing. They attempted, in this way, to picture the natives as participants in the democratic process, though they knew full well that such "agents" did not represent the natives but were even hated by the natives they were imposed on. The Israeli officials sometimes have gone as far as to acknowledge that it is their established policy to impede the existence of any independent native movement that does not receive instructions from some part of the settlers' establishment. Amon Lin, who was Chief of the Department of Arab Affairs in the Alignment (then composed of Mapai and *Ahdut havoda*) declared on one occasion to Haaretz (5 January, 1967) that "There is a great danger in the very existence of an Arab Party not allied with any Jewish Party. Experience in the Middle East shows that extremist elements always get the upper hand within a

(82) Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 99.

(83) Cited by Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 100, from *Davar*, 10 October, 1965.

(84) Mentioned by Jiryis, *op. cit.*, (Beirut ed.) p. 245.

(85) Landau, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-102.

nationalist party, then they remove moderates by labelling them traitors A nationalist party which does not identify with the state [the Israeli settler state] is liable to bring disaster upon the Arab population in Israel.”⁸⁶

* * *

The three settler states, as mentioned earlier, pride themselves on being constitutional-democracies, regimes that represent a democratic oasis in Africa and the Middle East. But it is quite clear from what was mentioned above that such democracy is reserved for the settlers themselves, while the natives are left out of the democratic process. In South Africa and Southern Rhodesia the majority of the natives are deprived of their voting rights. In the three experiments, the natives are effectively deprived of two basic elements in the democratic process: the freedom of expression and the freedom of association. In all three settler states there is a tendency for the executive branch of government to be free from judicial control and restraint. The judicial branch of government is always burdened with reasons of state, whether such reasons — security, defense, combatting subversive elements — are arbitrary or valid. In all three settler states the decline of democracy is even evident to many of the settlers who still have the courage to observe and criticize. Such conscientious observers are well aware of the practices followed by the authority, whose effect is the total abnegation of the democratic process, but the wave is clear and cannot be checked: arbitrariness is well under way, and any one concerned with real democracy can expect more of it.

* * *

Perhaps the most brutal aspect of discrimination against the natives is their confinement to their residences by the settlers' authorities. Confinement to residence means that those affected cannot leave their residence without permits granted through special and complicated procedures. Confinement to residence is practiced in South Africa within the framework of Apartheid, in Southern Rhodesia within the framework of racial discrimination slowly developing into Apartheid, and in Israel within the framework of alleged security requirements. The practical effects of all three systems, from the standpoint of the natives at least, are just the same: the natives are effectively impeded in their freedom of movement. The confinement of natives to residence reflects, other than the settlers' discriminatory attitude toward the natives, their desire to keep the natives under strict and constant control so that they can be har-

(86) Quoted by : *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

rassed *en masse*, whenever the occasion arises. At the same time, the confinement of natives to residence allows the settlers to have a free hand in consolidating their interests and institutions with the least possible intervention by the natives.

In South Africa, the Group Areas Act restricts the rights of residence, within group areas, to members of the population group for which the group area has been proclaimed. Europeans, Asians and coloured persons are only able to live within their own group areas. They may not reside in African residential areas established under the Bantu Urban Areas Consolidated Act of 1945. The latter Act, which was amended by the Bantu Laws Amendment Act of 1964, severely restricts Africans in urban areas. Europeans of course got the best deal in the Group Areas Act, as the Urban centers — all — are designated as white areas, and as over three-quarters of total South African territory is restricted to whites. Africans, on the other hand, are allowed to live in urban areas only as long as their work is desirable to the white settlers. Thus, Africans are allowed to reside in urban areas if they are employed by whites as employees or domestic servants, or if they are performing certain farming services. Each African living in an urban area must always have in his possession a complicated set of official documents proving who he is and why he is there. The normal thing, according to Apartheid, is for Africans to be living in their native reserves. Entry and departure to and from African reserves is under strict control. The native reserves are considered the areas properly belonging to Africans; thus any African whose services are no longer desired by whites must return, or be returned, to his "home"; that is to his reserve. This is done by force if need be. It should be noted in this respect that native reserves in South African extend over some 12% of total South African territory while the Africans represent over three quarters of the total population.

In Southern Rhodesia, freedom of movement and residence is not recognized by the 1961 Constitution. Special provisions exist for the restriction of Africans' movement and their choice of residence. An African cannot move about in the country without a certificate of registration. Under the Natives' Registration and Identification Act of 1957, all Africans must be registered at a registration office set up under the Act and must obtain a certificate of registration which they must have with them at all times.

Under the Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations, the Minister of Law and Order can impose restriction on the freedom of movement both in relation to specific individuals and in relation to specific areas. Also, the Land Apportionment Act effectively prevents Africans from leasing, acquiring or occupying property in European areas and *vice versa*. In practice, unless Africans are employed as domestic servants or their presence is necessitated on their employers' premises, they may not reside in the European areas, which include all urban centers and more than half of the Southern Rhodesian territory.

In Israel, similar practices are employed on the basis of alleged state security requirements. In practice the net result is restriction of the natives' freedom of movement. About 80% of the native inhabitants of Israel lived between 1948 (the creation of the state) and 1967 in the shadow of a military government based on the State of Emergency Laws promulgated in 1945, during the era of the British mandate over Palestine. Those laws were severely criticized by the Zionists at the time — for example by Jacob Samson Shapiro who later became the Israeli Minister of Justice — and were described as having no parallel even in Nazi Germany.⁸⁷ Notwithstanding such severe Zionist criticisms of those laws, the Israeli authorities did not annul them after 1948; rather they consolidated and reinforced them. The Israeli authorities practice restrictions on the natives' freedom of movement on the basis of the Zones of Security Regulations enacted in 1949. Of special importance in the 1945 Laws is Art. 125 which gives the military governor the right to declare certain regions as closed regions, and thereupon to limit entry to and exit from them. Also, Articles 109 and 110 give the military governor the right to put any person under police surveillance, to prohibit anybody from being in one place or another, to oblige him to keep the police informed about his movements and whereabouts, and to deprive him of his right to his property, including essential basic necessities and so forth.

The Zones of Security Regulations decreed in 1949 proclaim as a protected zone the area extending from 10 km north of the 31st parallel to 26 km south of that line. They also empower the Minister of Defence to declare as a zone of security any area within this area. These regulations impose on the zone of security the same regulations applicable by the State of Emergency Laws to the closed regions — that is: restriction of entry and departure to and from those zones. But these regulations go even further than the previous laws: they give the Minister of Defence the right to expel permanently the inhabitants of a zone of security on the basis of an order signed by him and subjected to no review whatsoever.

These sets of laws and regulations make out of the military government a state within a state, especially after the Supreme Court had consistently adopted the view that it is not within its competence "to intervene in the domain reserved to the Military Government where this government acts on 'reasons of security'... because this intervention, in itself, could prejudice the security of the state."⁸⁸ This position of the Supreme Court had, of course, the effect of increasing the arbitrary nature of the Military Government's acts.

The Minister of Defence utilized the prerogatives granted him by the above-mentioned laws and regulations. He designated military governors for the areas of Galilee, the Triangle and the Negev, where most of the native population live.

(87) See : Jiryis, *op. cit.*, (Beirut ed.) p. 16. A large section of this book is devoted to the practice of military government in Israel.

(88) Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 31.

Within these areas, a number of closed zones were proclaimed.

It is one of the most brutal aspects of the treatment the natives are subjected to, that as Jiryis says, "No person, outside those responsible within the Military Government, knows the exact frontiers of the regions subordinated to the military government, or the limits of the closed zones. In this, the Military Government bases its actions on Art. 4 (which states that there is no obligation to publish acts relative to the State of Emergency) in order to clarify the area of its competence ... The citizen who desires to know the geographical extent within which he is permitted to circulate, has to address himself each time to the scattered officers of the Military Government or the commissariat of the police, which do not have the necessary information most of the time."⁸⁹

There is no legal text restricting the application of these repressive regulations to the natives. In theory they could be applied to any citizen, but as Jiryis says, these repressive laws are not applied with all their severity except to the Arabs, whether they inhabit the areas subjected to the military government or not. In order to prove his point, Jiryis quotes the report of the state controller which states that "The order of the Military Government declaring a given zone as closed is general and all-inclusive, and is applicable to every citizen whether he is a resident of the closed area or not. Hence, whoever enters or leaves a closed zone without a written authorization from the Military Governor is guilty, theoretically, of a legal offence. In practice, the Jews are not required to get such authorization, and the authorities do not apply to them, in general, the penal provisions governing the contravention of the Article (Art. 125)."⁹⁰

It is perhaps instructive, in order to illustrate how Art. 125 is applied, to mention that fines imposed on the natives as a result of violations of legal provisions (especially for not carrying legal passes) totalled about 3000-4000 Israeli pounds per day. This sum is an average which had been calculated along some seven years since the establishment of Israel, as Jiryis reports. The Military Government was abolished from 1 December 1966, but the responsibilities of applying the Emergency Laws of 1945 devolved on the Police which carries them out with comparable efficiency. Thus the natives do not feel the change to any appreciable degree. Moreover, as a result of the June 1967 aggression and the subsequent Israeli control over large Arab areas, the military government of the occupied areas now exercises arbitrary and far-reaching powers over the inhabitants of those occupied areas. Passes and all sorts of written authorizations are a daily ordeal for hundreds of thousands of the natives.

One thing which perhaps should be mentioned *en passant*. If one takes a look at the passes given to the natives by the settler authorities in the three settler states, he will be astonished at their large degree of uniformity. They are

(89) *Ibid.*, p. 108, (Maspero ed.).

(90) Quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 111, from : *Rapport du Controleur d'Etat sur les Dispositions du Sécurité*, année budgétaire, 1957/58, no. 9, 15 February, 1959, p. 56.

full of details, and warnings, thereby underlining the harsh treatment to which the natives are subjected.

* * *

Legal controls imposed by the settlers over the natives aim not only at keeping the natives inactive politically, but also at keeping the natives in an inferior position *vis-a-vis* the settlers in other walks of life. In the domain of work, for instance, it is the practice in the three experiments under discussion to discriminate in a variety of ways against native workers.

In South Africa, the policy of excluding certain categories of the population — usually Africans and non-whites — from the more skilled and better paid types of work has been followed ever since the Union was established or even before. In some cases, such exclusion is a matter of practice; in other cases it is provided for by legislation. This line of policy has been modified recently as the demand for African work has grown, but the basic theory underlining this policy is still valid.

What is more important is that African workers are denied the right to organize themselves. The Industrial Conciliation Act of 1956 defines African workers as employees so that they are denied the possibility of organizing themselves in trade unions. Thus, there are no African trade unions in South Africa, which could protect and further the interests of African workers. Also, African workers are not usually given the same wages as European workers for the performance of the same service.

In Southern Rhodesia, the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 served the same purposes as the South African act. It also defines the native workers as employees who cannot legally organize themselves in trade unions. But Southern Rhodesia in 1959 enacted a more sophisticated Industrial Development Act which provides for the existence of registered and unregistered trade unions. Only non-racial trade unions may be registered. This non-discriminatory stand seems on the surface to be desirable. But this egalitarian construction is designed for an un-egalitarian purpose as the white workers dominate, with the encouragement of the authorities, the trade unions legally registered. Thus, the interests and demands of the African workers could not be seriously accorded enough attention within the framework of the existing, theoretically non-discriminatory, trade unions. The legal prohibition of a purely African trade union, able to register as such, hinders the economic advancement of the African workers. In addition, large numbers of African workers are categorically excluded from the scope of the Act by the provision that the Act does not apply to those employed in farming or domestic service in private households, where more than half of the African workers are to be found.

In Israel, there is a powerful trade union organization in the shape of the Histadrut. But the Histadrut has a history of refusing to allow the natives to

take part in its activities. During the days of the Mandate, the Histadrut consistently campaigned against the use of native workers by the settlers, whenever it was possible for Jewish workers to do the service required. Histadrut's slogan then was the emphasis on Jewish work. After the establishment of the state of Israel, Histadrut introduced a new slogan to harass the Arab workers: organized work. As the Arab workers had by then no organized trade union, and as they were not admitted to the Histadrut, the new slogan simply meant an organized campaign aimed at denying employment opportunities to Arab workers. Hence, "expulsion of Arab workers, especially in days when the level of unemployment was high among the Jewish workers, became a daily affair. Work inspectors and sometimes workers' committees used to undertake such expulsion operations with the help of the police."⁹¹ This campaign of harassment against native workers led those workers to accept cheaper wages than those given to Jewish workers for the performance of the same service. Finally, on 16 January 1959, the Histadrut decided to accept the natives in its ranks and starting from 1960, this decision was applied. But again, as in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the settlers' interests dominate the Histadrut and the native workers' interests are not given enough attention within the framework of an apparently non-discriminatory trade union.

In fact, discrimination against native workers is far from being obliterated. Native workers' wages are still inferior to those of Jewish workers'. The government itself not only tolerates but even applies discriminatory standards. In 1952, for example, an unskilled Arab worker employed in the public work services expected to get one Israeli pound per day when a Jewish worker, employed to do the same service, used to get more than two and a half times that amount. In 1952 also, the Minister of Education acknowledged in the Knesset that a Jewish teacher, holder of the secondary school degree and licensed from a teachers' college would get 69 Israeli pounds per month, when an Arab teacher, with the same qualifications, would get only 41 Israeli pounds.⁹² Even some Israeli writers, such as Aharon Cohen, recognized the discrimination practiced against Arab workers and the limited possibilities open to them for advancement.⁹³

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We mentioned above some of the legal controls over the activities of the natives in the three settler states. It should have become clear from the legal texts as well as from the examples cited, not only that the settlers' pretensions of

(91) Jiryis, *op. cit.*, (Beirut ed.), p. 201.

(92) *Ibid.*, pp. 206-207, reported from "*Compte Rendu des Débats Parlementaires*," 1952, t. 11, p. 1103.

(93) Quoted by *Ibid.*, p. 281, from Cohen's work : *Israël et le Monde Arabe*, p. 530.

practicing democracy are fallacious, but also that there is a clear and systematic discrimination practiced against the natives. The settlers, when they are led by facts to acknowledge the irrefutable evidence of discrimination, resort to an argument typical to all three settler states. This argument asserts that no matter what legal controls are used against the natives, the natives are still assured of democratic freedoms (freedom of expression, association, etc. ...) far exceeding those allowed to their kin by other neighbouring governments. Even if there was some truth in this assertion, it is no excuse for allegedly democratic systems to deny sections of their populations basic democratic rights guaranteed to the rest of the population. One of the tenets of democracy is that of equality. When this equality is denied on the basis of colour, race or religion, then under no condition can the pretence of democracy be considered valid.

3. Policies and Tendencies in Dealing with the Natives

Beyond the legal controls over the activities of the natives, there are certain policies and tendencies which guide the settlers in their dealings with the natives. Such policies and tendencies are not necessarily embodied in legal enactments; sometimes they are not clearly pronounced or even developed by the settlers' authorities, yet they are discernible on closer examination of the settlers' conduct towards the natives. In this chapter, we shall dwell briefly on some of these policies and tendencies; first we will discuss some of those policies and tendencies as they reveal themselves in the political domain.

It was mentioned above that the settlers wish to keep the natives outside the political process, or at least curtail their activities in that respect. In South Africa and Southern Rhodesia the natives are deprived of their voting rights, while in all three experiments, the natives' freedom of expression and association is subject to vast limitations. But politics is an aspect of life that cannot be completely and permanently exiled. Thus the settlers resort to an alternative that is acceptable to them. While they try to obliterate any genuine independent native political activity, they accept and even encourage certain "politicization" among the natives, on the condition that it be controlled and in harmony with the general settlers' interests. The settlers, drawn from what they consider to be a politically superior background, took a paternal attitude toward harmless native politicization, a patronizing attitude that could be deduced (happily for the settlers !) from their original civilizing mission.

The patronizing attitude comes down in practice to recruiting certain "loyal" native elements into the political hierarchy and having them participate, within limits, in the political process. Such practice is immensely helpful to the settlers for at least three reasons: 1- It "proves" that the settlers are living up to their civilizing mission by training the natives and bringing them up from their "primitiveness". 2- Such "docile" native politicians serve as a "show case"

suggesting to the outside world that there is no real discrimination against the natives; that everything is going fine and that the natives are satisfied and well integrated in the political process. 3- It serves the purpose of absorbing some of the natives' unrest; it opens some channels through which the natives can communicate their grievances. In the settlers' estimation such a "game" could effectively serve as an alternative to rebellion and revolution.

In South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel, the settler authorities use this method of appeasement. Those recruited to play a harmless role in politics are usually chosen from native chiefs and headmen, leaders of eminent families and so forth.

In South Africa, Bantu Councils were set up, where chiefs appointed by the government always express their gratitude to the Nationalist Party and its Apartheid policy. Though the actual importance of such councils in the political process is very minor, yet the chiefs seem to enjoy every bit of authority they exercise. Quotations from the chiefs' letters of gratitude to the authorities provide a valuable "testimony", from those primarily concerned, to the South African propaganda apparatus. The fact remains, however, that such tactics are resented and suspected by most of the natives.

In Southern Rhodesia, the settlers' authorities followed the same policy-line: encouragement of the chiefs to play a harmless political role within the framework of the settlers' designs. Starting from 1962, even some natives, fifteen in number, were allowed to sit in the Legislative Assembly. The Rhodesian Front leaders (Smith's party) "believe that African aspirations can be satisfied by enhancing the power of the chiefs and through community development", as one student of Rhodesian politics noted.⁹⁴ This belief is presently being put into effect in varied and subtle ways, as the Smith regime moves toward a republican form of government. But, again, no serious observer of the Rhodesian political scene would hold the view that the natives have greater support for the puppet chiefs than they have for their banned political parties.

Israel has done best at this game. After all, Israel can pride itself, in comparison to South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, that all the natives who remained there can and really do vote. The natives in Israel are, after all, in the minority and extending the right of vote to them does not automatically imply the uprooting of the settler regime. Native elements can and do even sit in the Knesset. We will not discuss in detail the nature of the natives' participation in Israeli politics, but will confine ourselves to a few points:

1- The Mapai party, which has consistently led, without interruption, successive governmental coalitions since the establishment of Israel, usually

(94) Samuel W. Speck, Jr. "The Gap Widens in Southern Rhodesia", *Africa Report*, January, 1963, p. 13.

secures more than 50% of all Arab votes. This is invariably attributed to the special influence Mapai used to exert in the echelons of the Military Government, and in the different departments and bureaux for Arab affairs in the various ministries.⁹⁵

2- The Mapai followed the policy of collaborating with the rich and prosperous among the natives, who often represented the interests of important and influential families. Jacob Landau, an Israeli professor at the Hebrew University, whose book on the Arabs in Israel has been cited several times above, notes that "most [Mapai sponsored] candidates ... were from the upper strata of the local notables and close collaborators with the Israeli Government and Mapai".⁹⁶

3- The Arab members of the Knesset, except for the Communists, have always had less work to do than the rest of the members. To quote Landau again: "Only in rare instances do the Arab members of the Knesset speak up in the Knesset on general matters." Arab Members of the Knesset allied to Mapai are described by Landau in these terms: "In many instances they probably expect Mapai's approval in advance at least on the general grounds of their speeches."⁹⁷ This being the fact of Arab representation in the Knesset, it was not astonishing that the Arab Members of the Knesset allied to Mapai voted for the government and against the abolition of military government in 1963, when they should have known full well that almost all the Arab inhabitants were suffering from the military government. The low esteem in which the Arab MK's allied to Mapai are held prompted an eminent Arab collaborator, Saif Al-Din Zubi, to complain in an interview with *Yediot Achronot* published on 14 October, 1966 "that the Arab allies in the Alignment were hardly ever consulted, though directed as to how to vote."⁹⁸

4- The farce of Arab participation in the political process in Israel was characteristically described by an Israeli commentator, Palmon, who wrote in *Haaretz* (14 January 1966) that the Arab role in the electoral campaigns is "a struggle — in the name of the Arabs — between the Jews themselves for the sake of Jews".⁹⁹

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(95) See Landau's account on why Rakah (The Israeli Communist Party that split from MAKI in 1965) secured a high proportion (22.6%) of the Arab votes in the November 1965 election : "It is also possible that the easing of restrictions by the military administration encouraged some Arabs to vote according to their inclination *without fear of possible reprisals*" — p. 148 (emphasis supplied).

(96) Landau, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

(97) *Ibid.*, p. 195-196.

(98) Reported in *Ibid.*, p. 197.

(99) Reported in *Ibid.*, p. 187.

From what was mentioned above, it becomes clear that the natives' participation in the existing political structures in the three settler states is more of a show case than a serious political participation. The settlers have succeeded in tempting certain native elements to become politicians, whose usefulness is essentially propagandistic. What is noteworthy, however, is that, in the three experiments under discussion, the settlers have tended to collaborate and encourage the traditional leaders of the natives. This is not a coincidence, and one can clearly see the reason behind this policy. The settlers, whose settlement in lands not theirs was possible only because of the backwardness of the native inhabitants, see in the development of the natives a clear threat to their security and continued existence. The natives' backwardness is their ally. Leaders entrenched in traditions, guardians of old vested interests, can come to easier terms with the settlers than the revolutionaries who are all for a more rapid developmental pace. The settlers, no matter how strongly they profess their attachment to the concept of "progress", no matter how persistently they express their desire to develop the natives, are, in the final analysis, ardent reactionaries when the question of developing the natives comes into the picture. With this in mind, it becomes easier to explain why the settler authorities treat the educated natives much more severely than they do the rest of the native population. It is a fact, for instance, that the educated natives in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel, find themselves most of the time in a state of unemployment, especially since the settler authorities keep at a bare minimum the number of the educated natives in governmental services.¹⁰⁰ In South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel, the educated natives find it necessary, in order to escape unemployment, to take up menial jobs as manual workers. Yet, the percentage of unemployed educated natives continues to be high in all three settler states.

Another ramification of the authorities' encouragement of "traditionalism" within the indigenous population is their lack of enthusiasm for extending to the natives educational facilities in any way comparable to the educational facilities enjoyed by the settlers. In South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel, a good proportion of the natives of school-age do not receive any schooling.

In South Africa, the percentage of the natives of primary school age who do not attend schools is still great though there has been some expansion in this respect during the last decade. In Southern Rhodesia, about 60% of the African children do not attend primary schools, while in Israel this percentage in 1966-67 was more than 30%.¹⁰¹ The percentage among the settlers' children,

(100) In Israel for instance, there were some 50,000 government functionaries in the year 1961. Among those only some 500 were Arabs or about 1% while the Arab minority represented over 12% of the total population. (Jiryis, *op. cit.*, p. 185).

(101) Jiryis, *op. cit.*, pp. 189-190.

of course, comes in all three countries close to 100%. The percentage of natives in secondary schools and at universities is even less than at the primary school level.

Complementary to this policy of not extending wide educational facilities to the natives, there is the tendency to keep the natives' educational facilities in poor repair. In South Africa, the government pays ten times more for the education of the European student than it does for the African student, and the same is true for Southern Rhodesia. In Israel, the situation is somewhat better, but the Jewish student still costs the government much more than the native student. The state of the natives' schools in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel is distressing. It is perhaps useful in this respect to mention Sabri Jiryis's description of the Arab schoolbuildings in Israel:

"The buildings of the Arab schools in Israel are in a distressing state. Generally they do not meet the need: they are old, with very small rooms, without light, without rest rooms, without playgrounds or spacious yards — not to mention the inadequate and rudimentary furnishings." ¹⁰²

Such is the state of the native children's schooling and the natives' schools in the settler states. What about the contents of the educational programmes for the natives at such schools? Broadly, it could be said that in the three experiments, the native students are taught to respect the settlers' rights, history and culture, and to nourish doubts about the natives' rights, history and culture.

In South Africa, UNESCO's report on Apartheid in education points out that just as the education of Africans and the textbooks provided for their use are designed to prepare them for their inferior position in society, so the education and textbooks of European children inculcate into them and perpetuate the idea of European superiority, of African primitiveness and barbarity. Particularly in the teaching of history they present a picture designed to justify and strengthen the policy of Apartheid.

In Southern Rhodesia, the educational content of the programmes for the native students has not so far elaborated, as much as in South Africa, the tenets of European superiority, but a trend is certainly developing in that direction. Already, books by well-known authors, treating objectively the problems of race in the history and politics of Southern Rhodesia, are barred from the schools' library shelves. For instance, books by Ronald Segal, the South African writer, and Basil Davison, the British historian whose field of interest is Africa, are among the books that are barred.

In Israel, there is a subtle educational policy aiming at erasing the national consciousness of the Arab students, and preparing them to assimilate the Jewish culture. "It is a fact that a great number of those [native students]

(102) *Op. cit.*, p. 192.

who studied at primary schools hardly know how to read and write the Arabic language though it is their mother tongue.”¹⁰³ Arab history is taught in a distorted fashion, so that the Arab students get the idea that it is an endless succession of intrigues and massacres, while at the same time Jewish history is presented gloriously, and in a very sympathetic perspective. In the secondary schools (arts section) more than one third of the time allotted to history is devoted to Jewish history, while the time devoted to Arab history represents only one fourth of the time devoted to Jewish history or about one twelfth of the total time allotted to history teaching.

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The settler authorities, in their attempts to keep the natives in their traditionalism, do not restrict themselves to the field of education. Their hostility to the natives’ advancement manifests itself in the economic domain as well. Here, their systematic efforts show that they regard unfavourably any native development toward industrialization. Industries are to be found, in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel, in the settlers’ areas. Such industries, financed by the settlers’ money — and their imperialist backers, are also run by the settlers, while the natives are used as suppliers of cheap labour. It is true that the natives do not have enough capital to develop industry, but it is true also that the settler authorities have not encouraged any development in that direction.

The settler authorities want the natives to remain essentially agriculturists except when they are needed as a cheap labour force. Again, in the field of agriculture, the settlers’ authorities do not encourage the modernization of the natives’ agriculture, and do not offer them the aid usually given to European farmers.

Thus one can discern throughout a systematic effort on the part of the settlers to keep the natives at a lower level of development. The basic policy line behind such tendencies is worth repeating once more: more rapid development of the natives represents a threat to the settlers, who know full well, that they owe what they acquired largely to the backwardness of the natives.

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The settlers have succeeded in establishing states, and in posing as law-making authorities. But they are also well aware that their “legitimacy” was realised through violence and terror. Violence and terror against the natives

(103) *Ibid.*, p. 195.

allowed them to establish themselves in states. One would think that as the settlers have now acquired a title of legitimacy, they would always express their policy-desires through legal enactments, that rather than use force against the natives, they would abide by the laws that they have the power to enact, that at least a minimum of legality in their treatment of the natives would be assured. But this is not the case. Contemporary experience quite clearly proves that the settlers are ready, at any moment, to use unrestrained force against the natives, irrespective of whatever legality they claim. Brutal, inhuman force could always be resorted to, organized massacres against the natives are second nature to the settlers, deeply rooted in their feeling of superiority, and deeply rooted also in their history of violence. The massacres of Kafr Qassim in Israel and Sharpeville in South Africa illustrate the point well.

The Sharpeville massacre of March 21, 1960 is the best known of the two. It was occasioned by a demonstration of African and non-white citizens who wanted to support the campaign against the carrying of passes in Sharpeville, south of Johannesburg. The police interfered and killed 72 Africans and wounded some 200 more, though the demonstration was peaceful. The massacre, which revealed the brutality of the South African regime, is too well-known to be dealt with in detail here. March 21 has since been declared by the U.N. an international day for the elimination of racial discrimination, and is observed by all UN member states.

The Kafr Qassim massacre committed by the Israeli authorities on 29 October 1956 far exceeds the brutality shown in the Sharpeville massacre, because it was not provoked at all. It was simply an act of naked terrorism reflecting a total indifference on the part of the Israeli settler authorities with regard to the Arab natives.

Sabri Jiryis gives a vivid and detailed account of the massacre in his work on the Arabs in Israel.¹⁰⁴ We will present here a brief account of this massacre.

Kafr Qassim, a small Arab village in the Triangle, witnessed on 20 October 1956 a completely unprovoked massacre. On the eve of the Israeli aggression against Egypt (the Tripartite aggression) a regiment attached to the Command of the Central Region was ordered to defend a part of the Israeli-Jordanian cease fire lines. A unit of frontier guards, under Major Melinky, was placed under the authority of the Brigade Commander, General Shedmy. The Commander of the Central Region, General Tsour, informed General Shedmy on the morning of 29 October 1956 of the policy to be applied with regard to the Arabs. It was necessary for the success of the Sinai aggression to keep absolute calm along the Israeli-Jordanian cease-fire lines. Thus, General Shedmy decided upon a curfew in the area under his authority. On the same day, General Shedmy informed Major Melinky of the curfew and

(104) *Ibid*, pp. 171-212.

ordered him to see to its rigorous application in Kafr Qassim and other adjacent villages. General Shedmy ordered the Major to be tough and strict in applying the curfew, and to shoot to kill if necessary: "It is better to have them dead, rather than get involved in the complications of arrest."¹⁰⁵

Kafr Qassim was a village whose men used to work in the fields outside their village. They usually returned to their village shortly after sunset, and it was impossible to tell them about the curfew, which was to start at 5 p.m. before they returned from the fields. Melinky asked his superior, General Shedmy, on what to do in such a situation. General Shedmy was firm: "I do not want sentiments. May God give them His mercy."

Melinky transmitted the orders to his subordinates. He repeated to them the orders of General Shedmy: no arrests, shoot to kill. People in the village were informed about the curfew shortly before it was imposed but what of the workers in the fields?

When they started their walk back home they were stopped and shot down. The net result was 43 Arabs murdered in cold blood, most of them workers and including seven youngsters who used to help their parents in the fields.

The authorities kept very silent about the massacre, until it was no longer possible to hide it. Thus, more than two weeks later, the Prime Minister made a vague statement in the Knesset on 16 November 1956 in the course of which he talked about some citizens "injured" by actions of the frontier guard!

It was characteristic of Israeli justice that through subsequent long investigations and trials the killers were sentenced to light terms in jail, and were accorded one commutation of their sentence after another. Thus was closed one of the most brutal massacres in contemporary history. But the natives perpetuate each year the memories of those massacred. Their commemoration, and the degree of bitterness felt in the course of the commemoration, forced the Israeli authorities for several years to close the village of Kafr Qassim, and prohibit natives from other villages from entering it, during the last few days of October.

* * *

The Kafr Qassim and Sharpeville massacres are two incidents characteristic of the methods settlers use in their treatment of the natives. Sharpeville, as stated above, is internationally well-known, but the Israeli and Zionist information media have succeeded in letting world opinion gain only slight knowledge of the Kafr Qassim massacre. Nevertheless, the Israeli terrorist methods could not disguise themselves for long. During the June 1967

(105) *Ibid.*, p. 182.

aggression and after, the world had still another chance to witness new series of Israeli crimes against the natives.

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We will not discuss here the atrocities committed by Israel on the native civilians during and after the June aggression.¹⁰⁶ But it is perhaps useful to mention very briefly some of the things which took place. A number of villages were erased completely, such as Emams, Beit Nuba and Yalu,¹⁰⁷ and most recently Halhul. Tens of thousands of the natives were forced to leave the Israeli occupied territories, for Jordan, the UAR or Syria, while over 7000 houses were totally destroyed as an intimidation measure designed to discourage the Arabs from resisting Israeli occupation.¹⁰⁸ These brutalities did not go unnoticed by world public opinion and by the U.N. as did the Kafr Qassim massacre. The U.N. is currently involved in investigating such atrocities, but this will be discussed later on.

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In this brief discussion on the settlers' policies and tendencies in dealing with the natives an attempt has been made to show the similarity shown by the three settler states in their treatment of the natives. Common to the three experiments is a position of superiority consistently adhered to by the settlers in their dealings with the natives. This superiority, whether based on race, origin, religion or a combination of all three elements, is apparent in most if not all walks of life. The settlers not only treat the natives without thought, but also have a tendency to kill them without thought and to treat them in the most brutal and barbaric ways. The settlers' superiority is enhanced by the fact that they are conquerors, European conquerors, who have defeated the natives. In their endeavour to further reinforce their position, they do not feel restrained even by the laws that they themselves have enacted. Their superior power of destruction does not recognize even a self-imposed limit. The language they understand is force: material force for the most part. Let us now turn to a discussion of those forces that challenge the European settlers.

(106) See on this subject : *The Arabs under Israeli Occupation*, PLO Research Center, Beirut, 1969.

(107) Michael Adams in *Peace News*, November 10, 1967, and in *Sunday Times*, June 16, 1967.

(108) See : E.C. Hodgkin, *London Times*, 27 October, 1969.

III

CHALLENGING THE EUROPEAN SETTLERS

The European settlers did not go unchallenged. As a matter of fact one can expect such ambitious schemes of settlement not to escape challenge from different quarters. First there are those who are primarily concerned, the natives of the areas coveted by settlers. Second there are the kith and kin of those natives in the neighbouring countries. Third, there is the world at large, which, at the present time, is more "international" than ever. The world is no longer confined to Europe and the West. The countries of Asia and Africa have risen to self-assertion and importance, and they understand well what colonialism means.

In this part of the essay we shall study briefly the three challenges to the European Settlers. We shall see later why one of the challenges was stronger in some cases than others and so forth. We shall also have the occasion to study the effectiveness of each challenge in each case under discussion.

1. The Natives Take up the Struggle

Due to several factors which could be broadly described as factors of backwardness, native societies in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine were unable in the early stages of European settlement to respond effectively to the incoming danger. Especially important was the factor of the military noncompetitiveness of the natives in comparison to the settlers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. In Palestine, there was another factor limiting the range of the natives' response — that factor was the special situation of Palestine at the time. Palestine was part of the Ottoman Empire, and her defence was essentially the duty of the Empire. Also important as a factor in retarding — relatively — serious native responses to the intrusion was that the ambitions of the settlers were not quite clear to the natives. Many natives regarded the European settlers as a passing phenomenon; most did not realize that it would entail in the future the acquisition of their lands and the creation of an alien state.

* * *

The Hottentots' attempt to counter the challenge of the Europeans in South Africa has already been mentioned. The wounded Hottentot, as reported

by a Dutch official, explained well the increasing native awareness of the impending problem. Though the history of the South African native resistance movement has yet to be written by the Africans themselves, especially in regard to the early stages, yet it is possible now, with the available evidence, to outline the major developments in the history of native resistance.

When the Boers started their advance northward, they met stiff opposition from the powerful Bantu tribes. The wars of resistance that ensued, the so-called Kaffir wars, lasted for nearly a hundred years. Notwithstanding the bravery shown by the Africans, they were slowly pushed back beyond the Great Fish River because of the superior arms the whites possessed.¹⁰⁹ The arrival of the British in South Africa brought immense reinforcement to the position of the whites *vis-a-vis* the Africans. "With their overwhelming superiority of arms and large numbers of properly trained men they were able, in spite of some grim and spirited battles, eventually to subdue all opposition offered by the African people to their grand design for the colonization of the country and the subjugation and exploitation of its people."¹¹⁰

Thus within some two centuries and a half native armed resistance was overwhelmed and subdued. Towards the end of the 19th century the whites had a free hand over the territory.

Discrimination against the natives was an item of faith with the whites, Boers and British alike. But due to some liberal influence in the British policy — the liberalism of the 19th century — there grew in the 1880's what is usually referred to as Bantu Political Liberalism. The theoretical assumption of such liberalism was the possibility of reconciling the settlers' and the natives' interests. Indeed, it was within the framework of such liberalism that the Africans created their first semipolitical association in South Africa. From 1882, the natives organized themselves in what was called the Native Education Association, which played a significant role in opposing discriminatory laws, especially in opposing the pass laws.¹¹¹

After the Boer war of 1894 and the subsequent treaty of Vereeniging (1902), the alliance between all sections of the white population became more evident. It was a logical step that more pressure would be applied against the natives. It was in those circumstances that the last attempt at native armed resistance, the Bambata rebellion, was harshly quelled in 1906.

The establishment of the Union of South Africa in 1910 gave the settlers the opportunity to try to make their exercise of power legitimate. The Africans were now totally subdued, and the settlers were set on ruling them as defeated

(109) See a pamphlet by the A.N.C. : *African National Congress of South Africa*, (Dar es Salam, 1963), p. 3.

(110) *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

(111) G.M. Carter, "African National Movements" in *Southern Africa in Transition*, ed. by J.A. Davis and James K. Baker, (New York, 1966), p. 7.

people. One of the early efforts of the settlers was to legitimize and reinforce their acquisition of land. Confining the Africans to certain limited lots of land, and barring them from acquiring lands in other areas were the dominant themes among the settlers at that time. Such a trend of thought was crystallized in the passing of the Native Lands Act of 1913. But the African opposition took on an organized form to fight the Act before it was proclaimed. It was apparent then to Africans that tribalism and traditionalism were not an effective means of combating the settlers. Thus, modern African leaders, drawn mostly from intellectual and professional circles at the time, came together in Mangaung (Bloemfontein) in the Orange Free State on 8 January 1912 and formed the African National Congress. "Contrary to African tradition and custom this organization was not led by chiefs, but by the people who understood the new situation, the ways and intrigues of the white conquerors."¹¹² The A.N.C. fought without success against the Native Lands Act. But it was virtually to become the main expression of African resistance from that time to the present day.

The A.N.C. generally reflected the liberalism that was prevalent at the time; its elitist character was obvious. Nevertheless, the harsh treatment the Africans were subjected to gradually convinced its leaders to take an increasingly militant line. In 1919, for instance, a violent demonstration against the carrying of passes was staged by the natives. The natives' challenge to the settlers was growing in intensity.

Passive resistance, nourished and led by Gandhi's presence and inspiration, made headway during those days, especially among the Indians. The oppression against the Indians, which was intensified after the First World War, led them in 1927 to seek to establish contacts with the Africans. Thus a non-white coalition was taking form. In 1930 and 1931, a tendency toward increased militancy became evident and pass-burning demonstrations were organized, and certain white concerns boycotted. It was around that time that African workers started to become politically active with the establishment of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union.

In the thirties also, the settler authorities tried to accommodate Africans by having them participate in some harmless political activity: the Native Representative Councils, a kind of "show-case" composed of and dominated by white government officials and government-nominated African members. Before and during the Second World War, the failure of this system was quite evident and was subsequently abandoned by the Nationalist Party.

Toward the end of the Second World War, and under the influence of the then optimistic atmosphere generated by the impending defeat of Hitler's racism, and by the prospects of establishing a United Nations Organization based on

(112) *African National Congress of South Africa, op. cit.*, p. 7.

equality for all men and people, African leaders issued in 1945 a statement entitled "African Claims". Its underlying theme was the demand for "the abandonment of any policy and all practices that discriminate against the Africans in any way possible."¹¹³

Soon, however, Africans' hopes for developments after the Second World War were to fade away. Strikes, demonstrations and political manifestoes, now on a multiracial basis, were again resorted to. Workers again took an active part in the campaign, through a big strike and demonstration organized in 1941 by some 70,000 gold mine workers.

The culminating point of developments then was the A.N.C.'s adoption, especially under the influence of the younger generation of African activists who formed the A.N.C. Youth League, of the "1949 Programme of Action". Among other things, the programme laid down the forms and methods of a more militant struggle. It adopted the methods of strikes, boycotts, civil disobedience and non-cooperation. Civil disobedience meant defiance of laws and government orders. Non-cooperation meant "to cease to recognize a foreign authority on your soil; to cease to obey it; to ignore its law-courts; to refuse to pay its taxes; and to decline to serve it as soldiers and policemen".¹¹⁴ On the first of May 1950, the A.N.C. in the Transvaal together with other organizations called for a strike in Witwatersrand to protest against controls over the non-whites' freedom of expression and association. In the subsequent unrest, 18 Africans were killed by police fire. The symbolic reaction of the settler authorities, in order to counter the Programme of Action, the 1950 strike, and the increasing cooperation between all non-white groups, was to enact the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950. The typical charge levied against any African nationalist or any non-white — and even white — activist against discrimination, was that he was either a communist or a fellow-traveller. The Suppression of Communism Act also reflected the European settlers' belief that their ultimate supporter in their racial policies would be United States' imperialism and its allies. In order to protest against the Act, and to commemorate the death of the martyrs of the 1st of May, the A.N.C. and its allies initiated a nationwide campaign which culminated in the successful stoppage of work on 26 June 1950. Even now the 26th of June is celebrated by Africans and other non-white groups in South Africa as a national day of protest and mourning.

In the two years following 26 June 1950, a great deal of cooperation between the A.N.C. and other non-white political organizations (the South African Indian Congress, and the South African Coloured People's Organization) was achieved. A joint national campaign of defiance of unjust

(113) See full text in G.M. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality : South Africa since 1948*, (New York, 1958), pp. 484-485.

(114) *African National Congress of South Africa, op. cit.*, p. 14.

laws was started effectively on 26 July 1952. The defiance campaign lasted for some six months, and in the course of it, over 8000 volunteers, men and women of all races, took part and were imprisoned for defying Apartheid legislation. Some 40 non-whites were killed and many more wounded.

As expected, repressive laws were tightened, increasing the personal risks of those involved in resisting the authorities. But the Africans and their allies were not to be intimidated. In 1954 the A.N.C., the South African Indian Congress, the South African Congress of Democrats and the South African Coloured People's Organization issued a call for a Congress of the People. The Congress of the People met on 26 June 1956, at Kliptown in the Transvaal (near Johannesburg). The police interfered, but as the Congress comprised over 3000 delegates from all over South Africa, it was deemed prudent by the authorities to disturb the Congress only, not to clash with it.¹¹⁵ The Congress produced the famous Freedom Charter. The Charter declared in its preamble that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it... that our people have been robbed of their birthright to land, liberty and peace by a form of government founded on injustice and inequality ... that only a democratic state based on the will of all the people can secure to all their birth rights without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief." The Charter then goes on to detail the basic policies of a democratic state, and in this respect devotes its attention to economic advancement and the building of a society based on social and economic equality. The Freedom Charter is still considered a programme of work for the A.N.C. and its allies.

Government reaction to the Congress of the People and the Freedom Charter was the staging of a trial on fabricated charges of high treason. The trials started toward the end of 1956. The legal process and the trials dragged on till 1961 — and all charges were proved false and fabricated. In the meanwhile, Africans staged several successful strikes and demonstrations. But the most conspicuous event in that period was the Sharpeville Massacre of 21 March 1960. The massacre, the state of emergency that was declared subsequent to it, the more repressive laws that were enacted and according to which the ANC, PAC and other organizations were banned, all ushered in a period of more violent non-white reaction to European settlers.

During this period, the Nationalist Party, the representative of the Afrikaners and the spokesman for the racist Afrikaaner ideology, was reinforcing and consolidating its stand against the remnants of British influence in South Africa. The dream of a totally independent South African Republic was becoming dearer to it as the realization of the Republic became more feasible. A draft constitution for the new Republic was submitted to a

(115) See a detailed and sympathetic account of the Congress in *Sechaba* (the official organ of the A.N.C.), Vol. 3, No. 6, June, 1969.

referendum on November 5, 1960, with, of course, only white voters participating. The draft was approved by the eligible white voters, and South Africa was declared a republic on 31 May, 1961 and ceased to be a member of the British Commonwealth. The Sharpeville massacre and the draft constitution strengthened the feeling of unrest amongst Africans and their allies. On December 16-17, 1960 a Consultative Conference attended by African nationalists resolved that "because the African people were denied participation in the republican referendum, they do not accept the results." The conference called for a national convention "representing all the People of South Africa" to draw up a "truly South African Constitution". The government tried to frustrate the meeting of such a convention, but, by using the tactics of changing the date and place of the convention, the Africans and their allies were able to hold a General Conference in Natal on March 25-26, 1961. Nelson Mandela, one of the founders of the ANC Youth League, was chosen as leader of a National Action Council whose membership remained secret. The Convention issued an ultimatum to the government demanding that a representative national convention be called before 31 May 1961 — the date when the new constitution was due to come into force. The government retorted by further intensifying its harsh measures: during the month of May 1961, some 10,000 Africans were detained. It became obvious that the government would strike brutally at any mass demonstration. The Republic was bent on tightening its control. 1961 witnessed the first steps in this direction in establishing closer coordination between the military and the police, and in a systematic decline of the rule of law. The Republic was bound on a course of action leading it to become a police-state of the first order.

The first election under the Republic was scheduled for October 18, 1961. The Africans and their allies organized a stay-at-home demonstration on the eve of the election day. There was a good response to this call, but with the elections taking place, with a police-state clearly emerging, with repressive and inhuman laws enacted, all chances of a peaceful settlement were lost. The only alternative was armed struggle.

It is perhaps pertinent at this stage to mention the rivalry between the ANC and the Pan-African Congress, the two nationalist movements in South Africa. In 1958, a group of ANC activists led by Robert Sobukwe broke away from the ANC as a protest against what they considered to be a harmful alliance with Asians and coloured.¹¹⁶ They also accused the ANC of being dominated by communists. In 1959 this group formed the P.A.C. which placed more emphasis on the African character of the struggle against the Europeans. The PAC attempted to appeal to rural Africans, and used native languages in

(116) See : *A.N.C. of South Africa*, pp. 15-18, for the ANC official account of the split.

its appeals. But the ANC was also placing more emphasis on appealing to and working with rural Africans in order to widen its popular base. Both parties, notwithstanding their rivalry, cooperated in a limited way during and after the Sharpeville massacre. Both of them, in earlier times, believed in the possibility of a peaceful solution. And both of them, in the early sixties, shifted to armed struggle. It should be mentioned, however, that the rivalry still continues, though the ANC has emerged in recent years as the stronger of the two, and the most widely supported by Africans.

The sixties ushered in the period of armed struggle. The 16th of December 1961 witnessed the commencement of organized armed resistance led by an underground organization supported by the ANC: Umkhonto We Sizwe, or the Spear of the Nation. On 16 December 1961 there were explosions in certain public buildings in Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Durban. There were also posters stuck up near the sites on which the explosions took place, announcing that they were the work of the new organization, described as "a new independent body formed by Africans. It includes in its ranks South Africans of all races. ... [It] will carry on the struggle for freedom and democracy by new methods which are necessary to complement the actions of the established national liberation organizations."¹¹⁷ The new organization was described by Mandela as able to "hit back in reprisal for attacks on innocent people by the government." Armed struggle was then firmly espoused and Africans were called upon "to prepare for the worst", to use the words of the ANC's representative abroad, Oliver Tambo, now Acting President-General of the ANC, in a interview published by the London *Observer* on April 5, 1962. "Violence by the African People had become inevitable," said Nelson Mandela. "We felt that without violence there would be no way open to the African People to succeed in their struggle against the principle of white supremacy... Our problem was not whether to fight but how to continue the fight."¹¹⁸

Umkhonto We Sizwe was not the only armed resistance organization; there was also Poqo which started its activities in 1962, and which is allegedly controlled by the PAC. PAC was as committed to violence as the ANC. In December 1962, Poltako K. Laballo, then Acting President of the PAC, declared in London that "The African People recognize that, to effect any change in South Africa, the present situation, whereby white South Africa holds the monopoly of military power, must be changed. This can be achieved only by our acquisition of the means of challenging that military power."¹¹⁹

Declarations espousing armed struggle are quite clear: they came not only

(117) From *Sechaba*, June, 1969, p. 11.

(118) Reported by Leonard M. Thompson, *Politics in the Republic of South Africa*, (Boston, 1966), pp. 180-181.

(119) Reported by J. A. Marcum and A. K. Lowenstein in "Force : Its Thrust and Prognosis" in J. A. Davis and James K. Baker (eds.) *Southern Africa in Transition*, (New York, 1966), p. 259.

from Africans but also from other non-white political organizations. What was the actual result of the espousal of armed struggle?

It is estimated by an American specialist that during the three year period starting from December 1961 there were over 200 acts of violence against the government and its allies [including African collaborators].¹²⁰ In addition to hit-and-run attacks, there were popular outbursts, coupled with killing and burning on a number of occasions. Of such acts of violence, one can mention the Paarl affair on November 22, 1962, organized by Poqo — and as a result of which Poqo was banned, its leaders were imprisoned and a number of its fighters were sentenced to death. Another significant act of violence was the bombing of the Ministry of Agriculture in November 1962 by the Spear of the Nation. The *Manchester Guardian* reported on November 10, 1962 that the acts of violence were becoming more frequent.

The year 1962, which witnessed the intensification of the violent armed struggle of the natives, also witnessed the passage of the Sabotage Act, which gave a very wide definition to sabotage and at the same time made it punishable by death. Additional methods of repression and a further development of the police-state were the signs of the time. It is suggestive in this respect to quote what a white politician from the Liberal Party, Patrick Van Resburg, had to say in 1962 on South Africa's police force:

"South Africa has a police force of some twenty thousand whites and thirty thousand Africans, Indians and coloureds... There is a sizeable political branch of the police force. This branch can open mail, tap telephones and search houses at any time. It has an intricate system of spies... the whole defence force is designed to put down internal rebellion [so that] violent revolt in South Africa would be ruthlessly and quickly suppressed."¹²¹

Military spending in South Africa rose from US\$ 61.6 millions in 1960 to US\$ 168 millions in 62-63, and to about US\$ 400 millions in 66-67. It is expected that this figure will continue to increase, and will reach in one decade twelve times the amount it was in 1960. Seven years ago, in June 1962, the Minister of Defence announced that South Africa could mobilize more than a quarter of a million soldiers at short notice.¹²²

1963-1964 were years of trials and imprisonments. The Criminal Laws Amendment Act (63) marked another step in by-passing elementary legal procedures. In those years almost all nonwhite political leaders were imprisoned, including Nelson Mandela, whose hiding tactics before he was imprisoned in November 1962 made him famous all over Africa and the world; Robert Sobukwe, leader of the PAC, and others. Many leaders were prohibited from taking part in any political activity. In addition, many other leaders were

(120) Thompson, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

(121) Reported by Marcum, *op. cit.*, pp. 260-261, from *Guilty Land*, (New York, 1962).

(122) *Ibid.*, p. 266.

exiled. In July 1962 the leaders of the Spear of the Nation were arrested and tried in what has become known as the Rivonia Trial. Many were sentenced to death, but international pressure forced the government to commute the sentences. 1963-1964 were years of relative calm, compared to 1962, thanks to new measures of repression that have maintained an average of some 10,000 political prisoners from 1963 till now. But the armed resistance is far from being quelled. Indeed, the year 1965 and after witnessed the opening of a new dimension in guerrilla activities as the ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) decided to increase their cooperation against the South African-Rhodesian alliance. This development will be commented on in greater detail later.

The African revolutionaries and their allies entertain no illusions as to the difficulties facing them in their task of overthrowing the white supremacists. More emphasis is placed now on revolutionary technique as against spontaneous political protest demonstrations. "The winning of our freedom by armed struggle — the only method left open to us — demands more than passion. It demands an understanding and an implementation of revolutionary theory and techniques in the actual conditions facing us. It demands a sober assessment of the obstacles in our way and an appreciation that such a struggle is bitter and protracted."¹²³

The obstacles in the way of the liberation movement in South Africa are many and varied. The South African territory is vast and parts of it could lend itself to guerrilla activity, but the South African army and police force is also powerful, strong and well organized. There is no neighbouring country friendly to the cause of the revolutionaries in which the revolutionaries can take refuge in times of difficulty and where their forces can be built up in preparation for a raid across the border. As a matter of fact, across the borders of South Africa there are governments sympathetic to its policies: Portugal and Southern Rhodesia. Between those two countries and South Africa there is an active alliance not only politically but also militarily. South Africa's role in this alliance is no mean one. As *Sechaba* noted, "South Africa is the main pillar of this alliance; with its tremendous economic resources, its military might ... it stands out as the senior partner and gives technical, financial and military aid to the Smith regime and to Caetano in Mozambique and Angola."¹²⁴

Another obstacle is that the long duration of the rule of the white supremacists, and their methods of repression, have convinced some Africans to give in and even to collaborate with their oppressors. Many natives are playing in to the hands of the authorities. The liberation movement pays special attention to this matter, and devotes much of its energies to political education

(123) "Strategy and Tactics of the A.N.C.", *Sechaba*, No. 3, Vol. 7, July 1969, p. 18.

(124) "Intensify the Revolution", *Sechaba*, Vol. 3, No. 7, July 1969, p. 5.

of the African masses. "It is naive to believe that oppressed and beleaguered people cannot temporarily, even in large numbers, be won over by fear, terror, lies, indoctrination and provocation to treat liberators as enemies. In fact history proves that without the most intensive all-round political activity this is the more likely result. It is therefore all the more vital that the revolutionary leadership should be nation-wide and should have its roots both inside and outside the actual area of combat."¹²⁵

Another obstacle still facing the freedom movement in South Africa is the split between the ANC and the PAC. It is true that the split is not as serious now as it was some few years ago — now that the ANC has emerged again as the better organized and disciplined and the more popular of the two. Yet the split exists. There have been several attempts to remedy the situation but such efforts have not brought about any substantial progress.

Notwithstanding all these obstacles, the revolutionary movement is gathering momentum day by day. Cooperation among liberation movements in the whole of Southern Africa is increasing and represents today one of the best achievements. Through this increased cooperation, it has been possible for the anti-Apartheid fighters of South Africa to keep in contact with Zambia and Tanzania. Laurence Muller, the South African Minister of Police and the Interior, declared on 27 October, 1968 that at least 2000 black Africans who had left the country on the "subterfuge" of going abroad to study were being trained as guerrilla fighters by the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) and the ANC; and that attacks were expected from Rhodesian territory. The Minister also acknowledged that the guerrilla activity "was still going on" in the strategic Caprivi Strip and that 46 Africans in the area had been detained recently. Furthermore, he admitted that the guerrillas were using now a new and successful technique. Whereas in the past they had infiltrated armed groups of 10 to 15 men, they were now slipping over the borders unarmed men in an effort to indoctrinate the local Africans. There were "strong indications", said the Minister, "that this tactic had been used successfully in the Caprivi Strip." The Minister finally concluded that the South African Government was "so concerned about keeping the terrorists away from our borders" that hundreds of South African police had been sent to Rhodesia.¹²⁶

The fact of South Africa's alliance with Rhodesia and Portugal (which rules over Mozambique and Angola) is revealing as it reflects the immense challenge the natives are posing to the European settlers. Early in 1968, the Administrator of the Natal Province, Mr. T.J.A. Gerdener, admitted that if the Portugese were to withdraw from Mozambique tomorrow, "South Africa could become involved in a terrorist war within a matter of weeks."¹²⁷

(125) "Strategy and Tactic", *op. cit.*, p. 20.

(126) *Africa Diary*, (November 24-30, 1968), p. 4204.

(127) *Ibid.*, (January 14-20, 1968), p. 3753.

Meanwhile the struggle continues in South Africa. Reports of acts of violence, strikes, distribution of banned publications, oppressions and occasional flare-ups dominate the South African scene. The spirit of revolution against the established authorities is spreading even to some white sections of the population as was evidenced by the student unrest of September-October 1968. It is true that civil war is at present a very remote possibility, but it is quite clear that the natives have taken up the challenge, and succeeded in shaking the future prospects of continued white European settlers' supremacy in South Africa.

* * *

In Southern Rhodesia the natives were forcibly subdued by the pioneer column in the early 1890's. Soon the conquerors started to build their settlements and humiliate the natives in the process, by such things as confiscating the natives' cattle and so forth. The land problem was of course another cause of friction; while the practice of forced labour was still another humiliation imposed on the natives. The rising discontent of the natives was keenly felt by some settlers — such as Frederick C. Selons who learned the natives' language and reported extensively their grievances.¹²⁸ But the dominant theme among the settlers was the desire for firmer control. Increased European pressures on the natives convinced the latter the only course of action open to them was to drive the Europeans out of the country, and they thought they had the power to do that. In March 1896, the natives started implementing their plans: in a wide-spread uprising they succeeded, within some two weeks, in stirring up trouble that resulted in the killing of some 130 Europeans. But in April the tide was already turning against the natives: help for the Europeans was soon to come from the South; even the Imperial government itself interfered with its own soldiers to help reinforce the company's form of rule. The Matabele Rebellion, as this uprising is called, faced a formidable enemy, using techniques hitherto unknown to the natives. By June 1896, the uprising was heading for final collapse. It was, however, about the same time that the Mashona people, in the East, took up the struggle against the European intruders. Again, they fared no better than the Matabele. Thus, toward the end of 1896 — though really only by October 1897 — the two native rebellions were overrun. European conquest was reinforced. Harsh methods of repression to which the natives were subsequently subjugated broke the back of the natives' resistance for many years to come. The natives had to be content with the inhuman treatment meted out to them while the settlers were now firmly in the saddle.

Southern Rhodesia's natives seemed doomed to lives of desperation. It is true that some of them maintained some relations, from 1912 on, with the ANC

(128) Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma*, *op. cit.*, see the chapter on Rebellions.

of South Africa, but it was only in the 1920's that a group of educated Africans from Southern Rhodesia organized themselves in the Southern Rhodesian Native Welfare Association. The Association maintained certain contacts with the ANC, and voiced the native discontent concerning land and labour policies. In the 1920's also, native workers started to organize themselves into trade unions. The first such union was an "extension" of the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (I.C.U.) of South Africa. In 1927 Southern Rhodesia's African workers organized their first strike under the leadership of Robert Sambo, and 3,500 African workers stopped working at the mines of Sham Va.

Tension continued from then on to mar the relationship between the natives, especially the workers, and their European rulers-employers. But it was only after the Second World War that the natives were able to fully overcome the effects of the disastrous years of 1896-1897.

In 1946 a South Rhodesian African National Congress was set up under the influence of the Nyasa migrant workers in Southern Rhodesia who belonged to the Nyasa ANC. The new organization was quite interested in concrete problems, and took a more militant approach than the previous inter-war elitist associations. Also, around that time, the Rhodesian Railways African Employees' Association was set up.¹²⁹ The natives' awareness of their bad conditions was intensifying. Strikes and demonstrations became more frequent. The natives' docility was giving way to a renewed and rebellious indigenous spirit.

Southern Rhodesia became part of the Central African Federation when this Federation was established in 1953. At that time the most famous Southern Rhodesian African leader, Joshua Nkomo, was the Secretary-General of the powerful Rhodesian Railways African Employees' Association, and the head of a dormant Southern Rhodesian ANC. With the advent of the Federation, the Southern Rhodesian Africans stood to benefit from the more advanced African political organizations that had been previously developed in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the two partners of Southern Rhodesia in the Federation. Shortly after the Federation was launched, and again under Nyasa influence, a Southern Rhodesian Youth League was organized, led by George Nyandoro. Finally, in 1957, the militant and socialist Youth League was united with the aged Southern Rhodesian ANC, and a revitalized ANC was the result of the Union. Nkomo was elected as president but the then militants of the Youth League exerted a greater role in running the Congress and shaping its policies. The government of Southern Rhodesia was not happy with the increasing militancy of the Congress, so it banned it in 1959. The Southern Rhodesian stage was set for increased tension between the natives and the settlers.

(129) On the nascent labour movement in Southern Rhodesia, see R. Gray, *The Two Nations*, (London, 1960), pp.315-396.

The period between 1959 and 1963, the date when the Central African Federation came to an end, was a period of increasing aggressiveness by the white rulers toward native political movements. It was mentioned above that the Southern Rhodesian ANC was banned in 1959, but the nationalist movement did not die out. The nationalists resumed their activities after the ban by assuming another name: this time their movement was called the National Democratic Party. The European authorities, however, were well aware of whom they were fighting against. Measures of repression were enacted as laws, while the whites were increasingly entertaining the idea of a white independent settler state in Southern Rhodesia. The natives, aware also of the ultimate aim of the settlers, responded, under the leadership of the National Democratic Party, with intensified acts of violence. On December 9, 1961 came the National Democratic Party's turn to be banned. Once again the nationalist movement assumed another form, this time the nationalists operated under the name of the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) whose creation was announced in February 1962. ZAPU rallied from the start some 20,000 militants under the leadership of Nkomo. As the Central African Federation was approaching its end, an escalation of tension between ZAPU and the Southern Rhodesian authorities was bound to ensue. ZAPU, faced by the increased intransigence of the settlers, and their agitation for an independent Southern Rhodesia under their rule, responded by intensifying its militancy and thus precipitated its own banning in September 1962. This time the nationalists did not assume another name; they kept the name but went underground.

The Southern Rhodesian elections of 1962 under the 1961 constitution¹³⁰ put in power the Rhodesian Front Party — an extremist white party led by Winston Field and Ian Smith. It was a certainty at the time that the Federation was about to be dissolved. With the Federation dissolved, the Rhodesian Front's Party Congress, which met in September 1963, strongly urged the government to achieve full independence. Winston Field, then the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, tried, through negotiations with Britain, to gain independence but his efforts were doomed to failure. On 13 April 1964 he was forced to resign after the majority of his cabinet revolted against him for his alleged "moderation" in the pursuit of independence. Ian Smith succeeded Field in the premiership and was able, after the Rhodesian Front's landslide victory in the elections of 15 February 1965, to proclaim, on 11 November 1965, Southern Rhodesia's Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI). How did the Africans react to such sweeping events ?

For a while, the nationalist leaders had attempted negotiations with Britain when the 1961 Constitution was being drafted. Though initial agreement had been reached between Nkomo and other parties to the

(130) The Constitution gives the Africans only 15 seats in a Legislative Assembly of 65 members.

negotiations concerning African representation, the Africans later come to believe that what they had secured was not much. Subsequently, they boycotted the referendum on the Constitution; and spontaneous African violence, led generally by the N.D.P., led the government to ban the party. ZAPU, as we have mentioned, had been established early in 1962 amid an atmosphere of increasing African militancy. Yet up till then ZAPU leaders had been ready to make concessions; sometimes to the great chagrin of their kith and kin in the North, Banda and Kaunda, who were leaders of stronger, better organized and more militant national parties. Inconsistency within the leadership of ZAPU was to cost the party dearly. The issue debated was Nkomo's qualities as a leader. A group of rebels against Nkomo, led by the Reverend N. Sithole, attracted some professionals and intellectuals, but could not compete with Nkomo within the framework of ZAPU. Thus, they established their own Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) by mid-1963. Thus, in the second part of 1963 there were two nationalist movements in Southern Rhodesia: Nkomo's ZAPU (which changed its name domestically to People's Caretaker Council, but retained the name ZAPU internationally) and Sithole's ZANU. The rivalry between both movements was and continues to be an important aspect of Rhodesian politics.

The ZAPU-ZANU rivalry benefitted only the settlers, especially in those tense days. To crystallize the split and allow it to flourish, the Field cabinet permitted both ZAPU and ZANU to operate legally in August 1963. At any rate, the settlers' attempt to lure either of the two competing nationalist parties to their side did not succeed — both parties were insistent on not giving in to the settlers' demands of independence on the basis of the 1961 constitution.

To check the increasing native militancy, the European rulers tightened up their legal set-up by strengthening their security system, and increasing penalties for acts of violence. For instance, in 1963 the penalty for possession of offensive weapons was increased from ten years to twenty years' imprisonment. Nationalists were generally accused of being communists and European settlers regarded themselves as front-liners in the sacred "Free World Struggle" against communism.

The year 1963 was a year of dissension within the ranks of the nationalist movement. But toward the end of the year it appeared that the two competing parties had not lost sight of the circumstances obtaining then, and of the extremism to which the settlers were heading. Disturbances, toward the end of 1963, became more frequent. The government retaliated by imprisoning hundreds of the leaders of both parties. When Smith became Prime Minister, he tightened security measures against the nationalists even further. This did not deter the nationalists from continuing their attacks against government property and other public concerns. A testimony of the strength of the nationalist agitation is that between April and June 1964 some 500 Africans

were convicted by courts on charges of sabotage and terror.¹³¹ Only a few months later, on 26 August 1964, the government banned both ZAPU and ZANU, together with some African newspapers.

The new wave of repression assured relative peace for the latter part of 1964 and the early part of 1965. In 1965, with the imminent proclamation of independence, the nationalist parties were charting their future plans at Lusaka, the capital of Zambia (formerly Northern Rhodesia). It was clear that the settlers would have their independence, illegally if Britain did not go their way; and it was clear also that violent struggle against a *fait accompli* was the only possible valid response. From their offices in Lusaka, both ZAPU and ZANU directed the activities of their followers in Southern Rhodesia. In the general elections that took place in February 1965, thanks to the nationalists' exhortations, Africans' boycott of the election was very much in evidence. Also, on the eve of the election, acts of violence committed by the natives took place.

When UDI was proclaimed on 11 November 1965, the Africans were not yet prepared for a general uprising against the settlers, but a spontaneous turn toward violence was witnessed in most urban centers. Many African employees of the government balked at making loyalty pledges to the Smith regime. Bulawayo witnessed a two day strike of African workers which the government was able to break only by the force of arms and by shooting at demonstrators. Some 200 Africans were detained as a result of the UDI proclamation, on 12 and 13 November 1965. The Smith regime supplemented the already repressive measures by a series of harsh administrative regulations.

Starting from the spring of 1966, operations carried out by guerrillas trained in neighbouring African countries (Zambia and Tanzania especially) were becoming more frequent and sizeable. The Sionia battle late in April 1966 is one example of such operations. The guerrillas usually cross the Zambezi river and clash with the Smith regime forces in the valley. In May 1966 the Smith regime estimated that there were some 900 fighters in Zambia and Tanzania ready to carry out operations in Southern Rhodesia.¹³² In August 1966 the Southern Rhodesian Minister of Internal Affairs, William Harper, prided himself that "we have shot whole gangs of these terrorists — not one surviving — when they resisted arrest."¹³³

In spite of all the determination of the Smith regime to quell the "terrorists", the guerilla warfare in Southern Rhodesia is not on the decrease. Government reports substantiate that. In 1966, according to government sources, 20 guerrillas were killed. In 1967, 25; and in the first two months of 1968, over 100. The government also admitted that 13 members of the Rhodesian security forces have so far been killed in the entire series of clashes with the

(131) James Barber, *Rhodesia : The Road to Independence*, (London, 1967), p. 209.

(132) John Day, *International Nationalism*, (London, 1967), p. 110.

(133) *Africa Report*, October 1966, p. 44.

nationalists.¹³⁴ But certainly the number of Rhodesian casualties is much higher. The Rhodesian government is using air force to subdue the guerrillas — napalm is used freely, and areas of bush have been fired by rockets in order to burn the guerrillas' hiding-places.¹³⁵ The main guerrilla tactics are still mainly variations of the hit-and-run pattern, but the process of establishing permanent bases in Southern Rhodesia is well under way. Though both leaders of ZAPU and ZANU are detained (Nkomo, whose term of detention for five years was renewed in December 1968; and Sithole who was sentenced in February 1969 to six years' hard labour), the revolution goes on.

An important factor in escalating the guerrilla activity in Southern Africa (South Africa and Rhodesia) was the merger of the ANC's military wing with that of ZAPU. The unity of struggle between South African nationalists and Southern Rhodesian nationalists has a long history behind it, but it was only in the second part of the 1960's that this unity manifested itself in concrete terms. The reasons for such unity of struggle are easy to detect. "A unique form of alliance has been formed between two liberation movements for the purpose of fighting imperialism, racism and oppression. The purpose is to fight effectively in unity. The fact that our enemies are acting in a united and coordinated fashion only lends point to the ZAPU/ANC alliance."¹³⁶ It is not only that ZAPU and ANC are now allied in their armed struggle. It is more important that there are increasing signs of cooperation with other national liberation movements in Southern Africa: with FRELIMO in Mozambique, with MPLA (Movement Populaire Pour la Liberation d'Angola) in Angola and SWAPO of South West Africa.

The cooperation among liberation movements in Africa south of the Zambezi — which is the result of geographic circumstances, similar political circumstances, and the alliance between South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Portugal — could have far reaching consequences on future developments in that important part of the world. It is expected that within a few years the whole area will be in flames as the revolutionaries intensify their united struggle. Knowing the strength of the racist regimes there, and taking into account the immense importance of the area to the imperialist forces, one could conclude that the struggle will be both fierce and long.

As for Southern Rhodesia, the situation as it stands now is developing to the advantage of the nationalists. It is true that the native's full potential in backing the liberation struggle has not been tapped yet, but it is through the increase in the number and size of the armed clashes between the natives and

(134) See : Alan Rake, "Black Guerrillas in Rhodesia", *Africa Report*, December 1968, p. 23. See also Davis M'Gabe, "Rhodesia's African Majority", *Ibid.*, February 1967, pp. 14-20.

(135) See various issues of the *Zimbabwe Review*, official organ of ZAPU, which is published in Lusaka.

(136) "Intensify the Revolution", *Sechaba*, July 1969, p. 10.

the settlers that this potential will be translated into reality.

Southern Rhodesia's geographical position is advantageous to the cause of the nationalists as it borders on Zambia which offers the nationalists facilities for training. In fact, Zambia's support for ZAPU and the nationalists in general has brought her the wrath of the European rulers not only in Southern Rhodesia, but also in South Africa. Vorster, the South African Prime Minister, threatened Kaunda early in 1968 that he would hit him back "so hard that he will remember it for a long time."¹³⁷ Starting from June 1968, acts of sabotage committed by the European settlers against Zambia were making news. Such acts of sabotage — the destruction in June 1968 of an important bridge in the Luangwa valley, several miles away from Mozambique, for example — are intended as a warning to Zambia. South Africa has also been since summer 1968 flying reconnaissance flights over Zambia. Retaliatory raids by the settlers against Zambia — and the Rhodesian and South African training camps in Zambia — have not so far been resorted to, but there are many indications that this possibility could materialize in the future as the national liberation struggle intensifies.

* * *

In Palestine, the natives' response, as was mentioned earlier, was restricted by the fact that Palestine at the time of early Zionist settlements there was part of the Ottoman Empire. Another factor that impeded a quick native reaction was that, unlike what happened in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the Zionist Jews started settling in Palestine as civilians engaged in civilian matters only, and the military aspect of the Jewish-Zionist settlements, though provided for subtly from an early time, was to manifest itself to the natives only later. Thus, in Palestine there was no early military confrontation between the settlers and the natives. However, once the settlers were there, friction between the natives and the settlers was bound to develop on account of land, and because of the superiority the settlers felt in regard to the natives.

There are no written native accounts (or at least they have not been discovered so far) showing their reaction to the settlers. But a student of the subject of early native-settler contacts affirms that there were certain frictions between the natives and the settlers in the 1880's and after. It is interesting to note the resemblance with early settler-native friction in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

"The Jews, fearing for their first small crops, considered such incursions on their land by Arab shepherds as trespass and dealt with them summarily. Erring flocks would be corralled and the owners fined to redeem their animals. The settlers were intentionally severe on Arabs caught

(137) *African Diary*, (February 25 - March 2, 1968), p. 3815.

pilfering, in order to discourage others. Accidents, quarrels about trifles and wrangles over the fixing of boundaries led to blows from time to time.. In them the Jews more than held their ground.”¹³⁸

The charges are all familiar. They were used as pretexts to dislodge the natives not only in Palestine but also in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and in other places where Europeans wanted to settle on the natives' lands.

On the maltreatment to which the natives were subjected, we have a valuable testimony by a Zionist source, Ahad Ha'am, the Zionist philosopher and writer, and the leader of what was called Cultural Zionism. After his first visit to Palestine in 1891 he noted the Jewish-Zionist maltreatment of the natives. He wanted the settlers to treat the natives with respect and friendliness. "Yet what do our brothers do in Palestine? Just the very opposite: Serfs they were in the lands of the diaspora and suddenly they find themselves in freedom, and this change has awakened in them an inclination to despotism. They treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, deprive them of their rights, offend them without a cause, and even boast of these deeds.”¹³⁹

It was in that same year, 1891, that the first "official" reaction to the intrusion of Jewish-Zionist settlers took place. On 24 June, 1891 a number of Jerusalem native notables and leaders cabled the Ottoman Prime Minister requesting the issuance of a *firman* [decree] prohibiting Jews from entry into Palestine and settling there. The Ottoman authorities reacted favourably to the natives' request, but the intervention of some foreign powers (especially Britain) relaxed the application of such restrictions as were imposed. Notable in this respect were the activities of the British Consulate in Jerusalem.

Up to the end of the 19th century, there was no organized native movement reacting to the settlers' intrusion. But there is a document from 1899 expressing the general feeling of the natives at the time. In 1899, a former president of the Municipal Council of Jerusalem, Yusuf Diya Al-Khalidi, sent a "careful, reasoned letter" to Zado Kahn, the Chief Rabbi of France and an intimate of Herzl. In this letter, the Palestinian notable foresaw the possibility of a popular movement emerging against the Jews "which the Ottoman government with the best intentions in the world could not quell".¹⁴⁰ Shortly afterwards, in 1901, "large purchases by the Jewish Colonization Association led to unrest in the region of Tiberias".¹⁴¹ Peasants were resentful as they were systematically eased out of the holdings where they used to work as share-croppers or tenants. Yet still they did not take action on their own, as they were Ottoman subjects and they counted on the government of Constantinople to protect them.

(138) Neville Mandel, "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Immigration into Palestine : 1882-1914", in St. Anthony's Papers, *Middle East Affairs*, No. 4, p. 84.

(139) Reported by Hans Kohn, "Zion and the Jewish National Idea", in *Reflections on Modern History*, (New York, 1963), p. 196.

(140) Mandel, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

(141) *Ibid.*, p. 91 and after.

Early in the 20th century, there was an increasing native awareness of the seriousness of the settlers' challenge. We can find in Najib Azouri's works an indication of this. In 1904 Azouri, a Lebanese thinker who lived for a long time in Palestine, described in his book *Le Reveil de la Nation Arabe*¹⁴² the threat of Zionism to nascent Arab nationalism, and foresaw the possibility of a clash between the Zionists and the Arabs engulfing the whole area and influencing international politics. This line of thinking was gaining ground among the natives. In 1908 a revolution took place in Turkey and a general atmosphere of relative freedom predominated. The new leaders, however, were more tolerant of the settlers' activities. Thus the natives' fears were strengthened; disturbances broke out at Tiberias and Sejera and the settlers were allowed to organize their own guard to defend their interests. The natives' fears were further justified as they realized, increasingly, that those foreign settlers "teach their children gymnastics, wrestling and fencing; when you enter their houses you see how they fill them with weapons, arms and Martini rifles."¹⁴³

Again their efforts were still directed toward Constantinople as the ruling center of Palestine. But it was about that time that organized native political movements started to arise: a National Party, with headquarters in Jaffa, was established in 1911. Its declared policy was to hinder Zionist expansion in Palestine. Right before the First World War, some clashes between the natives and the settlers took place, but they were again of a spontaneous, local nature.

Following the issuing of the Balfour Declaration and the publication of secret war agreements between the powers toward the end of 1917, the natives understood, though not fully, what was planned for them. For two years they tried to assert their rights through peaceful means. Congresses, petitions, negotiations and so forth were, however, to no avail. In April-May 1920, with Palestine now under British control, the natives' despair over the Zionist-British collusion increased and resulted in a series of uprisings in many cities against both the settlers and the British, who were now committed to establishing a national home for the settlers in Palestine. The number of casualties in the 1920 uprisings reached some 400 dead and about five times more wounded. The struggle for Palestine had by now reached a new, more violent stage. Violent clashes, interrupted by attempts at peaceful settlement, became the pattern after that. Of those violent clashes, the summer uprising of 1929 should be noted. But most notable of all was the 1936 revolution.

The immediate background to the 1936 revolution was the natives'

(142) Paris, 1904.

(143) From an open letter published by two Arab newspapers : *Al-Moqtabas* and *Al-Karmel* toward the end of 1910. The letter, written by Shukri al-Asali, once a Governor of Nazareth, was addressed to the Turkish General and signed under a pen-name. Cited by *Mandel, op. cit.*, p. 96.

demonstrations on the occasion of the 18th anniversary of the issuing of the Balfour Declaration, in November 1935. But the unique character of the revolution was the emergence of a revolutionary popular movement, not in complete harmony with the traditional Palestinian leadership, and fiercely opposed to the Zionist-British plans. It was the peasants and workers who provided the operational basis of the revolution, and for this reason the attitude of the established traditional leadership *vis-à-vis* the revolution was an ambivalent one. The revolution was well entrenched in the mountains, in the Jenin area near Haifa, but soon it was to spread, far and wide, to many other geographical regions. The outward manifestations of the revolution calmed down by November 1936 when Arab kings, under British influence, advised negotiations with Britain. The traditional leadership heeded the advice, and acted accordingly, yet the resistance movement in the mountains and in the rural areas did not calm down. Instead, it increased its intensity in 1937 and 1938. It was estimated that the revolutionaries numbered some 10,000 fighters, totally devoted to the cause, in addition to wide masses of natives that supported them in specific areas and operations.

The 1936 revolution, which manifested in many respects the characteristics of a war for national liberation was a magnificent event in the history of the native challenge to the intruders. If it failed to achieve its aim, after three years of struggle, this failure was the result of several factors which have to be taken into account. The revolution antagonized the British, the settlers and the traditional political leadership which was clearly challenged; and it was a tacit alliance of all those elements that crushed the revolution. The failure of the revolution is not a testimony of its weakness, but of the immense strength of its enemies, who succeeded, through the traditional leadership, in making "negotiable" the cause for which the revolution was started.

The 1936-1939 revolution was the climax of the natives' struggle against the intruders and their protectors; the harsh methods utilized to defeat it broke the back of the natives' resistance for about a quarter of a century.¹⁴⁴ There was, in fact, some native resistance to the settlers between 1940 and 1948 (the establishment of Israel) but it was limited and sporadic. When Zionist terror against the natives broke out in full strength and in large scale in 1947-1948 — to force the natives to leave their country — the natives' response was to flee their country in haste and fear.

After 1936, when Arab kings, under British pressure, interfered to end the long strike of the natives that had lasted for over six months, the Palestine problem was "Arabized" and some ten years later it was internationalized. When the 1936-39 revolution was finally quelled, traditional leadership and

(144) See some useful remarks on the revolution by Eli Lobel, "Les Juifs et La Palestine", in Sabri Jiryis, *op. cit.*, Maspero ed., pp. 27-33.

Arab kings were left as undisputed spokesmen for the natives of Palestine. The natives, especially the rank and file among them, did not manage a real comeback till the mid-sixties, and soon after that they were to gather momentum at the end of 1967.

During those twenty-five years, from 1939-1964, the Palestinians were generally dependent on Arab efforts to rescue them from their plight. This is not to say that they stood still, hands tied, waiting for whatever might come about. There were now and then some resistance movements, some fights between groups of Palestinian patriots and the settlers, especially after the Second World War and the establishment of Israel, and especially in the mid-fifties before the tripartite aggression against Egypt. There were also heroic attempts inside Israel, on the part of the native minority left there, at resisting the settlers. But, essentially, Palestinians were between 1939 and 1964 pawns in Arab politics, dependent on Arab leaders, and divided among themselves on what course of action to follow.

The circumstances of 1963-64 helped the Palestinians to emerge again as a force in their own right. At that time, Israeli plans for the diversion of the Jordan river waters were a very lively issue in Arab politics, and the implications of such plans for the possibility of increasing Zionist immigration into Palestine inculcated into the Arabs, and the Palestinians especially, a feeling of uneasiness. The failure of two decades of Arab diplomacy to restore the rights of the Palestinians to them prompted the Palestinians to agitate for a unified Palestinian action independent from Arab action. It was in mid-1964 that a number of newer-generation Palestinian leaders met and proclaimed the Palestine National Charter, which resulted — with the agreement of the Arab Summit Conferences in January and September 1964 — in the establishment, in the autumn of 1964, of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

The PLO was, in the opinion of many Palestinians, essentially a formal, and “governmental” organisation. A more militant approach was taken by a group of Palestinian professionals and workers, who declared armed struggle against the Israeli settler-state on the first day of 1965. Their movement was called Al-Fateh: its organizational roots go back to 1956, but only in 1965 did it find it feasible to start its armed struggle against the Zionists.

January 1, 1965 was then the real date when the Palestinians started to rise again to self-assertion. Israel was soon to realize the new mood of the Palestinians and to react to it. On January 14, 1965 an Israeli military spokesman acknowledged that infiltrators affiliated with “an Arab terrorist organization” had been discovered and that this terrorist organization was directed from Syria. Shortly after, on March 1, 1965, Eshkol (the then Israeli Prime Minister) issued a warning to the Arab countries, especially Jordan, considering them responsible for infiltrators coming from their respective lands. At the same time, Israel complained to the UN Security Council of acts of

sabotage in its territory.¹⁴⁵ After this, Israel intensified its retaliatory raids against Arab countries surrounding it. There were further complaints to the Security Council on the parts of all concerned, and there were further retaliatory raids by Israel against Arab countries.

The period between January 1965 and June 1967 was a period of intensified struggle. Freedom fighters (or the fedayeen, sacrificers) used to cross the cease-fire lines from the U.A.R., Syria, Lebanon and Jordan, accomplish their missions in Israel, clash at times with Zionist settlers or with Israeli armed forces and return to their bases in the countries neighbouring Israel. Israel in return stepped up its retaliatory raids against the Fedayeen bases, against their village-supporters, especially in the West Bank of Jordan, and against the Arab countries. Al-Fateh's activities during the thirty months between January 1965 and June 1967 were generally limited in nature and scope, but they were more than enough to disturb not only the Israeli army but also the Zionist settlers. The first major Israeli raid took place less than six months after Al-Fateh started its activities, on 27 May, 1965. The attack was allegedly directed against an Al-Fateh camp, but civilian targets were not spared: many civilians were killed including two children. Such retaliatory raids did not deter Al-Fateh and the fedayeen from continuing and intensifying their struggle. On the contrary, they helped enhance Al-Fateh's prestige among the Palestinians and the Arabs at large;¹⁴⁶ especially since Al-Fateh's activities coincided with official Arab hesitation and inactivity toward the Israeli diversion of the Jordan river waters, and Bonn's exchange of diplomatic relations with Tel-Aviv.

By mid 1965, then, Al-Fateh was emerging as the spokesman for the fighting Palestinians, for the Palestinians who are not only determined to regain their homeland, but are also willing and ready to sacrifice themselves for the cause. The PLO remained the "official" spokesman for Palestine in Arab — and some international — parleys and councils, but in the battle-field Al-Fateh was the catalyst of the struggling Palestinian masses.

The enhanced prestige that Al-Fateh felt is reflected in part of a memorandum where it criticized certain Arab regimes for restricting Al-Fateh's freedom of movement on their territories, and for their banning of Al-Fateh's news and its military communiques.

It reiterated its demands from the governments of the countries neighbouring Israel in a memorandum dated 12 March 1966 addressed to a conference of the Arab Heads of Governments held in Cairo. The memorandum urged the participants in the conference to accept the three following principles:

(145) See : S/6208 of 1 March 1965.

(146) See on this point a pamphlet by Y. Harkabi, a retired senior officer of the Israeli army entitled : *Fedayeen and Arab Strategy*, (Adelphi Papers, No. 53, December 1968) p. 24.

"1 — Respect of the Palestine Arab People's right to struggle for the liberation of its homeland and to build its revolutionary organization.

2 — Granting of total freedom of action for all Palestinian revolutionary movements that adhere to armed struggle as a path to liberation.

3 — The necessity of making available, to serve as a springboard for liberation, each Arab land adjacent to Israel : Such lands should not be turned into prisons for the fedayeen... under the pretext of placating the enemy and avoiding his reprisals."¹⁴⁷

Al-Fateh's prestige was, then, high enough to request Arab governments, on behalf of the fedayeen, to make their lands available and prepared for fedayeen activities. It could not possibly have requested that if it had not felt that it enjoyed the full backing of the Palestinians.

1966 was truly dominated by the fedayeen action and Israeli reprisals. Israel was well aware of the significance of Al-Fateh. In a letter to the Security Council on May 3, 1966, devoted to Al-Fateh's activities, the Israeli representative stated that "since January 1965 there have been a total of forty-three such terrorist attacks across the frontiers," and that "the Al-Fateh Organization publishes in the Arab press 'communiques' about its exploits. Although boastful and exaggerated those stories are reasonably accurate about times and places."¹⁴⁸

No doubt Israel wanted to exaggerate Al-Fateh's importance in order to justify its retaliatory raids across the cease-fire lines. Such retaliatory raids culminated in the barbarous Israeli attack on the Jordanian Village of Sammu' on 13 November 1966. Civilian targets were hit and twenty persons were either killed or wounded. The attack on Sammu', which was condemned by the UN Security Council on 25 November 1966, underlined the increasing impact of Al-Fateh and the fedayeen on the Israeli government.

After the attack on Sammu', Al-Fateh issued a political statement repeating its theme of the re-emergence of the Palestinian personality. The statement also attacked the Jordanian government (by name) for its reserved attitude toward the fedayeen, greeted the new fedayeen organizations that had made their debut in the meanwhile among the Palestinian masses in Jordan, Gaza, Syria, and Lebanon, and concluded by ascribing to the fedayeen activities certain shortcomings in the Israeli economy.¹⁴⁹

Up to the Fifth of June 1967, Al-Fateh published 65 military communiques, reporting over 200 operations. The turn toward violent armed struggle was well under way.

In the early days after the Israeli aggression of June 1967 against the U.A.R., Syria and Jordan, the fedayeen movement underwent a deep soul-

(147) *Al-Fateh Yearbook : 1968* (in Arabic) p. 125.

(148) UN Security Council, Document No. S/7277.

(149) See Fateh Pamphlet : *Revolutionary Studies and Experiments No. 10*, (Nd., no publisher, in Arabic), pp. 25-32.

searching and re-evaluation. The June confrontation was essentially a confrontation between regular armed forces. It also did not last long enough for the fedayeen to influence its outcome through guerrilla methods of fighting. Of course, Al-Fateh did its best during the six days of fighting; some ten military communiques were issued describing the outcome of over twenty military engagements with the Israeli forces during the week of active hostility. But the circumstances during and immediately after the aggression, the military defeat of the Arab armies and the generally low standard of Arab (and Palestinian) morale at that stage, made it difficult for the fedayeen to resume immediately the same pattern of attacks developed in the thirty preceding months. The consequences of the June aggression, on the other hand, especially the vast Arab-populated territories now under Israeli control, helped the fedayeen to re-activate themselves and resume their armed struggle. The newly-occupied territories meant that the Israeli armed forces had to be spread thinner, over areas populated by Palestinians generally sympathetic to the fedayeen, and resentful of the Israelis.

After a period of over three months of re-examination, Al-Fateh resumed its activities. Networks in which residents of the newly-occupied Western Bank of the Jordan river could participate, were now established. Palestinian youths, from all sectors of the society, who had by now become firmly convinced that the Palestinians themselves were the ones who should shoulder the responsibility of liberating their homeland, now flocked to the resistance organizations in large numbers. New organizations appeared as the new volunteers, with varying backgrounds, found it difficult to get themselves adjusted to the framework of one resistance movement. Thus volunteers sharing the same political outlook, social background or even geographical location, gathered in separate organizations.

Fedayeen activities began to reappear in the news in the last days of September 1967. Palestinian and Arab reaction to those activities was admiration bordering on unbelief: they were considered a spark of hope in the gloomy days that followed the June aggression. Though the Arab masses exhibited a remarkable persistence and determination after the catastrophe of June, it was generally admitted that it would take a long time before Arabs would feel confident enough to pass on to an offensive stance. When the fedayeen assumed such a stance in September 1967, Palestinians and Arabs in general saw in that a testimony to the inner strength and soundness of the fedayeen and their strategy, whose ultimate aim is a people's war of national liberation.

We will not state here in detail the development of the fedayeen's struggle against the Israeli settler authorities, and the new dimensions of such a struggle. This is too vast a subject to be dealt with here. We will confine ourselves to stating some conclusions which will give us a clear idea about the extent of the natives' challenge to the intruders:

1- Fedayeen activities have been intensified, and continue to be intensified to an unprecedented level. The number of operations has multiplied several times over a period of two years, averaging now some 400-500 operations per month. The character of the operations has radically changed from the hit-and-run pattern to that of large military confrontations. The reach of the operations has gone beyond the territories occupied during the June aggression to strike at targets deep inside Israel proper. The Israeli authorities, after an initial attitude dismissing the fedayeen activities as insignificant, now recognize that it will take a long time before the fedayeen activities can be checked.

2- The intensification of the fedayeen activities brought serious Arab support to the fedayeen organizations, especially among the broad masses of the people. Such support makes it difficult for any Arab government of a country surrounding Israel to entertain any hope of checking, controlling or restricting the fedayeen's freedom of movement. The experience of Jordan in November 1968 and the most recent Lebanese experiment in November 1969, fully substantiate this thesis. The "Palestine problem" was no more a pawn in the formal-traditional political structure of Arab politics. Arab governments in countries surrounding Israel now although grudgingly at least tolerate the fedayeen's pressure and freedom of movement on their territories, even though they know that they run the risk of Israeli retaliatory raids.

3- The PLO had been characterized in its early history by the fact that it reflected the Arab formal-traditional political structure, and was conceived by some as a possible alternative to Al-Fateh and other fedayeen organizations. However in February 1969, a new Palestinian National Assembly was constituted. This new National Assembly turned the PLO over to the resistance movements, signifying the emergence of the resistance organization as the undisputed spokesman of the Palestine People.

4- The fact that there are many and varied resistance organizations which emerged before but especially after the June aggression, constitutes a hindrance to the efficacy of the 'Palestine action', which, in order to be more effective, has to be more unified. The initial scattering of resistance movements gave way, however, to a certain coordination of a military nature between some resistance movements in the summer of 1968. Now with the transformation of the PLO into a revolutionary body run by revolutionaries representing the greatest majority of the fedayeen, it has become possible to carry on within the framework of the PLO a more effective dialogue regarding the raising of the level of military cooperation among the various resistance movements. As a result of such a dialogue, a Unified Command for the Armed Palestinian Struggle was created in April 1969. Further unitary steps are contemplated,

and, as it looks now, it is justified to expect that in the near future, the Fedayeen — all of them — will be more united.

5- The fact that the natives of Palestine have taken to armed struggle, and that they have proved ready to sacrifice generously for the liberation of their homeland has sharpened the international awareness of the reality of what has taken place in Palestine during the past fifty years. The natives' struggle clarified the Palestine problem as a struggle between the natives and the Zionist settlers' thus placing the problem in its proper perspective. Large sections of international public opinion rightly understand the problem now in those terms.

* * *

The natives, in the three experiments under discussion, are now set to pursue their aims of national liberation through armed struggle. It is noteworthy in this respect that though the natives' initial reactions to the settlers varied from one experiment to another — military confrontation in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and protest movements in Palestine — yet at a later stage, they adopted the method of political struggle in one way or the other. The latest stage, however, which was reached in the early 1960's in South Africa, and by the mid-1960's in Southern Rhodesia and Palestine, emphasizes armed struggle undertaken by the natives concerned. This does not mean of course that regional and international pressures are not sought or applied. It simply means that the natives have grown convinced that the struggle for liberation is primarily their duty.

Armed struggle has not so far reached in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia the level it has reached in Palestine, for a variety of reasons, the most important of which is that the Zionist settlers in Palestine inflicted on the natives, in the space of a relatively short period, a treatment harsher than that inflicted on the natives in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia over a longer period. Also important for the intensification of armed struggle in Palestine is the fact that the direct imperialist support granted to Israel in the course of 20 years of its existence, has not left the Palestinians bewildered as to who their enemies are. The link between Israel and West European-American imperialism is obvious. Thus, whereas in Southern Rhodesia, for instance, the nationalists used to plead their case to Britain up till recently, hoping that Britain would come to their aid against the settlers, it has been clear to the Palestinians that they are not only struggling against "isolated" settlers, but against the settlers and their supporters at the same time.

The fact that armed struggle has not so far reached in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia the level it has reached in Palestine does not mean that it will not reach that level in the future. There is an increasing awareness, on the

part of African nationalists, of the wide international dimensions of their struggle against the settlers, and increased recognition of the role of the imperialists in supporting the Smith and Vorster regimes. This clarity of vision should work — and indeed is working — as an added stimulus to their resolve to pursue the course of armed struggle. The cooperation that is currently being enhanced between liberation movements in the whole of Southern Africa is a sure path toward the intensification of armed struggle.

The espousal of armed struggle is a significant phenomenon. Among other things, it means clarity of vision, purification of the soul and total rejection of compromise solutions. It also indicates a conscious attempt to do away with fetters traditionally imposed and perpetuated. As it requires from the freedom fighter full devotion and unlimited sacrifice, it totally transforms his life-pattern: it widens his horizons so that he comes to realize that he is not only a revolutionary against the settlers, but also against the circumstances of his country that made the intrusion of the settlers possible. Unlike traditional resistance to the settlers, armed struggle well understands the world of today with its modern technology and its scientific foundations. Armed struggle is thus a modernizing movement fighting imperialism — and local traditionalism.

2. Regional Solidarity in Face of the Intruders

The phenomenon of European settlers in Africa and the Middle East stirred and continues to stir regional reactions wider in scope than the local reactions of those natives directly affected. Regional opposition to the intruders is the result of a variety of factors. Far from attempting to enumerate all those factors, we shall mention only three: the psychological, the security and the humanitarian factors.

The first factor can be described simply as a feeling of bitterness, a feeling of injured self-pride, among peoples who share, with the natives directly affected by the settlers, the same culture and traditions, and who live in similar environments. The settlers' intrusion is thus considered not only as an isolated phenomenon directed against a specific area and its inhabitants, but also as an insult to the dignity of the region as a whole, since it represents the dominance of a foreign culture over the indigenous culture. Thus, the settlers' intrusion becomes intolerable on account of its degrading not only the natives of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine, but also all the peoples living in the region.

The second factor, the security factor, can have two meanings. First there is the expansionist nature of the settler states. It is generally believed in the regions where Europeans made their intrusion — and history, of course, bears this out — that European endeavours can extend in space as far and wide as the means at their disposal allow them to. The settlers in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine were certainly content with smaller pieces of

territory when they started their endeavours. As the means of conquest at their disposal were reinforced, their hunger for larger territories was effectively expressed and fulfilled. The extent of their settlements depends not on their being — in principle — desirous of a certain territory. Rather, it depends on their strength to acquire and hold territories. The settlers are not short of “grand designs” engulfing large stretches of land. Thus, they pose a danger to the security and well-being of the regions in which they are implanted. It could be asserted that the settlers are *now* satisfied with what they have. It could be said, for instance, that Smith is certainly not going to expand militarily at the expense of neighbouring African states; that though he might have thought of expansion if there were more white settlers, and though he still encourages white immigration into Rhodesia, yet circumstances presently obtaining do not justify any fear of him as far as expansionism is concerned; there the second meaning of the security factor comes in. The peoples of Africa and the Middle East were dominated by European colonialism until quite recently. They are jealous of their newly won sovereignty and desire to guard against any possible intervention from the outside, especially from their previous colonial masters and their allies. It is clear to them that the settler states are remnants of colonialism and imperialism, and they can — and do — act as outposts for present day imperialism and neo-colonialism in the regions where they are implanted. They are foreign bodies disturbing the harmony of those regions and posing a threat to their security. Hence, it becomes a regional duty to oppose the settlers.

The third factor is of a humanitarian nature. The sufferings of the natives under European rule are better known and better appreciated by their kith and kin. Injustices committed upon them evoke strong sentiments on the part of their neighbours. The human desire to right the wrong is then another factor which leads the peoples of Africa and the Middle East to sympathize with the oppressed and to come to their rescue.

* * *

Regional solidarity in face of the intruders is a phenomenon contemporary with the emergence of national and regional consciousness. It dates from the moment when local painful experiments with the settlers were communicated to — and realized by — a wider, regional audience. Regional solidarity, however, requires still other “pre-requisites”. It requires, beyond the feeling of identity or sympathy with those oppressed, a minimum feeling of strength, regional strength, that makes it possible for the neighbouring peoples to think that they can contribute something to the struggle against the European intruders. A weak and subdued neighbour finds it farfetched to concern himself seriously with a difficult situation when he himself is immersed in difficulties. Thus regional solidarity in face of the intruders

became more pronounced, and became more effective as African and Arab states gained independence. This solidarity is now well articulated officially in the resolutions and activities of regional bodies such as the League of Arab States and the Organization of African Unity. On the non-governmental level, regional solidarity in face of the intruders is expressed by increasing public pressure for a deeper commitment in the struggle for liberating the natives from the European oppressors.

* * *

Early feelings of solidarity among Africans in respect of the European challenge came in the late 19th century. Themes such as "Africa for Africans," and "Africa must face up to Europe" became more frequent from the 1890's on. Early centers of African solidarity were based in the United States of America and the Carribean Islands where Africans, formally liberated from slavery only a short time before, considered themselves the vanguard of a nascent African nationalism. The second generation of pan-Africanists included a group of African students who studied in the U.S.A. around the turn of the century. Those were mostly from Southern Africa, such as Isaka Seme who wrote in 1906 a book entitled *The Regeneration of Africa*, and who was a cofounder of the A.N.C. in 1912.

In 1900 the first Pan-African Congress was held in London. One of the most prominent personalities of the Pan-African movement at the time was Dr. William du Bois. One of the themes of the Congress was the way Africans were treated by Europeans. It is noteworthy that the participants in the Congress (mostly U.S. negroes) addressed a memorandum to Queen Victoria protesting against the treatment of Africans in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.¹⁵¹ In subsequent Pan-African Congresses during the inter-war period (1919, 1921, 1923, 1927) this theme was reverted to with increasing emphasis. The 1919 Congress, for instance, asked for "a code of law for the international protection of the natives of Africa," and demanded that "the land and its national resources should be held in trust for the natives." The 1923 Congress asked that "black folk should be treated as men. We can see no other road to peace and progress." The participants severely criticized the rulers of South Africa, especially General Smuts who was "striving blindly to build peace and good will in Europe by standing on the necks and hearts of millions of black Africans."¹⁵²

The sixth Pan-African Congress was held only in 1945. But in the meantime cooperation between African nationalists in the continent was increasing. The

(151) Colin Legum, *Pan-Africanism : A Short Political Guide*, (New York, 1962), p. 25.

(152) *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.

A.N.C. was established in 1912 and its influence was felt in both Rhodesias during the inter-war period. African trade unions also cooperated with each other and profited from this mutual cooperation. In the thirties, African nationalists were faced with the racial theories of the Fascists and they found it necessary to express their disapproval of such theories. During the war years, a Pan-African Federation was set up which convened the Pan-African Congress at Manchester in October 1945. The main characteristic of this Congress, as against previous congresses, was its predominantly African (rather than U.S. negroes) composition. The leadership of the Pan-African movement was now in the hands of Africans, not in the hands of U.S. and Carribean negroes.

The resolutions of the Manchester Congress were clearer and sharper than resolutions adopted at previous congresses, not only in regard to racial questions but also in regard to national liberation and freedom from exploitation. For instance, participants affirmed that "the object of the imperialist powers is to exploit" and that "all colonies must be free from foreign imperialist control".¹⁵³ On the particular problem posed by the domination of European settlers over the natives, the participants in the Congress demanded "the abolition of local laws which allow Europeans to take lands from the Africans". It also demanded "the immediate abolition of all racial and other discriminatory laws".

The period of the early 1950's in Africa was the period of national liberation struggle. The anti-colonialist revolution that the world witnessed after the Second World War was by then sweeping over north, west and east Africa. By the spring of 1957 five African states had reached their independence: Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia and Ghana — and the independence of the last three states was the result of intense struggle and heavy sacrifices. Now, regional solidarity could take a "governmental" form. The first Conference of Independent African States was held in Accra, April 1958. The eight then independent African states participated. South Africa was of course excluded.

The Accra Conference issued a declaration in which the participants pledged themselves *inter alia* "to uproot forever the evil of racial discrimination in all its forms wherever it may be found." In addition to this Declaration, several resolutions were adopted. One of those resolutions dealt with racialism. In this resolution, the participants, after affirming in the preamble that "the practice of racial discrimination and segregation is evil and inhuman," and after describing racialism as "becoming an element of such explosiveness which is spreading its poisonous influence more and more widely in some parts of Africa that it may well involve our continent in violence and bloodshed," condemned, in the operative paragraphs, the practice of racial discrimination

(153) *Ibid.*, p. 137.

“especially in the Union of South Africa, in the Central African Federation, in Kenya and in all other parts of Africa.”¹⁵⁴

This line of support continued to be independent Africa's approach to the problems facing the South African and Southern Rhodesian natives. At times, the phrasing of the resolutions was stronger as, for instance, was the case of the second conference of independent African States (Addis Ababa — June 1960) when it resolved, regarding the Central African Federation, that the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia be democratized by introducing the principle of “one man, one vote”, and regarding South Africa, when the participants decided “to assist the victims of racial discrimination and furnish them with all the means necessary to attain their political objectives of liberty and democracy”.¹⁵⁵

Concerned particularly with the problems of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia was the Pan-African Movement of East and Central Africa (PAFMECA). PAFMECA was founded in 1958 as a loose association of political parties in a number of Central and East African territories, including both Rhodesias. South Africa's ANC used to attend as observer. Leading PAFMECA personalities were Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika (now Tanzania) and the late Tom Mboya of Kenya. Later, PAFMECA was enlarged to include some independent states: Tanganyika (after it attained independence) and Ethiopia. It was also enlarged to include parties from Southern Africa, changing its name to PAFMECSA (for Southern). The association was successful in airing the political demands of member parties. In the framework of PAFMECSA the struggle against foreign settlers in Rhodesia and against racial discrimination in South Africa was given unanimous support. For instance, in its Conference at Addis Ababa (February 1962), it demanded the continuation of the Central African Federation, condemned “the unholy alliance” in Southern Africa between Verwoerd, Welensky and Portugal's Salazar, and rejected the granting of self-government to Transkei by South Africa as “a cynical fraud and a calculated insult to African people who are demanding complete and genuine freedom for all of South Africa”.¹⁵⁶ PAFMECSA was dissolved shortly after the 1963 Addis Ababa Conference that created the Organization of African Unity.

South African native organizations were helped by some African states on individual bases, but not through an organized effort by an African body. The same is true of nationalist movements of Southern Rhodesia. In the meanwhile, unofficial African conferences, such as the All-African Peoples' Conferences, were clamouring for more direct involvement in the struggle against white domination in Southern Africa.

(154) *Ibid.*, pp. 142-143.

(155) *Ibid.*, pp. 155-156.

(156) *Africa Report*, March 1962, p. 14.

In 1963, a newly organized set-up, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), including all independent African states, was established. The OAU symbolized the coming of age of efforts at African cooperation. True, it did not go very far, or even far enough, in unifying Africa, but it was a machinery useful to assure for Africa at least the required minimum of unity following the aftermath of the Congo and Algeria problems that split African states into different rival groupings (Casablanca, Monrovia and the OCAM's groupings). With the establishment of the OAU, regional solidarity for the cause of the natives in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia reached a new phase.

The OAU was born as a result of an African Conference held at Addis Ababa in May 1963. The conference was attended by all thirty African states then independent except Morocco (because of Mauritania's presence) and Togo. South Africa, of course, was not invited. The conference adopted some resolutions and drafted the OAU Charter. As Africa was by then mostly independent, it could devote more time and energy to tackling problems caused by European settlers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

In the first resolution on decolonization, the participants noted in the preambular paragraphs "with deep concern, that most of the remaining dependent territories in Africa are dominated by foreign settlers," and were convinced that those settlers were imposed on these territories in order to establish colonial bases in the heart of Africa. The first operative paragraph of the resolution declared "that the forcible imposition by the colonial powers of the settlers to control the governments and administration of the dependent territories is a flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate inhabitants of the territories concerned." Two operative paragraphs (3 and 4) dealt specifically with Southern Rhodesia. In the 3rd paragraph, the Conference warned the United Kingdom of the consequences of transferring powers "to foreign minority governments imposed on African peoples by the use of force..." while in the 4th paragraph the Conference reaffirmed its support for African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia and solemnly declared that "if power in Southern Rhodesia was to be usurped by a racial white minority government, the member states of the conference would lend their effective moral and practical support to any legitimate measure which the African nationalist leaders may devise for the purpose of recovering such power and restoring it to the African majority."¹⁵⁷ Other paragraphs in this resolution on decolonization (paragraphs 12-15) dealt with arrangements for supporting various African nationalist movements, including the receiving, by African states, of nationalists from the liberation movements for the purpose of "training them in all sectors" and providing them with the assistance they need.

(157) See text of resolutions and the OAU Charter in *Africa Report*, June 1963, pp. 9-13.

The problem of South Africa was specifically dealt with in the second resolution of the conference on Apartheid and Racial Discrimination. The preambular paragraphs of the resolution stated the participants' conviction of the necessity for coordinating their efforts "to put an end to the South African government's criminal policy of Apartheid and wipe out racial discrimination in all its forms." The operative paragraphs dealt mostly with steps to be undertaken, such as the establishment of a joint fund for concerted financial assistance to anti-Apartheid movements, "effective assistance of every kind to anti-Apartheid movements in South Africa to help them carry out their struggle", the despatching of a delegation to the U.N. Security Council to explain the situation, coordination of sanctions against South Africa and so forth.

The resolution on Decolonization established a "coordinating committee" of nine member-states with headquarters in Dar es Salaam "responsible for harmonizing the assistance from African states..." This committee of nine came to be known later as the "liberation committee".

The OAU Charter is, of course, a legal document which does not deal with particular issues. Though nothing was mentioned in the Charter about the "liberation committee", yet the committee is now functioning as part of the OAU. The aims of the liberation committee, as it was decided in subsequent meetings, were to collect material assistance (military and otherwise) from African states and channel this assistance to the liberation movements according to certain agreed criteria; and also to bring about more unity among various liberation movements working in the same territory. The committee met for the first time in June-July 1963 under the Chairmanship of Oscar Kambona, Foreign Minister of Tanganyika. Since then, it has been meeting in regular sessions (every six months) and irregular ones to discuss specific and urgent issues.

In respect of South Africa, the liberation committee tried over a long period of time to get the ANC and the PAC to cooperate in their struggle. Later, however, the committee threw its backing behind the ANC. In its meeting in Algiers between July 16-22, 1968, it decided to withdraw aid from "unrepresentative" or "ineffective" movements. Accordingly, the PAC was considered as falling into this category and it was decided to suspend the aid hitherto given to it "until it overcome the great confusion" in its leadership. The Sixth African Summit Conference held in September 1968 approved the liberation committee's decision.

The OAU gave the South Rhodesian problem fuller care and attention. The liberation committee, especially its standing committee on Defence (composed of five members) has been occupied since 1965 with considering ways and means of assisting African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia. The recommendations of the committee were subsequently discussed, after UDI was proclaimed, by a meeting of African Foreign and Defence Ministers representing 35 African

states that was held at Addis Ababa between December 2-5, 1965. The meeting approved the following measures :

- 1- to break diplomatic relations with the U.K. unless the Rhodesian rebellion were crushed by December 15, 1965.
- 2- to take measures against Rhodesia itself, especially economic measures.
- 3- to make contingency plans in the Defence committee for military and paramilitary measures against Rhodesia.¹⁵⁸

The Rhodesian rebellion was not crushed by 15 December, 1965. A few days after that date, and notwithstanding the unanimous decision taken at the above mentioned meeting, only nine of the 36 member states of the OAU broke their diplomatic relations with Britain.¹⁵⁹

The Defence Committee met to discuss "military and paramilitary measures" in Accra, on January 6, 1966. The committee reported to the full membership of the "Liberation Committee" which held a session between 1 and 6 February 1966. It was decided, at that session, to give priority to the case of Rhodesia and Mozambique. The Liberation Committee, in turn, reported to the sixth ordinary session of the Council of Ministers (of the OAU) which took place between February 28 and March 6, 1966. The meeting was torn by strife, due to the circumstances that surrounded the coup d'etat in Ghana the previous month. The Council adopted several resolutions on Rhodesia, not very militant, generally speaking. Among other things, the council asked Britain to take effective measures including the use of force against the Smith regime. It also established a committee of solidarity with Zambia (to help her, because of difficulties that would ensue to her economy on account of the boycott imposed on Southern Rhodesia) and requested Nyerere and Kaunda to attempt to reconcile ZAPU and ZANU.

Nothing much has come out of the OAU in respect of Rhodesia since that time. Decisions taken previously are, till now, reaffirmed and re-emphasized, but the liberation committee was not quite the effective tool Africans envisaged in 1963. At the 12th ordinary session of the committee, held at Conakry, in January 1968, President Sekou Toure deplored the Committee's inactivity and noted the failure to implement the decisions taken by the OAU in December 1965. He concluded that "the committee cannot but present a balance sheet of failure".¹⁶⁰

The fiasco that the liberation committee met in the Rhodesian affair further emphasized the difficulty of mustering enough support for exceptional

(158) See : *Africa Report*, January 1966, p. 21.

(159) Tanzania, Guinea, Ghana, Congo (Brazzaville), Mali, Mauritania, UAR, Sudan and Algeria.

(160) See : *Africa Report*, March 1968.

measures of coercion on the part of a large grouping of states such as that represented in the OAU. Nevertheless it would be an understatement of African solidarity with the nationalists of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia to conclude on these remarks. In fact, beside the increasing popular pressure by Africans for direct African intervention against the white settler authorities in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, there are a number of African states which give support, and it seems will continue to give support, material, military and moral, to the cause of African nationalists in Southern Africa. Tanzania and Zambia especially, thanks to their geographical position, are rendering immense help to the revolutionary movements in Southern Africa. The more militant African states, such as Algeria, Guinea, Congo (Brazzaville) and the UAR are also contributing generously, and in a variety of ways, to the revolutionary movements. The leaders of those movements are among the first to acknowledge the value of such help as is rendered to them.

* * *

Arab awareness of the seriousness of Jewish-Zionist penetration in Palestine became more pronounced in the early part of the 20th century. Articles and books dealing with Zionism and imperialist ambitions in the area became quite common before the First World War. Some Arab efforts to oppose the settlers were undertaken between 1916 and 1920 on the part of traditional Arab leaders (Husain, Faisal) as well as by some Arab movements emanating from Damascus and other Arab cities. These efforts were, generally speaking, conciliatory in tone, though they stopped short of accepting the settlers' sovereignty over any part of Palestine. They were the efforts of nascent nationalism aware of its limitations. From the 1920's on, Arab parts of Asia adjacent to Palestine fell under European colonial rule through the mandate system. The 1930's witnessed the emergence of Iraq and Egypt as semi-independent entities under British influence. When the 1936 revolution in Palestine took place, those semi-independent entities, as well as the traditional states of Arabia (Saudi Arabia and Yemen) acted as intermediaries between the British and the Palestinian revolutionaries, thus officially "Arabizing" the Palestinian problem. As was mentioned above, this intervention on the part of the Arab kings was the result of British pressure, yet it was not unsympathetic to the Palestinians. It was an expression of solidarity with the natives of Palestine, aiming at a compromise solution. Besides this official Arab intervention in the 1936 revolution, one should note that many Arabs actively participated in the revolution itself, side by side with the Palestinians. Regional solidarity on the part of the popular masses was then much more pronounced than on the part of governments.

The way the British crushed the 1936 revolution, as was noted above, broke the back-bone of the natives' resistance, for a long time to come.

During this period, the Palestine problem was championed mainly by the Arab governments. Thus it should be instructive to study such activities, starting from the 1936 intervention.

On 8th October 1936, an appeal was issued by the Kings of Iraq, Yemen and Saudi Arabia and the Prince of Transjordan calling on the Arabs to suspend the strike, "relying on the good intentions of our friend Great Britain and its announced wish to implement justice." As a result, the strike was officially called off and in October a British Royal Commission was despatched to study the question in its entirety. Arab chiefs, on the other hand, had assured the Palestinians that they would continue their best endeavours with Great Britain in order to ensure a just solution for the problem. From that time on, consultations between British governments and the "independent" Arab governments were continuous, the Arab governments playing chiefly the role of pressuring the Palestinians to a more moderate stand,¹⁶¹ and at the same time giving the official expression of the Arab demands to Britain and the League of Nations. The result of Arab governmental efforts with Britain and the British Royal Commission's investigation, was the publication of a white paper in 1938, reverting again to the theme of the possibility of Arab-Zionist understanding. It also advanced the opinion that partition was impracticable. A conference in London was convened in the early part of 1939, and was attended by Arab governments and a Palestinian delegation. The conference was a failure and the British produced yet another white paper in May 1939, which was rejected by both the Zionist settlers and the Palestinians alike.

It should be mentioned at this stage, that again, between 1936 and 1939, Arab popular support for the Palestinians was far more militant than the Arab governmental attitude. Thus, in the latter part of 1937, when the idea of partitioning Palestine into a settler state and a Palestinian state was in the air, a non-governmental, popular conference was held at Bludan, Syria between 8 and 10 September, 1937. The conference was attended by some 450 delegates representing the actual political forces then at work in most of the Arab countries. This conference, following the themes of Arab nationalism at the time, declared that Palestine was an inseparable part of the Arab homeland. It also declared its total rejection of the partitioning of Palestine and its insistence on repealing the Mandate and the Balfour Declaration, and affirmed the right of Palestinians to independence and sovereignty.

This radical stand of the popular Arab forces was reiterated again in other regional conferences and in a semi-official conference: the Arab Parliamentary Conference which was held in Cairo between October 8 and 11, 1938.

Toward the end of the Second World War, negotiations started between

(161) See on the general subject : Leila S. Kadi, *Arab Summit Conferences and the Palestine Problem, (1936-1950), (1964-1966)*, PLO Research Center, Beirut, 1966.

the then independent Arab states for the purpose of creating an instrument for increasing inter-Arab cooperation. Those negotiations resulted finally in the establishment of the League of Arab States whose pact was signed on 22 March 1945. The League of Arab States took from the start an essentially resolute stand on Palestine, though at times this resoluteness was mitigated by factors of political expediency — on the part of some Arab governments — and through submission to indirect British pressure. A Special Appendix Relating to Palestine was included in the pact. This Appendix considered Palestine to be independent: "Its existence and *de jure* national independence is a matter on which there is no doubt." It also maintained that there "should be no impediment to Palestine's participation in the proceedings of the League's Council."¹⁶² The league was from the beginning preoccupied with Palestine; it was only a few months old when it started its activities in this respect. Thus when the British Foreign Secretary, Bevin, announced in the House of Commons on 13 November 1945 that a joint American-British Commission of enquiry would be despatched to study the Palestine problem, the League of Arab States replied in December 1945 affirming the right of Palestine to independence. The reply however did not espouse the Palestinian viewpoint as much as the Arab and Palestinian masses desired, and was generally met in Arab and Palestinian circles with disappointment.¹⁶³ The Higher Arab Committee of Palestine, for instance, insisted, in a comment on the reply, that "the Palestinians, while grateful for the concern shown by the Arab governments and the Council of the Arab League regarding their problem, insist that the decisive say in the problem is *theirs*" (emphasis in the original).

Arab chiefs wanted to improve their public image after increasing criticisms of the League's reply to Bevin's statement. Thus, after the publication of the Anglo-American Commission's report, they reacted by announcing that they would discuss the matter at "the highest level". A conference gathering most of the Arab Kings and Presidents met at Inshas (Egypt) and was presided over by King Farouq. But again Arab official attitudes were not as responsive and committed as the Arab masses desired. Another Conference was held at Bludan (Syria) in June 1946, and was attended by Heads of Governments and Foreign Ministers. It is noteworthy that the governments concerned observed the increasing delicacy of their position as a result of the mounting tension in Palestine. The tide of Arab popular support was gathering momentum to such an extent that the participants felt that "the position of Arab governments would become so delicate that they would be unable to prevent their peoples from volunteering to support the Arabs of Palestine by every means: money,

(162) See text in *Arab States and Arab League*, Mohammad Khalil, (ed.), Beirut, 1962, Vol. II, p. 61.

(163) Najib Sadaqa, *The Palestine Problem*, (In Arabic), (Beirut, 1964), pp. 279-283.

arms and volunteers."¹⁶⁴

There is no need to go into the details of the Arab governmental attitude toward Palestine within — and without — the framework of the Arab League. In sum, it could be said that the Arab governments shouldered the burden of the problem from 1936 on, but their attitudes were more compromising and betrayed more expediency than the Arab masses desired. The ritual practice of speechmaking, of passing resolutions at specially convened meetings, and so forth, dominated the Arab governments' way of expressing solidarity with the natives of Palestine, till the middle of the 1960's when the Palestinians rose again to self-assertion. It is true that it was through the Arab Summit Conference of 1964 that the Palestine Liberation Organization was created, but it is also true that it was around that time that the Palestinians were becoming increasingly restive at the repetitive pattern of Arab politics that transformed them into pawns in the game. What the Arab states did in the Summit Conference of 1964 was just about to be done by the Palestinians themselves. It bears perhaps some repetition to mention again that Al-Fateh launched its armed struggle campaign on the first of January 1965.

The pattern of Arab solidarity with the natives of Palestine in face of the foreign intruders could perhaps be summarized by emphasizing the following observations:

- 1- The Arab people realized the extent of the settlers' threat at an early stage. Although the settlers were coming as private citizens not as conquerers, yet the fact that they were intruders and that their immigration was motivated by wider ambitions, compelled Arab nationalists to draw the inevitable conclusion that their presence represented a danger to the area, and that, in the words of Najib Azouri, they were destined to clash with the natives of the region.

- 2- The people of the different Arab countries — especially Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and Iraq — reacted strongly to the settlers' intrusion at an early stage. Many of those who wrote on Zionism and warned against it were Arab thinkers not only from Palestine but also from many other Arab countries. In fact, since Arab nationalists proclaim the unity of the Arab homeland, Palestine was thus considered as an integral and inseparable part of that homeland. Problems resulting from the intrusion of European settlers therefore had to be treated, not as a local matter, but rather as a matter of concern to Arabs everywhere.

There is no clearly documented information on how actively the Arabs participated materially in challenging the intruders in the first stages of the

(164) See full text in Kadi, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

evolution of the problem. But such material Arab participation in combating the British and the Zionists was already in evidence in the early thirties. The 1936-1939 revolution witnessed an influx of Arab volunteers that was clear evidence of the extent of the regional challenge to the intruders. Besides, beginning with the 1920's, Zionism started to figure as a major issue in the programmes of most Arab political parties.

3- Official Arab intervention (after the debacle of Hashemite diplomacy in 1917-1920) is usually dated from the year 1936. It assumed a sharper form in 1948 and then again in 1962 when three Arab states were attacked by Israel. It could generally be said that official Arab intervention in the two decades after 1936 was the result of three conflicting factors: (a) the demand of Arabs in general that their governments take an active anti-Zionist role; (b) the personal ambitions of certain Arab chiefs to secure for themselves some benefits — material or moral — from this intervention (King Abdullah of Jordan is a striking example); and (c) the pressure Britain exerted and continued to exert on certain Arab governments till the mid-1950's, aiming at appeasing the Palestinians and achieving some sort of compromise solution.

Arab official intervention in Palestine was not an unmixed blessing. On the positive side, it showed Britain and the world that the Zionist penetration into Palestine had a regional dimension. On the other hand, however, Arab official intervention at times diverted attention away from the natives of Palestine whose interests and very existence were jeopardized by the settlers' intrusion. Moreover, the attitudes of Arab governments in support of the Palestinians were — especially between 1936 and the mid-1950's — mostly based on political expediency, i.e. the desire to appease their subjects, to secure individual interests and to grant favours to Britain (and later to the U.S.A.).

The official Arab intervention in the 1947-1949 period is partly responsible for obscuring the real dimensions of the struggle. Instead of emphasizing that the two sides directly involved in the struggle were the natives of Palestine and the Zionist settlers, there emerged a feeling that the struggle was essentially between the Arab states and Israel. The Palestinians' identity was contained within the framework of the established Arab regimes. It was only in the mid-1960's that the Palestinian character of the struggle re-emerged.

4- Arab popular dissatisfaction with the way Arab governments handled the Palestine problem during the critical years of 1947-1949 resulted in a series of political upheavals that, within the span of ten years, swept out of power the majority of the politicians who had played a prominent role during that period.

5- Zionist attempts at diverting the Jordan River waters in order to increase Israel's absorption capacity precipitated a period of increased tension between Arab governments and Israel which reached its climax before the mid-

1960's. During that period, Arab governments, in cooperation with some Palestinians, established the P.L.O., while Al-Fateh, entirely dependent on Palestinian revolutionaries, started its armed struggle campaign in 1965. The period from 1964 to 1967 could be described as a period of further Arab involvement in the Palestine problem. It could also be described as a first step towards the re-emergence of the Palestinian personality.

6- The June 1967 Israeli aggression against three Arab countries further emphasized the necessity for regional commitment to challenge the intruders as it revealed Israel's expansionist designs on areas extending beyond Palestine proper. The effects of the aggression on the natives of Palestine have been dealt with above. Its effects on Arab states were also of importance. The Arab Summit Conference of Khartoum (September 1967) introduced a new principle in Arab regional solidarity against the Zionist settlers. This principle is that of sharing financially in the burden of combating Israel. The UAR and Jordan, it was decided, were eligible for financial assistance from oil-rich countries to help them withstand the economic effects of the June aggression. In this respect, then, there was a further affirmation of Arab regional solidarity in the face of Israel. Also the June aggression convinced the countries neighbouring Israel, and other Arab countries willing to share in the Arab military effort, to enhance their military coordination. A joint Arab command for the Eastern Front (Syrian and Jordanian fronts) was established, with the participation of Iraq. An Arab "Conference of Confrontation", for the Arab countries willing to participate in the military effort against Israel, was held in Cairo in September 1969, where in addition to the UAR, Iraq, Syria and Jordan, Sudan and Algeria took part. Thus, it could be safely said that the June aggression further enhanced Arab solidarity against the settler intrusion.

7- The June aggression enhanced the prestige and strength of fedayeen action. It should be noted in this respect that, after June, fedayeen action had a far-reaching effect on the Arab masses in general. The massive Arab support for the fedayeen forced the Arab governments surrounding Israel to at least acquiesce in allowing the fedayeen a great deal of freedom of movement. Even countries that were not objects of aggression and had not taken part in the June hostilities, such as Lebanon, came to find that they had no choice, in the face of public pressure, but to allow the fedayeen the freedom of movement which they needed. The Israeli policy of massive retaliation was not a strong enough deterrent to convince Arab governments of the necessity of impeding the fedayeen's freedom of movement.

Also, Arab popular support for the fedayeen is not presently expressed solely in terms of moral support. There are now a large number of Arabs actively participating in the fedayeen organizations. Arabs falling as martyrs in the Israeli-occupied territories and in areas controlled by Israel since 1948

have now become a daily event. Also military training undertaken and organized by many Arab mass movements and organizations is now a common phenomenon.

* * *

It can be seen from the above that there is a strong regional solidarity (African and Arab) against the intrusion of the settlers in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine. This regional solidarity began to be developed in the last years of the 19th century but became more and more important as African and Arab peoples rose to self-assertion, and later attained their independence. Emergent Arab and African nationalist movements assumed an increasingly hostile attitude toward the settlers, and this hostility is now well-expressed by governments and by popular movements. The similarity between African attitudes toward South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and Arab attitudes toward Israel is clear and does not call for further investigation. But it should be noted that Arab solidarity in the face of the Israeli settlers has been stronger than African solidarity in the face of the white settlers. This fact is the result of two factors:

1- The feeling of oneness among the Arabs is stronger and has deeper roots than the feeling of oneness among Africans. The concept of the unity of the Arab nation is not matched by an equally strong and clear concept of the unity of Africa.

2- Israel now occupies territories which belong not to Palestine proper, but to other Arab countries as well. Thus the Israeli settlers' threat to the region has gone further than the South African and Southern Rhodesian settlers' threat.

As a result of these two factors it was possible for the settlers in Africa, for instance, to develop rather friendly relations with some "independent" African states such as the relations between South Africa and Malawi, or between South Africa and the previous British High Commission territories; while the Israeli settlers in Palestine have encountered complete failure in their attempts to develop friendly relations with any Arab country.

Notwithstanding the differences just mentioned about the degree of African and Arab solidarity in the face of the intruders, the basic tenets in the African and Arab attitudes are one and the same:

- 1 — Total rejection of the legitimacy of the settlers' existence in its present form.
- 2 — Absolute unanimity that the present settler states are foreign entities in Africa and the Middle East.
- 3 — Strong determination to assist the natives of South Africa, Southern

Rhodesia and Palestine to regain their rights and to exercise sovereignty over their lands.

4 — Deep commitment on the part of the great majority of African and Arab states to struggle through peaceful and non-peaceful means to put an end to the present settler supremacy.

3. *The World's Role : Growing International Opposition to European Settlers*

European settlers in Africa and the Middle East enjoyed international (that means essentially European) support for their efforts when they first started their settlement schemes. They were considered as a sort of missionaries whose mission was to civilize and Europeanize the natives and their lands. The successes of the settlers were considered as civilizational achievements. That the natives were killed, tortured, discriminated against and subjected to atrocities mattered only a little in a world dominated by a Europe entrenched in the traditions of colonialism and imperialism. European settlers' inhuman treatment of the natives was rationalized at times as an inevitable component of the process of civilizing the natives and introducing them to the modern world. Although at times such inhuman treatment was criticized by some missionary societies, philosophers and humanists, yet the general pattern was that of approval. After all, it was clear to everybody at the time, that it was only through such inhuman treatment that "civilization was introduced" in the U.S.A., Australia and Latin America. True, in South Africa efforts were made by the British government to erase slavery; true, in the Charter granted to the British South African Company of Rhodes there were certain clauses which were intended to guarantee a minimum of the natives' rights, as was also the case with the Balfour Declaration. But Britain followed such an "enlightened" policy only half-heartedly, and except for slavery its attitude was based on political expediency rather than on moral commitment. Segregation and various methods of depriving the natives of their rights were tolerated in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia when they were under British control; measures harmful to the interests of the native population in Palestine were undertaken under the British mandate. The dominant theme in Europe (which till recently meant most of the world) was that the settlers were doing essentially a good thing that should not be hindered even though such doings appeared to some to be morally unsupportable. In the spirit of imperialism that pervaded the West at the turn of the century, moral commitment to universal human values did not mean much; and the concept of equality between men and peoples was still a distant one.

Opposition to European settlers up to the end of the 19th century was then only an individual endeavour on the part of certain moralists who were in touch with the actual barbarous acts committed by the settlers. Such people were essentially in agreement with the general line of the settlers' ambitions, but they thought that the settlers should be more moderate in pursuing their

objectives, more exact in their ways of achieving those objectives. Criticism of the settlers' cruelty then generally took the form of bidding the settlers — who were considered in principle to be of high moral calibre — to live up to their announced ethical standards, to be "nice" to the natives and treat them more justly if not equally. The London Missionary Society and the *Manchester Guardian* were among those who favoured a better treatment of the natives of Africa, in the 19th century. Ahad Ha'am, a Jewish moral philosopher, was among those who favoured a better treatment of the natives of Palestine.

The twentieth century, especially after the October Revolution in Russia and the rise of nationalist movements in Asia and Africa, was more international than the 19th and was more favourably disposed toward taking a serious look at the problems raised by the continued supremacy of European settlers in Africa and the Middle East. The world of today is less European than the 19th century, and, hence, the settlers are not favoured today as much as they were in previous days. The world's role in opposing them is growing. Let us discuss briefly how this is happening.

* * *

Legislation enshrining racial discrimination in South Africa is usually dated from 1809, when the British Governor of the Cape, the Earl of Caledon, introduced a pass law for the Hottentots. Under this law, all Hottentot males not working for the whites were considered as "vagrants" who were required to hold a pass, and to show this pass to every white who asked for it; otherwise they would be punished. The early protesters against this pass system were the church missionaries in the first and second decades of the 19th century.¹⁶⁵ Among the early European attempts to secure a minimum of "good" but not equal treatment of the natives was the London Convention of 1884 which secured to the natives the right of access to the courts. This "triumph of humanism" was however very limited and circumspect in application. Moreover it was rendered obsolete shortly afterwards with the start of the Anglo-Boer wars. Also, the situation in the then Transvaal state was most discriminatory against the natives and the Indians. It was in the last years of the 19th century that Gandhi started his campaign against racial discrimination, especially in the Transvaal. Subsequent to this campaign, the practice of racial discrimination received some "international" opposition: The Transvaal Policy was fiercely denounced in India "and gave the colony a bad press in Great Britain".¹⁶⁶ But the practice of racial discrimination grew stronger after the British-Boer *entente*, which culminated in the establishment of the Union of South Africa.

(165) L. E. Neame, *The History of Apartheid*, (London, 1962), p. 17.

(166) *Ibid.*, p. 33.

In the inter-war years, racial discrimination was widely criticized in India, under the influence of Gandhi. It is also reported that the Indian delegation raised the problem of racial discrimination practiced by South Africa against Indians in the Assembly of the League of Nations in 1922. South African legislation, discriminatory against Indians, was criticized there as severe and unjust.¹⁶⁷ Prominent philosophers such as H.G. Wells and Harold Laski spoke in the inter-war years against the superiority the settlers maintained in Africa. But it was only after the Second World War that racial discrimination met with general criticism.

South Africa's practices of racial discrimination were brought to the attention of the UN from its early days. Only eight months after the UN Charter came into force, India, in a letter dated 22 June 1946, requested that the question of the treatment of the Indians in the Union of South Africa be included in the provisional agenda for the second part of the first session of the General Assembly. The Union's representative countered on October 24, 1946, in the 19th meeting of the General Committee by affirming that the question concerned not Indian nationals, but Indians who were nationals of the Union of South Africa, and that, accordingly, the question was within the domestic jurisdiction of the Union, in accordance with Article 2 (7) of the Charter.¹⁶⁸ This line of argument is still adopted by the South African authorities. However, as early in the history of the UN as 1946, the South African argument was not accepted and it continues to be unacceptable. The General Committee of the first session of the General Assembly decided that Article 2 (7) of the Charter did not apply, and referred the question to a joint meeting of the First Committee (political and security questions) and the Sixth Committee (legal questions). In the joint meeting of the two committees, the Indian representative introduced a draft resolution which considered *inter alia* that the "Union government's discriminatory treatment of Asiatics in general and Indians in particular constitutes a denial of human rights and fundamental freedoms and is contrary to the Charter."¹⁶⁹

It should be noted that the stress was put on the treatment of Indians — the question on behalf of the natives was still not raised. Also, the Indian draft resolution was not adopted; instead a more conciliatory draft was what finally emerged. The resolution adopted was, at any rate, a clear enough repudiation of the South African contention that the matter was a domestic issue. It was also a clear indication that the practice of racial discrimination has its effects on international peace and security since the resolution mentioned this explicitly, basing itself on the fact that the policy of racial discrimination impaired the

(167) Pierre Queuille : *Histoire de L'Afro-Asiatisme Jusqu'à Bandung* (Paris, 1965), pp. 104-105.

(168) *UN Yearbook*, 1946-1947, p. 144.

(169) *Ibid.*, p. 168.

relationship between two member states of the U.N. Operatively, the resolution requested the two governments concerned to report at the next session of the General Assembly on measures adopted to reach agreement within the framework of the international obligations of the Union of South Africa.¹⁷⁰

In the Second Session of the General Assembly the issue was again raised at India's request. The Indian representative reported that no progress had been achieved. The General Assembly at this session did not take any resolution on the question because the two drafts introduced did not command the necessary majority. The Third Session of the General Assembly, however, succeeded in passing a resolution inviting "the governments of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa to enter into discussion at a round table conference, taking into consideration the purposes and principles of the Charter of the U.N. and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights."¹⁷¹

The Fourth Session of the General Assembly did not discuss the problem as it was generally thought that a multilateral conference of India, Pakistan and the Union of South Africa should be able to settle the question. This was the only session of the General Assembly in which the question of South Africa's racial policies was not discussed. The idea of holding a multilateral conference did not appeal to the South African government. Thus, the question was raised again at the 5th and 6th sessions of the General Assembly. With the intensification of the discriminatory measures in South Africa, the UN General Assembly was being faced with an increasingly explosive situation. In the Fifth session of the General Assembly, we find in the preambular paragraph of resolution 395(V) a clear denunciation of the policy of Apartheid as implying racial discrimination:

"Considering that a policy of 'racial segregation' (Apartheid) is necessarily based on doctrines of racial discrimination."¹⁷²

This clear inference that Apartheid implies racial discrimination was only another step towards discussing the whole problem of race-relations in South Africa; now not only in regard to the Indians but in regard to the victims of Apartheid as a whole.

As matter of fact, the Assembly started consideration of this broader issue in its Seventh Session. On the Agenda of the 7th Session there were two questions related to South Africa's racial policies. The first was the traditional question of the treatment of Indians and was raised by India and Pakistan. The other was "The Question of Race Conflict in South Africa" which was raised by a host of African and Asian states. The explanatory memorandum of the 13 Asian and African countries stated that this race conflict was creating a dangerous and explosive situation which constituted both a threat to international peace and a

(170) *Ibid.*, p. 148.

(171) *UN Yearbook*, 1948-1949, p. 310.

(172) *UN Yearbook*, 1950, p. 407.

flagrant violation of the basic principles of human rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Charter.¹⁷³ As a result of the discussions, the General Assembly adopted resolution 616(VII) establishing a commission of three members "to study the racial situation in the Union of South Africa in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter..." It also invited the government of the Union of South Africa "to provide the commission with the necessary staff and facilities".¹⁷⁴ It was clear from the discussions that preceded the adoption of the resolution that the problem of race-relations in South Africa was considered by the Afro-Asians as an aspect of colonialism and white settlement in South Africa. "By lowering the status of the original inhabitants of South Africa to the advantage of a minority representing the conquerors of that country, the government of the Union of South Africa is practising a form of colonialism against which a struggle is being waged in the UN," the Pakistani delegate said.¹⁷⁵

Since then the battle against Apartheid has been fully engaged in the UN. The question of the treatment of Indians has been subsumed, since 1962, in the broader question of race conflict in South Africa.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to trace these developments in detail. But it is important to note that in the sixties, the UN became more vehement in attacking South Africa's Apartheid policy, and, later, more concerned with practical means as to how to bring down that policy. The Sharpeville massacre was mainly responsible for this new approach.

On 25 March 1960, representatives of 29 African and Asian countries requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council "to consider the situation arising out of the large scale killings of unarmed and peaceful demonstrators against racial discrimination and segregation in South Africa." It was on the first of April 1960, that the Security Council started to discuss for the first time one of the many aspects of South Africa's racial policies. During the debate that ensued, the United Kingdom, France and Italy raised the question of the Council's competence to deal with the issue.¹⁷⁶ The Council, however, considered itself quite competent and adopted a resolution in which it recognized that the situation in South Africa was one that had led to international friction and, if continued, might endanger international peace and security. It also called upon the government of South Africa to initiate measures aimed at bringing about racial harmony based on equality in order to ensure that the present situation did not continue or recur, and to abandon its policies of Apartheid and racial discrimination. The United Kingdom and France abstained from voting on this resolution.

(173) *UN Yearbook*, 1952, p. 297.

(174) *Ibid.*, p. 306.

(175) *Ibid.*, p. 302.

(176) *UN Yearbook*, 1960, p. 143.

The international atmosphere of indignation at South Africa's racial policies was also reflected in the General Assembly. In 1961, the General Assembly in resolution 1662(XVI) deplored South Africa's persistent disregard of world and UN opinion and its determined aggravation of racial issues, and requested all states to take action to bring about a change in South Africa's racial policies, which led to international friction and endangered peace and security. But the indignation at South Africa's racial policies reached more serious proportions at the next General Assembly session.

At its 17th Session, the Assembly adopted resolution 1761(XVII) with a roll-call vote of 67 to 16 with 23 abstentions. This resolution signified the beginning of a serious international fight against the South African settlers' policy in racial matters. The operative paragraphs of the resolution requested member states "to take the following measures, separately or collectively, in conformity with the Charter, to bring about the abandonment of these policies [South Africa's racial policies] :

(a) breaking off diplomatic relations with the government of the Republic of South Africa or refraining from establishing such relations.

(b) closing their ports to all vessels flying the South African flag.

(c) refusing landing and passage facilities to all aircraft belonging to the government of South Africa and companies registered under South African laws.

(d) boycotting all South African goods and refraining from exporting goods including all arms and ammunitions to South Africa."

The resolution also established, in paragraph 5, a special committee "(a) to keep the racial policies of the government of South Africa under review when the Assembly is not in session [and] (b) to report either to the General Assembly or to the Security Council or to both as may be appropriate from time to time." The resolution in its eighth operative paragraph also requested "the Security Council to take appropriate measures, including sanctions, to obtain South Africa's compliance with resolutions of the General Assembly and of the Security Council on this subject and if necessary to consider action under Article 6 of the Charter."¹⁷⁷

The Special Committee on Apartheid was constituted of 11 member states. It submitted three reports in the course of 1963. The first report, submitted on May 6, 1963, noted the sharp build-up in security forces in South Africa. The second report, submitted on July 17, 1963 to the Security Council, described the new Apartheid measures and recommended that the Council affirm its support of the General Assembly resolution No. 1761(XVII) of November 6, 1962. Shortly afterwards, on September 13, 1963, the Committee submitted a third re-

(177) *UN Yearbook*, 1962, p. 100.

port to the General Assembly for consideration at its 18th session.

Six days before the Special Committee's report to the Security Council was submitted, thirty two African states requested an early meeting of the Security Council. The Council subsequently met on 31 July till 7 August 1963. On August 7, the Council adopted resolution S/5386 with 9 affirmative votes and two abstentions (United Kingdom and France). The resolution noted with concern, in the preamble, "the recent arms build-up by the government of South Africa". In its operative part, the resolution stated that the Council "strongly deprecates the policies of South Africa in its perpetuation of racial discrimination as being inconsistent with the principles contained in the Charter of the UN..." In the third operative paragraph, the Council solemnly called upon "all states to cease forthwith the sale and shipment of arms, ammunitions of all types, and military vehicles to South Africa." There was another paragraph of the draft resolution which called upon all states to boycott all South African goods and refrain from exporting to South Africa strategic materials of direct military value. This paragraph was not adopted because of U.S. opposition to it.¹⁷⁸ The Secretary-General was requested to report to the Security Council by 30 October 1963.

On 11 October 1963, the Secretary-General submitted a report on the developments of the situation in South Africa. The Security Council met again to consider the report, after a request to this effect was advanced by the African states. This new series of meetings took place between 27 November and 4 December 1963. A resolution (S/5469) was adopted unanimously on 4 December 1963. This resolution condemned "the non-compliance by the government of the Republic of South Africa" with the previously adopted Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and affirmed the previous appeals for the banning of military shipments to South Africa. The resolution also requested the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts "to examine the methods of resolving the present situation in South Africa through full, peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all inhabitants of the territory as a whole..."¹⁷⁹

The Secretary-General nominated a committee of experts headed by Alva Myrdal. On 20 April 1964, this group of experts submitted its first report to the Secretary-General who brought it to the attention of the Security Council, noting that the government of South Africa refused to cooperate with the group. The experts' report recommended that a convention representing all the inhabitants of South Africa be convened to set a new course. The report also discussed the question of sanctions to be imposed but thought that a technical study of the question was needed. It also called attention to the death sentences imposed on some African nationalists.

On 27 April 1964, 58 Afro-Asian representatives requested the President of

(178) *UN Yearbook*, 1963, pp. 15-16 and p. 20.

(179) *Ibid.*, p. 22.

the Security Council to convene a meeting of the Council in order to resume consideration of the situation in South Africa. The Security Council did not meet till June.

In the meanwhile, the Special Committee on Apartheid established under General Assembly resolution 1761(XVII) submitted a fourth report to the General Assembly and the Security Council on 23 March 1964 in which it noted South Africa's continued intransigence and demanded firm action against that government. It submitted still another report on 25 May 1964 to the Security Council and the General Assembly, in which it again re-asserted the seriousness of the situation, demanded the application of economic sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter and drew attention to the proceedings of the International Conference on Economic Sanctions against South Africa held in London between 14 and 17 April 1964.

Notwithstanding all those reports and the demand of 58 Afro-Asian states, the Security Council did not meet till 8 June 1964. It was clear that there was a certain sympathy for South Africa's policies in the Western camp. Now that matters were coming to a head, the Western powers delayed the meeting of the Council. During the Council's series of meetings between 8 and 18 June 1964, two resolutions were adopted. The first, 190(64), was adopted on 9 June. It urged South Africa to renounce the execution of persons sentenced to death for acts resulting from their opposition to the policy of Apartheid, to end the Rivonia trial and to grant amnesty to all persons already imprisoned, interned or subjected to arbitrary arrest for having opposed the policy of Apartheid. It is indicative of Western sympathy toward the white rulers of South Africa that the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Brazil abstained from voting on this resolution. Those powers which abstained held the view that the resolution constituted an intervention in the judicial system of South Africa;¹⁸⁰ thus, in a way, supporting the discriminatory laws upon which that judicial system rests. The second resolution, adopted on 18 June 1964 as resolution 191(64), was very moderate in tone. It was adopted by 8 votes to three abstentions (Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union because it did not provide for the application of sanctions; France because of its traditional stand that the question is beyond the scope of the United Nations), while the African states expressed that they accepted it with reservations. The main feature of the resolution was that it decided "to establish an expert committee composed of representatives of each present member of the Security Council to undertake a technical and practical study and report to the Security Council as to the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of measures which could, as appropriate, be taken by the Security Council under the UN Charter."¹⁸¹

The expert committee established under resolution 191(64) reported in

(180) See UN periodical : *Objective : Justice*, Vol. I, No. 1. (1969) p. 4.

(181) *UN Yearbook* 1964, p. 119.

February 1965 that it was unable to reach full agreement on its conclusions. The conclusions reached by the majority were generally full of doubts regarding the effectiveness of sanctions. The minority of 4 out of 11 maintained that sanctions should be imposed. This minority group was composed only of African and Socialist Countries, namely Czechoslovakia, Ivory Coast, Morocco and the U.S.S.R. No African or Socialist country was in the majority; the only Asian country in that group was China (Formosa). The experts' committee's report has never been considered by the Security Council.¹⁸² It is noteworthy that since then the Security Council has not concerned itself with Apartheid.

The General Assembly, on the other hand, has been more vehement in the battle against Apartheid. This, of course, is understandable in view of the "aristocratic" composition of the Council. What is more important is that the Assembly has developed, as will be explained later, two trends in dealing with the present situation in South Africa : one trend was to study the international economic relations of South Africa in an effort to unmask the imperialist-capitalist partners of South Africa's rulers; and the other trend was to go deeper in clarifying the "settlement aspects" of the white rule in South Africa. In pursuing those two trends — in addition to other aspects of the problem — the Assembly was and continues to be faced with a minority opposition composed — virtually — of the Western powers and their allies.

Those developments took place especially starting with the second half of the 1960's. Thus, for instance, the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid, established by the Assembly in 1962, submitted a report on 16 August 1965 in which it blamed the intransigence of South African policy partly on the impression created by the Expert Committee's report that economic sanctions were unlikely because of continued opposition by most of the great powers and South Africa's major trading partners. In this report, the Special Committee considered action under Chapter VII of the Charter as "indispensable." The General Assembly in its 20th session, adopted resolution 2054(XX) on 15 December 1965. In resolution 2054A it noted with dissatisfaction the recent build-up of South Africa's military and police forces, and the continuation of foreign investments in that country. It again requested an arms embargo and drew the attention of the Security Council to the seriousness of the situation, arguing that "universally applied economic sanctions are the only means of achieving a peaceful solution..." The resolution also enlarged the membership of the Special Committee by six members who bear primary responsibility in world trade and in the maintenance of peace and security. But the major Western powers — and some of their allies — declined membership : United States, United Kingdom, France, Canada and Italy. The Soviet Union, of course, accepted, and the committee denounced those who declined membership in it as undermining the au-

(182) *Objective : Justice, op. cit.*, p. 5.

thority of the organization, while the Algerian delegate accused them of direct participation in the maintenance, if not propagation of Apartheid.¹⁸³

Resolution 2054B established the UN Trust Fund for South Africa to receive voluntary contributions for legal assistance to victims of racial discrimination and repression in South Africa, relief for dependents of persecuted persons and refugees, and the education of prisoners, their children and their dependents. The Fund had humanitarian purposes and did not constitute anything important in the battle against Apartheid.

The year 1966 was characterized by the beginning of an international campaign against South Africa to convince world public opinion of the evils of Apartheid. Regional seminars at different places were held under UN auspices. Also in 1966, the twenty first session of the General Assembly proclaimed in resolution 2142(XXI) of 26 October 1966 the 21st of March — the day when the Sharpeville massacre took place — as an International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The main resolution on Apartheid in 1966 was resolution 2202A(XXI) of 16 December 1966. In this resolution, for the first, the Assembly (operative paragraph 3) deplored :

“the attitude of the main trading partners of South Africa, including three permanent members of the Security Council,¹⁸⁴ which by their failure to cooperate in implementing resolutions of the General Assembly, by their refusal to join the Special Committee on the policies of Apartheid of the government of the Republic of South Africa and by their increasing collaboration with the government of South Africa have encouraged the latter to persist in its racial policies”.

Again in operative paragraph 4, the Assembly drew the attention:

“of the main trading partners of South Africa to the fact that their increasing collaboration with the government of South Africa despite repeated appeals by the General Assembly has aggravated the danger of a violent conflict and requests them to take urgent steps towards disengagement from South Africa and to facilitate effective action, under the auspices of the UN, to secure the elimination of Apartheid.”

In operative paragraph 7, the Assembly once more drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the situation in South Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security and that universally applied mandatory economic sanctions under Chapter VII were the only means of achieving a peaceful solution.

Thirteen states abstained from voting on this resolution, all from Western Europe, North America and the “white” Commonwealth; except for Malawi (Africa) and Japan (Asia.)

(183) UN Document A/AC 115/SR 72, 6 May, 1966.

(184) The three permanent members meant are the United States, the United Kingdom and France.

The Special Committee on Apartheid established in 1962 continued its work in 1967. Noteworthy in this respect is that the beginning of serious armed struggle in South Africa prompted the committee in its report to urge "the international community to affirm the right of the South African people to resort to all forms of struggle".¹⁸⁵ Noteworthy also is that the unit on Apartheid established in January 1967 by the U.N. Secretariat (pursuant to resolution 2144A(XXI), prepared in 1967 a publication entitled *Foreign Investment in the Republic of South Africa*. Thus in 1967 there was a developing trend to endorse the armed struggle of the non-white population in South Africa, while the trend of unmasking South Africa's real supporters was growing.

The 22nd session of the Assembly confirmed the growth of those trends mentioned above. Thus, in resolution 2307(XXII) of 13 December 1967 the Assembly in operative paragraph 2 reaffirmed "its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the people of South Africa for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all the people of South Africa irrespective of race, colour or creed", while in paragraph 8 it appealed "to all states and organizations to provide appropriate moral, political and material assistance to the people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle for the rights recognized in the Charter". Also in this resolution, the Assembly, instead of deploring the attitudes of the main trading partners of South Africa — as it did in resolution 2202(XXI) — condemned "the actions of those states, particularly the main trading partners of South Africa and the activities of those foreign financial and other interests, all of which, through their political, economic and military collaboration with the government of South Africa... are encouraging that government to persist in its racial policies."

The year 1968 was proclaimed Human Rights year. During that year many questions of human rights were high-lighted and given great publicity. For South Africa, the year was important for the solemn observance in most member countries of the 21st of March as the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. It was also marked by the convening in Tehran between 22 April and 13 May 1968 of the International Human Rights Conference. The Conference was more outspoken in its condemnation of Apartheid and its support of the legitimate struggle waged against it in South Africa. It declared that it strongly recognized and vigorously supported the legitimate struggle of the inhabitants and the national liberation movements in Southern Africa to secure their enjoyment of their inalienable rights to equality, freedom and independence.

This new vehemency was reflected in the General Assembly as well. In its main resolution on the policies of Apartheid, the 23rd session of the General

(185) U. N. *Monthly Chronicle* Vol. 4, No. 9. (October, 1967) p. 15.

Assembly in resolution 2396(XXIII) dealt with new issues such as the wider reaches and implications of the actions of South Africa in respect of the exercise of the right of self-determination in Southern Africa, the South African liberation movement, and the flow of immigrants to South Africa. Thus, in the fifth preambular paragraph of the above-mentioned resolution the Assembly recognized that "the policies and actions of the government of South Africa constitute a serious obstacle to the exercise of the right of self-determination by the oppressed people of Southern Africa." The resolution in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 elaborated on this point more clearly thus condemning in paragraph 2 "the government of South Africa for its illegal occupation of Namibia and its military intervention and its assistance to the racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia..." while in paragraph 3 it asserted that the whole white supremacist regime in South Africa should be changed when it reaffirmed "the urgent necessity of eliminating the policies of Apartheid so that the people of South Africa, as a whole, can exercise their *right to self-determination and attain majority rule based on universal suffrage*" (emphasis supplied).

The other point in this resolution is its concern with the South African liberation movement. Thus in operative paragraph 7 the Assembly called upon "all states and organizations to provide greater moral, political and material assistance to the *South African Liberation Movement in its legitimate struggle*" (emphasis supplied). In paragraph 8 it expressed its grave concern... in respect of the "treatment of freedom fighters who were taken prisoners during their legitimate struggle for liberation" and declared in sub-paragraph (8C) "that such freedom fighters should be treated as *prisoners of war* under international law..." (emphasis supplied).

Another feature of the resolution which points more directly than ever before to the phenomenon of white settlement in Africa is contained in paragraph 11 of the same resolution where the Assembly requests "all states to discourage the flow of immigrants, particularly skilled and technical personnel, to South Africa". Needless to say, this paragraph represents an effort to delve deep into the roots of the problem, as it clearly implies that the situation in South Africa is a direct result of immigration of whites (who are skilled and technical) and their settlement in that territory.

The resolution re-iterated, with stronger wording, the General Assembly's previous condemnation of South Africa's principal trade partners and again drew the attention of the Security Council to the grave situation in South Africa, requesting it to adopt under Chapter VII "effective measures to ensure the full implementation of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against South Africa."

It is noteworthy, in the UN activities regarding Apartheid in 1969, that the Special Committee on the policies of Apartheid launched an appeal on the occasion of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in which it urged all states to apply measures to discourage immigration to South Africa, requested international recognition of the liberation movements in South

Africa and appealed to all states to provide aid to those movements that struggle against Apartheid.¹⁸⁶ The Special Committee, in another meeting held in May, 1969, concerned itself with the South African military build-up. In this respect, views were expressed regarding the possibility of South Africa forming a military alliance with some Latin-American countries, Madagascar, New Zealand and Australia in a form of Indian Ocean-South Atlantic Treaty Organization. Such an organization was described by the South African Prime Minister, on 23 April 1969, as aiming at filling the "Indian Ocean Power Vacuum" which would result from the withdrawal from the area of the British Navy.¹⁸⁷ The committee also concerned itself with the increasing numbers of airlines flying to South Africa, among which were a number of West European airline companies, along with the United States, Israel, and others. On 6 June 1969, the Special Committee finally decided to undertake a widerange study on the question of foreign economic interests in South Africa and on South Africa's commerce and its investments abroad. It was clear to the committee that such a study would be useful in considering the effectiveness of sanctions and clarifying the imperialist economic influences in South Africa.¹⁸⁸

Other than the Security Council and the General Assembly, the problem of South Africa has also been considered by the Commission on Human Rights which established in February 1967 an *ad hoc* Working Group of Experts composed of eminent jurists and prison officials to investigate the charges of torture and ill-treatment of prisoners, detainees or persons in police custody in South Africa; to receive communications and hear witnesses and use such methods of procedure as it may deem appropriate; and to recommend action to be taken in concrete cases. The Group was, and still is, chaired by Ibrahima Boye of Senegal. This Group of Experts investigated charges brought before it by the WFTU in two sessions held in September 1967 and January-February 1968. Its report submitted in February 1968 criticized the South African legislation relating to labour problems. It especially recommended that African Trade Union Organizations which in fact exist must be granted legal recognition. Subsequently, the Economic and Social Council in its resolution 1302(XLIV) substantially adopted most of the recommendations of the Group of Experts. The Group however is still active in investigating other charges against the South African authorities.

Many agencies of the UN family have been concerned with the South African racial policies, especially the I.L.O. and UNESCO. It is however beyond the scope of this essay to go into the details of their activities in this respect.

The UN activities in South Africa have increasingly enlarged their scope. At the beginning, the UN was concerned only with the legal position of people of Indian origin in the Union of South Africa. Then, the whole problem of South

(186) *Ibid.*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (March 1969), p. 7.

(187) *Ibid.*, Vol. 6, No. 6, (June 1969), pp. 21-22.

(188) *Ibid.*, Vol. 6, No. 7, (July 1969), p. 67.

Africa's racial policies was subjected to discussion, then to criticism, then to condemnation. Apartheid is referred to now as a crime against humanity. This development in the attitude of the UN reflects two things : greater international awareness of the evils of racism; and the changing composition of the UN, especially the General Assembly. It should be noted that while the UN vehemence against Apartheid is growing, yet its effective action to put an end to Apartheid has not been remarkable. This meagre actual achievement is the result of the Western powers' reluctance to adopt effective measures against South Africa. The UN is now keenly aware not only of this reluctance, but indeed of the active encouragement the racists of South Africa receive from those Western powers. Thus, we find in the General Assembly's approach to the problem of South Africa two new trends which have been developed in the last few years and which aim at : 1 — exposing the Western powers' interests in maintaining and strengthening Apartheid, by studying those powers' financial involvements in South Africa; 2 — strengthening the activities of the liberation organizations by endorsing their struggle — including armed struggle — and recognizing its legitimacy. Those two trends are most helpful in clarifying the realities of the situation and in advancing methods to put an end to it. Also, the UN's concern with putting an end to the flow of immigrants to South Africa represents an increasing awareness of the real dimensions of the situation : the density of white population on the territory of South Africa is a potential evil which should be checked.

It is true that the UN activities have not been very successful in effectively resolving the situation in South Africa. Even experience with mandatory sanctions, should such an approach be adopted in the future, is not reassuring. Yet international indignation at what is taking place in South Africa as a result of white settlement there is such that the continuation of this situation is unthinkable.

* * *

The case of Southern Rhodesia was not considered by the UN until the sixties. But before that, and indeed from the beginning of the 20th century, there were varied international criticisms of white supremacy there. Those who concerned themselves with the situation in South Africa also generally concerned themselves with the situation in Central Africa. The Bandung Conference in 1955 reflected the growing Afro-Asian awareness of the seriousness of the situation developing in Central Africa, and the Afro-Asian peoples' solidarity movement carried this awareness even further. However, as the Southern Rhodesian problem is the first problem for which the UN imposed sanctions under Chapter VII, it is perhaps more to the point to concentrate on the UN activities relative to Southern Rhodesia as a crowning symbol of the growing world role in opposing the claims of the white settlers there.

On December 14, 1960, the General Assembly adopted a historic resolution

of far-reaching consequences. This resolution No. 1514(XV) is famous by virtue of its expressive name : Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. Many of the Western Powers, led by the U.S., abstained from voting on this resolution. But this abstention, which reflects opposition, did not deter the General Assembly — with its recently strengthened anti-colonial majority — from carrying on in this way. Nearly a year after the adoption of the Declaration, the General Assembly considered the situation with regard to its implementation. As it noted that there had not been much advancement in this respect, it adopted on 27 November 1961 resolution 1654 (XVI) establishing a special committee of 17 (later on 17 December 1962 membership was increased to 24) to study the application of the Declaration and to make suggestions and recommendations on the progress and extent of its application. The committee was authorized to meet outside the UN headquarters whenever and wherever such meetings might be required for the effective discharge of its functions.

But even before the committee was able to meet, the Fourth (Trusteeship and Non-Self-Governing Territories) Committee, during the 16th General Assembly Session, transmitted to the Special Committee a draft resolution inquiring whether Southern Rhodesia was to be considered a non-self-governing territory.

The Special Committee, which met for the first time in February 1962, agreed to give priority to territories situated in Africa, and in this regard, accorded the Southern Rhodesian problem the first priority. During the discussion on Southern Rhodesia, which took place between March 7 and 29, 1962, it heard evidence presented by African nationalists and white settlers. It subsequently decided that Southern Rhodesia has not attained a full-measure of self-government, thus it was a non-self-governing territory within the meaning of Chapter XI of the Charter, and the United Kingdom had the obligation of reporting on its situation. The committee also decided that the 1961 constitution was unacceptable to the indigenous population. It also further decided to establish a sub-committee on Southern Rhodesia to follow up on this subject, especially by contacting the United Kingdom.

The General Assembly agreed with the findings of the special committee, that Southern Rhodesia was a non-self-governing territory, in resolution 1747 (XVI) of 28 June 1962 and the United Kingdom was accordingly requested to submit information on its political advancement pursuant to Article 73 (e) of the Charter. The United Kingdom objected maintaining that Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing territory which had its own proper government.

Between 1962 and 1965, several General Assembly resolutions were adopted in regard to Southern Rhodesia. The constant themes of those resolutions were that the 1961 constitution should be replaced by another constitution acceptable to African nationalists based on the principle of one-man one-vote, that political freedom should be granted to African political movements and parties, and that amnesty should be granted to political prisoners. Besides, matters of detail, arising from certain political circumstances, were discussed and certain limited

measures of action were prescribed.

During that period, however, the Security Council also concerned itself with Southern Rhodesia. In August 1963, four African states (Ghana, Guinea, Morocco and the United Arab Republic) requested that the Security Council consider the problem. The Council met in September 1963, and before it was an African draft resolution which, among other things, called on the United Kingdom not to transfer to its colony of Southern Rhodesia as at present governed any powers or attributes of sovereignty until the establishment of a government fully representative of all the inhabitants of the colony. The Council, according to the draft resolution, would recognize that the present government in Southern Rhodesia came to power as the result of an undemocratic and discriminatory constitution imposed on the population of Southern Rhodesia and opposed by the overwhelming majority of its population. This draft resolution was not adopted though it received 8 affirmative votes. It was vetoed by the United Kingdom, a permanent member of the Council, while France and the United States abstained. The United Kingdom maintained that Southern Rhodesia was a self-governing territory, that the situation there did not constitute a threat to peace, and that subsequently, the Security Council had no right to interfere. Needless to say, this result was disappointing to Africans and to the anti-colonialist powers. For those, the General Assembly provided a better and more sympathetic forum. Southern Rhodesia, subsequently, was not considered by the Security Council till May 1965.

The year 1965 was a year of consequence to Southern Rhodesia. It witnessed three events, each one leading to the next. Ian Smith dissolved the Legislative Assembly on 30 March in order to strengthen his hold on the Legislative Assembly and pursue his independence policy. The election of May 1965 brought a sweeping success to Ian Smith and his Rhodesian Front Party, thus making a unilateral declaration of Independence more imminent than ever. Finally, the third event was UDI itself which was proclaimed on 11 November 1965. How did the UN react to those three events ?

The Special Committee (the committee of 24) met in April 1965, following the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly, and called upon the United Kingdom to take urgent and immediate measures to cancel the proposed elections as it was obvious that the results would be used as a pretext for unilateral action. The committee also, for the first time, recommended the use of sanctions and requested all states to abstain from providing arms and ammunition, economic and financial aid to the Southern Rhodesian regime. It also reaffirmed themes elaborated previously in several General Assembly resolutions. In May 1965, the committee held a session in Lusaka (Zambia) so that it could be closer to Southern Rhodesia. There it heard evidence from African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia, and its presence made quite an impression on the African scene.

The Security Council concerned itself again with the Southern Rhodesian problem. On 30 April 1965, it considered a request by all African states (35) members of the UN, dated 21 April 1965. The African request stated that the

possibility of a unilateral declaration of independence in Southern Rhodesia "was creating a threat to international peace and security". As a result of the Security Council deliberation, a resolution — 202(1965) — was adopted by seven affirmative votes to four abstentions — all the permanent members of the Council except China, though of course the reasons for the Soviet abstention were different from the reasons of the other three abstentions. This resolution, on which the Soviets did not vote because it was very moderate, requested the United Kingdom "to take all necessary action to prevent a unilateral declaration of independence"¹⁸⁹ and asked that the United Kingdom and all other UN members should not recognize such a declaration. The resolution reiterated old themes that a constitutional conference representing all the population should be convened, that the United Kingdom should not transfer any attributes of sovereignty to the racist regime and so forth. A Soviet amendment which would have the Council call on the United Kingdom to cancel the May elections and to grant immediate independence to Southern Rhodesia by a democratic system of government was rejected.¹⁹⁰ The United Kingdom's attitude was the same as before: it did not regard the Security Council as competent to deal with the problem !

The United Kingdom, on the other hand, had no objection to discussing the problem within the framework of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting which was held in June 1965. The meeting called on the United Kingdom to convene a representative constitutional conference within some three months, in order to establish the "earliest practicable date" for independence based on majority rule. It was further requested, that, if the racist government in Southern Rhodesia did not attend such a conference, the 1961 constitution should be suspended and an interim government appointed by the United Kingdom which should repeal discriminatory laws and call free elections.

No representative constitutional conference was held during the next three months — or after that period. There were some tense negotiations between Smith and Wilson, but no agreement was reached. It was quite obvious that Ian Smith was heading for a unilateral declaration of independence and that the British government was not keen on taking effective measures to make this impossible.

Meanwhile, the General Assembly started its 20th session in September 1965. The situation in Southern Rhodesia was becoming increasingly tense. Three General Assembly resolutions on Southern Rhodesia were adopted within the one month from 12 October to 11 November 1965. The first, resolution 2012(XX), adopted on October 12, in its 4th operative paragraph called "upon the United Kingdom to take all possible measures to prevent a UDI and in the event of such a declaration to take all steps necessary to put an immediate end to the rebellion with a view to transferring power to a representative government in keeping with

(189) UN *Monthly Chronicle*, June 1965, p. 20.

(190) See : *Objective : Justice*, *op. cit.*, p. 36.

the aspirations of the majority of the people.”¹⁹¹

The second resolution, 2022(XX) was adopted on November 5, only a few days before UDI was proclaimed. Its language was stronger than the previous resolution. In operative paragraphs 7 and 8 it reiterated African demands for the granting of political freedoms for African nationalists, and the calling of a constitutional conference after the suspension of the 1961 constitution. In paragraph 11, it called upon the government of the United Kingdom “to employ all necessary measures, *including military force*, to implement paragraphs 7 and 8 above”¹⁹² [emphasis supplied]. Hence, the United Kingdom was called upon to use force in order to quell the impending rebellion. This did not frighten Ian Smith who was sure that Britain would certainly not employ military force to bring his racist regime down. He went ahead and proclaimed Southern Rhodesia’s unilateral declaration of independence on 11 November 1965. The General Assembly was thus compelled to adopt still another resolution, No. 2024 (XX) on 11 November 1965, the same day on which UDI was proclaimed. In it, the Assembly condemned the unilateral Declaration of Independence made by the racist minority in Salisbury, invited the United Kingdom to implement immediately the relevant resolutions “in order to put an end to the rebellion”, and recommended the Security Council to consider the situation as a matter of urgency.

The General Assembly thus reacted vigorously to the policy pursued by Smith from early 1965 with the obvious aim of declaring independence. True, the Assembly resolutions were quite ineffective in halting Smith’s determination to pursue his policy. It could even be said that the Assembly resolutions were not a factor for Smith to consider in carrying out his policy. Yet the General Assembly resolutions reflect, quite obviously, the strong international disapproval with which the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia were faced.

The Security Council took up the issue on 12 November 1965. The United Kingdom voiced no objection to the Security Council’s competence this time. The United Kingdom was now all too ready to recognize that the issue was of international concern. On the same day on which the Council started its series of meetings, a resolution, 216(1965), was adopted which condemned UDI and called upon all states “not to recognize this illegal racist regime in Southern Rhodesia”.¹⁹³ Another resolution was passed on 19 November 1965, in the same series of Security Council meetings. This resolution, 217(1965), determined that the situation obtaining in Southern Rhodesia was “extremely grave”, that the government of the United Kingdom should put an end to it, and that for it to continue constituted a “threat to international peace and security”. The

(191) *Ibid.*, November 1965, p. 16.

(192) *Ibid.*, December 1965, pp. 12-13.

(193) *Ibid.*, December 1965, p. 25.

resolution called on the United Kingdom "to quell this rebellion". It also called on all states "to desist from providing (the illegal regime) with arms and military equipment, and to do their utmost in order to break all economic relations with Southern Rhodesia including an embargo on oil and petroleum products." The resolution was adopted unanimously, while France abstained. Thus, selective economic sanctions were imposed for the first time in the history of the United Nations. These sanctions however were made under Chapter VI, rather than under the more rigid system of sanctions embodied in Chapter VII of the Charter.

The oil and petroleum products embargo did not work. South Africa came to the help of Southern Rhodesia by transporting oil by road tankers and by rail in quantities which were more than enough for the needs of Southern Rhodesia. Also, Portugal did not accede to the Security Council resolution. Instead, it maintained that its transit facilities from Mozambique to Southern Rhodesia, which is land-locked, would not be closed. Thus, supplies of oil could still be piped through Beira (in Mozambique) by the Beira-Umtali pipeline. Thus, it was quite clear that the embargo was not hurting the Smith regime at all.

The oil embargo proved especially ineffective when two oil tankers destined for Southern Rhodesia appeared near the port of Beira in April 1966. The committee of 24 responded vigorously to this infringement on the embargo by calling on the Secretary General to request the necessary Security Council action "for firm mandatory sanctions" under Chapter VII. The United Kingdom, on the other hand, requested the Security Council to meet in order to consider the situation. The Council met and adopted on 9 April 1966 resolution 221(1966), in which Portugal was called on not to receive oil at Beira destined for Southern Rhodesia or use the Beira-Umtali pipeline to supply oil to Southern Rhodesia. The resolution also called upon the United Kingdom "to prevent, by the use of force if necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil destined for Southern Rhodesia." This resolution, which was supported by the United Kingdom and its Western allies, failed to meet African demands for the necessity of imposing mandatory sanctions under Chapter VII. Thus, on 10 May, 1966, 32 African states requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider more effective measures to deal with the racist regime.

When the Council met in May 1966, it had before it a draft resolution submitted by the then African members of the Council, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda. This draft resolution called on the United Kingdom to use all measures, including force, to abolish the racist minority regime. It also called upon all states, especially Portugal and South Africa, to apply measures contemplating total rupture of economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, and invited the United Kingdom to use the methods provided for in Chapter VII to effect a complete embargo of oil to Southern Rhodesia. The draft failed to be adopted. It

mustered only six affirmative votes out of 15 (after the membership of the Council had been enlarged), while one voted against and 8 abstained (including all permanent members of the Security Council, except the Soviet Union which voted in favour).

The frustration of African states, during the May 1966 meeting of the Security Council, prompted them to direct their attention to the study of the real causes behind the Western camp's tacit support for the Smith regime. Thus, in 1966, the committee of 24 grew convinced that "economic pressures on the British government constituted an important influence on its policy."¹⁹⁴ Hence the Secretary General was asked to prepare a study on:

"the implications of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in Southern Rhodesia and their mode of operation in order to assess their economic and political influence".

A report on these activities was subsequently published on 7 October 1966.¹⁹⁵

In the same year 1966, the General Assembly adopted two resolutions on Southern Rhodesia. The first, 2138(XXI) of 22 October 1966, was intended to forestall any possible agreement between the British government and the Smith regime, in the nature of a "sell-out". The resolution introduced no new principles. It reiterated previous themes, but condemned any agreement which could be reached between the administering power (Britain) and the illegal racist regime that did not recognize the inalienable right of the people of Zimbabwe to self-determination and independence. The second resolution, 2151(XXI) of 17 November 1966, went two steps further. In it the Assembly condemned the foreign financial interests in Southern Rhodesia, it also called upon the United Kingdom to put an end to the regime by the use of all necessary measures "including in particular the use of force". Thus it was becoming clear to Africans and their allies in the anti-colonial majority of the Assembly, that interests of an economic nature were responsible for the maintenance of the Smith regime, and that the United Kingdom should use force on behalf of the international community represented by the U.N.

But Britain did not take any notice of the demands made on it by the UN. Instead, in early December 1966, the British Prime Minister, Mr. Wilson, met Ian Smith aboard *HMS Tiger* off Gibraltar. The discussions aboard *Tiger* did not come to any meaningful conclusion, as Smith was adamant on going his own way. Upon the failure of the *Tiger* discussions, the United Kingdom, on 8 December 1966, requested the Security Council to meet again in order to invoke

(194) See : J. Leo Cefkin, "The Rhodesian Question at the UN", *International Organization*, Vol. 22(3), Summer 1968, p. 655.

(195) See : UN Document A/6300/Add. 1, (Part II).

Chapter VII and impose sanctions on Southern Rhodesia's most important products.

Thus, for the third time in 1966, the Security Council met to consider the situation. The Council determined in its resolution No. 232(1966) of 16 December that "the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security." It was the first time the Council had made such a clear decision. Then the Security Council proceeded to act on the basis of Chapter VII; it decided, invoking articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, "that all member states of the UN" should prevent the import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products, hides and skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia. The resolution also imposed a complete arms and oil embargo. The legitimacy of the struggle of the people of Southern Rhodesia was also recognized. The resolution thus enlarged the scope of the selective mandatory sanctions, but it fell short of a system of comprehensive sanctions such as that desired by the anti-colonial powers. The Soviet Union and two African states who were members of the Council thus abstained from voting on it.

A few months after the selective mandatory sanctions were adopted, it became clear that they were not effective enough. It also became clear that they could hurt other African countries as well, especially Zambia. On the other hand, the United Kingdom resumed, in the meantime, its contacts with the Smith regime. These developments prompted the committee of 24, in August 1967, to express its conviction that sanctions "must be comprehensive and mandatory and backed by force." It also considered that any further consultation to determine Southern Rhodesia's future must be carried out between the United Kingdom and the African political parties, not by negotiations with the racist regime.¹⁹⁶

As expected, the views of the committee of 24 were reflected in the General Assembly during its 22nd session. In its resolution 2262(XXII) of 3 November 1967, the General Assembly condemned the United Kingdom for failing to take the measures necessary to bring down the present Southern Rhodesian regime. It called on the United Kingdom government "to take immediately all the necessary measures including the use of force" to bring about such a change. The Assembly stated that any effective UN sanctions would have to be "backed by force" and urged all states "as a matter of urgency to render all moral and material assistance to the national liberation movement of Zimbabwe".¹⁹⁷ Those who abstained from voting on this resolution were all the countries of North America, Western Europe and Scandinavia, except Spain (which voted for) and Portugal (which voted against). In addition Japan, Australia and New Zealand also abstained. The three African states of Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho did

(196) UN Document A/AC. 109/SR. 523, 10 August 1967.

(197) See : *International Conciliation*, "Issues before the 23rd General Assembly", September 1968, p. 71.

not participate in the vote.

1968 was a crucial year for both Southern Rhodesia and the United Nations. On 29 May 1968 the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 253(1968) in which a system of comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions against Southern Rhodesia was adopted. Resolution 253(1968) was not easily adopted. The Council meetings that culminated in its adoption started on 19 March and were adjourned for further consultation on 26 March. Then again, the Council met on 18 April, to adjourn for consultation on 23 April. Finally, on 29 May, a draft resolution produced after extensive consultation was adopted unanimously after the failure of a Soviet amendment (supported by the anti-colonial forces) to make the resolution stronger. Comprehensive mandatory economic sanctions were set out in 23 detailed paragraphs, and the resolution established a committee of Security Council members for the purpose of following up the implementation of the sanctions. In addition, the resolution asked all states to take measures designed to put an end to immigration to Southern Rhodesia, and reiterated all previous UN demands: calling on the United Kingdom to take all effective measures to end the rebellion, support for the movements struggling against the Smith regime, censuring those states that persisted in trading with the illegal regime and so forth.

In the subsequent months, the overwhelming majority of member-states replied favourably to the Secretary General's request for information concerning measures adopted to carry out the Security Council resolution. Portugal's reply however was evasive as it raised questions concerning the legality of the UN action. South Africa did not reply at all and its Prime Minister Vorster was reported to have said that neither pressure nor force would compel South Africa to take part in boycotts or sanctions. South Africa's government was determined to carry on its policy of normal trade with Southern Rhodesia even if this meant taking risks.¹⁹⁸

The United Kingdom government had no intention of going it all the way against the Smith regime. Only a few months after the adoption by the Security Council of resolution 253(1968), the Wilson government started flirting again with the Smith regime. Such flirtations reached their climax in mid-October 1968 with the discussions between Wilson and Smith aboard the *Fearless* where Wilson offered the rebel regime still further concessions.¹⁹⁹ The *Fearless* encounter, though it failed, prompted a strong reaction in the 23rd General Assembly session, which on 25 October 1968, adopted resolution 2379(XXIII) which, in order to forestall any British concession to Smith, called upon the United Kingdom "not to grant independence to Southern Rhodesia unless it is preceded by the establishment of a government based on free elections by

(198) See : UN Document A/AC. 109/L. 393, 7 April 1967.

(199) See : ZAPU Publication : *Les Propositions Britanniques Pour La Rhodesia A Bord Du Fearless*, (Lusaka, January 5, 1969).

universal adult suffrage and on majority rule.”

Meanwhile, the Security Council Committee, charged to follow up the imposition of sanctions, was established from seven Security Council members on 29 July 1968. It started its work on 28 October 1968. The committee has continued to meet since then; it has studied reports submitted to it by the Secretary General on the application of sanctions, but it has not been effective in this due to its composition, since its membership included the United States and the United Kingdom.

The 23rd session of the General Assembly dealt fully with the Southern Rhodesia problem in its resolution 2383(XXIII), which was adopted by a roll-call vote of 86-9-19, on 7 November 1968. This resolution noted in its preamble that “sanctions applied by the Security Council have not so far produced the desired results.” The operative paragraphs of the resolution reiterated previous demands in stronger language and made new ones. On the use of force, for instance, it affirmed its “conviction that the only effective way of quelling the rebellion ... is through the use of force by the administering power” (paragraph 2), condemned “the failure or refusal” of the United Kingdom “to bring down the illegal racist minority regime...” (paragraph 3) and called upon the United Kingdom “to use force to put an immediate end to the illegal regime...” (paragraph 5). On the matter of sanctions, it affirmed its conviction that they should be more comprehensive and “strictly supervised by force and complied with, in particular, by South Africa and Portugal” (paragraph 4), and it drew the attention of the Security Council to the urgent necessity of adopting new measures under Chapter VII, in order to widen the scope of the sanctions “to include all the measures laid down in Article 41 of the Charter”, and in order that sanctions “be imposed on South Africa and Portugal”... (paragraph 9). The resolution called upon “all states to bring to an end the activities of financial, economic and other interests operated by their nationals in Southern Rhodesia” (paragraph 8), condemned the policies of South Africa and Portugal in regard to sanctions (paragraph 7) and condemned also the illegal intervention of the South African forces in Southern Rhodesia.

Those who voted against the resolution were five countries in Western Europe, together with Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and the United States. Among those states that abstained only two were Afro-Asians, Japan and Malawi.

Two developments dominated the UN activities concerning Southern Rhodesia in 1969. The first was the attempt of the Smith regime to adopt a new constitution further legalizing the Rhodesian Republic. The second was the increasing indications that sanctions were not as effective as had been expected, and that they should be deepened (to be fully comprehensive), widened (to include South Africa and Portugal), and strictly enforced.

The first development was dealt with by the committee of 24, which unanimously adopted on 26 March 1969 a resolution in which it expressed “its

concern at the steps being taken by the illegal regime to entrench, under the guise of a so-called new constitution, its policies of separate racial development, in Southern Rhodesia, to the detriment of the legitimate rights of the African population."²⁰⁰ It also called upon the administering power to prevent the introduction of the so-called new constitution in the territory.

All aspects of the Southern Rhodesian problem were, however, dealt with during the meetings of the Committee of 24 held in Africa in May 1969. In its meeting at Lusaka (Zambia) between 9 and 16 May 1969, the Committee, from which the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom absented themselves, heard strong statements from the majority of its members as well as from petitioners from ZAPU and ZANU. In those statements, the United States, the United Kingdom and West Germany were frequently attacked on account of their failure to stand clearly against the Smith regime. The representative of ZAPU, George Silundika, charged that British leaders in the House of Commons were themselves "breakers of sanctions" through the companies in Rhodesia in which they were shareholders. In this connection he named such prominent British politicians and diplomats as Reginald Maulding, Quintin Hogg and Lord Caradon.²⁰¹ Mr. Silundika called for an end to the demand that the United Kingdom use force to topple the Smith regime in Rhodesia, since the British Government would never use force against its own agency. The real enemy in Rhodesia was the United Kingdom, and it should be placed in the same dock as the Boers of South Africa and the Portuguese in Angola, Mozambique and Guinea (Bissau). ZANU representative Tasigana Mutizwa outlined the foreign economic interests in Southern Rhodesia and explained the role of NATO in fostering the Salisbury-Pretoria-Lisbon alliance. The observer from Zambia made a statement during the meeting, in which he outlined the dangers facing his country from the increasing military build-up in the south.

The Committee of 24 adopted a comprehensive resolution regarding Rhodesia on 10 June 1969, and at the same time communicated this resolution to the Security Council. The committee's resolution was strongly worded. It noted with concern the failure of sanctions adopted (paragraph 3); it condemned the United Kingdom for its unwillingness to take effective measures against the illegal regime (paragraph 4); it condemned "the policies of South Africa and Portugal and *other governments* that continue to entertain political, economic and financial relations with Southern Rhodesia," (emphasis supplied), and condemned also the activities of foreign interests, economic and otherwise, that permit the illegal regime to flout the sanctions imposed on it (paragraphs 6 and 7). The resolution also called the attention of the Security Council to the

(200) UN *Monthly Chronicle*, Vol. VI, No. 4, (April 1969), p. 51.

(201) *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, No. 6, (June 1969), p. 12.

necessity of deepening, widening and strictly enforcing the sanctions.²⁰²

The Security Council met on 13 June 1969. Other than the documents of the Committee of 24, it had previously received a letter dated 6 June 1969 addressed to the president of the Council by representatives of 60 states, requesting the urgent meeting of the Council to discuss the failure of sanctions and the deteriorating situation in Southern Rhodesia. The Security Council also had before it detailed reports specifying the states that maintain consular and commercial representation in Southern Rhodesia and the airlines servicing the territory, and a note on immigration to Southern Rhodesia.

This series of Council meetings was long and heated, and the draft resolution introduced by the Afro-Asians failed to be adopted. The anti-colonial forces in the Security Council were vehement in their attacks on the international imperialist interests at work in Southern Rhodesia and were furious at the evasive attitude of the United Kingdom in particular and of its allies in the Western camp. The draft resolution that failed to be adopted would have had the Council decide that all states should immediately sever all political and other relations with the Smith regime, condemn Portugal and South Africa for their attitudes to sanctions and extend the sanctions to them as well, and call upon the United Kingdom to immediately apply all effective measures including the use of force to end the illegal regime.

The Council's deliberations, as mentioned above, were long and heated. At different stages, the Western camp's economic, financial and strategic interests in maintaining the Smith regime, and fostering the colonial alliance in Southern Africa, were brought up in detail, and underscored by the anti-colonial forces. Data from Western sources showing how the sanctions were being flouted by Western companies were revealed. Also, the dangerous effects of the colonial-imperialist alliance in Southern Africa on the sovereignty and integrity of Zambia were brought to the fore.²⁰³

During the debate, Western powers indulged in the same pious talk that characterized their attitudes toward the problem. There were speeches that sanctions would work in the long run, that the use of force was unthinkable and so forth. When the draft resolution was put to a vote on 24 June, 1969, it received 8 affirmative votes (comprising the Afro-Asian and socialist states) and 7 abstentions representing the Western camp and its allies. It failed as it did not get the two-thirds majority required.

This was the last time the Security Council considered the Southern Rhodesia situation. It was a sad reflection of the fact that the UN, and especially the Security Council, lacked sufficient energy to take the necessary measures with respect to the dangerous situation created by the illegal regime. But

(202) *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, No. 7, (July 1969), pp. 57-58.

(203) See a Summary of the Security Council deliberations in *Ibid.*, pp. 11.39.

international support for the cause of the natives of Zimbabwe and against the settler regime is still growing and it is expected that the world's role in this struggle will continue to grow and become more effective. Especially important in this respect is the increasing militancy and aggressiveness of the colonial bloc in Southern Africa and the increasing infringement of this bloc on the security and sovereignty of neighbouring states, Zambia in particular. It is conspicuous in this respect that Portugal had been recently "censured strongly" by the Security Council on 28 July 1969 for its attack on Zambian territory. It is also conspicuous that this resolution — 268(1969) — was adopted by an affirmative vote of 11, with 4 abstentions all from the Western camp including three permanent members of the Security Council (France, the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain).

As the situation in Southern Africa moves in the direction of wider espousal by nationalist groups of armed struggle, as the colonial bloc there feels increasingly threatened by the activities of the armed resistance movements, a policy of colonial reprisals against Zambia and other independent African states adjacent to Southern Africa will become increasingly obvious. A situation similar to what is taking place between Israel and the Arabs is well under way.

* * *

Zionist settlers in Palestine, even more than the white settlers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, have enjoyed a great deal of sympathy in the West during the 19th and 20th centuries. The atmosphere of imperialism not only gave birth to the phenomenon of Zionism, organized in the manner of a chartered company for settlement purposes, but also reached its apex with Zionism. Zionism was the culminating point of imperialism, where there was apparent not only the eagerness to occupy other people's land, but also the international, that is West European-American, character of the enterprise. Zionism was a concerted attack by Western Europe and North America on one of the Afro-Asian peoples. Thus we find behind Zionism far more "European-American" sympathy than we find behind white settlements in Africa. In Zionism, the attempts at white settlement in a non-European land were elevated to the status of a doctrine, of an ideology. Boers had to live some one hundred years in Africa in order to start developing their Afrikaaner ideology, justifying their settlement and ascribing to themselves a "mission". Zionism, on the other hand, had been completely developed in Europe, as a culminating point of the imperialist mode of thinking, and thus it had inherited all the sympathies that were engendered by imperialism. In this way international opposition to Zionist settlers came mostly from Asia and Africa; now, with the changing concepts of the contemporary world, opposition to Zionist settlers is beginning to grow in Europe and the United States as well.

Since Zionism was the creation of concerted imperialist action, and since imperialist powers were the leading powers in the League of Nations and were the most influential in the UN in its first decade, it was impossible for those international organizations to understand the natives' viewpoint correctly and sympathize with it. As a matter of fact, Israel was legitimized by concerted imperialist action through the League of Nations first and then through the UN. And now, although the UN is at present more representative than it was before, of the aspirations of the world as a whole — except for China — the fact that the UN itself, when it was dominated by the West in the first decade of its existence, authorized the creation of Israel, still hinders a just consideration by the UN of the Palestine problem. Several other factors have also contributed to the conclusion mentioned above. Paramount among those factors is that the problem of Palestine was pictured by Zionism, and by some Arabs also, as a struggle between the Arab states and Israel, while the conflict is really between the native Palestinians — supported by Arab states — and the Zionist settlers. With the growth of Palestinian armed resistance, this basic fact is being more widely understood. Also, another factor that confused the picture of the struggle between the natives and the settlers was the alleged relationship between Judaism and Zionism (by considering Zionism as an outgrowth of Judaism). This factor added to the simple native-settler conflict new dimensions based on religion, mystery and history. That Zionism was and is a secular imperialist movement which utilizes religion as a pretext, was a fact that was not conceded by many — and still continues to be denied by some. Yet, it will be seen that the simple nature of the conflict in Palestine, as a conflict between natives and foreign settlers, is becoming better understood internationally, especially by the anti-colonial forces all over the world.

Early international opposition to Zionist settlers and schemes in Palestine came from countries that were under colonial rule in Asia. India, in particular, with its long experience of British colonialism, was among the first to realize what was going on in Palestine. Indian leaders during the thirties, notwithstanding the fact that they were deeply immersed with their own problems with Britain, concerned themselves also with what was taking place in Palestine. Nehru, commenting on the Balfour Declaration some 16 years after it was issued noted that, "One not unimportant fact seems to have been overlooked. Palestine was not a wilderness, or an empty uninhabited place. It was already somebody else's home."²⁰⁴ A writer on Asian affairs commented that "almost all Westernized Asian intellectuals of the past half century subscribed to this view".²⁰⁵ Nehru expounded his views on Palestine as follows:

(204) Reported by a writer sympathetic to Zionism, Michael Brecker, in his book *The New States of Asia : A Political Analysis* (London, 1963), p. 127. The quotation is to be found originally in *Glimpses of World History*, (New York 1939), p. 763.

(205) Brecker, *Ibid.*, p. 127.

"The British policy has created a special minority problem there [in Palestine]: that of the Jews; and the Jews side with the British and oppose the freedom of Palestine as they fear that this would mean Arab rule... On the Arab side there are numbers, on the other side great financial resources and the world wide organization of Jewry."²⁰⁶

Nehru wrote again on the Palestine problem in 1938, as follows:

"We must remember that Palestine is essentially an Arab country and must remain so. And the Arabs must not be crushed and suppressed in their own homeland."²⁰⁷

On 26 November 1938 Gandhi, the great Indian Leader, notwithstanding great pressures put upon him to favour the idea of a Jewish state in Palestine, published an article in *Harijan* — an Indian newspaper — asserting that:

"Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the same sense that England belongs to the British and France to the French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose the Jews on the Arabs. What is going on in Palestine today cannot be justified by any moral code of conduct. The Mandates have no sanction but that of the last war. Surely it would be a crime against humanity to reduce the proud Arabs so that Palestine can be restored to the Jews partly or wholly as their national home."²⁰⁸

Apart from Asians, the early critics of Zionism, included the Marxist-Leninists, whose doctrinal attitude against imperialism prompted them to criticize Zionism. Lenin on several occasions denounced and proved the viciousness of the concept of Jewish nationalism. He criticized the Bund (the Jewish Workers' Union) and referred to the Bundists as propagators of bourgeois nationalism in the workers' ranks. Also, Abraham Leon, an ardent Marxist, in his detailed study of *The Materialist Concept of the Jewish Question*, reached the conclusion that "Zionism is the product of the imperialist era."²⁰⁹ But Marxists generally did not pay much attention to the "settlement" aspects of Zionism and did not concern themselves, till lately, with the harmful effects of settlements on the native population.

Hence, early criticism of Zionism came from the hard-core anti-colonialist circles, in Asia and in the socialist world. Later these criticisms gained wider support in Africa and Latin America and even in Europe and North America. But those criticisms were quite un influential in shaping policies.

Zionist "claims" in Palestine received "international" sanctioning in the agreement between the League of Nations and the British government in 1922.

(206) Reported in a publication of the External Publicity Division of the [Indian] Ministry of External Affairs, *India and Palestine*, (N.d., New Delhi).

(207) *Ibid.*, p. 13.

(208) *Ibid.*, p. 11. See also : G H. Jansen, *Africa, Asia and Non-Alignment*, (London, 1966), p. 29.

(209) *The Materialist Concept of the Jewish Question : A Marxist Interpretation*, (Mexico, 1950), p. 211.

The Mandate agreement incorporated the Balfour Declaration. Protests of Palestinians and Arabs against the imposition of the Mandate and against its contents were to no avail. Their arguments that the Mandate over Palestine went counter to the principles of the League of Nations were not heard as they were not backed by force.²¹⁰ The League of Nations was a predominantly European body and it is agreed now that the mandate system, far from combating colonialism, was a thin veil for the expansionist tendencies of the victors of the First World War.

The establishment of the UN signified the beginning of a new era in the treatment of colonial questions, but the break with the past was not complete. The principal actors in the new organization were generally the same as those who were the principal actors in the League of Nations. The interests of the non-Westerners were still little cared for. Some endeavours were made in respect of colonialism, and the trusteeship system represents an improvement over the mandate system. But the new organization was not anti-colonial in its activities, that is not until the new states of Afro-Asia made themselves felt during the second half of the fifties.

The UN was then generally favourably disposed, especially during its first decade, to Zionist claims because of the dominant Western influence in it. When the problem of Palestine was discussed in the UN in 1947 and later, the international body was more concerned with whatever peaceful arrangement it could devise, than with going deep to the roots of the problem.

The first UN activity with regard to Palestine came in April 1947 when the United Kingdom asked the UN Secretariat to convene a special session of the General Assembly for the purposes of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question by the General Assembly at its second regular session. This done, the General Assembly in its second regular session in the autumn of 1947 had before it an item entitled "The Future Government of Palestine". At that time, and after the number of Zionist settlers reached some one third of the population of Palestine, the United Kingdom thought that it was sound to relinquish her responsibilities in Palestine, in order to leave it to the settlers to implement their schemes, and in order to implicate other imperialist powers in what was going on in Palestine. In the General Assembly, the settlers found their best ally in the United States and its friends. Under the influence of the United States especially, the Assembly passed resolution 181(II) of 29 November 1947 calling for the partitioning of Palestine into a Jewish (settler) state, an Arab (indigenous) state, and an international zone including Jerusalem and its surroundings. Much has been said and written about the circumstances leading to the adoption of this resolution, but it could be said that it is comparable to imperialist action in previous days, more than to the new concepts that — though they were not given enough stress in the General Assem-

(210) See the account of a Palestinian on the illegality of the British Mandate in : W. F. Boustany, *The Palestine Mandate : Invalid and Impractical*, (Beirut, 1936).

bly — were sweeping the Afro-Asian countries and the world altogether. The Partition Resolution of 1947 was unquestionably similar to the Land Apportionment Act of 1931 in Southern Rhodesia. By virtue of the Partition Resolution, the natives were deprived of their lands and from exercising sovereignty over them. There is one point, however, in which the Land Apportionment Act and the Partition Resolution differ. The Act was the work of the Southern Rhodesian settlers and the British imperialists, while the Resolution was a product of concerted action on the part of many imperialist powers. It is noteworthy that only two Afro-Asian states supported the partition resolution, Liberia and the Philippines — and both were ex-American colonies where the United States enjoyed considerable influence which she fully exerted on this occasion.²¹¹ Two Afro-Asian states abstained from voting, China and Ethiopia, but the majority of the Afro-Asians were fiercely opposed to partition : Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, beside all the Arab states. A latent theme in this opposition was that a Zionist state could only be a European transplantation in the Middle East.

The partition resolution was not all that the settlers wanted. The Jewish state that the resolution aimed at creating would have had some 49% Arabs. The settlers understood that it would be extremely difficult for them to subjugate this large "minority" of natives, especially when this minority was surrounded by Arabs on all sides. Moreover, the Zionists wanted more lands in order to be able to bring in more immigrants. How did they deal with these problems ? In the grand imperialist traditions, they decided to carry out "a few calculated massacres", calculated to spread terror among the natives and induce them not only to leave the territory allotted to the establishment of the Jewish state, but to leave as much of Palestine as possible. Systematic terror was applied against the natives, especially between December 1947 and May 1948, to make sure that the new Jewish state would have both a minimum number of natives and a maximum area of land. Hundreds of thousands of native refugees fled their homes to more secure places in the neighbouring Arab countries. Thus the settlers' aim was achieved, but how did the UN react to this inhuman treatment of natives by its cherished settlers ?

It did not react by censuring the settlers for their massacres, but countered by general expressions of sympathy for the natives made refugees and urgent appeals for help. But it could not deny the natives their minimum rights : the right to return home or be compensated for their losses. Thus, resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1949, stated (in paragraph 11) that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return, and for loss of or damage

(211) See, for an account of United States pressure on Liberia and the Philippines : Kermit Roosevelt, "The Partition of Palestine : A Lesson in Pressure Politics," *Middle East Journal*, January, 1948.

to property which under principles of international law or in equity should be made by the governments or authorities responsible.”

It is beyond the scope of this essay to go into the details of the refugee problem, but this paragraph of the resolution did not lead to any practical conclusion worth mentioning. Israel of course was not expected to comply with this paragraph especially as regards allowing the natives of Palestine to re-settle there after it had sought by all inhuman means to drive them out. The fact that paragraph 11 of the above-mentioned resolution was not implemented did not hinder the UN from admitting Israel to membership in the world body by UNGA resolution No. 273 (III) of 11 May 1949. It is significant to note, however, that Israel's admission to membership was conditional in the sense that it was based on certain Israeli declarations pertaining to the implementation of the partition resolution (which Israel violated by occupying lands exceeding the area allotted to it by the resolution) and the aid to refugees resolution (resolution 194) whose paragraph 11 was quoted above. The preamble of the resolution admitting Israel to UN membership reads, in part, as follows :

“The General Assembly, recalling its resolutions of 29 November 1947 [the partition resolution] and 11 December 1948 [the aid to refugees resolution] and taking note of the declarations and explanations made by the representative of the government of Israel before the *ad hoc* political committee in respect of the implementation of the said resolutions...”

It is also significant that the admission of Israel, the settler-state, to UN membership was again a European-American affair : of the ten non-Arab Afro-Asian states then members of the UN only two approved of Israel's admission (Liberia and the Phillipines), while two abstained (Thailand and Turkey). The rest voted against.

The UNGA has, since then, concerned itself with one of the remnants of the Palestine problem: the right of the refugees to return home or else, if they choose not to, to receive compensation. The UNGA, in a series of resolutions adopted annually — as a routine affair — since 1949, has reaffirmed the importance of paragraph 11 of resolution 194(III) of 11 December 1948. As time has gone on, however, and the Afro-Asian representation in the UN has increased, resolutions have become more and more expressive of regret regarding the Israeli refusal to comply. Thus, in resolution 2154(XXI) of 18 November 1966, it was stated in the first operative paragraph that the General Assembly :

“notes with deep regret that repatriation or compensation of the refugees as provided for in paragraph 11 of the General Assembly resolution 194(III) has not been effected...”

The attitude of the UN Security Council towards the Palestinian problem was generally similar to that of the General Assembly. The main concern of the Security Council was how to keep peace at any cost. However, because the UN

Security Council is the UN body directly concerned with the maintenance of international peace and security, the Council found itself involved, more than any other UN body, in discussions regarding Israel and its aggressiveness and terrorism.

Even before Israel was admitted to UN membership, the Security Council found it necessary to "note with concern" the uncooperative Israeli attitude in the case of Count Folke Bernadotte's assassination.²¹² The assassination, as is well known, was actually done by organizations related to the Israeli government. Also, after the admission of Israel to membership, and because of frequent Israeli military attacks on villages and other civilian targets in neighbouring Arab countries, the Security Council has, on a number of occasions, censured such attacks, as for example in resolution 101(1953) of 24 November 1953 regarding the attack on the Jordanian village of Qibya, and resolution 106(1955) of 29 March 1955 regarding the Israeli attack on Gaza.

International awareness of Israel's link with imperialism and its expansionist tendencies sharply increased after the tripartite aggression against Egypt in the Autumn of 1956.

The tripartite aggression against Egypt and the leading role Israel played in it substantiated, beyond any shadow of doubt, two of the charges usually levelled against Israel :

1 — That Israel is an imperialist out-post in the Middle East, ready to join hands with imperialist powers to threaten the sovereignty of any state in the region.

2 — That Israel is bent on expansion, and that it is ready to do this by violent means, even at the risk of threatening international peace and security.

The UN — still at that time under the influence of Western powers though its membership increased drastically in 1955 thereby giving the Afro-Asian states a stronger say in its affairs — found it necessary to take a determined stand against the aggressors. Israel's share of the strong words utilized then by the UNGA was larger than the shares of its two partners in the aggression (France and the United Kingdom), because the Zionist authorities tried, to the bitter end, to fulfil through aggression some of their expansionist schemes. In resolution 1123(XI) of 19 January 1957, the UNGA noted "with regret and concern the failure of Israel" to withdraw to the old cease-fire lines, while resolution 1124(XI) of 2 February 1957 deplored "the non-compliance of Israel with demands that it should complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line, despite the repeated requests of the General Assembly" and called upon Israel "to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line without further delay".

Since the Suez invasion, the international position of Israel has been dete-

(212) United Nations Security Council, Resolution 59 (1948) of 19 October, 1948.

riorating considerably and consistently, especially in Afro-Asia, and especially with those Afro-Asian states that were then members of the UN. Thus, for instance, Krishna Menon, the eminent Indian statesman, reflecting on the tripartite aggression more than eight years later (in November-December 1964) observed that "[The] invasion angered Asia and Africa; it placed them [the Israelis] in the role of allies and abettors of Imperialism."²¹³ As a matter of fact, the tripartite aggression against Egypt coincided historically with the newly ascending international role of Afro-Asia.

The Afro-Asians, as pointed out above, were more disposed to see Israel for what it is, a colonialist-imperialist endeavour aiming at settling Europeans at the expense of natives. The rising self-assertion of Afro-Asianism, which was clearly felt by the mid-fifties, posed a potent challenge to Israel, the settler state.

It is perhaps pertinent at this juncture to trace some of the governmental attitudes of Afro-Asia towards the Palestine problem, especially since Israel is, geographically at least, a country situated in that part of Asia that links it with Africa.

Back in March 1947, when the UN was still unoccupied with the problem, the Asian Relations Conference, which was held at that time, underscored the dichotomy between Zionist claims and Asian thinking. A representative of the Zionist settlers in Palestine was present, who tried to convince the participants in the conference that the Jews of today were an old Asian people. When his arguments were duly refuted by an Egyptian woman delegate, the Zionist settlers' representative had an angry exchange with the Chair (Mr. Nehru was then in the Chair) and walked out. Nehru affirmed at the end of the conference that "Palestine is essentially an Arab country and no decision can be made without the consent of the Arabs."²¹⁴ Jansen, who reported this incident in his book on *Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment*, commented on Nehru's remark as follows :

"His remark presaged the future, for in many subsequent conferences, Israel's presence — or rather non-presence for she was never invited again — became a source of discussion and even controversy. Though a small country, she remains an irritant — a splinter in Asia's thumb."²¹⁵

When the Asian states in the early fifties started to think that they were entitled to play a distinct international role by coming together, one of their early efforts in this direction was the Colombo Conference. The conference, in which Burma, Ceylon, India, Indonesia and Pakistan participated, was held at Colombo in April 1954. Part of the discussion centered on whether it was advisable and practicable to condemn the establishment of the Israeli state as a violation of international law. Though the conference did not go that far, espe-

(213) Michael Brecker, *India and World Politics : Krishna Menon's View of the World*, (London, 1968), p. 77.

(214) Jansen, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.

(215) *Ibid.*, p. 56.

cially since Israel by then had been a UN member for almost five years, yet the discussion of the question in terms of the possibility of condemning the establishment of Israel is a clear enough indication of how Asia readily understood the fact that Israel was a European implantation in the Middle East whose legitimacy was open to question. The final communique of the conference urged the UN to bring about and expedite the rehabilitation of the Palestinian refugees in their original homes. It also stated that the participating members expressed "deep sympathy with the Arabs of Palestine in their sufferings and affirmed their desire to see a just and early settlement of the Palestine problem."²¹⁶

One year after the first Colombo Conference, the famous Afro-Asian Conference took place at Bandung (Indonesia) between 18 and 24 April 1955. What was important from our point of view, in this conference, is the fact that South Africa and Israel were the only two states, UN members, geographically situated in Africa and Asia respectively, that were not invited to attend at a conference where even non-independent states were invited, such as the Gold Coast (later Ghana). The exclusion of Israel along with South Africa was a clear reminder of the Afro-Asian feeling that Israel did not belong to Afro-Asia, that the Israeli authorities were as foreign to Afro-Asia as the South African authorities.²¹⁷ The conference was also outspoken in its support for the rights of the Palestinians. The final communique of the conference stated that "[In] view of the existing tension in the Middle East caused by the situation in Palestine, and of the danger of that tension to world peace, the Afro-Asian Conference declares its support for the rights of the Arab people of Palestine and calls for the implementation of the UN resolutions on Palestine and the achievement of a peaceful settlement to the Palestine question."

This resolution was satisfactory to the Arabs as it referred to the rights of the Arabs of Palestine and the need to implement UN resolutions, which meant that the Palestinian refugees had to be repatriated or compensated. But Israel viewed the resolution differently. To quote a Zionist sympathizer's comment on the resolution would be useful: Michael Brecker, who was referred to several times before, wrote: "Although the practical significance of this resolution was limited, the symbolic victory of the Arabs was not."²¹⁸

(216) *Ibid.*, pp. 113-164, and pp. 412-414.

(217) The Central African Federation was invited pursuant to Nehru's argument that if the invitation were accepted, it would be an encouragement to Africans and liberal whites; and if it were not accepted, it would reveal the leaders of the Federation as racials. The Federation authorities chose the second course and refused to attend, sensing the anti-racialist atmosphere of the conference. (See Jansen, *op. cit.*, p. 174.)

(218) *The States of Asia*, (*op. cit.*), p. 134.

It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding the mild language of the resolution and its total conformity with the basic tenets of international law and morality, Michael Brecker characterized it as a "symbolic victory for the Arabs", when it was only a symbolic victory for the most rudimentary concepts of justice and law.

Israel was then quite out of favour with the Afro-Asian governments in the mid-fifties. It was isolated and suspected; its nature, as an imperialist outpost in the Middle East, as an expansionist racist entity, was known and felt, with varying degrees of clarity, in Afro-Asia. If such awareness was not formally expressed in the Colombo Conference communique, or in the Bandung Conference communique, the reason lying behind this is that governments are always aware of their international obligations and limitations. Israel was, after all, a member of the UN, where it sat as an equal partner to the governments participating in the Colombo and Bandung Conferences. It was also supported by a number of big powers, and was giving "aid" to a number of Afro-Asian countries. Thus the rather moderate attitude taken by the Afro-Asian governments towards Israel could be well explained.

In contrast to Afro-Asian governmental conferences, Afro-Asian non-governmental conferences present an opportunity for the participants to express their feelings in a more outspoken way. Such conferences can go deeper into the roots of the problems under discussion. Hence, within the framework of the Afro-Asian peoples' solidarity movements, which have held a number of conferences since 1958, the Palestine problem has received a far more sympathetic treatment.

The First Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference which was held in Cairo between December 26, 1957, and 1 January 1958, was an historic conference, the first of its kind, attended by some 500 delegates coming from 48 countries and representing about 1500 million people. The conference studied a number of questions — racial discrimination, colonialism, and so forth — one of which was Palestine. On Palestine, the conference adopted a resolution No. 6, which reads as follows:

"1 — The conference adopts the attached report submitted by the Palestine delegation on this case²¹⁹.

2 — The conference declares that the state of Israel is a base of imperialism which threatens the progress and security of the Middle East and condemns its aggressive policy which is a threat to world peace.

3 — The conference confirms the Arab rights in Palestine, expresses its sympathy with the Palestine refugees, and supports all their rights and their return to their homeland."

This first conference set the pace for future Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conferences. But as the Afro-Asian awareness of the nature of Israel developed, so the language used in future conferences regarding the problem grew stronger.

The Second Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference (held in Conakry,

(219) A report of some 1000 words, outlining the history of the Palestine problem, analyzing Zionist and Israeli links with imperialism, and stressing the characteristics of Israel as an experiment in settler colonialism. For the report and the resolution see : *First Afro-Asian Peoples' Conference*, (Cairo, publication of the permanent secretariat 2nd ed., n.d.), pp. 40-43.

Guinea, between 11 and 15 April 1966) dealt in detail with the problem. As it was convened for the "expression of Afro-Asian solidarity in the face of imperialism, colonialism and racialism, ... it has found it necessary to appoint a special sub-committee on the Palestine problem". The text that was subsequently adopted was a summary of the report of the Palestine delegation adopted at the first conference. Imperialism, colonialism, domination and blind racialism were singled out by the conference as contributors "to the creation of this problem". The continuance of the Palestine tragedy was considered "a continuous triumph of the powers of evil in that part of Afro-Asia". Israel's nature was emphasized as "a partner with the colonialist and imperialist powers in their policy of expansion and a very strong tool in implementing the policy of neo-colonialism in Africa and Asia". The text also stressed that Israel's vote at the UN was "always cast in favour of the colonial powers and against the freedom-loving people." Finally, the resolution that was adopted by the conference reiterated previous attitudes but added in paragraph 1 that the conference:

"supports the People of Palestine in their determination to organize themselves into an independent entity on Palestine soil. Such an entity would represent the people of Palestine and embody the expression of their will. It shall be recognized by all the freedom-loving peoples of the world as an organ that speaks for the people of Palestine."²²⁰

Thus the Palestine problem was gradually and consistently being understood in its proper context: a problem of European settlement on non-European land that resulted in the expulsion of the legitimate inhabitants of Palestine. The duty of the Afro-Asian peoples was to support the natives and expose the links of the settlers with the imperialist-racist powers.

At the subsequent two Afro-Asian solidarity conferences held before the June 1967 aggression, the tide of Afro-Asian indignation at Israel was rising steadily. Resolutions on Palestine became longer and more outspoken, dealing more with specific details, recommending concrete action, and at the same time searching deeper into the roots of the problem.

The Third Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Moshi, Tanganyika, between February 4 and 11, 1963, for instance, did not only support the return of the Palestinian refugees to their homeland but also supported "the restoration of their homeland to them." It supported "the Palestinian people's right to establish an independent and united entity on the *free land of Palestine*" (emphasis supplied). The conference questioned the legitimacy of the existence of Israel by declaring that:

"What is called Israel is but a part of Zionist colonialism propped up with the aid of Western imperialism in the heart of the Arab homeland

(220) See Full Text in : *Afro-Asian Solidarity and Arab Causes*, (Cairo, Afro-Asian Publications, No. 19, June, 1967), pp. 236-239.

of Palestine, to safeguard its [Western imperialism's] interests, to realize its strategic and petroleum projects as well as to obstruct the advancement of the Arab Nation towards unity, liberation, and socialist construction."

Other paragraphs of this resolution included calling on all Afro-Asian peoples and nationalist parties "to exert pressure on their governments for the abrogation of concluded bilateral treaties [with Israel] and the prevention of new ones that might be concluded with Israel, the dangerous tool of neo-colonialism". The conference also resolved "to work for the cessation of relations between some African freedom fighters and Zionist governments and parties"; and requested "all Afro-Asian countries to put a stop to the farcical immigration [of Zionists into Israel] in the interest of neo-colonialism and Zionism."²²¹

The upsurge of the Afro-Asian peoples' opposition to the Zionist settlers in Palestine, and their state Israel, reached a new — and natural — apex in the fourth Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference that was held at Winneba, Ghana in May 1965. At that time, in the mid-sixties, the Palestinians were well on their way to asserting their independent identity through armed struggle, carried out by the fedayeen organizations, and symbolized by the establishment, some time earlier, of the Palestine Liberation Organization as a political organization for the Palestinian people. The participants in the 4th conference then fully realised the real nature of Israel as a settler state, and realised also that the Palestinian resistance was just another national liberation movement fighting against settlers supported by colonialism and imperialism. The resolution adopted at that conference based itself in the preamble on faithfulness and sincerity "to the principles of truth and justice", not specifically on UN resolutions. The ten operative paragraphs of the resolution did not mention the UN resolutions at all, except indirectly by re-affirming previous resolutions, which in turn referred to UN resolutions, in as far as this meant the right of the Palestinians to return home or be compensated. Instead, the resolution supported the Palestinian view-point fully, when it condemned, in operative paragraph 3, "the establishment of Israel in the occupied part of Arab Palestine and support [ed] the P.L.O. in its just struggle to liberate Palestine." The solution now was not only to repatriate the Palestinians (1st and 2nd conferences), or to restore Palestine to the Palestinians (3rd conference), but to liberate Palestine from Zionism.

In order to reach this solution, the conference appealed in paragraph 4, "to Afro-Asian peoples to provide all moral and material help to the P.L.O. in its just armed struggle to liberate the usurped Palestinian homeland".

Two paragraphs (7 and 8) dealt with the duty of Afro-Asia to isolate

(221) *Ibid.*, pp. 204-2.

Israel. Thus paragraph 7 appealed "to all the national committees, organizations and parties in Asia and Africa to double their efforts to counter and forestall Zionist infiltration into Asia and Africa ... and to bring pressure to bear on their governments to abrogate various agreements concluded with Israel, the dangerous instrument of neo-colonialism". Paragraph 8, on the other hand, called upon "the Afro-Asian states to boycott Israel politically and economically and to work *for its expulsion from the UN*" (emphasis supplied).

The culminating point came in the last paragraph (No. 10) of the resolution, as it spoke of a solution to the problem within the general framework of liquidating colonialism. In this paragraph the participants affirmed that "the cause of Palestine will only be settled within the framework of the general plan for the liquidation of colonialism; any other settlement that does not entail the liquidation of the imperialist aggressive base, Israel, can only be sought by imperialism and its allies."²²²

This conference was not only important for its clear analysis of the problem of Palestine, but also because it was attended by a large number of Latin American delegations. The unity of the struggle against colonialism and imperialism was on its way to include the Latin American peoples.

Another point should also be noted: within the framework of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Movement a plethora of more specialized conferences were held (journalists', women's, jurists', writers', youth, etc.) in which the Palestine problem was dealt with along lines analogous to those of the more representative solidarity conferences. Thus it could be said that Israel was laid bare before Afro-Asian eyes, and its real nature was disclosed for everybody to see. We shall deal below with the attitude of the newer Afro-Asia and Latin America Peoples' Solidarity Organization (OSPAAAL) towards the Palestine problem, but let us now turn to the attitude of Afro-Asian governmental conferences towards the problem.

Since the Bandung Conference, no other Afro-Asian conference was held, though certain efforts were made in that direction especially in 1965. The results of the Bandung conference, as has been mentioned, were regarded by Israel as a big blow to its prestige. Thus, after Bandung, the Israelis doubled their efforts to win over many Afro-Asian states, by offering them technical assistance and granting them loans (originating from imperialist countries and concerns). Through such efforts Israel was able to bring about some "moderation" towards itself in the policy of certain states, especially in Africa. These efforts however were not enough to change the feelings of the majority of African states. It is perhaps pertinent in this respect to glance through the final communiques of some African governmental and non-governmental

(222) *Ibid.*, pp.242-244.

conferences.

Two conferences for the Independent African States were held in April 1958 and June 1960, respectively. In both conferences, all African states then independent participated — except, of course, South Africa. Both of these conferences discussed the Palestine problem, expressed grave concern over it, as a “threat to international peace and security” and demanded a “just solution” for it.

The early sixties witnessed the splitting of African ranks over the Congo problem, and another split over the Algerian problem. As a result of those two splits, two groups of African states were created: the moderate Morovia group (with smaller groups inside it) and the more nationalistic Casablanca group. Both were essentially busy with African problems, but the Casablanca group concerned itself with the Palestine problem as well. Right from its first meeting in January 1961, the Casablanca group characterized Israel as an “instrument of colonialism, old and new, not only in the Middle East but also in Africa and Asia”. At about the same time, the All-African Peoples’ Conference of Cairo (March 1961) designated Israel along with the U.S.A., West Germany and others as practicing neo-colonialism.

The split in Africa’s ranks was overcome by the establishment of the Organization of African Unity in May 1963. In the meanwhile, and right after the Bandung conference, the Afro-Asian spirit was generated in the non-aligned movement, a movement cherished by the leading powers of Afro-Asia, as well as by Yugoslavia — a European “cousin” of the Afro-Asians.²²³ The non-aligned movement had its historical roots in the Brioni (Yugoslavia) conference of 1956, where presidents Tito, Nehru and Nasser met. The Brioni conference communique supported the Bandung conference communique on Palestine. But the conference was an important one because it opened a new club, the exclusive club of the non-aligned powers.

The first fully-fledged conference of the non-aligned met at Belgrade on the first of September 1961. The conference, in which 28 states participated, focused its attention on international affairs, especially on East-West relationships. The Palestine problem, however, was also discussed. With regard to this the participants condemned the imperialist policies pursued in the Middle East and declared their support for the full restoration of the rights of the Palestinians, in accordance with the UN Charter and its resolutions.

The communique of the Belgrade conference was rather moderate. It followed the lines agreed on at the Bandung and Brioni conferences. The second non-aligned conference was held some 3 years later, between the 5th and 10th

(233) In UNIDO, Yugoslavia, for the sake of electing members of the Board, is classified as an Afro-Asian country.

of October 1964. By then, the Palestinians were beginning to assert themselves, and international awareness of the reality of the Palestine problem was increasing. The second non-aligned conference, which was held in Cairo, was a larger affair than the first one: 47 countries participated, all from Afro-Asia, except for Yugoslavia and Cuba. In addition, ten delegations from Latin American and European countries attended as observers. The Palestine problem was discussed and as a result of the deliberation the participants in the conference condemned "the imperialist policy pursued in the Middle East," and in conformity with the Charter of the UN decided to: "1- Endorse the full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland and their inalienable rights to self-determination. 2- Declare its full support for the Arab people of Palestine in their struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism."

It is noteworthy here to mention that the resolution referred to the "Charter of the UN" and did not refer to its resolutions. It is also important that the resolution spoke of the Palestinian right to self-determination, a right of which the Palestinians were deprived by the UN in 1947. A third point should also be noted: the participants' support for the struggle of the Palestinians "for liberation from colonialism and racism". This is a clear indication that the participants regarded Israel as a colonialist racist entity.

It is clear then that the non-aligned world was growing receptive to the Palestinian viewpoint. It has developed its awareness that Israel is an imperialist racist entity which not only discriminated against the natives, but forced them to leave their country altogether.

No third conference of the non-aligned has been convened yet, though recently there have been some efforts in that direction. It is quite obvious, though, from indications of trends prevailing in the non-aligned world, that if such a conference were to be held in the future, the Palestinians would be sure to have their viewpoint vehemently espoused.

The non-aligned movement is, in a sense, wider — at least potentially — than the Afro-Asian movement. It could include certain European and Latin American countries. As a matter of fact, the early 1960's witnessed a movement towards enlarging the scope of the revolutionary spirit that has been sweeping through Afro-Asia since the mid-fifties, in order to include Latin America, especially after the revolutionary regime of Cuba proved itself. The second non-aligned conference was attended by some Latin American delegates as observers. The fourth Afro-Asian solidarity conference was attended also by many Latin American delegations, again as observers. Thus, on governmental and non-governmental levels there was a feeling, varying in clarity, that Latin America has a role to play in common with the Afro-Asians, in combating colonialism, imperialism and racism. This development was crystalized in the first Afro-Asian and Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Conference that took place in Havana (Cuba) between the 3rd and 12th of

January 1966, and was attended by delegations from 82 countries. The conference issued a general declaration known as the Havana Declaration, and a number of resolutions on specific issues. The declaration, significantly enough, called for "the solidarity of all peoples with the Arab people of Palestine in their just struggle for the liberation of their homeland from imperialism and Zionist aggression". This theme was further elaborated in the general political resolution where Zionism was described as racist, and where it was resolved that "the right of the Palestinian people to recover their land is a just one".

Moreover, in a series of resolutions on "burning issues", the conference adopted a long resolution on Palestine. The preamble of this resolution mentions that the conference had studied the problem in depth, while the first operative paragraph states that the conference considered "Zionism as an imperialist movement by its very nature, aggressive and expansionist by its aims, racialist in its structure and fascist in its means and methods." Other operative paragraphs represent a strong reiteration of the demands formulated at the fourth Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in 1965. Thus paragraph 4 significantly condemns "the Zionist movement and the existence of Israel in the occupied part of Palestine", while paragraph 5 requests *inter alia*, "the expulsion of Israel from international organizations."²²⁴

In conclusion, it could be said that starting from the mid-1960's there was a clearer and better understanding of the nature of the Palestine problem. This clearer and better understanding was more apparent in non-governmental conferences for reasons mentioned above, but was apparent also in governmental conferences. It was more apparent in Afro-Asia, but was also coming into being in Latin America, Europe and even in North America.

The Israeli June 1967 aggression against 3 Arab states highlighted and illustrated the fact that Israel is bent on aggression; and its refusal to withdraw from the territories occupied as a result of the aggression, highlighted and illustrated the fact that Israel is also bent on expansion. Israeli treatment of the civilian population in the territories occupied as a result of the June aggression highlighted and illustrated the fact that the Israeli settler authorities are bent on denying these civilians their basic human rights. The Israeli aggression of June represents a setback for the Palestinians as well as for the Arabs, but, on the other hand, it helped the world understand better the gravity of the threat to the security of the area, posed by the Zionist settlers.

We will not mention here all the new manifestations of anti-Israeli feelings;

(224) For the full text, and other aspects of the conference (such as how the conference was convened) see: *Resolutions: 1st Conference of Solidarity of the Peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America*, (mimeographed), (Havana, 1966). It should be noted that the conference was held in 1966, so the "occupied part of Palestine" refers to the areas occupied since 1948, not to those occupied during the June 1967 aggression.

that is a task beyond the scope of this study. We will only mention in some detail two aspects of the developing international attitude towards the problem. The first aspect is the two solidarity conferences with the Arab peoples held so far; the second is the new, more vigorous UN treatment of the question of Israeli violations of human rights.

On the non-governmental level a remarkable development prompted by the June aggression has been the convening of special conferences — so far two in number — for the support of the Arab peoples. The first such international conference in support of the Arab Peoples took place in New Delhi between 11 and 14 November 1967. Though it was hastily organized, delegates from some fifty countries took part in it. Krishna Menon and Romesh Chandra of India were among a number of internationally distinguished participants in the conference. Due to the general atmosphere of shock that had permeated the Arabs at their military setback in June, the conference was more concerned with the direct effects of the aggression, and with regard to this the resolution passed by the conference called for “the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli troops to the position prior to June 5, 1967.” But the resolution also noted the wider aspects of the problem. It noted, for instance, the Zionist urge for expansionism; it paid attention to the “settlement aspects” of Zionism when it mentioned critically that: “[An] Israeli call went out to millions of foreign settlers who are citizens of other countries and whose livelihood was not in danger to come and occupy lands taken by force from the Arabs.” The resolution also did not neglect to mention that “Israel must implement the UN resolutions including those concerning the return of Palestinian refugees to their homes.”²²⁵

The Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples was held in Cairo on the 25th of January 1969. The Cairo conference was more significant because of 3 factors:

- 1- Israel's expansionism was further illustrated by its consistent refusal to withdraw from lands occupied as a result of the June aggression, despite the wording of the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967.

- 2- Armed Palestinian resistance which was re-activated starting from September 1967 was, in early 1969, a force of undisputed significance.

- 3- The organizers of the conference had enough time to prepare for it. Thus delegates from 75 countries participated, including a number of internationally distinguished personalities. In addition fifteen international non-governmental organizations were represented.

The Second International Conference in Support of the Arab Peoples reiterated the views developed previously. In addition, it hailed the Palestine

(225) See full text of the resolution, along with a description of the conference in *Al-Arab* (a monthly English publication of the L.A.S. office, New Delhi), December 1967, pp. 3-4.

armed resistance movement and insisted that no peace could be achieved in the Middle East if the people of Palestine were denied the right to self-determination and the right to exercise their sovereignty over their homeland.

A Third International Conference for the Support of the Arab Peoples will be held in 1970, most probably in Europe. That the location of the next conference will probably be in Europe is not without significance. It demonstrates that the growing international opposition to Zionism and its practices in Palestine is reaching such a level that it is beginning to penetrate right into areas that have been for a long time emotionally and economically attached to imperialism and Zionism.

This opposition to Zionism and its practices in Palestine is especially outspoken with reference to Israel's inhuman treatment of the civilian population in the areas occupied during the June aggression. As a matter of fact, so many articles have been published even in the press of the imperialist countries, condemning the Israeli practices in the occupied territories, that the most ardent Zionist sympathizer has to admit that Israel's world image has changed. Golda Meir, herself, confessed to the London *Sunday Times* of June 15, 1969 that "our image has been worsened in some way ... It hurts us that this change has taken place..."

This changing international atmosphere was reflected even in the UN — not only in the General Assembly but also in the Security Council where the U.S., the most ardent and most powerful supporter and backer of Israel, still enjoys a considerable influence. We will not concern ourselves here with the series of condemnations that were thrown at Israel after the June aggression as a result of its raids across the ceasefire-lines on Arab targets, civilian and military, in the neighbouring countries. We will only discuss the UN attitude towards crimes for which even Israel cannot disclaim responsibility — these crimes concern Israeli inhuman treatment of the civilian population in the occupied territories.

Concern over the fate of the civilian population in the occupied territories was one — and the only — thing that the Security Council in its series of meetings during and after the June aggression was able to agree upon in resolution 237(1967) of 14 June 1967, and it was also the only thing that the General Assembly was able to agree upon in its Fifth Emergency Special Session which started on 19 June 1967. Both resolutions [237(1967) and 2252 (ES-V)] concerned themselves with humanitarian assistance to those affected by the aggression, and called *inter alia* upon the government of Israel to facilitate the return of those who had fled the areas of military operations. The 22nd session of the General Assembly concerned itself with the same problem in its resolution 2341(XXII) A and B of 19 December 1967.

The most serious UN consideration of the inhuman treatment inflicted on the civilian population in Israeli-occupied areas came in 1968. The forum was that of the Human Rights Commission of the Economic and Social Council.

During its 24th session, the Human Rights Commission considered cases showing systematic violations of human rights. On 27 February 1968, the Commission adopted unanimously, except for the abstention of Israel, resolution 6(XXIV), a "moderate" resolution which re-affirmed the right of all refugees from areas which were subjected to military operations, to return to their homes. The resolution also requested the Secretary General to keep the Commission informed about the development of the situation. This was not the only action taken by the Commission. Reports of the inhuman treatment to which the civilian population of the occupied territories was subjected, left its impression on the members of the Commission. Thus considerations of such treatment were resumed on 8 March 1968. As a result of those considerations, the Commission decided by 14 votes to one (Israel) with 7 abstentions, to dispatch a telegram to the Israeli authorities expressing alarm at press reports regarding systematic destruction of Arab homes in the Israeli occupied territories, and calling upon the Israeli authorities to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population in the occupied areas.²²⁶

1968 was also Human Rights Year, proclaimed as such by the UNGA in its resolution 2339(XXII) of 18 December 1967. An international conference on Human Rights was convened by the UN, at Teheran, between April 22, and May 13, 1968 in order "to review the progress made in the twenty years since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to formulate a programme for the future". The Teheran conference was a most proper forum to discuss the plight of Arab civilian population in the Israeli-occupied territories.

Thus, resolution No. 1 of the conference was devoted to this human rights problem. The resolution, a long one, based itself in the preamble on previous UN resolutions, on reports of the UNRWA's Commissioner-General, on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, on the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 regarding the protection of civilian persons in time of war, and on the Human Rights Commission's actions during its 24th session. The operative part included 6 paragraphs in which the conference expressed "its grave concern for the violations of human rights in Arab territories occupied as a result of the June 1967 hostilities" (paragraph 1), drew the attention "of Israel to the grave consequences resulting from disregard of fundamental freedoms and human rights in the occupied territories" (paragraph 2), called on "the government of Israel to desist forthwith from acts of destroying homes of the Arab civilian population ... and to respect and implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 in occupied territories" (paragraph 3), reaffirmed "the inalienable rights of all inhabitants who have left their homes ... to return, resume a normal life,

(226) See : *UN Chronique Mensuelle*, Vol. 5, No. 4, (Avril 1968), p. 102.

recover their property and homes and rejoin their families"... (paragraph 4), requested "the General Assembly to appoint a special committee to investigate violations of human rights in the territories occupied by Israel, and report thereon" (paragraph 5), and requested the Human Rights Commission "to keep the matter under constant review" (paragraph 6).²²⁷

Israel, however, was insistent on pursuing a policy that jeopardized the rights of the civilian population in the occupied territories. Furthermore Israel refused to apply UN resolutions regarding the repatriation of the refugees and those who fled their homes during the June aggression. Meanwhile, on 31 July 1968, the Secretary General submitted a report to the Security Council in which he informed the Council that resolution 237(1967) of 14 June and General Assembly resolution 2252(ES-V) were not implemented due to Israeli objections to the method of their implementation. He also underscored the Israeli refusal to receive a humanitarian mission which could help in the implementation of the resolution and which would study the situation of the Arab population in the occupied territories.²²⁸

On 20 September 1968, at the request of Pakistan, the Security Council started examining the Secretary General's report of 31 July 1968. After a prolonged discussion, the Security Council adopted resolution 259(1968) of 27 September 1968 in which the Council expressed its concern for the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of Arab territories under Israeli occupation, asked the Secretary General to dispatch urgently a special representative to those Israeli-occupied territories, and requested the Israeli authorities to receive, cooperate with and facilitate the task of such a representative.

But Israel again refused to receive such a special representative or to cooperate with him. Thus, the Secretary-General brought this fact to the attention of the Security Council in his report on 14 October in which he confessed his inability to send such a representative on account of the intransigent Israeli attitude.²²⁹ Israeli disregard for human rights and for Security Council and General Assembly resolutions in these instances has been obvious.

The 23rd session of the General Assembly took note of all this, and subsequently on 19 December 1968, it adopted two resolutions: one on the general question of refugees and their right to return to their homes (resolution 2452(XXIII), A, B, and C) and the other on the specific question of Israeli violations of human rights (resolution 2443(XXIII)). The first resolution is not of great importance to our particular concern, except perhaps part A of it, which requests the Israeli government to take immediately all

(227) The full text is reproduced by the A.J.I.L., Vol. 63(3), July 1969, pp. 674-681.

(228) See a summary of this report in UN *Chronique Mensuelle*, (Vol.V, (8)), Aout-Septembre 1968, pp. 121-123.

(229) See a summary of this report in *Ibid.*, Vol. V, (10), November 1968, p. 3.

effective measures to allow the refugees from the 1967 hostilities to return home. Resolution 2443(XXIII) was a comprehensive one in regard of Israeli practices in the occupied territories. Its preambular part not only mentioned all Security Council and General Assembly resolutions adopted on the subject, as well as the resolutions of the Human Rights Commission and the Economic and Social Council, but also mentioned in detail the resolution adopted at the International Conference of Human Rights. The five operative paragraphs of the resolution dealt with the Assembly's response to Israel's challenge of human rights. In paragraph 1, the General Assembly decided "to establish a special committee of three member states to investigate Israeli practices affecting the human rights of the population of the occupied territories". In paragraph 3 it requested "the government of Israel to receive the special committee, to cooperate with it and to facilitate its work", and requested "the special committee to report to the Secretary General as soon as possible and whenever the need arises thereafter". The three members were to be appointed by the president of the General Assembly, and the Secretary General was requested to provide the committee with all the facilities necessary for the performance of its task.

Thus the General Assembly took charge of the problem, placed it in its proper perspective and devised a means to deal with it by establishing a special committee, similar in status to the General Assembly's special committee on Apartheid. Though the resolution was not passed by a large majority, the voting being 60-22-37, yet the majority of Afro-Asian countries supported it, while Israel, the United States and some African states such as Malawi and Lesotho opposed it. No Asian state voted against it. The Israeli delegate, right after the vote, hastened to say that his government continued to oppose the terms of reference of this special committee!

The establishment of the special committee was hindered not only by the Israeli objection, but also by the death of the President of the 23rd session of the General Assembly. After consultations with member states, a meeting of Vice-Presidents of the 23rd session of the General Assembly took place in June to discuss the person who could replace the deceased president in making the nomination. Finally, on 23 June, 1969, the Secretary General advised member states that the head of the Peruvian delegation, who was also a vice-president of the 23rd session, would take up the duties of the deceased president in this respect.²³⁰ After lengthy consultations, the Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories was constituted of Ceylon, Somalia and Yugoslavia. On 11 November 1969, the special committee held its first meeting, elected Mr. H.S. Amerasingh, permanent representative of Ceylon to the UN, as its

(230) ONU *Chronique Mensuelle*, Vol. 6, No. 7, (Juillet, 1969), p. 71.

Chairman, and requested the Secretary General to inform the government of Israel that the committee had been constituted and to request that government to receive it.²³¹

At any rate, the obstacles and delays that surrounded the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution 2443(XXIII) did not deter the Human Rights Commission from taking up the issue of Israeli violations of human rights. The twenty fifth session of the Commission, which began in February 1969, had before it a report by the Secretary General on the situation with regard to human rights in the Israeli occupied territories. The Commission considered this report under a sub-item on the study of situations which reveal a consistent pattern of violations of human rights. On 3 March, 1969, by a roll-call vote of 13 in favour to one against (Israel) and 16 abstentions, the Commission decided to establish a special Working Group of Experts to Investigate Allegations Concerning Violations by Israel of the 1949 Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, in territories occupied by Israel as a result of hostilities in the Middle East. Under the resolution, the Working Group was empowered to receive communications and hear witnesses and was requested to report its conclusions and recommendations to the next session of the Commission. In the same resolution the Commission reiterated its previous position, affirming the rights of peoples who had fled their homes to return to them, deplored Israel's continued violations of human rights in the occupied territories, particularly the acts of destroying the homes of the Arab civilian population, of deporting inhabitants and of resorting to violence against inhabitants expressing their resentment of the occupation; and called on Israel to put an end to such acts. The Commission also expressed its deep concern with regard to Israel's refusal to abide by the 1949 Geneva Convention, and decided to include the question of human rights in the territories occupied as a result of the hostilities in the Middle East as a separate item of priority in its next session.

In accordance with the resolution, members of the Working Group would be the same as those composing the membership of the Working Group of Experts established under the Commission's resolution in its 23rd and 24th sessions on the treatment of political prisoners in South Africa.²³²

Three points should be mentioned in this regard. The first is that out of the 16 abstentions, only two were from Afro-Asia — the Congo (Kinshasa) and the Phillippines, and the rest of the abstainers were the United States, the United Kingdom, several countries in Western Europe and Latin America, Australia, New Zealand and Greece. The second point is that the membership of the group of experts was the same as the membership of a group of experts

(231) UN Press Release WS/424, 14 November, 1969, pp. 8-9.

(232) UN *Monthly Chronicle*, Vol. 6, No. 4, (April 1969), pp. 67-68.

previously established to investigate human rights violations by South Africa. Thus, the two settler states, members of the UN, Israel and South Africa, were subjected to investigation regarding their human rights policies by the same working group of experts. The third point is that Israel, like South Africa before it, has again refused to receive the working group of experts, thereby, again like South Africa, tacitly acknowledging that allegations levelled at her are essentially valid.

The working group of experts visited the three Arab countries which were subject to Israel's aggression in June 1967 (United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria), plus Lebanon. In those four countries it heard a considerable number of witnesses at hearings open to the public held during the month of August 1969.²³³ Those hearings made quite an impression on the population of the states visited as it was felt that the UN was seriously concerning itself with human rights violations in the areas occupied by Israel. The group has not so far published its findings, but it is expected to do so early in 1970.

Thus, though long over-due, the UN has started interesting itself seriously in the inhuman treatment inflicted on the natives by the Israeli settler state. The extent of the UN involvement in the clear cases of violations of human rights is still small. It encompasses only such violations as took place after the June aggression. So far, the discriminatory treatment of the natives of Palestine who are considered second-class citizens in Israel is still beyond the UN's supervision and intervention. So far, the right of the Palestinians to self-determination is still denied. Justice has not so far been rendered to the natives of Palestine, nor has it been unequivocally expressed by the UN. Yet it is clear that "... UN organizations ... have been growing increasingly hostile to Israel's position in the over-all Arab-Israeli dispute".²³⁴

* * *

International opposition to European settlers in non-European lands could be generally characterised as a recent phenomenon. This opposition was clearly articulated first by the inhabitants of the regions directly concerned; then it was shared by oppressed peoples everywhere, especially in Asia and Africa. After the Second World War one could observe that this opposition to European settlers became a policy-line for many a newly liberated country. Public opinion in imperialist countries, especially those that supported the settlers' schemes one way or the other, lagged far behind Afro-Asia and the socialist countries in understanding the damage the settlers have inflicted on the natives.

(233) See : *UN Weekly News Summary*, (WS/409 and after, August, 1969 and after). See also the press releases of the UN Information Centre in Beirut, starting from 1 August 1969.

(234) Richard Falk, "The Beirut Raid and Law of Retaliation", *A. J. I. L.*, Vol. 63 (3), July 1969, p. 419.

The UN is an organ which could be described both as an embodiment of international "will" and as an organization where the will of certain powers prevails over the will of others. It is not our intention here to analyze the development of the UN in terms of either or both of the concepts mentioned above. It could be broadly said, however, that the UN was generally and without any qualification led by the United States and its allies during its first decade of existence. In 1955 there emerged a challenge, the Afro-Asian challenge, not strong enough to check, but strong enough to be taken into account. With the Afro-Asian outlook coinciding in many important respects with the outlook of the socialist countries, the influence of the United States and its allies in the General Assembly suffered but was not checked. The sixties witnessed a fresh influx of new, especially African, states to the UN; the result was the launching of a strong anti-colonialist offensive that was able, especially in the General Assembly, to put the United States and its allies on the defensive at least in respect of colonial questions. It became possible in the sixties to see the United States, the United Kingdom and their allies put in a minority position, voting against or abstaining from voting on many resolutions passed with overwhelming majorities. In the Security Council the situation was less amenable to change due to the restricted composition of the Council and the predominance of the United States and its allies in its permanent membership. It is true that the Security Council membership was increased to 15 members recently; it remains true however that the influence of the United States and its allies in the Security Council is still much larger than in the General Assembly.

The problems of European settlers in parts of Africa and Asia were not dealt with as such in the early days of the UN. The problem of Southern Rhodesia was not brought before the UN till the sixties; the problem of racial discrimination in South Africa was first brought to UN attention in the guise of a problem of racial discrimination against a minority belonging ethnically to another UN member country. The problem of Palestine could be considered as an exception in that it was dealt with rather fully by the UN in 1947. At that time, though the problem was posed by the Arabs and the Asians as a problem of foreign settlement against the will of the indigenous population, yet the nature of the composition of the General Assembly at that time, the great role played by the USA in the deliberations of the General Assembly, and the recent memories of Nazi crimes against the Jews, all these factors blurred the vision of the General Assembly, thus resulting in a gross distortion in the characterization of the Palestine problem. In those circumstances, with the Afro-Asians in the minority and with the General Assembly composed predominantly of European and American powers, the partition resolution was adopted on 29 November 1947. Given the Afro-Asian reluctance to support that resolution, it could be asserted that it could not have been adopted had the Afro-Asians been as well represented in the UN in 1947 as they were represented in 1955 and after.

The problem of apartheid in South Africa was not seriously tackled till after the General Assembly's membership was enlarged in 1955 and after. Before that date, the Assembly's tackling of the problem of racial discrimination against the Indian minority was both timid and limited. A massacre like that of Sharpeville was necessary for the Security Council to consider the serious situation arising from the problem of European settlers and domination in South Africa.

It was only in 1960 that the UN came out clearly in favour of the granting of independence to all colonial countries and peoples, and the process has not yet been completed. In this context it could also be asserted that had the Southern Rhodesian problem been brought before the General Assembly not in the sixties but a decade or a decade and a half earlier, the legitimacy of the foreign settlers there would probably have been recognized, and Southern Rhodesia's partition could very well have been effected!

It is obvious that the fullest United Nations treatment of problems arising from the existence of European settlers on non-European lands, was the treatment of the latest case before the General Assembly: the case of Southern Rhodesia. The case that had least treatment was that of Palestine, in the forties; while the treatment of South Africa's case in the fifties falls somewhere in between. It could simply be said that in regard to European settlers, the UN in the forties "established" the settler supremacy in part of Palestine; in the fifties it tolerated the continued settler supremacy in South Africa; and in the sixties it refused to recognize the already illegally established settler supremacy in Southern Rhodesia. Israel was given statehood by the UN in the forties, South Africa has not so far been denied statehood by the UN, while Southern Rhodesia's regime is now subjected to UN sanctions because it aspired to do what South Africa and Israel had done previously.

International opposition to the settlers is growing and will continue to grow in this age where the principle that colonial countries and peoples are entitled to independence is almost unequivocally espoused. Those who stood to profit from the *ancien régime* look with astonishment and bitterness at what is taking place today. Despite the fact that even the most reactionary powers in our contemporary age, the United States and the United Kingdom, were compelled under pressure of public opinion to approve the sanctions imposed by the Security Council against the Smith regime in Southern Rhodesia, one can still find an old hand in "traditional" international law, Charles G. Fenwick, express himself on the Security Council considerations of Rhodesia as follows:

"To read the indictment of Rhodesia by the O.A.U. in November 1966, and a week later by the UNGA on November 17 and again a month later by the Security Council on December 16, one would come to the conclusion that some crime of the first magnitude was being committed by the Smith government and not rather a serious delinquency such as one and all of the colonial powers committed with impunity in Africa within the memory of most of us. Admitting

that some 220,000 whites are in control of some four million Africans, denying them what are accepted today as majority rule and other civic rights, *what transformed so suddenly what was a common situation a generation ago into what is a threat to the peace today*; and whose peace at that?"²³⁵ (emphasis supplied).

The change in international attitude towards the settler regimes and settler supremacy is best illustrated by what Fenwick mentioned. "What was a common situation a generation ago" has now come to be considered a situation threatening international peace and security. What was sanctioned by the UN in 1947 (the partitioning of Palestine), was quite unthinkable less than two decades after, in respect of the Southern Rhodesian problem, unthinkable to such a degree that nobody suggested partitioning Southern Rhodesia though the settlers wished to see this happen.

It is not astonishing, given the superior attitudes the settlers feel *vis-à-vis* the natives, that the three settler regimes have come into difficulty with the UN concerning human rights issues. Admittedly, Israel's status is the least threatened so far by actions of the Human Rights Commission or by other UN organs, while Southern Rhodesia's status is the most threatened. Israel and South Africa are still UN members and it is not likely that they will be expelled in the near future, while the Smith regime will never be accorded UN membership. Does this mean that international opposition within the UN framework to Israeli settlers in Palestine will continue to be dormant; that the white settlers in South Africa will continue to be criticized by the UN but without ever running the risk of losing their status of UN membership?

The question of course, is for the future to answer. One can however notice that the UN traditions of the forties and the fifties constitute nowadays a hindrance towards a treatment of the settlers in Palestine and South Africa similar or comparable to the treatment of the settlers in Southern Rhodesia. South Africa's UN membership was never questioned then, though the situation in South Africa was clearly discriminatory in the forties and fifties. Israel's membership was a UN act based on the partition resolution — though it is also based on certain commitments which Israel has not honoured. It is not reasonable to think that the UN would in the near future annul the partition resolution or revoke the admission of Israel to UN membership. But it is not unlikely that in the long run something of the sort could happen.

Before changes in political concepts and attitudes are institutionalized through states' policies and then through the UN framework, they are informally expressed by non-governmental associations, conferences and gatherings. Before resolution 1514(XV) on the ending of colonialism was adopted by the UN in 1960, the end of colonialism had been, for a long time, a rallying theme for all the peoples of Africa, Asia and the socialist countries.

(235) *A. J. I. L.*, Vol. 61 (3), July 1967, p. 753.

Points expressed emotionally and passionately today can very well become the "legal" framework of tomorrow. The role of the activities of foreign economic and other interests in impeding the implementation of the resolution on the ending of colonialism, which would have been considered some ten years ago as going far beyond the UN's sphere of competence, is now well clarified, and well dealt with by UNGA resolutions.

Today there is a revolution encompassing the whole of Southern Africa, there is a powerful armed resistance movement being carried out by the native Palestinians, encompassing Israel and Israeli-occupied territories. Foreign settlers in all these cases are backed by imperialist powers and interests, while the natives' struggle is generally considered as a national liberation struggle which is backed by all the anti-colonial countries and movements. Through armed struggle in Palestine, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, the similarities between the settlers in all three territories, and the natives in all three territories, are becoming more pronounced. It is conspicuous that in many Afro-Asian and Latin American non-governmental conferences, the Land Apportionment Act (of Southern Rhodesia) was criticized along with the resolution partitioning Palestine. It is conspicuous that the 4th Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference condemned not only the illegal Smith regime, but also the establishment of Israel. It disturbed Fenwick that what the Smith regime had done in 1965 would have been considered a common situation a generation ago. It would disturb many of similar backgrounds to see the Afro-Asian and Latin American peoples condemn the establishment of Israel, an act carried out under UN auspices some two decades earlier. But the fact remains that the world of today understands better the sufferings of the oppressed, and is willing to come to their rescue. The fact remains that what the world generally considered a sacred civilizing mission performed by the settlers, a century and more ago, is considered by the world of today as brutal imperialist exploitation.

* * *

The challenge to the settlers comes then from three directions: native, regional and international. Which challenge can be more effective and why?

It is noticeable that international opposition to the settlers is most crystallized in the case of Southern Rhodesia, and least apparent in the case of Israel. It is also noticeable that native opposition to the settlers is more powerful in Israel, less powerful in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Is there any reason behind this?

It is beyond doubt that the natives — in all three cases — would have liked to see their rights secured through international action. The Palestinians hoped for this in 1947 and 1948, the natives of Southern Rhodesia worked for this seriously in the early sixties; the natives of South Africa and their allies

also put their hope in the UN in the fifties.

But the UN did not satisfy the grievances of the Palestinians — not only that, it effectively denied them their right to national self-determination; it did not see their viewpoint. Hence in the late forties they began to grow frustrated over the UN. The natives of Southern Rhodesia were much luckier internationally; their viewpoint was quite fully espoused by the UN from the beginning — of course because of the dominance of the Afro-Asian outlook in the General Assembly; thus they were confident at some stage that the UN could secure their rights for them. The response of the UN to the grievances of the non-whites of South Africa supported them to some extent but not very much; thus they were not dissatisfied with the UN but not fully satisfied either.

For the Palestinians, the UN was not of much help, not even moral help. They found it necessary to rely on themselves in order to effectively challenge the intruders. After some two decades of painful suffering they succeeded in establishing themselves as serious challengers to the intruders. The Africans of Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, counted primarily, and to a large degree still count, on foreign pressure exerted on the settlers. This foreign pressure has taken place and is still taking place, but not to the degree necessary to bring down the settler regime. The international support the Africans of Rhodesia received, and continue to receive, has the effect of appeasing them — though only to a certain extent. Hence, in a way, the international support accorded them hindered, to a degree, their reliance on themselves, though recently they have become increasingly aware of the limitations of international support. During the sessions of the committee of 24 that were held recently in Africa to discuss the Southern African problems, a sense of despair over UN activities was clearly noticeable in many statements made by African leaders. This sense of despair was further justified by the failure of the UN Security Council, in June 1969, to reach agreement on further measures to bring down the Smith regime.

The history of international action in quelling a violation of international standards is not as bright as the history of action taken directly by those suffering from such a violation. The natives of Southern Rhodesia are becoming increasingly aware of this fact. "The sanctions that will never work" is an apt description of their attitudes towards UN action.²³⁶ It is expected that with this increasing awareness of the limitations of UN action, the natives of Southern Rhodesia will increasingly rely on their own strength.

It could be concluded, then, that notwithstanding the importance of international support, the native challenge to the intruders is generally the most effective. The settlers are immune to international pressure, because they have decided to go it alone, to care only a little about international

(236) See : "The sanctions that will never work", *Zimbabwe Review*, Vol. 1, No. 2, (June 1969), p. 9.

condemnations. What they understand is concrete action. In the domain of concrete actions, the UN suffers from limitations unknown to native armed resistance.

* * *

Problems arising from the continuation of the settler entities in non-European lands are far from being settled. Palestine, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia are still dominated by settlers who are well entrenched, and who, despite all resistance, are not likely to give up. How will the future be? How do the settlers visualize the future and what are the "native solutions" to the problems posed by the settlers? That is what we will discuss next.

IV

THE FUTURE

The future of the areas under the settler authorities in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine is far from being clear. The settlers are well entrenched in the territories they control, but the natives are increasingly taking to arms in order to implement justice and regain their rights. On the one hand it seems unthinkable that the situation will continue in the future as it is today. It is unthinkable that the settlers will remain supreme for ever. On the other hand, it is far from realistic to expect that the settler regimes will be toppled under native, regional and international pressure in a short time.

While the settlers now in control tend to think that they are not seriously threatened, they are well aware of the dangers which will continue to face them in the future. Thus, they elaborate or at least tend to elaborate certain schemes which in their opinion can satisfy both themselves and the natives. The natives, on the other hand, are still nowadays largely on the defensive, yet they have their ideas about the general lines which they would like to see implemented in the future. It should be fruitful to see how both sides have developed their schemes — or visions — of the future.

1. How the Settlers Visualise the Future

The settlers have always affirmed that their move into lands not theirs was the result of a multiplicity of factors among which figure predominantly their mission to civilize the natives, their desire to spread the Gospels, and their belief in the necessity of expanding the frontiers of civilization (i.e. Europe) *vis à vis* barbarism. Their relationship with the natives, they thought, would be a peaceful one built on cooperation similar, from their point of view, to the cooperation between a man and his child, a master and his admiring and loyal disciple. The fact that they wanted from the natives their lands, their very means of existence, does not seem to have formed an obstacle to the sweet dreams of the Empire-builders.

Their wild imagination, their inherent feelings of superiority towards the natives, and their unflagging belief that they were "right", made it possible for them to draw a picture (in reality a caricature) of grateful natives eager to sacrifice everything for the sake of increasing their learning by means of

contact with Europeans.²³⁷

Naturally, nothing of the sort happened. Instead, gradually but consistently, the relationships between the settlers and the natives deteriorated. The result of this is upon us at present: pockets of settlers, islands of Europeans in an ocean of natives, each side looking at the other with doubt and fear. Thanks to the settlers' superior resources and their technical and military skills, they were able to accomplish a great deal of what they planned. But, with the mounting native hostility to the settlers, how do the settlers view the future?

* * *

In South Africa, the idea of separating the settlers and the natives in different territories was long in vogue before the Nationalists came to power in 1948. The idea of separation was an old Boer concept. President Kruger of Transvaal mentioned in 1888 that "their [the Boers'] principle is to allot a certain district to every tribe that keeps quiet and peaceful and is willing to accept civilization; such district to be in proportion to the size of the tribe".²³⁸ The idea continued to gain ground so that, when confronted by the facts of Africa's awakening, Verwoerd recognized the need to re-affirm the concept in its mid-twentieth century version: "We must draw a line in Africa between those territories to be controlled by the white man and those to be controlled by the black man ... The line of white control may not even cover the Central African Federation ... South Africa does not plan to solve its colour problem by oppression. The solution must of necessity also offer advantages to the Bantu and the Coloureds."²³⁹

The future, as visualized by Verwoerd and the settlers of South Africa, lies in enforcing the separation of races. In 1959 the South African Parliament passed the Bantu Self-Government Act. The premises on which this Act is based are that "God had given a divine task and calling to every nation" and that every nation has "an inherent right to self-preservation." The Act envisaged the establishment of eight main national homelands for the Bantu (i.e. Africans) in which the Bantu would be able to develop to their full capacity as independent communities. It was envisaged that those national homelands would be ruled in accordance with their level of development, that eventually they would be ruled independently by the Bantu and would ultimately achieve internal autonomy. It would be only in those homelands that the Bantu would have political rights. In areas other than their homelands, the Africans would

(237) See for instance : Herzl's *Altneuland*.

(238) See : Neame, *op.cit.*, p. 24.

239) *Ibid.*, p. 158.

be considered aliens. The South African government would be represented in each of the Bantu areas by a Commissioner General whose duty would be to explain the general policy and advise the inhabitants on how to develop their area. Also, administration in the Bantu areas would be based on the tribal system, now considered as the most representative African political institution.

The fear that haunts the settlers most in their new environments is that of being outnumbered by the natives. In South Africa and Southern Rhodesia where the natives actually do outnumber the settlers, the authorities deprive the natives of their essential political right: the vote. In Israel before June 1967, this fear did not exist because the settlers succeeded in driving the natives out of their homes. Only a small native minority remained in Israel. But after the June aggression, the number of the natives in Israeli-controlled areas (including Israel "proper") has reached more than one third of the total population. Since the native population growth exceeds that of the settler population growth, one would expect that the natives, after some two to three decades, could outnumber the settlers. What is the attitude of the settlers towards the actual or potential preponderance of the natives?

In Israel, the Zionists before 1948 always insisted on having their own state, a "puritan" state composed only or mostly of Zionists even though such a state had to be smaller in territory than a bi-national Palestinian state of natives and settlers. They had this smaller state in the partition resolution and succeeded in 1948 and 1949 in expanding it a bit more, and succeeded also in "purifying" it of natives except for a slight native minority of some 12%.

South Africa's settlers, partly motivated by the Israeli experiment, have been expressing since the fifties the idea that a smaller white South African state is preferable to a big multi-national South African state. Verwoerd "had no hesitation in choosing a smaller white state rather than a big state which would eventually become non-white."²⁴⁰

But the choice in South Africa between a small but pure "Israel" there, and a large multi-national South Africa does not seem to be very clear-cut. Verwoerd was able to opt out of the two difficult alternatives by advocating another alternative: separate Bantu national states which could be bound to the white state through "wise statesmanship, help and cooperation". "If and when the Bantu areas developed into autonomous units they would be politically independent, though there would be economic interdependence. He [Verwoerd] was convinced that the development of the Bantu national homes would create so much friendship that there would be no danger of animosity towards white South Africa."²⁴¹

(240) *Ibid.*, p. 160.

(241) *Ibid.*, p. 160.

We have mentioned above some of the provisions of the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. One of the most controversial points of the Act is the degree of independence which could be given to the Bantu areas. It seems that the majority of the settlers prefer that matters such as foreign affairs and defence should continue to be in the hands of the whites, of the South African government. Others think that perhaps something like a "Commonwealth pattern", whose leading state would be white South Africa, could be worked out.²⁴² Still others think that it will take the Bantus some hundreds of years to learn how to run a state. But, to the South African government, those future questions could only be settled in the future, and in accordance with future circumstances. What was important at the time was to embark on the experiment, with zeal and stubbornness.

The first experiment in "Bantustans", (as the Bantu national homes are commonly known) was the Transkei experiment. Transkei was the largest of over 250 reserves (representing some 13% of the whole South African territory) which were allowed to remain in native hands after the last of the Kaffir wars. In area, Transkei covers some 16,000 sq. miles. It also possesses a coast line. It is inhabited by some one and a half millions who live solely on agriculture and grazing. In Transkei there are several white towns and white traders, but it is asserted that those white spots will have to go at some unspecified future date.

Transkei is the "pioneer" experiment for the development of eight Bantu political units (the eight largest native reserves in South Africa). In June 1962 Transkei, the first of these Bantustans, was granted "independence" according to an announcement by Verwoerd. Since then, Transkei has had its own flag and its own national anthem. The Transkei constitution was passed by the Transkei Territorial Authority in December 1962 and was subsequently approved by the South African legislature in May 1962.²⁴³

The Transkei constitution provides for a legislative Assembly of 109 members and for a Cabinet responsible to the Assembly. Xhosa (a local native language), English and Afrikaans are all designated "official languages". The competence of the indigenous Transkei authorities is limited, according to the constitution, to education, agriculture, forestry, justice, finance, interior, roads and works. Other matters such as defence and foreign affairs are within the competence of the South African government. Of the 109 legislative Assembly members, 64 are to be appointed; these are tribal chiefs appointed and paid by the South African government. Only 45 members are to be elected. Furthermore,

(242) Legum's book on South Africa, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

(243) See : Newell M. Stultz, "Creative self-withdrawal in the Transkei", *Africa Report*, April 1964, pp. 18-23, and Edwin S. Munger, "Transkei Independence : Fact or Fantasy", *Africa Report*, May 1962, pp. 3-6. See also Colin Legum : *Southern Africa : Crisis for the West*, (London, 1964), and Norman Pollock, "The Transkei : An Economic Backwater", *African Affairs*, Vol. 68, No. 272, (July 1969), pp. 250-256.

the president of the Republic of South Africa may dissolve the Transkei Legislative Assembly at any moment.

The first elections in "independent" Transkei took place on 20 November 1963. On 11 December 1963 the constitutional process was completed when Chief Kaiser D. Matanzima, who was elected by the Assembly as Chief Minister (head of the Cabinet) took the oath of office on the same day. At the opening of the Assembly's session, on 11 December 1963, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, M.D.C. de Wet Nel, spoke of the Republic of South Africa's "creative self-withdrawal" from the Transkei and warned the members of the Assembly "to beware of looking to "foreign countries" for help."²⁴⁴ Thus, the pioneering experiment was launched, to the delight of the advocates of apartheid. Similar steps in dealing with seven other large reserves were to follow. The future of the white settlers in South Africa, as visualized by the settlers, looked more promising, at least to themselves.

But the experiment was met with wide and deep opposition from those directly concerned. Not only did the natives organize several acts of defiance to the new constitution, right from the beginning, but also the election results (for the 45 elective seats) revealed amongst those who participated in the election a deep resentment of apartheid.²⁴⁵ It is evident that the Bantustans, with their meagre resources, have no chance of being politically and economically viable entities. All the areas allotted to Africans represent only some 13% of the South African territory, and those areas are already over-populated even though only one third of the total African population lives on them. Recent assessments of the Transkei experiment maintain that the Transkei "reminds Africans more of imposed limits than of widening opportunities", and that the idea of separate development "discloses the hollowness of its pretensions" and that it is largely meaningless.²⁴⁶ The South African authorities insist, on the other hand, that the experiment is meaningful and significant.

Separate development and ultimate full partition of South Africa are long-term projects. Their present-day function is to appease Africans, to gain time for the South African settlers. But in the meanwhile, the settlers not only sense that those schemes could not be of much avail, but they also feel their continued supremacy and existence are threatened. There have been many calls from South African leaders for the settlers to be under no illusion as to what is taking place. Back in 1961, Mr. Eric Louw, then Minister of External Affairs, warned that "the people of South Africa should be under no illusions. The forces against it [South Africa] are growing stronger and stronger. At present the battleground is the UN but it may be extended soon."²⁴⁷

(244) Stultz, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

(245) Legum, *op. cit.*, pp. 60-65, 151-152.

(246) See : Pollock, *op. cit.*, p. 256. Pollock cites this assessment from T. Karis, N. M. Stultz and G. M. Carter, *South Africa's Transkei*, (London, 1967).

(247) Reported by Legum, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

What is the nature of the battle? If we determine this we can grasp the significance of South Africa's moves and we can also see how the settlers visualize — without illusions — their future as it is being developed in African and world contexts.

To the settlers the battle of South Africa is the "traditional" one between the forces of democracy on the one hand and world communism on the other, between freedom and oppression. Their "battle" is a most reactionary re-statement of the old Cold War, in which the whites of South Africa represent democracy, enlightenment and freedom as against Africans who are tools of world communism and its subversive concepts. This battle, as conceived by the South African settlers, is not only a clear testimony of the heavy United States and United Kingdom investments in South Africa, but is also a testimony of South Africa's estrangement from the world of today where even the capitalist advocates and innovators of the Cold War have been reconsidering their position.

The white settlers in South Africa entertain a feeling of comfort — and even pride — in identifying themselves as westerners working for the supreme western values and interests. "We can ride out the storm in the knowledge that it is the solid core of western interests, threatened by all this recklessness, which we are maintaining and strengthening" wrote *Die Vaderland*, a South African newspaper, on 29 October 1963.²⁴⁸

Part of this "free world battle against communism" was France's battle against the Algerians who were at the time accused of being communists. The South African government was quick at that time to dispatch a military mission to study the counter-revolutionary measures adopted by the French government. Present cooperation with Portugal is viewed in a similar perspective: cooperation to quell communist subversion. At times, not satisfied with the support given to them by the U.S. and its allies, South African leaders tend to reprimand those allies who seem to have mellowed in their fight for the "cause" of democracy. At times, South Africa's whites feel physically isolated in an African Ocean that is set on ridding itself of their supremacy. Schoolchildren are exhorted to prepare themselves as they are "the coming generation which will have to defend South Africa". The fact that South Africa is a western settler state endears in her eyes the "courage" shown by another western settler state, Israel. It is not a coincidence that Israel is the most admired state in South Africa. Israel, similar to South Africa — a western island in an ocean of natives, was extolled by Mr. Fouche, once South Africa's Defence Minister, who said that like the whites of South Africa the Israelis "stand alone in the world, but they are full of courage". *Die Burger*, an Afrikaaner newspaper, drew the same analogy on March 13, 1962: "We in South Africa would be foolish if we did not at least take account of the possibility that we are destined to become a sort

(248) Reported by Legum, p. 88.

of Israel in a predominantly hostile Africa, and that fact might become part of our national way of life."²⁴⁹

A stand against the world has thus been developing. Colin Legum reports that a war psychosis has been created in South Africa. "When fighting is necessary we will not hesitate. A time comes in a people's history when not only reason must speak, but also blood. That time has now dawned", wrote *Die Transvaaler* in mid-1963. Legum reports that war psychosis has taken women in its grip. "Ministers' wives are among the leading personalities in the Women's Shooting Clubs. 'I can shoot moving targets easily, but do not give me the standing targets,' boasts the wife of the Minister of Bantu Affairs and Development."²⁵⁰

And South Africa is now a military garrison. Its expenditure on arms has increased more than tenfold within a decade. Military training of whites in South Africa is one of the most rigorous in the world. That is how the future is visualized and being developed.

The battle, with its international implications as conceived or misconceived by South Africa's leaders, will inevitably come. But in the meanwhile, why can there not be a small role for diplomacy, an effort to make Africans understand?

The other side of the policy of militarism, is a coolly calculated diplomatic initiative to win over some African states through cooperation and extension of aid. South Africa has always pronounced itself prepared to help its African neighbours regarding the enhancement of their development. Charles De Water, an adviser to Dr. Malan (who became Prime Minister in 1948) advocated the idea that South Africa should take the lead in organizing Pan-African scientific, veterinary, medical, agricultural and economic associations.²⁵¹ After some reluctance, these views were accepted by the government and initiatives along these lines were taken, but they did not amount to anything.

More recently, in the early sixties and after the coming to independence of many African countries, Dr. Verwoerd has consistently upheld the view that cooperation with African countries is essential, and has offered to meet with the heads of African states, for this purpose.²⁵² The aim of South Africa is, of course, to gain for itself some acceptability within Africa, to buy legitimacy with aid, skill and money. African countries, or at least the overwhelming majority of them, were unwilling to guarantee for South Africa's whites their continued supremacy. Thus, except for Malawi and the previous High Commission Territories (Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland), all African states have refrained from cooperating with South Africa despite all the pious pronouncements regarding the mutual benefits of cooperation.

(249) Reported by *Ibid.*, p. 86.

(250) *Ibid.*, p. 78.

(251) John Cope, *South Africa*, (London 1965), pp. 191-192.

(252) Legum, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

As visualized by the whites of South Africa, the immediate future depends on their military strength coupled with some diplomatic initiative in Africa. In the long run, the solution is separate development, in which case it is expected that partition would ensue with Africans taking some 13% of the land — or perhaps a little more, depending on the future generosity of South Africa's whites — and the settlers taking the rest. These South African visions of the future do not seem sound and healthy or capable of fulfilment. We have outlined the reasons for this judgment in different places above, and we shall discuss below the natives' viewpoint. But it is perhaps relevant at this juncture to note that some settlers — for example the white South African historian Arthur Kepple-Jones — do look at the future differently. In his futuristic fiction: *When Smuts goes: A History of South Africa from 1952 - 2010, First published in 2015*,²⁵³ which he wrote in 1947, the historian predicts that in 1977 South Africa's forces will clash with UN forces and the republic will subsequently be conquered. What would eventually happen to the whites? According to Kepple-Jones they will choose to emigrate from South Africa to Australia, New Zealand and Latin America!

* * *

What about the future as the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia visualize it? Southern Rhodesia became the Republic of Rhodesia, on 11 November 1969, exactly four years after UDI was proclaimed. Does this development and the new constitution that brought it about "secure" the future?

The settlers of Southern Rhodesia wanted, originally, to open the continent up for Christianity and commerce. Christianity was the concern of the missionaries who wanted, more or less sincerely, to modernize the natives. Through their work in education and their welfare activities, they incurred upon themselves the wrath of many settlers who argued that the natives should remain "an object" in the modern white society that was being built. In 1903, the Salisbury Chamber of Mines recommended that "restrictions be placed on the present system of christianizing the natives".²⁵⁴ The concomitant missionary tasks of educating the natives were frowned at "whilst the Kaffirs [i.e. natives] remain in a raw state, the native question will have little significance beyond a difficulty to make them work. The black peril will only become a reality when the results of our misguided system of education have taken root and when a veneer of European civilization struggles with the innate savage nature".²⁵⁵ A correspondent of *The Rhodesia Tribune* wrote on 28 June 1912 that "I do not consider it right that we should educate the native in any way that will unfit him

(253) Pieter Maritzburg : Shuter and Shooter, 1947.

(254) Reported by Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma*, pp. 251-252.

(255) Reported by *Ibid.*, p. 252.

for service. He is and always should be a hewer of wood and drawer of water."²⁵⁶

The settlers then turned out more interested in commerce than in Christianity. Establishing a permanent white settlement, in order to benefit from cheap labour and to exploit the territories' richness, was an idea both appealing and applicable. The Africans, in this European milieu, were to be merely a source of cheap labour. The dictum of Sir Harry Johnston, a first class imperialist, was at the bottom of the policy that was developed later. In 1893 Sir Harry wrote that "Africa which is well within the tropics must be ruled by whites and worked by blacks."

At that time, the future relationship between the settlers and the natives was not a serious question. Segregation was postulated as a way of life. Natives were to have obligations, while whites were satisfied to play the role of strong father or gentle master. The future outlook of the settlers was optimistic as it envisaged a future based on the perpetuation of the natives' subordinate position.

Slowly but consistently however, the picture started to change. Africans were growing increasingly discontented with the conditions imposed on them. They were becoming increasingly aware of their inalienable rights that were being denied them. In the thirties, discrimination against natives was reinforced by the two weapons of the Land Apportionment Act and the Industrial Conciliation Act. The settlers at that time concentrated their efforts on keeping the Africans down. The system of European domination became more self-conscious and rigid. Separation became a line of policy firmly adhered to, and firmly imposed. The African reserves were to develop in isolation from the rest of the Southern Rhodesian territory.

However, as was again the case with South Africa, the Africans were to be found everywhere in Southern Rhodesia. They were not, for all practical purposes, confined to the reserves. Africans were becoming increasingly articulate in voicing their demands. After the Second World War, the settlers found it necessary to advance schemes for the future. Thus, in 1947, the Liberal Party (a white party) came to the conclusion that territorial segregation should be translated into a political segregation. The party Congress in that year "adopted a scheme whereby Southern Rhodesia would ultimately be divided into two equal portions half for the whites and half for the blacks".²⁵⁷ The government of Sir Godfrey Huggins then countered by proposing that two Europeans be elected to the parliament in order to look after the natives' interests. At the same time it was suggested that Africans be barred from the common voting roll for twenty years.

In the elections that ensued, the white electorate gave Huggins a resound-

(256) *Ibid.*, p. 252.

(257) L. H. Gann and M. Gelfand, *Huggins of Rhodesia*, (London, 1964), p. 203.

ding victory. In that same year, 1948, the Nationalists attained power in South Africa. This gave reason for Huggins to look south: for some sort of white master-plan for Southern Africa. "The United States of Africa" was Huggins' cherished term for the sort of scheme he entertained. After the elections he reaffirmed his belief that "there is going to be a United States of Africa as sure as the sun comes up". First, the two Rhodesias would be linked up, then Nyasaland would join to form "the Great Middle Dimension of Africa"; next would come a partnership with the Union of South Africa and finally "a federation of every African territory into one united states".²⁵⁸ Europeans were to be in charge of the federation; Africans were to be taught the technique of participating in the political process, but were not expected to master the lesson in the foreseeable future.

Huggins, a practical politician, notwithstanding the fact that he received a mandate from the white settlers to close the common voting roll for Africans for the next twenty years, felt that he would be better able to pursue his master-plan if he were less doctrinal in adhering to a racist policy. Instead of clearly discriminating against Africans on grounds of colour, he achieved the same result by raising the economic qualifications for enfranchisement in 1951. The mood in Southern Rhodesia was more daring in expressing deeply-held racist views. The White Rhodesia Council, devoted to keeping Southern Rhodesia white, was quite influential. Its statute, published in the early fifties, went so far as to deny that Southern Rhodesia was a "country of Africa". It went on to affirm that it is "imperative [that] there should be white supremacy for hundreds of years."²⁵⁹

In the early fifties the Central African Federation was being worked out in negotiations between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland under the auspices of the British government. The British government, aware of the emerging anti-racist trends of the post-war years, stressed that the Federation should adopt the principle of "partnership" between the settlers and natives. The principle was adopted, and the Federation, despite African opposition, was launched in 1953.

But what did it mean by "partnership"? Colonial Secretary James Griffiths clarified the meaning to some extent while addressing some African councils in 1951. "I want all the Europeans to treat you as partners, and I want you to treat them as partners. It is only by partnership that I see any prospect of decent orderly development in these territories. The British government does not want white or black supremacy."²⁶⁰ This was only a vague statement and it was not clarified at any time afterwards how orderly democratic methods

(258) Grey, *The Two Nations*, *op. cit.*, p. 308.

(259) Reported by : *Ibid.*, p. 313.

(260) Harry Franklin, *Unholy Wedlock : The Failure of the Central African Federation*, (London 1967), pp. 61-62.

could lead to a partnership between a minority of settlers and a majority of natives.

Southern Rhodesia's European politicians were — with good reason — happy with the new term: it was advantageous to Britain and it was non-committal regarding its actual implementation. Huggins admitted that partnership was a difficult word to define and even considered that any definition could be dangerous. To him, partnership was understood to be “based on the total rejection of racial domination by either black or white”. Roy Welensky thought of partnership as a remote and mystical parity of power which would come about when Africans had reached a level of civilization and responsibility equal to that of Europeans. Partnership was later defined by Sir Roy in the election campaign for the first Federal Assembly in 1953 in these terms:

“The success of the Federation was dependent on partnership between the African and his European master. If the African wants to rise he must exert himself. We shall see that the African can only gain political freedom by attaining European standards and culture. We are here to look after the African or to guide him where we want him to be.”²⁶¹

The advocates of partnership among the settlers always confessed, moreover, that even in the future power would be held equally by Europeans and the natives, not by the native majority. As it has turned out, “partnership” was just a polite phrase for “European supremacy”. The policy of partnership was expressed in a number of legislative acts that were meant to keep the Africans subordinated for the foreseeable future. Starting from 1958, it became evident that partnership was a farce; that the Africans' advancement could not be accomplished by those who regarded the Africans as inferior.

As the Federation was running into difficulties by the early sixties, there was a revived interest in fashioning new formulas for the future within the framework of a new constitution. The 1961 constitution that was finally worked out between the British and the settlers, did not satisfy African demands whose party, the NDP, advocated a policy of one man, one vote. The whites' parties were generally in favour of a limited franchise which would keep the Africans in their place while extending to them a slight chance of participation in the political process. The 1961 constitution, negotiated in an era of rising African self-assertion, represented a moderate shift in the previously-held white settlers' position. It allowed the Africans to participate in the Legislative Assembly with 15 out of 65 members. It introduced a complicated franchise system that was more “liberal” than previous systems; and the franchise, being entrenched in the constitution, was not, as in the past, subject to amendment by a simple parliamentary majority.²⁶² However, the

(261) *Ibid.*, p. 82.

(262) See : James Barber, *Rhodesia : The Road to Rebellion*, (London 1967), pp. 74-75.

constitution was too conservative in its "liberalism" to be of significance to Africans. As a matter of fact, even before the official referendum on the new constitution was held on 26 July 1961, the NDP (the African nationalists' party) submitted the draft constitution to an African referendum organized by the NDP, on 23 July 1961, and the draft was overwhelmingly rejected. This did not deter Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Prime Minister at the time, from proclaiming, after the draft was approved by the official referendum, that the referendum results signified "the birth of the Rhodesian nation", and declaring that "the stage is set for the African people to play their part fully in the political life of the country".²⁶³

The "official" visualization of the future was again based on "national cooperation" between the settlers and the natives, cooperation that would lead Rhodesians, whites and blacks, "closer and closer to a sense of one nationalism". That this concept was already rejected by Africans was clear. That the settlers were hiding themselves behind pious statements in order to continue their supremacy, was also clear.

The 1961 constitution, theoretically, has nothing which precludes the Africans from becoming a parliamentary majority in the future, by meeting the franchise requirements. Practically however, it was calculated that at least 20 years would have to pass before this could possibly happen. Ian Smith, in 1964, said that he did not foresee an African nationalist government in his life time.²⁶⁴

Many settlers regarded the 1961 constitution as a compromise intended to preserve the Federation. But the Federation did not last long after the constitution became operative. In the negotiations between the settlers and Britain between 1963 (the date when the Federation was dissolved) and November 1965, when UDI was proclaimed, the settlers tactically admitted that Africans would have to be in the majority at some remote future date. But their "concession" certainly did not satisfy the Africans, nor Britain. Britain was now under growing international pressure which insisted on the right of the Africans to be in the majority. Finally, on 11 November 1965 UDI was proclaimed. The settlers decided to go it their own way.

How does the government of Ian Smith visualize the future? Unlike South Africa, there has not been a doctrinal espousal of apartheid, but all indications suggest that the settlers of Southern Rhodesia are moving in that direction. The early visions of the future by the settlers shortly before and after UDI were to "fight it out"; fight it out against a mean international plot engineered, again, by communists and their stooges, the Africans. If they [the white settlers] did not obtain independence, declared Ian Smith, they would have

(263) See : *Keesing Contemporary Archives*, (October 21-28, 1961) p. 18385.

(264) Barber *op. cit.*, p. 84.

to leave Rhodesia. They would rather fight it out than go voluntarily.*

The editorial of *News Front* (the Rhodesian Front Party — Smith's party) of 4 October 1964 drew a "clear" picture of Southern Rhodesia's white destiny: "The arena is the world. The contest is white civilization versus barbarism Today, Southern Rhodesia, almost the last stronghold of this principle, finds herself cast to lead the counter-attack". Shortly before that, John Gaunt, then a newly appointed Minister of Local Government, reflected in an interview with the *Washington Post* published in mid-1964 about what would happen in Rhodesia, after the whites had seized independence: "There will be some shooting, screaming, foaming at the mouth for a few days Then ... we'll be forgotten." Changes in the 1961 constitution would have to be made, as the constitution — as it was mentioned above — does not contain anything which could preclude Africans from becoming a parliamentary majority at some future date. Gaunt said that such changes would have to be made as it "would be pretty silly to take all these risks and then in about ten years get an African majority government; wouldn't it?"²⁶⁵

The role of Southern Rhodesia in a world battle was further elaborated by Ian Smith upon proclaiming the UDI. He stated in no uncertain terms:

"I believe that we are a courageous people and history has cast us in a historic role... We may be a small country but we are a determined people who have been called upon to play a role of world wide significance... The decision which we have taken today is a refusal by Rhodesians to sell their birth-right and *even if we were to surrender, does anyone believe that Rhodesia would be the last target of the communists in the Afro-Asian bloc ?*"²⁶⁶

Mr. Clifford Dupont, who was a deputy Prime Minister and a Minister of External Affairs, was more emphatic when he told the Legislative Assembly in March 1963:

"Southern Rhodesia today is in the front line; but we are fighting not only our own battle for existence, but theirs [that of the United States and the United Kingdom]. Is it too much to ask for their sympathy and understanding in this struggle ? I do not think I am being melodramatic in stating that small as we are, at the present moment in the battle for Africa we are the vanguard and I have no hesitation in saying that if we go the way of Central and East Africa then it is only a question of time before Western civilization also has to go."²⁶⁷

1966 was the year when the settlers discovered that, except for tacit encouragement from certain Western interests, they were standing alone against the world. Even the United Kingdom and the United States could not

(*) Reported by Barber, *Ibid.*, p. 304.

(265) Reported in *Ibid.*, p. 252-253.

(266) Quoted by Kenneth Young, *Rhodesia and Independence : A Study in the British Colonial Policy*, (London, 1967), p. 288, emphasis supplied.

(267) Quoted by Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 205 from S.R.L.A. *Hansard*, 13 March, 1963.

overtly support them in face of international pressure. To the settlers, there was even an East-West conspiracy against them which A. E. Striton described in *The Citizen* (4 March 1966) in these terms:

“As false prophets of new political and social theories, the liberals are dupes of sinister masters, who, bent on world conquest, have inflicted the universal body-politic with a malignant view and in the battle for the minds of men... these obedient leftist professors, lecturers, teachers, journalists, authors, artists, clergymen etc. [barter] their services without scruple to the highest bidder in the slave market of the principal contenders in what is euphemistically termed the East-West cold war.”²⁶⁸

The world was being subjected to subversive activities, international organs were clearly working against civilization which only the Southern Rhodesian settlers were upholding. Fowatt Phillips, an M.P., described the UN before the Legislative Assembly on 1 July 1966, as a “forum of communism ... dominated by thirty-three irresponsible African states”.²⁶⁹

Against this background the settlers started thinking, in the latter part of 1966, of the necessity of regularizing their future by means of a new constitution which would sever all that remained of their ties with the United Kingdom, and which would guarantee them a future befitting their wishes without regard to any foreign intervention.

On January 17, 1967 the Cabinet decided to set up a commission to prepare a republican constitution. One of the guidelines of the commission was, in Smith's words, to work for a system which “acknowledges our different communities and provides safeguards which will enable the different communities to live according to their own wishes.”²⁷⁰

The theme of separate development was advanced systematically afterwards. On the role of the Europeans, Smith announced on 19 February 1967 in a speech before the Legislative Assembly: “The role of the Europeans has been to protect the African from himself. History has shown that the African is his own worst master.”²⁷¹ On 22 April 1967, a special congress of the Rhodesian Front Party announced a set of new principles in which the move towards the right was very evident. Among other things, the party pledged itself that it would ensure that the government of Rhodesia would remain permanently in responsible hands [by which it is generally understood: European hands], and that it would oppose compulsory integration believing that “the peaceful co-existence of people can only be achieved when communities have the right and opportunity to preserve their own identities, traditions and customs”, and recognizing “the obligation of the government where necessary to ensure the provision of such separate facilities as will make this possible.”²⁷²

(268) *Ibid.*, p. 286.

(269) *Ibid.*, p. 287.

(270) *Keesing Contemporary Archives*, (February 4-11, 1967), p. 21864.

(271) *Ibid.*, (May 20-27), p. 22043.

(272) *Ibid.*, p. 22043.

The report of the constitutional commission, chaired by W. R. Whaley, which was published on 10 April 1968, is a good example of the settlers' visualization of the future: It rejected the principle of ultimate African majority rule as irresponsible and instead it recommended a new principle of race-parity designed, as the commission stated, to prevent two things: permanent political domination by Europeans and also eventual African rule. For the time being, the report stated, Africans must concede that Europeans should exercise the most authoritative voice in government for a period "not measured by clock or calendar".²⁷³

The proposed new constitution came up with a complicated voting system, but it openly reserved half the seats for the whites then, and in the future. One quarter of the seats was given to Africans — tribal chiefs and so forth. The fourth quarter was to be elected on a multi-racial basis.

Race-parity was thus assured not for today, not for tomorrow, but in the distant future. Even Rhodesian papers commented that the proposed constitution would not allow Africans to attain parity with whites for generations "and if they do, they cannot get beyond it even if Rhodesia lasts 10,000 years."²⁷⁴ The draft constitution, it should be said, did not espouse apartheid; rather it formally denounced it. But it suggested certain measures which are quite in harmony with a concept that has been characterized as a crime against humanity.

The Whaley Commission's report was decent enough to formally reject apartheid, though it recommended a constitution that is in harmony with it. But the settlers were now more adamant. Their concept of the future was becoming firmly based on something like apartheid. On 19 March 1968, a new party, the Rhodesian National Party, was formed and the new party came out openly in favour of apartheid.

Even the Rhodesian Front Party, the government party, was not quite satisfied with the constitutional commission's formal rejection of apartheid. The settlers have no desire for even any outward appearance of decency. The party developed, in July 1968, a set of counterproposals the most important feature of which was the possibility of future partition. "It is accepted that partition is for practical purposes virtually impossible; but it is felt that our descendants may decide it is both possible and necessary, and for this reason the safeguard must be included in the constitution."²⁷⁵ Also, the counter proposals contained an elaborate "provincial system of government" which bears resemblance to the Bantustan system in South Africa. In September 1968, Smith declared his belief that "separate development and provincialisation" could ensure "a just and safe future for Rhodesia".²⁷⁶

Preparations for the new constitution were delayed for a while as the

(273) *Ibid.*, (June 29 - July 6, 1968), p. 22784.

(274) *Ibid.*, p. 22784.

(275) *Ibid.*, September 21-28, 1968; p. 22927.

(276) *Ibid.*, p. 22928.

Fearless talks between Wilson and Smith were going on. However, by May 1969 Smith announced definitely that the *Fearless* talks had come to nothing, that the draft constitution would be published on 21 May 1969, and that a referendum would follow on 20 June 1969.

The constitutional proposals, as published on 21 May 1969, state clearly in the introduction that the 1961 constitution was objectionable on several counts: "the principal ones being that it provides for eventual African rule and inevitably the domination of one race by another; and ... it does not guarantee that government will be retained in responsible hands."²⁷⁷

The constitutional proposals provide for a bi-cameral legislature: The House of Assembly and a Senate. The House of Assembly will be composed of 66 members, 50 of whom will be Europeans. The remaining 16 seats will be for Africans. Half of the African seats will be elected by Councils of Chiefs, and the other half elected by Africans at large. With the increase of the contributions to the national exchequer from the African community, the number of African seats will be enlarged to a maximum of 50 seats thus bringing about a parliamentary parity between the two races. The Senate will comprise 23 members, 10 elected by the European community and another ten elected by the African community, while the remaining three members would be appointed by the Head of the State. The constitutional proposals also contain provisions on provincialization. Moreover, they also contain a clear affirmation of the division of land between African and European areas. The constitution, if approved, was to enter into force on 11 November 1969, making of Southern Rhodesia the Republic of Rhodesia.

The proposals neither formally endorsed nor rejected apartheid, yet they contained provisions which made many white Rhodesian "moderates" describe them as a prelude to apartheid. It is estimated that it will take generations before parliamentary parity between whites and Africans can be reached.

On June 20, 1969, the new name of Southern Rhodesia and the draft constitution were approved, by a strong majority of 73% for the new constitution and 81% for the "Republic of Rhodesia".²⁷⁸

Thus the future as visualized at present by the settlers of Southern Rhodesia is based on continued European supremacy for generations to come. Eventual partitioning of Rhodesia between a white and an African domain is an idea that is gaining ground day by day. Though there is no definite expression of this ultimate solution, yet there are many indications that point in that direction. For the present, the accent is on provincialization which could serve as a prelude to partitioning. At any rate, these long-range future schemes do not prejudice the short-range occupation with militarism. We have quoted above a number of the settlers' leaders to show that they regard their continued military supremacy *vis à vis* the natives as their real guarantee for the future. Meanwhile, the

(277) *Ibid.*, July 26 - August 2, 1969; p. 23476.

(278) *Ibid.*, p. 23477.

settlers' regime, notwithstanding all the condemnations thrown at it by Africans and international organizations, still has the 'subtlety' to attempt to practice open deception towards African countries. On different occasions Smith and his lieutenants talked about the possibility and advantages of peace with their neighbours, especially with Zambia. On 13 January 1967, for instance, Smith expressed his readiness to help Zambia attain a higher economic level.²⁷⁹ In this respect, the settlers' regime in Southern Rhodesia had even less luck than that of the Pretoria regime. The pious statements of the Southern Rhodesian settlers about the advantages of economic cooperation in Central Africa were met only with contempt.

* * *

Let us now turn to the third experiment in settler colonialism, that of Israel. How do the Israelis visualize the future and how do they envisage a solution to the natives' hostility?

It should be noted at the outset that settler colonialism in Palestine was the most internationally supported of the three endeavours, as it was undertaken by the most sophisticated settler elements, and pious statements expressing the desire to civilize and help natives were more abundant than was the case with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. At the same time, the Zionist settlers were more preoccupied with their purity; they did not want anything to do with the natives. For them the question was essentially how to get the land and get rid of the natives of the land.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to go into the details of the hypocritical statements made by the settlers' leaders exhorting the natives to cooperate with them for the two sides' mutual advantage, as it is also beyond our scope to show how the settlers really never intended to cooperate with the natives except in one respect: to ease the natives out. But the high degree of the settlers' hypocrisy is remarkable. Let us take for instance the statement of Golda Meir in June 1969 in which she expressed her conviction that someday Israeli experts in agriculture, medicine and engineering would cross the Arab borders to bring to their neighbours the benefits of their skills.²⁸⁰ Two years after the June aggression, after some 20 months of tacit Israeli refusal to implement the Security Council resolution of 22 November 1967, and after a long and bitter Zionist campaign against the two-and four-power talks on the Middle East, and after many declarations by Israeli leaders to the effect that Israel will never withdraw from all the territories occupied as a result of the June aggression, Meir persists in trying to deceive Arab and world public opinion by asserting her firm conviction of the inevitability of cooperation at some future date. Let Israel cooperate first in the repatriation of the natives. Similar to the pious statements of the settlers' leaders in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, cooperation is visualized by the

(279) *Ibid.*, (February 4-11, 1967), p. 21864.

(280) *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 June, 1969.

Israeli leaders on the basis of respect of the *status quo* with its enshrinement of the settlers' supremacy.

But behind this facade of pious pronouncements, Golda Meir knows full well that the settlers' "rights" have always been the fruit of their military strength. It was she who said, addressing a meeting in Haifa recently, that "the only guarantee for peace is our military strength".²⁸¹ She was quite right in this: the settlers' peace is not based on the consent of the natives, not based on the settlers' adjustment to their environment, but only on their military strength. This then is how the Israeli settlers visualize the future: their continued existence with supreme power on lands not theirs, guaranteed by force — a guarantee identical with the guarantee enjoyed by the settlers of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.

Before admitting that their future is guaranteed only through force, the Zionist settlers made a military garrison out of their "state", a garrison — again as in the case of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia — well linked with the imperialists who tacitly, and overtly, extend to it all possible aid.

Would this really guarantee the future? At rare moments of truth, the Israeli leaders seem to question this thesis. Dayan himself, some two years after the June aggression, seemed to question this thesis in an interview published in the French *L'Express* (19-25 May 1969). He agreed in the interview that "the greatest problem is to find a way to live with the Arabs". He also agreed to the fact that "the Arabs regard us as foreigners, intruders who deprived them of their lands". He did not want to impose on the Arabs the reality of the Israeli military conquest "but would like a political and human solution". What are the lines of such a solution? "We are Europeans" stated Dayan, "we are foreigners but we are ready to share with them [the natives] our standard of living and treat them as equals."

The solution then implies again the concept of compatibility of interests — the compatibility of interests between a thief and the home owner. Dayan should have realized a long time ago that the difficulty which defies solution is that no native would like to see a foreigner on his land, especially when this foreigner is fully armed not only with weapons but also with the determination to deprive the native of his land. As to sharing with the natives the Israeli standard of living and treating them as equal, one could say that the system of "collective punishment" which Dayan elaborated in November 1969 is a striking illustration of what is meant by equal treatment.²⁸²

When Dayan acknowledged that the Zionists were Europeans he was also stating that, by its very nature, Israel cannot but be out of harmony with the

(281) *L'Orient*, (Beirut Daily), 13 July, 1969.

(282) It should be noted that Article 33 of the Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians in times of war reads in part: "No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited."

Middle East. Zionism, as we have seen, is a Western doctrine which thrived in an atmosphere of imperialism. Herzl envisaged a Zionist state in Palestine as a "rampart of Europe against Asia". Ben Gurion's famous phrase that Israel was part of the Middle East "only in geography" — which is a static factor — was followed by his affirmation that Israel is Western in structure and outlook.

As an extension of the imperial west in the Middle East the settlers in Palestine, similar to the settlers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, look to themselves as part of the "Free World", as heroes destined to fight the battle against communist domination. They are also the vanguard of the battle. The Israelis pride themselves that in June 1967 they emerged victors without costing the U.S. a fraction of what is being spent in South Vietnam. American generals affirmed that the Israeli aggression had the effect of extending and consolidating the "strategic reach" of the U.S.²⁸³ Levi Eshkol, the late Israeli Prime Minister, declared in an interview published in *Newsweek* (11 February 1969) that Israel is "valuable to the United States much beyond its size"; while a certain Israeli writer proclaims that Israel is the last United States garrison in the Middle East; an effective bulwark against communism.²⁸⁴ Israel's links with western imperialism imposed on her the duty to perform another service — a mission — in Africa and Asia. That mission was not only to fight "communism" with arms but also to supply assistance, military, economic and technical, to the countries of Asia and Africa as a neo-colonialist agent. We have mentioned above how the Afro-Asians reacted by specifically designating Israel in the sixties as an agent of neo-colonialism. Ben Gurion with his usual frankness affirmed this truth when he mentioned in a speech to the Knesset on 24 October 1960 that Israel's assistance to Asian and African countries "redounds to Israel's honour in Europe and America."²⁸⁵

In order to live up to their dedication to the "principles of the Free World", Israeli leaders are all for intensifying the East-West cold war. Similar to the ultra-rightist stands of the settlers of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia they look with apprehension at efforts to relax international tensions. Israel's refusal to sign the treaty of non-proliferation of atomic weapons is well known. Bi-lateral (US and USSR) and four-lateral talks on the Middle East in early 1969, met with great anger and anguish in Israel. There was a fear in Israel (unjustified in view of the consistent U. S. support of Israel) that the consultations would force upon her a settlement that could curb her expansionist schemes. The Israelis admit — quite defiantly — that they have no intention of withdrawing from the areas they occupied as a result of the June hostilities, despite the UN Security Council resolution to this effect adopted on 22 November 1969. A feeling that they have to stand alone if need be against the UN — and the world — is a clear reminder of the feelings of South Africa's and Southern

(283) See for example : *United States News and World Report*, 19 June, 1967.

(284) *Jerusalem Post*, 17 January 1969.

(285) *Israel Digest*, Vol. 3, No. 22, 28 October, 1960, p. 4.

Rhodesia's settlers. Golda Meir's statement to *Maariv* on 22 May 1969 that "Israel would refuse to accept any agreement which might be reached by the four powers if it was found to be unsatisfactory" and that "this would be the case even if the recommendation was put to the UN Security Council or General Assembly", could be regarded with only minor alterations, replacing Israel by South Africa or Southern Rhodesia, as an equally valid statement for either Smith or Vorster.

In their fears of being left alone in the world as a result of whatever East-West accord could be developed, the prominent Israeli historian Jacob Telmon noted recently (May 1969) that many Israeli leaders are afraid of any signs of mutual understanding between the USSR and the US even concerning the Vietnamese question.²⁸⁶ A "nihilistic spirit" haunts the leaders of the Zionist settlers in Palestine, similar to the spirit that haunts the settlers' leaders in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. The Israeli settlers' loneliness in a misunderstanding world reaches its height concerning the question of Jerusalem, where the Security Council and the General Assembly requested Israel not to change the status of the city, and condemned the Israeli act of incorporating it into Israel. Here, the Israeli settlers are left nakedly exposed as aggressors before the world body, who have no resort to any argument other than that old one employed by South Africa to no avail since 1946: that as the question of Jerusalem is a domestic matter the UN intervention in the question is unjustified as it constitutes an intervention in the internal affairs of the state of Israel!²⁸⁷

It is ironic that a state that prides itself on being "created" by the UN, a "child" of the UN, would consider as "illegal" the UN intervention in Jerusalem, whose international status is as much a UN work as the existence of Israel.

Golda Meir well understands that the image of Israel in the world has changed. She confesses that, "It hurts us that this change has taken place." But then she goes on to affirm the choice of defiance: "if we have to choose between a lot of sympathy in the world towards Israel destroyed, and a lot of misunderstanding with Israel alive, I am sorry that we are not understood but I think I would rather be alive."²⁸⁸

The meaning of what Meir said is clear: Israel is determined to live not because of international sympathy, as used to be the allegation before, but against international sympathy. The world now is the enemy, and the Zionists are resolved to resist it if it does not sanction their expansionist policies.

Defiance of the world, resistance to UN "illegal" intervention in the "internal affairs" of Israel — with respect to Jerusalem and with respect to human rights — all this loneliness, this frustrating feeling of isolation prompts the settlers to more militarism, more stress on the value of force as a guarantee

(286) See : *La Merhaab*, (Israeli newspaper), 26 May, 1969.

(287) See the speech of Yigal Allon before the General Zionist Conference. Press reports on 7 and 8 July, 1969.

(288) *Sunday Times*, June 15, 1969.

of the future.

One of the side effects of this stress on militarism in Israel is that the democratic process is diminishing even among the settlers. One of the prominent topics debated in Israel today is this phenomenon of declining democracy under the rising tide of militarism.

Besides their pious pronouncements and militarism, the Israelis, especially after the June aggression, have been increasingly involved in advancing schemes for their new and old native victims. The old design of subjecting the natives to military government was abolished — formally — in 1966 after it developed an abhorrent international reputation for Israel. But it seems that in practice its abolishment did not take place before the June aggression or even after, because on as recent a date as February 1968 the subject of the liquidation process of the military government was still brought up.²⁸⁹ Thus the military government was abolished only at a time when newly occupied territories were subjected to military rule.

But military rule is not a full answer to problems that will continue to grow in the future, especially when Israel is set on retaining most, and probably all, of the occupied territories. The natives in those territories together with the old "minority of natives" in Israel "proper" constitute more than one half of the total settlers' population. How do the settlers visualize the future?

Zionist racism is based on exclusiveness; it is too jealous of purity, too attached to the idea that a Zionist state should be fully Jewish in character. Thus it is not inclined to leave any place for the natives even as cheap workers. Zionist colonialism insisted on having the land empty — or else emptying the land. In 1948, there were voices that wanted to drive the remaining small native minority out of Israel, in order to keep the state completely "Jewish". This exclusiveness of Zionism stems from both racist grounds and strategic considerations. When Israel was established, the failure of the South African settlers' experiment was rather evident, and the difficulties that would face the application of apartheid were not a secret. The Zionist settlers in Palestine wanted to build a state "secure from the inside"; this security could only be provided by forcing the natives out and this was almost completely effectively done. During his visit to South Africa in June 1969, Ben Gurion emphasized this "superior technique" in settler colonialism. He emphasized to his racist white hosts that the Israeli formula of forcing the natives out, if it had been applied in South Africa, would have guaranteed South Africa against "internal subversion."²⁹⁰ Against this background of exclusiveness one should investigate the Zionist settlers' "constructive" visions of the future.

The dream of getting rid of the natives is paramount in the Zionist settlers'

(289) See for instance : Amnon Rubinstein's article in *New Outlook*, (February, 1968), entitled "Military government goes quietly" pp. 32-33. In this article the author acknowledges that only the natives were subjected to military government.

(290) See : *Al-Itihad*, (an Israeli newspaper published in Arabic), 24-6-1969.

visions of the future. Through increased sophistication in the application of terror in the areas occupied as a result of the June aggression, the settlers hope that the natives would feel obliged to leave. In this, the settlers were partially but not completely successful. Reports from the spot written in November 1967 indicate that the rate of the natives' exodus that month was running at the rate of some 200-300 persons a day.²⁹¹ During 1968 and 1969, the rate of the natives' exodus was less, perhaps much less, but it is a daily affair to hear of people expelled by the occupying authorities to Jordan or other Arab countries. Nevertheless, the situation in 1967 was much too different from the situation in 1947-1948 when the natives easily succumbed to the psychological effects of terror. During and after the June aggression, there was a stronger feeling of determination, on the part of the natives, to stick to their homes. The experience of their relations, staying for some 20 years in refugee tents, was not encouraging. Hence, we find, after the June hostilities, a resistance to terror, a refusal to leave, especially on the West Bank of the Jordan river. Zionist terror has, therefore, failed to compel the natives to leave. The grounds thus have not been clear, so far, for the annexation of the occupied territories without endangering the Jewish character of Israel. Is there another alternative?

One such alternative is advocated by the Secretary General of Rafi, Shimon Peres. His alternative does not seem to be based on terror, rather it is based on encouraging Arab emigration.

"There is the phenomenon in the modern world of roaming from village to city and from agriculture to industry. In the Arab world industrial development was delayed by several generations, but the twentieth century arrived in the Arab world with the assistance of oil wells which made possible employment and enrichment of many. Why prevent the movement of emigrants from underdeveloped agriculture in Judah and Samaria [i.e. the west bank of the Jordan river] to the oil countries of Kuwait and Bahrain?"²⁹²

What Peres does here is simply to restate an old Herzelian idea that has been constantly present in the minds of the Zionists: to spirit the native element, the penniless ones, "across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it any employment in our own country."²⁹³ But what Peres refuses to recognize here is the fact that a man cannot so easily forget his home, where he was born, nurtured and raised. The experience gained after 1947-1948, with respect to the same natives, does not justify Peres' wishful thinking. The experience of the Jews themselves does not justify what Peres advocates. Only about 15% of the Jews of the world actually responded to Zionists calling on them to leave their homelands, and many of those who settled in Israel still retain their separate nationalities, and always have the freedom to

(291) See : Don Peretz, "Israel's New Arab Dilemma", *MEJ*, Vol. 22(1), Winter 1968, pp. 45-57. Information taken from the *Washington Post*, November 27, 1967.

(292) *Ha-aretz*, November 9, 1967, (quoted by Peretz, *Ibid.*, p. 51).

(293) *Diaries*, Vol. 1, p. 88.

go home, to their countries of origin.

Getting rid of the native Arabs is then unlikely to be accomplished either by the employment of terror or by encouraging Arab emigration. And since the Zionist settlers are especially inclined — not to say obviously determined — to annex most, and probably all, of the occupied territories, while at the same time they are determined not to commit South Africa's mistake of having actually to live with the natives — thus jeopardizing the Jewish character of the state — then what can be the answer to such a dilemma?

It is not astonishing to see the Zionist settlers follow in the steps of South Africa's settlers in their determination not to integrate with the natives, and to preserve their supremacy towards them. It has been a current theme in Zionist thinking since mid-1967, that a native Palestinian "state", autonomous in its internal affairs, within the framework of Israel, could be created in part of the occupied territories. This theme has been so current that it is not necessary to document it. The theme has so far not been put forward officially by the government; especially as the Palestinians' response to it was strongly negative.

Though the scheme has not been effectively put forward so far, yet it is far from being dropped. Writing in June 1969, Haim Herzog, an influential insider in the Israeli ruling circles, states his view that perhaps it is more advisable for the time being to forget about the establishment of a Palestinian state, and to be concerned more with the idea of establishing a Druze state — that is, a state for an Arab religious community; members of this community are to be found in Syria and Lebanon also. Herzog thinks that this "theme" could serve well Israeli objectives in advancing an appropriate political base along which the future of the Middle East could be developed.²⁹⁴

The idea of a small native "Bantustan" entity in Israel, in a greater Israel, is thus a corner-stone in the settlers' visions of the future. Admittedly it will take a long time for the settlers to formally espouse such a solution, and longer to put it into effect. But again this course of events is inevitable since the settlers are determined to expand, and at the same time guard their racial and cultural exclusiveness. It was one of the best Israeli spokesmen to the world, Mr. Abba Eban, who explained the exclusiveness of the Zionists in these terms:

"The idea should not be one of integration. Quite the contrary: integration is rather something to be avoided. One of the great apprehensions which afflict us when we contemplate our cultural scene is the danger lest the predominance of immigrants from Oriental origin force Israel to equalize its cultural level with that of the neighbouring world."²⁹⁵

The Zionist settlers, with their racist attitude to preserving their exclusiveness, their Jewish character, can talk about peace in order to deceive their

(294) *Yediot Ahronot*, 6 June 1969. Herzog is obviously referring to an old Zionist scheme of dividing the Middle East up into religiously-based entities! A return to the Middle Ages.

(295) *Voice of Israel*, (New York, 1957), p. 76.

neighbours and the world, can talk about the possibility of establishing a native Bantustan in Greater Israel to quieten their tensions and the tensions experienced daily in areas under their control, but, like other settlers in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, they approach the future armed. They know that their future extends as far as their strength extends: geographically and temporally, horizontally and vertically. So the rallying cry in Israel will continue, for a long time in the future, to be that "we have to live with this unresolved conflict for perhaps 30 years" — as General Rabin told a correspondent of the Associated Press in June 1969.²⁹⁶

* * *

In studying how the settlers visualize the future it was remarkable to see the similarities in approach between the three settler states in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel. All three states regard themselves as western, European states, all of them are aware of the problem of their inherent incompatibility with their environments. All of them entertain a sense of mission — a false mission at that! — of combatting world communism, that manifests itself in their neighbours and their natives. All of them serve as havens for western imperialist capital investments, and all of them work or try to work as agents for infiltrating western economic and financial interests in to the new states of Africa and Asia.

It is revealing to read the interview given by Ian Smith to the Israeli journalist, Haim Herzog (who was referred to above), as it was published in *Ha-aretz* on 27 June 1969. In this interview Herzog remarked that the Israelis in the six day war obstructed the Soviet schemes in the Middle East and Africa, whereupon Smith replied by affirming that Israel and Rhodesia have a common denominator: Israel is a thorn in the flesh of the Middle East while Rhodesia is a thorn in the flesh of Africa and those "two small races constitute a great obstacle to the communist schemes of expansion". In this interview Smith declared his conviction that Rhodesia's relations with Israel will be further strengthened in the future, and he envisaged the possibility of Southern Rhodesia carrying out retaliatory raids across the borders with Zambia — along the Israeli pattern — if the "terrorist" attacks did not calm down.

These similarities between the three settler states lead them into similar visions of the future. There is first their conviction that they have a world role to play in the battle against communism, thus they link their future — consciously and unconsciously — with the imperialist powers, though they know full well that their vulnerability is much more than other parts of the so-called Free World. Second, when those settlers think of the future they think of it in terms that guarantee for them their exclusiveness — racial, cultural and even economic and financial. Their enemy, in their adherence to exclusiveness, is the

(296) *L'Orient*, (Beirut daily), 22 June, 1969.

idea of integration which, in the words of Eban, should be avoided. All of them are committed to a practical policy of Apartheid, though Southern Rhodesia and Israel — with the propagandist's prudence — do not formally employ the term. In their vision of the future, all three settler states are for the creation of native "Bantustans" on autonomous bases within the framework of a greater settler commonwealth. We will not evaluate the soundness of the idea of native Bantustans directed in their important affairs by the settlers. It is enough to recall PAFMECSA's condemnation of South Africa's Bantustans, in February 1962, as "a cynical fraud and calculated insult to African people".

Other than those schemes for separating the natives into special autonomous units subjected ultimately to the settler authorities, the settler states, content as they will be if the *status quo* can be preserved, (less of course the native "troubles") can be generous in talking about the necessity, desirability and possibility of peace with their neighbours, in such a way as to have the settlers supreme in the territories they acquire. Pious pronouncements, based especially on economic arguments, are thus another characteristic of the settler states in dealing with the problems of today. The settlers like always to talk about their skills, about their richness in capital, and about the compatibility of economic interests between themselves and their neighbours. But what they need from this "altruistic attitude" is first to secure "legitimization" for themselves in their discriminatory practices towards the natives. Another motivation of this "altruism" is the hope that through such cooperation, they can exploit the rich resources in the areas surrounding them; while a third motivation is the international propagandist value of talking "positively", and in a "constructive spirit" about a future based on "peace, love and cooperation"!

Realistically, however, the settlers themselves do not believe their own pious pronouncements and they cannot but be doubtful about the little chance of success in the schemes of separation of themselves and the natives. Thus, in reality, their approaches to the future, their day-to-day preparations for the future, are based on the necessity of keeping themselves militarily supreme. Deep in their souls they envisage their future as an "intensified replica" of their past in lands not theirs: full of terror and blood. They think that if they have to have a future, they will have to emerge victorious from all the battles ahead of them. They can keep themselves superior by keeping their strength superior. And they can keep this if they continue to be more technically advanced. Hence, their enemies are not the natives in general, as much as they are the modernized natives: the natives who are both open to the sciences and to the world. The settlers have a vested interest in keeping the natives underdeveloped, thus it could be affirmed that they are the most reactionary forces in today's world; the sworn enemies of the natives' progress and development.

The settlers then visualize their future extending as far as their strength extends: in time and in space. They are afraid of the future, because the future

will bring about, inevitably, more modernization of the natives. But is it their physical existence that is threatened by the developed natives? Or is it only their supremacy *vis à vis* the natives that is threatened? We shall discuss this in the following pages.

2. *Native Solutions to the "Settler Problem": Prospects and Problems*

Perhaps it is still too early to speak of native solutions to the settler problems in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel. In all these three settler states, there is native resistance, there is determination and there is no lack of courage, yet the natives do not seem about to take over in the near future. Determined as they are to win their rights, the natives boldly acknowledge that their fight is going to be a long one, beset with difficulties and obstacles. At this stage of the struggle against the colonial settlers, the natives are not in a position to elaborate detailed work programmes. Yet they have their blueprints of what they would like to see accomplished.

Common to all these blue-prints is their insistence on being free from racism, and discrimination on grounds of race or religion. It is a remarkable and commendable fact that the natives in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel, while they are more than fully justified in disliking the settlers, insist that they are ready to live with the settlers on terms of equality to all. Their only condition for this is the elimination of the discriminatory basis on which all the settler institutions are founded. To many settlers, this condition is tantamount to their physical destruction because they have grown into the habit of thinking that their existence cannot but be privileged and supreme. But it should be made clear that there is no native movement, whether in Southern Africa or in Palestine, that advocates the physical annihilation or forcible exodus of the settlers *en masse* and without distinction. What the natives are against is not the existence of the settlers as such. They are not against the settlers on account of their colour, skin or religious beliefs. Instead, they are against the supremacy of the settlers, against the discrimination the settlers practice, against the methods the settlers apply. The fact that most of the settlers have at least acquiesced in their leaders' discriminatory policy against the natives does not becloud the natives' clear conviction that if they are the victims of discrimination, they should not practice discrimination against their oppressors. Emphasis, then, on the equality of rights among all sects and races, is the most distinguishing feature of the natives' blueprints for the future.

There is an enormous body of material in the documents of the native liberation movements to illustrate this emphasis on equality. In South Africa, the Freedom Charter which was adopted on 26 June 1955, is still the guiding document of the A.N.C., and serves as its blue-print of the future. The Freedom Charter is totally unequivocal in its emphasis on equality. The Charter starts

with these words:²⁹⁷

"We, the *People of South Africa*, declare for all our country and the world to know..." (emphasis supplied). It is notable that the declaration is made on behalf of the *People of South Africa* altogether, not on behalf of the natives alone. This fact is further illustrated by the following preambular paragraph:

"That Southern Africa belongs to all who live in it, black and white, and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the People..."

The A.N.C. thus fully accepts the settlers' right to continue their existence, fully accepts that South Africa is theirs as it is the Africans' and the coloureds; but then the birthrights of all have to be secured and in this respect the Freedom Charter declares:

"That only a democratic state, based on the will of all the people, can secure to all their birth-rights without distinction of colour, race, sex or belief."

From those, — and other — preambular paragraphs, then, "we, the people of South Africa black and white together — equals, countrymen and brothers — adopt this Freedom Charter..."

The Freedom Charter then goes on to affirm in the operative paragraphs the constant stress put on the idea of equality: "The rights of the people shall be the same, regardless of race, colour or sex"; "There shall be equal status in the bodies of state, in the courts and in the schools for all national groups and races"; "All national groups shall be protected by laws against insults to their race and national pride"; "The preaching and practice of national, racial or colour discrimination and contempt shall be a punishable crime"; "All people shall have equal rights to trade where they choose, to manufacture and enter all trades, crafts and professions"; etc. etc...

This insistence on equality among all races and creeds is also noticeable in Southern Rhodesia. The following quotations are from ZAPU's comments on the Fearless proposals, contained in a brochure published in January 1969. In outlining the conditions whose fulfilment is necessary for a "peaceful solution of the Rhodesian problem", ZAPU demanded "drawing up, on the basis of an unqualified majority rule, an independence constitution with no elements whatsoever of class, racial or tribal distinctions or differentiations..."²⁹⁸

In concluding its comments on the Fearless proposals, ZAPU asserts: "It is not our objective to deny any other rightful citizen of our country rights which belong to and are exercised by every other citizen. It is by reason of this principle that we condemn minority racist rule..."

(297) For full text of the Charter, see : *Sechaba*, Vol. 3, No. 6, (June, 1969), pp. 12-13.

(298) See : *On the British Fearless Proposals For Rhodesia*, (Lusaka, January, 1969), p. 16.

The Palestine resistance movements have not adopted so far a blueprint on the future of a liberated Palestine. Al-Fateh however, the oldest and strongest of the resistance movements, quite clearly espouses the view that the aim to be achieved is not to expel the Jews, but to establish a free democratic Palestinian state where Jews, Christians and Moslems can live side by side, with equal rights guaranteed to all individuals irrespective of origin or creed. It is important to note the clear distinction Fateh — and other resistance movements — draw between Judaism and Zionism. Similar to many non-Zionist Jews, they regard Judaism as a religion that has nothing to do with Zionism, which is an imperialist political movement. Their position on this question is based on Jewish literature opposing Zionism. Hence one of the objectives of Fateh — and other movements — is to liberate the Jew from Zionism, which is the same objective espoused by many Jewish organizations such as the American Council for Judaism which was formed in response to the adoption of the Biltmore programme, and such as the organization being presently set up by Rabbi Elmer Berger under the tentative name of Jewish Alternatives to Zionism. In this respect, it should be noted that Fateh published, in March 1969, an appeal to the Jews of the world urging them to form a Jewish front against Zionism.²⁹⁹

A Palestinian democratic secular state, as envisaged by the resistance movements, would treat its citizens equally, regardless of origin, colour or creed. "We do not intend to drive them [the settlers] out as they drove us out," declared a P.L.O. spokesman. He affirmed that the settlers can stay in a liberated, democratic and secular Palestine: "the condition is that they accept to live as peaceful citizens".³⁰⁰

Establishing a state on the basis of equality to all means simply that all present state structures based on discrimination have to be supplanted. In South Africa, for instance, the Freedom Charter proclaims that "All Apartheid laws and practices shall be set aside"; "Restrictions of land ownership on a racial basis shall be ended, and all the land redivided among those who work it, to banish famine and land hunger"; "People shall not be robbed of their cattle and forced labour and farm prisons shall be abolished"; "All laws which discriminate on grounds of race, colour or belief shall be repealed..." etc., etc...

Granting equality to all, then, means that new state structures have to be built in place of the present ones that are based on discrimination. In Southern Rhodesia, for instance, the nationalists insist that a democratic system of government would necessarily mean the abolition of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, the abolition of all other racist and discriminatory laws, and the remodelling of the structure of the state institutions: "The police, the army, the administration, the legislature," says ZAPU in its comments on the Fearless

(299) See : *Al-Ahram*, (Cairo daily), 15 March, 1969.

(300) Reported by Michael Hudson, "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its significance in the Middle East Crisis", *M.E.J.* Vol. 23, No. 3, (Summer, 1969), pp. 291-307. The quotation is on p. 304.

proposals, "are all constructed in a manner to serve oppression and exploitation of the African people. These must be dismantled and reconstructed to serve justice and freedom. The statutes must then be expunged of all laws born out of racism and the economy adjusted for the benefit of the entire people in the country and not just a few."³⁰¹

In a democratic secular state of Palestine, Zionism with its exclusiveness and racism would have to be wiped out. In the words of Michael Hudson "The de-zionising" of the Jewish population would require essentially its renunciation of the goal that "Palestine be as Jewish as England is English." This would mean the abolition of the Law of Return, under which Jews throughout the world are eligible for automatic citizenship in Israel. It would also mean relinquishing those deeply-rooted symbols of a Jewish state — the flag and the name of Israel. Israeli political parties and quasi-governmental institutions would have to be radically reorganized. It would not mean, assert the Palestinians, the infringement of any religious practices which Jews of all tendencies now enjoy in Israel.³⁰²

The emphasis on equality then is the most distinguishing feature of the solutions which the natives envisage to the settler problem. The equality, it bears being said again, would entail fundamental changes in the existing governmental structures, and their replacement by new structures democratic and non-discriminatory in nature. There is yet another distinguishing feature in the envisaged native solutions to the settler problem: there is no hint whatsoever to the effect that the natives would force the settlers to leave the country. This is a very important standpoint, significant not only because of its humanitarian character, not only because it indicates a noble gesture shown by the natives to settlers who on the whole have always persecuted the natives in many ways and treated them inhumanly, but it is of practical importance as well. This standpoint is in fact an appeal to those enlightened settlers, to those settlers who can see, understand and appreciate the contemporary spirit of anti-racism, to those settlers who can sympathize with the natives' drive to equality and to regaining their rights, — it is an appeal to all those to come to the side of justice and freedom.

It is a well known fact that the general orientation of the settler communities is a reactionary one, perhaps one of the most reactionary in the world. This is especially true of the settler leaders and those prominent in economic and financial activities. The generally reactionary orientation of the settler communities, however, does not preclude and should not prejudice the fact that there are among the settlers some who are amenable to understanding the natives' viewpoint, either because they are themselves oppressed (such as many of the oriental Jews in Israel), or because they are in touch with the spirit of the contemporary

(301) ZAPU's pamphlet on Fearless proposals, *op. cit.*, p. 14.

(302) Hudson, *op. cit.*, p. 305.

world (the socialists in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel), or else because on ethical, religious or humanitarian grounds they oppose discrimination based on race or creed. Those people are quite naturally potential, and in some instances actual, allies to the natives. They have nothing to fear from an eventual native victory over the settler regimes. On the contrary, they stand to gain, at least morally, by living in a democratic state. Their role, up till now, does not seem to be important practically, but when the possibilities of eventual native victory increase, those sections of the settlers will become more emboldened, readier to speak out and even to act in conformity with native strategy.

The standpoint that the natives take in not forcing the settlers to leave a liberated and democratic homeland is then of immense importance, from a humanitarian as well as from a practical viewpoint. This standpoint brings about another question; the question of who are those settlers who would want to leave, and why.

It is most likely, after an eventual native victory, that those settlers who are fully convinced of the validity and soundness of racism, those who cannot live with the natives on an equal basis, those who fear "integration" because it does not assure them of supremacy, those who are in lands not theirs merely for purposes of exploitation, it is most likely that those settlers would find it unbearable to live in a democratic country controlled jointly by the natives and their allies.

There is also another element in the problem. The liberation of the natives' lands would not come about in a peaceful way: there is going to be resistance by the settlers, by their imperialist allies and most probably by mercenaries of the same genre as those who backed Tshombe in Katanga. The settlers, in all certainty, will fight like dogs, will betray their hatred to the natives in every conceivable and inhuman way. The settlers of Algeria in their war against the nationalists, especially when it was becoming evident that France would accede to the nationalists' demands, present a good and lively example of what might become the situation in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia or Israel. The French settlers and their "Organization d'Armée Secrète" (O.A.S.) present a good and lively example of the atrocities the settlers might commit against the natives, and bear evidence that the settlers, armed and desperate, can act brutally against the natives, as befits an adventurer in the wilderness. The O.A.S. proved beyond any doubt that deep in the insides of the "civilized European settler" who came to non-European lands in order to spread civilization, lies a primitiveness that is certainly not matched by the primitiveness of those whom he wanted to civilize.

Now it is unthinkable that settlers guilty of such crimes as those that were committed by the O.A.S. in Algeria would make the fine tissue of a group contributing to the establishment of a democratic state, or accepting the obligations of living in such a state. Thus there would be some settlers who

would want or have to leave, or else would have to pay for their crimes. Those could be many, or could be few, depending on future reactions to the native struggle. The French settlers in Algeria always insisted that they were as Algerian as any other born Algerians; they always asserted that they had no place to go. Would it be a big humanitarian problem if many settlers of South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel found that eventually they had to leave? Some of the Boers have been living in South Africa for two and a half centuries, while some settlers in Southern Rhodesia and Israel have been there for two or more generations. What would become of such people? Do they have a place to go to?

It bears repetition to mention that they do not have to go, they do not have to leave South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Israel if they are able to commit themselves to the side of justice, freedom and democracy. They can contribute positively to the construction of a democratic secular state in South Africa as well as in Southern Rhodesia and Israel. Otherwise, those who are resolved to refuse to live peacefully with the natives on an equal footing, have to find somewhere else to live. In the "history" of South Africa that Kepple-Jones wrote in 1947, many Boers would find it expedient to live in Latin America and Australia. Many settlers in Southern Rhodesia think of themselves as British, have their relatives in Britain, spend their vacations there and many return to retire in Britain. Many of them have left Britain to go to Southern Rhodesia only in the hope of making a fortune, and returning rich. Many settlers in Israel — almost all Israelis coming from western countries — have retained their original nationality, have kept their "foreign" passports and renew them regularly, have kept their relations and sometimes members of their immediate family in their country of origin. Their presence in Israel is like the sojourn of an adventurer, who goes hunting but is always ready to return to his old loyalties, to revive his loyalties to his original country. Those adventurers who are well conscious that they have their homes somewhere else are the ones most likely to resist the natives because they would never think of living with the natives on an equal footing. Their departure would not present a problem as they know full well that they have their homes somewhere else.

It is, of course, still too early to discuss in any detail the future of European settlers when their governmental institutions have been toppled and their privileges no longer exist. It is unthinkable that the settlers will continue to be supreme as they are today. It is unthinkable that settler colonialism will not be erased in Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and Israel. The lessons that can be drawn from contemporary history fully justify the natives in their belief that ultimately they can emerge victors. Especially instructive is the lesson of Algeria, where the settlers were well-rooted in the territory for a period longer than that enjoyed by the settlers of either Southern Rhodesia or Palestine. Their number was large, their determination to keep their privileged position in Algeria was never doubted. Working against them, however, were not only the

Algerian revolutionaries, the Algerian natives, but also the spirit of the contemporary world which always regarded them as intruders, usurpers, foreigners who were out of harmony with their environment. The fact that the majority of them left Algeria after independence is not a testimony to any bad faith shown by the Algerians towards them, nor to any lack of willingness to treat them as equals. Their departure is a testimony to their short-sightedness, to their refusal to adjust to changing circumstances, to their determination to either stay supreme and privileged in Algeria or else to vanish from a democratic Algeria. The lesson of the French settlers in Algeria — the largest single European settler community in a non-European land to be obliterated — should be studied closely by the remaining settler communities in Africa and the Middle East. The methods of the reactionary settler leadership in Algeria, the obstructionism and brutalities of the O.A.S., should also be studied closely by those settlers who would like to remain where they are, to cooperate with the natives in establishing truly democratic institutions in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and Palestine. Such a study could provide them with insight on how to avoid contributing to a deteriorating situation, and could convince them even more of the necessity of building bridges, of respecting the natives, and of the need to accept to live with them on an equal footing.

The lessons of contemporary history are clear: There is no place for privileged settlers at this stage of history. The few remaining islands, still subject to settler colonialism, will have to go, in conformity to the pattern of today's world. In North Africa, in many parts of East and Central Africa, the settlers' privileged position is no longer viable. Many European settlers left Africa in the sixties, but "by and large, the Europeans who have chosen to remain in East and Central Africa" as Professor Fred G. Burke remarked "are those who have come to know, understand and respect their black countrymen."³⁰³

In summary, it could be said then, that the native solutions to the settler problem are based on a few simple principles, such as the principles of equality, of democracy practised by all, of the necessity of building new institutions that supplant the existing institutions which are based on discrimination, either tacitly or overtly. Those settlers who can see the evils of the present discriminatory and unjust institutions, who can cooperate with the natives in building democratic societies and states free from discrimination on the bases of colour, race, creed or origin, can play a great role in easing the transition of political power from the settlers to the natives, in making the transition less damaging to themselves and to other settlers. This role is admittedly a most difficult one, but for the same reasons it is most desirable.

(303) F. G. Burke, *Africa's Quest for Order*, (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1964), p. 111.



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