

PALESTINE BOOKS – No. 29

WHITHER ISRAEL ?
A STUDY OF ZIONIST EXPANSIONISM

By

Khalid Kishtainy



PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
RESEARCH CENTER

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Palestine Liberation Organization

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Beirut — Lebanon

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C O N T E N T S


	Page
List of Maps	7
Introduction	9
Chapter I : The Land and Its Frontiers	13
Chapter II : Great Expectations	27
Chapter III : The Phantasmagoric Land and the Witches of Macbeth ..	39
Chapter IV : Population Pressure	57
Chapter V : Force and Expulsion	71
Chapter VI : Fait Accompli and Reprisals	85
Chapter VII : The Role of the Diaspora	99
Chapter VIII: From Montefiore to Weizmann	107
Chapter IX : By the Sword	121
Chapter X : Between the Wars	147
Chapter XI : Suez and After	159
Chapter XII : From Naqura to Qantara	169
Chapter XIII: The Inevitable	193
Sources	217

LIST OF MAPS


	Page
Map I : The Expansion of Israel	8
Map II : The Kingdom of Solomon and David, Mentioned by Herzl as the Envisaged Jewish State	221
Map III : Palestine Under Turkish Administration	222
Map IV : Settlement of Egyptian-Palestine Border 1906	223
Map V : Palestine in the Sykes-Picot Agreement 1916	224
Map VI : Settlement of the Northern Frontier of Palestine 1919-1923	225
Map VII : British Military Administration of Palestine, 1918 (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration — South)	226
Map VIII : Israel According to Rabbi S.H. Isaacs	227
Map IX : Israel According to Harry Sacher	228
Map X : Israel as Demanded by the Zionist Organization 1919	229
Map XI : The Jewish State as Drawn in 1937	230
Map XII : The Jewish State as Proposed by the Jewish Agency 1946	231
Map XIII : Early Jewish Colonisation Penetrating the Country	232
Map XIV : New Colonies set up with the Object of Pushing the Partition Borders Back	233
Map XV : Jewish Settlements 1947	234
Map XVI : Partition Autonomy Plan Proposed by the British Govern- ment in July 1946	235
Map XVII : UNSCOP Partition and the Arab and Zionist Military Response to it	236
Map XVIII: More Territory Seized by Israel, 18 July 1948	237
Map XIX : More Lands Seized by Israel from UNSCOP Arab Terri- tory between the Second Truce, 18 July 1948 and the Conclusion of the Armistice Agreements in 1949, by Force and Direct Talks	238
Map XX : More Lands Seized by Israel as a Result of the 1967 War	239

MAP I


THE EXPANSION OF ISRAEL




According to the 1937 Partition Plan




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According to the 1947 UN Partitic
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Palestine Armistice in 1949



Area Occupied in 1956



Area Occupied in 1967

INTRODUCTION

The Palestine question has defeated not only those who have tried to solve it but also those who have tried to assess it. It has been asserted time and time again that it is a question which allows no neutrality. If so, then Palestine has served to underline a fact well recognized by ancient and primitive man, but long muddled by bourgeois idealism, i.e. that the only objective brain is the blank brain. Once a brush stroke touches the white canvas, all the following strokes must be conditioned by the first. Many British authors have written books on the Palestine question, and a number of them have been hailed as truly objective and free from partiality. What is not mentioned is that their "impartiality" is, in fact, no more than a partiality to the British Administration, which had to rule the country for thirty years by walking a tight rope of expedient equilibrium.

The pertinent question which must be asked is what is the standpoint of the writer on this or any other issue. The rights and wrongs of the Zionist case hinge on a few basic questions. Are the present Jews actually the blood descendants and heirs of the ancient Hebrews? Do they make up a nation of their own now? Is any nation, once dispersed from its home and settled somewhere else, entitled to reclaim the same home centuries later and expel the existing population? Is any people entitled to a special or exceptional treatment? Does the establishment of Israel and not the long term action on behalf of equality, brotherhood, integration and enlightenment really solve the Jewish question? The author's answer to all these questions is a definite "no."

This is the time to caution the reader against one misunderstanding. It is unfortunate that it has fallen to my lot to write on a territorial conflict, for my preoccupation is primarily with people and hardly ever with property, with how they live rather than where they live. The two sides, alas, are often overlapping. The present book, therefore, must be read throughout against the silhouette of the refugee behind the barbed wire. Only then does the discussion over this village or that couple of dunums make any sense. Hence, I find myself under some compulsion to dedicate the next few pages to the human element in this story.

In a property society, the two elements are interchangeable and intermingled. The property society solved this particular entanglement by adopting a simple principle which says, "Possession is nine tenths of ownership." Although the Zionists have rejected this principle, they will soon find that it is, in fact, the only plausible legal umbrella which can protect them. "Possession is nine tenths of ownership" is an illusive rule, like everything else produced by the property society. After a number of years, there will be in Israel a generation of Jews completely rooted in the land. Any thought of throwing them out will entail an act

of inhumanity and illegality, a fact which the Palestinian fighters have already appreciated. On the other hand, there will be a mass of dispossessed Palestinians whose only plausible umbrella is the universal cry of all dispossessed peoples: "Revolt!"

This is only a minor contradiction in our laws.

Such are the facts which I have come to appreciate on such a question, not through logical, legalistic or political reasons, but out of personal daily experience. Such are the facts which projected for me the tragic consequences of both the Palestinian problem and the Jewish question. The crucial years in anybody's life are the childhood years. Sigmund Freud considers the first five years, and particularly the fifth, as the years which shape the entire life of man. Even the most normal and happy person cannot but seek refuge in his childhood once the power of the conscious is suspended by sleep, illness or psychosis. It is, therefore, only the psychologist—not the lawyer, the politician or the priest—who can identify the nationality of the individual.

Religion makes the least adequate criteria for judging anybody's nationality, for the simple reason that religion and ideology belong to a later stage of one's life. On the other hand, music stands out as probably the most effective indication of one's nationality, for the good reason that it is the earliest form of self expression and communication for the child. A Japanese conductor may spend his life studying western music in Moscow or Paris, but in the hours of a shattering emotional experience, he finds himself humming his national Hagoromo songs.

The Israelis must bear witness to this fact. The moment the political, military and economic pressure is withdrawn, they will soon find out that they really have very little in common. This is one good reason for the Zionists to maintain the pressure by wars, reprisals and tension. It is absurd to say that Yehudi Menuhin belongs to the tabla playing Moroccan Jew and not to Vaughan Williams. Such is the attitude of the internationalist toward the national question, an attitude based on respect to the inner attachment of the individual, to his real national culture free from the exterior political pressure and away from the considerations of frontiers, doctrines, religion and race.

In Britain, I met a Palestinian—a man who is earning four or five times what he used to earn in the Arab World and enjoying a standard of living twice as high as he could expect back at home. He is free from fear, despotism, discrimination, humiliation and all the diseases of the developing world. He has an active social life, entertainments and numerous friends. But as the guests depart, he slips immediately back into his thoughts, dreams and nightmares. Memories of his childhood, the dockyards of Jaffa, the glittering sight of Jerusalem, the yearning for his dispersed little sisters and aging parents begin to take over. Back in his own Orient, he is suspected and feared like the Jews before him in the West. He is the mysterious evil behind all inexplicable things. He is accused of espionage, subversion and immorality. He is shuffled from Qatar to Beirut, and from Beirut

to the refugee camp. Whenever there is trouble the cry goes up, "Yil'an illi khalaq al-Falastiniyin"—a curse upon him who created the Palestinian.

It is the contact with the Palestinian which gave me a living picture of the Jewish problem. A compulsory and permanent exile in a land to which a man does not belong, a land in which he did not spend his childhood, destroys the soul of the refugee and unsettles his inner serenity and peace. If the establishment of Israel can offer a better solution than integration for the psychological turmoil of the Jew, then the whole world should give its support to the Zionist programme, great as may be its loss of the fertile genius of the Jew, of the refugee in his best neurotic tension and torment.¹ The Palestinian refugee of London has revealed to me that the expulsion of a people can come second only to extermination in the long record of international crimes. "There is nothing worse for mortal man than wandering," was the cry of Homer's Ulysses. The Palestinians are gradually taking the place of the old Jews, and it will be a sad reflection on our era if the past two thousand years taught us no better way of doing things than that of Emperor Titus.

Sami Hadawi expressed the mood of the homeless Palestinian I came to know in his lengthy "I remember" lament:

"I remember the open fields around the walls of the Old City, where so often the shepherds watched their flocks by night. I remember Solomon's Quarries, which extend to a great depth under the Old City. I remember how, as children, we used to peep into the endless dark of that cave, daring not to go more than a few yards for fear that the unknown would devour us . . .

"I remember my home, its walls and fences and the trees and shrubs I planted and tended with my own hands; and I enquire: Who are those people who live in my house? What right have they to be there? Why will they not even pay rent for their forced occupation? In how many homes are my precious belongings now scattered after they had been plundered and robbed? Who is now eating off my dining-room table? Sitting on my sofas, couches and chairs? Sleeping in our beds? Playing our piano? Using our library and kitchen utensils? Who gathers the grapes off my vine? The fruits off my trees? Who plucks my flowers? Who feeds my canaries? Are the strangers' children using my children's swings, sand-boxes and toys?"²

The Palestinian tragedy was created by anti-Semitism, but perpetuated by Zionism. The indictment of Zionism as the primary cause for the escalation is now the solemn conviction of Arabs, Jews and Gentiles, and the expansionist aspect of Israel is the most ruinous factor in the present conflict. Its sinister effect extends far beyond the Middle Eastern scene and puts the clock back to where it was in 1939. Since then a world war has been fought at a colossal cost to establish one simple principle, i.e. that no country should be allowed to impose changes outside its frontiers by resort to military force, or get away with the fruits of its accomplishment.

World War II will stand as one of the first wars ever fought on the grounds of

(1) One of the main causes of European anti-Semitism, the *raison d'être*, of Zionism, is the Jewish preponderance in the liberal professions. Far from solving this problem by taking the "surplus" to the Jewish State, Israel is now providing a new source for augmenting it. According to a WHO report, 54.3 per cent of Israeli medical graduates have been emigrating from Israel to the West (against Syria's 9.45 per cent and India's 6.1 per cent). The fact caused an uproar against any more medical schools in Israel (*Medical Tribunal*, 11 September 1969).

(2) Hadawi, S., *Bitter Harvest*, New York, 1967, pp. 327-28.

a sublime principle. The effects of the lesson, underlined by the Allies' magnanimous disinterest in territorial prizes of war at the expense of the vanquished, fired the enthusiasm of the idealists who wasted no opportunity, be it at the United Nations or in the regional conferences, to reiterate the same principle that military aggression was no longer acceptable as a means for effecting changes. With the blood and sweat of millions of peoples of all races and creeds, the *right of conquest* was finally given its ignoble burial, and scores of countries which joined the United Nations have largely respected the spirit of the new era—excepting one small member, the prodigal child of the United Nations.

Israel's military *faits accomplis* create a reversal whose dangers to the future of international law and order and the dreams of every political idealist, cannot be overstated. Not an iota of progress could have been made without the brutal law of flogging to death the smallest starving child who arrogated for himself a slice of bread which did not belong to him. Not an iota of progress towards a peaceful and orderly world can be expected if one single country is allowed to resurrect the right of conquest under any name, title or pretext. The lessons of the Arab-Israeli conflict have already outlined the shape of things that can emerge from one allowance.

A world without war may be still a long way ahead of us, but when its day comes, it will undoubtedly follow the day of establishing the rule that nobody is allowed to gain any advantage out of any aggression. Only then do we expect the swords to be beaten into ploughs. These are points which do not mean anything to Zionism, a backward looking movement, but carry with them all the hopes for a brighter world.

No problem—individual, national or international—has one cause only, and it is practically beyond human capability to assemble all the elements and causes of even the smallest problem. The reader may find the juxtaposition of Marxism, Freudism and bourgeois history strange and confusing, but this is how our problems are. The intensity, and at times emotionalism of the treatment, may serve as a subjective colouring emanating from the author's background and national temperament. No doubt, other people have even more ideas which add to the confusion and complete the realism of the picture.

CHAPTER I

THE LAND AND ITS FRONTIERS

In the Beginning

To start by re-stating the fact that the frontiers of the present Middle Eastern countries are irrational is merely to repeat a hollow platitude. International frontiers are shaped by thieving conquerors, money makers, religious bigots and even gangsters, who often speak of rational and "natural" frontiers, but seldom stop there. The present contemporary map of the Middle East was drawn by the Western imperialists after World War I, with the same illogicality as that of Central Europe or Central Africa. In this map, Palestine was carved out of the neck of land known as the Fertile Crescent, after some long haggling between the powers over strategic and imperialist advantages which had nothing to do with any ethnic or geographical considerations.

The unfortunate position of the country as a bridgehead for conquerors or as a buffer between the mighty powers deprived it of the opportunity of maintaining a durable political entity. During World War I, H. Sidebotham and his British Palestine Committee followed this line of approach and advocated the occupation of Palestine as a defence line against any menace to the Suez Canal from the east, an idea which had already been pressed on Whitehall before the fighting by Lord Kitchener.¹ By the beginning of the war, the entire Middle East was partitioned by the Western European Powers into spheres of economic influence—except Palestine which was left undecided. There the interests of Britain, France and Germany met and all agreed to leave it as a no-man's land. Sir Harry Johnston, who was sent on an official lecture tour to Syria, gave an expression of this mood in 1912 by calling for the internationalisation of the Holy Land.²

Earlier in the nineteenth century, it played the same role as a buffer defending Syria against the ambitions of the Khedives of Egypt, and later on, the British. During the Middle Ages, it separated the Abbasids of Baghdad from the Fatimids of Cairo, whilst in ancient times it was the battlefield of Egypt and Assyria. The Sovereignty of the country, its shape, frontiers and population rarely depended on its own evolution, but more often on the development of the surrounding countries. As a small strip of cultivable land with practically no rich natural resources, it could only maintain a small nation living in effective peace with its stronger neighbours. Palestine is also a buffer between the desert and the green valleys as

(1) Antonius, George, *The Arab Awakening*, London, 1958, p. 246 and Sidebotham, H., *Great Britain and Palestine*, London, 1937.

(2) Frischwasser-Ra'anana, H.F., *The Frontiers of a Nation*, London, 1955, pp. 55-56.

shown by the numerous deserted cities and ruins which indicate the see-saw play enacted on its face. One generation of political stagnation and the desert claims its own. The name of Palestine itself is used in the Old Testament as "Pelistin," which referred to the land of the Philistines, on the coast; but the Greeks applied it to the interior as well, and the name became common after the Roman occupation.³ The other names, like Eretz Israel or Canaan, do not identify the country either.

"An authentic and original name for this land as a whole has not come down to us from Old Testament times, and presumably none such ever existed; since as a natural phenomenon it was never a homogeneous, self-contained entity and was never occupied by a homogeneous population, nor did any political development ever take place in an area substantially identical with its territory."⁴

Palestine appears on the map as a continuation of the Syrian mountains, rivers and valleys melting gradually into the desert. The Egyptians and the Assyrians did not recognise its entity and treated the whole area as one. The Assyrians used the name "Ammon" for the entire region of Syria, and the Egyptians called it Canaan, which meant for them the whole of Egyptian Syria. The Arabs and the Turks had also parcelled it together with Syria. This is the factor which lies behind the nationalist confusion in which the Palestinians found themselves after the Balfour Declaration and which they seem to have resolved only after the Six Day War of 1967.

Eretz Israel, which combined the Kingdoms of Israel north of Jerusalem and Judah to the south, had no permanent recognisable shape. The Zionist leaders who speak of "historical Israel" naturally refer to the kingdom at the height of its expansion during the tenth century B.C. (Map II). The Jewish empire had lasted about half a century, and during the reign of Solomon it was already in decline territorially. Its high mark was reached during King David's reign when its domain extended from Damascus in the north to the Wadi of al-Araba and the tip of the Red Sea in the south, and from Phoenicia and Wadi Al-Arish in the west to the desert in the east (including the east of River Jordan). This area, however, was not exclusively Eretz Israel as it included a number of other states which accepted the suzerainty of Israel. After David's death, the Aramaic Kingdom established itself in Damascus, and soon became the strongest power in Syria (including Palestine). Israel's borders began to shrink and with the rise of Assyria, it was reduced by Tiglat-Pileser in 733 B.C. to a dependency limited to Mount Ephraim and the royal city of Samaria.⁵ Only for a short spell during the empire did Israel enjoy access to the sea in the west or in the south, and sea-going remained a non-Jewish occupation frowned on by the Israelites.

Nor did the Jewish Kingdom come anywhere near the extravagantly promised land as delineated in the Bible. An examination of the frontiers as promised by Yahweh cannot be avoided in such a work in view of the covenant which has

(3) *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, Palestine.

(4) Noth, Martin, *The History of Israel*, London, 1958, p. 7.

(5) Noth, *op. cit.*, p. 260.

cast its magic over the Zionists and the Orthodox Jews. Here again we are left in the same wilderness surrounded by masses of interpretations. The texts, written in different times and under changing circumstances, are contradictory. (Theologians, of course, always patch up these and any contradictions.) The earliest "promise" was that granted to Abraham, "To your descendants I give this land, from the river of Egypt to the great river, the river Euphrates, the land of the Kenites, the Kenizzites, the Kadmonites, the Hittites, the Perizzites, the Rephaim, the Amorites, the Canaanites, the Girgashites and the Jebusites."⁶ References to the Euphrates as a border occur also in Deuteronomy (XI:24) and Joshua (I:4). In Exodus (XXIII:31) Israel is drawn from the Euphrates to the Red Sea. As time passed, the authors of the Bible restricted the domain of Israel to more realistic borders and gave it a definite shape. The most detailed and coherent description is given in Numbers (XXXIV:3-12), and runs as follows: "And your southern border shall commence at the end of the Salt Sea on the east; and your border shall turn south of the ascent of Akrabbim and pass to Zin and its extremity shall lie at the south of Kadesh Barnea; and it shall go on to Hazar Addar and pass on to Azmon, and the border shall turn from Azmon unto the brook of Egypt, and its terminating points shall be at the sea. And as the western border shall ye have the Great Sea for a border; this shall be your western border. And this shall be to you the northern border: from the Great Sea shall ye mark out Mount Hor: from Mount Hor ye shall point out your border unto the entrance of Hamath; and the goings forth of the border shall be towards Zedad. And the border shall go out to Ziphron, and its termination shall be at Hazar Eman: this shall be unto you the northern border. And you shall turn yourselves to the eastern border, from Hazar Eman to Shepham; and the boundary shall go down from Shepham to Riblah, to the eastward of Ayar; and the boundary shall descend and shall touch upon the coast of the Sea of Chinnereth, eastward; and the border shall go down to the Jordan, and terminate at the Salt Sea."

It is difficult to draw any precise map out of the details given in the foregoing passage. The confusion is largely due to the changes in the scenery and names of locations. We know the Salt Sea as the Dead Sea, and the Sea of Chinnereth as Lake Tiberias. The Brook of Egypt is not the Nile but Wadi al-Arish flowing into the Mediterranean near al-Arish at 33 degrees, fifty minutes east longitude.⁷ The name is an admission that Sinai and al-Arish are Egyptian territory according to the Bible. Hamath is recognised as Hama, but its "entrance" is by no means certain. The majority opinion is that it lies south of Hama; but S.H. Isaacs put it well inside present day Turkey (Map VIII). Mount Hor was thought by scholars to be Mount Hermon, Mount Akra, between Alexandretta and Latakia, Mount Amanus (Giaour Dagh in Turkey) or Mount Nuria (at 34 degrees, nineteen minutes latitude). Hazar Enan is identified in Ezekiel as the "Border of Damascus" in another passage which takes Berothah—Hamath—Damascus as

(6) Genesis. XV:18-21.

(7) Isaacs, S.H., *The True Boundaries of the Holy Land*, Chicago, 1917, p. 24.

borders from the north and Hauran and Gilead as borders from the east.⁸

As Israel, after the 1967 war, controlled areas which did not correspond with the Palestine promised by Balfour and mandated by the League of Nations, so was the case with the ancient Kingdom in relation to the covenants. It ruled then over Transjordan, the Mount of Gelead, although it was not included within the borders specified. Yahweh was even more economically minded than the Gods of the twentieth century. Sinai, where He spoke to Moses, was left out, and Lebanon, from where Solomon used to import the timber of his palace, was included instead. Another guiding principle—to leave a no-man's land between Israel and Egypt, also weighed heavily in His strategic thinking.

With the eventual destruction of Jewish autonomy in both Samaria and Jerusalem, the political history of Palestine was closed. During the Roman rule Palestine was treated as a part of the important "Provincia Syria." The Arabs regarded it in a similar way, and governed it from Damascus or Cairo. In the early history of the Arab Empire, "Filastin" appears as one of the Junds (military districts) lying to the west of the Jordan and south of a line drawn from a point between Tiberias and the Dead Sea to the Mediterranean south of Jaffa. Its southern border is a line between Dathin, near Rafa, on the Mediterranean, to Wadi Araba in the Negev. Sir William Muir draws the northern border, according to the Arab concept, from the Dead Sea to Mount Carmel. The southern border was roughly the same as that of the Mandate.⁹ In most maps relating to the Middle Ages, Palestine appears as part of one Arab state or another. It is one reason for the misunderstanding or wilful misinterpretation which bedevilled Anglo-Arab relations as a result of the correspondence between Sharif Husayn of Mecca and Sir Henry McMahon, High Commissioner for Egypt, and the dubious "portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo" which McMahon wanted exempted from the Arab state.¹⁰ What idea the Arabs had on Palestine related to the land west of the Dead Sea.¹¹

Until 1948, the only government which had established itself in Palestine was that of the Crusaders. There are more political similarities between the Republic of Israel and the Medieval Kingdom of Jerusalem set up by the Crusaders than there are between it and the ancient Hebrew Kingdom. The Crusaders' state came about as a western invasion from the direction of the sea and consolidated itself in the plains and valleys. The resultant map was a strip of a beach head with a

(8) Ezekiel, XLVII:15-20.

(9) Muir, Sir William, *The Caliphate, its Rise, Decline and Fall*, London, 1891, p. 1426. Map in: Hitti, Philip K., *History of Syria*, London, 1957, p. 413.

(10) Text of letters in Appendix A, Antonius, *op. cit.*, Arab views on them: *ibid.*, pp.164-179. Pro-Arab interpretation. c.f. J.M. Jeffries, *Palestine: the Reality*, London, 1939, pp. 64-87, 466-478; also *The Palestine Deception*, Daily Mail Enquiry, p. 43. British Government's Views: Command Paper 1700, 1922. See also Sykes, Christopher, *Crossroads to Israel*, London, 1965, pp. 84-87.

In a letter to *The Times* (23 July 1937) written 20 years after the event, Sir Henry McMahon said that the intention was not to include Palestine in the Arab Kingdom.

(11) Muir, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

wide corridor leading to Jerusalem, the spiritual reason for the invasion, and a route to the Red Sea, the actual motive.

The Sinai Border

When the Balfour Declaration was made, Palestine was part of Syria and Lebanon. Southern Palestine was the Sanjaq of Jerusalem a district of the Vilayet of Syria, and northern Palestine from the north of Jaffa was part of the Vilayet of Beirut. (Map III). The northern and eastern borders during the Ottoman rule offered no problem as they were merely district borders with only administrative and juridical value. Not as simple was the question in the south where Britain ruled Egypt. There the conflict sprang from British fears for the Suez Canal and Ottoman concern for the pilgrims' Mecca route, around which Palestine's sole importance seemed to revolve in the eyes of the Turks.

In 1832, the ambitious Muhammad Ali of Egypt conquered the whole of Syria and appointed his son, Ibrahim, a governor. The campaign was carried out in spite of the opposition of Britain, and in 1840 Palmerston finally engineered the expulsion of Egypt from Syria. The 1841 Convention left Muhammad Ali ruling Egypt, Sinai, Aqaba and a number of forts en route to Mecca. The Syrian (or Palestine) Egyptian frontier became for the first time a matter of international politics.

The scene drastically changed in 1892. In 1840, Britain had been pressing to push the frontier of Egypt, which was under French influence, back to the west. In 1882 the situation was reversed, and Egypt came under British occupation. Sir Evelyn Baring (later Lord Cromer) strongly protested to Constantinople against the Sultan's investiture firman on the enthronement of Khedive Abbas Hilmi Pasha in 1892.¹² The firman omitted to mention Sinai and the Red Sea forts under the Khedive's rule. Sir Evelyn Baring protested against the omissions and the British Ambassador raised the question in Constantinople. The Grand Vizier settled the matter by sending a cable on 8 April 1892 to the Khedive recognising Egypt's rule over the "Peninsula of Tor Sinai" and annexing at the same time Aqaba to the Vilayet of al-Hijaz. Sir Evelyn wrote to Tigrane Pasha, the Egyptian Minister, on 13 April accepting the Turkish offer of the territory as "bounded to the east by a line running in a south-easterly direction from a point a short distance to the east of El-Arish to the head of the Gulf of Aqaba."¹³ The letter was published in the official gazette and Turkey made no objection.

The question of the Egyptian border flared up more seriously in the first half of 1906, and was finally resolved in the summer of that year. It started when an Egyptian force under the command of a British officer established itself in Wadi Araba in the Negev. The Turks demanded its withdrawal and retaliated by sending a force of their own to Taba, in Sinai, on the western shore of the Gulf of

(12) The Sultan of Turkey enjoyed suzerainty over the Khedive of Egypt. Both owed their actual rule to Lord Cromer.

(13) This and other citations from the correspondence relating to the Sinai frontier are published in: *Egypt No. 2*, Command Paper 3002, 1906.

Aqaba. Britain objected to the move and suggested the formation of a joint commission to establish the frontier, a suggestion which Turkey rejected. Mukhtar Pasha went further and claimed that the Egyptian-Syrian border takes a triangular shape extending from Al-Arish to Suez and back to Aqaba (Map IV).

The objective behind this odd line was to secure access to the Suez Canal, and the British found no difficulty in quashing the claim. The Turks argued that Sinai was only put under Egyptian administration in connection with the pilgrimage route via Aqaba. As Aqaba had reverted to the Sultan in accordance with the 1892 firman and the cable of 8 April 1892, Egypt had no longer any standing in the peninsula. As a compromise, Turkey suggested a new line extending vertically from al-Arish to Ras Muhammad on the tip of the Sinai peninsula (Map IV). The talks dragged on until Britain could no longer wait. The British Embassy served an ultimatum on the Porte on 3 May to submit to the British demands. The fleet was alerted, and the necessary measures were taken, by 11 May, to occupy various Turkish positions. All attempts to win more time failed and Tawfiq Pasha had no alternative but to cable at the eleventh hour (14 May) acceptance of "the line of demarcation starting at Rafa, near al-Arish, and running towards the south-east in an approximately straight line as far as a point on the Gulf of Aqaba, at least 3 miles distant from Aqaba."¹⁴ A joint commission arrived in Rafa on 28 June to draw up the details. The Turkish side was again difficult and insisted on taking the border from the Rafa to the west of Mugdaba and thence running at a distance varying from 5 to 15 miles from the straight line to a point on the Gulf of Aqaba to the west of Marashash. The matter was referred again to Constantinople where the British delegate countered by a threat to demand Wadi Araba in the Negev. The final compromise made Marashash the terminal point in the south. Turkey yielded Mufrag to Egypt and took a portion of Naqb al-Aqaba in return. The settlement was made official by an Irada issued on 11 September.¹⁵

The conflict was closely connected with imperialist plans and jealousies. The Germans were busy with their Hijaz railroad which was envisaged to reach the Yemen, by-pass the Suez Canal and threaten British interests in Southern Arabia, East Africa and India. The British, on the other hand, were helping the Yemeni rebels against the Sultan. Palestine and the head of the Red Sea were vital parts in that conflict. From his seat in Cairo, Lord Cromer was keeping a sharp eye on the border. It was he who initiated most of the moves, and effectively argued the Egyptian case. He resorted to classical Arabic sources and mediaeval usage and pointed to the border pillars still in existence. "At Rafeh there is a tree, and on each side of this tree there has been, for many years, a marble pillar, marking the Egyptian and Turkish boundary."¹⁶ In later days, Amir Faisal (later Faisal I of Iraq) expressed similar views on the territory of Syria, "from Taurus moun-

(14) Tawfiq Pasha to Sir N. O'Connor.

(15) Gooch, G.P., and Temperley, H., *British Documents on the Origins of the War 1898-1914*. London, 1928. Summary from the annual report for Turkey — 1906, p 189.

(16) Cromer to Edward Grey, 21st May.

tains to the Sinai Desert.”¹⁷ Faisal was, in fact, reiterating the concept held by the Syrians whose delegate to the Peace Conference spoke of their country as “the only one which is so fortunate as to have clearly defined frontiers—the Taurus, Sinai, the desert and the Mediterranean.”¹⁸ The 1906 demarcation remained the only recognised frontier and was not seriously challenged by any party, whether Arabs, Jews or Western powers, until the 1956 Israeli occupation of Sinai.¹⁹

The Northern Border

The imperialist competition in the area led, before the Great War, to an explosive distribution of the spheres of influence. France secured for itself the Levant, Bagdad fell to Germany, and Southern Iraq and Egypt to Britain. Palestine became the meeting point, and was left, therefore, as a no-man’s land. Furthermore, Britain wanted to connect Iraq with the Mediterranean by a railroad. One of the main projects considered in Britain was the Willcocks scheme for a line connecting Haifa with Bagdad.²⁰ As war broke out and Britain and France found themselves linked in a struggle of life or death, the time became right for a mutual settlement of Palestine. For years France has staked her claim to the Holy Land as part of Syria. Britain had no historical claim, but found a French presence to the east of the Suez Canal a danger not to be countenanced. The efforts to agree on a joint future settlement ended in 1916 with the signing of the secret Sykes-Picot Treaty. The notorious treaty not only flouted the rights and ambitions of the peoples or the promises given to them, but also made nonsense of the geographical and human factors.

The agreement divided the Fertile Crescent into a French Blue Zone covering Cilicia and coastal Syria from Alexandretta to Acre, a British Red Zone covering central and southern Iraq, an international Brown Zone covering the main portion of Palestine, a Zone “A” extending from north Iraq to the interior of Syria to be an Arab state under French protection and finally a Zone “B” extending from the Red Sea to Iraq to be an Arab state under British protection (Map V). Palestine was thus divided into many parts. The north including Huleh Upper Jordan and northern Galilee went to France. Judea, Samaria, Gaza and the coastal plains were internationalised. The Negev and Transjordan went to the Arab state. In addition, Britain was to receive the Port of Haifa.

The invention of the Franco-British-Russian condominium enabled Britain to sever Palestine from Syria and keep France out of it. It was the first stage of the game. The second stage was to hoist the Union Jack over it. The Sykes-Picot

(17) French to Curzon, *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, First Series, Vol. IV, p. 313.

(18) Statement by Chekri Camen on behalf of the Syrian committee, 13th February 1919, D.H. Miller, *My Diary at the Peace Conference of Paris*, Vol. XIV, p. 399.

(19) Meinertzhagen, an extreme spokesman for Zionism, disputed the Egyptian frontier after the 1956 campaign (see below). In November 1919 he suggested that the “Aqaba to Rafa” line was the correct border for Palestine. (Meinertzhagen to Lord Curzon, *Documents*, 1919-1939, Vol. IV, p. 534).

(20) The competition for railway concessions and its bearing on this subject is examined in some detail by Ra’anan, *op. cit.*

Agreement gave Haifa and Bagdad to Britain, but made inadequate provisions for the projected railway link. As the line would emerge from the Syrian Desert and enter Palestine, it would have to pass through the French-protected Arab Zone just north of the Yarmuk River.²¹ France was also given the right to utilise the line for the purpose of reaching a free zone in the Port of Haifa. Here was a golden opportunity for Jewish nationalism. The British, unbeatable at finding justifications and political levers, discovered the formula of a Jewish national home under British protection. The Balfour Declaration was issued in November 1917, and the Jewish nationalists were let loose to frustrate any opposition to the British rule over Palestine. Sir Mark Sykes corrected himself and described his secret agreement as a mistake. When General Allenby set up his Occupied Enemy Territory Administration for Palestine, he ignored the 1916 arrangements and brought the Palestine northern border right into the French zone. After a protracted struggle with the French, M. Clemenceau conceded Palestine to Lloyd George in a meeting held in London towards the end of 1918.²² The agreement was verbal, and Palestine seems to have been vaguely referred to as stretching from Dan to Beersheba.

Clemenceau yielded Palestine and the Mosul in Iraq as part of a *quid pro quo* arrangement with Britain. France was in need of British help in the final settlement of Central Europe and the questions of Tangier, Gambia and other African colonies. This is probably why, when the question of Syria was discussed on 10 March 1919, he asked for some time.²³ As the French left, disappointed, pressure was put on Clemenceau both in the press and in the Chamber. He was accused of betraying French interests in Syria, and the Government was forced to back out of the 1918 verbal arrangement. It did so by encouraging the Arabs in their claim for the Ittihad as-Suri (the Federation of Syria which included Palestine) on the one hand, and by calling for the implementation of the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement on the other. In the summer of 1919, they called on the British Government to withdraw their troops beyond the Sykes-Picot line.

The issue led to long talks in which the Zionist organisation played an essential part. The main conflict was over the Litani river and the Jordan sources. The Zionists stood for the inclusion of this area in Palestine, and spared no effort towards that end.²⁴ Their ambition coincided once more with the British imperialists who wanted to have their Bagdad-Haifa line and the eventual oil link between north Iraq and the Mediterranean entirely under their own control. Topographical technicalities made part of the disputed area vital for the economical implementation of the project. The British delegate, therefore, had given full backing to the

(21) Ra'anán, *op. cit.*, p. 69.

(22) Cumming, H.H., *Franco-British Rivalry in the Post-War Near East*, London, 1938, p. 78. Stein, Z., *The Balfour Declaration*, London, 1961, pp. 614-618.

The two works contain valuable studies of the Anglo-French struggle over Palestine. See also Ra'anán, *op. cit.*,

(23) Miller, D.H., *op. cit.*, Vol. VI, 317.

(24) See next chapter.

Zionist claim and argued that it was Britain which had spent £750,000,000 through the expulsion of Turkey from the area. "If the French Government would reimburse His Majesty's Government one half of this sum they might have any boundary they liked, here or elsewhere." The water sources, he argued, were also essential for the success of the Zionist colonisation as promised by Britain. A further resort to history was also made, and "historical Israel" from Dan to Beersheba, was invoked as a basis for the delineation of Palestine.²⁵

The French position was based on the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which gave them the coast to Acre, northern Galilee, the Huleh and Upper Jordan. Furthermore, M. Berthelot argued that the Litani was important for the Syrian irrigated lands and the snows of Hermon dominated Damascus.²⁶ The French, like the British, were in fact thinking more in terms of their imperialist projects rather than the national homes of Jews or Arabs. They had their own railway scheme to connect Alexandretta with Iraq and the Persian Gulf in competition with the British Haifa line. As the British introduced their Zionist proteges, the French brought forth the Syrian Arabs to the conference. Oddly enough, Lawrence, who was strongly opposed to French intrusion, argued that the dependence of Arab tribes on certain towns like Damascus made it necessary to bring the border down to the south and enable them to maintain their contacts with Damascus.²⁷

Clemenceau had asked, according to the 1916 agreement, to draw the border from a point just north of Acre, through the north end of the Sea of Galilee to a point south of Dira roughly the latitude of that lake, as Berthelot visualised.²⁸ In contrast to that, Lord Curzon demanded the frontier to be drawn from the Litani on the coast, and across to Baniyas and the old Dan or Huleh in the interior.²⁹ Both Lloyd George and Arthur Balfour called for the inclusion of the Hermon water sources in Palestine. After reaching agreement with France, Lloyd George answered a question in Parliament on the waters of Litani, "No! They never have been included in Palestine. The agreement entered into between M. Clemenceau and myself was that Palestine was to be the old historic Palestine, that is, from Dan to Beersheba. That does not include the Litani river."³⁰ The British proposal followed a line extending from Sidon to a point south of Damascus, nearly identical to the proposal of the Zionist organisation (Map X). The British delegation suggested the arbitration of the United States on the demarcation, but the French rejected it out of hand "since President Wilson was entirely guided by Mr. Brandeis, who held very decided views."³¹

(25) Documents 1919-1939, I series, Vol. IV, pp. 599-601.

(26) David Lloyd George, *The Truth about the Peace Treaties*, London, 1938, p. 1178.

(27) Miller, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 170.

(28) Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, p. 1178.

(29) *Ibid.*, p. 1144 — Aide-Memoire 15th September 1919. Dan was a district and not a town. It is said that Lloyd George, when asked to indicate it on the map, did not know where it was. Temperly identifies it with Beisan, about 70 kms. from the Syrian border. (Temperly, *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, London, 1924, Vol. VI.)

(30) *Hansard*, 16 September 1920, (134) 700.

(31) Lloyd, George, *op. cit.*, p. 1093 and 1179. Brandeis was the leader of American Zionism and played an important role in winning American support to the Balfour Declaration.

As a compromise, the Deauville Line was proposed to the French but was also rejected. France had finally abandoned the Sykes-Picot line in June 1920 and put forward a compromise proposal of its own based on a line starting from Ras an-Naqura to the north of Metulla—Baniyas—the north of the Lake Huleh, down the Jordan, thence to the Sea of Galilee and the Yarmuk.³² The bulge toward Metulla and Baniyas was made to leave the existing Jewish colonies within Palestine. The French proposal was accepted as a basis for the final settlement and after a series of adjustments, the Franco-British Convention was signed in December 1920 in Paris, giving a general shape to the frontier and providing for the formation of a joint Boundary Commission to elaborate the agreement.³³ The experts of the Commission worked hard on the details and finished their work in February 1922. Ras an-Naqura was made the border point on the Mediterranean as suggested by the French. The boundary then extended in an eastern direction to Haramun, Metulla (left in Palestine), Baniyas (in Syria) to the east of al-Hamm Station on lake Tiberias. At this point, it parted from the lake and left the remainder of the eastern shore in Palestine (Map VI). Promise was given for the supply of water to the Jewish colonies from Upper Jordan and the Yarmuk but not from the Litani. Provisions were also made for the Syrian right of fishing in Lake Tiberias.³⁴ The agreement was signed in March 1923 and approved by the League of Nations in 1934. The line remained the undisputed international Syrian-Palestine frontier.

The negotiations were the opportunity for massive Zionist pressure in which Justice Brandeis used all his influence and the frustration of the efforts was a great disappointment to the Zionist Organisation. The Arabs, on the other hand, were not consulted. That their country was doomed to remain under the misguidance of the Mandate until such a time as the people were ready for self-rule is a conception which may be argued either way. But it was an obvious violation to decide on the future limitation of their land and sign away part of it over their heads. The guiding principles were those of imperialist interests, and all the other sentimental considerations of history and Bible were the niceties of sterile disputation. *The Times* wrote on the border issue in no vague terms:

"We must therefore draw this northern frontier with regard not only to what Biblical Palestine accomplished, but to what it failed to accomplish."³⁵

Mr. Raper asked Mr. Harmsworth, the Under Secretary for the Foreign Office, in the House of Commons, about the border talks and what the attitude of the Arabs was. The answer given to him by the Under Secretary was, "I should have notice of that question."³⁶ Mr. Raper returned to the subject a few months later and the only reply he managed to solicit was "...this and other relevant

(32) Ra'anana, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

(33) Cmd. 1195 of 1921.

(34) Cmd. 1910 of 1923. Maps included.

(35) *The Times*, 19th September 1919.

(36) *Hansard*, 15th July 1920, (131) 2596.

considerations have naturally not been lost sight of in the negotiations.”³⁷ At the same time we read in Mr. Frankfurter’s Memorandum of 24 June 1919, how Justice Brandeis pressed on Balfour the Zionist territorial demands and asked that the British Government should reach no settlement before his return from Palestine. Balfour promised this and all his other requests.³⁸

It was the French who tried to sway the Conference by producing Arab spokesmen. The Lebanese delegation had thus availed themselves of the opportunity and demanded the return of the Lebanese territory under British occupation, so that Lebanon might live in prosperity.³⁹ There is, however, a noticeable gap in the Arab position in connection with the northern border. The reason is that they did not see their claims in terms of a frontier adjustment. To them, Palestine belonged to Syria, and they went to the Peace Conference with that demand. For them it was a minor district delineation.

The East and West of Jordan

The eastern border was a simpler matter. You either accept Transjordan as part of Palestine, and then the desert will be your border, or consider it a separate country, and the River Jordan and the Dead Sea will be your unmistakable boundary. Only to the south of the Dead Sea does it become somewhat blurred. But Wadi al Araba can be, and is taken as, the natural dividing line between Transjordan and the Negev, if and when the latter is considered as part of Palestine which is rarely the case. Unlike the northern boundary, the eastern border has been accepted by all rulers of Syria and Palestine on this basis. The question is whether the Jordan-Dead Sea line delineates two countries or two districts. The Biblical demarcation leaves us in no doubt that the Hebrews looked at the Land of Gilead as a foreign territory.⁴⁰ The Arabs made the same distinction and called one Falastin and the other Urdun. The Turks followed their example and considered the east of Jordan part of the Vilayet of Syria and the west of Jordan as part of the Vilayet of Beirut and the Sanjaq of Jerusalem (Map **UI**). The East Roman Empire considered Transjordan as Palaestina III and the West bank as Palaestina I and II.⁴¹

The Zionists claimed that Transjordan was callously severed from Palestine by the Churchill settlement of 1921.⁴² The east of Jordan was included in their proposal to the Peace Conference, but they had made no effort to settle there by that time. The number of Jews who permanently lived east of Jordan at the

(37) *Hansard*, 10th November 1920. (134) 1194.

(38) *Documents 1919-1939*, I series, Vol. IV, p. 1278. During the meeting Balfour wondered how President Wilson could possibly reconcile his adherence to Zionism with the doctrine of self-determination. Brandeis explained it all to him!

(39) Miller, *op. cit.*, Vol. XIV, p. 429.

(40) See above.

(41) Ra’anan, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

(42) De Haas wrote, “There was at that date no thought of dividing Palestine at the line of the Jordan, and it was understood that Transjordan would run east to the Hejaz railroad.” J. De Haas, *History of Palestine*, London, 1934, p. 497.

time was only two. Other authorities put it at three.⁴³ The Churchill settlement was also no more than a confirmation of the existing position and accepted idea, as Transjordan had been ruled, since 1918, by Faisal from Damascus. Its mandate was later on awarded to Britain at San Remo in April 1920 with a proviso for the exclusion of the area from the terms of the Jewish National Home, a proviso which was claimed by the Jewish Agency in 1946 to be temporary. With the overthrow of Faisal by the French, in July 1920, the British High Commissioner addressed the notables of Transjordan and promised them self rule, which they had already enjoyed. Abdulla entered the country in February 1921 at the head of an army to avenge the overthrow of his brother. Herbert Samuel, the High Commissioner for Palestine, was embarrassed by Abdulla's march across Transjordan en route to Syria and solved the predicament by installing Abdulla as Amir of Transjordan. Churchill recognised him as a ruler in April. The border between Transjordan and Palestine was defined in a proclamation issued with the Palestine Constitution in 1922 excluding from its application the area east of a line drawn from Aqaba, through the centre of the Wadi al Araba, the Dead Sea and then along the River Jordan to its junction with the River Yarmuk.

The argument for excluding Palestine from the British promise to Sharif Husain as given by McMahon can hardly apply to Transjordan. The area cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be considered as lying to the West of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo. Mr. Bonar Law, in reply to a question in the House of Commons, excluded Transjordan from the government of Palestine.⁴⁴ The British military authorities applied the term "East of Jordan" to it and treated it as a separate entity, O.E.T.A.. East (Occupied Enemy Territory Administration—East), a term which was a transgression in itself, as the British Army had neither conquered nor occupied Transjordan. The Sykes-Picot Agreement recognised the same division and included both the east of Jordan and the Negev in the Arab Zone B. The Arabs presumed that Transjordan was an indisputable part of their kingdom. Representatives from the country had thus attended the conference of the Notables of Syria on 9 May, 1919, and pledged their allegiance to King Faisal.⁴⁵

It was Balfour and Colonel Meinertzhagen who called for the inclusion of the East of Jordan in Palestine.⁴⁶ But even Balfour recognised the Arab claim to it in his conversation with Brandeis. The American Zionist leader told him that the question of the southern and eastern boundaries was an "internal British question." Balfour replied that this could only be the case in regard to the southern boundary. The claim to the east of Jordan was a matter dependent on Faisal's acceptance.⁴⁷

(43) Sykes, C., *Crossroads to Israel*, 1965, London, p. 66.

(44) *Hansard*, 28th July 1920, (132) 1414.

(45) *Documents 1919-1939*, I Series, Vol. IV, p. 267.

(46) Memorandum by Balfour, 11th August 1919. *Documents 1919-1939*, p. 347; Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 17th November 1919, *Ibid.*, p. 534.

(47) *Documents 1919-1939*, p. 1277.

Balfour was in error as regards the southern border as well because the Negev was included in the Arab Zone in the Sykes-Picot Agreement and in the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (Map VII). Ma'an was in fact administered from the Hijaz and when Abdulla became Amir of Transjordan, his father, Sharif Husain, ceded the south of the Negev to him. Ibn Sa'ud put a claim to Aqaba and the southern Negev, in 1925, after the overthrow of Husain. The boundary draft plan proposed by the Zionists in 1918 did not reach to the Gulf of Aqaba and made a provision for right of access through the Arab Kingdom.⁴⁸ In the eventuality, Britain annexed the area and made Aqaba the Transjordanian outlet to the sea. Balfour, in reality, was not in error.

The Lost Frontiers

Thus was born the Palestine of the Mandate, the home of the Arabs and Jews. As hostility between the two communities became insupportable and the building up of a Jewish-Arab Palestine too costly for the mandatory power, the idea of partitioning the land was advanced in the mid-thirties. A number of maps were drawn at different times. The United Nations Organization finally sent its own Special Committee on Palestine which made the last partition proposal in the summer of 1947. The U.N.S.C.O.P. (United Nations Special Committee on Palestine) drew the frontiers of the two Palestinian states in accordance with the ethnic distribution of the population and with a view to the economic viability of the two future states.

Drawing a line from Qadas on the Lebanese border in a southern direction passing west of Safad, east of Mount Tabor, north of Afula south and west of Nazareth, and then in a northern direction to the east of Shafr Amr and terminating at the Mediterranean south of Acre, the Committee gave the Arabs the area to the north of this line, the Western Galilee, for its Arab population and to afford room for the future development of the Arab state. The hills of Samaria and Judea were also given to the Arabs for the same ethnic reason. The area was defined by a line taken from the south of Beisan on the River Jordan in a north west direction towards the south of Afula and then westward to Lajjun, thence in a southern direction towards the west of Tulkarm, Mejdal Yaba, Rishon-le-Zion, thence eastward to the west of Latrun, down to the east of Isdud and the south of Beersheba. The Line crossed the northern Negev to the Dead Sea. Jerusalem was excluded from the Arab State and was reserved for an international regime on account of its special religious status. The northern coastal strip was defined by a line from the north of Isdud following the coast towards Egypt and then back into the Negev, allowing the area of al-Auja to the Arab State.

Two intersection points were made, the first at Afula to afford a link between the Arab area east and west of the River Jordan and the area of the Western Galilee and Lebanon. The second point east of Isdud was meant to link the entire Arab area east of Israel with the Gaza strip and Arab Africa. Both intersection

(48) See Chapter II.

points also gave the Arab State and Transjordan access to the Mediterranean. The Jewish State was given the Negev to allow room for development and access to the Red Sea. An important deviation from the ethnic consideration was the case of Jaffa where a majority of some 70,000 Arabs lived. The town was nevertheless given to the Jewish State to "allow continuity."

The rough sketch of the U.N.S.C.O.P. Proposal was elaborated by the historical UN resolution of 29th November which recommended the partition of Palestine along the lines detailed in the resolution. The Arab town of Jaffa was left to the Arab State as an enclave within Israel. This was the last frontier delineation. With the outbreak of hostilities at different times, a variable cease-fire line defined the contours of Israel.

CHAPTER II

GREAT EXPECTATIONS

In addition to the vague definition of "Palestine," the delineation of the country was made more complex by the extraordinary nature of the Balfour Declaration. Self-determination or plebiscite would have settled many contested areas. The idea was not unusual in the region, for Britain had proposed a plebiscite to decide the future of Mosul between Turkey and Iraq and the dispute was settled accordingly. Nor was it possible to abide by the ethnic distribution. Any acceptance of such principles would have demolished the promised National Home. The contest was, therefore, thrown open with very few guiding lights. In the absence of the internationally accepted principles, mysticism and superstition were admitted as evidence. Economic considerations were also added to give a further dimension. The Jewish nationalists naturally wanted the largest possible country. Only a fraction of their dreams was realised by the Balfour Declaration and the 1947 Partition Proposal. The popular theory now is that what the W.Z.O. (World Zionist Organisation) has failed to secure from the imperialist powers and the international organisations is being attained by deceit, force and diplomacy. Whether one subscribes to this theory or not, it is imperative to examine the original ambitions of Jewish nationalism.

The Bible as Part of International Law

The Zionists usually speak of historical Eretz Israel, a vague term which can mean anything. Its basic source is the Bible. Here, the unbeliever may turn away in amusement, but in fact the idea is quite logical. If the Balfour Declaration and the right to take over Palestine is based on the Biblical references, then obviously the same source should give guidance on what Palestine is. The World Organisation of Agudat Israel was not out of context when it rejected the 1937 partition plan and asserted that "the frontiers of our Holy Land have been defined by the Creator of the World." It has become customary to learn from the clerical how to define the frontiers of Israel, and it was within this context that the opinion of Rabbi Fishman was solicited by the UN Special Committee on Palestine:

- "...What was the 'Promised Land'?"
- "The Promised Land was quite a large one, from the River of Egypt up to the Euphrates."
- "It included the whole of Syria?"
- "A part."
- "The whole of Transjordan and Iraq?"
- "No."

- "The whole of Syria, Lebanon, present day Palestine and Transjordan?"
- "Possibly part of Syria and Lebanon."
- "....."
- "Was not the promise of God made to Abraham and Moses fulfilled by Cyrus' order of return to Jerusalem?"
- "Cyrus gave only a part of the land to the Jews."
- "And therefore, according to you, a part of the promise of God was redeemed?"
- "The Maccabeans enlarged the area that Cyrus gave back to the Jews. Cyrus put in his proposal to the Jews only a part of the country, and the Maccabeans later expanded that part."

Rabbi Fishman's cryptic remarks on the proposal of Cyrus and the Maccabeans expansion of it was given for the benefit of the Committee. Twenty years later, the Sephardi Chief Rabbi of Israel, Itzhak Nissim substantiated Fishman's quasi historical reference. Rabbi Nissim declared after the Six Day War that the territories conquered by the Israelis belonged to historical Israel. From the rabbis the generals took their cue.

"There is not only a book called the Bible, and the people of that book; there is also the land of that book, the land of the Judges, and of the Patriarchs in Jerusalem and Anathot, Hebron and the fords of the River Jordan."²

Speaking in terms of strict history, the Zionists find themselves at a great disadvantage. They have to forego the important coastal plain which was not part of their kingdom, the small hinterland state. They have also to waive their claim to the Gulf of Aqaba, and the watershed of the Jordan. The Bible is more generous than history, and in the Bible the Zionists found their evidence. Ill-informed on Jewish history and on Judaism itself, the founder of Zionism, Dr. Herzl, had to fall back on the naïve and ready-to-hand concept of God's promise. When he was going to submit his proposal to the German Emperor, he decided to define Eretz Israel as the land between Egypt and the Euphrates.³ In his Diaries, he spoke of the Palestine of Solomon and David. To this end, W.B. Ziff furnished us with a map of "The Land of Israel during the time of Solomon" in his book *The Rape of Palestine* published during the partition controversy.⁴ The map stretches to the Euphrates and includes Sinai, the Gulf of Aqaba and Jordan. The real man for the Bible was not the dreaming agnostic, Herzl, but the warrior mystic, Ben Gurion. For him, a place is Israeli territory as soon as he gives you the Hebrew name for it. After his 1956 conquest in Sinai he baptised the new territory by announcing the birth of the Third Jewish Kingdom, extending from Dan in the north to the Straits of Shlomo in the south.⁵ Referring to Tiran, he wrote, "We have, indeed, an emotional attitude to Yotvat (Tiran). But I am prepared to give that up."⁶ In his speech of 22 July 1948, he gave accounts of the sweeping annexations under-

(2) Moshe Dayan reported in *Jewish Chronicle*, 18th August 1967.

(3) I. Cohen, *Theodor Herzl*, London, 1959, p. 189.

(4) London, 1948.

(5) *Bamachane*, 8th November 1956.

(6) Ben Gurion, *Israel — Years of Challenge*, London, 1964, p. 120.

taken by the army, with the moving narrative, albeit pedantic, to his soldiery, of Joshua's advances. When his forward policies contravened the laws and decisions of the Mandatory and the United Nations, he simply shrugged his shoulders, "The Book only is binding upon us."⁷ One piece of the Book does not seem to bind the "Old Man." He quoted many maxims from the Old Testament except, "He who ruleth his spirit is better than he who taketh a city."

Following "Operation Broom" which swept away thousands of Arab villagers from Upper Galilee and the north of Mount Tabor, the *Jewish Chronicle's* "Sermon of the Week" hailed the Hagana glories and quoted the Midrash thus, "In the Messianic Age, God will transplant Sinai, Carmel and Tabor from their present sites, bring them to one spot, and build Jerusalem on their combined heights."⁸ The case of Jerusalem requires very little treatment. The Arabs, the Great Powers and the United Nations would indulge in lamentable self-deception if they accepted any Zionist assurance on this score. "Next year in Jerusalem" has long been the Zionist rallying cry. During the 1948 war every Jewish vehicle sent to that front was daubed, "If I forget thee, O Jerusalem, let my right hand forget her cunning." The encroachment on the Dome of the Rock, in connection with the Wailing Wall, started the 1928 riots and massacres. Since them, and until the partition of Palestine, Zionist extremists continued to defy the authorities by blowing the shofar outside the wall, although the wall and all that it stood for in Judaism was no part of the atheistic position of most of them. Even El Al had its religious claim to the city, and drew its share from the Bible in its publicity campaign.⁹ The Sinai Desert was never a part of historical Israel even in the wild imagination of such a fanatic as Col. Meinertzhagen, who contested Egypt's rights to it by saying merely, "Israel had invaded no-man's land." Nevertheless, as soon as Sinai was occupied in 1956, the Israelis remembered the place where the Torah had come down to Moses. An expedition was actually formed and sent to Sinai to find it. Scholars and archaeologists, whose evidence is supposed to be in solid materials and scientific data, suddenly forgot their training and, under the auspices of B. Mazar, the President of the Hebrew University, went to Sinai in the second week of its occupation to find out where the burning bush had been! Interesting theories were soon debated. Some authorities believed that it must have been on the highest mountain in Sinai. Jabal Sarbal, 7000 feet high and Jabal Musa, 8000 feet high were the favourites. Other scholars, however, had a different opinion. God must have chosen a low hill for the purpose! All went looking for low hills and thousands of people applied to the Government to go on pilgrimages to Mount Sinai. The controversy and worthy research soon vanished in the way that it had

(7) Ben Gurion, *Destiny and Rebirth of Israel*, p. 199. In remembering Ben Gurion's use of the Bible, we cannot but remember Arthur Koestler's remark "The Old Testament, taken as a practical guide to twentieth century politics, is a more pernicious influence than Hitler's Mein Kampf." (*Promise and Fulfilment*, London, 1949, p. 307).

(8) *Jewish Chronicle*, 11th June 1948.

(9) El Al advertisement in *The Times* (4th June 1968) spoke of newly conquered Jerusalem as "the city, referred to as Salem in Genesis, which offered hospitality to Abraham, is the city of David the King and of Solomon."

started. Sinai must be handed back. No one thought again of looking for the burning bush, nor had there been any searchers before October 1956 although Sinai had been there for a good many centuries.

Not only did Sinai have its place in the history of the Book, the people of the Book, or the land of the Book. Iraq is also claimed by the same "history." The American Minister of Constantinople, Mr. Oscar Straus, a Zionist Jew, advised Herzl to take Mesopotamia. The Zionist leader answered in the affirmative. "We could tie the mystical element in there," said he, "the birth place of Abraham."¹⁰ More interesting than the case of Iraq is that of Uganda. The Zionists were split on this offer which was made by the British Government in 1903. Supporters of the scheme recalled the Biblical promise from the River of Egypt to the Euphrates; and did not the Nile flow in Uganda? A certain Goldreich cited the Talmud, "When Moses fled from Pharaoh, he found refuge, according to a Talmudic legend, in the Sudan where he became ruler of the land for forty years."¹¹ So, Republic of the Sudan, watch out!

As Zionist hopes rose during World War I, numerous books and pamphlets appeared on Biblical Israel. V.L. Trumper published a number of such booklets including *Historical Sites in Southern Palestine*, and *Historical Sites in Central Palestine*. Towards the end of 1917, Sir Adam Smith wrote *Syria and the Holy Land* which became Lloyd George's authority in his boundary dispute with the French delegate at the Peace Conference.¹² Samuel Hillel Isaacs, a Jewish scholar, published *The True Boundaries of the Holy Land* in which he made an advance plea to the Peace Conference to include Lebanon in Palestine. Taking his clues from Numbers XXXIV: 3-12¹³ and by using his own interpretation, he took the northern frontier far into southern Turkey (Map VIII).

Such notions may look like the fantasies of wild dreamers, and Arab references to them may sound like the exaggerations of a hallucinatory over anxious brain. Yet, exactly the same mystical notions have occupied an important place in the political arena of Palestine. To Eshkol, for example, pre-June 1967 Israel "has been cut out to one fifth of its original size," as he said to a students rally in Haifa. As for the question of the refugees, he made it clear to the future generation of Israel that "there is no point in talking about resettling the Arab refugees in Israel . . . most of the refugees are actually living on the historic soil of the land of Israel."¹⁴

The leaders of the Labour Party, including Ben Gurion and Eshkol, always found it easier to cite the Old Testament than to cite the pillars of progressive thought of our time. There is certainly more Talmud than *Das Capital* in the literature of Poale Zion and the Zionist socialists in general. S. Levenberg sets out to put the case of his party by quoting, not Marx, Engels or even Ber Borachov,

(10) Manuel, F.E., *The Realities of American Palestine Relations*, Washington, 1949.

(11) Goldreich, E.I., *The Mystery of Zionism*, Pamphlet, 1905.

(12) Lloyd George, *op. cit.*, pp. 1178, 1180.

(13) See above, Chapter I.

(14) Broadcast by Israeli Radio, 11th June 1965, BBC, MR, Part IV.

the founder of Poale Zion, but Ezekiel, "Behold, O my people, I will . . . bring you unto the land of Israel."¹⁵ When the fate of Palestine was under consideration at the Peace Conference, Poale Zion's frontier followed the same line advanced by the General Zionists.

Economical Eretz Israel

General Karl von Horn, the UN Chief Observer, described Ben Gurion as a man who was more in the habit of quoting the Bible than following it. The description applies at its best to the frontier issue. Although the leadership took the mythical, or "historical" legends as a basis for their claims, in practice they were not bound by them, when it suited them to go beyond the achievement of their fathers.¹⁶ It may be amusing to read Herzl's comment on Iraq. Abraham was born there, so we are told, but not patriarch had anything to do with Lebanon. Weizmann, however, was surprised that it was excluded from the National Home. "We did not know that France had designs on the Levant and thought that we could include the whole of the area in the Jewish National Home." From the mountains of Lebanon, Herzl envisaged in his novel *Old New Land* the Jewish State was to generate its electricity. The British Palestine Committee wanted Damascus included in Palestine.¹⁷

In the middle of the war and before the Balfour Declaration was issued, Harry Sacher wrote *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, in which he set out to delineate the frontiers according to the concept, "What the Bible gives me, I shall take, and what the Bible does not give me, you shall not have." Sacher admits that historical Israel did not possess the tip of the Dead Sea or reach the Euphrates.¹⁸ According to his geography, the furthest point to the north reached by the Hebrews was just north of Sidon, and the furthest point to the south was Wadi Araba at 30 degrees, 30 minutes north. He argued that this was not enough. Economic considerations must be taken into account. Palestine must become a bridgehead between Asia, Africa and Europe. It must become a meeting point for the roads and railroads converging from the neighbouring countries. Aqaba, for one thing, must be annexed to it. In the north he suggested that the border should follow the first five miles of the lower course of the Nahr al Awali, thence at a straight line to the south east to a point at 36 degrees east by 33 degrees 15 minutes north. Another straight line south-south-east would take us to Basra (32 degrees 30 minutes north) then southward parallel to the railway at a distance of 10-20 miles to the east of it to al-Jafar (20 miles east of Ma'an), then south-west to Aqaba and from Aqaba to Rafa.¹⁹

(15) S. Levenberg, *The Jews and Palestine*, London, 1945.

(16) *The Zionist Review* (January 1919) wrote, "The Jewish point of view, the aim must be to secure those boundaries which are dictated by history and by economic considerations." C.f. also, *Palestine* (the organ of the British Palestine Committee), 15th February 1917.

(17) *Palestine*, 15th February 1917.

(18) Sacher, H., *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, London, 1917, p. 210.

(19) *Ibid.*, pp. 210-213.

The author includes an article by the agricultural engineer, S. Tolkowsky, in which he writes about the importance of the "fertile table land of Hauran, renowned for its fields of wheat" and "the mountains of Gilead (Transjordan) with their forests of oak and pine."²⁰

Sacher's mapping of Palestine (Map IX) is no pious Jewish dream. It is the imperialist map cherished by the European merchant class ever since the days of the spice route, and attempted by their conquerors from the crusaders to the nineteenth century capitalists. Sacher, in fact, had a forerunner in the person of an anonymous French Jew who published a letter in 1798 (just before the campaign in Egypt) and called for the Jewish colonisation of Palestine in furtherance of France's imperial aims.

"The country we propose to occupy shall include—subject to such arrangements as shall be agreeable to France—lower Egypt with the addition of a district which shall have for its limits a line running from Acre to the Dead Sea and from the south point of that lake to the Red Sea."²¹

The drawing of the border some twenty miles to the east of the Hijaz railway was an explicit attempt to control this important line over which Germany and Britain were watching each other. In view of its importance to the Muslims as the pilgrim route to Mecca, the Zionists shifted the eastern border, presumably on the advice of the British, to the west of it in 1919. It was stated that they had done so in deference to the Arab plans for Arabia and Syria. It was a concession from the Jews, *Palestine* argued,²² and the Arabs should compensate them by opening Damascus as a free city, establishing a customs union and allowing Jewish Palestine to establish special business connections with its strong and prosperous Jewish community of Mesopotamia through a new route via Basra. The line also happens to follow closely the ten inch rain line bordering on the desert.

Sacher's thesis was followed by massive studies of this question. From 1917, *Palestine* carried a number of articles on the boundaries. On 15 February, 1917, it defined Palestine in terms of Jewish history and went on to eliminate the causes of the weakness of the ancient kingdom. This time the country should extend to the north of Sidon, and include Damascus, Transjordan and Aqaba, following the same boundaries as those propounded by Sacher. Military thinking occupied an important part in the deliberations of the magazine which considered the occupation of the northern hills and Transjordan necessary for the defence of Palestine.²³ The other factor taken into consideration was the economic potentialities of these areas.

While British Zionism was fighting its way, the Continental Zionists were making their own plans. Attempts were made to persuade the German Government to issue its own "Balfour Declaration." Their boundary plan turned out to be

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 163.

(21) Cited in J.M.N. Jeffries, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

(22) *Palestine*, 23 November 1918.

(23) *Palestine*, 15 February, 5 May and 28 July 1917

almost identical with that of the Zionists in London.²⁴ Whether the Zionists in the two belligerent camps were comparing notes during the war or a general understanding on future plans had already been reached before the war started, the fact remains that the boundary ambitions, formalised by British Zionism at the end of the war, had been the consensus of opinion of the Movement as a whole. The Federation of the Dutch Zionists adopted a resolution which was closer to Sacher's plan and took the border to the east of the Hijaz railway.²⁵

The *Zionist Review* followed a similar line between Beirut and Sidon to the south of Damascus.²⁶ The projection of Palestine into Syria loomed in the thoughts of Theodor Herzl when he was trying to establish the "Jewish land company for Syria and Palestine."²⁷ N. Sokolow, President of the Zionist Organisation, went further in his expectations, and penetrated into Syria and Iraq. "Palestine (and gradually the thinly populated neighbouring districts) can become a great outlet for Jewish population . . . the vast tracts of the so-called Syrian desert are only regions deforested."²⁸ At the same time, little was said on the western and southern side of Palestine in view of the British position there. But some ideas were advanced for the removal of the boundary from Rafa to al-Arish.²⁹ In 1903, the Zionist Organisation accepted the British offer of al-Arish, and sent a commission to investigate the possibility with a view to future extension into Palestine. The water problem and Lord Cromer's suspicion killed the project.

The various suggestions and proposals had finally led to a draft boundary plan worked out by the Advisory Committee on Palestine in November 1918. The plan included the Litani River to Baniyas, the sources of the Jordan and the East of Jordan to the west of the railway. "In the south, a line from a point in the neighbourhood of Aqaba to El Arish" was proposed, with a rider, "There shall be a right of free access to and from the Red Sea, through Aqaba, by arrangement with the Arab Government."³⁰ The last provision is an acquiescence to the Arab claim for southern Negev. Al-Arish was dropped in the end, and the existing Egyptian boundary was left as it was. In February 1919, the World Zionist Organisation submitted its statement to the Peace Conference of Paris, including a schedule on the boundaries, as follows:

"Starting on the north at a point on the Mediterranean Sea in the vicinity south of Sidon and following the watersheds of the foothills of the Lebanon as far as Jisr El Karraon, thence to El Bire, following the dividing line between the two basins of the Wadi El Korn and the Wadi Et Tein thence in a southerly direction following the dividing line between the Eastern and Western slopes of the Hermon, to the vicinity West of Beit Jenn, thence Eastward following the Northern Watersheds of the Nahr Mughaniye close to and west of the Hedjaz Railway."

(24) Cf. Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 91.

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 102.

(26) Z.R., November 1918.

(27) *The Complete Diaries of Theodor Herzl*, N.Y., 1960, Vol. II, pp. 716, 720, 775.

See also next chapter.

(28) Sokolow, N., *History of Zionism*, London, 1919, XXIII.

(29) De Haas, *Palestine*, 9th November 1918, p. 497.

(30) Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

"In the East a line close to and West of the Hedjaz Railway terminating in the Gulf of Aqaba."

"In the South a frontier to be agreed upon with the Egyptian Government."³¹

In other words, the proposal extends Palestine to Sidon (taking about one third of present day Lebanon), stretches to the suburbs of Damascus, and takes in much of Transjordan including the town of Amman and Ma'an in the east. The clause referring to the southern frontier makes it plain that, in their minds, the signatories did not recognise the existing frontier with Egypt as anything but transient. The boundary as given above happens to follow nearly the same line proposed by the British Government to the French (Map X). The statement went on to support its territorial proposals by emphasising the two claims of history and economy. We cite the relevant part in view of its bearing on future developments:

"The boundaries above outlined are what we consider essential for the necessary economic foundation of the country. Palestine must have its natural outlets to the seas and the control of its rivers and their headwaters. The boundaries are sketched with the general economic needs and historic traditions of the country in mind, factors which necessarily must also be considered by the Special Commission in fixing the definite boundary lines. This commission will bear in mind that it is highly desirable, in the interests of economical administration, that the geographical area of Palestine should be as large as possible so that it may eventually contain a large and thriving population which could more easily bear the burdens of modern civilised government than a small country with a necessary limitation of inhabitants."

"The economic life of Palestine, like that of every other semi-arid country depends on the available water supply. It is, therefore of vital importance not only to secure all water resources already feeding the country, but also to be able to conserve and control them at their sources."

"The Hermon is Palestine's real 'Father of Waters' and cannot be severed from it without striking at the very root of its economic life. The Hermon not only needs re-forestation but also other works before it can again adequately serve as the water reservoir of the country. It must be therefore wholly under the control of those who will most willingly as well as most adequately restore it to its maximum utility. Some international arrangement must be made whereby the riparian rights of the people dwelling south of the Litani River may be fully protected. Properly cared for these headwaters can be made to serve in the development of the Lebanon as well as of Palestine."

"The fertile plains east of the Jordan, since the earliest Biblical times, have been linked economically and politically with the land west of the Jordan. The country which is now very sparsely populated, in Roman times supported a great population. It could now serve admirably for colonisation on a large scale. A just regard for the economic needs of Palestine and Arabia demands that free access to the Hedjaz Railway throughout its length be accorded to both Governments."

"An intensive development of the agriculture and other opportunities of Transjordan make it imperative that Palestine shall have access to the Red Sea and an opportunity of developing good harbours on the Gulf of Aqaba. Aqaba, it will be recalled, was the terminus of an important trade route of Palestine from the days of Solomon onwards. The ports developed in the Gulf of Aqaba should be free ports through which the commerce of the Hinterland may pass on the same principle which guides us in suggesting that free access be given to the Hedjaz Railway."

The statement was signed by such figures as Nahum Sokolow, Chaim Weizmann, Stephen S. Wise, and Jacob de Haas. The claims of the Zionist delegation were echoed and supported by the influential circles of the Movement. Justice

(31) Text in D.H., Miller, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 15

Brandeis sent a cable to the Conference stressing the importance of Hermon, Hauran and Transjordan.³² The aging Max Nordau demanded the inclusion of the Hauran.³³ Weizmann impressed on Meinertzhagen the urgency of the Zionist territorial demands in the north and east and the Political Officer was inspired to submit to the British Government his own boundary plan which corresponded to the aspirations of Chaim Weizmann and closely followed the border line of the World Zionist Organisation proposal.³⁴

The socialist Poale Zion submitted a memorandum to the British Labour Party in 1920 joining hands with the General Zionists in the same territorial demands. "Palestine must include the western basin of the Litani, the Jordan sources as far as Hermon and the Hauran District up to Kahar al-Ange, south of Damascus."³⁵

The Case of Transjordan

The overwhelming opinion in Zionist circles was that the eastern bank of the River Jordan was part of the coveted Palestine. It was included in the statement submitted to the Peace Conference and in nearly every map drawn by the Zionists. In their official terminology, they called Transjordan "East Palestine," and the Palestine west of the River Jordan "West Palestine," and continued to do so even after the establishment of Israel.³⁶ *The Zionist Review* protested against the division of Transjordan and Palestine in the Military Administration immediately after occupation.³⁷ Weizmann intimated that "if he cannot go east of Jordan the many millions of Jews who eventually come to Palestine will be crowded out."³⁸ The Jewish Agency insisted that the area of the Balfour Declaration included both sides of the River Jordan.³⁹

Few historical or religious associations did the Jews have with Transjordan, but the Zionists pressed for its annexation for economic and military reasons. The 1919 statement to the Peace Conference speaks of the "fertile plains east of Jordan." The underpopulated country offered an obvious outlet for future settlement of a good many people. *Palestine* carried an article on the economic possibilities of Gilead and concluded by quoting the Arab saying, "Thou canst not find a country like the Belka for cattle and sheep."⁴⁰ Dr. Rappin dwelt on the railway

(32) Lloyd, George, *op. cit.*, p. 1179.

(33) Letter to the Conference of the Zionist Organization of America, September 1919, *Jewish Guardian*, 10 October 1919.

(34) Meinertzhagen, *op. cit.*, Map p. 64.

(35) Jewish Labour Correspondence, January 1921.

(36) The Israeli reply, on 5 July 1948, to Count Bernadotte's proposals, spoke of "...the partition of Western Palestine between the Jewish people and the Arab population of Palestine. (Bernadotte, Count Folke, *To Jerusalem*, London, 1951, p. 149). Moshe Dayan expressed the same concept of the "western part of the land of Israel" in June 1968. (J.C. 28 June 1968).

(37) Z.R. November 1918, also *Palestine*, 23 November 1918.

(38) Meinertzhagen, *op. cit.*, p. 65.

(39) *Jewish Agency Documents Submitted to United Nations*, 1947, p. 4. G. Kirk, *A Short History of the Middle East*, 1955, p. 151. Statement by Ben Gurion to UNSCOP in *The Jewish Plan for Palestine*, Jewish Agency, 1947, pp. 301, 318.

(40) *Palestine*, 28 July 1917.

importance of the Hijaz line and Aqaba. Once a branch line was laid, he said, Indian pilgrims could go to Mecca via Jewish Palestine.⁴¹ Despite the establishment of Arab autonomy in that area, the aspirations to it continued on both the left and the right wings of the Zionist Movement. The Poale Zionist Levenberg⁴² wrote as recently as 1945 about the colonisation possibilities of the "artificially excluded" eastern Palestine. A. Konikoff prepared a survey for the Jewish Agency with the inevitable chapters on the severance of "East Palestine," the cultivable lands, the country's possibilities for population, and the legal position of the Hijaz Railway.⁴³ The Revisionists, on the right, had never recognised the separation of Transjordan. Their successors in the Herut Party had only accepted the fact in the fifties when Menachem Begin started to aim at respectability with a view to taking office. The Herut brochure for the 1949 general election crystallised the party positions thus:

"The Jewish Homeland, the area of which covers both sides of the Jordan, is a complete historic and geographic entity. Dissection of the Homeland is an unlawful act; agreement to dissection is also unlawful and is not binding on the Jewish people. It is the duty of this generation to return to Jewish sovereignty those parts of the Homeland which were torn off from it and given over to foreign rule."⁴⁴

After the adoption by the United Nations of the U.N.S.C.O.P. Partition Proposal in 1947 and the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948, a new frontier concept was evolved. Israel was not given even the smaller "West Palestine" of the Mandate in its entirety, nor was she able to seize it in the fighting. The northern Mandate border was realised by Israeli arms, but not the border to the east or the west. A large pocket, the Arab triangle, remained in Arab hands west of the Jordan. Egypt was also able to maintain its hold on the Gaza Sector in the west. She did not annex the sector but set up a special administration in it. The new Kingdom of Jordan annexed the West Bank on 24 April 1950. The borders have become the cease-fire lines which neither party has recognised as permanent. Although Israel negotiated with Abdulla some kind of a border settlement in which Jordan had ceded parts of the Arab Triangle in 1949, and despite Israel's protestations to the permanency of the borders and her call on the Arabs to recognise them as such, the actual attitude remained different.

"The Israel Government's official attitude towards the annexation as well as to that part of the British Statement which declared that the terms of the Anglo-Jordan Agreement would also apply to the annexed area was one of reservation. Since it could not remain indifferent to the fate of this territory, and since its consent had not been obtained before the annexation, the future of the territory remained an open question as far as Israel was concerned."⁴⁵

(41) *Palestine*, 30th June 1917.

(42) Levenberg, *op. cit.*, p. 73.

(43) Konikoff, A., *Transjordan—an Economic Survey*, Jewish Agency, 1946.

(44) Cited in McDonald, J.G., *op. cit.*, p. 133. Many attempts are made to play down the views of the Revisionists and belittle their influence and importance by calling them a mere fringe group. The Revisionists, in fact, occupied the third place in the early thirties, and in the 1949 elections they came fourth, with the General Zionists, the Progressives, the Sephardim and the Communists well behind. M. Begin became a Minister of State in 1967.

(45) Israel Government Yearbook, 1950, p. 145.

This position was easily rationalised: When Israel accepted the U.N.S.C.O.P. proposal, she did so in terms of a partition between an Arab state and a Jewish state. The former did not materialise as the Arabs simply joined the remaining parts of Palestine with Jordan and kept Gaza under an Egyptian administration. This had altered the position in Israeli eyes. In later years, Ben Gurion threatened to occupy the West Bank and hold it. The 1967 war brought the threat to fruition. The same applied to the Gaza Sector, whose administration by Egypt was not accepted in Tel Aviv. The first attempt to annex it was made in 1956 and was repeated in 1967.

Promise and Non-fulfilment

There is nothing extraordinary in those great expectations. It is natural for people to entertain exaggerated hopes of what a Christmas box will bring them, particularly when they happen to have no experience of Christmas gifts. The Jewish nationalists had not imagined their Palestine, handed to them as a prize in a World War which they had very little to do, but to be small and poor. Their early literature is full of dreams of milk and honey, of booming markets and world communications. The only map available to them is that indicated, with ample generosity, in Genesis.⁴⁶ Their ambitious design had an obvious virtue to recommend it. The vulnerability of the old Jewish Kingdom was partly due to its small size. If the world meant to solve the Jewish Question by sending the Jews back to Palestine, provision should be made to insure against the same vulnerability and repetition of the tragedy. If the Jews must have a cure along the Zionist thesis, the Jewish Homeland should be large enough to give them a life free from claustrophobia, persecution and threat. It was the statesmen of the Great Powers and the commissioners of the United Nations who were at fault. Their interest, however, was not in the salvation of the Jew, but in the salvation of their own anti-Semitic world from the Jews.

Arab spokesmen are in the habit of quoting the various Zionist authorities to show the ambitious plans perpetrated against their land. It is, in a way, a superfluous effort if not actually doing the work of their opponents. The Jewish nationalists have not denied their early territorial ambitions. *Davar*, the leading paper of the ruling Mapai Party, carried an article shortly after the 1967 conquests reiterating the old ambitions. Historical Palestine is the final goal of Zionism. Sinai is only a part of the Negev annexed to Egypt for imperial reasons which concerned Britain in the past. The Paper cites the various Zionist authorities much as the author has done in this chapter.⁴⁷

(46) Of such promising dreams, Paul Newman wrote in his poem *Pro Patria*, at the turn of the century:

White Hermon glistening in the morning glory,
Dark Sinai with its single Cyprus Tree,
Great Tabor, and that rugged promontory,
Whence Carmel frowns upon the laughing sea.

(47) *Davar*, 27 October 1967.

CHAPTER III

THE PHANTASMAGORIC LAND AND THE WITCHES OF MACBETH

Why the Modesty?

Whether historical, Biblical or Balfourian, Eretz Israel was envisaged by the Zionists on a grand scale. The Palestine of the Mandate was in itself a whittling down of their proposals. In 1937, only a fraction of that Mandate area was offered to the World Zionist Organisation (Map XI). The offer was accepted with reservations. In 1947, the partition idea was again advanced and adopted by the United Nations General Assembly and the Zionists again accepted partition and expressed satisfaction with the portion allotted to them. It is on record that their aspirations, up to the last minute, were for the whole of Palestine. In May 1942, a meeting attended by all Zionist factions was held in Biltmore, United States, where a declaration, better known as the Biltmore Programme, was adopted unanimously. The resolution advocated that Palestine, in its entirety, "be established as a Jewish Commonwealth." The partition idea was aired, during the war, by the Colonial Office, and the Jewish Agency lost no time in protesting, in October 1944, against any such plan. The position of the Revisionists was, and remained, for the entire "historical" Israel. In his press conference of 7 January 1947, Moshe Shertok spoke of Jewish independence in the whole of Palestine.¹

The question is, what made the Zionists reduce their claim and accept, as they said, one-tenth of their Eretz Israel? The Jewish nationalists are not known for humility, felicity or the spirit of compromise. Yet the Executive of the Jewish Agency met in 1946, and submitted a plan of its own for the partition of Palestine which left even Jerusalem in the hands of the Arabs. Instead of the eventual Israeli corridor to the Holy City, the Executive allowed an Arab corridor to Jaffa, splitting Israel into two (Map XII). The proposal was rejected by the British Government, and the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (U.N.S.C.O.P.) drew up the last partition plan. The Jewish Agency accepted the U.N.S.C.O.P. proposal and fought for its implementation. Why did they welcome this "pitiful small slice of territory," as Ben Gurion had described it—a mere 16,000 square kilometres?

The answer is that they did not. They declared their acceptance, but they have never accepted it. In dealing with this side of the story, we encounter one of the most cynical aspects of Zionism, the harvest of the training and education of the east European ghetto which glare at us from every corner of Israeli politics. Why should the victims of the ghettos pay any respect to promises or covenants, made

(1) Kirk, G. *Short History of the Middle East*, p. 217.

with the gentiles? Did the gentile keep his word over the centuries of oppression? They had no share in the organisation of the gentile world or the making of its laws and treaties. It is natural for them to feel that the book only is binding upon them. The most exacting intellectual training in the ghetto has always been the interpretation of the Old Testament and the Talmud. The intricacies of the Talmudic studies are more spectacular than anything in the field of mental exercise. The result, as it came to be utilised by the Zionists, is a confident knowledge in the ability to circumscribe any awkward word and a habitual recourse to ambiguity. The patience of the British administrators has been tried to its limits by the hair-splitting argumentation of the Jewish Agency officials.²

The Zionists had accepted in principle the 1937 partition proposal because they simply had to, as the British Government was determined not to go along any further in converting the country into a Jewish commonwealth. They even proposed a legislative Council with an Arab majority which, once allowed, could have crippled the entire project. Half a loaf is better than no bread. The same maxim was followed in 1947 when Mr. Bevin made it clear that any further mass immigration and land acquisition must depend on the approval of the Arabs. Acquiescence in the partition plan, therefore, was an unavoidable evil for the leaders. Unlike the Arabs, who can afford unrealistic pride and remain unprincipled in stubbornly holding on to their principles, the Jews learned to teach their necessity to reason.

With the mixture of the dialectics of refugees and the evolutionism of scientists, the World Zionist Organisation was able to shift its ground as circumstances required. For years the Jewish Agency³ had accused the British Administration of equivocation. More than once did it call on the Administration to make the Balfour Declaration completely clear to the Arabs and remove any false hopes in their minds about the future of the Jewish National Home. The truth, in all fairness to the British Government, is that it was the World Zionist Organisation which needed to clarify its position and remove the false hopes of the Arabs. The Balfour Declaration was clarified, in no small measure, by the 1922 White Paper. By the mid-thirties, Britain felt that her commitment in helping to build a national home in Palestine without jeopardising the interests and rights of the non-Jewish population, was discharged. It seems that the World Zionist Organisation wanted Britain to tell the Palestinians what they would have liked to tell them themselves—preferring to shift the responsibility to the British Government. The same Gilbertian situation was repeated in 1968 when Premier Eshkol went to Washington and asked President Johnson to give a clear assurance on the Arab-Israeli boundaries. In bewilderment the American President asked, "You are asking me to guarantee your borders? What borders do you want me to guarantee?"⁴

(2) Cf. Storrs, R., *Orientalisms*, London, 1937.

(3) The Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Organization are, to all intents and purposes, the same. The former is the name given to the latter for convenience.

(4) *Newsweek*, 22 January, 1968.

Up to the moment of writing, the world is still puzzling over what borders Israel wants.

It was while pursuing this determined course of ambiguity, that they denied any intention of establishing a Jewish state in Palestine. N. Sokolow, President of the Zionist Organisation, asserted that "The Jewish state was never a part of the Zionist programme."⁵ In evidence of this claim, he gave a typical interpretation to the title of Herzl's tract "*Jüdenstaat*." Sokolow said⁶ that in the committee responsible for writing down the Basle Programme, Herzl had denied that his aim was to create a "Jewish State." 'If it had been he would have called the historical pamphlet "Einen Jüdischen Staat" and not "Jüdenstaat" which means "Jews' State."' Weizmann addressed his Arab listeners during the visit of the Zionist Commission to Jerusalem and warned them against the treacherous insinuations that the Zionists were seeking political power in Palestine. The Arab notables thanked him for his assurances and pledged themselves to join in the common effort.⁷ In 1930, he addressed his followers and repudiated the aim of a Jewish majority or statehood. After years of such denials the Jewish Agency demanded, in 1944, both a Jewish majority and a Jewish State.⁸ Ben Gurion issued a statement following the U.N. adoption of the partition proposal confirming that "Statehood is the logical outcome of the Mandate."⁹ The Yugoslav member of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine asked Ben Gurion to explain his position when he denied to the Peel Commission in 1937 any intention to set up a Jewish State because it would mean domination by the Jews of the Arab inhabitants. So sure and sincere in his views was he that he could only repeat the one reason prompted by his examiner and add. "The other reasons I do not remember."¹⁰

Students of Zionist history must dwell on the issue of what kind of a home the leaders had in mind. Documents are varied and contradictory. Naturally, a great proportion of the contradictions are the result of too many brains, as may be expected in any political movement. Yet, the dearth of official documents on this crucial matter and sometimes the explicit denial of any ambition for political power leave us with the impression that some guile was intentionally perpetrated. The ambiguity of the "National Home" which frustrated all attempts at definition was one of their clever inventions. The learned doctor, Max Nordau, explains how they hammered out the Basle Programme of 1897.

"I did my best to persuade the claimants of the Jewish State in Palestine that we might find a circumlocution that would express all we meant, but would say it in a way so as to avoid provoking the Turkish rulers of the coveted land. I suggested "Heimstätte" as a synonym for state . . . This is the history of the much commented on expression. It was equivocal, but we all understood what it meant. To us it signified "Jüdenstaat" then and it signifies the same now."¹¹

(5) Sokolow, N., *History of Zionism*, London, 1919, XXV.

(6) Article in *The Zionist Review*, October 1917.

(7) Storrs, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

(8) Jewish Agency Memoranda of October 1944 and May 1945, *Documents relating to the Palestine Problem*, Jewish Agency publication, 1945.

(9) *The Zionist Review*, 31 January, 1947.

(10) Statement by Ben Gurion, *The Jewish Plan for Palestine*, Jewish Agency, 1947, p. 345.

(11) Quoted in Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel*, p. 24.

The leaders of the World Zionist Organisation, including its two distinguished Presidents, Mr. N. Sokolow and Dr. C. Weizmann, were accordingly not telling the truth.¹²

The extremists justify such practices by pointing to the leading states and emulating their practices. The time will certainly come when the leading states of the world will point to the past practices of the Zionist state and Israel shall be a light unto the nations! Indeed, Zionist duplicity and double dealing have already acquired international fame.¹³

World Jewry is familiar with the spectacle of its nationalists eating their own words and, for good or bad reasons, breaking the promises made to their followers. Why shouldn't they also eat words spoken to Arabs and gentiles? To make the task easier they found that words are better eaten when they are not sandwiched with paper. Once more, no one understood this fact better than the "old man." He argued against any written constitution for Israel, and insisted on the Provisional Government not writing anything in the Declaration of Independence about the frontiers of Israel.¹⁴ Years before that, the Conjoint Committee (representing the non-Zionist Jews) held talks with the Zionist Organisation on a common programme. One of the stumbling blocks in the talks was that the Zionist representative, Mr. H. Sacher, refused to put anything down in writing.¹⁵ Zionist hands must be left free, except from Arab thoughts.

Organic Zionism

Zionist acquiescence is only transient. Being a science lecturer, Dr. Weizmann had established what is known as organic Zionism. The National Home should be built up in an evolutionary manner like a living body, utilising every opportunity, adapting itself to circumstances and accepting nothing as eternal or unchangeable. Only in this light, can we understand how he accepted the tiny portion of Palestine offered by the Royal Commission in 1937. When his colleagues attacked the proposal and lamented the loss of the Negev, he aptly answered, "It will not run away."¹⁶ Organic expansion is by no means a monopoly of the second generation. Herzl had considered the acquisition of Lebanon as a first stage in the building up of the state. "Then Israel would be a serious but friendly neighbour to the Sanjak of Jerusalem, which I shall acquire at the first opportunity, as the Bulgarians did with Eastern Rumelia."¹⁷

(12) Shortly after the publication of Weizmann's diaries, "Trial and Error," Mr. Rabinowicz, a fellow Zionist, gave a heavily documented analysis of Weizmann's accounts. The scholarly study leaves the reader wary of anything said by the first President of Israel. (Rabinowicz, *Fifty Years of Zionism*, London, 1952).

(13) Cf. Sykes, *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 24. C. Sykes, a moderate sympathiser with Zionism, could not help observing: "The unpleasant truth must be faced that the Zionists in London in 1917 were undoubtedly guilty of double-dealing."

(14) "If ever indeed frontiers can be irrevocably fixed" (Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny*, p. 275).

(15) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

(16) Barbour, N., *Nisi Dominus*, London, 1946, p. 185.

(17) Herzl, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 1344.

The question of the Negev and its loss, according to the 1937 partition plan, aroused a serious outcry from the opposition. Partition was supported by the Labour Party, with Ben Gurion in the fore. His attachment to the Negev is almost an obsession. What made him forget his cherished dream? "The debate," he explained, "has not been for or against the indivisibility of the Land of Israel. The debate concerned which of the two routes would lead quicker to the common goal."¹⁸ In a lecture which he gave at the time to Ihud Olami in Zurich, he pointed out that the Partition of Palestine was not a final conclusion but merely a transient step. After the Six Day War, *Davar* reminded its readers of Ben Gurion's words, and commented:

"The great debate between the Zionist Labour Movement and the rest of the Zionist camp, and the Revisionists, was not about the aim, but about the means. When the 17th Zionist Congress defeated the motion of the Revisionists to define the aim of the Zionist Movement as the creation of a Jewish State, it did not do so because it opposed this aim but because such a definition would not further the Zionist cause one step and would only create unnecessary obstacles. The aim of the whole Zionist camp was a Jewish State in Palestine, but since it was impossible to reach this goal in a single step, it was ready to proceed gradually. Just as we knew what comes first in settlement and policy, we knew what precedes what with regard to the geographical borders."¹⁹

Of all the fellow Zionists whom Ben Gurion hated, the foremost was Jabotinsky, who had often embarrassed the movement by insisting that it was better for them "to tell the truth." His quarrel with him was wholly on "which of the two routes will lead quicker." The Revisionist leader was not given to that kind of diplomacy and summed up the difference between himself and the World Zionist Organisation in only that he was "Straightforward, but the programme was the same."²⁰ He torpedoed the good work of Zionist duplicity by warning the Royal Commission against credulity in what they had heard earlier from Weizmann. "Should we swear to you we would be satisfied, it would be a lie," Jabotinsky was an impetuous journalist and had none of Weizmann's experience in the laboratory to appreciate the law of the conservation of mass, that nothing will "run away."

The struggle for Transjordan gives a good illustration of the Zionist mind at work. Only a few months after the establishment of Transjordan under the rule of Abdulla in 1921, Weizmann was intriguing with Colonel Meinertzhagen for an exchange of that region for naval and air bases in Haifa, Jaffa and Gaza granted to Britain in the future state of Israel.²¹ The talks were conducted behind the back of the British Government who set up the Amirate of Abdulla. Yet when the Government called on the Zionist Organisation to endorse the settlement of Transjordan, the Executive showed no hesitation in doing so. Even the extremist Jabotinsky found no difficulty in willingly putting his signature.²²

(18) Barbour, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

(19) *Davar*, 27 October 1967.

(20) Jabotinsky's statement to the Royal Commission, 1937.

(21) Meinertzhagen, *op. cit.*, p. 132.

(22) Weizmann, C., *Trial and Error*, London, 1950, p. 404.

Despite the official Zionist endorsement of Transjordan's independence from the National Home, the covetous eyes have never moved away. As late as March 1943, the Labour Zionist Convention issued a Declaration speaking of "the area of Palestine and Transjordan combined." General Patrick J. Hurley, President Roosevelt's personal representative in the Middle East, reported to Washington on 3 May, 1943, that the Zionist Organisation in Palestine was envisaging "a sovereign Jewish state which would embrace Palestine and probably eventually Transjordan."²³ The Jewish Agency strongly protested in 1946 against Bevin's decision to grant Transjordan independence. In its letter to the Government, the Agency considered the step illegal and prejudicial to the interests of the Jewish people in Palestine.²⁴ In his diaries written after the establishment of Israel and Jordan, Weizmann spoke of the "arbitrarily" removed Transjordan.

The Revisionists maintained their unshakeable claim to the east of Jordan even beyond the establishment of Israel. In January 1956, the Herut Party called for an attack to take over the British-backed Kingdom of Jordan.²⁵

Jacob de Haas, the influential member of the Zionist Executive, crossed the t's and dotted the i's by teaching his followers how things were done. "Not a soul in 1921 dreamed of the unnatural divorce of Transjordan from Western Palestine, and the subversion of the whole economic structure of the country. It was done as a move in that perpetual game of chess. It can be undone and it *will* be undone when we discover the right move and call 'check.'"²⁶ When de Haas wrote these words, he was already trying to prepare for the "check" move. In 1924 he reached a transaction for the purchase of 100,000 acres in Transjordan at one dollar an acre. The deal was arranged behind the scenes, as government regulations prohibited the Jewish acquisition of lands east of the River Jordan. The transaction could not be carried out.²⁷ A similar attempt was made in 1932 for a lease of 70,000 dunums near the Allenby Bridge. The following year a third deal was attempted for 100,000 dunums. Each time, the British administration heard about it and put a stop to it.²⁸ These attempts are minor examples of the illegalities on which the Jewish Agency thrived. Curiously, the Zionists attempted the colonisation of Transjordan only after its establishment as an Arab Amirate, and not before.

Jerusalem is another case of Zionist duplicity. When the Jewish nationalists embarked on the colonisation of Palestine, they took to the plains and ignored the Holy City. Theodor Herzl denied to the Pope any designs on Jerusalem. "We are not asking for Jerusalem, but for Palestine—only the secular land."²⁹ He

(23) *Foreign Relations of the U.S.: Near East and Africa*, Washington, 1964, Vol. IV.

(24) Text in the Political Report of the Land Office of the Executive of the Jewish Agency to the XXII Zionist Congress, 1946.

(25) *New York Times*, 25 January 1956.

(26) *Zionews* (organ of the New Zionist Organization), 14 May 1937. (Typewritten copies in the British Museum).

(27) Letter to *New York Times*, 8 July 1936.

(28) Ziff, W.B., *The Rape of Palestine*, London, 1948.

(29) Herzl, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, p. 1604.

was afraid of Christian opposition to his project and went out of his way to assure the European potentates on this score by proposing the extra-territorialisation of the *Christian* holy places so as to make them "*res sacrae extra commercium gentium*" (above the traffic of nations).³⁰ No mention is made of the Muhammadan holy places. The idea of the internationalisation of Jerusalem was also advanced by Weizmann during World War I.³¹ As mentioned above, the Jewish Agency did not include it in the Jewish sector in their partition plan. The U.N.S.C.O.P. proposal, enthusiastically accepted by the Jewish Agency, had also kept the Holy City out of the Jewish state. Were they seriously disposed to forego this important centre? Our curiosity is easily satisfied by Ben Gurion's speech to the Constituent Assembly in Jerusalem: "With all respect to the Conciliation Commission of the United Nations, the decision with regard to Jerusalem was made 3,000 years ago when Ben Yishai made Jerusalem the Jewish centre."³² The U.N. decision is overruled by Ben Yishai's decision. A minor controversy erupted in 1949 when Menachem Begin suggested in the Knesset the inclusion of a clause in the constitution mentioning Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The ad hoc Legislative Committee did not approve it. Reason? The Powers would not have it. When the Knesset met in Jerusalem, all the ambassadors boycotted it and an international storm of protest ensued. It remained a diplomatic practice in Israel. As the controversy raged inside Israel, we were able to hear the Zionist mind thinking aloud. The late M. Shertok was forced by Begin to state, on 16 February, that those who voted against Jabotinsky's resolution at the 17th Congress³³ nevertheless established the state eventually. "Those who vote against Begin's resolution now will establish Jerusalem as a capital." Begin's indiscretion in making the world hear what was being perpetrated was strongly denounced by the government deputies. Twenty years had to pass before Shertok's solemn promise was made good and the Israeli delegate defied the whole world at the United Nations in April 1968. "Jerusalem is the Crown of the Jewish people," he told the U.N. delegates.

The border with Egypt presented one more example of mystification. It was the Zionists' intention to move the existing boundary further back into Sinai, but the idea was dropped, in view of the British presence in Egypt, and the Anglo-Turkish settlement of 1906 mentioned earlier. After both campaigns of 1956 and 1967, the older claims were resurrected.³⁴ Meinertzhagen lamented the "illegal severance of Transjordan and the area of Sinai," and argued that "the present Egyptian occupation of this area had no authoritative sanction."³⁵ A case was made

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 1561.

(31) *The Diary of Lord Bertie*, London, 1924, p. 105-6.

(32) *Palestine Post*, 14 February 1949.

(33) Cf. 1931 when the General Zionists then denied their intention of working towards a state.

(34) Jabotinsky composed in 1920 the militarist song, "From Kantara to Nekura, from the desert to the sea." The song was modified during the Mandate, but in 1967 Israeli soldiers who reached the Suez Canal, where Kantara lies, restored the original words to the song.

(35) Meinertzhagen, *op. cit.*, p. 65. In his letter to Lord Curzon, when Britain was straddling the Suez Canal, he wrote, "The southern boundary can well remain the old Turkish-Egyptian administrative boundary from the Gulf of Aqaba to Rafa."

that the Aqaba-Rafa line was not an international frontier and that Turkish sovereignty over Sinai remained valid until the defeat of Turkey.

Territorial concessions on the part of the Zionist organisation were neither made willingly nor seriously. Even before the boundaries of the Mandate were made, the British Palestine Committee warned, "They will never tolerate partition, they will never be reconciled to partition."³⁶ The partition meant here was conceding northern Galilee to Syria. How much more did the determination apply when it came to the partition of the heart of Palestine? The oath was renewed by Irgun's (later the Herut Party) statement on the U.N.S.C.O.P. proposal:

"The partition of the homeland is illegal. It will never be recognised. The signature by the institutions and individuals of the partition agreement is invalid. It will not bind the Jewish people. Jerusalem was and will forever be our capital. Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever."³⁷

The Logic of Israeli Expansion

Political Zionism (as opposed to spiritual Zionism, which aimed at resuscitating religion by giving it a new heart in Palestine where a limited community of devout Jews might lead an idealistic Jewish life) was planned on a grand scale, as outlined above. The land was expected not only to be greater, but also to become a centre for world communications and trade. Israel was even expected to become a transit base for Muslim pilgrims to Jerusalem and Mecca. This was not a jingoistic ambition, but a practical necessity. How else could the World Zionist Organisation attract the prosperous Jews of Paris, London and New York if it could not show better returns for their money in the Holy Land? Who was going to accept a poor Zion as a substitute for an affluent New York?

Zionism aimed at solving the Jewish problem by transferring the Jews to Palestine. The ingathering of "millions" of Jews and the achievement of a majority in Palestine have been basic slogans. It is a fundamental tenet of Zionism that a minority is bound to suffer persecution and its only way to reach a secure and dignified life is to become a majority. The solution of admitting a few thousand immigrants and no more makes nonsense of the entire theory. Britain, America and the United Nations, who thought in terms of various partition plans which could protect the position of the Arab population, revealed their pitiful lack of knowledge of Jewish nationalism. The U.N.S.C.O.P. proposal allocated to the Jewish state 13,500,000 dunums of which 7,500,000 were cultivable. Only 1,500,000 were in the hands of the Jews. The state contained as many Arabs as Jews, and had more of its land owned by Arabs than by Jews. The urge to expand, dispossess the Arabs, and drive them out, becomes the natural procedure to follow. Those who accept Zionism cannot but accept with it the expulsion of the refugees and the expansion of Israel. That is why these two serious acts seem a mere trifle to the admirers of Zionism.

(36) *Palestine*, 19 October 1918.

(37) Begin, M., *The Revolt: The Story of Irgun*, London, p. 335.

Another important factor which makes Israeli expansion unavoidable is the nature of Zionist activities. Unlike other nationalist movements, Zionism had no home to liberate from foreigners. The national liberation of Palestine meant then the liberation of the Arabs from the Turks, and later on from the British. To the Jews, it was not a question of liberation but of acquisition, buying lands, and, if possible, buying the whole country. The pioneers of the spiritual Chovevei Zion worked on, buying lands from the Arabs. The political Zionists endeavoured to buy the country from the Sultan. Together with that, went the large scale practice of bribery. Accounts of those activities are by no means rare in any Zionist work on the period. Herzl had thus discovered the importance of capital to Jewish nationalism. There was enough of that in the hands of the rich Jews, but the dilemma was how to tap the source. He tried the greatest names in the world of Jewish finance, namely Rothschild and de Hirsch and failed to convince them. He had nothing to show.

With the gradual consolidation of the project, his successors began to penetrate the pockets of the rich, with the help of vigorous propaganda pressure. The publicity leaflets of the various funds concentrated on new lands reclaimed, new villages bought, new farms established, with pictures and figures. It is always more exciting to acquire a new house than to improve or use an old one. Expansion has become essential for the fund raisers whose good results are, in turn, essential for the maintenance of an acceptable standard of living, and necessary for the success of the project.

When Herzl wrote his "*Jewish State*," the overwhelming majority of the Jews, particularly in the West, were not interested in Zionism. They were unwilling to give money, and uninterested in emigrating to Palestine. To win them over, the Movement required intensive propaganda.

However, it was not only the Jews who needed enlightenment. It was recognised that if the Jews were to realise the Zionist dream, it would have to come through a grand gesture from one of the great powers whose policies are influenced by the moulders of public opinion. Every single issue relating to Palestine was resolved not on the soil of Palestine but in the capitals of the West. Zionism has become as a result an industry teeming with public relations officers, journalists, writers, fund collectors, lecturers, emissaries, representatives, consultants, research scholars, intelligence agents, gun runners, not to mention the ordinary office staff.³⁸

The annual budget of the Jewish Agency is not less than the budget of many states.³⁹ Anyone familiar with the working of a modern government and its Parkinson's law can appreciate the necessity for expansion. Israel is a gigantic project involving the movement by air, land and sea of several million people from the four corners of the earth, and settling them there. It involves the transfer of millions of pounds, and the purchase of equipment and armaments worth even more

(38) It was reported in 1964 that the World Zionist Organizations was manned by 4,000 employees in Israel alone, and maintained 500 emissaries abroad. (*J.O.* and *MER*, 11 December 1964).

(39) Exceeding \$100,000,000 in the early sixties. (*New York Times*, 4 May 1960).

than that. Jewish funds invested in the development of the colonies between the two World Wars were put at \$500,000,000.⁴⁰ How much was spent for military and political purposes must remain a question of speculation. The length of the operation (nearly a whole century from the beginning of early agricultural colonisation) made the thousands of people connected with the project look at Zionism and its expansion as a permanent mode of life. The frequent embargoes put on the shipment of arms to Palestine, and then Israel, brought highly rewarding premiums to many agents, gun runners and arms manufacturers. The financial transactions and contributions brought further fortunes to all those whose experience is called upon in the economic and monetary fields.

The new class which has developed in most emergent and socialist states and, with its own particular interests, has helped in perverting the evolution of democracy and socialism, has its parallel in the Zionist Movement. The World Zionist Organisation has become a vested interest for an army of clever and influential people who are responsible for moulding our opinions and influencing our policies. Their function had been to establish a Jewish State and bring the Jews to Palestine. The State is established and there are no more Jews to bring. This fact was recognised soon after the establishment of Israel. A few months before the Sinai Campaign, *The Jewish Chronicle* reported, in May 1956, from Israel, that there was a general feeling that Zionism had no further role to play, and all that the people expected from the 24th Zionist Congress was to fill their hotels and restaurants with delegates. "Much of the reason for this derives from the lack of prestige from which the Jewish Agency (or the Zionist Organisation) suffers inside Israel, because of the reputation it has acquired of being over-staffed, inefficient, and extravagant in its expenditure of an income which comes to it too easily."⁴¹

No one foregoes a handsome income which comes "too easily." The survival of this giant of an organisation is now hinged on creating tension, showing more results, and breaking new ground—literally. Like the new class of the socialist world, the W.Z.O. is sensitive to any criticism which touches its operations or unravels their ambiguity. Zionist financial operations are even more difficult to decipher than the political machinations. Sometimes, it is a question of different names given to the same set up, different operations carried out under the same name, funds passing through different conduits to the same destination, funds earmarked for home but actually sent abroad, or vice versa, non-Zionist front organisations acting for Zionist terminals, etc. The usual mysteries of finance are doubled and trebled in the work of Zionist finance. The task of the layman is made no easier by the reticence on the subject.⁴² There are now hundreds of books published on Israel, its society, politics, etc. No facet of the Israeli economy is

(40) Cf. *Foreign Affairs*, January 1942.

(41) *The Jewish Chronicle*, 4 and 18 May 1956.

(42) "Issues," the periodical of the anti-Zionist American Council for Judaism, New York, carried a number of articles on the subject. Zionist financial operations were investigated by the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate. References to the report are made below.

left without the most detailed figures and "facts." Yet, one almost despairs when looking for any information on the funds reaching Tel Aviv and the Zionist Organisation, although such funds are by far the most important item in the economy of Israel.

An essential element in the history of Israel and Zionism is the poverty of Palestine, which put off the Jews. An artificially high standard was created for the settlers regardless of their production or its value, and the deficit was covered by the incoming contributions. The myth of the land of milk and honey was destined to become the basis of the entire political, economic and military life of Israel, where things are managed without regard to cost or the laws of economics. The Government of Israel is in the same boat as the W.Z.O. in its dependence on the diaspora financial contributions. The propaganda tactics of the fund raisers are based on a simple formula: immigrants in need of land, land in need of immigrants. As long as the two do not meet, money will continue to pour in. Territorial expansion is one way of preventing the solution of the equation. *The Jewish Chronicle* took up the matter again during the following crisis and made a sound comment on the drop in the contributions collected in 1965, "The cause of the short fall in fund raising is twofold. First it is difficult to generate the old time excitement without the old 'Save our people' and 'Let our people go' slogans . . ." ⁴³ Territorial expansion is one way of preventing the stabilisation, and creating the "excitement." The following diagrams illustrate the close link between Israeli expansion, fund contributions and Jewish immigration (see pp. 50 & 51).

The Neurosis behind Zionist Policies


As always, there is the psychological force which lubricates the mechanism of national behaviour, but in the case of Israel this force plays a greater part than usual by virtue of the tormented Jewish history, which makes it imperative to keep the Jewish Question always in sight in dealing with the policies of Israel. In the following chapters a picture will be presented of a Zionist state unable to come progressive humanity, loath to achieve a peaceful equilibrium with its neighbours, ever in search of danger and trouble, restless, dissatisfied and worried. Israel may be the miracle of miracles, but the miraculous genius is always nearest to turmoil and disaster.

In dealing with the Jewish Question, one encounters a marked sense of guilt present in the Jewish psyche which manifests itself in numerous little details of individual and collective behaviour. The anti-Semite puts it down to so-called wickedness, treachery, etc. The Christian may hold the crucifixion of Jesus as the distant but powerful cause of this complex. Sigmund Freud takes the story

(43) *The Jewish Chronicle*, 17 December 1965.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED JEWISH APPEAL⁴⁴


In million U.S. dollars



(44) Based on figures given in "The UJA Funds' Reorganization," Lessing J. Rosenwald; American Jewish Yearbook for the years 1962-1967; letter from ACJ.

JEWISH IMMIGRATION BETWEEN 1930-1960

In Thousands



further back, and by building on Ernest Sellin's theory of Moses's murder by his Jews in Sinai, comes to the conclusion that it was the act of patricide, the most painful act of murder, that weighed heavily on the Jews' primaevial conscience and developed into a national guilt complex. Although still in the realm of theoretical speculation, a more realistic interpretation may be found in the documented history of the Jews. It is still murder, but rather a case of mistaken murder, and the victim of the crime is the nation itself.

Of all the peoples under the sun, and for reasons outside the scope of this book, the Semitic peoples (Semitic in the geographical sense and not the racial) had developed, along the great rivers of the Middle East, a peculiar fear of "happenings" and particularly of death which stood for them as the most sinister abomination in life. Religion soon developed immortality as a trick to overcome the death of the individual, and at the hands of the Jews, the death of the nation. By electing the the captive Jews as the true blessing of God which did not last. The inexplicable upon them. Yet, such were the political circumstances that the life of this immortal nation happened to become one of the shortest in history and to meet its end in a most cruel manner. The immortality of the Jewish Kingdom looked to the captive Jews as the true blessing of God which did not last. The inexplicable was explained away by the prophets and rabbis in the idiom of sin, already developed in the Jews' moral philosophy. The Assyrians, the Babylonians and the Romans could not have destroyed the Jewish Kingdom, had it not been for the sinfulness of the Jewish people and their turning away from their God and His prophets. The Old Testament gives numerous instances of this kind of rationalisation, admonishing and guilt preoccupation. The Jews came to accept their mistaken responsibility for the murder of the nation and, since the nation was God's own people and therefore part of Him, for deicide.

The Jewish people lived as a ghost nation in the Galut, laden with guilt and striving to relieve themselves of its weight by the absurd attempt to give a substance to the ghost, to restore it to its body. The attempt to achieve the impossible, once taken seriously, is bound to involve incalculable difficulties, disasters and pain. This, understandably, must lead to a further accentuation of the complex. The Zionists were only able to achieve the mythical restoration of the ghost to the body at a very high price of sacrifice in blood and material. Jews in their hundreds died of disease in the early days of colonisation, in Arab-Jewish blood baths and wars, in the "floating coffins" of derelict ships bringing refugees from Nazi Europe during the war and going down to the bottom of the sea with Zionist heroics. Millions perished in Europe with Zionist assistance, connivance or a conspiracy of silence.⁴⁵ The implementation of the programme brought death and destruction, on the other side of the scale, to thousands of Arabs and made about a million of them refugees. It is practically impossible to list all the innocent

(45) More has come to light recently of Zionist responsibility for the six million Jews who had died in Hitler's Europe. The role of the Jewish Agency in the liquidation of the Hungarian Jewry, for example, is given in Ben Hecht, *Perfidy*, New York, 1961.

people of all nationalities who lost their lives in the course of fascist terror, nor the material losses incurred. The Zionists have, of course, a justification for every incident, and can produce the guilty Britisher, Arab, German, American, anti-Zionist Jew or anybody whom they hold responsible—but never themselves. Yet, deep in their conscience, or in their subconscious, all the stories are stored in a different version, the authentic version.

Murder and ruin are not extraordinary deeds in human chronicles, but their impact on the psychological constitution differs from one individual to another. They come very naturally to a cannibal in the jungle, but appear extremely awesome to the Jew of our era. The pacifists, socialists, idealists and intellectuals who had to face the task of killing innocent people could not come out of the death scene with their psyche unscathed. Abba Eban, one of Israel's leading intellectuals, felt this conflict and spoke for its victims in the middle of the crisis, "The tug of guilt against the exaltation of virtue produces a tension so exquisitely painful that it almost baffles description."⁴⁶ The W.Z.O. which endeavoured to make the Jew "normal" has actually done no more than accentuate his abnormality by adding a new dimension to his guilt complex. Anyone who is not an anti-Semite, coming into contact with the Israelis, cannot help feeling that the Western assimilated Jew is by far more relaxed and settled, less complex and tense, bearing fewer grudges and fears than the Israeli Zionist Jew.

One step from the sense of guilt and the subject becomes a victim of manic-depression. Here is very dangerous ground of speculative thought involving an application of individual diseases and afflictions to the community at large. Yet, Jewish history is permeated with these typical spells of acute despair, apathy and self pity followed by spells of unrestrained exhilaration, over-confidence and bustling activity which tire the gentiles. To watch the present mood of Israel and Zionist Jewry in general, one can get a good picture of what a communal state of mania may be approximated to. Israel is exasperating the outside world with her arrogance, energy, over-confidence and ultra-efficiency.

The guilt complex and the manic-depression have one final end, the suicidal disposition. Israel had the best chance of achieving peace with the Arabs after their 1967 defeat. Instead of acting with the true magnanimity of a dignified victor, she behaved with the hooliganism of a maladjusted thug. It was a performance which puzzled many admirers of Israel, but it was only the most clear cut case of a missed opportunity for de-escalation. Many were the chances in which Israel could have started a new chapter with her neighbours. She has achieved many impossible feats except the one simple necessity of peace. Are we to accept that her intelligent tacticians have really found the task of placating the Arab beyond the scope of their learning and shrewdness? Given the position of Israel as it is in the Arab world, Israel's rejection of the prospect of peace leaves us with the one conclusion that she is seeking self-destruction. This is a point where a path to a less speculative field may be opened. Further away from the neurosis of

(46) *New Judea*, October 1947.

guilt and depression a more immediate neurosis can be found in the reluctant immigrants who make up the majority of the people in Israel and who were brought to the state against their psychological inclination. They came to Israel not of choice but because of no choice, of "ein brera" (no alternative). Whenever the Jews found a way to Western Europe and the United States, they went there rather than to Israel. The Algerians went to France, the Libyans to Italy, but the Yemenites and the Moroccans had no alternative but Israel. Others, like the Iraqis, would have preferred to stay in their original homes, had it not been for the subversion, intimidation and false promises of the Zionist agents.⁴⁷ A minority went to Israel, driven by the real Zionist fervour. They had to sacrifice better opportunities in the West and, unconsciously, must have hated the whole affair as a result.

The green envy felt by the Israelis towards their fellow Israelis who find their way to New York or London is a recognisable trait of their society. The new immigrant's face flashes with a joyful smile, which is immediately photographed, at the sight of Jaffa from the sea. After a few months, he goes into mental turmoil and every fellow sufferer helps in fighting back his yearning for his original home. After two or three years he achieves the serenity of the martyrs when his yearning and inner struggle sinks down into the dangerous realm of the subconscious. He hums to himself the romantic songs of his youth from his home of origin, and sings, when with his comrades, the martial songs of Topol en route "to Cairo." As he sleeps on the stones of Sinai, he dreams of his childhood in Odessa or Budapest. The Israeli settler must be the most unsettled man in the world—so much so that mental illness has overstretched the ingenuity of the health officers and statisticians.⁴⁸

Israel has become to many Israelis like the invalid parent—a sacred responsibility whose end is deeply wished. This very wish adds a further weight to the already existing complex of guilt. This is the core of contradiction between fighting for Israel to the last breath at one moment, and emigrating from Israel at the slightest sign of a recession at the other. The first compensates for the guilt of the second, as the fund contributor compensates for the guilt of his staying in the Galut by paying those who go to Eretz Israel.

Typical is the manner in which the death wish is mixed with the thirst for pity. The preoccupation of the Zionists in creating scare waves throughout the diaspora has its causes in the need of the Israelis for the pity and sympathy of the others, as well as touching their pockets. Here may lie another reason for Israel's flirtation with death, brinksmanship with disaster and invitation to trouble—all representing faked suicide attempts. Expansionist adventures are the ideal form for such an exercise. The people of Israel are in need of a continuous mental diversion, for the moment they relax, they start brooding. Expansion is the manifestation of the manic exhilaration which has been sweeping Israel for many decades now,

(47) Cf. Chapter IV.

(48) *Lancet*, 1965, Vol. II, p. 842, Johnson, R.H. "The Health of Israel."

and from which there can be only the one road leading to the other phase of the neurosis. Once that stage is reached, it will be the doom of Zionism which will probably only come in the form of a psychological disintegration.

All the material and psychological factors associated with Jewish nationalism make the policy of expansion part and parcel of the policies followed by any Zionist Government in Tel Aviv. The foremost spokesman of militarism, General Dayan, spotlighted this "must" latent in Zionism, when he spoke one year after the extensive conquests of 1967 and observed: "Ever since the return of Zion 100 year ago, two processes continue: colonisation and extension of the borders. In such a way the people in Israel grew from 600,000 in 1948 to nearly three million in our days. But this is not the end of the road and not the full stop. This is a process which must continue. It is the people of Israel who determine the borders of the state."⁴⁹ Now that we have examined the grand design which the Jewish nationalists had envisaged for their national home, how intent they have been on achieving that which could not have been achieved, how compelled they are by the logic of Zionism and its political function to expand, what forces there are behind Israel's need for tension, it remains to consider the ways and means to which they had to resort in pursuing this policy.

(49) "Israel and the Middle East," by Tawfiq Toubi, in *Labour Monthly*, February '69.

CHAPTER IV

POPULATION PRESSURE

Colonialist Rule by Majority

Crowded in their ghettos, for centuries, the Jews have learned the mechanics of population pressure. Jewish nationalism, in itself, is a result of the persecution and expulsion to which the Jews were subjected since the nineteenth century, as a result of the European population explosion. With their waves of migration, ever since Hebrew history was recorded, they have acquired a sixth sense of this pressure. They knew that once Palestine became overcrowded, they would find their way gradually to the surrounding countries. This logic was grasped by Theodor Herzl early in the century. During his interview with Prince Hohenlohe, the German prince asked him whether his projected state was meant to go as far as Beirut or beyond. The father of Zionism struck another line in the Zionist strategy: "We will ask for what we need—the more immigrants, the more land."¹ Chaim Weizmann outlined the process to the XIIth Zionist Congress: "The Mandate has now been published and cannot henceforth be altered, except in one respect. Transjordan which in the first text of the Mandate was outside the sphere of the Mandate is now included in the Mandate. By this means . . . the question concerning the eastern frontier has been in part answered. The question will be still better answered when Cisjordan is so full of Jews that a way is forced into Transjordan." ² The same appreciation was shared by Meinertzhagen, Weizmann's confidant.

The Jewish nationalists were also influenced by another factor. When they started to colonise Palestine there was only a small Jewish minority, less than eight per cent of the population. Jewish presence is one way of proving that Palestine is the home of the Jews. They invariably asserted the Jews had never abandoned their ancestral home, and that there was no time in history when there were no Jews in Palestine. As the Arab referred to his possession of the land, the Zionist wished to refer to the Jewish existence on the land. Furthermore, Jewish nationalism was a fluid nationalism which had neither the country to operate from, nor the power to subjugate one. For the Germans, the French and the British, the question of population was not related to their colonialist movement. They were in East Africa, Algeria and India, not because they had a population of their own there, but because they had conquered the land and ruled over it by force. The Jews were in no position to do that in Palestine and their only chance of becoming

(1) Herzl, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 701.

(2) Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 104.

masters was in constituting a majority there. At the same time, many of the socialist Zionists could not easily accept the idea of denying the non-Jewish majority any share in the government, nor did the contemporary political scene permit that. The only way to guarantee a Jewish rule was to make the majority Jewish. The whole concept of Zionism is based on the fact that a minority can never be at home anywhere, and the only way for the Jews to enjoy a truly normal life is through establishing themselves as a majority somewhere. This was the rationale behind Weizmann's famous phrase, in front of the Peace Conference of Paris, about making Palestine as Jewish as England is English.

The ethnic distribution of Palestine and Jewish immigration have become the most essential factors in Zionist policies ever since Zionism commanded the scene. Aliya (immigration) was, in fact, the central point on which "Practical Zionism," which was supported by such leaders as Weizmann, differed from "Political Zionism," upheld by such stars as Herzl and Max Nordau. The latter considered gradual penetration a course for alarming the ruling power from which a charter should be acquired, while the former considered the gradual settlement of the land by an ever increasing number of Jews as the surest way for the eventual takeover. One Zionist Congress after another spent hours of deliberation on the vexing question of how to get more Jews on the land. It also became a basic concern to the various commissions of enquiry—and the primary bone of contention with the Arabs. The Zionists put Aliya as their first aim and their decisive weapon. Aliya became a highly professional career and a well established industry; it shaped the policies of Israel and was shaped by its policies. In the thirties, when the world was shaken by financial crises, Palestine was one of the few prosperous countries—mainly because of the constant stream of immigrants, of the money coming with them, and the scores of new projects needed for them. It has become the solution par excellence for the thousand natural shocks that Israel is heir to.

Immigration has caused numerous clashes among the Zionists, and between the Zionist Organisation and the outside world, particularly with the non-Zionist Jews. The American Council for Judaism fought the Zionist thesis of Aliya, and the literature of this organisation is full of polemics on this point. Ben Gurion caused an uproar by accusing his fellow travellers of betraying their ideas by staying away. His major disappointment in life, he told foreign reporters after the 1967 war, was that the Jews did not come to Israel. Just before that war, Israel was accusing the Zionist Organisation of failing in its duty in regard to immigration. It was a time when Israel was facing a serious economic crisis, and there were more Jews leaving than arriving.

More serious were the continuous disagreements which the Jewish Agency had with the British Administration. Soon after the 1921/2 incidents, the White Paper was published restricting Jewish immigration according to the economic capacity of the country, this vague principle, which meant admitting no more than could be absorbed without dislocating the economy, was difficult to apply. The issue was

the subject of an annual controversy between the Administration and the Jewish Agency. After prolonged wrangling, the Administration used to fix the annual number of immigrants, and the Jewish Agency would then issue prospective immigrants with certificates. But the Zionists, who accept nobody's authority without having to, invariably supplemented the official figure with an additional number of "illegal" immigrants. The story reached macabre proportions during the war, when they accused the British Government of inhumanity in turning away the victims of the Nazi holocaust, and the British accused them of recklessly toying with the fate of their victims and jeopardising the war effort. The climax was reached in 1946 when the Anglo-American Committee recommended the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish immigrants. The Arabs opposed it, and so did the British Government. It was the signal to ring down the curtain on the drama of the British Mandate in Palestine.

The Zionist Organisation was often faced with the choice of one of its major objectives: immigration or independence, population or land. The choice was always the same: immigration. This was the theme of the disagreement between the bi-nationalists and the statist. During the thirties, the slogan of bi-nationalism gained ground. The occasion was the apparent impracticality of the mandate and the determination of the British Government to reach a new solution which was ultimately found in partition. Under this pressure, the Zionists were forced to initiate talks with the Arabs. During those talks, in which Ben Gurion, Moshe Shertok and Dr. J. Magnes took part, "Magnes was prepared for a limitation of numbers; Ben Gurion for a limitation in space."³ The partial acceptance, by the Zionist Organisation, of the partition plan pointed to the same sense of priorities: better a small portion of Palestine with sovereignty over Jewish immigration than a larger Palestine with immigration in the hands of somebody else. The lesson is obvious; with a limited population Israel cannot win the upper hand over the Arabs and expand, but with a limited area and an unrestricted immigration, the power necessary for expansion will be available, and the logic of population pressure will take its course. Land does not beget people, but people may beget the land. It was the same principle which prompted the Jewish Agency to embrace the idea of partition and accept a small area rather than face immigration restrictions in 1937.

The crossroads were confronted again, and in a more decisive manner, in 1947. The Zionists had already made up their minds in Biltmore (1942) to take the entire land of Palestine as a Jewish state. But at the end of the war, the Jews were still outnumbered by the Arabs. It is claimed that the Yishuv (Jewish settlers in Palestine) fought a war of independence against the British—a war of liberation. The name may be conceivable in terms of driving out the Arabs, but hardly in regard to the British. The official policy of the Zionist Organisation was for the

(3) Bentwich, N., *Judas L. Magnes*, London, p. 191.

Mandate to continue in Palestine.⁴ It was only when Mr. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, insisted on restricting Jewish immigration and keeping out the illegal immigrants, that they came out against the British and remembered that Britain was really an imperialist power against which a war of liberation should be waged. Such a change of policy was foreshadowed in a broadcast by Kol Israel (the underground radio station) on 12 May 1946. A telegram intercepted by the British Intelligence revealed that the broadcast was made at the request of Mr. Shertok (later on Premier Sharett) and was sent over to Ben Gurion by Mr. Sneh of the Jewish Agency.

"We would therefore warn publicly His Majesty's Government that if it does not fulfil its responsibilities under the Mandate—above all with regard to the question of immigration—the Jewish people will feel obliged to lay before the nations of the world the request that the British leave Palestine."⁵

The slogan of immediate independence was raised in the following months as a result of Britain's opposition. When partition was finally proposed, they were glad to endorse it although only 56 per cent of Palestine was awarded to them.

The nervous reaction against any interference with immigration is noticeable in any Israeli comment on the subject. The old reaction against the Mandate immigration policy was reinforced in 1948 against the United Nations. The trusteeship proposal, canvassed by the United States, was opposed by the Jewish Agency because the proposal did not embody all the fundamental provisions of the Mandate in regard to the building up of the National Home. "Above all, the right of Jews to immigrate and settle would no longer be valid, and this provision alone was enough to condemn the entire project."⁶ A few months later the United Nations decided to initiate a mediation to bring about a peaceful solution. Count Bernadotte was selected for this thankless task on 20th May. The Swedish aristocrat ploughed his way through that critical summer and reached the same conclusion in his report to the Security Council:

"It could not be ignored that unrestricted immigration to the Jewish area of Palestine might, over a period of years, give rise to population pressure and to economic and political disturbances which would justify present Arab fears of ultimate Jewish expansion in the Near East."

Israeli reaction to his work was immediate. They did not even wait for the publication of his report and assassinated him during a duty visit to Jerusalem. The Israeli government strongly rejected his attempt at restricting immigration, and stood "emphatic in its opposition to any infringement of Israel's independence and sovereignty as regards her immigration policy." The reply (6 June 1948) speaks

(4) Moshe Shertok expressed the willingness of the Jewish Agency to see the British Mandate continue with all its provisions (including immigration) as late as the beginning of 1947. (*Zionist Record*, 10 January 1947).

(5) Statement of Information relating to Acts of Violence. Cmd. 6875, July 1946.

(6) Statement by Shertok to the First Committee of the U.N., 27 April 1948, U.N. Official Records. Second Special Session.

in quite milder terms when it deals with the Mediator's territorial concessions to the Arabs. Bernadotte reiterated his reading of the situation and warned:⁷

"Should unrestricted immigration indefinitely continue in Palestine, there might in the future arise a serious economic and political problem beyond the control of any Jewish government. It cannot be ignored that immigration affects not only the Jewish State and the Jewish people but also the surrounding Arab world."⁷

During the talks, Shertok was frank enough to warn him against the future population pressure which was bound to build up. The best way to forestall such an explosion, he told the Mediator, was to give Israel more lands from the start so that she might not look for expansion.⁸

What Count Bernadotte said was confirmed a few years later by no other man than Professor Marver H. Bernstein, consultant to the State Comptroller of Israel. He observed that the influx of immigrants since 1957 had put pressure on Israel's finance and water resources. "There was a growing realisation that in these circumstances large scale founding of new farm villages was no longer feasible." The crisis led to the Jordan water project, which, in turn, precipitated an Arab move to divert the water at source,⁹ and brought war nearer. Professor Bernstein was not the first to point out that Israel had been living beyond its means. "Consequently, it has been able to support a standard of living . . . not justified by its earnings from productive enterprise."¹⁰ It needs little imagination to see that with this kind of policy, an attempt must be made sooner or later to go out and look for other sources of feeding the ever increasing population. If we take Bernstein's assessment of the population crisis with only some two million people on the land, we can visualise what it will entail if that figure is tripled and quadrupled as it is intended. Once more the expansionists know where to stand. *Newsweek* reported Ben Gurion, on 2 April 1958, as preferring to have mass immigration rather than economic independence. Mrs. Meir justified the policy by talking pitifully of the *ein brera* (no alternative) position of Israel, which makes it impossible to turn back refugees. She omitted to mention the squabbles with the immigration agents for their failure in chasing more immigrants to Israel.

How did the Jewish nationalists, therefore, claim that millions of Jews could be and would be settled on this stretch of land—a claim which had frequently clashed with the conclusion and actual policies of the British Government and its various commissions of experts? One of the wildest Zionist estimations was the one put forward by W.B. Ziff. He estimated that 32,933,000 people could live in the Holy Land. He reached his conclusion by this reading of the map:

"Surrounding it (Palestine) on all sides are vast undeveloped reaches, the major part of which are as empty as the moon, so that the country is not even necessarily

(7) Reply of the Provisional Government of Israel, in Bernadotte, Count Folke, *To Jerusalem*, London, 1951, p. 149. Bernadotte's reply, *ibid.*, p. 153.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 212.

(9) Bernstein, M.H., *The Politics of Israel*, p. 204.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 227.

limited by its own boundaries, which are more artificial than real. The Bedouin ignore them, hardly aware that they exist."¹¹

The author called Transjordan, "the eastern two-thirds of the National Home," and called for the incorporation and the opening of that country for Jewish immigration.

The population weapon has been in the minds of Jewish nationalists in every stage of the upbuilding of Israel. During the Peace Conference of Paris, Mr. Lansing asked the disciple of synthetic chemistry and father of organic Zionism to explain to the Conference, on behalf of the Zionist Organization, what they meant by the ambiguous "Jewish National Home," which apparently puzzled the Conference also. True to form Weizmann answered in these words:

"The Zionist Organization did not want an autonomous Jewish government, but merely to establish in Palestine, under a Mandatory Power, an administration, not necessarily Jewish, which would render it possible to send into Palestine 70,000 to 80,000 Jews annually."¹²

In an almost identical appreciation of the position, Ben Gurion demanded that at least Transjordan, regrettably separated, should be opened to Jewish immigration. He affirmed that the Mandate which deprived the Jews of Transjordan did not prohibit Jewish immigration to it, and consequently no amendments to its terms were needed in this respect.¹³ The Machiavellian side of this wish is brought into sharp focus by the fact that Ben Gurion has never believed that a Jew can lead a truly Jewish life outside Israel. He wrecked the world of American Jewry by denouncing their sojourn on a gentile land under a non-Jewish rule. That he would like to see his fellow Jews come all the way from America and Europe, at great cost and trouble, to live in Transjordan under the rule of Abdulla is absolutely absurd. Ben Gurion knew what he was talking about. Population means staking a claim and a first step in the "organic" expansion. So keen was he on this tactical move that during the Zionist-Arab talks of the thirties, he wrote, in 1934, to Dr. Magnes (who was acting on behalf of the Jewish Agency) expressing his hope of reaching an understanding in which the Arabs would agree to Jewish immigration to Transjordan also.¹⁴

Following the failure to annex the Litani and the watershed of the Jordan to Palestine, the Zionists approached General Gouraud and Henry de Jouvenel, the High Commissioner of Syria and Lebanon, for the establishment of some Jewish colonies in Syria and Lebanon. The French recognised the real purpose. What the World Zionist Organisation could not achieve at the Peace Conference might be realised by a population settlement. De Jouvenel explained that he had no objection to Jewish colonisation in other parts of Syria, but positively refused to allow Jews to settle in the coveted parts of the water sources on the border.¹⁵ The

(11) Ziff, *op. cit.*, Ziff's emphasis.

(12) 27 February 1919, Miller, *op. cit.*, Vol. XV, p. 115.

(13) Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*, p. 35.

(14) Bentwich, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

(15) Ra'anan, *op. cit.*, p. 139, Weizmann, *op. cit.*, pp. 360 and 452.

French offer was not taken up because it would not lead to the annexation of the area. A similar attempt was made in the other direction toward Al-Arish and was likewise recognised by Lord Cromer who prevented it.

The Struggle for Aliya

Expansion and immigration are always closely linked in Zionist history. The more expansionist a politician is, the more committed to immigration we find him. Both features emerge at their best in Ben Gurion, who preached his gospel of aliya wherever he went. "We appeal to the parents to help us bring their children here. Even if they decline to help, we will bring the youth," he said in August 1949.¹⁶ In 1951, he sent a wave of false enthusiasm throughout the world of the Jewry. Some four million Jews are coming! Eastern Europe is opening its gates! It was soon discovered to be a piece of demagoguery. His failure to open the east European reservoir was a great blow to him.

In 1945, Mr. Truman instructed Earl G. Harrison, the American representative on the inter-governmental Committee on Refugees, to furnish him with information on the Jewish displaced persons. The findings were that there were about 100,000 of them. It was the beginning of the long drawn out case of the 100,000 certificates, fought between the British Government and the Jewish Agency. Mr. A. Lilienthal sketched the Zionist intriguing, intimidating and pressuring to bring in all that number to Palestine. A great deal has been written about the protracted struggle between Truman and the Jewish Agency on one side, and Bevin and the Arabs on the other. Very little has been said about the struggle against the unhappy people themselves, how "they are not to be asked but to be told," what news they were given of anti-Semitic pogroms raging in the States, how many of them were flogged, intimidated and expelled, what pressure was used against the Joint Distribution Committee not to help them. According to Lilienthal's accounts, out of the 100,000, more than 55,000 applications for emigration to the United States were filed by 1947, despite all the Zionist pressure. The figure also underlines Mr. Truman's "humanitarian" insistence to the British Government to issue 100,000 immigration certificates immediately and save American society. As the State of Israel was declared it became the "only place for them to go to," it was asserted.

Having emptied the D.P. camps of post-war Europe, the Zionists embarked on the oriental communities. Iraq, Yemen, Morocco were successfully dealt with, thanks to the general oppression and discrimination of the existing governments and the fascist elements which cooperated with them. Nevertheless the oppression did not work out in Iraq as the Zionists had expected, despite the option law which gave Iraqi Jews the choice of emigration to Israel or staying in Iraq. The old attachment of the 110,000 strong Iraqi community to their country defied both Zionist temptation and the local fascist pressure. Zionist activists were sent to Iraq with arms and explosives. A number of minor outrages were staged against the Jews and the resultant panic was enough. Police investigations under interna-

(16) Cited. A. Lilienthal, *What Price Israel*, Chicago, 1962, p. 191.

tional supervision led to Zionist cells where a considerable quantity of arms and explosives of an identical type to those used in the outrages was discovered. Zionist spokesmen boasted of the achievement later on, and after the damage had already been done.¹⁷ The Operation Ali Baba (as it was called) left only 4,500 Jews in Iraq. It was a no less colourful title than Operation Magic Carpet which transferred the Yemenite Jews to Israel between 1948 and 1950. With the independence of Algeria, most of the Algerian Jews opted to settle in France rather than Israel, to the horror of the Zionist Organisation. A mock trial was held in Jerusalem in 1963 in which Algerian Jewry was tried and condemned for betrayal. Most of the Libyan Jews, who numbered about 35,000 before the 1948 war, left the country mainly for Italy. When the 1967 war ended, there were only 5,100 Jews left in Libya. Of these, 2,900 went to Italy after the Six Day War.¹⁸

The Oriental Jews who settled in Israel did not prove worth their salt according to Zionist expectations. If the militant policies are to survive and flourish, immigrants from the West must come and tip the balance against the increasing number of the "Second Israel," the contented and easy-going Oriental Jews. The Western Jews are unwilling to go to Israel and prefer to send a portion of their tax-exempted income rather than their children. Furthermore, both Western and Oriental Jewries are uninterested in Israeli expansion, if not weary of it, and both are adamant about immigration to Israel. The hard core for Israel's expansion is found among the sons of the east European ghettos and the opening of the east European migration gates remains the dream of the extremists of Tel Aviv.

For years now Zionist propaganda pressure has been directed against the Soviet Union and eastern Europe for no other purpose than to force the authorities to get rid of their Jews. So far it has succeeded in Poland. After the 1967 war and the support given by Gomulka to the Arab cause, tension between the authorities and the Jewish sympathisers with Israel increased. The Zionist Press highlighted the tension and pointed at the Jewish defiance on this score.¹⁹ Eventually the Polish government yielded to Zionist machinations and opened the door for the Polish Jews to emigrate to Israel. Hundreds of Jews began to apply for emigration visas, but Poland had only about 20,000 Jews when emigration was allowed. The main concern is Soviet Jewry, totalling about 2,600,000 souls, and it is Russia which is receiving the worst of the offensive. In 1958, a widespread campaign was launched against the Soviet Union under the slogan "Let our people go." Smears of anti-Semitism and religious persecution were thrown at the Soviet government by those who were altruistic and were fighting the religious parties in Israel over the question of Jewish religious practices. The *Jerusalem Post* lifted any doubt about the purpose by suggesting "the simple solution of permitting those Jews who would wish to do so to emigrate."²⁰

(17) One of the victims who lost an eye in the explosions sued the Israeli government for damages. *Haolam Hazev* carried, on 20 April 1966, a long report on the "mishap."

(18) J.C., 16 February 1968.

(19) Reports carried by *The Jewish Chronicle* on 22 March 1968, it reported that the Jewish writers drank to the victory of Israel "glass after glass."

(20) *Jerusalem Post*, 3 December 1965.

Ben Gurion's biographer explains that the "old man" was motivated in his preoccupation with tapping the easy European reservoir of Jews by two factors. One of them was humanitarian concerning the reunion of families, and the other was political, related to the expansion of Israel:

"On the other hand, population growth was, and continued to be, the very basis of Jewish statehood, for the number of people in Israel available to settle the empty expanses in the state, and thus stake the claim of ownership over them, is even now, after the doubling of the original Jewish population, inadequate."²¹

In October 1958, the Zionists managed to persuade the Rumanian Government to allow some of their 138,000 Jews to join their families in Israel. It was projected as a major breakthrough. Ben Gurion announced to the world that he had definite information that the "ingathering" of some three million Jews from Eastern Europe was imminent and called it "the greatest miracle in our time." Millions of dollars poured in, until it was discovered four months later to be another Zionist hoax.

During Krushchev's visit to America in 1959, representation by prominent figures including Senator Lehman and Senator Javits, was made to the Soviet leader on behalf of the Soviet Jewry under the same slogan of "Let our people go." Eastern Europe, which became the first place in which a Jew could become a head of state, was accused even of genocide. More spectacular than the representation of American senators, was the work of some communist organizations. The Australian communist weekly *Tribune*, reported in December 1965 that the Australian Communist Party had sent two of their Jewish leaders to Moscow, and made a personal representation to the Kremlin on behalf of Jewish immigration to Israel. That a communist party did not see how such a solution would be a denial of the basic tenet of Marxist ideology is a startling phenomenon. It is to the great credit of Zionist publicity and energy to note that many socialist and Marxist organizations have remained silent for years and only open up with criticism and self-criticism of the Soviet Union when the Zionists turn on the heat. It is also remarkable that the smear of anti-Semitism was directed at the Soviet Union in more recent years and in the liberalisation era of post Stalinism. Before the establishment of Israel, Stalin had generally heard refreshing comments from the pillars of the World Zionist Organization. Both Weizmann and Ben Gurion commended the new Soviet deal in the thirties.²² In his diaries N. Bentwich praised the treatment of the Jews as he discerned it during his visit to Russia in 1931.²³ Even at a more recent date and after the establishment of Israel, Ben Gurion told his general staff, "The new regime removed all vestige of Czarist discrimination against the Jews. The individual Jew has the same rights as the non-Jew."²⁴ More

(21) B. Litvinoff, *Ben Gurion of Israel*, London, 1954, p. 229.

(22) In his statement to the Peel Commission, Weizmann mentioned the Russian Jewry and testified that "The situation has, I think, materially improved," and went on to deny that this was any official anti-Semitism which is considered a crime against the state. Weizmann was speaking in November 1936, during the worst period of Stalinism.

(23) N. Bentwich, *Wanderer Between Two Worlds*, London, 1941, p. 191.

(24) Israel Government Yearbook, 1950, p. 22.

informed than Ben Gurion on the position in the Soviet Union was Mr. Begin, who spent some time in Russian prisons early in World War II. His experience did not prevent him from observing, "The truth is that the Soviet Government is anti-Semitic."²⁵

The pseudo-humanitarian concern over Soviet Jewry boils down, in the end, to allowing the Jews of the USSR "to leave in order to join their families or people in Israel," as Mrs. Golda Meir put it in November 1961. Even without Mrs. Meir's additional proviso "or people," the Zionists find no difficulty in arranging relations for any prospective immigrant whom they want to have. Formal marriages between people who had never met before and never would, were arranged during the Mandate and progressed into a prosperous business. Behind the concern for the religious and cultural rights of the Jews under communist rule, and the humanitarian appeals to let the Jews rejoin their families in Israel (why not somewhere else?) lies the real motive of Israeli power. The Director General of the Israeli Ministry of Defence opened a chink in the official thinking of his government in 1959: "The greater the population of Israel, the greater will be her army. A million soldiers will safeguard the state of Israel against any Arab attack. No Arab country will dare attack Israel if her army is a million strong."²⁶ By translating the defensive terms of the statement into their true meaning according to Israeli military understanding of defence, the full significance becomes readily revealed. Premier Eshkol explained to the Zionist General Council in Jerusalem (March 1964) the significance of the "constant expansion of population" to Israel. "It behoves us now to draw up plans for the 4th and 5th million. We must mobilise the forces required."²⁷

The population strategy was one of the few facts which the Arabs managed to discover. Throughout their history *vis à vis* the Jewish National Home, they stood firmly opposed to immigration. An end to the influx of Jews was one of the basic demands put to the British Government in all their negotiations with it. The British Government had also recognised this major point, and in their attempt to allay Arab fears before World War II, they issued the White Paper which limited Jewish immigration to a final figure of 75,000 after which the country would be stabilised and the question of further immigration would be left to the indigenous population. Throughout the war, the Zionists fought the White Paper as if there was no war, to use Ben Gurion's words. After the establishment of Israel, the same pattern persisted with only the third part shifted to Moscow. The Arabs, with their new alignment with the socialist countries of Eastern Europe, used their influence to obstruct any influx of Jews to Palestine. Diplomatic representation on the matter was officially made, and it was mentioned that the end to the Rumanian exodus of 1958 was due to Arab diplomatic pressure. The Zionists

(25) Begin, *op. cit.*, p. 17.

(26) Cited in, S. Hadawi, *Bitter Harvest*, N.Y. 1967, p. 277.

(27) *Issues*, Spring 1955, "Between two governments," B. Matovu.

regretted the great noise which they made, and it has been recommended ever since to keep aliya developments more discreet. Figures are very difficult to come by nowadays as the Israeli immigration departments have become very reticent and guard their books as top secret documents.

Buttressing the National Home

Population in Israel has been used exactly as a builder would use his cement, or a commander his army. The settlers are moved, stretched, used as a filling or a skirting, thinned out or consolidated, put in store and then reactivated, and so on. Ben Gurion gives glimpses of the population tactics in his ideas on the disposal of population, settlement of land, peopling of empty areas, etc.²⁸ The kibbutzim are the obedient arm of this policy. A kibbutz is a military camp with only one distinction—it is more solidly anchored. A frontier kibbutz is surrounded by barbed wire, floodlit at night and guarded by its armed men. Unlike an ordinary soldier, who is often too willing to abandon camp and return to a lively town, the kibbutz settler has his family with him, and he and his family find themselves defending their own home and back garden. The tradition grew over the years that wherever you want to annex a land, you must hasten to send a portion of the population there and settle it. There is some old principle behind it, going back to the days of the mediaeval ghetto, like many features of Israeli life and politics, when possession was nearly the only proof of ownership left in the hands of the Jews. Having illegally taken so much of Arab property, the Israelis developed a psychological as well as a strategic conception that no territory should be safely considered a part of Israel until it was crowded with a Jewish population. Moshe Dayan expressed this anxiety in his rejection of the proposal to create a neutral zone between Egypt and Israel. "If we keep away from the border, it will cease to be our frontier."²⁹ The only thing which gives credence to Israel frontiers is the fact that Israelis are living and working there. The theory of the population frontier accepted by the government, considers any area an Israeli territory on paper only, as long as there are no Jews inhabiting it. The areas populated by Arabs are accordingly projections of the Arab world which happen to be under Israeli occupation. Until a recent date these parts remained under military rule, and the military regulations were lifted only after the implementation of the dispersion and consolidation policies. One of these areas is Upper Galilee which was not affected by Jewish colonisation, and remained basically Arab. In the middle sixties, Zionist activities warned against leaving the pocket untouched by Jewish colonisation and a campaign was made in behalf of Jewish settlement of that region. The Lands Leasing Law for the development of the Galilee was made for the purpose. The policy was pursued with ruthless vigour after the 1948 war and the great exodus of the Arab refugees. Emissaries were rushed to the four corners of Europe to tell the Jews that the land was empty. There was no time

(28) Ben Gurion, *Israel—Years of Challenge*, p. 61.

(29) *Jewish Chronicle*, 21 September 1956.

for the immigrants to think or consider. Bring them in! Within months, Arab-
vacated properties, houses, fields, shops were filled, and new settlements arose
all along the cease-fire lines regardless of any eventual settlement or UN dis-
cussions.

The phrase was coined that Israel's frontier was the washing line. It is where
women take their children and set up an improvised home. Where they hang out
their daily linen, there only does historical Eretz Israel end. Behind this picture,
lurks the dogged resistance to any compromise or back-peddalling. The Israelis
have learnt that, even when their own government decides to withdraw, no police,
army or UN emergency force, can remove these women with their washing on
the line. There, Israeli children take their first lesson of, "Hold on, do not give
up an inch, and fight it out."

In Chapter X, the seizure of the demilitarised zones by such militant
kibbutzim will be sketched out. The kibbutzim are normally manned by dedicated
and extremist elements of pioneers (Chalutzim). Herut members (the old terrorists
of the Irgun) make up a good many of them, and contribute to the general tension
prevailing along the unhappy borders. They arrive unexpectedly with their
prefabricated homes, machinery and ready blueprint for the entire operation,
which is usually executed with immaculate precision overnight. When the sur-
rounding Arabs wake up in the morning, they find they have new neighbours.
Such was the case of the Burayr villagers who, on a fine April morning in 1948,
suddenly found a new settlement set up next to them on top of a strategic hill
commanding the route to the Negev. The following day another convoy of trucks
arrived and the second settlement was built up overnight under floodlight. The
process of dotting the coveted areas with such military colonies was in fact pur-
sued throughout the Second World War and was stepped up before the Declara-
tion of Independence as will be mentioned in Part 3. The case of the military set-
tlement of al-Auja in the demilitarised zone between Sinai and the Negev, and its
part in ousting the Egyptians and paving the way for the 1956 Sinai Campaign,
stands as the classic example of the use of population and settlement as arms of
expansion.

Another form of settlements served the purpose of putting a seal on an already
accomplished operation. Most of the settlements established in the annexed terri-
tories after the 1948 war were of this type. The conquest consolidation in the
aftermath of that war was marked by eighteen new settlements in Upper Galilee,
fifteen in Western Galilee, four in the Jordan Valley, two in the Beisan Valley,
seven in Yezreel, three in the Ephraim Hills, eleven in Shomoron, six in the
Sharon Plain and on the Arab Triangle border, nine in the Lydda Plain, Sixteen
near Jerusalem and eight in the Negev; all hurriedly set up in 1948 and 1949.³⁰
The removal of the Arabs from the strategic places and their replacement with
Jewish settlers became part of the military planning. The high figure mentioned

(30) "Israel's Economy in 1948/49," A. Bonne, in the *Israeli Economist*, 1949-50.

above for the purely Arab area of Galilee is a pointed to the effort to break down the stubborn character of this zone which continued to arouse comments in the worried press, and whose settlement, together with that of the Negev, was made part of the defence programme of Ben Gurion.

The technique is still in vogue. After the Six Day War, the procedure was extended to the new conquered territories. From September 1967, the green light was given and the first Nahal settlement appeared in the Occupied Territories. The war has become a population war in the truest sense. The Arabs are trying to regain control by pushing in as many Palestinians as they can and the Israelis are trying to maintain their grip by bringing in as many Jews as possible. Therefore any thought of reaching a solution for the Palestinian refugees and any homeless Jews cannot be conceived outside the framework of a final political solution.

CHAPTER V

FORCE AND EXPULSION

The Adoration of the Gun

More than in most other political conflicts, psychological factors loom in every phase and facet of the Palestine question. The emotionalism of both sides is proverbial. After centuries of brutal persecution and the blood, or gas, baths in which some six million people were liquidated in Nazi Europe, the victims developed the secret love and admiration of the weak for the beastly prowess of the tormentor. Despite the understandable indignation felt by many Zionist sympathisers, the fact remains that, in many aspects, Israel is following the ideology of Nazism, particularly in the adoration of might and the cynicism towards idealistic international concepts. Specifying what was intended for the new Jewish state, Jabotinsky gave the Peel Commission this psychopathic understanding of limited independence: "It does not necessarily mean being independent in the sense of having the right to declare war on anybody."¹ His successor, M. Begin, gave the existence of man this definition, "We fight, therefore we are."

The Israelis have given us one more sorry example of how we succumb to our emotionalism rather than to our rationalism. Up to the day of writing and after half a century of accumulated experience, they insist that force is the only way to make the Arabs accept a solution and embrace peace with Israel. "Arab aggression can be only met with force, and no outcome is possible but one brought about by Jewish arms," wrote Ben Gurion.² This view is shared by his disciple, General Moshe Dayan, who lost no chance to lecture his people that force was the only hope of persuading the Arab to go to the conference table. *The Jewish Chronicle*, one of the more objective and moderate Zionist papers, fell in the same trap and expected Israel to have achieved her aim by force. Writing whilst the Egyptian tanks and planes were still smouldering, the Editor said:

"As for the *crucial* problems of Israel-Arab relations, the Arabs, having failed to be persuaded by argument that Israel had come to stay, will now have to learn the hard way, by military defeat."³

One more factor in this preoccupation with force is that the Zionist Movement was born at the highest glory of imperialist might. As a small part of the western imperialist movement, it admired everything that was the secret of imperialist glory. In their polemics, the Zionists fall back on the past experience of

(1) Cmd. 5479, 1937.

(2) Ben Gurion, *Israel—Years of Challenge*, p. 24.

(3) *Jewish Chronicle*, 9 June 1967.

the western powers. What justification could Israel have for invading Sinai or occupying it? Ben Gurion answers by referring to the United States' invasion of Mexico in 1916 and their remaining there until 1917 for the purpose of stopping the Mexican marauders.⁴ After the Arab-Jewish incidents in 1921, the Zionists discussed means and methods of handling the Arabs. Free references were made to the experiences of former British generals, and their advice on the use of force as the only thing which colonial peoples could understand. W.B. Ziff (in his already-mentioned book) quoted Mark Sykes on the Arabs who, "long had the knack of falling in with the plans of a successful conqueror." The same Zionist writer described the Arabs thus, "Turbulent, destructive, inefficient, seemingly incapable of any but the most elementary creative activities." This kind of wisdom had been upheld by the Zionists long before the Jewish National Home was born. Alexander Aaronsohn, who lived with his brother, the more adventurous Aaron, in Palestine before World War I, wrote in his diaries, "...the Arab is a cunning fellow, whose only respect is for brute force. He exercises it himself for every possible victim and expects the same treatment from his superiors."⁵ This attitude is no better or worse than the general attitude expressed by the white settlers in Africa and the British colonialists in India.

As soon as the Arabs started to oppose the Zionist aspirations, force was suggested as the only means of making them accept what the Zionists said and concede what they wanted. This has remained the general guiding principle to the present day, despite its apparent failure. That the fellahin may have a grievance, that the workers may be suffering from unemployment, that the middle class may be losing jobs to the newcomers, or that the people may have legitimate national aspirations of their own, are all fairy stories of the English Arabophiles. The view was shared by most of the so-called socialist and Marxist Zionists, an affair which exposes the hypocrisy and chauvinism of the Zionist left. A good example may be found in the investigations carried out after the 1928 Jewish-Arab clashes. The Royal Commission which was sent to investigate the incidents found, and with no need for any Marxism, that the incidents had their deep roots in Arab fears for the future, strengthened by mass unemployment, the displacement of some fellahin, and Zionist discrimination against Arab labour. The Jewish Agency submitted its own reading of the situation and advanced these causes which we give in the same order as that given by the Agency:

- (1) No military enforcements were brought in.
- (2) Negligence in using the existing force effectively and early enough.
- (3) Omission to arm the Jews
- (4) Disarming the Jewish police.
- (5) Withdrawal of the sealed armouries (used to be given by the Government for the Jews' self-defence in emergencies) from some colonies.
- (6) Delay in opening fire on the Arabs."

The statement continues to list a few more causes, none of which had any

(4) Ben Gurion, *Israel: Years of Challenge*.

(5) Aaronsohn, A., *With the Turks in Palestine*, London, 1917, p. 25.

bearing on the unemployment of workers or the displacement of the fellahin, caused by Jewish immigration. No mention was made of the fact that during those months of the international crisis, unemployment among the Jews alone reached 8,440 in August 1927, putting a heavy burden on the finance and taxation of a small country like Palestine.⁶

The 1928/29 disturbances proved to be a landmark in Jewish-Arab relations as Jews and Arabs continued to refer to their experiences and losses during those fateful months. The psychological outlook of both communities could have been affected one way or another by a dedicated and sound leadership. The bi-nationalist, Dr. J. Magnes, felt the weight of the opportunity and, in 1930, wrote his tract "*Like all the Nations*," which put a large share of the responsibility for the massacre on the Jews. The Zionists, almost to a man, were infuriated by his analysis. *New Judea* commented in February 1930 on the "depressing" pamphlet by chiding its author: "the task of protecting a population afflicted with a conscience so sensitive that its first reaction to massacre is a sense of blood guiltiness, would not prove remunerative." Henceforth, the Yishuv must be trained to live without their conscience and to look pleasantly at the sight of massacres. Banquo must go and leave Macbeth to his ambitions. The method of reprisal and force, of telling the Arabs and not asking them, and of putting a high price on Jewish life, gradually developed across the years and became the accepted mode of Israeli politics.

"In the last week," wrote *Yediot Abaronot* on 16 May 1967, "There was an interruption in Syrian sabotage acts and this was due to Israel's warnings which had an effect on Damascus." But what is the good of that to the Israeli paper? Leaving well alone is an anathema. So *Yediot Abaronot* continued, "If our warning remains verbal, the Syrians will regain courage and the sabotage acts will be resumed. *Only action will convince them.*"

The resort to terrorism, assassination, intimidation and force in general became part of the psychology of the Jewish nationalists and Israel. The Jewish state was not born of love or wedlock but of hatred and violence, of anti-Semitism and massacres. It is not her fault to be born so, inasmuch as delinquency is not the fault of any juvenile. Obsession with force has become part of the Israeli scene, however hard the pacifists may try. The fun and pride which the Israelis find in marksmanship, in playing with arms, chasing the Palestinians and watching military operations are remarkable. The peculiarly excited expression on the faces of the crowds watching the Jerusalem military parades is something unknown even in the glory of German militarism. General Moshe Dayan, the embodiment of the new generation, spoke for them: "The most exciting thing in life is war." His unnecessary and reckless presence in many trivial operations, often to the embarrassment of the officer in command, cannot be explained except by this primitive thirst for the excitement of fighting. Foreign observers are often disgusted at the

(6) Cmd. 3530, 1930. Report on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1929.

sick humour of scaring the Arabs by firing overhead in play, or in earnest. Less humorous is the wanton firing at border villages during army exercises.⁷

The leader of the Herut Party draws a picture of the Israeli adoration of the gun in his account of the attempt to seize the Radio Station of Rammalla. "Inside the transmitting station, Avitagar, one of the bravest officers, threw his revolver several times into the air, caught it neatly and pointed it at the astonished British and Arab officials."⁸ The discovery of the fighting Jew after years of humble weakness and humiliation gave the Zionist Jew a new broom and it thrilled him.

It was this psychological and ideological position which shaped the World Zionist Organization plan for the final showdown with the Arabs, brushing aside any attempt to find a less bloody solution. Every opportunity was taken for getting military training, smuggling arms, and setting up underground arms factories. Ben Gurion even went out in the streets during the London blitz to get acclimatised to air raids. Once the 1948 expansion had spent its force, the "old man" started to lay plans, in 1953, for the second leg of the expansion with a detailed programme of military preparation. After twenty years of hard work in the barracks and on the field, Israel stands now as a little Middle Eastern version of Prussia, ever proud of its powers and ever ready for aggression.

Arab Lands but not Arab People

The conquest of Arab territories by the force of arms is only one half of the operation. Unlike other conquerors, who find no objection in living with the indigenous population, the Jewish nationalists do not want to rub shoulders with other inferior races in their "own" country. Until the 1967 war, a sound argument was advanced that the Jewish Agency needed an empty land for the immigrant refugees. In 1967, there were no Jewish refugees and the struggle for immigrants became a state problem. Furthermore, the new immigrants coming from the industrial west were not keen on agriculture. Yet, the problem of what to do with the Arab fellahin left in the newly occupied territories racked the brain of every Israeli politician. They are mercilessly pressed by two factors, firstly the basic aim of the Jewish state, i.e. to have a Jewish majority and secondly by the exclusiveness of the orthodox Jewish concept. Every conceivable means open to the authorities (under the circumstance) was therefore used to get the Arabs out.

Expulsion of the Palestinian population is accordingly an essential part of Israeli expansion. The story of the great Arab exodus is now a common fact and has been dealt with in many books and articles. It is that, during 1947/1948, nearly a million Arabs left their homes and properties in Palestine and sought a refuge in the neighbouring Arab countries, and refugees they remained. Their properties and lands were taken over by the new Israeli citizens who were shipped from

(7) Glubb, J.B., *A Soldier With the Arabs*, London, 1957. The U.N. Chief Observer, General Burns asked the Israelis to keep their exercises at a distance of a thousand yards from the villages. The Israelis replied that it was within their sovereignty and continued to enjoy the fun.

(8) Begin, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

Europe post haste. The event happened and a legend grew around it. Why did they leave? Israeli spokesmen lost no time in making out a case that they had left of their own free will and at the instigation of their own leaders. Dr. Walid al-Khalidi challenged this claim in two articles carried by the *Middle East Forum*. They were followed by another, written by Erskine Childers, in the *Spectator* of 12 May 1961. On the Israeli side, Dr. Leo Kohn wrote a study of the question and a battle of words erupted on this issue. "*The Other Exodus*" contains a large section of the correspondence.⁹ Mr. C. Sykes, a moderate Zionist sympathiser, passed judgement on the duel. "In the writer's opinion the correspondence completely disposes of the Zionist allegations that the exodus was a result of Arab planning."¹⁰ The correct way to disentangle the facts is to avoid the mountains of words written on any subject revolving around a question of justice. Whether it was the Arab leaders or the Zionist terrorists who made the Palestinians move, is immaterial in regard to their rights to return. The Zionists have always claimed that the Arab leaders do not represent their people, and that the ordinary Arabs would gladly live in peace and brotherhood with them. If the Zionists were innocent of and even opposed to their exodus, they should have more reason to take them back.

The Zionists, who wanted to repeat the experiences of their ancestors, must have learned the logic of their fathers on approaching the same land centuries before, "All the inhabitants of the mountain from Lebanon unto Mesrephoth-Mayim, all the Zidonians; these will I drive out,"¹¹ and again, "Then will the Lord drive out all these nations from before you."¹² The limited lands and resources of Palestine seem to make it imperative for any conquering nation to drive out the existing inhabitants and make room for themselves.

The Biblical assessment of the situation could not but find its echo in the rabbinical commentary of the religious authorities of the Israeli army as given by *Mabanim*, the official organ of the Rabbinate of the Israeli Defence Forces, when it wrote on the annexations of the occupied Arab territories in these chilling terms:

"We must disprove a common view, exploited by Israel's enemies to this day—that the Jewish religion commanded the death of the Canaanites in antiquity. The scripture is an entirety, and it is wrong to tear one or two sentences out of context to 'prove' things which never existed. For it says in Exodus 23, (30/31): '...and I will set thy bounds from the Red Sea even unto the Sea of the Philistines, and from the desert unto the river; For I will deliver the inhabitants of the land into your hand, and thou shalt drive them out before thee.'

"This quotation states explicitly expulsion, not extermination. Expulsion in antiquity has its modern equivalent in population exchange and transfer in contemporary terms; i.e. a peaceful solution to a territorial conflict whose other alternative is the annihilation of one of the two sides. The scriptures explicitly forbid the ruthless expulsion of the Canaanites. We must carry out an orderly and humane transfer over a relatively extended period, rather than abruptly. It must relate to the fertility of the Israeli population and its ability to replace the evacuees, lest the land become desolate

(9) *The Other Exodus*, pamphlet published by National Publications House Press, defending the Arab case.

(10) Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel*, p. 420.

(11) Joshua, XIII:6.

(12) Exodus, XXIII:31.

and wild. For it says in Exodus 23, (29/30): '...I will not drive them out from before thee in one year, lest the land become desolate, and the beast of the field multiply against thee. Little by little I will drive them out before thee until thou be increased and inherit the land.'

"...The Arabs who inhabit this country today are an essentially alien element to it and to its fate, and should be dealt with according to the rules which applied to the aliens in antiquity. Our wars with them were inevitable, just like those in antiquity with the people who inhabited our country for their purpose. It is impossible to live together with the Arabs over prolonged periods for their consciousness, prayers, desires and vision are orientated towards Mecca, whereas the Israelis' are towards Jerusalem. Only those facing Jerusalem represent the true sons of the land, whereas those facing Mecca are true to Arabia. The situation is clear, and its outcome is clear; either the Arab element ceases to worship Mecca and starts worshipping Jerusalem, or it returns to Arabia and leaves the sons of Zion to fulfil their destiny unhindered. Those who will disturb shall be expelled ..."¹³

The real driving force behind the unhappy exodus is the project itself. One misfortune of the Arabs is that the fate of Palestine was always left in the hands of people who had only a limited knowledge of Jewish nationalism. Had the members of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine known what it was all about, they would have seen that the proposed Jewish portion of Palestine would never do for the expansionist Jewish nationalism. It is against the nature of things. The 16,000 square kilometres could never do for the millions of Jews who were envisaged. What is the good of gaining more lands if they are inhabited by Arabs? This fact shaped the psychology of the Yishuv since the early days because they knew inwardly that there was going to be a kill, and the best protection against any weakening was to avoid any affection towards the victim, the sacrifice. The warning of "*New Judaea*" against any weak conscience and sense of blood guiltiness which would not prove "remunerative" was a fair presentation of the facts. Force and brutality must be nourished and sharpened for the day. The Arabs must not be incorporated, must not be employed, fraternized with, or encouraged.

Thus it came to pass that the tools of this machine, the Zionist terrorists, were unleashed in 1947/1948 to open the torrent of blood and terrorize the victims. In Deir Yassin some 250 villagers, men, women and children, were killed and barbarically mutilated. The scene of horror prompted even Ben Gurion to send a message of regret and condemnation to Abdulla. Hagana vans mounted with loud speakers roamed the Arab villages shouting, "Unless you leave your homes, the fate of Deir Yassin will be your fate." The Hagana radio station, broadcasting in Arabic, kept the Arab population informed of the terror and fear striking various named villages. Where terrorism failed, lies and deception were used to tempt the Palestinians to flee.¹⁴ Terror raids on a smaller scale were enacted in other places and took the story to an earlier stage when there were no Arab armies or volunteers. A great deal of evidence came to light later on. During a trial in Haifa about the activities of the L.H.Y., an army major who happened to be one of the witnesses told the court: "As for Lifta, the Hagana, I.Z.L. and L.H.Y. attacked the Arabs there for ten days and in Shaykh Badir, the Hagana

(13) *Mahanaim*, April 1969.

(14) Childers, *The Spectator*, 12 May 1961.

waged psychological warfare by warning letters, and the L.H.Y. blew up a home there, which probably helped to empty their quarter.”¹⁵ The significant piece in the testimony is the role of the Hagana in this psychological warfare, a role generally denied by the Jewish Agency, and ascribed to the strictly terrorist organizations. Yet the scientist, Dr. Weizmann, wondered like a naïve schoolboy and with even greater innocence, “I do not know why they ran away!”

One of the early raids which led to a definite escalation occurred on 18 December 1947, when a Hagana unit attacked the village of Khissas near the Syrian border. The attack was carried out at night, and resulted in the death of ten Arabs. Syria and Lebanon were drawn into the embroilment by the fact that two of the dead were Lebanese and two were Syrians who happened to be guests at the village. On 15 February, the Hagana attacked the village of Sassa, a distant and peaceful village which took no part in the conflict. The Hagana destroyed twenty houses of the inhabitants, with the idea that by striking at the furthest and least involved villages, the lesson of terror would be more telling to the nearer villagers.¹⁶ In other words, strike at the innocent to teach the guilty, or, as the leader of the Stern put it, “It makes it all the more telling—a demonstration when the victim is a friend.” It was his reply to the remark that Lord Moyne, whom the Sternists had murdered, was in fact a friend of the Zionist cause.¹⁷ The Secretary of the Palestine Labour Political Committee, Mr. Jackson, admitted that the Hagana policy of “active defence” involved “indiscriminate” reprisals meant “to root out the nests of Arab resistance.”¹⁸

The idea of clearing the land has been in their minds in the same way as the idea of the state. They very rarely declared that it was part of their programme and when they were called to account they had no scruples in denying it, but it was always there and often came to the surface, like the idea of the state. Israel Zangwill wrote to the Spectator in 1921, denying that expulsion of the Arabs was part of the Zionist plan. He clothed his denial in these terms, “But it is untrue that I say to the Arabs: ‘this is our land, get out.’ What I say is: ‘You have other and vaster land—a new Arab state even—where you can live self-governed, free from our competition. Why not trek to them, we compensating you?’”¹⁹

Meinertzhagen reiterated the same idea “The Arabs who dislike the solution can be compensated and moved elsewhere.”²⁰ Jabotinsky made similar utterances. The idea continued to occupy the minds of the Zionists well into the forties. It was suggested by Harold Lasky in 1931, and Chaim Weizmann in 1937 and 1941. In December 1944, the British Labour Party adopted the famous Zionist inspired resolution stating, “Let the Arabs be encouraged to move out as the Jews move

(15) *Palestine Post*, 7 January 1949.

(16) Kimche, J. and D., *Both Sides of the Hill*, London, 1960, p. 83

(17) McDonald, J.C., *My Mission in Israel*, London, 1951, p. 64.

(18) *Jewish Chronicle*, 16 January 1948.

(19) Reprinted in *Jewish Chronicle*, 4 February 1921.

(20) Meinertzhagen, *op. cit.*, p. 191.

in." One interesting point here is that the Zionists had objected to the interference of the Arab states in the future of Palestine, and to the intrusion of the Arab kings in the question in 1936. But when it came to expelling the Palestinians they expected the same Arab world to look after them in their "new Arab state."

As the controversy raged on about who caused the Arab exodus, a slow-motion exodus was actually in progress but the Israeli propagandists skilfully diverted even Arab eyes to the verbal controversy. Throughout the existence of the State, Arab citizens were continually leaving the country under various forms of pressure. In a city like London, one often comes across Arab Israeli intellectuals who have left their country because it was impossible for them to live there any longer. From time to time, press reports bring the news of tragic attempts made by Arabs trying to cross the border from Israel—like the sad death of Jamil Mishal, the Hebrew University student who was killed whilst throwing himself from a train in an attempt to escape from Israel, leaving behind a letter to his father telling of his despair of making any satisfactory life under the Israeli Government. Villagers who happened to live in the military zones were removed from their places for "security" reasons. The dispersal of the Arabs and their replacement with Jews in accordance with the population frontier theory led to the disappearance of a number of Arab villages. The operation was carried out under a number of pieces of legislation including the Absentee Property Law, the Fallowed Land Regulations and the Lands Leasing Law. Early in 1962, some 3,500 villagers were removed from their place in Galilee, and their lands, an area of 550 hectares, were taken over.²¹ According to Glubb's calculation, 5,648 Arabs were driven from Israel to Jordan between the Armistice and October 1950.²²

More serious was the use of force against the Bedouin of the Negev, whose plight was investigated by Commander E.H. Hutchison, head of the Israel-Jordan Mixed Armistice Commission. The Arab nomads who had been living there since time immemorial, were subjected to aeroplane strafing, constant searching of their tents, burning of their belongings, etc. One operation discovered by Commander Hutchison was the expulsion of the Bedouin of the neutral zone of al-Auja and their replacement with other Israeli Bedouin from Beersheba. "The fact that over 7,000 Bedouin had been driven from their lands in Israel since the signing of the General Armistice was a matter of UNTSO record."²³

It must remain a matter of speculation to estimate the total number of Bedouin driven out by one method or another. The Israel Government Yearbook of 1950 puts the figure of registered Bedouin living in Israel as 21,000 only. The 1931 census put them at 66,00 and in 1947 they were estimated to be 90,00 souls. Yet, the debate went on—"Who expelled the Palestinians?" It is a commonly known fact that the Bedouin left in Israel now, are no more than scattered groups of mere tourist importance. As for the grazing rights which these Bedouin had

(21) *Ihud*, July-August 1962.

(22) Glubb, *op. cit.*, p. 285.

(23) Hutchison, E.H., *Violent Truce*, New York, 1956, p. 76.

acquired over the centuries and which were sanctioned by the Mandate Government, they became a thing of the past.

On 24 October 1956, a new Deir Yassin massacre was enacted in Kafr Qasim. The Frontier Force opened fire in cold blood on a group of Arab villagers returning from their work, killing 51 and injuring 13 of them. The justification this time was that a curfew had been imposed on the zone in connection with the attack on Sinai. The Mukhtar of Kafr Qasim was informed of the fact by an officer at 4.45 p.m. The curfew was due to start at 5 p.m. The Mukhtar warned that there were labourers still at work who would not be back before the time limit. The officer assured him that "the Frontier Force will take care of these labourers." According to an eye witness who escaped death by feigning death, as the labourers started to come in small batches, the officer asked them to stand aside, and ordered his men to mow them down. Among the dead were twelve women and seven children. The Government hastened to cover up the scandal, paid compensation to the dependants, and prosecuted the guilty. The State Attorney said,

"It was clear and it would be proven that the villagers were returning home from outlying districts and did not know of the curfew, nor could they have known of it. They were returning peacefully before dark. They were killed without warning, without even being told of the fate that awaited them."²⁴

Extermination of the Arabs is the suppressed desire of a large section of the Israeli nationalists. Whenever an opportunity offers itself the desire is released. The main force suppressing it is world public opinion on which the whole fund-raising work depends. The saddest thing about Zionism is that it is born out of its time. Had it been born two centuries ago, it would have fitted perfectly in the cruel world of Peter the Great.

Twice Kicked out

On 5 June 1967, the Israeli Army swept through the Arab adjoining territories. Every interested observer looked to see whether the 1948 story would be repeated, how it would be re-enacted, and who would be the cause. The Arabs knew the position well. Their radio stations and propaganda sources had not only refrained from encouraging the Arab Palestinians to leave, but in fact had asked them to stay where they were. King Husain went even further and appealed to them to remain as a thorn in the eyes of the enemy. Nevertheless, some 323,000 Arabs left their homes in the following weeks. It was estimated that 113,000 of these were already refugees from the 1948 war. The total figure was distributed as follows: 178,000 went to Jordan, 107,000 went to Syria and 38,000 went to Egypt. A new feature in this exodus is the 45,000 Syrians who began to feel the brunt of Israeli expansion and left their homes for safer grounds. The Government of Jordan put the number of the refugees who came to the east bank up to the

(24) Appeal by Tawfiq Tubi, Member of the Knesset; J.O. and the M.E.R., 29-3-57.

end of May 1968 at 401,248. The Arab Governments wasted no time in pressing for the return of the refugees. The Arab position was therefore made clear. What was the Israeli position?

Terror in the 1948 style was not applied, but villagers were evicted from their homes and their houses were destroyed and bulldozed. They were left homeless and unattended. Amos Kenan, an Israeli journalist, deserted his unit because he would not participate in the demolition of four villages. He wrote a report on the subject (published by *Peace News*). "This report has been translated and circulated in the world as a proof of Israel's crimes." Kenan's military commander called for him and informed him that what happened was a regrettable error which would not recur.²⁵ But it did recur. A few weeks later, the village of Jiftliq was razed to the ground. There used to live in the village some 6,000 souls, most of whom had already left for Jordan. The Israelis justified their action, this time, on the grounds of health, claiming that the fear of mice caused them to destroy the village.²⁶

The Israeli military authorities issued an interesting and convenient order to destroy any house from which fire was opened or in which arms were found, regardless of the ownership of the house or who possessed the arms. Many houses were destroyed merely on the suspicion of firing at Israeli convoys. The destruction of a house usually led to the destruction of the adjoining properties as well. A house in Jerusalem was destroyed, in March 1968, for yet a new reason. One of the resistance fighters under arrest used to live in it. This particular act aroused world wide protest, as it led to the destruction of a few more buildings including a British school. In Jerusalem, the operation started immediately after the occupation of the Holy City where a large area of Arab dwellings were bulldozed into the ground, because they were, so it was justified, unhealthy and slummy. In the long trail of destruction, the authorities took few measures to rehouse the old inhabitants. The other method of expelling the Arabs was by plainly putting them over the border, which was done to those who stood up against the authorities, and included such people as the Mayor of Jerusalem and Shaykh Abd al-Hamid as-Sayih, President of the Shari'a Court of Jerusalem. They would be happier over there, they were told.

In all cases, the old buses were there to take people on the one-way journey to the border. Only the old loudspeakers threatening vengeance were missing. Mr. Eban's hypocrisy of 1958 on the Arabs' responsibility for the refugees, "Theirs is the initiative for its creation. Theirs is the onus for its endurance," was exposed for all to see. The Israeli justification for flouting the U.N. resolution to take back the 1948 refugees is adequately refuted. No Israeli authority claimed that the 1967 refugees left on Arab "initiative." Both the Jordanian Government and the International Red Cross did everything possible to send the new refugees back, with very limited results in the face of Israeli opposition. King Husain even offered

(25) *New Statesman*, 12 July 1968.

(26) *The Times*, 30 November 1967

financial aid to those who returned. Out of the nearly four hundred thousand new refugees, only 16,000 were allowed to return. The Israeli authorities resorted to technicalities in turning down thousands of applications for repatriation, to the despair of the Red Cross representatives. It is difficult, however, to say how many of the refugees left as a direct result of fear or force. In 1967, the issue was complicated by the dependence of many West Bank families on money earned in the various Arab countries. Indicative of the fear and the Israeli exploitation of its existence is the novel story of a village emptied in a perfectly peaceful manner. A news company asked the commander for help in re-enacting the capture of a destroyed village. The commander was only too pleased and even helped in the production by advising them to make the mock armour attack on another undestroyed village. With the villagers still there, it would look like the real thing. When the film was finished, not one villager remained in his place.²⁷

Beyond some useful border re-adjustment, a large section of the Israeli government appears to find it more advisable to hand back the West Bank. Not so is the case of Gaza. The overwhelming opinion is for the annexation of the sector. To do so profitably the population must be spirited away. It was here that force and terror were applied on a larger scale. Michael Adams visited the area in January and sent a damning report. For no more than a cracker of an improvised bomb which left no serious casualty or damage, the entire population of a camp was kept under a curfew lasting days, during which no provisions for water or food were made and the UNRWA work was obstructed and even prevented. Men were ordered into a compound where they were held for hours, under adverse winter weather conditions, while the guards repeatedly fired overhead. Demolition of houses followed the usual pattern, each house bringing down two more with it. Moved by the travail of the population, Mr. Adams asked an Israeli officer with the rank of colonel whether he knew that such acts were against the Geneva Convention. The Colonel answered with a question. "What is this convention?" *Le Monde* apparently took this naïve question seriously, and published an article on 8 February 1968 citing and explaining to the Israelis the terms of the convention. Mr. Adams concluded his report thus:

"I had my ups and downs during four years as a prisoner of war in Germany but the Germans never treated me as harshly as the Israelis are treating the Arabs of the Gaza Strip, the majority of whom are women and children."²⁸

Nevertheless, it could be a fair judgement to say that there was an appreciable change from 1948. The principle of force was the same, but the degree was reduced. In 1948, fire was directed at the villagers, whilst in 1967 it was directed at their homes.

(27) Private information from a Red Cross eye witness. According to the study made by Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat (*River Without Bridges*, Beirut, 1968, p. 43), 68 per cent of the 1948 refugees and 42 per cent of the 1967 refugees left their homes before seeing any Israeli. Those who reported contact with terror were 21 per cent in 1948 and 48 per cent in 1967.

(28) *Guardian*, 26 January 1968.

The Jordanian Government accused their enemy of even using money to induce the inhabitants of the Gaza sector to go to the eastern bank of the Jordan. According to *al-Hayat*, a Beirut newspaper, the Gaza families were offered ten Israeli pounds per head on departure, and another ten on arrival at King Husain Bridge. The Mukhtars of the camps were visited by two officers who asked them to submit lists of families who were supported by men working in Arab countries. Such families were ordered to go to Jordan and follow their men. The refugees of the Jabaliya camp protested to UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Work Agency) against the forced removal. That did not prevent the number of refugees transferred from Gaza to Jordan during the first year of occupation from reaching a total of 45,000, according to the local UNRWA representative.²⁹ From the Jabaliya camp alone, 5,000 refugees left for Jordan. Brigadier Mordecai Gur, the Gaza commander, affirmed that they had left of "their own free will," but he mentioned that a number of the Jabaliya camp were arrested as saboteurs.³⁰ Whatever the motives of the refugees, some ghastly scenes were witnessed at the border point. The Jordanian authorities refused to allow the truck loads of Gaza refugees to enter and the victims were hustled backward and forward until both sides opened fire at each other, with the refugees sweating in the middle, the women wailing and the children screaming. "*Hayom*" attacked the "treacherous behaviour" of Jordan which "reveals the cruel attitude of the Arab authorities toward their brethren."³¹

The Israelis dislike the sight of an Arab population opposite their positions. As soon as they occupy an area, they begin their steady work of harassment to make the neighbouring Arabs go. This feature of their policy was manifested on a large scale along the Suez Canal. They kept their guns trained on the Egyptian thickly-populated towns of the canal zone, and looked for any excuse to start their bombardment. In a few months, most of these towns looked like ghost cities. Should the opportunity arise to occupy the area, the Israelis would feel gratified to receive them empty. The same applies to the Jordanian villages and refugee camps stretching along the River Jordan. The sight of death in these desolate camps must be something unforgettable. The Israeli practice, according to the eye witnesses, is to fire one shell at a site and wait for a few moments until the refugees rush to the casualty to give aid or out of curiosity; another shell is then fired at the same spot where the desired crowd has congregated. Property, including

(29) *Al-Hayat*, 17, 26 July 1968. (Jordan put it at 47,000. Amman Radio, 3 August 1968, B.B.C. MRIV.)

(30) Kol Israel, 2 August 1968, B.B.C. MRIV.

(31) Kol Israel, 1 August 1968, B.B.C. MRIV. Curious how the Israelis are re-enacting so many acts of their drama under the Nazis, with the leading roles reversed. Before World War II, Hitler started to send the Jews to Poland. Poland refused to take them. The scenes at the King Husain Bridge were not unfamiliar to the Israeli officer, only it was he who was in the truck on the German-Polish border. A young Jew, living in Paris then, had his father expelled by the Nazis in that manner. In despair and anger, he killed a German diplomat in Paris, a completely innocent man. In 1968, a young Arab living in America had his father in occupied Jerusalem. He killed Robert Kennedy, another innocent man.

that of UNRWA, is destroyed in the process. Gradually, the camps and villages are emptied. They become the monopoly of the resistance fighters, whom the Israelis intend to clear. In the summer of 1968, the Jordanian fellahin dared not venture to collect their crops within range of Israeli fire and all attempts by the Government to induce them failed. It was eventually decided to bring in over seventy foreign students from Europe and employ them in gathering the crops.³²

After the 1967 war, the case was put whether Israel was not developing into a little Prussia of the Middle East. The sight of soldiers and volunteers with their weapons, in cinemas and cafes, became familiar. The army, with its longest national service and highest expenditure ratio in the world, is in complete control of the situation and confident of handling any conceivable Arab challenge. This has been the case throughout its brief history. Operating with complete impunity, it has become an effective and ready tool for the immediate utilisation of any opportunity to push Israel's borders forward. The only hindrance to this strong arm of Tel Aviv, is international complications, the reliance on the good will of the donors and arms manufacturers, and lastly, the Zionist logic of maintaining a Jewish majority dwarfing a disgruntled minority. Whenever and wherever these obstacles can be overcome, the strong arm of Zionism rushes forward with force and expulsion to make a new map.

(32) *The Times*, 5 July 1968.

CHAPTER VI

FAIT ACCOMPLI AND REPRISALS

The Title Deeds

The belief in force as the only way of handling "backward" peoples led Israel naturally to the policy of fait accompli. What matters to Israel is to decide what she wants and then wait for the opportunity to go and get it. The Arabs and the world will then adapt themselves to the new situation. Such was the view expressed by Dr. Weizmann at a meeting held on 9 July 1919 between General Clayton and the Zionist Organization. "He (Weizmann) thought that a clear statement of policy and the declaration of the fait accompli would probably be accepted peaceably by at least 75 per cent of the Arab population."¹ This was apparently the life-long idea of Weizmann, for in a different meeting years later, he advised Mr. Roosevelt, then President of the United States, that the consent of the Arabs should never be solicited. Britain and America should simply work together with the Zionists for the establishment of the Jewish National Home, in which the Arabs would have no alternative but to acquiesce.²

The refusal of the British Government to accept this view remained a bone of contention with the Jewish Agency to the end of the Mandate. In May 1945, the Agency clarified its conceptions in its memorandum³ to the British Government. "We submit that a clear cut decision in favour of a Jewish state by H.M. Government . . . is the way to secure Arab acceptance." The memorandum went on to remind the British Government that the Amir Faysal and Arab representatives endorsed the Balfour Declaration after it had been made and started to resist it only when the Government started to vacillate. The position was reflected in the writings and statements of Zionist spokesmen and fellow travellers⁴ and in their avoidance of any dealings with the Arab in later days.

Naturally, the attitude has its roots deep in the Zionist disbelief, itself a product of anti-Semitism, in the law, reliability and good intentions of the gentile world. It also happened that the Jewish nationalists were schooled in this fashion, inter alia, by a series of circumstances in Palestine. During the Ottoman rule, the government in Istanbul had often laid heavy restrictions on the entry and sojourn of the Jews and the acquisition of lands. But the government was too weak to enforce its restrictions, and the local officials were too corrupt to resist easy

(1) Minutes of the Meeting, *British Documents 1919-1939*, Series 1, Vol. IV, p. 333.

(2) Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 534.

(3) *Documents relating to the Palestine Problem*, Jewish Agency, 1945.

(4) James G. MacDonald advocated, "The best way to get Arab acceptance was to present them with a *fait accompli*," *op. cit.*, p. 24.

money. The result was the adoption by the Jewish colonisers of a determined policy of facing Istanbul with a series of accomplished facts, against which the central government or the successive walis could do nothing at a later stage. *Fait accompli*, as a matter of fact, was the prime principle in Turkish administration and judicature in general. The right of *tasarruf* (actual working of the land) gave the cultivator the right to register the land in his name after ten years of cultivation. The principle of *mahlul* (dissolved) entailed the loss of ownership after failure to work the land. During the Mandate, the politically minded Zionists were driven to the same approach by the weakness of the opponent and the referee. To the referee, the British Government, all that mattered was to be left in peace. If the Jews managed to get away with things easily and swiftly, it was good luck to them. The same policy was pursued by the United Nations. In the obsession to restore peace as quickly as possible, the world organization smothered the very child it meant to protect.

The Zionist Organization realised that the Palestine question was an uncharted sea. The Balfour Declaration and all the relevant treaties and resolutions attached to it were unwarranted acts which gave a second party that which belonged to a third party. Their interpretation was uncertain, their endorsement fractional and their future doubtful. The only guarantee that could reassure the Zionists was the accomplished fact. It also happened to become their last argument. In a television debate on the motion, "The Arab case is more powerful than the Israeli," the Zionist case was put in analogy with that of the United States. Although the Americans had driven out the original inhabitants, the Red Indians, and seized the country, no one disputes the rights of the American settlers now. The Marxist controversy which raged after Stalin's somersault in voting for Israel, hinged on the question whether the Jews had or had not established themselves as a nation in Palestine after the Zionist colonisation.⁵ The usual remark made to the Arabs is, "O.K., the right is on your side, but the Jews are there now. What are you going to do about it?"

In partitioning the country, the various experts and commissions had no maps or treaties in their hands to guide them. Their only clue was to find out where the Jews had actually settled. It became, therefore, a set procedure for the Mandatory Power and the United Nations to follow two opposites, the maintenance of the status quo and the acceptance of the *fait accompli*. The situation was grasped from the earliest days of the Zionist Movement. Theodor Herzl explained in his letter to the Kaiser that the best approach was for Germany to face the world with a *fait accompli* in a pro-Zionist Declaration. Everything depended on "the form of the *fait accompli* which is to be created."⁶

(5) Al-Wa'i of the Egyptian communists put the case, on 20 December 1947, for the accomplished form of a new Jewish nation in Palestine. In a long theoretical study, the Committee of Democratic Arab Students in Paris, argued that, although Jewish immigration to Palestine was a reactionary measure, the existence of a large number of such immigrants in Palestine as an accomplished fact gave them the right to self-determination as a nation. (*Al-Watan*, Bagdad, 3 October 1948).

(6) Herzl, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 716.

This did not apply to the Jews only but to the Arabs as well. They talked all the time of force as the only means of redress which might be accepted by the Jews and the British. Their march on Palestine in 1948 was made with the declared aim of facing the Jews and the United Nations with the fact of an Arab State. In the ensuing fighting, the Israelis took the loot of the accomplished facts, but the Arabs had also their share in the seizure of the Jewish colonies of Etzion. At an earlier date, their peasants occupied the Jewish lands bought by the Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association (a non-Zionist body). The Zionists who were supposed to receive them failed to overcome the accomplished seizure by any legal means. The obstacle was finally removed by resorting to the same method of "bribing the British, the mukhtars of the Arab villages and the fellahin. We also went to court over some of it, and in other places beat up a few Arabs."⁷ Palestine has become the land where possession is ten tenths of ownership. A world of illegalities evolved from the illegal act of Balfour.

So conscious was the Israeli command of the foregoing fact that it gave the military operation to advance southward and occupy the top of the Gulf of Aqaba the name of "fait accompli." The method naturally required the agility and swiftness necessary for any good burglary. With the United Nations and the world at large watching, a tight schedule was allocated for each operation. The race against time before the Security Council announces a cease-fire has become an essential training through which an Israeli General must go. In October 1948, the Israeli Command allowed Moshe Dayan 48 hours only to occupy Bethlehem and Hebron before the emergence of an "international complication."⁸ But one night's rest for the troops wasted the chance, and the cease-fire had begun before the region could be made a part of Israel. The Latrun and Jerusalem were not incorporated either because of a four days waste before the second truce was made effective on 18 July 1948.⁹ General Moshe Dayan learned the lesson, and in the 1967 war, the Israeli Army made no difference between day and night as flares and floodlights kept the act moving and squeezed the maximum into the minimum of time. The blitzkrieg technique was not adopted purely in imitation of Nazi military efficiency but for the purpose of serving the fait accompli policies.

Another lesson learned and effectively used was to keep quiet about the successes made and enjoy the silence (for a different reason) from the other side. By doing so, the Israeli Command threw dust in the eyes of the United Nations and neutralised what friends the Arabs had. They learned this from the July 1948 Security Council meetings. The seriousness of the Arab situation remained unknown to the British delegate, Sir Alexander Cadogan, until it was fairly late. When a cease-fire resolution was passed on 15 July, Ramla, Bayt Nabala, the Lydda and the Lydda international airport, were secure in Israeli hands. The same story occurred in 1967, only then it was the Soviet delegate who

(7) Citation in Kirk, G., *The Middle East in the War*, Survey of International Affairs, 1946.

(8) Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill*, p. 250.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 228. The Kimches give a good picture of this race and the time planning in conjunction with U.N. cease-fire deliberations.

was fooled by the silence of both parties. The Syrians, however, learned better and outdid the Israelis by announcing the fall of Qunaytra early on the morning of 10 June. It did not actually fall into Israeli hands until 2.30 in the afternoon.¹⁰ It must have struck the Israeli U.N. delegate as a treacherous piece of oriental guile. The invading force was nearly a whole day behind time, and he needed more courage in New York than the soldiers on the Golan Heights. He could only sit motionless denying the Syrian charges of ignoring the cease-fire, a position which was more untenable than that of Abba Eban who was helped by the silent Egyptians in 1948. Eban had to fight then a covering action at the Security Council to give the necessary time needed by Yigal Allon to complete the route of Operation Ten Plagues. He had the misfortune of having to undergo the same ordeal in 1956. The Israeli troops were still five days march from Sharm ash-Shaykh when the United Nations called, on 1 November, for a cease-fire. The decision was delivered to Mr. Eban on 2 November. For three days he kept on vacillating, seeking clarifications and making suggestions, until 5 November, when the entire peninsula of Sinai was in Israeli hands.

General Glubb made a sound observation on the role which the United Nations played in Palestine. Instead of allowing the sides to fight it out to a finish, the U.N. intervened half way, stopped the fighting and left things as they were, a phenomenal practice in our contemporary world when human intervention is only helping to upset the balance of many things without being able to create a new balance. The full scale expansion of 1967 was actually a completion of the 1948 job, but the intervention of the United Nations and the Great Powers divided it into smaller instalments of accomplished facts spread over twenty years. Israel welcomed the arrangement because it suited her book. The 1967 annexation has already proved too much for her stomach. Had the same happened in 1948, it might have created for her insoluble problems. As it is, nearly everything in Israel's existence is based on one accomplished fact or another. The numerous U.N. resolutions to the contrary are lying in a deep freeze, without even the need to repeal them, amend them, or renew them. The very existence of the state was recognised by many states including the USA and Britain, sheerly on a de facto basis. Her frontiers are only armistice demarcation lines accepted without prejudice to future claims.

Accomplishing a new fact is a carefully planned operation in which very little is left to chance, and every chance is exploited to the maximum. The operation is synchronised with such distant events as American presidential elections, U.N. recesses, holidays, involvements of the great powers, etc. The propaganda guns prepare world public opinion for the coup. Once the new fact is accepted, Israel retires like a contented cat to digest the meal. This is the state of the "peacefulness of Israel." Zionist propagandists are instructed to play down the Middle East and place it in oblivion. Arab shouts, moans and threats then

(10) Howard, Michael and Hunter, Robert, *Israel and the Arab World*. Also B.B.C. M.R. Part IV.

sound the ugliest in the hallowed stillness of the night. Why are the Arabs so morbid and depressed! They should look at their neighbours—cheerful, optimistic and contented! Why can't the Arabs forget the past and look to the future as Israel is doing? The Israelis are not moaning, so why are the Palestinians? As time passes and the Arab states begin to forget and start to argue among themselves about other affairs, the cat avails himself of the hubbub and snatches another piece of a *fait accompli*. By then Israel has digested the earlier bite comfortably. The immigrants are brought in and settled, world public opinion soothed, colonies and frontiers established and sufficient funds collected.

It is the ideal way of expansion for a little state like Israel, but its obvious flaw is that it creates undesirable precedents, and sets a dangerous pattern for dealings between Israel and the world at large. Once the Arabs learn to doctor Israel with the same medicine, the game will be over. For this reason, Israel is prepared to concede anything to the Arabs except the initiative for a *fait accompli*. She may withdraw from any part if there is sufficient pressure from outside, but will never allow her neighbours to take an inch by resorting to her own methods. It is the reason behind the rage which swept Israel after Nasser's closure of the Straits of Tiran. Israeli shipping, as assessed during the crisis, was negligible¹¹ and Nasser was becoming gradually, but decidedly conciliatory on the question of what was a strategic cargo. All he wanted was a political coup and that was what Israel could not afford. Having educated her people that *fait accompli* was their only ticket for existence, it became self-evident that an Arab *fait accompli* would be the death certificate of their state. The worries of the Zionists were that if Nasser got away with it, the people in Israel would get out of it by booking their *return* journeys westward.

The Shield of Reprisal

What was left for the Arabs to do? The United Nations Organization has been unwilling to break or incapable of breaking the Israeli weapon. Will they, as well, bow down to the *fait accompli* rule—and which *fait accompli*? Acquiescence was unbearable for at least some of them. Unable to use the gun effectively against Israel and reverse her achievements, they resorted to harassment. Whether guerilla warfare is a justifiable reply to Israel's militarily accomplished facts is a question which has been answered in both directions.¹² What had been a resistance movement for the democracies was anti-Aryan terrorism for Hitler's totalitarianism. Whatever are the merits and demerits of the Arab case, the stubborn intransigence of its partisans is a flash of that spirit which gives us martyrs. By refusing to knuckle under to the weight of the *fait accompli* policies, the Arabs are striking a magnificent blow for international order, at great cost to themselves, and with little cognisance from the international community.

(11) *Observer*, 4 June 1967.

(12) Cf. Correspondence in *The Times*, 26, 27, 28, 29 March 1968.

For Israel, it is not a question of theoretical dispute or political morality.¹³ Armed resistance to her accomplishments means one thing, i.e. that they are not really accomplished. The swiftness of her actions must be followed by protective deterrents. The policy is not a new development in Arab-Israeli relations as the current polemic may suggest. It has become an essential part of Jewish life in Palestine ever since the inauguration of the Jewish National Home—and even earlier. The reader finds many references to it in the present work. It gives, for one thing, eloquent expression to the Israeli adoration of violence and the Zionist conviction that “inferior” races can only understand force.

The idea was first embraced and practised in a collective way in 1921 when Arab violence was answered by Jewish violence.¹⁴ Its strongest champions were the Revisionists (the extremists and comrades of M. Begin, the Herut leader and Minister in the Eshkol Government). In their Prague Convention of 1938,¹⁵ they passed a resolution on the subject saying, “The Convention emphatically declares that, as long as anti-Jewish terrorism in Palestine continues unchecked, any attempts to stop it by acts of reprisal may be claimed to constitute a justifiable form of self-defence.” Whilst such acts may be understandable, though not necessarily justifiable, at a time of mass hysteria, they become obnoxious when they take the form of murdering individual innocent peasants for the blood of a Jew killed days before, somewhere else. *Davar* warned (on 22 September 1937) the Yishuv against resort to revenge and attributed reprisals to elements outside the Jewish Agency. That was a time when the Yishuv were a small and weak minority. In later years and after the establishment of the state, *Davar* became the foremost champion of tagmul (reprisal). *Zionews*, the organ of the New Zionist Organization denied, however, *Davar's* claim that the Revisionists were the only people responsible for the policy, and expressed once more Jabotinsky's “straightforward” approach: “Obviously, and no Jew should go out of his way to deny it, the occasional attacks on Arabs in Palestine following murder of Jews, are Jewish reprisals.”¹⁶

After the big annexations of 1948, and as the refugees tried to cross the demarcation lines for private or national reasons, to collect a sewing machine left behind or to shoot at Israeli traffic, the full vigour of Israeli violence was released on the Palestinian infiltrators and their border villages. Reprisal raids were born

(13) Oppenheim, *International Law*, London, 1963, Vol. II, gives the subject some consideration under the heading “Reprisals.” He cites the precedent of the Nazi bombardment of Almeria in 1937 in reply to shelling a German ship, and seems to endorse limited acts of reprisal under given circumstances against acts committed by governments and not by individuals. He makes no reference under this heading to the entry or invasion of other countries, but he deals with this measure on p. 154, with this conclusion: “Thus a state would be acting in breach of its obligations under the Charter (of U.N.) if it were to invade or commit an act of force within the territory of another state, in anticipation of an alleged impending attack or in order to obtain a redress without the intention of interfering permanently with the integrity of that state.”

(14) Cf. Report of the Commission of Enquiry, 1921, Cmd. 1540, p. 45.

(15) Their leader had already told the Peel Commission how to end the 1936 rebellion, “The first thing is to find the guilty ones and punish them.”

(16) *Zionews*, 24 November 1937.

then, but by no means exclusively because of the infiltrators. In August 1955, Moshe Dayan delivered a lecture to his officers, formulating the policy of setting a "high price for our blood."¹⁷ His thesis was to forget about mediation or the use of the influence of great powers, and reply instead to Arab infiltration by impressive acts of reprisal. At the time when Dayan gave his lecture, the militarists, led by Ben Gurion, were preparing for the 1956 onslaught on Egypt. It was known that the campaign could not be launched without a good alibi.

The technique was generally the same. A border incident happens and one or two Israelis get killed. The military command decide on a reprisal raid. They select an Arab village, suitable for the attack and fairly defenceless. It may be near the scene of the incident, or it may not as the innocence or lack of responsibility of the village is immaterial. The operation is then carefully planned and rehearsed, sometimes for weeks. The command waits for a suitable excuse, or creates one when none is found. In the case of the Lake Tiberias attack, a boat was sent towards the Syrian coast. The Syrians opened fire on it, and the mechanism of the whole attack was then released. General Burns states¹⁸ that the attack could never have been an improvised affair militarily. The attack happened five hours only after he had conferred with Ben Gurion on the results of his negotiations with the Arabs.

In the more accessible villages of Jordan, the element of surprise was emphasized and no attention was paid to a direct justification. The attack, as in Qibya, started with a concentrated bombardment of mortar and artillery. The men then moved into the village with explosive charges in packs especially designed for carrying on the back. Automatic weapons were then fired at the villagers indiscriminately, forcing them back into their homes. Once they were all inside, their houses were demolished with explosives. In the case of Nahhaleen, small charges were put in front of the doors. When they were blown in, soldiers entered the houses, and mowed down the inhabitants with automatic guns. Part of the plan was to lay ambushes along the road leading to the village. When a relief force was sent, the vehicles hit a trap line which set them on fire, or mines across the road. As the convoy halted, an Israeli force opened fire on the confused and injured soldiers.¹⁹ The attacks were made at night, but as they grew in intensity and extent, it was realised that the darkness put both the attacker and the attacked in confusion. The Israelis had lost eighteen of their men, including eight officers, in the raid on Qalqilya in 1956. Moshe Dayan decided then that the chapter of night reprisal actions had reached its end.

The usual targets for attack were the police stations and schools buildings (so desperately needed). Gharandel, Rahwa, and Sharafa lost their police stations and schools in 1956. (In Rahwa it was an UNRWA school.) In the artillery attack on Qalqilya, 48 policemen died, and a similar number of people perished in

(17) Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

(18) *Ibid.*, p. 118. In this attack 56 Syrians were killed.

(19) These accounts are given in Glubb, and corroborated in the accounts of U.N. observers.

Sharafa. The picture was no better on the border with Egypt. According to the accounts of General Burns, 246 military personnel and 187 civilians died on the Arab side in 1955, against 39 and 24 respectively on the Israeli side. The figures for 1956, until the Sinai campaign, are 97 and 102 on the Arab side, against 22 and 36 on the Israeli side.²⁰ For each life lost by Israel, more than six Arabs had to die. Dayan claims in his memoirs that the raids were always made on military targets only, but the available information and the casualty figures contradict him.²¹ The indiscriminate air and artillery reprisals following the 1967 war made no distinction at all between targets, except in emphasis. The new position enabled Israel to reply more ferociously. The conquest of the Golan Heights put Damascus itself under easy reach of fire. On the Egyptian side the artillery shelling of the Canal towns became a standing procedure. The air force was added to the reprisal arsenal against Jordan.

Zionist reprisal followed a distinct line of escalation. In the early thirties, when the Jews were in a weak position, and greatly outnumbered, they developed the policy of self-restraint (*havlaga*), based on the use of force for repelling attackers only. It soon gave way to the more daring tactics of the *Plugot Sadeb*, teaching the Jews to "go beyond the hedge" and attack the Arab belligerents in their own nests. In January 1948, it was decided to attack indiscriminately as it became no longer possible, the Hagana argued, to differentiate between the Arabs. In the fifties and sixties, reprisals took the form of minor battles fought with armour and aircraft. After the Six Day War, air blitz was applied to major urban centres. Until then, the military paid the greater toll, but the lead has been taken since 1967 by the civilians.²² Israel recognised the weakness of her case during the early years, and denied that the raids were carried out by her regular forces. In a raid on Qibya, the attackers were described as "outraged settlers of some frontier villages."²³ The Government put off the mask, which had, anyway, convinced no one, in the Knesset in September 1954. Henceforth, official responsibility was assumed for the reprisals.

The Israeli moral position might be enhanced if it could be shown that reprisal justified its price over the half century of its application. But it has neither brought peace nearer nor, at least, ended Arab attacks. On the tenth anniversary of the 1956 war, Moshe Dayan wrote that the war had achieved its purpose of ending the fida'iyin (self-sacrificing fighters) raids.²⁴ Dayan must have known that the

(20) Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

(21) Annals of the pre-1957 operations are given, with the expected exaggeration, in an Arab League publication "*Israel's Aggression Prior to the Israel Attack of October 29, 1956 on Egypt*," 1967. The 193 page book speaks of rape, crucifixion of an Iraqi, torture by pulling out nails, mutilation before and after death, etc.

(22) General Dayan put the total figures for Arab death casualties of reprisals for the first year at 71 Jordanian soldiers and 381 saboteurs (the term used for the civilians in general). *Jewish Chronicle*, 17 June 1968.

(23) Israeli Government Yearbook, 1950.

(24) Article in *Jewish Chronicle*, 28 October 1966. He confessed, though, that the war did not bring Arab-Israeli understanding any nearer. As for direct talks, the separation "was made even more absolute after Sinai."

situation was not as he described. The fida'iyin operations had simply shifted ground to the north leading eventually to the 1967 threat by Eshkol and the resultant Six Day War.

As the expansion tempo was accelerated, so were the guerrilla activities, and also the acts of reprisal. The annexations of 1967 enhanced the powers of both Israel and Al-Fateh; a new breed of professional resistance fighters grew up; a new reprisal technique was needed. As the acts of sabotage and infiltration continued without a break, Tel Aviv mounted heavy attacks on the eastern side of Jordan. Eshkol threatened, on 12 February 1968, that the "intensified aggression" of the past week would not be allowed to continue. Three days later the attack was launched with artillery, tanks and aircraft from different points along the River Jordan. Jordan gave the official casualty figures as 16 civilians and 7 soldiers dead. Major General Haim Bar Lev described the attack as "a new type of Israeli reprisal."

The sabotage continued; within one month 37 incidents were counted. On 21 February, three explosions were reported in Gaza; on 7 March two soldiers were killed in a clash with Fateh guerrillas; on 18 March a bus hit a mine, killing two people and seriously injuring eight more, according to the Israeli official figures.²⁵ On the same day General Dayan warned King Husain to control "his terrorists," a warning which was repeated by Eshkol in the Knesset. Three days later a full frontal attack was launched on Jordan with the village of Karama as the main target. The operation had obviously been planned and rehearsed when Eshkol served his notice. The Jordanians put the attacking force at 10,000 men. The Israelis claimed to have destroyed three police posts, killed 150 Arabs and lost 23 dead and one aircraft. The attack on Karama and the adjacent refugee camps took place on 21 March with the declared purpose of liquidating the guerrillas. General Bar Lev said on 22 March, "Ours was a clear and well defined objective, to hit and destroy the terrorists and their bases. This was achieved." On 23 March, the *Daily Telegraph* reported from the field: "Guerrillas back in control." Indeed, on 22 March, the Jordanians had already opened fire on Ashdot Yaakov, forcing Israel Galili, the Minister of Information, to modify the optimism of General Bar Lev, "Terrorism has continued since the Israeli Defence Force operation last Thursday. I should stress that when the operation was decided on, there was no understanding that it would put an end to terrorism."²⁶ General Herzog remarked in September that the fida'iyin had become like a "state within a state."

The trail of blood continued with the Israelis trying to play down the guerrilla activities and the Arabs speaking of scorched earth resistance. That reprisals, or "active defence operations," do not stamp out "terrorism" is not a new discovery made by Israel Galili. Mr. Jackson, the Secretary of the Palestine Labour Political

(25) Israeli authorities are in the habit of giving the earliest count of casualties on the spot and ignoring additional numbers.

(26) Interview, Kol Israel, 27 March 1968.

Committee admitted in 1948, that the indiscriminate reprisals then led to the extension and spread of the conflict.²⁷ The question is, why do the Zionists see no alternative to reprisal? They are, in fact, prisoners of this policy basically because of their expansion and unwillingness to forego any prize of war without gaining something even bigger. Many observers have come to think that the one way for Israel to neutralise the guerrillas is through making concession to Arab governments, or granting some of their rights to the Palestinians. As Tel Aviv is not prepared to concede anything, the policy of the strong arm is the only possible policy. Reprisals are also necessary in themselves for feeding the tension along the borders, the primary justification for the expansionist onslaughts.

An Eye for an Eye

However this is an over-simplification of the issue. Reprisal, on the whole, is a genuinely popular affair in Israel. Before the Six Day War, Mr. Norman Bentwich suggested, in a letter to the *Jewish Chronicle*,²⁸ that Israel might do well to revert to the old policy of the *havlaga* (self-restraint), which was pursued in the thirties instead of the *tagmul*. The replies and comments which his letter provoked revealed how overtaken by events the old Zionist scholar had become. Israel is no longer the weak Jewish community threatened by the Arabs. *Havlaga*, as we see now, was not a moral position but an expediency.

The Nazi slaughter and Nazi force fanned the victims' secret admiration for force and power. The Sabras (the young generation born in Israel) have to keep reminding themselves that they are not the same spineless Jews. The small, surrounded community with their guilty conscience,²⁹ living in homes which do not belong to them, react nervously to any report of a farmer's death in the furthest corner of a usurped frontier farm. Reports appear frequently in the Israeli press of attacks on innocent Arabs passing by in Tel Aviv streets in revenge for the death of some driver or soldier killed by Arabs from outside Israel. In some of these cases the police interfered to protect the wretched Arab and were beaten up themselves for obstructing the "an eye for an eye" procedure. It is the pressure of these people, once indoctrinated, which prevents the more balanced minds from seeking a different approach. The fate of Sharett is a reminder to any slightly moderate politician. Nor are such politicians helped by the flamboyant attitude taken by some Arabs.

Reprisal has also its roots deep in the tribal side of Biblical ideology, especially among those Zionists "steeped in tradition." The Book of Kings, with its long record of retribution and divine wrath, could not fail to make its impression on the nationally minded Israeli. The warning to the British of "gallows for gallows," and the 1948 Hagana broadcast to the Palestinians, "killing for killing, destruction for destruction," and the more recent warning dropped by air to the

(27) *Jewish Chronicle*, 16 January 1948.

(28) *Jewish Chronicle*, 25 November 1966.

(29) Very few Zionists deny the gross injustice done to the Palestinians as an unavoidable by-product of the establishment of the National Home.

Jordanians, "Death to any one who tries to cause death"³⁰ are all echoes of, "And if any mischief follow, then shalt thou give life for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, foot for foot, burning for burning, wound for wound, strife for strife."³¹ One unfortunate difference remains between the centuries-old text and the twentieth-century warning. The Bible speaks of retribution which follows mischief, whilst the Ministry of Defence warning speaks of retribution for merely the attempt. The Bible also speaks of "life for life," whilst General Dayan calls for putting a higher price for Israeli life, or six Arab lives for one Israeli.³² That reprisal is part of the mental make-up of the Zionist is evidenced by its long history, longer than ever admitted or recognised. Not only does it go back to the 1921 disturbances, but to the dawn of political Zionism. The encounters with individual Arabs and Circassians in quest of mutual blood vendetta early in the century, are now part of Israel's nationalist epics.³³

A revolting case of crude and pointless reprisal was carried out by the Irgun in 1938. Three of their men attacked an innocent Arab bus. The authorities arrested and hanged one culprit, Ben Yosif, for the deed. The Irgun retaliated against the Government by hanging an Arab in Haifa. It is, at least, one feature which makes Israel a truly Middle Eastern state. The thirst for revenge is a frequent preoccupation of Jewish Nationalism. The trouble taken in tracing and kidnapping Eichmann and other enemies of the Jews is striking. A somewhat similar attempt was made in 1941 to kidnap the Mufti in Bagdad by the Zionist agent, Etzel, and bring him to "justice." The assassination of Lord Moyne and the murder of individual British soldiers "in retaliation" could not be seriously meant as lessons to Britain. A glimpse into the tribal mentality of the nationalists is provided by Haim Laskov who was asked, on his appointment as Chief-of-Staff in 1958, why he had not Hebraised his name like everybody else. His reply was that his father had been killed by the Arabs, and he wanted them to hear more of it.³⁴ He believed that the Arabs knew the names of their Zionist victims. The tales of revenging the deeds of the Arabs, years later during Israel's wars, by various groups or individuals are cherished epics, told by the Israelis with a feeling of mysticism and divinity. It is the popular pressure for primitive revenge which sometimes forces Israel's moderate politicians to overrule their better judgement.

Reprisal requires a number of elements to make it credible and justifiable. The act of revenge must hit the guilty unmistakably. This has hardly happened in the Palestinian scene. Tel Aviv made no distinction between Arabs. An act of sabotage on the Egyptian front was sometimes avenged on the Jordanian front. Replies to infiltrators originating in Syria were answered by raids on Jordan, simply because it was more difficult to reach the Syrians. In view of the frequent

(30) Ministry of Defence circular, Kol Israel, 4 August 1968, BBC MR IV.

(31) Exodus, 21: 23-25.

(32) One had to remember here that Dayan's doctrine has its origin in the Nazi practice of shooting certain numbers of their enemy subjects for every German killed by the Resistance.

(33) Cf. Edelman M., *Ben Gurion*, London, 1964, pp. 42-45.

(34) *Zionist Record*, 4 January 1958.

animosity between these three countries, Israeli reprisals had even encouraged the perpetrators of infiltration. It helped them, for one thing, in shaking the regimes of their opponents. In reply to the killing of three Israelis by commandos operating from Syria, Israel raided the Jordanian village of Samu', on 13 November 1966, killing some thirty people and destroying forty houses, according to Israeli accounts, including the village mosque. The reaction in Jordan was rioting intense enough as to prompt the American Government to alert their Sixth Fleet. The cynicism of hitting the innocent for the act of the guilty was noted by the outside world. Premier Eshkol replied that it was up to Jordan to intercept Syria's commandos.³⁵

The Arab peoples are even more obsessed with vendetta. To them revenge is a question of personal honour, in whose pursuit a widow rears her baby for a score of years and then hands him the revolver telling him the story of his father. General Glubb traces a few of the border incidents to this rudimentary origin. As more people die by Israeli reprisal, more grow up with the idea of revenge. The extension of the Jewish-Arab blood feud has now reached as far as Algeria, making it obvious that the lesson which Israel claims to give, has indeed been received but with a different result. The stepping up of reprisals after the Six Day War, prompted even such leaders as King Husain to declare, on 23 March (following the raid on Karama) that the whole nation had become commandos and that the commando attack on Israel would continue. The *Jewish Chronicle* noted that even such a moderate as Bourguiba had begun to support "terrorism" against Israel.³⁶

The Zionists base their case on the assumption that it lies within the power of the Arab governments to end the guerrilla activities. This assumption could hold water if Israel had done its best to help the Arab governments in this approach. As the Israeli government wishes sometimes to refrain from reprisal but succumbs to popular pressure, the same applies to the other side. During the Tiran crises of May 1967, the Israeli press pointed out that the U.N. observers were not there to protect Israel but to help Nasser in following a policy of restraint.³⁷ His 1954 coexistence policies *vis à vis* Israel became untenable following Ben Gurion's raid of 28 February 1955 and the Palestinian rioting which followed in Gaza. A similar story occurred in 1968 when there was a misunderstanding between the Jordanian authorities and the commandos.³⁸ As Tel Aviv stepped up air bombardment of towns and As-Salt was made a heap of ruins in August, Irene Beeson reported from Cairo that the commando recruiting office was besieged by young men eager to enlist and the Sudan opened a training centre for recruits.³⁹ In the following weeks, Israeli towns were subjected to commando

(35) *The Times*, 13-16 November 1966.

(36) *Jewish Chronicle*, 2 February 1968.

(37) *Ha'aretz*, 19 May 1967.

(38) *Guardian*, 22 February 1968.

(39) *Observer*, 11 August 1968.

rocket attacks. Dayan's claim⁴⁰ that reprisals would expose the weakness of the Arab armies and Arab leaders and force them to curb the fida'iyyin proved to be hollow.

No one can accuse General Glubb of complicity with the infiltrators or approval of their approach. He makes it clear in his writing that his main concern was preserving the Hashemite regime, and that border incidents endangered that regime. He exerted what efforts he could to prevent infiltration, trace the culprits and put them in jail.⁴¹ The anti-Jordan Arab sources have more often than not accused Amman of shackling the commandos. Glubb Pasha explains that the complete control of such incidents is beyond any government in that particular area. In fact, many of the incidents were not political at all. Israel herself attributed many of them to smugglers who would be as unwelcome in the Arab countries. Others were the work of bedouin who for millennia have considered raids an honourable and normal way of living. They probably did not ever hear of the reprisals taken on some distant villagers, or, if they heard of it, did not link it with their own work. To prevent all acts of infiltration, the Arab governments would need to spend substantial amounts, and to run a highly unpopular policy.⁴² The Jewish Agency faced an exactly similar position during the Mandate. Britain called upon it, in vain, to stamp out terrorism. The set reply of the Jews was, "Am I my brother's keeper?" The *Palestine Post* then put it that the Yishuv could not be expected to act as informers on their own kith and kin.⁴³ Britain's frustration with Zionist policies led the Jewish Agency to join hands with the terrorists. Israel's policies have forced those peace-inclined Arab governments to sponsor the guerillas.

To conclude, reprisal is meant to satisfy a cruel desire for vengeance, an urge to exhibit power which is motivated by a long record of subjugation and weakness, and a conviction that the underdeveloped peoples can only understand the cudgel. These are the psychological elements. The practical and political basis is far more serious. The Zionists, generally well informed about Arab reactions, are not so blind as to be unable to see the stark fact, the ineffectiveness of the cudgel, that has met the eyes of every observer for the last fifty years in Palestine, and which has been recognised by historians for generations elsewhere in the world. But they know that reprisal was the chief weapon which put the Palestinians out of the way and brought Arab homes and fields into Israeli hands. An interesting passage quoted by Lt. Colonel N. Lorch, throws light on the tactical thinking of the Zionists as early as 1947. Israel Galili, Chief of the Hagana High Command, stressed the inevitability of the Arab-Jewish clash, and explained that it would start by small sporadic Arab attacks. The Jews would then "retaliate in

(40) Dayan, *Diary of the Sinai Campaign*, London, 1966, p. 23.

(41) Glubb, also Hutchison.

(42) *The Times*, in its editorial on 22 March 1968, scoffed at the Israeli case: "The idea that King Husain can shut down terrorist commandos like a watch committee shutting down seedy night clubs, shows an astonishing misunderstanding of the situation."

(43) *Palestine Post*, 22 January 1947.

a violent way." The whole country gets stirred up and the Arab states intervene to assist the Palestinians.⁴⁴ Seven months before the war began, the Zionist command knew the sequence of events. Had they seriously wanted to prevent the extension of the conflict, the obvious way would have been by restraint from retaliating "in a violent way." The series of outrages quoted by the same author during those seven months leave us in no doubt that Israel Galili was, in fact, working out the sequence in full realisation that reprisal was Israel's means for having that which she still had not. Pursuant to this thinking the Hagana Command developed the theory of the "connected struggle," according to which the military operations must be carried out in the form of "reprisals for attacks," in the words of Menachem Begin. The justification of the Herut Leader for the massacre of Deir Yassin is that it was an act of reprisal executed in accordance with the accepted custom of war. One flaw in his submission is that Deir Yassin was one of the least troublesome villages, and there was no reason to take vengeance on its inhabitants. But our point here lies in Begin's comment on the massacre, "The legend was worth half a dozen battalions to the forces of Israel."⁴⁵ The general Zionist thinking is that the permanence of violence against the Arabs and the perpetuation of a tense border are necessary for any eventual chance of expansion, and essential for deterring the Arabs from any idea of reversing the ever new status quo.⁴⁶ General Dayan found even more uses in this policy, and urged it for military reasons. The reprisal operations were instructive to the soldiers, and essential for raising their morale and state of readiness.⁴⁷ He stood steadfast in opposing the mediation of the great powers because he feared that it might tie the hands of the Israelis.⁴⁸

(44) Lt. Col. N. Lorch, *The Edge of the Sword*, New York, 1961, p. 55.

(45) Begin, *op. cit.*, pp. 213, 163-164.

(46) On 14 July 1966, Israel bombed the Syrian Water Scheme for the diversion of the Jordan waters. The purpose was all too apparent, but the justification given, was, once more, reprisal for a mine incident

(47) Naphtali Lau-Lavie, *Moshe Dayan*, London, 1968, pp. 101-106, 115-116.

(48) *Ibid.*, p. 134.

CHAPTER VII

THE ROLE OF THE DIASPORA

Zionist Finance

With a population of two million and a poor country of under eight thousand square miles, Israel was able to wage war against some four or five countries three times within twenty years and maintain a state of continuous belligerence, constant border clashes and economic boycott without the least sign of bankruptcy. In any land in revolt, the prime hope of the insurgents lies in inflicting such economic damage on their opponents that they can no longer sustain the losses and find no alternative but to negotiate or surrender. Even the giant power of the United States, with all its fabulous financial resources, was brought to heel in Vietnam by this logic of the war of liberation. The Zionists, however, have had to fight back the Arabs for more than half a century, and they emerge richer from every encounter. During the 1936 Arab Revolt, the Palestinian dockers of the Jaffa harbour went on strike. This was answered by the Jewish Agency by building a completely new port, exclusively Jewish. The insurgents destroyed some 200,000 trees which were immediately replaced by 1,000,000 new trees. The crops of 17,000 dunums were also destroyed but the Jewish Agency increased the Jewish lands by 183,000 dunums.¹ The rebels also destroyed 13 Jewish factories, but the Jews replaced them by more than two thousand factories in the following ten years.

Despite its limited natural resources and manpower, Israel has maintained the highest military expenditure in the world, reaching 10.7 per cent of its gross national product, compared with the 8.9 per cent of the United States, 6.7 per cent of the United Kingdom, 5.7 per cent of the Soviet Union, 5.1 per cent of France, 5 per cent of West Germany and 3.3 per cent of Italy.² With two million Jews, Israel was able to match the volume of armament of the United Arab Republic with its thirty million people and greater economic resources, by spending \$169 per capita on the army in 1966/1967 against Egypt's \$16 per capita.³ Yet, far from showing the slightest adverse effects on the country's development and social services, as was the case in the Arab States, Israel had still enough cash to spend freely on unlimited development projects, and run some highly expensive modes of agriculture and industry, like the method of extensive farming, the settlement of uneconomic lands, the setting up of costly kibbutzim and factories, the payment of

(1) Cohen, I., *The Zionist Movement*, London, 1945, pp. 209, 216, 235.

(2) *The Military Balance*, the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1965, p. 43.

(3) *The Military Balance*, the Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1967/8.

uneconomic wages, the boycott of Arab labour and the maintenance of artificial prices with direct and indirect subsidies.

Only four out of twelve cooperatives in 1925, four out of twenty-two in 1928 and two out of twenty in 1929, made any profit,⁴ and the pattern has persisted. The Simpson Report observed:

"The village of Afuleh, which the American Zionist Commonwealth boomed as the Chicago of Palestine, is a sea of thistles through which one travels for long distances. A plague of field mice, which has done extensive damage to both Jewish and Arab cultivation in the Vale during the present year, was officially stated to be due to the fact that 30,000 dunums of the lands held by the Jews are derelict and covered with weeds. It is also a fact that in a number of villages the tithes paid by the Jews are considerably below those paid by the Arabs who formerly cultivated those villages."⁵

In industry, it was recognised at last, in 1966, that only ten out of 170 textile factories deserved to survive.⁶ Housing units were built and left unoccupied and the massive Shalov Tower, Tel Aviv's emblem of development and Israel's financial fiasco, remained empty for two years. In Eastern Europe, results of a less alarming waste led to the downfall of many leaders, including Krushchev. But in Israel it was known that the exercise was a matter of political objectives. After the Arab lands had become secure in the hands of the Israelis, the question arose whether the kibbutzim should not be liquidated altogether as they had outlived their usefulness,⁷ (i.e. their military and political objective of hoisting the flag).

Nor was the development exuberance of Israel the result of any particular genius or resourcefulness, as it often claimed, but rather the result of "inefficiency, inflation and bureaucracy." A report by the *Sunday Times*, "The Land of Marks and Spencer," mentioned that Marks and Spencer, which is one of the most important champions of the Zionist cause, "steadily refuses to set up in Israel," and that Moshe Mayer, Israel's tycoon, built the bulk of his \$100 million empire entirely outside Israel.⁸ The underlying cause of this situation, the inefficiency and carefree waste, is projected from time to time in the series of financial and managerial scandals exposed by the press, as will be mentioned below.

Notwithstanding, the Israeli Government and the Jewish Agency are neither disturbed by the colossal bills nor restrained in their ambitious planning, for one simple reason—that they do not have to pay them. The diaspora of World Jewry seem to be under an eternal obligation to cover any deficit in Israel's budget.

During the first ten years of the state of Israel, the ten crucial years in building up the armed forces to invincible supremacy, the state had an average annual deficit of over \$255 million which was generally covered by sums contributed in one form or another from abroad. Between 1949 and 1966, Israel received \$7,000

(4) Report of the Executive to the Zionist Congress, XV and XVI.

(5) Cmd., 3686, 1930, p. 17.

(6) *The Times*, 19 March 1967.

(7) A thorough study of this point is given in G. Friedmann, *The End of the Jewish People*, London, 1967.

(8) *Sunday Times*, 27 July 1969.

million in external aid.⁹ Israeli Government bonds were also sold in a similar volume. She had also received, in the name of the Jews, reparations from Germany totalling over \$800 million. German reparations were of particular significance to the 1967 expansion as they were used in the acquisition of German tanks and military equipment. Not only was Israel able to put her defence forces in a superior position to all the Arab states combined, but also to build up a foreign currency reserve exceeding \$600 million by the beginning of 1967. She could never have ventured into the Six Day War or maintained her grip on the occupied territories without the big arsenal and high currency reserve of which she was in command. The supplementary work of settling the conquered expanses was also impossible without the same lavish sources which poured in even more spectacular sums in the aftermath of war.

The miracles of Israel are thus performed at the fund raising dinners of New York, and not on the sands of the Negev. The millions of dollars poured into Israel annually are contributed by philanthropists, rich and poor, in the name of charity. By skilful arrangements, dust was thrown into the eyes of the Americans, Jews and Gentiles, and their government. The destiny of the money was not clearly defined for the contributor who simply gave his money to the U.J.A. (United Jewish Appeal). The U.J.A. is a joint fund set up in 1935 by an agreement between the American Palestine Campaign for the Jewish Agency (the Zionist Organization) and the J.D.C. (Joint Distribution Committee). The domination of the U.J.A. by the W.Z.O. continued to rise until a new contract was signed in 1951, giving the United Israel Appeal (formerly the American Palestine Campaign) 67 per cent of the first \$55,000,000 and 87.5 per cent of the additional amounts received. The J.D.C., which conducts charity work among Jewish communities in the whole world, had to be content with a minor share, whilst the bulk of the money was devoted to the cause of a minority of two million Jews living in Israel. The discrepancy sums up the unhappy position of Jewish affairs at the present time. It is not the welfare, material or spiritual, of the Jewish communities which comes first, but the political operations of Israel and the W.Z.O. in their drive for a greater nationalist state.

The Weapon of the Galut

It is of profound significance that Dr. Theodor Herzl was made the prophet of Zionism. He not only foresaw the establishment of a Jewish state, but also that it would be built with fraud and corruption. Like many idealists, he considered the sublime ideal of ridding the Jews of their misfortune through his scheme a purpose noble enough to justify the method. The politicians of Israel and the apologists of the state follow the same track of ruthless idealism.

Herzl's scheme was to receive Palestine from Sultan Abd al-Hamid in return for a few million pounds collected from European Jewry. The attempt was supported by a shower of bribes to Turkish officials high and low, in pursuti of his

(9) Pinhas Sapir, *The Israeli Economist*, September 1967.

directive: "Trust in our army and our *purchased* friendships."¹⁰ In a private letter to Izzet Bey, the Turkish diplomat, Herzl offered the Turk 10,000 liras as a bribe for his services to the Zionist cause whilst he was making another attempt to bribe the vizir. "I shall send Wolffson to Constantinople to grease the palms of the pashas," he wrote in his diaries.¹¹ Where graft in Istanbul did not succeed, it was supplemented by baksheesh in the Holy Land. To allow illegal immigrants into Palestine, the minor Turkish officials were invariably bribed. The same method was used in acquiring the title deeds of lands, when land acquisition was proscribed by the Porte.

The resort to bribery, the weapon of the Galut as the Jewish nationalists proudly called it, was justified on the grounds of widespread Turkish corruption. The justification loses all validity when taken in conjunction with the records of Zionist relations with the British Mandate authorities, as it is known that British personnel were bribed by different means and for various purposes, including espionage on the government.¹² In 1943, when the menace of Germany was at its peak, a large gang, engaged in corrupting British soldiers in Palestine and buying from them quantities of arms, was discovered. David Ben Gurion and the Histadrut were implicated in this particular case. The officer defending the accused soldiers told the court that they had "become entrapped by an organization so powerful and so ruthless that, once its tentacles had closed on them, there was virtually no escape . . ." Another trial of British officers on similar charges was held in 1948.¹³

During World War II, the Zionists tried to repeat Herzl's attempt at "greasing the palms" with King Ibn Sa'ud, who was offered twenty million pounds in return for allowing the Jews to take the whole of Palestine and displace its indigenous population. Ibn Sa'ud rejected the offer indignantly and refused to confer with Chaim Weizmann on the subject. The intermediary, St. John Philby, fell out of favour with the King as a result of his attempt.¹⁴

The same weapon was likewise used in influencing the United Nations personnel. General Von Horn gives vivid accounts of the methods which Israel applied, including the immoral use of female soldiers ("the commandos," as they were called in U.N. offices) in corrupting representatives of the world organization. He himself was not exempted from the attempt, and a confidential questionnaire prepared by Israeli Intelligence and including such questions as whether he preferred Israeli women or Arab women, fell into his hands. Bribes varied from the friendly box of chocolates and packets of razor blades to the regular salaries paid punctually to the cooperators.¹⁵ Documents and information which come to light every now and then, reveal part of the financial debts owed

(10) Herzl, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 51.

(11) *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 773.

(12) See the Kimches' accounts, *op. cit.*

(13) Kirk, G., Survey of International Affairs, *The Middle East in the War*, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1954, pp. 207, 277.

(14) *Ibid.*, p. 314. Weizmann denied having initiated the offer at all, but admitted discussing it with Philby in advance. (*Trial and Error*, pp. 531-532).

(15) Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 100.

to the Zionist or pro-Zionist sources by the various gentile supporters of the movement—like Colonel Laurence. The annual boxes of Jaffa oranges sent regularly to the “friends of the Jewish people” are the least objectionable of the graft items applied by the Zionist Organization.¹⁶ Worthy of note is the fact that such corrupt methods were not only used in regard to the politicians of the gentile world but were also common within the movement itself where “graft and inducement” were used in steering its policies to the satisfaction of this or that faction.¹⁷

A “correct” form of corruption comes in the generous grants given to university chairs, in the form of subscriptions to periodicals and newspapers, invitations for lavish visits to Israel, subventions for “services rendered,” and so on.¹⁸ Several cabinet members and heads of the Federal Departments of the Truman Administration were commissioned to give speeches on the Jewish question for fees. Vice President Barkley received as much as \$1,500 per single speech during the period of establishing the state.¹⁹ Dr. F. Sayegh’s final paragraph of his *Zionist Diplomacy* was not far from the truth in stating:²⁰

“If we were to review all the types of bribery which Zionist leaders have, in their memoirs from the days of Herzl up to the establishment of the Zionist State, admitted giving to all those who refused to support them, that review would make up the greatest part of the whole history of Zionist diplomacy.”

Graft and corruption had been the inevitable means of sheer survival for the mediaeval Jew, inflicted on him by his anti-Semite persecutors and exploiters, like everything else which he acquired over the centuries. The weapon of the galut was buried with the galut for the emancipated and integrated Jews, but not for the ghetto graduates of the Zionist leadership. In providing the ready cash to the Zionist Organization, the emancipated Jew of the Western World is not only helping Israel to bribe its way along, but is also resurrecting the old weapon as a relevant and proper element of Jewish affairs.

The responsibility of the diaspora, which seems to rally to the call of Israel at an increasing tempo, for the expansionist policies of Tel Aviv, is very heavy. Without the limitless funds which are ever ready for the Government of Tel Aviv, Israel could never have overcome the resistance of the Arabs, expanded its colonisation programmes, achieved its military superiority or waged its periodic wars of conquest. At the same time, the diaspora succour went beyond the financial aid and extended to the fields of diplomacy, propaganda and espionage. The influence which the American Zionist lobby had on Congress and the White House, and the private Jewish access to President Wilson, President Truman, President Johnson and President Nixon are essential elements in the story of the Balfour

(16) Cf. Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 450.

(17) *Zionews*, 25 March 1938.

(18) See Kishtainy, K., *Verdict in Absentia*, Palestine Liberation Organization Research Center, Beirut, 1969.

(19) Lilienthal, A.M., *What Price Israel*, p. 110.

(20) Sayegh, Dr. F., *The Zionist Diplomacy*, Palestine Research Center, Beirut, 1969.

Declaration, the Palestine Partition, the western financial backing of Israel and the American endorsement of her expansionist achievements.

One of the recent revelations is the story carried by the *Los Angeles Times* on the influence that Dr. Henry Kissinger, Mr. Nixon's presidential adviser, had on the American President. The story was inspired by the discovery that Dr. Kissinger, as Director of the National Security Council, was preparing far-reaching reports for the President on sensitive areas, including the Middle East and the possibilities of using nuclear weapons by the United States there. One aspect of his activities that seemed to have irritated many Americans was the independent manner in which he conducted his work, by-passing the responsible departments, and using the confidential direct approach to the President.²¹

Episodes of the same influence exerted on behalf of the Zionist programme in Britain, France, Germany and Italy are now parts of the classic literature of Jewish Nationalism, and make up vital chapters in most books written on the subject. The reckless use of local Jews by the Zionist Organization and the Israeli Intelligence departments in their extensive and spectacular successes of espionage, is naturally a more difficult topic to deal with, but it has become the general practice of most countries, great and small, to exclude their Jewish citizens from classified military and diplomatic information related to the Arab world.

The foregoing paragraph has already taken a seemingly anti-Semitic hue and brought back to mind all the sinister charges of *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, which is receiving, nowadays, a new lease of life after a long spell of deserved oblivion. *The Protocols* are undoubtedly a forgery, and an obvious forgery at that—but the strange aspect of it is that its author, most probably the Tzarist police, had really foreseen the course which the Zionist Movement was going to follow. This rare insight of the Tzarists should not surprise us as the anti-Semites and the Zionists have usually thought with the one mind and compared notes; after all Count Plehve, head of the Tzarist police, reached complete agreement with Theodor Herzl on the means and objectives of the Movement in their cordial discussions.

The salient points of this agreement, which became the accepted starting points for the Zionists and anti-Semites in general were that a national home for the Jews should be found somewhere far enough from the western world, that the unwanted surplus Jews—the destitute and the unuseful—should be taken there, that the rich and useful should remain in the west and that the World Jewry should finance the operation and maintain the national home. This stage has been achieved in every detail, but the more fervent anti-Semites, like the writer of *The Protocols*, foresee another stage in which the Jewish state becomes a centre for world-wide domination. It was thus that Adolf Hitler observed in his brief comment on Zionism²² that the Jews had no wish at all to go to Palestine but

(21) *Los Angeles Times*, 19 August 1969.

(22) *Mein Kampf*.

that they wanted to make Palestine a centre for their operations. The fact that the bulk of the nationalist Jews are not going to Israel but are incessantly giving unconditional support to the expansionist moves of the state at whatever cost or risk, and that the state itself is simultaneously identifying itself with their affairs, cannot but confirm the anti-Semite in his conviction, i.e. that the Jews are bent on universal expansion in which not only the Middle East but the entire world falls into their grip. The obvious danger of this situation is a subject which falls outside the field of this enquiry which is related to Zionist expansion in the Middle East.

The long tradition of charity which has been built over centuries by the Jews for the rescue of thousands of homeless and needy people has been used by the W.Z.O. for the creation of thousands of homeless and needy people in Palestine and the lands adjacent to it. To the Arab nationalists, it looked like the old story of the Jewish conspiracy to establish a base in Palestine for the domination of the world. They look at the multiplication of Israeli might and domination and hear of the arms, funds, propaganda, solidarity and successful intelligence and information made available to Israel by World Jewry, and reach their own conclusion. The blame here is not on the Arabs but on the well informed western nationalist Jews who still have not appreciated the dangers of their unconditional identification with Israel, right or wrong. The Palestinian will sooner or later find out that his tragedy is less than that of the gullible Jew who, after his bewildering experience, could not keep a better sense of judgement.

CHAPTER VIII

FROM MONTEFIORE TO WEIZMANN

Lovers of Zion

The history of Jewish colonisation in Palestine must be taken back to the French Revolution and the ensuing conflict between France and England over the route to Asia. The first Balfour Declaration was issued by Napoleon during his march from Egypt to Palestine. The idea of the restoration of the Jewish people was later on sponsored by Palmerston, but the Jews were not moved. Not until the eighties was there any sign of serious Jewish initiative. In the intervening years, new factors emerged which gave it further impetus. The population explosion in Europe, the early clash between the industrial capital represented by the gentiles and the financial capital represented by the Jews, the final struggle between the aristocracy with their "court Jews" and the bourgeoisie, the murderous laissez-faire competition, particularly among the petit bourgeoisie, where the Jews were over-represented and too competitive, and lastly the spectre of the proletarian revolution and its numerous Jewish leaders, had all led to the one cry of the era, "Judens raus!" The old European anti-Semitism was given a new lease of life, reinforced by the new fashionable jargon and theories of the anthropologist and the racist.

The obvious destination for the expelled Jews was America, and the government of the United States, together with most other countries, clamped down on Jewish immigration. Palestine was found as a truly God-sent gift by the gentile anti-Semite. The restoration of the Jews to Palestine became a practical object for both the imperialist, who wanted to have a staging base en route to Asia, and the anti-Semite who wanted to send the Jews away. The Tzar, the Kaiser and Lloyd George and Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Winston Churchill all agreed on this objective.

The movement lost no time in acquiring the inevitable sentimental shell. Various forms of philanthropic work were extended to the Jew settling in Palestine. In the first half of the nineteenth century, this work was championed by the British magnate, Sir Moses Montefiore, who paid many visits to the Holy Land. The work during this first stage was based on improving the conditions of the Jews already in Palestine and affording them protection. Although the British benefactor considered receiving a land concession from the authorities and establishing industrial and agricultural colonies, no serious effort was made to bring in Jews. His sole endeavour in colonisation was the establishment of a farm for the

employment of a number of local Jews.¹ Both administrations, Turkish and Egyptian, were friendly and receptive to Montefiore's ideas and representations, and the Arab inhabitants were not denied his charities. The Jews themselves mixed freely with the Arabs and were often indistinguishable from them. They lived mainly in Jerusalem and Safad, spent their time in Jewish studies and worship, and lived on charity sent mainly from abroad. Their only ambition was to be buried in the land.

The second stage which occupied the latter half of the century was that of agricultural colonisation. It was then that pioneers with a different fervour started to arrive in appreciable numbers. Their target was not the Wailing Wall but the open fertile plains of the coast. It was the era of the French Second Empire when France began to take fresh interest in the Middle East. One of the new tools of French imperialism was the Alliance Israelite. Its major contribution to this narrative was the establishment of the agricultural school of Mikveh Israel (the Gatherer of Israel) in 1870. The Turkish government granted the school 617 acres near Jaffa. France, however, was backing a different Trojan Horse in the Middle East—i.e. the Christian Arabs of Syria—and the Alliance, accordingly, remained opposed to the Zionist programme. Most of the graduates emigrated to better countries, but the few hundred acres served their purpose as a nucleus for Jewish agricultural colonisation.

Eight years later, the first settlements of Petah Tikvah (the Gate of Hope) was set up. A group of Rumanian Jews emigrated to Palestine and established in 1882 the settlement of Zikron Ya'akov, ten miles from Haifa. In the same year, another Rumanian group founded Rosh Pinah (the Corner Stone), four miles north of Safad. As time passed, more colonies were established until their total reached twenty-one by the close of the century.

The raging pogroms in Eastern Europe made life intolerable, and one way of alleviating the misery was to be found in propagating the Love of Zion, an escapist idea, both mentally and physically. Leo Pinsker wrote the famous "*Auto-Emancipation*" in 1882. He called for the re-establishment of the Jewish nation in a land of its own, but he warned against its establishment in Palestine.² Events, however, forced him to shift his position and opt for Palestine as the European gentiles would not have the Jews anywhere in their colonial world, and the victims of the pogroms, in their agony and horror, sank deep into the escapist world of archaism. It is the natural desire of the anxious to coil into the foetal position and look back to the womb where they were once free of worries.

Pinsker had thus stood at the helm of the Chovevei Zion (Lovers of Zion) movement, much against his better judgement. Land acquisition and Jewish agricultural settlement in the Holy Land were the basic purpose of the Chovevei Zion. The movement, however, was less successful in actual colonisation and settlement than in publicising the idea and encouraging the Jews to emigrate.

(1) Diaries of Sir Moses and Lady Montefiore, London, 1953, Vol. II, p. 47.

(2) Pinsker, L., *Auto-Emancipation*, Norod Press, London, p. 32.

More important for propagating the seed was the philanthropic work of another magnate, Baron Edmond de Rothschild. The early colonies suffered disasters. Hundreds of immigrants died of malaria and other endemic diseases; most of the trained agriculturists left Zion for a better life in the New World and Australia; the colonies themselves ran into serious economic difficulties. Baron de Rothschild was induced to support them in 1883 by the English entrepreneur, Mr. L. Oliphant, who looked at the restoration of old Judea as a good financial venture. The Baron put the settlements to a good start after sinking substantial capital into them. After the growth of the colonies and the volume of administration required for them, he formed the Jewish Colonisation Association.

As shown in map XIII, Rothschild's colonies were concentrated on the maritime plain south of Haifa and north of Tel Aviv; and the rich agricultural lands west of the Jordan Valley from the north of Metula, in present-day Syria, to the north of Beisan. Needless to say, no thought was given to frontiers or historical considerations.

This stage came to an end with the birth of Herzl's political Zionism at the turn of the century, but it prepared the ground by increasing the Jewish population from barely 20,000 in 1880 to 50,000 in 1895, and the agricultural land owned by the Jews from 25,017 dunums in 1882 to 220,657 in 1900. There was, therefore, already a marked orientation to push quickly into Arab lands and establish Jewish sovereignty, despite the non-political nature of the pre-Herzl colonisation. The number of Jews had only increased by 150 per cent whilst the land under Jewish ownership had increased by nearly 900 per cent. In addition, only 4,500, out of the entire population of more than 50,000 souls, had joined the agricultural settlements, although the land purchases were made with the aim of providing farms for the immigrants.³ In fact, the number of settlements is quite misleading. Not until the 1930's was there any settlement with a population of over a thousand souls. The renowned Rishon le-Zion (the First in Zion) was founded in 1882 by six Russian Jews only, and its population was no more than 266 souls in 1890.⁴

Although Moses Hess had already elaborated the need for the restoration of Jewish rule to Palestine in his tract "*Rome and Jerusalem*" (1862), there does not appear any definite idea in the minds of the early colonists as to what they were setting about. They sometimes went out of their way to deny any political ambitions for the country. Ben Gurion was even grooming himself to become a member of the Turkish Parliament representing the Palestinian interests, and went to Constantinople to study Turkish law. The opposition to Theodor Herzl pronounced by Rothschild and the high priests of Jewish finance on the one hand, and the local Jewry under Turkish rule and the Chovevei Zion on the other, were expressions of that attitude.

Appearances, however, are misleading. Only a fraction of what people say

(3) Figures in Cohen, *op. cit.*

(4) *Jewish Encyclopaedia*, Agricultural Colonization — Palestine.

conveys their actions, and only a fraction of what they do finds any utterance from them. It was Ben Gurion who observed that he did not mind what other countries were saying about Israel, but what they were doing. The early pioneer might have been unaware of what his colonising work was leading to. The less he was aware of what he was doing, the deeper would be the effect of his action. But in the back of his mind, he had a vague feeling of the nature of the situation. The more he dug, the stronger would be the Jewish presence in the Holy Land. His strong refugee sense of the dynamic led his steps and added sinews to his toiling hand.

At any rate, the idea of establishing a Jewish home in Palestine was not infrequently advocated. In all the three famous appeals, Moses Hess's "*Rome and Jerusalem*," Leo Pinsker's "*Auto-Emancipation*" and Theodor Herzl's "*Jewish State*," the idea of a Jewish home with a Jewish government was put forward. It is certainly idle to keep repeating the slogan more than necessary. It is inconceivable that a pioneer fired by enthusiasm and determination could have gone to Rehovot or Metula without learning something about any of those history-making pamphlets. The settlers and their organisations acted as if they were sooner or later going to become masters of Palestine, at worst under Turkish suzerainty. Nor were the Arabs oblivious of the fact. They were already murmuring, "Is it true that the Jews are going to take over the land?" In 1898, the Egyptian *al-Muqtataf* published an article, cited many times, drawing attention to the danger of Zionist penetration. In the country, Palestinian fear and anger were given expression in a number of raids and aggressive acts on Gedera and Petah Tivvah. The displaced fellahin spearheaded the resistance. Clashes on the border demarcation of the settlements had already given signs of things to come.⁵ To the Arabs, the story of Israeli expansion goes right back to the magnanimous visits of Sir Moses Montefiore. They only needed to look at the lands slipping from their control to be convinced. The table given at the end of the present chapter reflects the picture which was seen in the Arab's mind's eye.

The explanation for the objection of the "spiritual" Zionists (to differentiate them from the political Zionists of the W.Z.O.) to the work of Theodor Herzl did not stem from serious regard to the rights of the indigenous population or the absurdity of restoring the old Kingdom of David. The opposition was motivated by self-interest. The settlers would have to face the wrath of the Turkish rulers, who undoubtedly would have sent them packing. Nevertheless, the colonists ventured into the open in 1908 by a miscalculation. The Young Turks Revolution succeeded in overthrowing the old regime with some help from the Turkish Jews. The Jewish association with the Young Turks was interpreted by the Yishuv as a *carte blanche* for their programme. The Revolution was celebrated by the colonists, who were then not even one tenth of the population, in the streets with the Zionist blue and white flags and the demand for a Jewish autonomy in Pales-

(5) Mandel, N., "Turks, Arabs and Jewish Emigration to Palestine," *St. Antony's Papers Number 17*, Oxford, 1965.

tine.⁶ The Turks reacted strongly against them and the leaders learned the lesson of discretion.

The bankers of Europe worried about their positions. Their endorsement of the Basle programme would have compromised their loyalty to their countries, and interfered with their financial dealings. Instead, whenever the Zionists had safely secured a victory, they received the acclaim of their former opponents. The *fait accompli* technique of the Zionist Organization was applied as effectively against the Jews as against the Arabs. Baron Edmond de Rothschild had thus blessed the success of the Balfour Declaration, after long aversion to Zionism, by visiting Palestine in 1925, "The sand has been turned into stone, and the settlements were the strong keystones of the House of Israel."⁷

The moving spirit of the Chovevei Zion spiritual Zionists was Ahad Ha'am, who was at loggerheads with the Zionist Organization over the whole concept and application of its Zionism. To him, Zionism meant the liberation of the Jewish spirit through education and religious experience. Smuggling Jews by bribing a Turkish gendarme, and extending a farm by cheating a poor fellah were hardly features which recommended themselves to him. But Ahad Ha'am was not against the final establishment of the Jewish state. Only it had to come after the regeneration of the spirit of the Jewish people.

The Chovevei Zion movement disintegrated with the rise of Herzlian Zionism, and most of its members joined the W.Z.O. Its President, M. Ussishkin, became the W.Z.O. representative in Palestine after the mandate. His extremism was the scourge of both the Arab inhabitant and the British administrator.

An essential difference remains between the nineteenth century colonisers and the twentieth century Zionists. The former thought in terms of integrating themselves with the original inhabitants. They learned Arabic and Turkish, adopted Palestinian habits and cooking, employed Arab labour and enjoyed fairly friendly relations with the natives.

Enter Theodor Herzl

With the establishment of the Zionist Organization, following the First Zionist Congress in Basle in 1897, the third stage in the conquest began. One of the plans proposed in the Zionist Congress was the institution of the Jewish National Fund in 1901 to mobilise capital for the purchase of lands in Palestine. The J.N.F. ventured into the field, but a number of reasons prevented the utilisation of the purchased farms. The failure prompted the organisers to set up the Palestine Land Development Company in 1908. From that year, the PLDC looked after the land purchase, lease and sale on behalf of the J.N.F. Two of the early settlements established by the PLDC were Kinereth (1908) and Daganiah (1909).

One of the main tasks performed efficiently by the PLDC for the Zionist Organization was to extend the volume of lands passing from Arab hands into Jewish

(6) *Ibid.*

(7) Bentwich, N., *Palestine*, London, 1934, p. 193.

hands by controlling the price through a virtual monopoly. Dr. A. Ruppin, Head of the Colonisation Service of the Jewish Agency, defended its function by mentioning that without the PLDC, the land prices would have soared as a result of competition and speculation.⁸

The third stage ushered in the more ambitious land expansion. Instead of the limited plantation type of agriculture based on vine, citrus and olive trees, wheat farming, which required larger plots of land, was introduced. An average of 250 dunums per colonist was allowed.⁹ This policy was pursued in the J.C.A. lands, but the J.N.F. found it too difficult and expensive for their resources, and opted instead for mixed farming.

The J.N.F. was more calculating in its land policies. The Chovevei Zion era had managed to scatter the Jews around Palestine, and show the flag in the length and breadth of the country. The task was left to the era of the Zionist Organization to link up the scattered pockets into an integrated body. The J.C.A. bought its lands in the Plain of Sharon and the rest of the coast area in the west, and along the River Jordan, Lake Huleh and Lake Tiberias in the east. Between them were the Samaritan hills with only the Plain of Esdraelon as a link. There, the J.N.F. concentrated its activities, which were crowned by the acquisition of 84,000 dunums in Esdraelon in 1921, and 200,000 dunums in Emek Yezreel and Emek Zebulun in 1924-5. The principle of linking up the colonies became a land strategy for the J.N.F.¹⁰ The bridge between the coast and the hinterland which was destined to become the basis for the link in all the partition plans, except the Woodhead Partition Plan of 1938, had been thus forged by the Zionist Organization.

The pre-mandate colonies are recognisable by their military feature. The buildings were constructed around a central self-sufficient area in the style of a courtyard. The houses were then linked together with a surrounding wall. By 1914, the joint effort of the PICA and the J.N.F. brought the Jewish population to 85,000 souls. Altogether, some 100,000 immigrants were brought into the Holy Land. Tel Aviv was built as a suburb of Jaffa during this period to serve as an exclusive Jewish centre isolated from the savage natives.

Under the Mandate

The Allies' victory inaugurated the fourth stage by the establishment of the British Mandate over Palestine. One of the terms of the mandate was the facilitation of Jewish land settlement. The Turkish regime left many lands in the possession of the Government, and the Jewish Agency claimed those lands as of right, in accordance with Article 6 of the Mandate. In response, the British Administration passed into the hands of the PICA the lands of Kabbar (5170 dunums), Athlit and Caesarea.¹¹ Among the lands received by the J.N.F. were the Rushmania

(8) Ruppin, A., *Agricultural Colonization*, London, 1926, p. 76.

(9) Cohen put the average holding for all Jewish colonies until 1914 at 240 dunums, *op. cit.*, p. 236.

(10) Ruppin, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

(11) The PICA (Palestine Jewish Colonization Association) was formed in 1925 to take over from the JCA (Jewish Colonization Association) the administration of the Rothschild Colonies. The change in name was a sign of the new orientation.

Property (3,385 dunums), the Huleh Concession, and the Rakayck. The Haifa Bay Development Company (a Jewish concern) was given the Acre Sands (12,225 dunums). By 1937, some 175,454 dunums were handed over by the Administration from the State Domain. In addition, the Arabs had sold them 682,865 dunums since 1921,¹² bringing the total cultivable lands under Jewish title to 1,238,896 dunums.¹³

The crucial stage of the thirties stepped up the forward land policies of the Jewish Agency. Where people could not be settled, plots of land were bought and left fallow. In the Beersheba sub-district, some 55,545 dunums were bought in different deals to make good the future claim for the Negev and open the way to the Red Sea. By the time the Woodhead Commission visited Palestine, not a single Jew existed on these lands.¹⁴ During the war, a score of new settlements were established in the Gaza Strip towards Egypt, and in the Negev, west and south of Beersheba. But until the 1948 war, only 2,000 Jews lived in the whole of the Negev.¹⁵ Map XIV shows where some of these settlements were placed and how they shaped the map of the UNSCOP Partition Proposal. The north of Gaza was left to the Arabs in the Peel Commission Partition proposal (1937), thereby exposing Tel Aviv and the heart of Israel to the Arab state. This was remedied by establishing 30 settlements in that area. Twelve more settlements were put in Beisan, which was also excluded.¹⁶ Accordingly the United Nations Special Committee joined the two areas to Israel. Similar settlements were put in the Galilee area, under the slogan "On to Galilee! Safeguard the frontiers of Palestine." Metula, on the extreme border with Syria, became a particular target.

These settlements were hurriedly set up according to the "sun set—sun rise" plan and in pursuance of the fait accompli principle. The procedure could not be explained better than by the architects of the National Home:

"The reasons for this haste are by now well known. It is necessary to confront the world with an established fact. By dawn the settlement must stand complete. Then it will be reckoned with as a reality."¹⁷ The policy reached a military crescendo before the final showdown, as reflected in the number of 35 new settlements established between May 1946 and the summer of 1947. Eleven of these

(12) Cmd. 5479, 1937.

(13) Cmd. 5854, 1938. There were various opinions as to the area of the cultivable lands in Palestine. The Jewish Agency, indifferent to the area's economic considerations, put the figure at a higher level. The Government independent experts who had to observe the sound economy of a farm, calculated the cultivable area as 7,120,000 dunums.

(14) Cmd. 5854, 1938.

(15) H. Sacher, *Israel—The Establishment of a State*, London, 1952, p. 251.

(16) Kirk, *The Middle East in the War*, p. 233, citing statement by Dr. B. Joseph, Legal Adviser of the Jewish Agency, to the Canadian Zionist Convention, Dr. Joseph said: "We have set them up in the places that are on the outskirts of the country in order to secure, when the day comes, that the whole of Palestine will be Jewish, and not only a part of it." Sacher, *op. cit.*, p. 25, affirms that the purpose of the colonies was to stake a claim.

(17) *J.P.A. News*, 21 March 1947.

settlements went into the Negev and Gaza.¹⁸ One of these settlement villages, Kfar Darom, had an area of 40 square yards and a population of 30 settlers only. It was placed ten miles from the Egyptian border along the road to Gaza. It gave the Egyptian army a few days headache in 1948. Between the two partition plans of 1937 and 1947, the number of major settlements rose from 207 to 300, about double the rate recorded since the beginning of the century. The total area increased from 1,232,000 to 1,807,000 dunums during the intervening ten years.

Monopoly of Industry

The penetration in the industrial field was even more impressive. The basis of Jewish industry was laid in the early twenties by granting the Jordan Concession to Pinhas Rutenberg, a former member of the Kerensky Government, who played a vital role in the anti-Bolshevik activities following the October Revolution. The granting of the concession was an extraordinary act of high-handed politics. Not only Arab, but even British prospective business men were ignored and nearly the entire economic development of the country was handed over to an individual, without so much as informing the public. The concession involved the exploitation of the water resources of Palestine for irrigation and power generation by diverting rivers and building up dams, reservoirs, power stations, and so on. All the lands, roads and buildings which the concessionaire needed were to be expropriated, and the Arabs who thought of obstructing the concession were threatened with deportation.¹⁹ The Zionist Organization denied any connection with Rutenberg, which, in itself, was a reflection of the seriousness of the industrial coup. The British Government sugared the pill by limiting the concession to 70 years, after which the project would be left to the discretion of the High Commissioner. In the stormy debate on the subject, Sir J. Butcher interposed, "I hope the Colonial Secretary will tell us, that there will be a High Commissioner in Palestine at the end of the 70 years to exercise these discretions."²⁰ The Zionists did not wait 70 years. In just over a score of years, the entire natural wealth and power energy of the country were lost by the Arabs.

The Rutenberg Concession led to the establishment of a chain of Jewish factories and workshops reaching 7,000 in 1945. In one year only, 1930-31, the power consumption of such plants went from 3,330,000 kilowatt/hours to 6,900,000 kilowatt/hours, and the figure leapt to 150,000,000 in the following twelve years.²¹ The rapid growth in the thirties was due to the influx of central European middle class Jews and the agreement reached between the Nazi authorities and the Zionists for the transfer of Jewish money to Palestine. The following figures show the number of capitalists (those proved to possess no less than £1,000) who reached Palestine in this period.

(18) Memorandum of the Jewish Agency for Palestine to UNSCOP.

(19) *Hansard*, House of Commons, 4 July 1922, p. 305.

(20) *Ibid.*, p. 319.

(21) Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 237, Bentwich, N., *Palestine*, p. 241.

<i>Capitalist Immigrants</i>			
1932	727	1937	1,275
1933	3,250	1938	1,753
1934	5,124	1939	2,606
1935	6,309	1940	802
1936	2,970	1941	314

The outbreak of the war and the shortage of industrial commodities in the Middle East gave a further impetus to Jewish industry. The dramatic development was reflected in the rise in the number of factories from 300 in 1930 to 3,161 in 1946. The industrial future of the country was seized, with no place left for the Arabs. Between 75 per cent and 80 per cent of the entire labour force was working for the Jewish sector of industry in 1941.²²

One of the greatest expansionist moves in this period was the building of the Tel Aviv port. Until the 1936 Arab general strike, most of the Jewish trade was handled by the Arab dockers of the Jaffa port, controlled traditionally by the Arabs. The Jewish Agency resented this little advantage enjoyed by the Jaffa dockers, and tried to receive a concession to build up a "Jewish" port. The administration resisted the attempt on account of its serious economic repercussions on the livelihood of the Jaffa population, and the waste in having two adjacent ports for the small area involved. The Jewish Agency availed itself of the Arab strike and sought permission to set up the Tel Aviv port. The authorities were only too willing to beat one section of labour by another, and the Histadrut was gratified to perform the task for the imperialists. The new port gave the Jewish economy a basic item and played an important part in the armament programme. No longer was Jewish cargo handled by Arab hands, and under Arab eyes. Even though the Yishuv lacked the port handling experience, Arab hands were not employed, but, instead, experienced Jews were brought in from Salonika.

The cultural base was also laid under the Mandate regime by the establishment of the Hebrew University. In an impressive ceremony held in March 1925, Arthur Balfour opened the University on Mount Scopus, and lecturers and scientists were recruited from the diaspora.

Expansionist Agricultural System

Throughout this stage, the old policies whose foundations were laid before World War I, were maintained and intensified. The type of agriculture devised by the Zionist Organization to suit their expansionist policies continued despite its apparent economic difficulties. The most tempting factor for the white settlers in the colonial world is the availability of cheap native labour. This labour force was fairly well tapped by the early colonists in the PICA settlements, but the Zionist Organization scorned the method and insisted on Jewish labour only. The aim was to make way for the immigrants and prevent Arab cheap labour from

(22) Statement by Dr. D. Harowitz to UNSCOP; UNSCOP Report.

competing with them. By artificially keeping up a high standard of living for the Jews, the Zionist Organization was able to bring in more immigrants to Palestine. The uncompetitiveness of the Jewish farmers was shifted to the colonies themselves and the losses were re-imbursed by World Jewry. The agriculturalist, Dr. Soskin, put forward a plan in 1920 for the conversion of the colonies from mixed farming to intensified farming. His plan revolved around a small-holding supported by an irrigation network and on five unirrigated dunums and five irrigated dunums per family, intensively cultivated with vegetables, some of which would then be available for export. The plan was calculated to reduce the cost of settlement by £200 per family and insure better results. The other expert on Zionist agriculture, Dr. A. Ruppin, thought the plan worth a trial, at least.

Soskin's plan was rejected. Dr. Ruppin admitted that the rejection was due to political reasons, but he did not disclose them.²³ The plan was favoured by the more moderate faction bent on better appreciation of the rights of the Palestinians. It meant the reduction of the allotment to ten dunums only per family, from the hundred dunums decided upon by the Jewish Agency.²⁴ Intensive farming would have endangered the takeover of Arab lands and reduced the Jewish domain. Following the 1929 clashes, Sir John Hope Simpson found that the land policy of the Jewish Agency had led to the displacement of some fellahin and threatened even more displacement. He recommended to the Agency the application of intensive farming as a method of making better use of the land and reducing the pressure on the Palestinians.²⁵

The boycott of Arab labour intensified the pressure on the fellahin. In the PICA colonies the former peasant could seek re-employment from the new landlord as a wage earner, which was prohibited in the J.N.F. colonies. The Jewish Agency did not stop here, but went further and picketed the older colonies which had a tradition of employing cheap Arab labour. The police had to intervene and prevent clashes.

The Administration had to issue the Land Ordinances to protect the displaced fellahin in 1920. The Ordinances were amended and renewed in 1928, 1932, 1933, 1934 and 1940 to meet the ever new Zionist devices for circumventing them.²⁶ The opposition of the Yishuv to the restriction was stepped up as the day of reckoning approached. The 1940 Land Transfers Regulations were met with mass protests and clashes, in which two Jews died. The Vaad Leume (The Jewish Assembly in Palestine) described the Regulations in the usual terms—"racial legis-

(23) Ruppin, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

(24) Report of the Executive of the Zionist Organization to XIII Congress. The question of the adequate area for a holding in Palestine was raised later on in connection with the displaced fellahin. The Jewish Agency put the figure then of 20-27 dunums for the fellah, who did not use modern techniques. (Cmd. 3686, 1930).

(25) Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development, Cmd. 3686, 1930.

(26) Despite the score of ordinances and regulations, Moshe Shertok was able to tell the UNSCOP, in the summer of 1947, that the Jewish Agency had bought since the last regulations of 1940, 38,000 dunums in the prohibited area and 23,000 dunums in the regulated area by exploiting the discoveries of loopholes. "So it was all done," he said, "within the four corners of the law. It may not have been intended by the authors of the law, but it has happened."

lation against us.”²⁷ The Jewish Agency principle that Jewish lands in all areas could not be bought or worked by Arabs was not racial discrimination.

Outwardly, the Jewish Agency could point to an immaculate record of fair dealing. The laws and ordinances were generally closely followed, the landlords were often paid handsome prices, the fellahin were usually given generous gratuities to take themselves somewhere else. Yet, in a backward community like the Palestinian peasantry, legalities and forms have been the curse of the poor ever since the law was put down by Hammurabi. The peasant probably took a second wife or bought himself a new gun with the gratuity, and left himself and his family ready for any exploitation—political, economic and social. It is no wonder that the fellah used to call it Kafir money, money that you had and yet had not.

The Jewish preference for urban life had also continued. In 1928, only 20.4 per cent, or 30,500 souls out of 149,000, lived in the settlements.²⁸ The rest crowded the main urban centres of Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and Jaffa. Where there was no Jewish population pressure, the J.N.F. stepped in, took over the land and left it fallow.²⁹ Where the land no longer mattered, the Jewish urban competition squeezed out the Palestinian Arab. The fellah was thus sent from his farm with a gratuity to set himself up in business. In the town, he encountered Jewish competition and monopoly. When he finally tried to sell his labour as a proletarian, he faced the Jewish boycott of Arab workers.³⁰ The economic plight was somewhat alleviated by the general boom brought about by the surplus of Jewish money which seeped into the Arab sector.

Curious to note how the two communities of Jews and Arabs are skilful in muddling any issue. The question of the Palestinian refugees—how, why, and how many—had had its precedent in the twenties and thirties in the form of the Palestinian displaced fellahin—why, where and how many? Arab speakers put the figure at “thousands of thousands.” The Jewish Agency denied the existence of any displacement problem.³¹ The British Administration tried to assess the extent of the problem but they could only manage to trace 664 evicted fellahin. The result of the investigation, published in July 1933 and years after the events, could only serve as food for thought. In the Middle East, people do not declare their daughters to the census in case the government puts a tax on dowry. Perhaps the most devastating sell-out was the Emek transaction in which 21 out of 22 Arab villages were abandoned.³² Moshe Shertok reduced the number to

(27) Kirk, *The Middle East and the War*, p. 234.

(28) Cmd. 3686, 1936.

(29) In 1929, the JNF held 270,000 dunums, of which only 130,000 dunums were utilised. (Cohen, p. 159).

(30) In 1941, according to the UNSCOP Report, 90 per cent of those who worked in the industries were Jews.

(31) Zionist assessment is given in Cohen, *op. cit.*, pp. 195-196, 228. The Arab case is put in Barber. Surprisingly, Arab publicists make little use of the fellahin question. Antonius, *op. cit.*, pp. 406-7, writing during the 1937 revolt, observed that the revolt was manned by the peasantry who fought against the Mandatory policy and “the Arab landowners and brokers.”

(32) Barber, *op. cit.*, p. 117.

14, and, after comparing them with the number of Arab villages in Palestine, remarked, "So if it is a question of 14 villages having ceased to exist, it is not a very high percentage ..."³³

Far more menacing was the J.N.F. principle of purchased land being "the inalienable property of the Jewish people." Whilst Arab lands were subject to market transactions, Jewish lands were extra-territorialised in a manner that put them irrevocably out of Arab reach.³⁴ The phenomenon had a vexing effect on the Palestinian cattle breeders. For centuries, the people of the Middle East considered uncultivated lands and lands after harvesting, common pastures as a gift of God. The colonists, obsessed with the right of ownership, refused to acquiesce in the ancient practice. Socialists or no socialists, they prevented the Palestinian shepherds and cattle breeders from using the same communal grounds.³⁵ The loss of Arab land was, therefore, re-asserted in every grazing season. The nomad, famous for his pride now crushed into an urban street beggar, became a familiar sight.

The land question was aggravated by the nature of Middle Eastern agriculture. Egypt and the Fertile Crescent are lands dependent on the rivers. The delicate complex of the irrigation system necessitated the existence of a central dictatorial government which took upon itself all matters relating to land and water. Land in the Middle East became a property of God, the King or the State. All the peasants and landlords were actually no more than tenants of the state. Feudalism could only be applied in a loose sense to the Middle East. The fellahin were not serfs of the Effendi. They were free to seek employment elsewhere, and their relationship with the Effendi was contractual, related to working the land only. It was not unfamiliar for a fellah to change his landlord, who was generally only an agent of the state, employing the fellah on its behalf. His sale of the land was usually no more than a sale of an agency. Instead of the European pride in the land, there is in the Middle East a streak of the ancient nomadic contempt for agriculture. It characterises the light heartedness with which the Arabs deal with land titles and land rights, so sacred in rain cultivated lands.

Hence, it was simple for the landlord to sell to the Jews and say goodbye to his tenants, and easy for the fellahin to depart from the land and even quit Palestine altogether. What the fellah did not know was that a new type of ownership was being introduced in the east. The land was not passing into the hands of a new landlord, a new agent of the state, but becoming extra-territorialised. The pattern of the miri sirf (absolute state domain), which allowed room for

(33) Shertok's statement to UNSCOP.

(34) Herzl spelt out this policy in a telling passage early in 1895: "We shall try to spirit the penniless across the border by procuring employment for it in the transit countries, while denying it employment in our own country. The property owners will come over to our side. Both the process of expropriation and the removal of the poor must be carried out discreetly and circumspectly. Let the owners of immovable property believe that they are cheating us, selling us things for more than they are worth. But we are not going to sell them anything back." (Herzl, Vol I, p. 88).

(35) Mandel, *op. cit.*

fellahin growth, was disappearing as a result of Article 6 of the Mandate. The Musha' (communal) village was based on the common property of the village lands. Every two years the lands were regrouped and redistributed among the cultivators. With the intrusion of Jewish purchasers, the system was disrupted, as the Jews did not want to share their lands with the Arabs. The Administration was egged on against these villages by the same argument as that levelled at the communistic type of Soviet agriculture. The lack of self-interest, it was urged, caused the decline of the Musha' lands. The National Home reduced the Musha' villages from 56 per cent of all villages in 1923 to 46 per cent in 1930.³⁶ The break-up of the system was an objective for which the Zionist Organization had plotted and had provided for in the terms of the Mandate. The British administrator could find no rhyme or reason in the Palestinian clamour for state intervention to protect the fellah and to conserve and improve the land, because he did not understand that, in the Middle East, state control and not private enterprise is the golden rule. The Zionists, who were agitating against the Musha' system, were at the same time establishing their own Musha' villages, the kibbutzim.

The Fellah and the Kibbutznik

Unlike the pre-J.N.F. settlers, the new colonists enjoyed nothing but enmity with the natives of the land. The Jews no longer felt that they were in Palestine on sufferance, but of right as pronounced in the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate. The country was no longer ruled by a Muslim Sultan, but by the British Army, whose purpose it was to protect the Jewish National Home. Their affront and arrogance was beyond the patience of the British administrators. How the Zionists treated the barbarian Arabs may be easily imagined.

The main cause of Arab worries was the ruthless extension of the Jewish National Home and the havoc, good or bad, which it had brought into economic life. This was a situation where benefits were naturally overlooked and damages were counted, enlarged and multiplied. It was as good for Dr. Weizmann to say that he put a lot of money in circulation as it is for Mr. Smith to say that he brought electricity to Bulawayo. Arab feelings were nettled by the frenzied and nervous hurry with which the programme was carried out. It was Lord Northcliffe who was the first to draw attention to this feature during his visit to Palestine in 1922. Many well-wishers of the National Home advised its builders against it, but, once more, they showed their scanty knowledge of the problem. Events proved that the Jewish Agency was correct in its nervous impatience. The Jewish National Home was the product of an expedient declaration made by an imperialist power during a particular critical stage. How could the Zionist Organization be sure that a different kind of critical stage would not

(36) Cmd. 5479, 1937. The fight against the Arab Musha' villages might also have been psychologically conditioned by the experience of the East European Jews who were barred from agriculture because of the Russian communal village agriculture, according to which the pasture lands were shared by the villagers. As the Christians did not want the Jews with them, they had to banish them from the land.

move that imperialist power in a different direction? The Zionist Organization had to act with the understandable speed of a burglar. The act had to be completed before the sun was up and the cover of darkness dispelled. The darkness under which the Zionist Organization worked was the era of western imperialism, and it was already on its last legs. Had the Zionists waited one more generation, their whole programme would have been on the scrap heap. No leader could issue a Balfour Declaration in the era of the Liberation Movement of Afro-Asia. Indeed, events have shown how justifiable was the frenzy for expansion. The declaration of World War II and the British need for Arab good will inspired a change in the policies of Whitehall, and the White Paper was issued in 1939 to make the total immigration to 75,000 more Jews as a final installment. In February 1940, the Land Transfers Regulations were issued restricting the Jewish purchase of land to specified areas, already crowded with Jews and amounting to only 5 per cent of the area of Palestine. Had the Jewish Agency waited until then, the Jewish presence in the Holy Land could never have reached the figures which impressed the United Nations Special Committee.

Apart from the strategic nature of Zionist hurry, the phenomenon has its deep roots in the mentality of the ghetto. In the desperate struggle for life, the Jew could only think of his very immediate need, saving his life. When his son was lingering on the rack, his mind was preoccupied with ransoming the poor son and not with planning for his wedding. The short term policies of the Zionist Organization remained an inherent feature of its work and were destined to become the long term curse of the state of Israel. Their outcome during the Mandate were just further instalments of the *ein brera*, of no alternative but to expand.

Agricultural Expansion till the Establishment of Israel³⁷

	<i>Area in dunums</i>	<i>Agricultural population</i>	<i>Jewish population</i>	<i>Number of settlements</i>
1882	25,017		22,000	6
1890	107,100	2,960		14
1899	247,000	4,500		21
1908	350,000			25
1914	450,000	7,500	85,000	43
1918	421,000	10,000	55,000	
1922	521,000	14,782	83,000	75
1927	903,000	30,329		110
1931	1,020,000	41,349	174,606	124
1936	1,232,000	98,303	384,078	203
1939	1,533,400		445,457	
1945	1,690,000	138,220	579,227	
1947	1,807,000	140,000	625,000	300

(37) Figures are based on the various reports of the Royal Commission, Zionist Executive, UNSCOP and Zionist sources. There are serious discrepancies between one source and another and some confusion due to the difference between the metric dunum and the Turkish dunum. Where the contradictions could not be bridged, the figures were omitted altogether.

CHAPTER IX

BY THE SWORD

Preparing the Ground

The long drawn march over nearly a century had finally reached its destination in 1948. Over the stormy years of strife and hard work, sufficient numbers of Jews were massed in Palestine for the battle, and numerous settlements fortified their lines. After years of embarrassing avoidance of peaceful settlement, the hour had struck for the kill.

Until 1936, the preparatory work involved colonisation, construction and immigration. The 1936 Arab Revolt and partition plan ushered in a new phase of military mobilisation. In this respect, the Yishuv received their early training from Orde Wingate, the British officer who was seconded to service with the Palestine Administration. Hitherto, the Jews, who were traditionally pacifist and little known for military valour, were on the defensive and, in general, wary of fighting the Arabs. Wingate trained them in the art of killing, in taking the aggressive initiative, and in giving the savage native a savage beating. His training showed results quickly, and the Jews assumed the upper hand in the warfare. If for nothing else, the Zionists should remain indebted to Britain for this valuable contribution to Jewish nationalist history. Their leaders buried their heads in the classic books of warfare technique. They translated them, memorised them and put them into manuals. They understood the position well. Years before, they were warned of the outcome, by their oracles, "Jewish and Arab sovereignty must clash. The Jew, if his immigration programme succeeds, must expand and that can only be accomplished at the expense of the Arab who will do his utmost to check the growth and power of a Jewish Palestine. That means bloodshed."¹

The war gave the Yishuv ample opportunity to get ready. Under the pretext of helping the war effort of the allies, they joined the British Army in droves. It was not an easy matter, for the Government was apprehensive of Arab reactions to a massive Jewish presence in the army. The WZO had to mount a campaign in London on behalf of Palestinian Jewish recruits. All in all, some 32,000 Jews received their training with the British forces during the war, and by the end of it there were over 14,000 Palestinian Jews in the British Army.² More difficult was the struggle for the formation of the Jewish army demanded by the Jewish Agency. After protracted talks and postponements, it was agreed,

(1) Meinertzhagen to Lloyd George, 25 March 1919, Meinertzhagen, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

(2) Lorch, N., *The Edge of the Sword*, London, 1961, p. 61; Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 253.

in September 1944, to allow a Jewish Brigade to be formed under the Star of David.³ The training and experience were put to immediate use in the 1948 war. Most of the Hagana commanders achieved their proficiency at the hands of the British officers. One of such men was General Moshe Dayan who lost his eye during the campaign against the French in Syria.

There was also clandestine training for those who could not join any army. Some forty-three Jews were arrested and sent to prison in 1939 as a result. The able bodied among the Displaced Persons kept in Europe and Cyprus received their training in their camps at the hands of Hagana military emissaries "under the noses of British guards."⁴

Together with the training went the armament programme. A special account was opened for the Arms Acquisition Organisation at the Bank of Tel Aviv, under the name of Flower Growers Association. (The Zionists cannot resist a cynical phrase). Ben Gurion took with him to the United States Chaim Slavin, a Jewish engineer, and left him there to acquire arms worth "millions of dollars," but given to the Jewish Agency at the paltry price of 800,000 dollars only. Lists with the names of ready volunteers were also prepared in America at the same time.⁵ Other purchases were made in Europe and as far afield as the Philippines. Under the nose of the Arabs, and with the help of their bourgeoisie, British military surplus and scrap were bought in Iraq and sent to Palestine. Shafiq Adas, a Basra Jewish merchant, was caught and hanged as a result. Arms were also bought or stolen from British military personnel as mentioned above. The massive arms depots of the Allies were the natural source for those to whom the Allied war effort was not a primary cause. The Zionist Jews, for whose enrolment in the British Army the WZO had fought, became the agents inside the camp, "The compelling need of the Yishuv . . . was a compelling factor"⁶ in justifying the plunder of the British Army in the most critical days of its history when Britain stood alone. With the change of the communist attitude to the Palestine question, a new source for arms was opened. Ehud Avriel was despatched to Prague from Paris, where he was in search of more arms. The famous deal was then contracted with the Czechoslovak Government.

Although Britain was aware of the import drive and gave it a safe passage, the equipment, including even aircraft, was hidden from the authorities. Some of the heavy armament, however, was kept outside Palestine until the Proclamation of Independence. Improvised landing strips were prepared and the Beth Darass airport was then taken from the British as soon as it was evacuated. It served its useful purpose for the import of the Czechoslovak weapons.

Clandestine arsenals were also set up. All kinds of weapons, from wooden training rifles made in carpenters' shops to heavy mortar guns were produced

(3) The story is given in Kirk's, *The Middle East in the War*, and in Sykes, *op. cit.*

(4) Lorch, *op. cit.*, p. 50.

(5) Litvinoff, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

(6) Mardor, Munya M., *Strictly Illegal*, London, 1964, p. 109. The author was in charge of arms acquisition operations. Accounts of the arms drive given in pp. 109-189.

secretly. The authorities uncovered some of them, but left the majority undetected. Machine tools were brought from the United States for the underground armament workshops. Mr. Harry Sacher was able to tell his comrades a few weeks before the conflagration that "Palestine Jewry is even today the best organised military force in the Middle East."⁷

The energetic work on expanding and fortifying the Jewish domain with settlements was stepped up with even more enthusiasm. Eleven colonies were set up in the Negev in November 1946. They were followed up by three more in February, in the Negev also, and in March two in Galilee. There were altogether 22 new settlements between October 1946 and January 1947.⁸ The J.P.A. News gave this picture of the nature of the hurried colonies, "Two barracks, a tent, a small water tower, some defensive sandbag emplacements and a barbed wire double fence . . ."⁹ The most menacing "settlements" were the Kfar Etzion series of colonies on the road between Jerusalem and Hebron. Months before the outbreak of hostilities, the women and children were withdrawn, and the fortified concrete blocks were put with ease to their proper function, i.e. opening fire at the traffic and severing communications.¹⁰

The Last Word

The endorsement of the Partition Proposal by the Jewish Agency was expedient and transient. Britain was unwilling to open the country to mass immigration. The Yishuv were also still in need of more soldier immigrants, ammunition and weapons. The United Nations, America and Britain were uncertain of the Partition Plan, and waited for the situation to clear up. Washington had, in fact, retreated from its position and pressed for a trusteeship plan on 19 March 1948. How was the new Provisional Government going to use its power and deal with its new neighbour? The Jewish Agency was hoping for a big loan (amounting to \$100,000,000) from the Export-Import Bank of the United States, and negotiations for it started soon after independence. Everything depended on their good conduct. The Hagana Command were not worried about this aspect, for they knew that the Arabs were going to do the job for them—and they, in fact, lured them into it.¹¹ This was the essence of the Zionist position. According to Bernadotte's accounts, Shertok had hinted to him that the whole of Palestine should belong to Israel, but that the idea was just impracticable. On 13 August, Mr. Ben Gurion clarified the position after his conquests, "The plan we steeled ourselves to accept in the last resort *for the sake of its international endorsement* is relevant no longer."

(7) *Zionist Review*, 3 March 1947.

(8) *Zionist Review*, 7 March 1947; JPA News carried an article, on 27 February 1947, explaining how the settlements established during the war had affected the UNSCOP frontier decisions.

(9) JPA News, 21 March 1947.

(10) Glubb, *op. cit.*

(11) See Chapter VI.

In March 1948, the Hagana High Command prepared Plan Dalet "to gain control of the area allotted to the Jewish State and defend its borders, and those of the blocs of Jewish settlements and such Jewish population as were outside those borders."¹² The passage spells out the Jewish Agency strategy for expansion. The J.P.A. (Jewish Palestine Appeal) agitation for border settlements was complemented by the Hagana plan to defend the distant settlements. The Etzion blocs, for example, could not be "protected" except by occupying Jerusalem, and Jerusalem could not be maintained without occupying Qastal. The settlements to the north could only be protected when Western Galilee was taken from the Arabs. In fact, some of the commanders advised withdrawing the few who were in such distant colonies for military reasons, but Ben Gurion was adamant, and the commanders were overruled by "a Zionist decision."¹³ Plan Dalet had also included the maintenance of free communication "for *military* and economic purposes" between the Jewish State and the Jewish centres outside it by controlling the major arteries of Palestine. Plan Dalet, in other words, was a blueprint for the Zionist occupation of all Palestine.

The expansionist position of the High Command was drawn by Ben Gurion to the Zionist Executive, on 6 April, 1948, in these terms:

"And let us resolve not to be content with merely defensive tactics, but at the right moment to attack all along the line and not just within the confines of the Jewish State and the border of Palestine."¹⁴

Thus, Ben Gurion was even looking across the borders of Palestine itself to the adjoining Arab countries. This was no idle talk, for the Israeli Army carried out Ben Gurion's instructions and marched on al-Arish a few months later. In fact, raids across the border were already recorded when a group attacked Syrian villages in February.¹⁵

Ben Gurion's ambitions were given further expression during the discussion of the National Administration on the drafting of the Declaration of Independence. The question arose whether the United Nations Resolution on Partition should be treated as a framework for the Declaration, in which case the borders of Israel would be defined therein accordingly, or merely as a basis for the Declaration and then the borders would be left out undelineated. Ben Gurion referred to the American Declaration of Independence, and insisted on keeping silent on the question of the borders:

"Take the American Declaration of Independence for instance . . . It contains no mention of the territorial limits. We are not obliged to state the limits of our State. The Arabs are making war on us. If we beat them, the western part of Galilee and the territory on both sides of the road to Jerusalem will become part of the State. If only we have the strength . . . Why tie ourselves down?"

His biographer went on to comment on the above citation as follows:

(12) Lorch, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

(13) Kimche, *Both Sides of the Hill*, p. 17.

(14) Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel*, p. 239.

(15) *Al-Abram*, 1 March 1948.

"Ben Gurion had no intention of keeping to the territorial limits for the Jewish State laid down by the United Nations. He was sure that opportunities for increasing the territory would occur, and that Israel would eventually attain the initial aims, even if it took centuries . . . Some people would say these hidden intentions smacked of imperialism, but others have called it a sense of history."¹⁶

David Ben Gurion gives in his own accounts a typical specimen of the way his mind works:

"To be sure, we had accepted the United Nations decision, but there was no telling whether the United Nations would back up its decision if we were attacked, or intervene in the event that our neighbours attacked us and we defeated them."¹⁷

The Prime Minister was laying the foundations of Israeli diplomacy. The Jewish State abides by what suits her in a U.N. resolution and ignores what does not. Ben Gurion's thesis was endorsed by a five to four vote. Events proved that the four were a bunch of fools.

Everyone for Himself

Once the United Nations had endorsed the Partition Proposal and the British Government had declared its intention of terminating the Mandate, the issue was left to the Zionists and Arabs. The WZO, with all its influence, made no attempt to bring in any international force to prevent the war, and poured cold water on any suggestion to that effect.¹⁸ The Arabs were determined to torpedo the Partition Proposal and the Partition frontiers. The Jewish Agency was determined to uphold the Partition Proposal and torpedo its frontiers. It was a position which enabled the Jewish Agency to let the Arabs make the running and then accuse them of a rebellion against the authority of the United Nations. The Arab delegates answered the accusation by pointing out that the resolution of the General Assembly had only come in the form of a recommendation and not as a binding demand.

Representatives of the Arab States met in Damascus and planned the destruction of the Jewish State. The troops of Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Transjordan were to attack in the direction of Afula and then advance to Haifa. Egypt was to attack Tel Aviv. So far went the intentions and plans, but in practice no attempt was made to carry them out. Abdulla refused to send his troops to the north, for his eyes were set in a southerly direction, where his friends in the British Cabinet wanted to set up a military base. Jerusalem was also a tempting crown for his kingdom. Iraq, which had no interest in Palestine, was finally compelled to move its troop after a students' hunger strike had brought nationalist pressure to a climax.¹⁹

The intervention of the Arab States only came after Palestinian resistance

(16) Bar Zohar, M., *The Armed Prophet*, p. 133.

(17) Ben Gurion, *Israel, Years of Challenge*, p. 40.

(18) The WZO called for an international militia to be recruited individually. Cf. reports and comments in *Zionist Review*.

(19) Lorch's claim that the Iraqi Army was actuated by oil interest connected with the Haifa Refineries does not seem justified. This would be too conscientious for that Government of Iraq.

had begun to lose heavily. The Palestinians were helped in their fight by volunteers from Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. It was hoped that the Liberation Army formed from these volunteers, together with other units in the south, would be able to stand up to the Hagana and liquidate the new state. Their strategy aimed not at capturing Jewish settlements but at disrupting Jewish communications. They operated mainly within the area allotted for the Arab state, particularly along the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road. This guerrilla strategy shaped the expansionist plans of the Hagana High Command. With the pretext of maintaining contact with the carefully scattered colonies, they could justify the destruction, occupation or strangling of any Arab village or town.

One of the early villages which fell to Hagana arms was Qazaza, which was destroyed and occupied in December 1947. Salama was taken in March. A new era began in Zionist history. Arab lands were hitherto acquired by money. From 1948 onwards, lands have been taken by military conquest.

The wholesale preliminary conquests were embodied implicitly in Plan Dalet which was drawn up in March 1948. Among its objectives outside the state of Israel were the capture of Arab forward bases and Arab villages near Jewish settlements, the besieging of Arab cities, and the maintenance of communications for military and economic purposes with the settlements in the Arab state. The full meaning of such outwardly limited objectives can only be appreciated if one keeps in mind the small size and shape of Palestine and the Partition borders. It is absolutely impossible to carry out the plan without liquidating the Arab state. The intention of insuring free military movement on someone else's territory against his will, is tantamount to a declaration of war.

On the basis of Plan Dalet, Operation Nachshon was prepared in April for opening the way to Jerusalem via Arab territory after occupying the villages on both sides. Deir Muhsin, Qastal and Deir Yassin were captured. This operational plan was superseded by another, Operation Harel, and more villages were taken, including Bet Surik, Biddu and Saris. All fell before the end of the Mandate and all belonged to Arab territory. The flight of the Palestinians followed the capture of each village.

The Hagana Command turned to the north where the Jewish Eastern Galilee was sandwiched between Arab territory. Arab Tiberias (in Israeli territory) was captured, on 18 April, to maintain communications with the northern colonies. This was followed, on 29 April, by the occupation of the town of Zemach on the border with Syria. Safad, predominantly Arab but included in the Israeli territory, was captured on 11 May after some fierce fighting. To the south, Beisan on the River Jordan was taken on 12 May. All the villages in the area, as far as Mount Tabor, fell.

Jaffa, a main Arab centre and allotted to the Arab territory, was dealt with in Operation Chametz, planned in April. Wholesale attack was not practicable for military and political reasons, particularly as the Mandate was still in existence. Operation Chametz was therefore drawn up in order to isolate the town. The

Hagana captured a number of villages around the town and severed its links with the Arab interior. The Irgun mobilised most of its forces and attacked the district of Manshia on 25 April. They were supposed to sweep through the town to the sea whilst the Hagana gave them support with artillery fire. The British Army intervened to save the civilians, and because the town was allotted to the Arabs. A ceasefire was arranged, but the town was doomed. Jaffa surrendered on 13 May. Out of 70,000 Arab population, only 3,000 had remained. The attack on this town underlines the hypocrisy of the "defensive war" and "repelling the aggressors." The Mayors of Jaffa and Tel Aviv had exchanged letters weeks before, pledging their towns to peaceful coexistence. The town launched no attacks. Some of the surrounding villages had even joined hands with the Hagana in denying passage to Arab guerrillas and in placing guards on the roads for that purpose.²⁰ The Zionist justification is that Jaffa could have become a danger.

The Hagana turned to Haifa on 22 April to implement Operation Misparayim. After a few days, negotiations were held between the Arab and Jewish notables and the Arabs finally decided to quit the town, and the famous exodus began by sea and land routes.

Operation Ben Ami was made to deal with Western Galilee. Acre, allocated to the Arab territory, was besieged before 15 May. The attack was launched on 16 May, and the historic town fell the next day. Other troops were sent up to the Lebanese border to "open roads" and establish contact with the isolated settlements of Yechiam and Hanita. Two villages were occupied near the border and the Hagana penetrated into Lebanon.

Operation Barak was planned for opening the Negev. On 12 May, Beir was taken by the Hagana and was followed by Hulayqat and Kawkaba. The Negev brigade also attacked Khirbat Ma'ir and captured it. Beersheba (Arab territory) was also in the schedule but it could not be attempted for military reasons.

Brutal massacres and destruction were wreaked on some of the villages of which the Deir Yassin story is the classic example. Arab sources mention that the entire population of Beit Daris was exterminated, and the inhabitants of Az-Zaytun were assembled in the Mosque which was brought down on their heads. All inhabitants of fighting age in Beit al-Khuri were killed. From Nasr ad-Din, only forty of its inhabitants managed to escape. Kidnapping, mutilation, brutal murder of children and old people were recorded.²¹ Zionist sources also refer to an Arab attack on a convoy to the Hadassa Hospital²² and the killing of fifteen men from the defenders of the Etzion bloc after their surrender.

The Arabs had also attacked a number of Jewish settlements, but failed in

(20) Dov Joseph, *The Faithful City*, London, 1962, pp. 30-31. Dov Joseph was a Jerusalemite lawyer and became the first Israeli Governor of the city.

(21) The Bulletin of the Lebanese Central Office of Information, Vol. IV, No. 55. Israel's Aggression, The League of Arab States, 1957.

(22) It was known that the Jewish Agency had abused the sanctity of the Red Shield (the Jewish equivalent of the Red Cross) by using it as a cover for military purpose. This particular case was investigated by a representative of the International Red Cross, and it was found that the vehicles carried supplies for troops in the Hadassa Hospital. (Kirk, *History of the Middle East*, p. 261).

most cases. In the North, the Liberation Army attacked Ramat Naftali, Mishmar Haemek and Ramat Yohanan. The Muslim Brethren attacked Kfar Darom in the Negev. All repelled the attackers. The Arab Legion attacked the Etzion bloc of four settlements on 4 May, and after fierce fighting the defenders surrendered.

The Official War

By 15 May, Palestinian resistance had completely collapsed, and the Hagana was free to operate in any direction inside and outside the Jewish territory. In front of their columns, the hordes of refugees fled in utter despair and panic. Mothers did not know who was taking their children and jealous men did not look to see which way their wives were fleeing. Appeals from Palestine showered the capitals, and the nationalist outcry could no longer be allayed. In Israel, the intervention of the Arab States was attributed, by the left and the right, to the wishes of the British Government. The military plan for the destruction of Israel was said to have been concocted in Bludan by General Clayton.²³ The claim is mainly based on the existence of British officers in the Arab Legion, which had, in fact, made no attempt to pierce the borders of Israel. M. Kubba, Chairman of the Istiqlal Party and a member of the Iraqi Government at the time, is already quoted above as saying that, in fact, the advice given to him by Clayton was against the despatch of the armies. Glubb also mentioned that, in his presence, Bevin had warned the Prime Minister of Transjordan: "But do not go and invade the area allotted to the Jews."²⁴ The principal motives behind the intervention of the Arab Governments seem to be a response to nationalist pressure, an attempt to divert the energy of the opposition, a desire for partitioning the Arab territory among themselves, and lastly, some anxiety about the fate of the Palestinians who were deluded by mighty promises.

The number of troops sent to Palestine was anything but sufficient to subdue the whole of the Yishuv and conquer the entire land of Palestine. The writings of military experts put the number of troops on both sides at the beginning of the war nearly at par. The Arabs brought more aircraft and heavy equipment, but the Hagana had better morale, organization, training, and short-wave communications. It seemed as if the combat was fairly organized by some good sport so as to insure a draw.

Map XVII shows that the advance of the Arab armies was generally restricted to the Arab territory. Starting from the north, the Lebanese marched on Upper Galilee, which was part of the Arab territory. Their coastal attack made no advance in the Arab territory itself, and they had never achieved the lines delineated by the U.N. plan. The Hagana forestalled their advance into the Arab Territory by capturing Kadesh and Malkia. They followed this up and occupied Nabi Yusha', on 17 May, and then penetrated into both Syria and Lebanon.

(23) Cf. *The Oiber Israel*, pamphlet by the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen), July 1968.

(24) Glubb, *op. cit.*, p. 66.

The Syrians were apparently bent on annexing Eastern Galilee, which belonged to the Jewish territory. Their push toward Degania was a fiasco and they had to retreat to their border. Another attack from the east succeeded in capturing only Mishmar Hayarden, to the south of Lake Huleh.

The Iraqi Army crossed the Jordan and attacked Israeli territory at Gesher without success. It was ordered to break contact in this area, and keep to Arab territory in the area of Janin-Tulkarm where the Transjordanians handed over to them. They attacked Israeli territory in the Tulkarm front and succeeded in occupying Geulim for a short time only. The attack was only made as a diversion, and in response to a request from the Arab Legion, which was hard pressed to the south of Latrun. The Iraqis kept their line westward along the partition border, some 15-20 miles from the coast. Arab nationalist sources insist that the halt of the Iraqi Army along the UNSCOP line, and its failure to attack in the direction of the sea and cut Israel in half, were signs of the pre-arranged understanding to implement the UNSCOP plan. The Hagana, on the other hand, planned to penetrate the Arab Triangle of Nablus-Jenin-Tulkarm. They captured Zar'in on 28 May, Mazar on 30 May, and then Arabuna, Muqaybila, Galama and other villages to the north of Jenin. The main attack on the town itself failed.

King Abdulla had one defined objective, namely, to annex what he could of the Arab territory, so as to acquire a respectable and viable kingdom.²⁵ He thus hastened to send his troops in three directions: the West Bank of the River Jordan, Jerusalem and Hebron. On the Western Bank, the Arab Legion liquidated the scattered settlements to the north of Jerusalem, including Atarot, Neve Yaakov and Bet Haarava. To the south, the Legion had already captured the Etzion bloc before the official war. In another operation they managed to occupy Ramat Rahel, only to lose it again. In Jerusalem, their target was restoring control over the Arab sectors of the city, a story which will be related presently. Hagana's main concern in this front was widening the Jerusalem corridor (in Arab territory). To this effect, they launched many attacks on Latrun without success. But the attacks on Latrun were the first stage also in an extensive operation to capture Ramalla and sever the Jerusalem link with the Arab Triangle, in conjunction with another direct attack from Jerusalem to Ramalla.²⁶ The pincer attack on Jenin in the north (28 May) and on Latrun to Ramalla (25 May) in the south, could have safely put the whole West Bank into Israeli hands, and might well have been conceived in that context.

The Egyptians advanced along the coast where a number of settlements were carefully thrown in their path. Nevertheless, the Egyptian Commander avoided contact, and, apparently, followed his instructions to reach the U.N. partition line and stop. The line starts from the Mediterranean north of Isdud, and north of Isdud did the advance column halt. Along their line of advance, they had to

(25) Glubb admits that the plan with which he was entrusted was to secure the Arab territory of the U.N. plan, minus Galilee and Gaza, for the Kingdom of Jordan, p. 66.

(26) Lorch, *op. cit.*, p. 190.

capture the settlement of Yad Mordechai. They attacked also the colonies of Nirim and Negba and Nitzanim. Only the latter fell into their hands. The Hagana, at the same time, captured a number of Arab centres, including the Sawafir group of villages. They counter-attacked in the Isdud area and advanced on Arab territory towards Gaza. The Egyptian violation of the U.N. border came in their advance across northern Negev to occupy Beersheba and Hebron, both in Arab territory. This was not a move against Israel, but against Transjordan. Both Arab States were contesting for control over that part of Arab territory.

In the meantime, the Security Council was debating the fighting and succeeded finally in forcing a truce starting from 10 June. Arab public opinion was so deluded that every move in Palestine was a glorious victory. The Arabs were convinced that the whole of Palestine was being taken over by the Arabs. The battles of Jenin and Latrun enforced this conviction, and not without justification. Every advance into a purely Arab town was therefore accepted as a step in the liberation work, a state which suited the politicians and the generals. The Partition Plan having been dismissed out of hand, no one knew where the Partition border stood or where the soldiers were fighting. When the truce was made, Arab public opinion received it with revulsion as an imperialist trick to save the Jewish State from destruction and give the Jews time to rearm.

With the first round of fighting, Israel had already added 300 square kilometres to the area allotted to it by the United Nations, leaving the Negev aside as an undecided issue. The same paradox, which the world had to encounter over and over again, was evolved. The Zionists, who proclaimed their adherence to the U.N. Partition Plan, were acting on the field as if none of them had heard of it. The Arabs, who bombastically declared their determination to annul the plan, were the one party who had actually adhered to it. The subsequent revolutionary regimes accused the royalist rulers of going to Palestine to implement the Partition Plan on behalf of the imperialists. That did not prevent the Arabs from being presented as the wicked aggressors who were attacking Jewish populated centres. Lieut. Colonel N. Lorch had actually included a map in his otherwise worthy book, with arrows indicating Arab invasion attacks on Jenin and Latrun, the two Arab centres which were only saved from Hagana capture by desperate defensive combat. The other side of the Arab menace, the armies of seven large states (the sixth and seventh are the Yemen and Saudi Arabia) armed to the teeth to destroy the poorly supplied and outnumbered defenders, is the second myth. The Hagana was neither outnumbered nor in short supply.

The fighting threw into sharp relief the use to which the expansionist device of maintaining communications had been put. Operation Ben Ami, for the capture of Western Galilee, was planned with the excuse of opening the road to Yechiam and Hanita, the two settlements which were the least trouble in the whole conflict. No one molested them and no siege was imposed on them. It seems that the Israelis were bent on preventing the Arab state from having an outlet to the sea. It was the Hagana who deliberated, years in advance, on disrupting Arab

communications. The Etzion bloc which, "continued to fulfil offensive tasks with which it was instructed from time to time: interruption of Arab communication . . .",²⁷ had had no other purpose. Besieging Arab cities was the fourth directive in Plan Dalet. Acre and Jaffa were cut off from the rest of Palestine in implementation of the Plan, weeks before any escalation in the fighting.

The Second Round

The four weeks truce prohibited the supply of arms and reinforcements to both sides. The Arabs declared their intention of resuming fighting after the four weeks, but made no serious attempt to improve their position. They had neither the sources or the skill to bring in worthwhile supplies illegally. The Israelis proclaimed to the world their acceptance of the truce as a permanent cease-fire and a step to peace. Simultaneously, they did everything possible to prepare themselves for a sweeping onslaught. Their forces rose from nearly 40,000 men to nearly 80,000 by bringing in illegal immigrants of fighting age. The four artillery pieces which they had were increased to 250 guns and 45 heavy mortars. Machine guns went up from 1,500 to 7,550. A new small air force was also created, and included some Flying Fortresses which managed to bomb Cairo. The smuggling of arms and combatants during this period was another epic in Zionist history. One of the dramatic episodes in this epic was the destruction of Altalina. The ship was bringing arms to the Irgun, but through technical and political miscalculation, its mission was discovered. The Israeli Government had no option but to reap at least a moral advantage, and ordered its destruction in front of the U.N. observers and foreign correspondents.

The balance of forces was seriously tipped in favour of Israel. Dayan observed, whilst on a visit to the United States, that Israel was in a position to occupy the whole of Palestine in six to eight weeks.²⁸ It remained a sore point for Ben Gurion that he had not put the young officer in charge from the beginning, and conquered everything. The commanders were looking forward to their opportunities. Among the plans laid during the truce was the occupation of Lydda, Ramla, Nazareth, Ramallah, Latrun, the Jerusalem Corridor and the old city of Jerusalem. The Kimches, who have inside knowledge of Israeli deliberations, described the Israeli desire for "live and let live":

"As they made their plans there came faint echoes of discussions at the United Nations and of the Mediator's plans to avert another outbreak of war. These reports were treated at the Israeli army headquarters, and especially at Allon's as largely irrelevant. The fighting, not the United Nations, would decide the war. The Israeli Commanders made their plans carefully. They did not want to be rushed. They had learnt from their earlier mistakes. And they paid no notice to the talking marathon at Lake Success, as it appeared to them. Yadin explained two weeks later that their plan of operation was based on the assumption that fighting would last for much longer than nine days. He had ambitious targets."²⁹

(27) Lorch, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

(28) Lavie, *op. cit.*, p. 61.

(29) Kimche, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

Some of those deliberations were outlined in a series written by Ben Gurion years later for *Ma'ariv* in May 1967. Everything was planned for the Arabs to whom the Israeli Chief of Staff left the signalling. It became the pattern for subsequent Israeli expansion: decide what to take next, lay the operational plan, draw the Arabs into the pit, accomplish the fact. It is the Israeli version of Caesar's words changed into, "I planned, I provoked, I conquered."

This time, Transjordan, Iraq and Lebanon were ready to let a sleeping dog lie, and prolong the truce indefinitely. The Egyptian and Syrian leaders were caught in their own web of fabricated victories, and were forced to follow the logic of their self deception. The truce was, therefore, terminated on 6 July and the ten day war flared up. In the north, Israeli forces attacked from the west, and after capturing a number of villages in Arab territory, including Shafa Amr and Zafuria, they conquered the town of Nazareth on 16 July. The whole of the strip west of Galilee was occupied. The battle on this front was entirely initiated by Israel, according to operational Plan Dekel, prepared during the truce.

To the east of Galilee, the Liberation Army of Fawzi al-Qawaki attacked Sejera unsuccessfully. The Israelis tried to cross the River Jordan, break into Syria and dislodge the Syrian forces from Mishmar Hayarden. The Syrians tried, on their part, to penetrate westward in Israeli territory. Both parties failed to achieve their objectives. Jewish settlers to the south managed to capture the Arab village of Shaykh Barqan.

The main conquests occurred in the central front. The Jewish Agency had failed to put sufficient settlements along the Jerusalem corridor. Ben Gurion explained that the former omission in peace must be corrected by war. Operation Dani was therefore prepared to conquer the town of Lydda, the Lydda Airport, Ramla, Latrun and Ramalla with all the villages in the area. The Arab Legion blocked their advance at Latrun and the Israelis could only win the area west of it, including the towns of Lydda, Ramla and the Lydda Airport, with all the valuable rich agricultural lands in the vicinity. Ben Gurion committed Moshe Dayan with the vanguard role in this operation as head of the 89th Battalion. Dayan recruited his special force from the ex-terrorists of Lehi. Together with his terrorists, he sent enough panic into the towns and villages to clear the entire area. He ordered his men to open fire at the village houses as they passed, and he himself participated in the fun.³⁰ Operation Kadem, for the expulsion of the Arab Legion from the rest of Jerusalem, failed to achieve its objective within the time limit and the second truce left the task unfinished.

Egypt's main pressure was directed at the settlement of Negba on the border of the Gaza coastal strip. The settlement stood its ground. They also attacked other colonies to the east of their line of communication, obviously to insure its safety. The Israeli Negev forces, on the other hand, occupied many villages including Iraq Suwaidan, Hatta and Kharatia, all within the Arab territory. The truce had once more come too early for the commanders. They still had not dis-

(30) Lavie, *op. cit.*, pp. 61, 67.

covered the right technique which would synchronise their operations with the U.N. interventions. Operation An-Far was planned to expel the Egyptian expeditionary force completely behind the Palestine-Egypt frontier and involved even an Israeli raid on al-Arish.³¹

The primary question in this front of the war was one of communications. Egypt wanted to keep the south of Palestine for itself. Egyptian forces were in command of the Beersheba and the Hebron areas, both Arab territory. To maintain its position there, Egypt had to ensure communications across the northern Negev. Israel had also its settlements in the south, and had also to ensure safe passage through the same strip of land. The crossroads was the scene of battle. The United Nations Special Committee foresaw the problem, albeit within a peacetime context, and arranged for an intersection east of Isdud. That point was liquidated by the Hagana forcing the Egyptians to move the intersection to the south to establish contact with the east by occupying Iraq Suwaydan and Iraq al-Manshia. Operation an-Far was planned for this stage to erase the contact point completely from the map and prevent any link between Arab Africa and Arab Asia.

Although the fighting did not achieve all that the High Command had aspired to, it nevertheless brought Tel Aviv something to be pleased with. "A thousand square kilometres have been added to the state," Ben Gurion informed his people joyfully. His staff were still counting the towns and villages taken from the Arab territory. Until the second truce, they had captured 14 Arab towns and 331 villages, of which 112 villages were outside the area of the Jewish State.³² Their inhabitants were put on the road (buses provided) to add another burden to the economy of the Arab states. The Jewish Agency rushed some 16 identified settlements and other secret settlements into the conquered territories between the beginning of the war and 1 July.³³

Count Bernadotte produced his plans during the second truce. He proposed to annex the Negev and Jerusalem to the Arab territory which would in turn become part of Transjordan. In return, Israel would take Western Galilee. The port of Haifa and the airport of Lydda would become free zones, and the two Arab and Jewish states would form a union. Only Transjordan accepted the Bernadotte plan. The Provisional Government of Israel rejected it without ceremony. By then, new accomplished facts were created. Ben Gurion declared: "The former negative attitude of Israel to the Mediator's suggestions remains not only unchanged but has stiffened as a result of the important military successes achieved during ten days fighting."³⁴

Foreign Minister Moshe Shertok told a press conference whilst the fighting was still going on: "The State of Israel is consolidating fast, occupying not only the territory assigned to us, but also expanding as a result of its own defence

(31) Lorch, *op. cit.*, p. 300.

(32) *Zionist Review*, 30 July 1948.

(33) *Zionist Review*, 6 August 1948.

(34) *Jewish Chronicle*, 30 July 1948.

against aggression. There is no reason for a territorial or any other compromise." Replying to a question by Arthur Koestler, he explained that they had accepted the U.N. partition plan "at a certain stage," but the new developments had cancelled their former position.³⁵ The bitter collision between the U.N. Mediator and the Provisional Government was the outcome of two diametrically opposing stands. Count Bernadotte was looking for a territorial concession to placate the Arabs and win them over to a lasting understanding with the Jews. Israel was seeking further territorial gains. Moshe Shertok, according to Bernadotte's report of the conversation, affirmed that Israel must seek further expansion. The great Arab promontories thrusting into the Jewish state would have to be abolished. In Shertok's view, that would be the best way to prevent future expansionist desires on the part of Israel. The Foreign Minister resorted to the excuse of population pressure and observed that the Jewish State must receive more people and hence must need more lands.³⁶

This position was reiterated in the official reply of the Israeli Government to Bernadotte's proposals. "It is, indeed, the conviction of the Provisional Government that the territorial provisions affecting the Jewish State now stand in need of improvement."³⁷ The military commanders were working out the plans for these improvements. Bernadotte's tragedy was that he touched the two delicate subjects of immigration, and the Negev. The Negev was the favourite haunt of Ben Gurion whose appreciation of beautiful things in life and in people was well reflected in that love. It was also considered the future dumping ground for those Jews unwanted by the European anti-Semites. But there was more in that adoration; the Zionists were apparently confident that there were "rich mineral resources of the Negev," as Dr. Weizmann had intimated at the time (January 1949) to the American Ambassador. The illustrious scientist believed that the area contained iron ore, potash, two million tons of chrome, oil in unknown quantities and possibly also uranium.³⁸ The fact is that the 1948 spiritual attachment to the arid desert from where the Torah came, followed stories of oil discoveries in which the protagonist, old England, had tapped three wells. It may be safely assumed that the bitter struggle of that year was another episode in the world oil conflicts, Britain backing Faruk and Abdulla, and America backing Ben Gurion. The outcome was also indicative of the trend. Concern for the Negev was put in the foreground of Israeli deliberations.

Complete the Job?

The Security Council had once more interrupted the functioning of the Jewish State. When the cease-fire was ordered Shatiel had hardly begun his operation

(35) *Zionist Review*, 18 June 1948.

(36) Bernadotte, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

(37) Reply dated 5 July, cited in Bernadotte, *op. cit.*, p. 149.

(38) McDonald, *op. cit.*, p. 116. In his diaries (pp. 561-2) Weizmann deals with the questions of the Negev and his intercession with President Truman. The American President agreed summarily to its inclusion in the Jewish State.

for the capture of the Old City of Jerusalem. In the south, the Egyptians were still straddling the north of the Negev and occupying the Gaza Strip. While the United Nations was considering what concessions could be made to the Arabs, the Israeli command had started to plan a new operation for the capture of all the territory in Egyptian hands. Mindful of its own technique, the Government was apprehensive that if the Egyptians were allowed to remain much longer, Bernadotte's proposal might become a *fait accompli* in the Negev. An attack in that front was accordingly envisaged, and Moshe Dayan was ordered, in the last hours of the fighting, to capture the village of Caratia, the vital springboard for launching an attack on the Egyptians. Operation Ten Plagues was drawn and preparations for its implementation started on 22 August with an airlift of equipment. Four infantry brigades, one armoured battalion and artillery units were brought to the front. The Prime Minister told the Actions Committee that "the boundaries are not yet established."

Although by this time, the Israelis had thrown away all pretence of *tabor* (innocence of guilt), a moral justification was still a necessary item in their planning. The intersection point was contested by Israel, and after arduous work the United Nations Supervision Board reached an arrangement by which each side could use the crossroad every six hours. All the time the Israelis were negotiating this arrangement, they were deploying their troops for the zero hour.³⁹ Ten days before that hour, the Israelis had denied U.N. observers access to their positions.

When all was ready, a convoy was sent to the Egyptian check point on 15 October. The Israeli vehicles were denied passage and fire was opened on them. Within hours, the whole of the front from Gaza to Beersheba was aflame. Al-Arish was subjected to heavy bombardment by the Air Force which had also raided most of the Egyptian positions in Palestine. Naval operations were also carried out against the coastal points. Isdud was evacuated and Beersheba was taken after an artillery bombardment. Tel Aviv was gratified for it had realised the biblical dream from Dan to Beersheba, but no one was ready to take the Bible seriously. So the attack continued. Most of the Arab villages of the northern Negev were captured and the Egyptians were pushed back to Yad Mordechai, north of Gaza. Egypt's link with the east was severed. Another attack proceeded in the direction of Bethlehem and Hebron, capturing most of the villages on its way, until it was checked by the Arab Legionnaires on a front which was not related in any sense to the issue of the Negev, and totally outside the Jewish territory.

On 19 October, the Security Council called on both sides to cease-fire and withdraw to the positions occupied before the fighting. Israel declined to respond and an Anglo-Chinese resolution providing for sanctions was then tabled on the 29 October. The United States wavered, in deference to Zionist pressure (1948 was

(39) Sacher, *op. cit.*, p. 295.

an election year), and the United Nations was denied the effective means of stopping a great deal of the Middle Eastern rot.

Protracted talks started on the question of withdrawal between Israel and the United Nations. Ralf Bunche, perhaps the only U.N. representative whose work was hailed by Tel Aviv, devised for the Israelis an ingenious formula which they had failed to see. As there were Jewish settlements in the Negev and south of the line of fighting, the Israeli troops in that area could not be considered as invaders, and the U.N. was fobbed off with an arrangement whereby Israeli forces might remain in their positions as long as they were connected with the settlements.

Despite the cease-fire of October, the attack on the Arab Legion in Hebron continued. Kol Israel announced, two days after the cease-fire, that the forces of Israel were about to capture Kfar Etzion. In his report, Dr. Bunche passed judgement on Operation Ten Plagues, branding it as a pre-determined attack unjustified by the convoy affair.

Since the first truce of June, the Israelis were no longer embarrassed to admit the real purpose of their military operations. The expansionist motivation has not been denied in the works of all Zionist historians of the 1948 war. The present narrative and assessment of the fighting are completely based on the writing of Zionist sources, with the exclusion of Glubb. Ben Gurion's version of the October operation leaves his reader fairly convinced that Operation Ten Plagues was an organised plot to wrest "an essential area of settlement and communications . . . as well as strategically indispensable."⁴⁰ Nevertheless, Ambassador McDonald of the United States had this lone sentence in his diaries on the whole ominous affair:

"Israelis launched *counter-attack* against Egyptians in Negev." Converts are always more fanatical than the missionaries.

At all events, the High Command had once more disappointed the politicians. Cease-fire was enforced whilst Egypt was still in the Faluja pocket and in Gaza, both within the Arab territory. Cease-fire was broken to allow an attack on Iraq Suwaydan, which was captured on 9 November. It was followed on 5 December by Operation Assaf in which Tal Farra, Shaykh Nuran and Khirbat Main surrendered. These minor conquests were the springboard for the final rout of the Egyptians in the decisive operational Plan Horev, commencing on 22 December.

On 21 December, the Israeli Government informed the Security Council that because of Egypt's refusal to enter truce talks, they found themselves free to act against her. Next day Operation Horev began for "the expulsion from the boundary of the country" of all Egyptian forces. The use of the word "country" is without any real meaning as the Egyptians were not on Israeli territory. Five brigades were committed to the task of two major attacks in the direction of

(40) Ben Gurion, *Israel, Years of Challenge*, p. 48, Mardor, *op. cit.*, mentions that his Prime Minister had ordered the conquest of the whole area under Egyptian control in August, p. 222.

Auja in the centre of the desert and in the direction of Gaza-Rafa. The southern flank took Misharif, Auja and Abu Ajila, advanced into Sinai and reached the Rafa Junction, Bir Hasna and Bir Hama in the heart of Sinai. Another section swung to the north and reached al-Arish. Cease-fire saved the town from capture. The northern flank was about to enter Rafa when the same cease-fire prevented the task.

Ben Gurion and his commanders were determined to ignore any Security Council nonsense this time. Israel, therefore, opposed the Council resolution of 29 December which called on her to stop fighting and withdraw to the original positions. Britain threatened to intervene and evict the Israelis from Sinai on the basis of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936. America, which was about to give Israel a massive loan, had also used its good offices with Tel Aviv, and the Israelis finally withdrew with broken hearts from Egypt. After a sharp cable from Washington threatening a "review of our attitude," Sharett and Ben Gurion explained to the Americans that their entry into Egypt was only "tactical" and necessitated by the military operations in Palestine.⁴¹ Col. Yigal Yadin insisted on keeping his forces near Rafa with the pretext that the border was not quite clear. The townlet of Rafa itself, he discovered, was administered by the British from Palestine.⁴² The same situation was repeated in 1956, and the compulsion which leaves "no choice" will remain the only principle appreciated by the government of Tel Aviv.

The Arab position in the north was totally liquidated in Operation Hiram. Like the position in the south plans were drawn for the "expulsion of the invader" and troops sat waiting for the opportunity. This was handed to them on a silver plate, on 22 October, by Qawaki's Liberation Army, which attacked a small Jewish settlement in the Arab territory on the Palestine border with Lebanon. Four brigades attacked the area on 29 October. Lebanon was threatened with invasion if it interfered in the capture of the whole of Arab Galilee. Lebanese territory was invaded although Lebanon had responded to their wishes. A score of villages were occupied and the soldiers stood at the Litani River, over which the Zionist Organization fought the French unsuccessfully. Now they had reached it, and the whole of Galilee was in their hands.

Following the capture of Beersheba, the Israelis pushed southward through the Wadi Araba in preparation for the conquest of the rest of the Negev. Abdulla invoked the treaty with Britain and called upon his allies for the protection of Aqaba. A British detachment was sent accordingly. On 24 February, the Israelis penetrated Sinai again, regardless of the Armistice Agreement which was already in force. On 5 March, they advanced to the Gulf of Aqaba with little resistance until they occupied on 10 March, Um Rashrash, which was destined to become the Port of Eilat. Another detachment was sent from Sedom on the Dead Sea to occupy Ayn Jadi on the western coast, east of Hebron. Both operations were

(41) McDonald, *op. cit.*, pp. 108, 111.

(42) *Zionist Review*, 14 January 1949.

carried out whilst the truce talks were going on between Transjordan and Israel. The invading forces were instructed to act with the maximum of caution, avoid clashes with Arab forces and conceal their advance from the eyes of the world.⁴³ The task was made easy by the Arab governments who were even keener on concealing the same facts lest their peoples might hear of the extent of their losses. The Egyptians, for example, were never told that the Israelis had captured Beersheba.

The Fight for Jerusalem

One of the greatest jokes of the ancient world was the name of Jerusalem—"the city of peace." No other city has witnessed or caused as much fighting and destruction as Jerusalem. In recent history, it became, during the nineteenth century, the direct cause of the Crimean War. The question of the Holy Places was discussed after the war, and the only solution which could be found was to leave things as they were. The principle of the *status quo ante bellum* was reaffirmed in the peace talks after the 1878 war. Muslim fears for the Holy Places were heard as soon as the words of the Balfour Declaration reached the eastern Mediterranean. Commander Hogarth of the Arab Bureau in Cairo was instructed by the British Government, in January 1918, to reassure Sharif Husain that the Mosque of Omar would remain a Muslim concern and would not be subjected "directly or indirectly to any non-Muslim authority."⁴⁴

The Mandatory Power followed the same rule and meticulously applied it throughout the critical years of the Arab-Jewish conflict. The Zionists, however, found the principle detrimental to their expansionist drive. It was urged that the Jewish rights regarding the Holy Places were better protected by the terms of the Mandate than by the international arrangement of the *status quo*, which in this case was not to their advantage.⁴⁵ The Mandatory was called upon to introduce new changes in favour of the Jews, but the Administration was unmoved. The Arabs were convinced that the moment the Jews had the opportunity, they would alter the *status quo* and seize the Mosque and the adjoining Waqf area, the reputed site of the Temple of Solomon. When the Mufti was asked by the Peel Commission whether he really believed that the Jews could end the Mandate and do that, he replied, "The Jews can do anything as far as Palestine is concerned."⁴⁶ The Mufti's fears were based, *inter alia*, on a number of pronouncements made by the Zionists to that effect. The Royal Commission of 1929 reported that Chief Rabbi Kook in his evidence before the commission had affirmed the desire to rebuild the Temple on the site of the Mosque, the second sacred shrine for the Muslim after the Ka'ba. The Chief Rabbi, however, observed that the event would not take place until the coming of the Messiah.⁴⁷

(43) Lorch, *op. cit.*, p. 441.

(44) Report of Commander Hogarth in Cmd. 5964, 1939.

(45) Report of the Palestine Zionist Executive to the Zionist Congress of 1929.

(46) Cmd. 5479, 1937.

(47) Cmd. 3530, 1930.

The Rabbi's condition serves no purpose except, perhaps, propaganda. The establishment of Israel and the ingathering of the Jews had remained for centuries dependent on "the coming of the Messiah." But when the time was ripe, the rabbis found no difficulty in reaching a new interpretation which made the Messiah unnecessary.⁴⁸

The termination of the Mandate which the Mufti predicted aroused a deep-seated fear among the Muslims. The Arab Higher Committee issued a statement saying that the Jewish Agency was preparing the minds of the world for the removal of the Islamic Holy Places and the rebuilding of the Temple.⁴⁹ The Christians had similar fears for the *status quo* of Jerusalem. Representatives of all the Christian churches in the area met in Jerusalem on 3 March and issued a statement denouncing the Partition Plan. This aspect, of course, was only one part of the problem. More basic was the middle class struggle for this important business centre and market of two hundred thousand people. The Arabs had no experience or appreciation of such a thing as a *corpus separatum*, or a belief in an international regime. In Jerusalem they were outnumbered by the Jews,⁵⁰ and the city could easily slip into the hands of their enemies.

Soon after they heard of 29 November Partition, the Arabs decided that the only method of handling this urban centre, teeming with a hundred thousand Jews, was to blockade it. Jerusalem was in the midst of an Arab area and its only contact with the main body of the Yishuv was through an undulating hilly road 30 miles long linking it with Tel Aviv. The guerrillas took up their positions along the route and severed this artery of life. Operation Nachshon for the liberation of Jerusalem began on 1 April, and a number of Arab villages, including the strategic Qastal, were occupied.

The Jewish Agency heard, in the second half of April, that the British were bringing the date of their evacuation of Jerusalem forward. Operation Jebusi was drawn for the capture of the Holy City as soon as the British left. Two brigades were allocated for the operation. A convoy of 350 vehicles, escorted by armoured cars and accompanied by the leading officials of the Jewish Agency, was sent to the city. The length of the convoy and the presence of Ben Gurion at the head of it (no white horse though) indicated the purpose of the journey. Ben Gurion was determined to make Jerusalem his capital. In the same spirit as he had opposed fixing the frontiers of Israel, he told the journalists in Tel Aviv, "There would not be a capital of the Jewish State as there could be no substitute for Jerusalem, but a seat of government would be selected."⁵¹ The convoy was mauled by an ambush and

(48) Rabbi Zevi Hirsch Kalischer of Thorn (Russia), published in 1861 "*The Quest of Zion*" in which he advocated, with much documentation from the Scripture and the Talmud, that the restoration of Israel did not actually need any Messiah. Rabbi Fishman made a complete turn about when he told the UNSCOP that the Jews must return first and then the Messiah would come.

(49) *Al-Abram*, 3 March 1948.

(50) The population of the city of Jerusalem (excluding the villages) was 33,700 Muslims, 31,300 Christians, 99,300 Jews.

(51) *Zionist Review*, 13 February 1948.

its purpose was therefore frustrated. The second leg of the operation began, aiming at the capture of Beit Ikse, Sha'afat and the neighbouring villages north of Jerusalem. Inside the Holy City, the operation involved the occupation of all British posts as soon as evacuated, the capture of the Arab positions which threatened the Old City and the linking up of the Old City with the New City (Jewish).

The second objective was a piece of expansionist mockery reminiscent of the imperial dust throwing. The Old City was inhabited by 20,000 Arabs and 1,700 Jews. To speak of occupying the Arab positions which threatened the Old City could only mean the occupation of that City. Part of this conquest was, in fact, the demolition of the Arab dwellings surrounding the Jewish Quarter. The plan was only abandoned for lack of sufficient explosives. The question of linking up the Old City with the New City required the occupation of the Arab district of Qatamun, and the linking up of Mount Scopus required the capture of Shaykh Jarrah. The Hagana occupied the key positions like St. Simon's Monastery as staging posts for the operation. Shaykh Jarrah was conquered on 25 April, A cease-fire was declared on 28 April, but the Hagana renewed hostilities the following day in Qatamun and occupied it. The Arabs, stricken with panic, evacuated Lifta. Although the truce was still binding, the Hagana continued to advance with agility from house to house and from street to street until the last day of the Mandate. The offensive to conquer the Old City was stopped by the cease-fire.

Operation Pitchfork started on 14 May, the last day of the Mandate. The Hagana had even bombed the city by air until the Arab position had become entirely desperate. This played into the hands of Abdulla, who was able to impress on Glubb the urgency of moving into the Holy City.⁵² The Arab Legion counter-attacked on 19 May, recaptured Shaykh Jarrah and rescued the Old City, but they could never salvage all the Arab areas captured by the Hagana. The Israelis occupied 80.8 per cent of Jerusalem.

The responsibility for the Jerusalem fighting is another bone of academic contention. Count Bernadotte put the blame on the Jews.⁵³ While there had been some mob violence, the Arabs had no operational plans for the conquest of the city. They made no attack on New Jerusalem, and the vulnerable Jewish Quarter suffered no more than sporadic molestation. Their danger to Jewish Jerusalem hinged on controlling its route to Tel Aviv and eventually the subjugation of the city, like the rest of the country, to an Arab Government.

The Zionists, on the other hand, envisaged a definite capture of the city and, preferably, the expulsion of most of its Arabs. The capture of Shaykh Jarrah was, in fact, carried out as early as 13 January, but the British Army took it back and restored it to the Arabs. The Hagana objectives were not restricted to opening roads and maintaining contacts only but also included the siege of the Arab quarters. The moves to occupy Shaykh Jarrah, the Isawiya village and

(52) Photo-copy of Abdulla's message in Glubb, *op. cit.*

(53) Bernadotte, *op. cit.*, p. 204.

the Augustus Victoria Hospital meant the closure of Arab communications in the area. The operation against the villages to the north was calculated to create the same position as that of Jaffa. It was hoped that Jerusalem would surrender, once disconnected from the rest of Palestine.

The story of the Jewish quarter is another example of Zionist expansion and subversion. The few hundred Jews living in the Old City were by no means disposed to nationalist sentiments. The majority of them were remnants of the old orthodox oriental community who found in Zionism their bitter foe. Israel, to them was, and still is, a blasphemy. They have never recognised it, and years after its establishment they applied to the United Nations for the internationalization of the Holy City. These Jews had even made a demonstration to the Arab quarters to deliver themselves and oppose the Zionist solution for their city. The Hagana had to prevent them, with the result of some casualties.⁵⁴ It was not the only measure undertaken by the Zionists to undermine the position of the Jewish Quarter.

The Arabs, realising that the Old City Jews were not their enemies, were willing to accept in December 1947, a peaceful agreement in which the British would undertake the protection of the Jews in return for an assurance that no arms or volunteers were sent to the quarter. The Administration was soon forced to imprison some of the Hagana men for arms smuggling. A new commander was spirited into the quarter to infuse the inhabitants with the spirit of "resistance," and to enforce a "general mobilization." A new line was set up behind the British line, and as soon as the British withdrew, the Hagana took up the vacated positions.⁵⁵ It was by sheer intimidation that the old inhabitants were made to join the so-called War of Liberation, and it was in the service of this war that the Hagana declined to answer the truce proposal put by the High Commissioner on 12 May (accepted by the Arabs).⁵⁶

One more expansionist plan drawn up during the four weeks truce was Operation Kadem, for the capture of the Old City. The Hagana reached its target during the ten days fighting, but failed to occupy it. Colonel Begley, Senior U.N. Observer, proposed a permanent truce for Jerusalem on 14 July, but Dov Joseph gave him a negative reply and merely promised to forward the proposal to Shertok.⁵⁷ The military expectation, however, bore no fruit as the Arab Legion dug in and kept its lines. Brig. General David Shaltiel stated that his troops would occupy the Old City in the next fighting,⁵⁸ but he had already wasted the opportunity and was therefore replaced by a more aggressive commander, young Moshe Dayan.

By the end of the year, the United Nations had passed three resolutions on the internationalization of Jerusalem. Both Transjordan and Israel behaved indifferently to the resolutions. Once Israel was admitted to the United Nations,

(54) *Al-Abram*, 26 February 1948.

(55) Lorch, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-185.

(56) Kirk, *Short History of the Middle East*, p. 266.

(57) Dov Joseph, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

(58) *Zionist Review*, 30 July.

the Knesset voted on 29 June 1950 for the incorporation of Jerusalem as an "integral part" of Israel. The Government started to move its offices to the New City as the capital of the State. Only the Foreign Ministry was left behind because no foreign government was prepared to put its ambassador in Jerusalem, in violation of the U.N. resolutions. The Government resorted to various means, including creating accommodation difficulties in Tel Aviv, and at the same time providing facilities in Jerusalem to induce the diplomatic missions to move. But nothing worked, and they had to issue a statement on 1 June 1953 pretending that the delay in moving the Foreign Ministry was only due to practical obstacles. The Zionists stood firmly against the internationalization. They were once ready to accept it in order to placate an imperialist power,⁵⁹ but who is the United Nations Organization? In a conversation with Ben Gurion, James G. McDonald reported that the "old man" was pleased with the U.N. inaction as it gave him time to establish even more firmly his control over the New City. "After all, is not possession nine-tenths of the law?"⁶⁰ Count Bernadotte cried to the moon in beseeching Ben Gurion's Government to submit any positive proposals regarding the demilitarization of Jerusalem. Abdulla was eager for the step as he recognised the lurking wolf behind the barbed wire. Bernadotte had to content himself with perusing the proposals of Amman. There was only a short spell when Tel Aviv seemed to have accepted the idea, but soon Moshe Sharett was forced to recant and call it an error.⁶¹ He called for the annexation of both Jerusalem and Galilee with this reasoning:

"However, the Christian world failed to protect even the Holy Sepulchre from being shelled by a Christian commander. It is only we who protected the Holy City against conquest by the forces of Islam . . ."⁶²

The Armistice Talks

By the end of 1948, all the Arab States were defeated and the only hope left them was for the sheer survival of their homelands. Egypt accepted cease-fire talks on 6 January. In the series of meetings held in Rhodes, the Egyptians demanded the implementation of the Security Council resolution pertaining to the withdrawal of the Israelis. Israel demanded the withdrawal of the Egyptians from Palestine. The final outcome was the expulsion of the Egyptians from the Negev with only the Gaza Strip, narrower and shorter than was envisaged in the Partition Proposal, left in the hands of the Arabs. The Gaza border was moved further west causing a number of Arab villages to lose their lands on the other side. One bone of contention in the talks was the sovereignty of the Auja area. This is the strategic point dominating the entire desert expanse of the Negev and Sinai. Any conqueror must control the Auja before moving either way. The Israeli command recognised its importance and insisted on its inclusion in the Israeli State, although

(59) Weizmann to Lord Bertie, *The Diary of Lord Bertie*, London, 1924, Vol. I, p. 105.

(60) McDonald, *op. cit.*, p. 208.

(61) Bernadotte, *op. cit.*, pp. 203, 206, 207.

(62) *Zionist Review*, 25 June 1948.

it was given to the Arabs in the Partition Proposal. It was finally arranged to make it a demilitarized zone under U.N. control. After a few years, Israel seized the area from which she launched all her successful attacks on Egypt.

The talks with Transjordan dragged on until Israel was able to receive from Abdulla the strip of land to the north and west of the Arab Triangle, where they had demanded some 400 square kilometers of strategically and economically important lands. Moshe Dayan came too late to win Jerusalem by war but he was able to receive some demarcation advantages from his opposite number at the conference table. The Negev was another issue. Realising that the law of conquest had become the law in Palestine, General Glubb mentioned that the Transjordanians had already been in the area, since June. But before he could have his say, the Israelis had made another conquest of the Negev. The *Zionist Review* carried an article mentioning that the Israelis had negotiated with Abdulla a satisfactory agreement on Aqaba, but the British Government interfered and torpedoed the agreement.⁶³ Israel had thus lost Aqaba.

When the Lebanese entered the negotiations on 1 March, the Israelis were occupying fourteen villages inside their territory. Tel Aviv insisted that to hand back the villages, the Lebanese must hand back Kfar Ras Nigra on the coast. The last bit of the Arab territory in Galilee was ceded to Israel. Lebanon had to give up also right of passage through her territory west of Metula and accept minor border adjustments in favour of Israel. The talks with Syria ended with a compromise, according to which the Syrians abandoned some of the territory which they had won and established demilitarised zones in the remainder. The zones were soon taken over by the Israelis.

Efficient machinery was set to work upon the conquered land to obliterate all evidence of former Arab ownership. The names of the smallest uninhabited hills were changed. Even Jaffa is now printed "Yafo" in English maps produced in Tel Aviv. Maps produced by the Survey of Israel are as intelligible to a non-Israeli as the mediaeval map of al-Idrisi. Throughout the armistice talks, Israel used a double standard in regard to the territorial settlements. What she had won by the force of arms belonged to her by right of conquest. What the Arabs had won by force of arms must be handed back by virtue of the Mandate border agreements or the UNSCOP Proposal. The cease-fire settlements added 25,000 Palestinians to the swelling number of refugees, from those who were made destitute by being cut off from their lands by the demarcation lines. The whole town of Gaza was separated from its immediate market.⁶⁴ The dispossessed villager sat back brooding on vengeance, re-conquest or rebellion:

"He can see his land across the line, but he enters upon it to tend his orange groves or harvest his crops at the peril of his life."

The 1948 fighting taught the Zionists that force, after all, is the best means

(63) Z.R., 21 January 1949.

(64) Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, 1949.

of achieving their aims. From 1880 until 1947, they could only acquire some one million and a half dunums of agricultural lands with all the money and ingenuity at their disposal. But a few weeks fighting had brought under their control over four million dunums of Arab agricultural lands. The area of the Israeli state increased from 16,000 sq. kms. according to the UNSCOP Proposal, or 56 per cent of the territory of Palestine, to 20,600 sq. kms., or 77 per cent of the same territory. According to the Partition Proposal, there ought to be 416,000 Arabs in the Jewish state, but the fighting reduced the problem to 150,000 Arabs only. Israel had taken the best parts, not only of Palestine, but of the UNSCOP Arab territory as well, particularly the lands extending along the border from Jenin in the north to Latrun in the south. The Palestinians were left with a collection of hills on the West Bank, littered with bare rocks and patches of shallow soil—and some half a million more people to feed.

Zionist apologists have their justifications for the 1948 conquest. They say the invasion of Palestine by the Arab States was an illegal act and a violation of the U.N. authority. Their expulsion from Palestine and the capture of the areas under their control were, morally and legally, correct. The Palestinians engaged in terrorist attacks and endangered the existence of the Jewish settlements. Punishing them and capturing their villages were necessary.

The Arabs reply that they did not challenge the U.N. authority as the Partition Resolution came in the form of a recommendation only. With the Mandate ended, the authority reverts to the majority of the people, according to the principle of self-determination. It was this majority who invited the Arab armies into Palestine to put down the rebellion of the Jewish minority.

The attack of the Arab armies on territory allocated to the Jewish State brings such questions from the Arabs: Has the United Nations the authority to divide and dispose of any country in any other way than by self-determination of its inhabitants? Was its resolution a binding obligation or a free recommendation? The entry of Arab armies into the UNSCOP Arab territory does not seem hard to justify. The Palestinians had no government of their own to extend a formal invitation, but it cannot be denied that the majority of the Palestinians and what political organizations they had, appealed for the succour of these armies, and the Arabs do not find it difficult to document this appeal. Iraq, Lebanon and Transjordan kept themselves within the Arab territory. Israeli attacks upon their positions were therefore acts of aggression. The same can be said about the Gaza Strip.

Israel also claimed that the failure to establish an Arab state in UNSCOP Arab territory altered the whole context of the boundary problem.⁶⁵ Israel could be as entitled to that territory as the other Arab states. Tel Aviv has never recognised Jordan's authority on the West Bank and continued to call it "Palestinian areas now under its control." The UNSCOP proposal, in fact, had never put the

(65) Cf. Israeli reply to the United Nations Mediator's proposals.

establishment of a state as a condition for the Arab right to their allotted territory.⁶⁶ It is certainly within the rights of the inhabitants to join any neighbouring state.

Harry Sacher recognised the difficulty of placing the blame on the Arabs. Leaving the legalistic arguments of his colleagues behind, he referred to the courage, blood and skill with which the Israelis had achieved their annexations, "and in the judgement of history these have been title deeds."⁶⁷ Of course, Mr. Sacher meant history as taught in the Nahalal primary schools, i.e. the history which makes up his own knowledge. It is indeed the law of might (courage) and the right of conquest (skill) with which the 1948 annexations must be justified or nothing at all.

The whole conduct of the war was developed in a purposeful expansionist manner. Kol Israel had called for the establishment of historical Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates and the occupation of Aqaba (in Transjordan) during the fighting.⁶⁸ The hope was reiterated, on 8 October, by the Israeli delegate at the United Nations when he opposed the secession of any part of the Negev and urged the inclusion of Aqaba in Israeli territory. Two days after the announcement of the first truce, opinion began to gain ground in the Government for a revision of the boundaries. Begin made the whole matter a question of military possibilities. Had they received the arms and ammunition, which arrived after the truce, from the start of the fighting, they could have conquered all the West Bank, "at least." He declared that the operation, as envisaged in January 1948, was based on the "strategy of conquest." It included the capture of Jerusalem, Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla and the Arab Triangle.⁶⁹

It is absurd to try and justify the 1948 annexations on moral or legal grounds, or, for that matter, to find when the Arabs had erred in their moves. They were already in the net, hard as they might have tried to escape. Israel must have its *Lebenraum*, to borrow from the terminology of the good teacher of the Zionists. Palestine did not belong to the Arab States, but the Jerusalem Zone did belong to the supreme authority of the U.N. Yet, Israel had invaded the zone, occupied it, and flouted all the U.N. resolutions on its status. Having defeated and expelled the Arab armies, Tel Aviv could have reinforced its moral position by restoring the captured territories to the unfortunate refugees under secured arrangements.

The Arab was made to play that unfortunate "corner" game of the "Games People Play" discussed by Dr. Eric Burn. Heads, the Arab loses; and tails, the Israeli wins. The game was based on the Zionist understanding of the Arab mentality and position. The passive Arabs do not act, but react. The initiative had

(66) The UNSCOP Report says: "Independence shall be granted to each state upon its request only."

(67) Sacher, *Israel: The Establishment of a State*, p. 245.

(68) Glubb, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

(69) Begin, *op. cit.*, pp. 155, 348.

thus rested in the hands of their enemies who ran the game and put the Arab on the suitable square.

Those, like General Glubb, who thought that the Arabs could have avoided misfortune simply by accepting the UNSCOP proposal, seem to put an illusory wedge between the cause and its effect. The Zionists justified the capture of many villages on account of their danger or their terrorist activities. Jaffa pledged to keep the peace, and did so. Yet it was attacked and taken. Deir Yassin not only kept the peace, but had actually done the policing duty for the Hagana by denying passage to the guerrillas. Yet Deir Yassin was not only captured, but also had its inhabitants massacred to boot. There was no way out for the Arabs.

CHAPTER X

BETWEEN THE WARS

Woe to the Vanquished

The 1948 war left the Arabs completely in the hands of their enemies. Their only escape was found in whatever sympathy or common interest the Great Powers might show. Sinai was saved on account of the pressure which Britain used on behalf of Egypt. A similar international interest saved Samaria for Abdulla. The truce came too soon, and Israel's conquests were left incomplete. There was bitterness felt by the commanders against the United Nations and the Great Powers, and even against the Israeli politicians, for interrupting their plans.

The cease-fire agreements were signed and the world was already tired of Israel's violations of agreements and extensive campaigns, as indicated in the New York and Washington reports. Eyes were turned to the internal scene where 2,500 square miles had been added to the Israeli State. Some five million dunums of private Arab property, a few hundred villages and a few thousand houses and premises had been left to the mercy of the government. The fighting had rendered incalculable service to the Jewish Agency which despatched thousands of Jews during the war, and in its aftermath, to Palestine. Out of the 295,000 immigrants who arrived in Israel during the early months of its establishment and until September 1949, 130,000 were accommodated in a total of 43,000 units of property left by the Palestinians.¹ Of the 370 colonies established between 1948 and the beginning of 1953, 350 were set up on Arab absentee lands. One-third of the entire Israeli Jewish people lived on such properties.²

During the last critical years of the British Administration, a number of emergency regulations were issued, giving the authorities the right of deportation and expropriation. The Zionists, having described them as racial and Nazi, found them now reasonable, and turned them to good use against the Arabs, whom they were meant to protect. In addition, they promulgated, in 1948, the Abandoned Areas Regulations, which enabled the authorities to take over properties left by the refugees. The Regulations affected all areas and villages "deserted by all or part of its inhabitants." As no village could be expected, in the kind of war fought in Palestine in 1948, to remain intact, the whole of Arab lands and villages became subject to arbitrary expropriation. In fact, some of the properties were taken over because their owners happened to be away for no more than a few hours. Well versed in the means of law evasion, the ex-Jewish Agency

(1) *The Israeli Economist*, 1949-50, The Absorption of Immigrants, by Dr. Sz. Wahrhaftig.
(2) Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*, Washington, 1958, p. 143.

officials reinforced the existing regulations by enacting the Civil Emergency Laws and Regulations, which gave the authorities the right to declare any Arab town or village an abandoned property, regardless of whether there had been any abandonment or not. The new term of "absentee" was coined to describe anyone who happened to have left his property before or after the establishment of the state, and for whatever time or distance. This included a total of 30,000 Arabs who had moved from one area of Israel to another. Their properties became subject to expropriation. A particular target for this policy was Galilee, where a number of peaceful villages like Ma'alul, Birwa, Safuri and Mujaydal were taken from their inhabitants.

The fate of Arab properties was left in the hands of the military governor, who disposed of the properties with arbitrary rule and under the sacred heading of security. Only on a few occasions could the fellahin manage to get his decision annulled by the Supreme Court, the true pride of Israel. The Baram and Ikrit groups of villages were blessed with such a ruling, but when the villagers went to re-inhabit their homes, they found that the army had beaten them to it and destroyed the villages. One village, Kharbat Jalama, was in fact ransacked by the idealist inhabitants of a neighbouring kibbutz.³

The authorities were vexed by two features of the Israeli Arabs in their relations with them. Those who remained in their villages were people who had attachment to their land strong enough to prevent them from joining the rest of the refugees. They were also docile and peaceful types who obeyed the Hagana instructions. It was, therefore, difficult to dislodge such people from their properties. Here was a good opportunity for the military governor to show his ingenuity. The governors, the big brothers in the Orwellian sense as described by Walter Schwarz, drew their authority from the Emergency Regulations issued under the Law of Administration Ordinance. Nearly all Arab citizens were subject to military rule. Their area was divided into three security zones with perpetual night curfew. Movement in the zones was restricted and the Arabs had to get a "visa" from "Big Brother" to travel between most Arab towns. They had to follow particular routes and keep their passes ready. Jewish settlements were out of bounds and so were many selected areas. The fellah was not allowed to visit some places at all.

Offenders were dealt with summarily in military courts with little or no access to civil courts, even in matters of civil law. "Big Brother" was empowered by the Regulations to impose curfew hours, withdraw telephone, postal and other state services, close any areas, occupy villages and cause the villagers to reimburse the expenses of occupation, dispose of vehicles, animals and movables, deport Arab citizens or deprive them of employment, and impose restrictions on their business or freedom of movement. In addition, the district commissioners were empowered to expropriate lands and properties.⁴

(3) Schwarz, W., *The Arabs in Israel*, London, 1959, p. 69. Walter Schwarz is a moderate Zionist.

(4) Israeli Government, Collection of Regulations, 1949.

Where requisition was impracticable, the military governor stepped in to perform the task in a quiet manner. By imposing restrictions on movement, business and working hours in any area, the villagers needed all their stubbornness to resist the temptation to sell or depart. By prohibiting their travel to the market, they were forced to sell their crops on the spot to Jewish monopolists, including the cooperative societies, who could dictate their own prices. They could have no protection because the Histadrut did not admit them as members.⁵ Where the product was state controlled, the Arabs were given lower prices for the same commodity. The price of Arab produced tobacco, for example, was I£1.800 per kilogram, but the price of Jewish tobacco was I£2.500 per kilogram. After protest and agitation, state control was ended, but Arabs found that no one would buy their products.⁶ In other cases, they were not allowed to tend their fields and orchards with the technical implication that they became "absentees" and their properties "abandoned." The inhabitants of Kfar Daram, the little Christian village near the Lebanese border, were ordered by the Jews to leave their village during the fighting. They obeyed the order, but they never saw their village again. They became absentees. Their case remained an "unfortunate" mistake, the excuse given generally when even these comprehensive regulations failed to achieve their purpose.⁷

The Land Acquisition Law was promulgated in 1953 to legalise the four year record of robbery (the description given by Ihud). All properties which were not in possession of their owners on 1 April 1952, after the preceding three years of deportation and dispersion, were expropriated. The Law also gave the government the right to expropriate any land for a number of reasons—defence being the usual one. Compensation was provided for at a rate far below the current market price. Mr. Eliezer Kaplan, the Ministry of Finance, admitted on presenting the bill to the Knesset that, "In some outstanding cases, the authorities had requisitioned land to which they had really no right." The *Jerusalem Post* reported that there was almost unanimous agreement in the Knesset that the requisitioning of Arab properties had not been always necessary.⁸ The Mapam "Marxists," however, did not show up in the Knesset to a man. They had good reason for disappearing as they had their own share of the loot. The unnecessary requisitioning is an admission of a deeper evil. The old Zionist policy of acquiring more lands than are required for the immigrants manifested itself in stronger terms after the establishment of Israel. The Zionists, who promised the world a fuller utilisation of the fallow lands of the Middle East, left thousands of dunums of Arab tilled lands fallow. The middle class immigrants continued to prefer the urban life of the cities, and the government was forced eventually, to lease 100,000

(5) Until April 1957, the crucial land grabbing period, no Arab was allowed membership of the Histadrut. After that date, Arabs who served in the Israeli Army were admitted. The Divide and Rule principle, openly pursued, allowed only Druze Arabs into the Army.

(6) *Ner*, May-June 1958.

(7) The story of this village and its militant priest is given in Schwarz, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-5.

(8) *Jerusalem Post*, 11 and 13 March 1953.

dunums back to the Arabs.⁹ But as late as 1960, there were still 20,000 displaced Arabs living idly in shacks¹⁰ a few miles away from the untilled lands.

The vast properties belonging to the Waqf (Islamic religious endowment) were seized and utilised according to the needs of Jewish immigration and settlement, in total disregard to the directions of the founder of the Waqf and the conditions of his endowment. The Waqf affairs, as a religious function, had been left for generations in the hands of a Muslim administration. The British Government respected the arrangement and set up the Supreme Muslim Council to look after the Waqf. The U.N. Partition Resolution directed also that the endowments' interests should be respected, a provision which is quite unnecessary in the world of the sacred right of ownership. The Israeli Government, however, took the view that as most Arabs had left the country, the Waqfs became abandoned properties—a fallacious argument, as the Waqf is an endowment with a built in arrangement for perpetuation related to defined objects. Nevertheless, the lands were handed over to the Development Authority. The Supreme Muslim Council was replaced by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the Mufti (the head of the Muslim community) was replaced by the Rabbi at the head of Waqf affairs. The riches of this institution are not unlike the riches of the church in any country. Its present income is incalculable, as the government has shrewdly included it under the other items of the Development Authority.

The outcome was the Arab loss of over four million dunums. There are many estimates as to the precise total of Arab properties in the new State of Israel. The records and most of the reports of the Custodian of the Absentee Property, together with the discussions of the Finance Committee of the Knesset, remain a guarded secret. The various attempts made by the United Nations to solicit information from the authorities, in accordance with standing UN resolutions, have brought no fruit.¹¹ According to the land survey of 1945, there should be 4,930,000 dunums in Arab possession in Israel. Twelve years later, this figure was reduced to 680,000 dunums. Within a few months only, the Israelis had freely acquired three times the land which the Jews had ever managed to hold in Palestine until 1948. The Development Authority declared officially that it had received 1,300,000 dunums in accordance with the 1953 Land Acquisition Law.¹² In addition, the Bedouin had lost their grazing and settlement rights in ten million dunums in the Negev.¹³ Shortly before the establishment of Israel, Ben Gurion had given this assurance in his address to the XXII Zionist Congress: "We do not wish and cannot take away from the Arabs in Palestine anything that they have or anything that they need for their existence." This was for the benefit of the United Nations and the Arabs. The JPA News, which is distributed to the

(9) Don Peretz, *op. cit.*, p. 131.

(10) *Ner*, May-June 1960.

(11) Don Peretz, *op. cit.*, p. 142.

(12) Schwarz, *op. cit.*, p. 98.

(13) Observations of Arab States on Working Paper of Land Experts, UN Document A/AC.25/W.85.

Zionist rank and file, explained a few weeks later that there were 7,500,000 dunums of cultivable lands in the UNSCOP Jewish territory. Only 1,500,000 dunums of this total belonged to the Jews and the rest is mainly owned by the Arabs. The JPA News said that 3,000,000 dunums would be "purchased" from the Arabs.¹⁴

The Palestinians reached the end of their tether in 1958, after their failure to achieve any redress through protests to the Government and the United Nations. During the celebrations of May Day, they exploded in mass demonstrations and riots under the slogan, "Stop the Land Grabbing." The more activist Palestinians organised themselves in an underground movement given the name of "al-Ardh" (the Land). Their outcry found echoes in a few individual Jews who expressed their protest against the Government in various forms, including squatting on the land destined for expropriation. The Israeli apologists, on the other hand, were stunned by the ungratefulness of the Arabs and pointed to comparative health and income statistics which put the Israeli Arabs in a more favourable light than their kinsmen in the neighbouring countries. The figures may be quite correct, but they could never incorporate all the unknowns, the might-have-beens, the relevant and less relevant considerations. For one thing, the income and standard of the Palestinian refugees who own the abandoned properties are not included in the Israeli arithmetic. Such a comparison is absurd. No one can be complacent about the Negroes of the New York ghettos by simply comparing their conditions with those of their kinsmen in the South. A comparison more to the point is to mention that on the basis of the figures given above, there were 6.6 dunums per Arab Palestinian under the British rule, against 3.2 dunums per Arab under the Israeli rule. The figures are even more shocking when we remember that nearly a million Arabs had left their lands to take refuge with their kinsmen. Nor was this the end of the story. The dispossessing of the Arabs continued years after the above figures were released. In 1962, three villages in Galilee were requisitioned, together with their 550 hectares of agricultural land, to make room for the town of Carmiel. Ihud commented on the measure:

"The new expropriation attests to the fact that there has been no change in the intentions of the authorities regarding the pitiful amount of land still left in the hands of Israel Arab residents and progressively disintegrating under the successive blows of a legislation that is discriminatory in practice if not according to the letter of the law."¹⁵

Bursting the Borders

During the Rhodes Cease-fire talks, the Israeli command were planning for the completion of the job. The West Bank of the River Jordan was still in the hands of the Palestinians. "Operation Shin-Tav-Shin" was drawn up for the expulsion of the Arab Legion but the conquest of the entire area was a serious step which could have brought wide international repercussions. Mr. Bevin wanted the area for his protege, King Abdulla, which made Israel waver in the implemen-

(14) JPA, 30 January 1948.

(15) *Ner*, July-August, 1962.

tation of the operational plan. The realisation of its existence, however, helped in forcing the hands of Abdulla during the talks and gaining valuable lands for Israel, but the full desire remained unfulfilled. The Arab "promentaries" to which Shertok referred, remained sticking in the body of Israel. The commanders bent over backwards looking for possibilities for filling in empty pockets and staking claims.

The persistent penetration, foot by foot, yard by yard, with armoured tractors, watch towers, continuous wrangling and firing, must have caused the UN Observer to curse the entire sacred area of the Middle East. Why couldn't the Jews go to bed and relax? Vladimir Jabotinsky anticipated the gentile criticism and answered it in front of the Peel Commission. He reminded them of Oliver Twist's famous word, "more"! The Jew, he said, was given the minimum, and it was his right to ask for more.¹⁶ There was always a patch of land to take, a few Arabs to expel, a tractor to go into a neutral zone.

In the story of the evasive peace, the UN observers stand as the accredited eye witnesses of the expansionist pressure, built up between the wars, along the 600 miles length of Arab-Israeli demarcation lines. The Palestine question took the new form of the border tragedies. Some of the refugees wanted to return to their homes by infiltration. Others had personal belongings, or a stray goat which they wanted to retrieve.¹⁷ The Arabs, because of the nature and history of their region, are not respectful of or accustomed to international frontiers. The nomads are not aware of them, and the various governments made the necessary allowance for this. It is the mode of Middle Eastern life to which the Israeli has remained a stranger. To him, shooting on sight was the accepted method of combating illegal entry. The monotonous acts filled many fat United Nations reports. Commander E.H. Hutchison, Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission in Jerusalem, has given accounts of the border stories between 1951 and 1955.¹⁸ His judgements were not only corroborated by his colleagues and senior officers, but were also considered as "ultra conservative."

The tension was at its worst in the Demilitarized Zones of some 100,000 acres created by the armistice agreements to ward off trouble and settle the disputed areas. The largest of these zones is al-Auja in the Negev. During the armistice talks in Rhodes, the Israelis demanded the withdrawal of Egypt from Gaza whereas the Egyptians countered by insisting on their opponents withdrawal from the Auja area. Both Gaza and al-Auja belonged to the Arab territory. The Israeli delegation was finally instructed, in February 1949, to agree to withdraw from al-Auja provided that the area was handed over to the United Nations as a demilitarized zone. The Israelis did not return the whole proposed territory but conceded only a small pocket about 22 miles along the Egyptian international frontier.

(16) Statement by V. Jabotinsky to the Royal Commission, 1936.

(17) Judge Benjamin Cohen, passing judgement on a border incident, said, "Infiltrators may mean a dangerous bandit or an innocent infant taken by his mother to her home." (*Jerusalem Post*, 2 January 1953.)

(18) Hutchison, E.H., *Violent Truce*, N.Y., 1956.

No sooner was the agreement signed, than the Israelis started to put the demilitarized zone to good use as a dumping place for the Bedouin of Israel. UN observers' investigations among the Auja Bedouin revealed that the Israelis were pushing the original inhabitants into Egypt by pushing in Bedouin from the Negev. The limited water resources were enough to build up the population pressure needed. The operation enabled the authorities to give the displaced Arabs an exile at al-Auja, and at the same time assume a *de facto* control over the zone. The effort to incorporate the area once and for all continued. According to the Armistice Agreement, no military forces were allowed in the zone. The obstacle was surmounted by infiltrating soldiers in the guise of settlers. Al-Auja was thus given its first kibbutz, Kibbutz Ketziat in 1953. The scarcity of water now drove away the Israeli Bedouin, the new inhabitants of the zone, and took them across the frontier to Egypt. About 3,500 members of the Azazma tribe were expelled in this manner and Tel Aviv shelved the Security Council resolution for their return. The area became a proper Israeli territory according to their population border theory. But the military presence could not pass unnoticed. The M.A.C. (Mixed Armistice Commission) investigated the matter and condemned the violation.

As the M.A.C. could do no better, the Egyptians took the matter into their own hands. They realised that it was not a question of a few square miles or a thousand bedouin, but a strategic move to establish a grip on the gateway indispensable as a forward base against Sinai. No commander can risk an attack on Sinai without al-Auja. Egypt established a post within the Demilitarised Zone, in the typical manner, i.e., not in quest of a real military encounter but as a prop for political or diplomatic pressure. Quarrels soon erupted over a few meters, giving enough cause to the peaceful civilian settlers to move in force and wipe out the post, killing some 50 Egyptians and taking over 40 prisoners. Zionist publicists successfully presented the case as one of an Egyptian military intrusion into a demilitarised zone. Their task was simple, as they only needed to suppress the mention of the Israeli civilian clothed soldiers. Israel was condemned by the M.A.C., the Egyptians were ousted, and the Zone of al-Auja went in its entirety to Israel. Its name on the map is now Nitsana.

The operation in al-Auja was carried out in conjunction with clearing out the lands straddling the border along the Gaza Strip. After a long period of quiet, no fida'iyin or marauders, the Israelis turned their eyes to this terrain early in the summer of 1953, and took action against the bedouin who lived on both sides of the Demarcation Line.

"Israel aeroplanes attacked Arabs and their herds of camels and goats. At the same time, incidents of increasing gravity occurred in the Demilitarised Zone itself. Israeli armed groups patrolled the zone; they shot at Bedouin at the two main wells; Arabs and their herds were killed by air and ground attacks; armed Israeli forces, up to approximately 30 men, shot the herds and burned the tents of the Bedouins."

Once the area was cleared, the settlements of Abu Ruth and Rahel were set up.¹⁹

All in all, between six and seven thousand bedouins, according to Bennike's report, were expelled from the Zone. The aggression on the bedouin, the non-political tribesmen, and the seizure of their lands disposes of the argument that the Palestinians were responsible for the Israeli acts of reprisal and expulsion. It was the story of the Red Indians—without the resistance of the Red Indians. Hunting down isolated bedouin was an exciting sport whose reports filled the Israeli press. A judge who tried two Israelis, charged with the murder of two bedouins, described the crime as "a horrible case of completely useless killing of innocent youths," and proceeded to sentence the murderers to five years!²⁰

The inhabitants of the Demilitarized Zone along the Syrian border met the same fate. The Israelis maintained that the zones belonged to them, and U.N. presence was only related to the demilitarization. They backed their claim with deeds and assumed control over the zones, which were highly fertile and not to be missed. Hence, the authorities moved the villagers to Acre and bulldozed their dwellings, where some 2,000 souls had lived. Baqra village, which housed some 350 of them and owned about 1,250 acres, aroused particular attention. Some of its people (95 souls out of a grand total of 350 people) were eventually allowed back, in deference to the Security Council resolution of 18 May 1951. The military governor, however, acted and made their return as unwelcome as possible, with his usual means of restriction on movement and business, which banned even the UNRWA relief supplies. In 1954, they could get no outlet at all to sell any of their crops. They continued to beseech General Burns to take them to Syria, a request which was eventually granted in 1956.²¹ Oliver Twist was given a few "more" acres.

The Tawafiq village had even a more tortuous story. The Israelis, following the concept of the washing-line frontier, pushed forward and established in 1950 a new kibbutz at Beit Katzir inside the zone by Lake Tiberias. From the kibbutz, they started to penetrate gradually into the farms of the Arabs. The tractor drivers "speeded up on each turn at the eastern boundaries of their fields, making the ploughs swerve out, thus slowly but surely extending their "previous" cultivation eastwards into Arab land. This was, of course, part of a premeditated Israeli policy to edge east through the demilitarized zone towards the old Palestine border (as shown on their maps) and to get all Arabs out of the way by fair means or foul."²²

From this kibbutz, the Israelis went on cultivating lands without any regard to the title deeds or the Arab rights. When the inhabitants of the Tawafiq village objected, the Israelis made a further violation of the Armistice Agreement by

(19) Report of Maj. General Vagn Bennike, Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision Organization to the Security Council, 27 October, 1953.

(20) *Jerusalem Post*, 2 January 1953.

(21) Accounts in Burns, *op. cit.*

(22) Horn, *op. cit.*

bringing in armed police supported by armoured vehicles. At the end of 1957, they began digging a ditch right through the village and sent their men to cut the barbed wire which the Arabs had put to protect their property. The fighting, for which the Israelis were looking, broke out, and for the price of one Israeli killed, Lower Tawafiq was taken and its inhabitants moved to safer grounds at Upper Tawafiq.

At the intervention of the M.A.C., the Israelis had to stop their work on this particular ditch. During the following year they began digging another ditch west of the village, promising not to cultivate the land adjoining the ditch—a promise which they had no intention of keeping, and which they broke a few months later. The M.A.C. had to step in and prevent them from digging yet a third ditch. Once more, they had to carry out their land annexation by making the M.A.C. observers *personae non gratae* in the kibbutz and the land adjacent to the ditch in violation of the Armistice Agreement. When the villagers tried to cultivate their land, armed policemen prevented them from doing their work. They eventually opened fire on the kibbutzniks who began to use their lands, and killed some of them. In January 1958, the villagers had to abandon their ploughs while Israeli and Syrian artillery fought it out.

General Van Horn gives this vivid picture, not only of the border landscape but also of the U.N. observer's despair:

"Gradually beneath the glowing eyes of the Syrians, who held the high ground overlooking the Zone, the area had become a network of Israeli canals and irrigation channels edging up against and always encroaching on Arab-owned property. This deliberate poaching was bitterly resented by the Syrians, who, shortly after a new canal had been started on 29 March (1958), opened fire on the Israeli irrigation teams . . .

"A close scrutiny soon showed me that the Israelis had been basing their claims in this area on the waterline of a small lake whose level had been steadily sinking for years since the last maps had been made. As its waters had receded, so the Israelis had advanced the frontier to their own advantage, a state of affairs not corroborated by the survey which had clearly marked the old level as the real boundary.

"Even the Book of Revelations could not have foreseen a situation in the Holy Land, where disputes over the level of a lake fringed with reeds and echoing to the call of flighting duck and the ugly rumble of bulldozers were to fill the air between Jerusalem and New York . . ." ²³

What is worthy of note at this juncture is the hungry desire for expansion which permeates every activity of a Zionist in Israel and extends from the Prime Minister down to the local tractor driver, who swings his plough slightly into Arab lands as he turns around, just to win a few more inches.

The other Demilitarized Zone was Mount Scopus in Jerusalem. Although the zone was entirely within the Jordanian territory and under U.N. supervision, no effort was spared in getting the Israeli possessions, the Hadassa Hospital and the Hebrew University, in combat readiness. According to the accounts of an Israeli prisoner-of-war, the so-called limited police detachment was a regular infantry unit of which the prisoner was a member. Two inch and three inch

(23) *Ibid.*, p. 78

mortar ammunition was captured by the Jordanians from Israeli smugglers.²⁴ A few of the smuggling operations were uncovered including the Barrel Incident which acquired a special notoriety in 1952. The tireless forward move started by claiming Solomon's Gardens and Israeli patrols were sent to it to validate the claim. The Jordanians opened fire and killed two of them, in May 1958. The Arabs living in the village of Isawiya were surrounded with barbed wire and their movements restricted. Even their right to dry manure was fervently contested. This development went hand in hand with another development calculated to remove the usual obstacle to Israeli expansion—namely U.N. supervision. The gradual corrosion of U.N. control over the Demilitarized Zone continued until the personnel of the M.A.C. joined the unhappy villagers of Isawiya in losing their own freedom of movement.²⁵ Constant vigilance on the part of the M.A.C. and the Jordanians prevented the wider aim of achieving the final coup. The Armistice Agreement established strips of no-man's land in Jerusalem. These were swiftly penetrated and annexed.

The Shop Window of Israel

The Arab Governments have blocked any channel of contact with the Israelis. No relations with the state at whatever level; no joint talks; boycott of all conferences, sports competitions and regional organisations in which Israel is represented. Students, diplomats and journalists abroad are barred from mixing with the Israelis. The only field of contact is the unavoidable field of the Demarcation Line. This is the shop window of Israel to the Arab world. Yet, it is exactly along the 600 mile line that the worst features of the new neighbour have been exhibited. The wrangling over a few square yards, the death and destruction because of them, and the persecution meted out to the fellahin who inhabited them could not fail to make their impression on the entire Arab world. The people in Cairo or Damascus do not know the Israelis. They form their pictures from the outcries heard along the borders and from the little tales which get multiplied into sagas as they travel along the roads to the capitals. The inhabitants of the Demilitarized Zones, by virtue of their access to both sides, could have become the missing link, the messengers of good will. Israel has done everything possible to remove them.

The political sovereignty over these villages was a contestable question. Their ultimate fate was left, according to the Armistice Agreement, to a final frontier settlement. Their control was given to the United Nations. But even if the Israeli claims of sovereignty were valid, the rights of the villagers to their lands could not be affected. Tel Aviv blocked this gap by exploiting one feature of the Arab position. Since the fellahin left for Syria, "of their own free will," they no longer remained Israeli subjects. They became Syrians. As foreign nationals, it was left to them to apply for visas from Israel to enter and administer their proper-

(24) Glubb, *op. cit.*, p. 342.

(25) Horn, *op. cit.*, p. 84; Hutchison, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

ties.²⁶ The Israeli representative at the Mixed Armistice Commission knew that this would involve Syria in recognition of the Israeli state. Leaving the political and legal aspects aside, there remains the human element. There was nothing religious or historical about these villages to bring tears to the eyes of Ben Gurion. The fellahin had been there for centuries. They knew no other land and could do no other job. The kibbutzniks were middle class people who were strangers to the farms. They had their own professions in which they could do better. Their life in Israel was not dependent on how many tomatoes or oranges they were growing but on how many dollars were being received from America. The cruelty to the inhabitants of these little hamlets cannot but inspire the lowest kind of feeling in the observer towards the authors of the deeds.

The reader may consider the reference to a few yards and inches a figure of speech. Yet, it is no more than the actual facts of the situation. To the south of Qalqilya, the Demarcation Line was drawn in such a way as to leave a small cistern three yards inside Israeli territory. As it happened, there was no cultivable land on the Israeli side and the cistern was useless to them. The Arabs, on the other hand, had relied on it for generations to water their little fields, until the Cease-fire Agreement had separated it from them. Not expecting any generosity from the Israeli representative, the fellahin proposed an exchange of three yards. When asked by the M.A.C. Observer whether Israel was prepared to allow the fellahin to use the water, the Israeli representative gave this curt reply, "If they cross the line, they will be shot."²⁷ It was the Zionist thesis that water in the Middle East was wasted and the Jews were coming to utilise every drop, for the good of the entire region!

The same story, but in reverse, occurred at Wadi Fukin. The village used to be inhabited by 350 people living on 11,000 dunums. After the Israeli bargain with Abdulla, the village lost 9,000 dunums to Israel. The remaining 2,000 dunums in Jordan were suitable only for grazing, with the exception of 400 dunums and these were supposed to maintain the same population. The water source fell on the Jordanian side of the border. On the agricultural lands which went to Israel, members of the Herut Party had set up a settlement opposite to Wadi Fukin. Rabbi Elmer Berger visited the area in 1955:

"I stood and saw with my own eyes how, since 1952 according to the UNRWA many Israelis have raided over the crest of the hill and, one by one, demolished the houses. The village is under a state of constant siege and systematic demolition. The objective, of course, is the water or spring which is still in Jordan."²⁸

All along the Demarcation Line, the military pressure and frequent massive raids on Arab border villages were part of the drive to get the adjacent lands as scarcely populated as possible in expectation of future conquests and annexations.

(26) *Jerusalem Post*, 6 January 1967.

(27) Hutchison, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

(28) Berger to Lessing J. Rosenwald, 25 May 1955, printed with other letters under the title, "Who knows better must say so," N.Y. 1955.

CHAPTER XI

SUEZ AND AFTER

The Three Year Plan

Following the Soviet fashion, most of the emergent states in Afro-Asia set out on their own three year, five year or seven year plans. In 1953, Ben Gurion thought out his own three year plan à la Israel.

By 1953, the Jewish State had absorbed its new conquered lands, and there was little left in Arab hands that could be taken away. Eyes were, then, turned outward across the Demarcation Line. Ben Gurion received his inspiration that a war was going to break out between the Egyptians and the Israelis in three years time, i.e., in 1956.¹ It was a simple inspiration as *he* knew that it was going to happen, and decided to have an immediate rest before the next encounter. Before tendering his resignation, he laid down a detailed programme for the army, his three year plan for conquest, and entrusted its implementation to Moshe Dayan, whom he had also appointed as Chief of Staff of the Israel Defence Forces at the same time.

Together with the military programme, there was the Seven Year Plan adopted at the same time, and providing for the diversion of 540 million cubic meters of the Jordan waters to the Negev and the arid plains of Israel. The principal canal of the Kinneret-Negev conduit was to tap the Jordan at Jisr Banat Ya'qub, south of Lake Huleh and across the Demilitarized Zone. A feeder canal from the Yarmuk, which flows in Israel for six miles only, was planned to divert its water to Lake Tiberias and then catch it from the southern end of the Lake and channel it to the Beisan plains, by another canal. The plan was another element in Ben Gurion's inspiration that there was going to be a war. After his return to the premiership, the plan was superseded, in 1956, by another one, which increased the amount of diverted water to 700 million c.m., i.e., 56 per cent of the total quantity available for irrigation, although only 23 per cent of the Jordan water originated in Israel.² The military programme aimed at throwing the last man in Israel into the war machine, and at getting this machine up to offensive capabilities on a campaign scale. The following were the seven points on which the programme was based:³

1. Strengthening the combat units and reducing the administration personnel.

(1) Lau Lavie, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

(2) O.Z. Ghobashy, *The Development of the Jordan River*, Arab Information Centre, N.Y.

(3) *Ibid.*

2. Building up the striking units of tanks, airforce and commandos.
3. Creating technical facilities for the speedy mobilisation of the people.
4. Transferring the supply and finance responsibilities to civilian departments.
5. Indoctrinating the new immigrants with Zionist ideology.
6. Developing the para-military youth organisation of Gadna.
7. Settling the Arab areas with Jewish colonisers.

These were the declared parts of the programme. The other parts which are not mentioned can be deduced from the course of events. The 1948-53 years passed comparatively quietly, although the wounds of the Arabs were at their worst, yet while the Arabs were quiet there appeared a marked escalation in the tension along the border. The same period of the three year programme was one of the worst periods in Arab-Israeli relations. The conclusion cannot be avoided. Moshe Dayan explained that border raids were necessary for military training. Ben Gurion knew that border tension was also necessary for the political green light of expansion. What most people, including the Israelis, had failed to see was that the bombastic speeches and border raids of the Arabs at the-time were, in fact, actuated by the Ben Gurion clique.

Within the context of the same programme, one can put in perspective the expulsion and liquidation of the bedouin tribes along the military route to Sinai from 1953 onwards. The strategic gateway of al-Auja was seized in 1955. One flaw in the military programme was the western embargo on arms to the Middle East. A strange bed-fellow was sought in France, also in 1953.⁴ A formal Franco-Israeli arms deal was signed in the following year and a second deal for the supply of aircraft and other weapons was made, in November 1955.

One element in Ben Gurion's inspiration was the impending British withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone. The agreement was finally reached in the summer of 1954 and provided for a phased evacuation to be completed in 1956, the year of the Sinai Campaign. Ben Gurion, according to T. Robertson, appreciated the advantages of such a withdrawal "particularly for a policy of territorial expansionism."⁵ There must have been also some appreciation of the Zionist expansion cycle which seems to explode in ten year periods 1921, 1928/9, 1936/7, 1947/8, 1956, 1967. The post-1948 war consolidation period was already past. The immigration line on the chart started to drop. So did the fund raising figures.

The one actor who failed to share the same appreciation was Moshe Sharett, who became the Prime Minister. Sharett had lived with the Arabs, knew Arabic well and was more a Middle Eastern character than Ben Gurion. His ambition was to see Israel accepted among the family of nations in the area. He was not a military man, and wanted to spare Israel the adventures of militarism. Therefore, he pursued a less aggressive policy and tried to reach some form of an *entente*

(4) According to Terence Robertson's conversation with Ben Gurion, *Suez Ten Years After*, BBC Third Programme Series, 1967, p. 61.

(5) Robertson, T., *Crisis*, London, 1965, p. 8.

with the Arab Governments. Mrs. Meir hurried to Sede Boker, where Ben Gurion was in retirement. The weak Sharett was letting the country slip into destruction. The "old man" was brought back to save Zionism from something worse than death, i.e., peace. The Israelis were told that he was brought back to put an end to the fida'iyyin, who hardly existed then. He was put at the head of the Ministry of Defence on 20 February 1955. One week later, two platoons of Israeli troops with armour columns penetrated three kilometres into Egyptian lines, reached the town of Gaza, and killed Captain M. Sadiq with 37 Egyptians and Palestinians, after destroying their positions. A pump house and a military camp were demolished.

General Burns happened to visit President Nasser a few weeks earlier. Nasser told the U.N. Chief Observer of his desire to maintain peace and avoid border incidents. He followed that with a visit to the Gaza Strip, where he reassured the troops that there was going to be no war and no incidents along the Demarcation Lines. On his second visit to the Egyptian President, after the Israeli raid of 28 February, General Burns detected a complete change of mood. Nasser explained that having reassured his men and lulled them into a false security, they were treacherously attacked.⁶

Ben Gurion's raid came after weeks of marked tranquillity on the Egyptian front. There were, in fact, more incidents with Jordan than with Egypt. Significantly, the author of the raid, Defence Minister Ben Gurion, dealt with the tension of the period and the acts of reprisal in his memoirs and failed to make any allusion to this most extensive operation.⁷

The shock to Nasser was profound. One day after the release of the news to his people, he pledged his armed forces to the policy of "returning aggression by aggression," a term which has kept cropping up in his political terminology ever since. In his speech, President Nasser made the deadliest explanation of Israeli expansion in terms of utilising truce for perpetrating surprise attacks on the deluded Arabs.

The Arabs fell once more into the trap and did what the Israeli expansionists wanted them to do. Nasser himself began to feel that Israel would never give him the chance to reconstruct Egypt. Somehow, Israel must be dealt with by force, first and foremost. Inter-Arab competition had also helped to shape this outlook. Egypt could not afford humiliation at the hands of Tel Aviv, if she wanted to assume the role of leadership and isolate Iraq, which became the centre of the Bagdad Pact. In the same speech, Nasser informed his enraged people that Abd al-Hakim Amer was instructed to prepare the army for the new policy of "aggression by aggression." The fida'iyyin squads were the summer fruit of the February seed. In September, he managed, like the Israelis, to break the arms embargo and sign the arms deal with Czechoslovakia. The confrontation was complete.

(6) Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

(7) Ben Gurion, *Israel, Years of Challenge*.

The second and more extensive Franco-Israeli arms agreement was reached in November, after posting Shimon Peres, the Director General of the Ministry of Defence, to Paris. Abba Eban puts forward a case that Israeli armament has been only a reaction to Egyptian rearmament notch by notch.⁸ Eban omits to mention that the first notch was the Franco-Israeli arms deal of 1953. Nasser, in fact, affirms that his agreement with Czechoslovakia was the result of the French deal.⁹

The general election in Israel was due in July 1955. During the campaign, Ben Gurion made the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba, the liquidation of the fida'iyin bases in Gaza and the irrigation of the Negev by tapping the River Jordan, his electioneering promises. On 20 July, he won the election. In August, he gave a lecture to the army officers on reprisal as a means of bringing the Arabs to the peace conference table by convincing them of Israel's invincibility. Moshe Dayan advocated the capture of Arab positions for political bargaining.¹⁰ *Komsomolskaya Pravda* quoted him, on 4 October 1967, as having advocated the preparation of the army "for the new approaching war to achieve our final aim, the establishment of an Israeli empire."

Tel Aviv had seen to it that the invasion gates were left securely open. The Israeli representative at the Rhodes armistice talks rejected the Egyptian offer to establish a neutral belt between the two countries. He argued that the suggestion would result in the loss of valuable lands.¹¹ (The border between Egypt and Israel is nearly all desert.) Egypt returned to the suggestion in 1956 and was once more opposed.¹² The U.N. Secretary General, Mr. Hammarskjöld, recommended in his official report of 9 April 1956, the marking of the Demarcation Line clearly around Gaza and avoiding one cause of trouble. Ben Gurion, remembering his earlier opposition to any frontier delineation on the part of Israel, rejected the recommendation and suggested that Egypt mark her own line!¹³ It was a useful counter-proposal which would have bound Egypt but not Israel. His government also rejected another proposal, in February, to increase the number of U.N. observers along the Demarcation Line. The Foreign Ministry argued that border peace was the responsibility of the countries concerned, and U.N. intervention was a denial of that responsibility.

Shortly after becoming Prime Minister, Ben Gurion requested Dayan, in October 1955, to lay the necessary plans for the capture of Sanafir, Ras Nasrani, Sharm ash-Shaykh and the two islands of Tiran. Dayan advised to attack Egypt as soon as possible.¹⁴

In January, the government announced a number of emergency measures and an extension of national service. Orders were given to build air raid

(8) *Suez, Ten Years After*, p. 79.

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 38.

(10) Dayan, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

(11) *Palestine Post*, 21 January 1949.

(12) *Jewish Chronicle*, 21 September 1956.

(13) Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 154.

(14) Lan-Lavie, *op. cit.*, pp. 138-9.

shelters. The Jewish Agency appealed for volunteers from the diaspora, between the ages of 17 and 27, for guard duties. The whole country was worked up to a state of hysteria with the cry, "There is going to be war." Spokesmen for the Herut Party called for an immediate attack with the explicit aim of expanding the state and annexing Jordan.¹⁵ The XXIV Zionist Congress was brought three months forward, and met in April, to hear ceaseless harangues of Israel's needs for fighting men and arms. Pressure was mounted on Britain and the United States to end the arms embargo. Ben Gurion addressed the Histadrut in March and summed up the situation in his fashion:

"Unless we receive defensive arms in sufficient quantities and in the most immediate future, it can be said almost with certainty that the Egyptian dictator, together with his allies, Syria and Saudi Arabia, will attack us within the next few months."¹⁶

Alliance Forged

Ben Gurion, however, remained uncertain of Israel's absolute military supremacy and, furthermore, he still had to find the international endorsement. This came after Egypt's nationalisation of the Suez Canal on 26 July and new partners were found in the imperialist camp. After a few weeks of secret negotiations, the elaborate plan for the tripartite aggression on Egypt was agreed upon. Part of this plan was diversionary attacks on Jordan. Shimon Peres was sent with a message from Ben Gurion to Christian Pineau, the French Foreign Minister, informing him of the impending reprisal raids on Jordan for diversion.¹⁷ Massive attacks on the innocent country were carried out on 10 and 11 October. The raids presented recognisable examples of reprisals as means of Israeli politics and military planning rather than deterrence.

Whilst his military Director General was in Paris coordinating the joint attacks on Egypt, Ben Gurion answered the reporter of the *Jerusalem Post*, "A war? There is no need for a war. They can see our strength without that. As long as it is for me to decide, we shall make no war." He added, "I will never make war," and he repeated, "never, you can tell anybody that."¹⁸ The interview had followed a series of similar pronouncements in which the Prime Minister had shown how well he had learned the Nazi manual of politics.

It is a total miscomprehension or misrepresentation to explain the Sinai Campaign as a result of the Arab infiltration raids, Egyptian menacing armament or Arab threats. Even more naïve is the submission that the attack, on 29 October, was due to the formation of the United Arab Command on 23 October. Moshe Dayan had already declared, in March, that there was going to be a war by the end of the year. In April, Ben Gurion threatened to open the Gulf of Aqaba by force.¹⁹ Early in September, Moshe Dayan unrolled all the plans for the capture

(15) *New York Times*, 25 January 1956.

(16) *Jewish Chronicle*, 23 March 1956.

(17) Robertson, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

(18) *Jerusalem Post*, 21 September 1956.

(19) *New York Times*, 25 April 1956.

of Sinai and re-examined them in the light of the French-British participation. There does not remain any doubt that the campaign was a premeditated war of conquest in the old style of collusion between imperialist states. The only remaining doubt concerns the precise objectives of the Israeli conquest. The difficulty arises when we try to draw a definite picture of Israeli aims. The Sinai campaign, like most Israeli expansionist moves, was not in the Great Train Robbery style, but rather in the manner of a smash and grab. It appears, from the available information, that Ben Gurion himself was uncertain of what could come out of the campaign. More than ten years after the event, he related that in his statement to the cabinet meeting at the time, he had mentioned that Sinai did not belong to Egypt and its people were not Egyptians, but Russia and America would not allow Israel to stay in it.²⁰ This position was also confirmed by his earlier memoirs. Dayan wrote in his own diary, "I kept asking him what were the chances that our forces would remain in Sinai, and Ben Gurion answered that he hoped they would, but he was not certain."²¹ Dayan conveyed the same uncertainty to the officers who pondered the same question.

On 29 October, sixteen transport planes dropped about four hundred Israeli paratroopers at the Milta Pass to the east of the Suez Canal. Land forces rumbled from al-Auja toward Abu Ajila in Sinai whilst another force attacked the coastal strip leading to Gaza. The Egyptians held their positions, in general, until the Franco-British intervention. The following day France and Britain served their ill-famed ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to end hostilities and withdraw from the Suez Canal. On 2nd November, the United Nations General Assembly called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of the invading forces. Israel vacillated in order to win time for the completion of the campaign, but cease-fire was finally accepted by all parties on 6 November, and the whole of Sinai was in Israeli hands, excluding the east bank of the Suez Canal which was allotted to the French. As the Franco-British invasion was bogged down, the Israelis tried to dress their soldiers in French uniform and occupy the area. Moshe Dayan, who launched the campaign with the justification of liquidating the fida'iyyin, was nearly killed in a fida'iyyin attack on his life two days after the end of the fighting. One man missed the jubilation of November. A few days before the general mobilization, Moshe Sharett was conveniently sent to the Far East on a good will mission in which he reassured Nehru a day before the attack that Israel had no intention of waging war.

The campaign showed the extent of the military preparedness for expansionist invasions attained by the Israeli army since 1948. It also revealed how well the High Command had developed the *fait accompli* technique by synchronising the operations on the field with the diplomatic manoeuvres in New York. Dayan depicted the position adequately:

(20) *Suez Ten Years After*, p. 71.

(21) Dayan, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

"The Government told me or asked me . . . can you do it, that is to say to take the entire Sinai within 8 days, and I said I suppose I can, but why 8 days? And they said, 'Now look here, the Security Council will be called on this day, it will take them two days to debate and then there will be one resolution, then we shall not obey, then there will be another meeting and the time that we have at our disposal will be more or less eight days.'"²²

Won by War, Lost in Peace

The long battle at the United Nations started. Ben Gurion was gratified, "As long as they are sitting in New York and we in Sinai, the situation is not bad," he said²³ brooding on what could be grabbed out of the smash. The armistice agreement with Egypt was dead, so were the armistice lines, "and no wizards or magicians can resurrect these lines."²⁴ Inspired as ever by the Old Testament, "Every place whereon the soles of your feet shall tread shall be yours,"²⁵ he warned that where the Israeli flag was hoisted, there it would remain. On 4 November, he stated that Israel had no intention of leaving the Sinai peninsula. *Ha'aretz* confirmed, on the 5 November, the Israeli determination to retain the Sinai. The Herut, of course, were in their element. The government now extended its opposition to U.N. presence to the occupied territories as well. On Wednesday 7 November, the Prime Minister reaffirmed to the Knesset that Israel was not going to evacuate Egypt. In front of the crowded chamber he was elated by yet another divine glimpse:

"The place where the law was given, and where our people were commanded to be a chosen people. Once again we see before our eyes, the eternal words of our scriptures, which tell of the departure from Egypt and of the coming of our forefathers into the desert of Sinai."

The elation lasted only a few hours, as pressure from the Soviet Union and the United States reached breaking point soon after the speech. President Eisenhower sent his message of concern the following day. Dr. Goldman, President of the World Jewish Congress, informed Ben Gurion that the collections of the Jewish National Fund would be prohibited. An American loan was blocked, and the flow of German reparation funds was also threatened by U.S. pressure.²⁶ The threats of applying sanctions touched the heart of the Finance Minister, and on the following day Israel announced her acceptance of unconditional evacuation—and the bluff was called. On 12 November, the United Nations announced that Egypt had accepted the stationing of a United Nations force as stipulated in the General Assembly resolution of 7 November, and the first contingent arrived in the middle of the month.

"As the Israelis withdrew across the Sinai, they began a systematic destruction of the surfaced roads, the railway, the telephone lines, and what few buildings there were along the railway, and at one or two road junction points. God had scorched the Sinai earth, and his chosen people removed whatever stood above it."²⁷

(22) Frost Programme, Independent Television, 23 August 1968.

(23) Dayan, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

(24) *New York Times*, 8 November 1956.

(25) Deut., XI, 24.

(26) Bar-Zohar, Michel, Ben Gurion, *The Armed Prophet*.

(27) Burns, *op. cit.*, p. 243. Dag Hammarskjöld protested against the wilful devastation.

Another fight was put up for the Gaza Strip. Here, the Israelis seemed more determined to keep this area. Ben Gurion did not talk of it in the same vein of uncertainty as he did of Sinai. The Government had, in fact, hastened to set up immediately a civil administration in the Strip, with an air of permanency. Once more, the Prime Minister affirmed to the Knesset, on 19 December, "Israel will under no circumstances agree to the return of the Gaza Strip to the Egyptian invader." Once more, he was supported by the guardians of Israel's destiny. The "Marxist" Mapam threatened to withdraw from the cabinet if the Egyptians were allowed back in Gaza. The United Nations was forced to call on Israel for the second time to withdraw from the sector forthwith, and the same pressure was again applied. Mrs. Meir moaned of the cruelty of the world toward the peaceful little Israel. On 1 March, she informed the General Assembly of Israel's intention to withdraw from the Gaza Strip and Sharm ash-Shaykh "promptly," and promptly was the evacuation completed, officially by 4 March. The United Nations Emergency Force moved in as the Israelis moved out.

The Canadian State Secretary of External Affairs, Mr. Lester B. Pearson, played a major role in disentangling the situation. One of his suggestions was a United Nations administration for the disputed areas. The Arabs opposed his plan because it tampered with their sovereignty. The Israelis would not have anything to do with it because it involved United Nations troops patrolling their side of the border. Israel was already looking for a second opportunity. Had they accepted the Canadian proposal, there could have been no Six Day War.

Can you Trust Them?

The attack on Egypt and the struggle to annex the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula came after a series of cynical statements reminiscent of the worst periods of European politics. In 1949, Abba Eban said that Israel "never intended and does not intend to annex any part of Egypt or any other Arab state."²⁸ A few months before the attack, Nahum Goldman replied to Nasser assuring him that Zionism had "no design on Arab property."²⁹ Ben Gurion persisted with monotonous repetition that his government was "opposed to any initiation of War." The highlight of deceit was reached on 30 October, the second day of the campaign. The Voice of Zion of Kol Israel maintained that Israel "is not out to wage war or conquer new territory" and the myth of wiping out the commando bases was reaffirmed. The following day, however, Walter Eytan, the radio commentator, modified the story slightly. True, Israel was out to wipe out the bases, but she had also "other scores to settle with Egypt." He went on to explain, "The unexpected intervention of Great Britain and France has transformed the scene." During the same day the hypocrisy was echoed at the United Nations General Assembly when the Israeli delegate, Mr. Abba Eban, categorically denied that his country had any territorial ambitions behind its attack on Sinai. The same

(28) *Palestine Post*, 5 January 1949.

(29) *Jewish Chronicle*, 25 May 1956.

lies and false pledges were repeated before and during the Six Day War, as will be mentioned in the following chapter.

A Route to the East

Israel could not get away with Sinai or the Gaza Strip. Opening the valuable Arab market by dictating peace on Zionist terms had also been bungled. An end was put to the fida'iyyin raids across the Gaza Strip, not by wiping out the fida'iyyin bases, but by the presence of the U.N.E.F. between the two belligerents. It was, nevertheless, by no means the beginning of peace or tranquillity for the Israeli border settlements. The fida'iyyin simply shifted their operation to the north and east. It has become an Arab politico-military tradition to keep one border always active against the Jewish state. The major gain reaped from the operation was the opening of the Gulf of Aqaba. Between the two wars of 1948 and 1956, there was a steady growth of Israeli trade with countries east of the Mediterranean, as can be seen in the following figures:³⁰

	<i>Exports in I£ 1,000</i>	
	<i>1952</i>	<i>1955</i>
British East Africa	40	612
South Africa	121	762
Ethiopia and Eritrea	30	353
Oceania	111	544
Philippines	0	2
Iran	0	28
Burma	10	170
Japan	10	80
Singapore and Malaya	363	647
Ceylon	131	394
Other Asian countries	282	1490

A number of projects in Ethiopia, Burma and other countries east of Suez were also won by Israeli concerns.

The opening of the Gulf of Aqaba was therefore a major gain on which Israel had insisted. The arrangement which Dag Hammarskjold made, led to a great expansion in Israeli trade with the east, and to the penetration of the Afro-Asian markets.

The claim for Gaza was based on the charge of the fida'iyyin raids originating from it and the fact that the Strip was part of the Mandate Palestine map. In regard to the question of Sinai, it was argued that the peninsula belonged to nobody. It seems that each member of the Israeli cabinet thought that "nobody" could only mean himself.

One of the results which the government did not foresee was the disintegration of the moral image of the Zionist state. To the Arabs and their Afro-Asian

(30) From the Statistical Abstract of Israel, 1955-6.

friends, the collusion of the Suez Campaign proved beyond any shadow of doubt that Israel is nothing but a cat's paw of the imperialists and a guardian of their Middle Eastern interests. Although it is a misleading oversimplification, the view helped to disorientate many of the former supporters of the Jewish state. The idealist aura which hovered over the Zionist enthusiasm and selfless sacrifice, was dispelled beyond retrieve. Yet it needed another war to bring into focus the image of Israel as an expansionist and imperialist state on her own, a link in the universal alliance of imperialism rather than a cat's paw.

CHAPTER XII

FROM NAQURA TO QANTARA

Blood and Water

The 1956 Suez Campaign had left the greater part of the Israeli ambitions unfulfilled as Dayan's army was rolled back to its original Demarcation Line—victorious but disgraced, successful but disappointed. By the end of 1966, ten years had passed on the drama, and the time, it seems, had become ripe for another explosion. Conditions on both sides were pressing for a new conflagration. The Israeli economy, with its essential elements of immigration and fund raising, slumped to a frightful point. In the Arab world, the essential feuds and differences spread literally "from the Atlantic to the Gulf," and high prices were offered for many heads. One indirect cause of the Arab strife was the Israeli water plan. It was the one expansionist operation which hit the Arabs hard between two Sinai campaigns, and threatened the area with another outbreak of hostilities.

Since the time when agriculture became the livelihood of the inhabitants of the arid Middle East, water has been mixed with blood and the cultivator has had to carry his spade on the left and his dagger on the right. A large section of Islamic Law deals with water rights, and Middle Eastern Courts and police authorities are kept busy with water disputes even in this age of lunar and space disputes. The small ancient and mediaeval worlds with their local issues, concerning individuals or groups gave place to the twentieth century international community of nations. The dispute between cultivators over ditches has become a dispute between states over rivers.

The Jordan is an ideal river for creating such a conflict. It is 156 miles long, stretching through Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Israel. The length of the Israeli controlled part is 73 miles. Its total annual flow is 1,880 million cubic meters. An important feature of this river is its considerable drop of about 1,000 feet in a distance of about 9 miles north of Lake Tiberias, and 600 feet south of it on its course to the Dead Sea. This gives the river its industrial and agricultural potentialities for power generation and gravity irrigation. It has become the focus of the Zionist planners who saw in the river the future hope for the millions of Jews yet to come.

Harnessing the power force of the Jordan was not easily appreciated by the Palestinians, and the Rutenburg Concession was granted in the twenties without much ado. Diverting the water was more tangible for the fellah, and since the rise of immigration in the thirties, the Jordan water has become a basic Arab-Zionist issue. The politicians soon discovered a political edge to the problem. If

the water was diverted to the Negev and the desert made really cultivable, more Jews would be able to settle, and the Zionist state would be all the stronger. Their opposition was probably more concerned with that aspect than with providing water for the fellahin.

The Jewish Agency turned its attention to the Jordan in the thirties when land acquisition became an administrative and political problem. The American land conservationist, Mr. W.C. Lowdermilk, was commissioned in 1939 by the Agency to study land and irrigation problems in Palestine. His proposal was based on his idea of a Jordan Valley Authority for diverting the waters of the river to the irrigation of lands, mainly in the Negev. He took no notice of the political divisions in the area and treated the whole network of the river and its tributaries as one unit in the service of his concept.¹ The Jewish Agency followed on with further studies culminating in the work of James B. Hays and J.V. Savage, "TVA on the Jordan" (1948). The concept of cultivating the Negev by taking the Jordan waters away from the people living along it, became the guiding light in the deliberations of the Agency. The colonisation policies were geared towards a map of Israel sticking its neck out to touch the upper reaches of the river in the north, and widening in the south to embrace the recipient lands in the Negev.

After the establishment of Israel, the Seven Year Plan of 1953 and the Ten Year Plan of 1956 were drawn for putting the Lowdermilk-Hays Plan into practice.² The Arabs initiated plans of their own advocating the priority of supplying the needs of the people immediately connected with the river on both sides. The most important plan suggested to the parties concerned was the one prepared, at the request of UNRWA, by Mr. Eric C. Johnston. The plan recommended the allocation of 879 m.c.m. (67 per cent) to the Arab states, and 426 m.c.m. (33 per cent) to Israel. It was urged that Israel be allowed 33 per cent of the water whilst only 23 per cent of it originated in Israel. No provisions were made for Lebanon to benefit from her Hasbani River whose water was allocated to Israel. Other objections of a technical nature were also raised³ and the Arab League rejected the plan. Arab spokesmen defended their stand by saying:

"Any Arab agreement at this stage will mean signing away the rights of the Palestinian Arabs . . . and a formal approval of the Demarcation Lines as permanent frontiers."⁴

Israel's attempts to carry out her own plans were frustrated at the Security Council, after a Syrian complaint in October 1953 against Israel's attempt to divert waters across the Demilitarized Zone. Major General Bennike, Chief of Staff of the UNTSO, ruled that the diversion was contrary to the Armistice Agreement, and requested the Israelis to cease work forthwith. The Syrian Representative observed that the Israeli attempt to tap the river whilst other international

(1) His plan is embodied in his *Palestine, Land of Promise*, New York, 1944.

(2) Cf. previous chapter.

(3) Ghobashy, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

(4) Hadawi, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-7.

plans were being considered was a measure to create a *fait accompli*. America, which was behind the work of Mr. Johnston (appointed by the President himself) resorted to its customary economic threat against adamant Tel Aviv. The Israeli Representative hastened to inform the Council that his country had agreed to suspend the work. When the Johnston Plan was finally submitted, it was accepted by the Israeli Government although it had cut its expectation of water from the 700 m.c.m. envisaged to only 426 m.c.m.

Whilst the negotiations were in the offing, Israeli experts were elaborating their own unilateral scheme. Following the rejection of the Johnston Plan, Israel declared herself free to act, and her own plan was made known in 1959. Zionist publicists emphasised the population pressure and Israel's economic needs.⁵ The Israelis were also motivated by political factors unrelated to the actual need. It was felt that waiting for a regional agreement would enhance the position of the Arabs and give them a say in Israel's affairs.⁶

The Arab League was convened to study the new situation. The Israeli unilateral plan was deemed an act of aggression which must be foiled by a counter-plan. In the following year, such a plan was endorsed by the League's Political Committee and Israel was threatened that if she went ahead with the project, the Arabs would implement theirs and divert the water at its head.

Israel's reply was a threat of war. The Arab League prepared for the eventuality with a report from its Military Committee. A Summit Meeting was convened in 1964 to examine how far the Arab states were prepared to press their luck. Funds were allocated for Lebanon, Syria and Jordan to implement their parts of the plan. Jordan limited its work to the Ghor Project for the diversion of part of the Yarmuk water. Israel kept quiet about the work carried out on the other side. The diversion was not substantial and the Yarmuk only joins the Jordan south of Tiberias, i.e., below the tapping points of the Israeli Canals. The Ghor project was also meant for the settlement of some of the Palestinian refugees on the eastern bank of the Jordan, a development vehemently desired by Israel. In addition, there was the pressure of America to make the Israeli rulers behave themselves. UNRWA, financed mainly by America, was behind the Ghor Project which was expected to relieve some of the financial burden.

There remained only Syria which could have interfered with Israel's plan. Israel had no alternative but to avail herself of the reprisal technique and strike at the Syrian site, destroying bulldozers and all. The Arab defeat in this encounter left deep scars on the Egyptian and Syrian governments. With one direct hit on a bulldozer. Israel had seized the full amount of 1,305 m.c.m. of the Jordan watershed, minus the Ghor diversion, without any supervision or arbitration.

The Israelis, at the same time, realised that they were indebted to their own superior strength. But how long would it remain so? How could they insure

(5) The Zionist Yearbook of 1964 mentioned that Israel had already exploited 80 per cent of her water sources and the remaining 20 per cent was in the Jordan.

(6) *Ner*, September-November 1962.

against tractors, armed like their own, and protected by an efficient air force, Arab or foreign? He who was in charge of the Negev settlers could not lie in peace until the water catchment of the Jordan passed into Israeli hands, nor could he forget the long record of Zionist advice on the matter. Dr. Weizmann insisted that the boundaries of Palestine "must be drawn so that every drop of water needed for irrigation of its soil must flow inside its boundaries."⁷ This opinion was seconded by Justice Brandeis, and elaborated in an article by Dr. Arthur Ruppin.⁸ S. Tolkowsk, an agricultural engineer, dwelt on this paramount objective in 1917.⁹ The statement of the Zionist Organization to the Peace Conference emphasised the importance of including the entire area in Palestine.¹⁰ The move of the Arab League confirmed all the previous fears.

The year 1964 was the date for turning on the Israeli water pumps and the unexpected problems soon followed. The reservoirs destined to store the pumped waters were found porous and the high salinity of the water frightened away the cultivators. Incredible and highly expensive schemes were drawn for overcoming the defects, but the conduit did not realise the desired aims,¹¹ and the only tangible result was the total military confrontation and preparation for war. The following figures indicate the trend, the drop in industrial and development budgeting and the rise in military expenditure.¹²

	1960/61	1961/62	1962/63	1963/64	1964/1965	1965/66
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Social Services	18.5	17.2	19.6	17.9	18.3	18.5
Economic Services	6.3	4.2	4.7	4.6	4.7	4.4
Public Services	6.0	5.1	5.9	5.4	5.5	4.9
Loans and grants						
to industry	13.0	10.8	6.5	5.3	6.1	4.3
Development & loans						
repayment	28.7	37.8	36.0	38.4	30.4	31.7
Defence & Security	21.8	19.1	18.6	19.7	26.7	28.6

The high military commitments shot up with the expenditure from £1,926,814 in 1964 to £2,992,934 in 1966, a spectacular rise for a small country of two million people. The increase was not matched by a corresponding development in fund raising, which was, in fact, showing a decrease. The contradiction was bound to be resolved in Zionist terms by *action*, or within the Israeli context, war.

Ironically, the full operation of the Israeli water plan signalled the steady drop in employment and national economic growth rates, culminating in the

(7) Speech on 20 August 1919, *Zionist Bulletin*, August 1919.

(8) Syria: an Economic Survey, *Zionist Review*, February 1919.

(9) "The Jews and the Economic Development of Palestine," *Zionism and the Jewish Future*, by Sacher, p. 163.

(10) Cf. Chapter III.

(11) Monroe, E., "Hopes and Fears," *The Times*, 11 May 1965.

(12) Bank of Israel, Annual Report, 1966.

1966/7 recession. Israel's life lies in the work of constructing and not in this construction.

Another outcome of the water contest which contributed to the story of the Six Day War, was Arab disenchantment with the United States. Both Israel and the Arab States were bound to seek American aid in carrying out the big projects involved, and Washington did not want to become a partisan in this conflict. President Eisenhower took particular interest in the issue and sent his "Water Ambassador" to find a way out. American policy was shaped by two aims—firstly, to see the Palestinian refugees settled in projects resulting from the solution, and secondly, to open new lands for future Jewish immigrants. It coincided with the policy of Tel Aviv, but not with that of the Arab League. When the Johnston Plan was rejected, America declared that it would still help in those projects which did not exceed the amounts fixed in the Johnston Plan. The classic situation was repeated again. By declaring a humble acceptance, Tel Aviv was able to receive American aid and exceed the amount fixed (there is no supervision) whilst the Arabs forfeited the aid, and lost their share by rejecting the plan.

The Arabs had their own Bunger Plan formulated in 1953 with the help of the American engineer, M.E. Bunger, to provide for the irrigation of the Jordan Valley. UNRWA and the U.S.A. were interested in it and even allocated the appropriate funds. Just at the time when workers and plants were being mobilised, America withdrew its support and killed the whole project. After the American consent to finance the Israeli plan in 1959, the Arabs reached their own conclusion and detected a double standard applied by the White House. The United Arab Republic led the attack on the imperialist United States, the source of all evil in the area.

Crisis in Tel Aviv

The winter of 1966/7 was the winter of discontent for the Eshkol Cabinet. Industrial employment fell by 8 per cent between October 1965 and October 1966. Construction work was 40 per cent down and the Government put off any new development projects. The number of the registered unemployed rose to 40,000 in December 1966, 56,000 in January and 62,000 in February, as declared preliminarily by the Ministry of Labour. In the new port of Isdud, 40 port workers went on hunger strike in protest against redundancy.¹³ The Ministry of Finance asked for the dismissal of 3,500 civil servants and called on the Histadrut to agree on a wage freeze. The overstaffing of the Hebrew University and the reckless waste in its expenses were found scandalous and a reorganisation of the famous university was consequently ordered.

It later transpired that the figures given by the Ministry of Labour were a calculated deception. Mr. Yigal Allon admitted at a later date that the number

(13) *Jerusalem Post*, 11 January, 23 February 1967.

of unemployed in the second half of 1966 reached the 99,000 mark, or more than 10 per cent of the employment market. This was four times the figure which shocked the government and the trade unions in Britain during the same period. The exposure of the fraud by the Jewish Observer in London led to the dismissal of its editor, Jon Kimche, after the Editorial Committee had ordered the withdrawal of an article dealing with the subject and had been forced to step in at the last minute and stop the printers from producing the magazine.¹⁴

There were all the signs of a devastating slump. Uncompetitive factories were shut and a few of the smaller banks, including the Feuchtwanger-Ellern, collapsed. The shares index of the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange was giving comfort to no investor. Immigration, the true industry of Israel, was dropping steadily until there was a time, in 1967, when the 1928 position of more emigrants than immigrants was reached. The humourist made his own report and mentioned that a notice was fixed at the Lydda Airport reading, "Would the last man leaving switch off the lights please." The 1966 figure was in the region of 12,000 only. Mr. Eshkol considered the fall in immigration as the primary cause of the recession, and the Zionist Organization was blamed for failing in its duties. One thing he carefully omitted to mention, i.e., that the funds sent to Israel had reached their lowest ebb, and that the 1966/7 budget was marked by a decrease of development from I£865 million to I£744 million, and an increase in defence by I£34 million over the already inflated Defence Budget. *The Jewish Chronicle* took him to task in its editorial comment which sums up Israel's economic position for the score of years of its history:

"There is all too much justification for his discontent, nevertheless to blame the World Zionist movement for the lack of immigrants is pointless, to blame Zionists for Israel's economic crisis is silly.

"Increasing emigration and Israel's concomitant inability to attract immigrants with education, skills and enterprise are due to three main causes. The first is Israel's failure to build a healthy economy. Micawberism, the conviction that money would be found from somewhere to meet deficits, endless subsidies for the inefficient, the hubristic belief that Israel is immune from economic laws and a highly political approach to economics all add up to what one percipient observer called 'charity socialism.' A second cause is the doctrinaire approach which has convinced many, including veterans and Israeli graduates as well as new or prospective immigrants, that their skills in Israel will meet with neither reward, scope nor satisfaction.

"Finally, Israel has not so far generated the moral and intellectual climate to inspire Jews from the free world with the belief that there they can make a special contribution as Jews and people. It is unrealistic to indict the WZO for the decline in immigration and futile to pretend that somehow an increase in immigration would solve Israel's economic problems."¹⁵

The crisis naturally touched the Zionist Organization itself. It was noticed that many officials of the Jewish Agency were unnecessary, and, accordingly, these were made redundant. A defence was put up on their behalf by the administration that they should remain in their positions as a matter of allegiance and gratitude for their services. The streamlining of the Agency reduced its departments from

(14) Cf. Letter of the Legal Adviser of the Zionist Review Ltd. to John Kimche *Jewish Observer*, 24 March 1967.

(15) *Jewish Chronicle*, 13 January 1967.

16 to 9 and the annual budget of the WZO was cut from I£362,578,000 in 1966/7 to I£309,776,000 in 1967/8. Outside the hall of the Zionist General Council, the question was debated whether the whole WZO was necessary any longer. The economic frustration was reflected on the political field in serious schisms which rocked Israeli society. Both Mapai and Herut had their splits and there were two communist parties operating in the little state. The crisis deepened all the existing national divisions and differences. The obvious way out of the wilderness was another expansionist operation which would reunite the people, bring immigrants and funds, give work to everybody, create a new mental purpose and lift the general gloom. From the depths of depression Israel must rise to a pitch of manic exhilaration, or else sink. It was a state of extreme sensitiveness which the heedless Arab came to excite.

Crisis for the Arab

It was the crisis on the other side which sharpened Israel's need for a military conquest. "One hand cannot clap," says the old Arab proverb. Like Israel, the Arab World was passing through a bad stage of disarray and disappointment.

"Revolutionary" Syria was bitten in its attempt to prevent the Israelis from taking the Jordan waters. The destruction of the Syrian diversion site was for Damascus what the 1955 Gaza raid was for Cairo. The same conclusion was also reached. Israel must be dealt with on the field and by fida'iyyin squads. Syria became the new training ground of the commandos.

Syria's encouragement to the fida'iyyin was made more complicated by the story of the Demilitarized Zones. Since the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement in 1949, Israel had been gradually seizing the zones and expelling their inhabitants. In January 1967, the development reached a pitch when the Syrians were swallowing their pride over the Jordan waters. From their high and dominating positions, they opened fire, on 4 January, at the Israeli cultivators in the Huleh Valley and the Kinneret area. Firing and mine explosions continued for nearly two weeks. The Syrian Minister of Information warned that the Joint Defence Agreement between Syria and Egypt would be implemented in the event of any large scale Israeli retaliation. General Odd Bull, the U.N. Chief Observer, managed an agreement whereby cultivation was stopped pending negotiations on the matter. Proposals and counter-proposals were exchanged without any progress.

Gahal and Rafi, as in 1956, accused the government of weakness, advised against negotiations of any kind and called for prompt military action first and giving an explanation to the world later.¹⁶ Shimon Peres criticised the Government in the Knesset for attending the Syria-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission. Under the pressure, the Government ordered resumption of work in February, and the Syrians once more opened fire. On 3 April, Kibbutz Ha'on became the target for Syrian artillery and tank fire. The hawks got the opportunity, on 7 April, and released the air force on Syria. In the ensuing battle, six Syrian Migs were downed

(16) *Jerusalem Post*, 25 January 1967.

within minutes. The importance of the battle in regard to the Six Day War was that it established the superiority of the Israeli air force over that of its enemy.

This was certainly the kind of large scale operation mentioned by the Syrian Minister of Information. The question was asked when would the joint Defence Agreement come into effect. The Syrians resumed their shelling on 11 April, and gave Mr. Eshkol his cue for the eventual warning of choosing "the time, the place and the means to counter the aggressors." A massive attack is the obvious interpretation of the words. The Soviet Government warned Nasser of Israeli troops poised to attack Syria. Nasser's hand was forced and the fateful request to the U.N. Emergency Force to evacuate was given.

The War That Must Be

Since then, the Soviet Union has been accused of passing false information to Nasser, and Soviet intelligence was accused of incompetence. The Eshkol Government asked the Soviet Embassy to visit the area and see what troop concentrations were there. Many observers puzzled over the Soviet refusal to take up the offer, and advanced various interpretations. The Soviet warning was not the first given on the subject. Early in February, *Izvestia* said that the Israelis were preparing to attack Syria. Nor was the Soviet Union alone in this prediction. Uri Avneri, the celebrated editor of *Haolam Hazeh*, said in January in the Knesset that Israel might be preparing to use arms against Syria on behalf of the oil companies. Eshkol's invitation for an inspection was a bluff, as Israel's military objective in the area was limited. The capture of the Golan Heights from the Syrians required neither mobilization, nor concentrations. Israel is also a small country with excellent means of communication and perfect coordination and ability to move up forces. The Six Day War had actually shown how, under the fatigue and circumstances of war, troops were moved within hours from the south to the north to achieve the capture of the area on the following day.

Although the circumstances of the 1967 war were different from those of the 1956 campaign, yet there is a striking similarity in pattern. In both cases, the drift towards war started by a determined militant opposition to a vacillating, peace inclined government. Ben Gurion was finally imposed on the cabinet of Sharett and Moshe Dayan was imposed, by the same clique of adventurers, on Eshkol. The steady build-up of the army was repeated with the aid of West Germany and America. Jordan was again held hostage. If any change occurred in its status quo Israel would be free to act. The ominous statement of an impending war, given by Moshe Dayan early in 1956, was echoed by his successor, General Rabin, in December, that 1967 was going to be an uneasy year, as Israel was going to hold Egypt and Syria responsible for the guerrillas.¹⁷ The 1956 Campaign and 1967 war were preceded by resounding humiliations to the forces of imperialism and blows to their interests. France's need to ease her position in Algeria by a blow to Cairo was replaced by Britain's need to ease her position in

(17) *Jewish Observer*, 6 January 1967.

Aden. The seizure of the Suez Canal was replaced by Syria's stoppage of the Iraq oil pipeline. The relentless attack on Britain's positions and alliances was replaced by that on America's. Eden's clumsy collusion with Israel was replaced by America's more subtle and discreet collusion.

The Six Day War came after a series of U.S. inspired coups in Guatemala, Ghana and Indonesia. It is generally believed, at least among the revolutionary experts, that such a coup was planned for Syria late in 1966. Salim Hatum made an attempt on 7 September and failed. Uri Avneri considered the failure of the American attempt to topple the rebels of Damascus by an internal coup as the motive for a new policy based on using Israel as a lever to dislodge the Syrian rulers.

"If the counter-revolution had won, there would have been no need to use Israel. But after the abortive coup, the U.S. has decided to stake an intervention from outside."¹⁸

The intent to destroy the Syrian Government was officially put by General Rabin, the Commander in Chief of the Israeli forces, on 21 May:

"We have done everything to try to prevent the Fida'iyin from operating. Now there is nothing left for us but to overthrow the regime in Damascus."¹⁹

The story of the Franco-British arrangement with Israel is now well established. America's part in the Six Day War is scarcely written and may remain speculative for many years to come. Ze'ev Schul of *Ma'ariv*, with excellent connections with the high circles of the Israeli Government mentions in his "Operation Red Sheet" that the Israeli Government had kept the State Department informed of the Israeli plans for the capture of the Straits of Tiran. America had offered her navy to open the Straits, but it was the Israeli Government who declined the American assistance.

The lesson which Tel Aviv had learned from the 1956 Sinai Campaign was that it would have achieved better results had Israel gone to war by herself alone. The collusion with the discredited imperialist states cost her the support of most of her friends. The Zionists have a long tradition of picking the champion of the day as the true and faithful master. In 1956, they learned that Britain's days were really over. Henceforth, nothing should be done without the approval of the man in the White House. Whilst American support was necessary, it was understood that this support should never reach the point of open alliance and active participation. It would cost Tel Aviv again the sympathy of her "socialist" friends and anti-imperialist partisans. "If war did come, Israelis don't want anyone else to fight for us," said Moshe Dayan on his appointment as Minister of Defence.²⁰

Mr. Avneri's remarks deserve some attention at this juncture. Syria, extremist and strongly leaning towards Moscow, started to hold the oil companies to ransom. The western oil monopolies have nothing to do with Syria but their oil passes

(18) *Haolam Hazab*, 6 November 1966.

(19) Eric Rouleau, *Israel et les Arabes*, Paris, 1967, p. 74.

(20) *Observer*, 4 June 1967.

over Syrian territory. The demand for higher transit royalties from the Iraqi Petroleum Company was not met and the Ba'athist regime turned off the mains. As soon as agreement was reached with the I.P.C. in the beginning of March, the Syrians turned their eyes to the American Tapline. Damascus Radio announced, on 12 March, that the Tapline Company was asked to reconsider the agreement "immediately." Three weeks later, Israeli planes thundered over the Syrian capital and spread havoc on the border positions. It was no longer time to pursue the royalties question. The Tapline happens to pass through the Golan Heights of Syria only. Negotiations for another and bigger pipeline following a different path were abandoned by the oil company. Prime Minister Eshkol played on the American fear of communist penetration by a series of statements which he made in May to the effect that Vietcong and Chinese guerrilla experts were training the Arab "terrorists."²¹

Those, like Mr. U Thant, who were surprised by the unusually strong reaction to the usual and seasonal gun duel across the Demilitarized Zone did not see the unusual developments outlined above.

The Crisis Itself

Israel had long put it on record that she would go to war if her right of navigation through the Straits of Tiran was tampered with. Nasser's closure of the Straits gave her the ideal justification for war, notwithstanding his explanation that only strategic cargo was going to be prohibited. Such cargo was usually handled at the Mediterranean ports and the only material unloaded at Eilat which could be considered as strategic was oil. Here, Nasser did not commit himself and, obviously, left the matter as an item for bargaining. American investigation at the time revealed that for the preceding two years no Israeli ships had passed through the Straits, except some small fishing vessels. Out of the 2,190 ships which called on Israeli ports in 1965, the year with the last available figures, only 54 used Eilat and only one of these was an Israeli ship.²² Israel's trade with the east, which amounted to 17 per cent of her entire exports, was not affected.

Yet, Egypt's move caused such repercussions in Tel Aviv. It was said that the Jews would start trickling back to Europe once Nasser's move became final. The religious related how, in his wandering to Palestine, Moses had sat outside Eilat and rested! Israel was in that nervous state and could not stand any provoking however harmless it might have been, a fact which seems to have passed unnoticed by the Arabs.

Counting the Blessings

When the American officials made public the results of their investigations and indicated Washington's reluctance to take any measures *vis à vis* the United Arab Republic, it was assumed that Israel was left to stew in her own juice.

(21) E.g., *Jerusalem Post*, 4 and 10 April 1967.

(22) *Observer*, 4 June 1967.

No one thought that it was a signal to stew the Arabs. Two days later, hundreds of planes bearing the Star of David screamed over the desert. Six days later, the armies of Egypt, Jordan and Syria were defeated, and the entire peninsula of Sinai, Jerusalem, Hebron, the West Bank and the Golan Heights were Israeli-occupied territories. The American Tapline passed into safe hands. A few weeks later, arrangement was made for Egypt to withdraw her troops from the Yemen and the British position was eased in Aden and consolidated in the Gulf. The Suez Canal was closed, and Soviet and East European supply route to Vietnam was severed. America stood to gain one billion dollars by the end of 1967 only from the additional oil sales made possible by the closure of the Canal.²³ But one thing did not happen, of the expectations of the CIA. None of the Arab regimes were toppled and the imperialist world was stunned at the discovery that President Nasser was actually supported by his people.

The unexpected prize in the war was the capture of Jerusalem. Jordan, which pledged its military support to Egypt, opened gun fire at the Israeli positions. The only forward operation was the seizure of the Headquarters of the UNTSO in the neutral zone. The Israelis, however, took the Jordanians at their words and moved to capture Sur Bahir and Ramat Rabel on the first day. Jordanian lines of communication with the south were severed. The attack was maintained throughout the night in the traditional style of squeezing every possible gain from the opportunity. By 7 June, the whole of Jerusalem was in Israeli hands. Ben Gurion saw his heart's desire of 1948 come true and hurried to the Old City. Near the Wailing Wall stood the Jordanian road sign in Arabic and English bearing the Arab name of al-Buraq. Al-Buraq was the legendary horse which the Prophet had ridden from that spot in his flight to heaven, and which is revered by the Muslims for that reason. Ben Gurion asked for an axe and knocked off the ceramic lettering of the word. "This is the greatest moment in my life."

On 29 June, the Demarcation Line in Jerusalem was declared non-existent and the two parts of the city were unified. The City Fathers declared that the Old City would not become part of Israel until it was settled with Jews. Old buildings were opened as hostels for new inhabitants and the bulldozers moved in to demolish the old Waqf properties, for which the Zionists offered high prices in the past. Now it all came gratis.²⁴ The Rabbinical High Court moved in August to the Old City and sat in a usurped Muslim girls' school to administer justice. The first case heard was one of a broken home. The court was followed appropriately in 1968 by the Prison Directorate and the Police Command. The museum in the Old City, with all its valuable contents including the famous Dead Sea Scrolls, was one of the war spoils which aroused worldwide protest in academic circles.

(23) *Evening Standard*, 26 September 1967.

(24) John Allis, reporting to the *Daily Telegraph* (16 June 1969) counted over 100 houses destroyed near the Wailing Wall for various reasons including the safety of road users.

Outside the territory of Palestine, Sinai was taken from the Egyptians, the Golan Heights from the Syrians and the island of Tiran from Saudi Arabia. An automatic lighthouse was put at the Straits of Tiran where Israeli gunners took over from expelled Egyptians. Sinai was carefully surveyed and an inventory was made for all the riches reaped. They included the Belaim and other oil fields, a manganese mine with all its mining equipment, and coal and kaolin mines. No time was wasted in exploiting them. With the conquered territory, installations, rolling stock, transport vehicles and military weapons and equipment worth millions of pounds fell into Israeli hands intact.

The closure of the Suez Canal raised the shipping cost of West European products, and opened new markets for America and Israel. The asbestos export from Eilat increased threefold from 1966 to 1967. The S.O.S. sent from Tel Aviv brought thousands of volunteers and immigrants from the gullible diaspora, and with them millions of dollars poured in. The capture of Jerusalem and Hebron opened exotic markets for the tourist industry. Even the blind went to see. A group of blind Jews went from Britain to the Promised Land and returned to tell the press that they found Israel "breathhtaking" and "fantastic."²⁵ Work was found for the unemployed Israeli as a killer. It was no wonder that the war had brought the Minister of Labour to the foreground of Israeli politics. The crisis was over. The general index at the Tel Aviv Stock Market rose by 17.61 in less than two weeks. The national division was healed, and Mapam, Mapai, Rafi and Ahdut Avodah entered into merger talks.

The Great Hoax

An Israeli diplomat defied the young editor of the satirical "*Israeli Imperial News*," Mr. Shimon Tzabar, to produce one Arab who did not believe in the extermination of the Israelis. The challenge was answered by a counter challenge to produce one Arab who believed in that. If they did, they would have done something about it.

Up to the present time, people believe that Israel was in real danger and the Arabs were poised to annihilate its people. The Israeli press, including *Davar*, *Ma'ariv* and *Ha'aretz*, had endorsed the same interpretation during the crisis month of May. Israel's absolute military superiority over all the neighbouring Arab states was also an accepted fact which was never denied by the Israeli Government. The capture of the Arab commands uncovered no instructions or plans for attack. The only offensive plan captured and disclosed was an air operation plan for the bombardment of Israeli military airfields and military positions. No orders were given for air raids on civilian targets.²⁶ Films and photographs of Egyptian tank positions also revealed the defensive nature of the Egypt troop concentrations. Israel published also captured Jordanian orders for attacks in the Latrun area. King Husain explained that the orders were taken after the massive Israeli

(25) *Jewish Chronicle*, 3 November 1967.

(26) *Jerusalem Post*, 11 June 1967.

reprisal on Samu', with the limited objective of giving Israel a taste of her own medicine in case of a repetition of the Israeli raid.²⁷ A plan for the Jordanian forces to invade Israel makes no sense.

In fact, one reason for the Israeli attack was the very fact that Nasser was not preparing or expecting a war. Thus it was possible for the Israeli air force to make its spectacular blitzkrieg and smash Egypt's fleet of planes as they were left exposed and unattended. This was the view expressed by General I. Rabin in his interview, during the war, with I. Livni, the Editor of the official weekly of the Israeli Defence Forces. The Chief of Staff had also explained how Nasser had become a prisoner of Pan-Arab politics where things were forced on him against the will: "His aim was to concentrate force as an act of threat. The concentration of troops and the involvement of the U.N. forces, created a situation which he did not plan, especially in the Straits of Tiran. Once again, the unforeseen development forced him to take new steps leading to the final step which led to the war. It turns out that our basic assumption that he was not prepared for war has been proved."²⁸

Nasser's later explanation of the catastrophe and the hearings of the Military Court which tried the responsible generals, had also revealed how unexpected and unprepared was the Egyptian military command for the eventuality of war. The High Command of the Air Force were enjoying an all-night party on the eve of the fighting.

Other Arab armies were even more oblivious. The Iraqi Air Force was not even in possession of operational target maps, and the pilots were simply detailed to "go and bomb Israel." King Husain relates a similar story about his own air force in his memoirs, which also reveal that the Syrians had their aircraft unprepared and their pilots unavailable on the morning of 5 June.²⁹

Nevertheless, Jean-Paul Sartre was made to lead a demonstration in Paris in sympathy for the Jews of Israel threatened with extermination. There were delegates at the United Nations who questioned the story of Israeli aggression and Mr. Eban still asserts that Egypt had attacked his country.

It was not surprising either to see the Zionist Jew in New York or London, hysterical about the fate of his victims whom he had thrust in the middle of the Arabs. The pertinent question is how did the Israelis themselves, informed journalists like Mr. Amos, swallow the same bait and get themselves swept away by the same phobia of impending doom? How can one reconcile the confident legend of the taxi driver, "No stop to Cairo" with the morbid street corner chat on the surest drug for an emergency suicide? Could it be all from that death wish which comes to the surface every now and then? Could it be that the taxi driver and the bearer of his slogan, "To Cairo," were oblivious of Israel's reminiscences of the Land of Egypt?

(27) King Husain, *Our War With Israel*, Arabic Edition, Beirut, 1968, p. 46.

(28) *Bamachane*, 12 June 1967. Rabin reiterated this view in *Le Monde*, 29 February 1968.

(29) Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 51, 54.

A few days after the hysterical agitation, the fact emerged that 20,000 Arabs were annihilated, according to Israeli reckoning. But the Israeli figure excludes the civilian casualties and those who died from their wounds. *Le Monde* put the number of casualties in Egyptian hospitals at 30,000, and its correspondent found 3,000 wounded soldiers in two hospitals only. Most of the wounded were suffering from napalm burns.³⁰ At a mass rally held on 27 July in Tel Aviv, Yigal Allon said that the June war was the last chapter of the 1948 war.³¹ All traces of the UNSCOP Partition Plan were obliterated and the Palestine Mandate frontiers were smashed. Operation Shin-Tav Shin, for the capture of the West Bank, "the battle that remains to be fought," was finally implemented.

The Six Day War brought the *fait accompli* technique to perfection. *Blitzkrieg* with utter ruthlessness and speed, was the key to the adventure. A ceaseless push forward, with night flares to keep the show going, enabled the commanders to beat the clock at the United Nations for the first time fairly comfortably. It was the fruitful result of an operation planned and rehearsed over and over again for ten years. The writers of the Institute for Strategic Studies paper reached this conclusion:

"The lesson is clear. So long as there remains a tacit agreement between the super powers to cooperate in preventing overt conflicts which threaten international peace and security, a nation using open force to resolve a political problem must do so rapidly, if it is to succeed at all. Once it has succeeded, the reluctance of the Great Powers to countenance a second conflict means that it is likely to preserve its gains. The lesson is a sombre one, placing as it does a premium on adventurism and pre-emption."³²

The same tactics of deception used in 1956 was repeated in 1967. Whilst his air force was bombing the heart of Egypt and his tanks pressing on Sinai, Dayan broadcast this message: "We have no aims of territorial conquest. Our only objective is to foil the attempt of the Arab armies to invade our country ...", and he did not fail to utter the Zionist prayer, "We seek peace but ...". An hour later he was followed by his Prime Minister with the same prayer of peace and pledges of no conquest, "Our only aim is to keep from our borders every threat of sabotage ... We again declare that we shall not attack any State ...". It was a reiteration of his 23 May statement to the Knesset that Israel had no aggressive designs on the Arabs. His representative at the Security Council, Mr. Gideon Rafael, read a message from his government on the day of the attack reaffirming, "We have no aims of conquest. Our sole objectives are to put an end to the Arab attempt to plunder our land ..." It would take another man all the control he had to utter the last phrase without grinning. The war won, Dayan hastened to declare, on 9 June, that the Gaza Sector, Jerusalem and the Western Bank became parts of Israel and it was up to the Arabs to come to the conference table and see what they could save of the remainder of the territories. On 12

(30) *Le Monde*, 20 June 1967.

(31) *Jerusalem Post*, 30 July 1967.

(32) Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, *Israel and the Arab World, the Crisis of 1967*, October 1967, p. 41.

June, it was Eshkol's turn to tell the Knesset that Israel would never return to her former borders. The 1949 Demarcation Lines were invalidated by the Arab attack, declared the Government officially on 5 July. Eban passed to the Security Council, on 13 November, the message of "Israel never, never to return."

Whilst inspecting the Gaza Sector, General Dayan told the journalists that there was no longer a difference between Nazareth and Gaza. He shed a tear for the poor inhabitants of the area whose freedom of movement was restricted by the Egyptian dictator, and hastened to give them their freedom to quit the country to anywhere they liked. The Gaza Strip, he said, was Israel; so was the West Bank and they should be both kept. Hebron, he said shortly afterwards in Tel Aviv, must be annexed because it was "the people's ancestral dreams."³³

What Road to Peace?

Pursuant to the maxim "No land is Israeli land until settled by Jews," the demands arose immediately after the war for colonisation in the newly conquered territories, with the obvious implications. It became a point of contention between Mapai and Mapam during the merger talks. The question was discussed by the Cabinet when Premier Eshkol announced the beginning of Israeli settlement of the new territories. Mr. Yigal Allon, the Minister of Labour, who was just recovering from the unemployment troubles, led the fight for the policy of annexation. Soon after Eshkol's announcement, Mr' Ya'kov Tsur, Head of the JNF, declared that the JNF was preparing for settlement in the occupied territories about 60,000 dunums, half of that in the Golan Heights, 3,000 dunums in the Hebron area and 3,000 in the Latrun salient.³⁴

Jewish colonisation in the Hebron area had a tortuous story. The Zionists established themselves there only to have their settlements destroyed in the 1929 violence. They re-established themselves in the thirties and built up in the Etzion Bloc during World War II, but their positions were liquidated again in the fighting of 1948. After the Six Day War, remnants of the old Orthodox settlers started to re-establish themselves again. When their leader, Shimon Zuiel, was asked by the *Daily Telegraph* correspondent what was going to happen to the dispossessed Arabs, he replied, "I don't know. Our Government is seeing to that."³⁵ A more judicious young man, Chaim Bajaio-Hanegby, grandson of the old Rabbi and Custodian of Hebron refused to take possession of his family's *property*. He wrote to *Ha'aretz*:

"Anyone pretending to speak on behalf of the entire community of Hebron is misleading the public. Anyone planning colonisation is herewith forbidden to do so on my behalf. I shall demand the realisation of my ownership rights when the ownership rights of the Palestinian Arabs over their property in Israel are realised."³⁶

The Mayor of Hebron, Shaykh Muhammad al-Jabri, protested against the

(33) UPI, 5 July and 9 August 1967.

(34) Kol Israel, 31 July 1968, BBC MR Part IV.

(35) *Daily Telegraph*, 9 November 1967.

(36) *Ha'aretz*, 20 May 1968.

encroachment of the Israeli settlers. General Moshe Dayan answered him that there would be even more settlers on the way, "That is the way to peace."³⁷

The Golan Heights needed some preliminary work for settling them. The Jewish Agency planned the creation of four artificial lakes to collect rain water for irrigation. The Housing Minister, Mordecai Bentov, said in July 1968, that 18 new settlements had been established since the war, ten in the Golan Heights, three in the West Bank and five in Sinai and Ha'arava—at a cost of £15,000,000.³⁸ The Jewish Agency had allocated an additional £25,000,000 for reclamation and other works in the same area to bring the number of settlements to a dozen.³⁹ The plan was soon extended to allow for 25 settlements accommodating between 400 and 600 people.⁴⁰ The settlements in Sinai included a fishing colony along a lagoon between al-Arish and Port Said. An agricultural colony utilising some 50 acres was set up near al-Arish with irrigation work speedily executed by the Jewish Agency. The Mekorot company began work, in December 1968, on the 100 km. water pipeline to Sinai, at the cost of £12,000,000.

In Jerusalem, Ben Gurion's axe was followed by Dayan's bulldozers, which knocked down the homes of some 600 families around the Wailing Wall.⁴¹ The report of the Arab League on Jerusalem claims that the authorities had seized all the empty lands around the Old City, thereby preventing the growth of the Arab population in the area. Within the walls of the Old City, they expropriated 126 dunums of properties including four mosques and six historical schools like the famous Qashtimaria School.⁴² The Mayor of Arab Jerusalem, Rouhi al-Khatib, stated in a press conference after his expulsion that, altogether, 700 buildings accommodating 6,000 Palestinians were taken over.⁴³ The Jordanian U.N. Representative submitted a memorandum to the Secretary General mentioning that among the properties expropriated were the Maghariba, Bab as-Silsila, ash-Sharq and the Suq. The Muslims' sacred spot of the Prophet's ascent to heaven was among the areas taken.⁴⁴ The old fears of the Muslim Palestinians began to take definite shape. Shlomo Goren, the Army chief chaplain, produced a new interpretation proving that the old Temple of Solomon was not exactly identical with the building of the Dome of the Rock, and that the compound of the mosque was actually part of the Temple. With shofar in hand, he led his faithful in their army boots to the Haram and sent his shofar flourish to the praying Muslims inside. The call for re-building the Temple became a popular slogan, but the Army Rabbi would not wait. He called for the immediate building of a synagogue in the compound and next to the beautiful mosque. Rabbi S.M. Lehrman produced even a picture of the new temple "as a symbol of peace" which should be built

(37) *Jewish Chronicle*, 7 June 1968.

(38) *Kol Israel*, 12, 20 and 25 August 1968, BBC MR IV.

(39) *Kol Israel*, 14 September 1968, BBC MR IV.

(40) *The Guardian*, 3 December 1968.

(41) *The Times*, 19 April 1968.

(42) *Al-Hayat*, 4 July 1968.

(43) *Al-Hayat*, 2 June 1968.

(44) *Al-Abram*, 14 June 1968.

at the old site. Excavations went on under the mosque, heedless of the condemnation of the entire Islamic World.

Jerusalem was re-opened for the Arabs in 1948 by the Arab Legion from the north via the district of Shaykh Jarrah. It is the highway which leads to the Arab Triangle and the rest of the West Bank via Ramalla. The Hagana tried to block this road by occupying the Arab villages north of the city, but failed in their objective. Following the Six Day War and the annexation of Arab Jerusalem, the Government engineered a different method of severing the city's connection with the rest of Arab territory. On 11 January 1968, the Ministry of Finance announced in the official gazette its decision to expropriate 3,345 dunums along the Jerusalem-Ramalla road. Those who had legal title were asked to present themselves and apply for compensation. The announcement also served notice to the inhabitants to clear off.⁴⁵ The small announcement given in Hebrew in the official gazette was never seen by the Palestinians concerned, who anyway had no knowledge of Hebrew. With the re-development of the spot, Israeli population was used to block the passage of the Arabs, and with the Etzion Blocs re-established in the south, Jerusalem was encircled.

The policy of expulsion and demolition followed on the heel of the troops. Qalqilya was one of the first villages to be axed. To the south, the villages of Beit Nuba, Yalu, and Zeita were demolished. Beit Nuba surrendered without resistance and its inhabitants were treated accordingly with magnanimity and were allowed to go to their fields and tend their crops. When they returned, they found the village razed to the ground. The names of these villages were consequently erased from the maps.⁴⁶ It was alleged that Zeita was destroyed because it harboured some guerrillas.⁴⁷ It must be a coincidence that the destroyed villages happened to fall near the old Demarcation Line. Nearly two hundred houses were demolished in Gaza and three hundred families were expelled from the sector. In its memorandum to U Thant Egypt mentioned that 35,000 Palestinians were removed from the Gaza Sector to the West Bank in a master plan to integrate the sector with Israel.⁴⁸ Individual reprisal, in the form of demolishing any house suspected of sniping, harbouring guerrillas, hiding weapons or helping the Resistance, was applied with good effect in Jerusalem, Nablus and Gaza. A strike on the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration ended with the novel result of 15 shops confiscated by the authorities in Jerusalem for taking part in the strike.⁴⁹ The steady exodus of the inhabitants brought the number of those who left the occupied territories during the war to 323,000, according to Zionist sources. About 178,000 went to Jordan, 107,000 to Syria and 38,000 to Egypt.

(45) *Jewish Chronicle*, 13 October 1967.

(46) The Israeli Representative told the Security Council, "All the land in question outside the Jewish Quarter itself was empty." (U.N. Monthly Chronicle, May 1968).

(47) *Israel Today*, 21 June 1968.

(48) *Al-Abram*, 19 May 1968.

(49) *The Guardian*, 5 November 1968.

Too Much to Swallow

Israel had undoubtedly reached the height of its military and imperialist glory after the Six Day War, and the summit of any height is always one step to the abyss. It was not only the Romans, the Arabs and the British who conquered half the world. There were also Gengis Khan, Hulagu and Hitler, who failed to find the formula by which they could integrate the whole and create a new civilised order. The Israelis puzzled over their poor-man's empire and said no. They did not want to be integrated into any entity with gentiles, and history had over-taken their 19th century colonial methods of ruling by the whip. Israeli society was, therefore, torn asunder by the question of what to do with the little empire.

Premier Eshkol maintained his thesis for a few days after the war that his government had no territorial ambitions. It was an anxious time and mighty words were exchanged in the international arena, but Mrs. Meir advised her people not to be "jittery" about what went on in the United Nations. As time passed and the *fait accompli* began to harden, fertile brains brought forth fertile ideas. While the world Great Powers were vacillating and the United Nations showing its ineffectiveness, the real problem for Tel Aviv emerged as one of population. According to the Israeli census, there were 600,000 Palestinians in the West Bank, 6,400 on the Syrian Heights, 350,000 in the Gaza Sector, and 33,000 in Sinai. With the Arabs of Israel, there would be altogether 1,385,000 Arabs against 2,365,000 Jews.⁵⁰ Statisticians differed in their figures but agreed in their results that sooner or later the Arab population would exceed the Jews, in view of the high birth rate of Muslim women of 9.7 as against 3.4 of Jewish women. Would it not be appropriate for the Government, one school of opinion asked, to introduce compulsory birth control for the Arabs and overcome this "unnatural" birth rate?

There was no difference of opinion on the future of Jerusalem. It was "the crown of the Jewish people" which could not be subject to any negotiations. The Golan Heights must be also annexed for security reasons, and to support the claim an archaeological mission was sent to the area to furnish irrefutable evidence that the Golan Heights belonged to the Jews a few thousand years ago. Mission was accomplished, as usual. Gaza was in Palestine, which to the Government stands for Israel, and must also be annexed. Sinai was a problem. It was not part of Palestine and there were international interests involved in it. In December 1967, Yigal Allon called for drawing a new map with the Western border extending from al-Arish to Sharm ash-Shaykh. Allon had undoubtedly envisaged the line in such a way as to include the Egyptian oil field in Israel. The extension of the line to Sharm ash-Shaykh is a new departure in Zionist cartography for until then, the line was drawn to Aqaba. General Dayan improved on his opponent a year later, in October 1968, and called for the annexation of the whole of Sinai.

(50) *The Times*, 24 October 1967.

The West Bank, with its 600,000 Arabs, was the hard nut to crack, but Labour Minister, Yigal Allon, produced what is known as the Allon Peace Plan for dealing with the area. The plan is based on the assumption that the cease-fire line of the River Jordan is the eastern border of Israel. The inhabitants of the area between Israel proper and the new cease-fire line become the citizens of a new Bantustan type of colony enjoying a measure of self-government. They can alternatively opt for a political link with Jordan without having a common border with her. Military positions will be established along the Jordan Valley and ridges with 15 Jewish colonies surrounding the enclave as a *fait accompli*. The natives will be given access to the Israeli Mediterranean ports. Israel has the freedom of movement in the area and the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip will be removed to live in the reservation. A modification of the plan envisages the incorporation of Hebron into Israel and limiting Allon's ideas to the area north of Jerusalem. *The Jewish Chronicle* commented on the plan that it was "an ideal way not only to eat one's cake, but also to keep it intact having eaten it."⁵¹ The paper forgot, however, that wanting things both ways has been the recognisable feature of Zionism since its birth.

It is one of the tasks of all conquerors to look after the fate of their conquered subjects in one way or another. The imperialists of Tel Aviv do not want to shoulder even this minimum of responsibility. The Allon "Peace" Plan foundered. With the forcible movement of the Palestinians from Gaza and Hebron to the new Bantustan, there would be 800,000 people on an area of 1,000 square miles of the poorest hills in the Middle East. How can anybody feed 800 people on a square mile of barren land? Nevertheless, the idea received the support of Premier Eshkol and of Defence Minister Dayan.

Whilst many words and plans were tossed by every shade of political opinion, the quiet process of incorporating the territories was in progress. The Israeli pound was made legal tender in the occupied territories shortly after the war. The military parade was held in Arab Jerusalem in May. Permits were issued in the summer for the inhabitants of the occupied territories to work for Jewish employers where their cheap labour was needed, and with no competition with Jewish workers. According to *Ha'aretz*, the Arab road workers from the occupied territories were paid a daily wage of I£4.20 against the I£20 of the Jew.⁵² In order to encourage Israeli capitalists in making the best of the available cheap labour and speed up the *de facto* annexation, the Government promised a 9 per cent state loan, an income tax rebate and a political guarantee to those who set up factories on the West Bank. The political guarantee is full of meaning. In September, a Ministerial Committee for the occupied territories was formed to replace the military administration by a civil one.

The struggle between General Moshe Dayan and Mr. Yigal Allon for power and for the succession to Prime Minister Eshkol introduced a new element in the

(51) *Jewish Chronicle*, 28 June 1968.

(52) *Ha'aretz*, 18 December 1968.

territorial question. A public opinion survey conducted for the Government paper *Davar*, in April 1968, revealed the following:

- 95 per cent favour retaining Arab Jerusalem.
- 88 per cent favour retaining the Golan Heights.
- 61 per cent favour retaining Sharm ash-Shaykh.
- 47 per cent favour retaining the West Bank.
- 21 per cent favour retaining Sinai.

Territorial expansion had become a truly popular slogan with the electorate, and extremism found many a champion. The Land of Israel Movement emerged to speak for the militant Zionists and preach the restoration to Israel of all its historical lands. Professor Harold Fisch, in a letter to the *Jewish Chronicle*, put the case for the Movement by arguing that Egypt had no legal title to Sinai and the same applied to the Kingdom of Jordan in regard to the West Bank. The whole area was Israel and must return to it.⁵³ Professor Abi Yona furnished extensive evidence to the effect that the old Sinai script was closer to the Hebrew of Palestine than to the Egyptian scripts, and that the inhabitants were the same Nabataeans as those of Palestine.⁵⁴ Gershom Schoken, the editor of *Ha'aretz*, advised the people to avoid publicity and let the new territories merge quietly with Israel informally and *de facto*.⁵⁵

In order to outbid Allon in extremism, Dayan moved forward and called in a Mapai Party meeting for the annexation of all the territories without exception. He solved the Arab numerical population problem by simply denying them the Israeli nationality, which is available, on the other hand, to any Jew from Tokio to California, in accordance with the Law of Return. Blood and not birth, residence or documents, preached by the Nazi Party before, is one's only title to nationality. The old Zionist concept of border colonies and maintenance of communications with them as means of Jewish territorial domination, cropped up again in his thesis: "We must have the possibility to move freely around in all the territories, without arrangements and accords, by sheer right. We shall go wherever we want to and, if there is need, we shall settle there." The future outcome of this policy is obvious and he did not fail to deal with it: "We have three factors at our disposal, space, time and authority. We should retain all these and exploit them—first of all by preparing for a possible war."⁵⁶ He was speaking for the Movement for the Annexation of the Liberated Territories, which ridiculed Eshkol's weak government and called for the formation of a war cabinet of generals to prepare for an expected Soviet-Egyptian blitzkrieg.

On the other side of the scale, Mapam had to cross swords with their Mapai partners over the West Bank, which they insisted should be handed back on the conclusion of a peace treaty. They agreed that Gaza and Jerusalem should be annexed, but Sinai and the Golan Heights should be only demilitarised. The area

(53) *Jewish Chronicle*, 3 January 1968.

(54) *Ha'aretz*, 16 October 1968.

(55) *Ha'aretz*, 22 November 1968.

(56) *Jewish Chronicle*, 28 June 1968.

would then be prepared for a regional federation. Abba Eban led the moderate faction of Mapai inside the Cabinet. No one envied him his position, as whenever he committed Israel to a compromise course, he faced a storm on his return to Tel Aviv. Between the hammer and the anvil of Tel Aviv and New York, he was forced to seek a refuge in his diplomatic shell: "We should say we do not know where the final boundaries will be, but they will be somewhere different from the cease-fire line and from the June 5th line."⁵⁷ Further to the left, there was formed a limited minority opinion represented by intellectuals, communists, and Marxists, who urged an immediate withdrawal from the conquered territories. An arrow pointing to the left is the emblem of the Anti-Annexation Movement. A minority of politicians, including former Minister Mr. Lavon, also called for complete evacuation for the sake of Israel's future security and stability.

The propaganda story of the expansionists was once more based on the intransigence of the Arabs. The Government declared its willingness to withdraw after a peace treaty concluded in direct talks with the Arabs, but they did not specify what territories they were going to hand back. The position of their propagandists was weakened by the acceptance of some Arab Governments of the Security Council Resolution of 22 November 1967 and the unanimous opinion expressed by one representative after another that no longer could the world tolerate territorial expansion by force. The Resolution which was submitted by the United Kingdom mentioned neither direct talks, peace treaties or territorial bargaining. Below is the full text of the much debated Resolution.⁵⁸

"The Security Council:

Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasising the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,

Emphasising further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,

1. Affirms that the fulfilment of charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:

(i) Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;

(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

2. Affirms further the necessity:

(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;

(b) For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;

(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

(57) *Jewish Chronicle*, 7 June 1968.

(58) S/RES/242 (1967).

3. Requests the Secretary-General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible."

The Government was apparently hoping for the resolution to die in the course of time. But an unfortunate announcement made in May by the Israeli Representative, Mr. Tekoah, accepting the Security Council resolution ignited a whole crisis in Tel Aviv. Mr. Tekoah must have relied on the traditional Arab intransigence and challenged the Arab representative to follow suit and accept the full terms of the resolution. To his shock, the representatives of some Arab Governments did and the fat was in the fire. It was certainly a new departure in Arab handling of the question. Foreign Minister Abba Eban, according to the correspondent of the *Observer*, found himself in trouble and embarrassment.⁵⁹ After a stormy Cabinet debate, a further demand was put on Arab intransigence. Israel Galili gave a speech, on 20 May, declaring that Israel would not accept withdrawal without direct talks, and that the old Demarcation Lines were dead and new border lines must be agreed upon. The Government issued a communique on 21 May, claiming that peace could not be established without direct talks. During the Security Council debate, none of the representatives, including Mr. Eban, mentioned direct talks in connection with the U.K. Resolution.⁶⁰

More Sir!

The wholesale annexation is bound to bring with it the seeds of conflict and the conflict cannot be treated by Tel Aviv except by additional security measures, border readjustments and conquests. Three fronts emerged here in Israeli military thinking—the Suez towns, the East Bank of Jordan and the south of Lebanon.

In Dayan's interview with David Frost, the Minister of Defence regretted the fact that he had left some areas unconquered during the Six Day War. The Israeli Army should have occupied the whole of the Suez Canal Zone and opened the Canal for shipping under Israeli administration.⁶¹ This opinion had a deeper history than the casual off the cuff manner which the television media may suggest. It was in 1959 that Moshe Dayan had called for the occupation of the whole of Sinai and taking the Suez Canal from the hands of the Egyptians.⁶² The prospect was prepared for by ruthless artillery bombardment of the canal towns to clear off the unwanted inhabitants and reduce the problem of the future fait accompli. The population of Port Tawfiq and Port Suez was reduced from 260,000 souls to 60,000 in just over a year.

On another occasion, Dayan explained that the border with Lebanon was not quite satisfactory⁶³ and the little levantine country lived in perpetual fear. The

(59) *Observer*, 23 June 1968.

(60) *U.N. Monthly Chronicle*, December 1967.

(61) Independent Television, 23 August 1968.

(62) Lau-Lavie, *op. cit.*, p. 178.

(63) *Jewish Chronicle*, 16 October 1968.

immediate target, however, seemed to be the land of Gilead, on the north of the eastern bank of the Jordan. The area is the only substantially fertile land left for Jordan and the half million refugees. Zionist eyes were cast on this region long before the Mandate was established. Although part of the Amirate of Transjordan which the Jewish Agency had recognised in the twenties, the Agency claimed Gilead for the Jews in their submission to the Palestine Partition Commission of 1938. Their spokesman demanded the inclusion of the area east of the Jordan between the Yarmuk in the north and a point opposite to the southern edge of the Beisan Valley.⁶⁴

With the consolidation of the already established fact, opinion began to prevail in Israel, according to Mr. Harold Jackson of *The Guardian*, that the area east of the Jordan should be included in the reservation envisaged by Mr. Allon.⁶⁵

Again, the reprisal acts, now recognisable Israeli means of expansion, were stepped up. Continuous artillery shelling and air raids made the fellahin desert their villages and fields. Groups of foreign students from many parts of Europe were flown into Amman to undertake the seasonal picking on behalf of the fellahin who dared not approach their crops. The shelling naturally drew fire from the Jordanian positions, and the artillery shells on the Israeli settlements released the settlers' clamour for occupying the Jordanian positions, as happened before to the Syrian Golan Heights. The Tel Aviv press began to allude to this "necessity" and the Military Correspondent of *Ha'aretz* mentioned that the bombardment was part of a plan to get the villagers out of the way prior to occupying the area.

This is not, however, the limit of Israeli ambitions. A few weeks after the June conquests, Brig. Chaim Herzog, the former governor of the West Bank, stated, "The next war will be fought for the capitals of the Arab States"⁶⁶ and General Rabin confirmed his views. In fact, the *Jewish Chronicle* correspondent reported from Tel Aviv that there was some inclination towards a new war as the way out of the no war no peace situation by conquering the Arab capitals.⁶⁷

The military build up continued, and with the millions of dollars sent to Tel Aviv, new and more effective weapons were purchased. Peace must be made on the Israeli terms of conquest and subjugation, and not even on the favourable terms of the Security Council Resolution. "Let no one point his finger at us if we find ourselves compelled to defend ourselves against Security Council vote," advised Premier Eshkol, and brushed aside the suggestion that President Johnson might be on the verge of an accord with Moscow over curtailing arms supply to the Middle East. What Israel wanted to see, he argued, was more arms. Apart from that, the best that the foreign powers could do was to keep out of the Middle East and leave its peoples to decide their own future "among themselves."

The victory enabled the WZO to penetrate the diaspora further and deeper. One of its new conquests was the assimilated French Jewry. In America, the Zionist

(64) Cmd. 5854, 1938.

(65) *The Guardian*, 12 June 1968.

(66) *Jewish Chronicle*, 17 November, 13 October 1967.

(67) *Jewish Chronicle*, 24 December 1967.

domination was nearly complete, as even the American Council for Judaism decided to open a dialogue with Zionism which caused the resignation of the strongly anti-Zionist faction.⁶⁸ The enthusiasm with which the Israeli victory was received among the Jewry of the People's Democracies prompted some of the Governments, particularly the Polish Government, to take measures to combat Zionism. Yet, the new diaspora solidarity did not prevent the growth of new and healthy movements. Like the 1948 war, the 1967 Six Day War afforded the Arabs an opportunity to re-examine their weaknesses. A far reaching philosophy for action emerged among the guerrilla fighters. To them the fight is not against the Jews or the people of Israel, but against Zionism. The differentiation between the Jews, the Israelis and the Zionists is not a new development in the Arab world, but until the Six Day War the differentiation was generally a lip service and a propaganda strategy. The war confirmed more than ever that the Zionist Government, in alliance with the world of Western imperialism, is bent on undermining the revolutionary progress of the Arab countries. Unlike the 1956 war, the Six Day War revealed Israel as a full partner of that world and not simply a hireling or an agent as the Arab nationalists had preached. The question which has to be pondered now is—will it be possible for Israel to fill in the vacuum which the western imperialist powers had left in the Middle East, grasp the present opportunity of despondency and apathy which it had helped to create, and install itself as a new master?

(68) Rabbi E. Berger appeared in London on behalf of the Arab case, an act which ended in his resignation from the ACJ. He was followed by a minority faction including M. Menuhin. cf. *New York Times*, 25 October 1968.

CHAPTER XIII

THE INEVITABLE

Arab Fears

The question which must be asked in any book on Palestine is, what solution? After so many dignified royal commissions, committees of enquiry, surveys of experts and endless debates in Parliament, Congress and United Nations, the question seems outdated and the answer presumptuous. But the question and its answers, however trivial or pointless, are important in one respect, i.e., as a pointer to the fact that the question is by no means resolved. The establishment of Israel has neither solved the Palestine problem, nor the Jewish question, if indeed it has not added another problem to the international scene, the problem of Israel.

There have been so many solutions and compromises suggested to the two parties by various interested and disinterested parties, but none of them received even a polite gesture of consideration. The Arab and Israeli look like two passionate protagonists whirling towards their pre-determined destinies in a bloody tragedy not too far from the lands of Sophocles, the Bible and the Quran. Every element in the Middle East conspires to make the life of its inhabitants a life of passion and emotionalism, and consequently of doom and fatalism:

Now let the weeping cease;

Let no one mourn again.

These things are in the hands of God.

Little room is left in the Middle East for any rational appraisal of any crisis and the mystic and psychological is more likely the kind of force that dictates to its people. The goal of the observer and the politician must be to look for the inevitable rather than the possible, and one of such inevitable developments, analysed and related in the preceding chapters, is Zionist expansion. Arab fear of this development is the natural reaction, which nevertheless, was dismissed out of hand in 1948 by the western world as an eastern exaggeration. The Arabs, however, recognised the danger in their own intuitive way, and out of their own personal dealings with the Zionists. The Arabs will never trust them and any rational argument to dispel their fear and mistrust is a wasted effort, if not a wicked counsel.

One result of this fear is the seemingly more irrational mood of Arab intransigence, which looks as suicidal as the Israeli thirst for expansion, a subject which calls for some examination. It is a recognisable feature of the mechanism of fear that the subject generates such an amount of charge during a single instance

that the overflow seeps into some of the unrelated organs causing unnecessary muscular contortions and uncontrolled discharges here and there. Curious that the strictly physiological operation can have a parallel in the abstract body of human society. Yet, this seems to be the basic explanation for a great deal of the speeches, actions and inter-Arab squabbles *vis à vis* Israel, that strike most people as illogical, unnecessary and even disadvantageous. One more symptom of fear is the total inertia to which the subject resorts and which is obviously a remnant of man's life in the jungle. The inaction which has so often characterised the policies of many Arab governments may have this psychological dimension in addition to the other and more objective factors. Intransigence is the perfect political expression of the inertia of phobia and the widespread fear of anything to do with Israel.

The Palestinian was not as naïve and unmindful as he is usually portrayed. He predicted his present plight well before the Balfour Declaration. His representative at the Turkish Parliament warned in 1911 of what was being perpetrated for Palestine,¹ and the Government was forced to take some reassuring measures. Arab writers had also drawn attention, in their own fiery fashion, to what might result from Zionist colonisation. It was the victory of practical Zionism in 1908, with its emphasis on the practical work of steady immigration and colonisation and boycott of Arab labour, which fanned the fear of the Palestinians into a blaze. The Balfour Declaration came to confirm the warnings of the intelligentsia.

It did not take the Palestinians long to recognise the tactics of the Zionist Organization of quiet penetration—a small farm gradually taking over the village and then the town. The mercurial behaviour of the Zionists is probably the most important factor in shaping the present Arab psychology towards Israel and in hardening Arab intransigence. The Palestinians were alarmed by the method in which the Zionist used every new gain as a springboard for another. In 1922, their spokesman summed up to Winston Churchill the revelation that had come to them, "When we protested against the recognition of Hebrew as an official language in the State we were told it was harmless; now we see that our fears have been realised, and that this very recognition is used as an instrument to establish a "right"."² This appreciation was repeated again to Churchill's successor at the Colonial Office, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, when the fate of Palestine was under review in 1939. To MacDonald's request that the Palestinians should make some concessions, the Arab delegates pointed out that such concessions were invariably treated by the Zionists as basis for further concessions.

The position was once more spelled out in 1948. Faris al-Khuri told the U.N. First Committee on 28 April: "They had only to adhere to the statements made by such Zionist leaders as Messrs. Wise, Weizmann and Sokolow, who had declared that the establishment of an independent Jewish state had never been a part of the Zionist programme and that the Arabs would not be ousted from their

(1) Stein, *op. cit.*, p. 89

(2) Cmd. 1700, 1922.

present position. But Zionist aspirations had grown from year to year." The subsequent history of the State of Israel and the periodic redrawing of the map justified the earlier fears which the foreign observers had dismissed as oriental exaggerations. It also confirmed the Arab in his reading of the situation and led him back into his own world of the self.

The spokesmen and ideologists of Arab nationalism spoke of a definite blueprint embodying the final ambitions of Zionism according to the religious covenant of an Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates. They still believe that the Knesset chamber bears that legend.³ The Arabs received their inspiration for these ideas from the earlier European anti-Semitic literature which was scarcely familiar to the Islamic world. *The Protocols of the Elders of Zion* has become a popular book, and a new translation with notes and history going beyond even the original author was published in Beirut. With the weirdness of the book with its metaphorical snake, the *Protocols'* popularity is a pointer to a political hallucinatory mind and the anxiety which is gnawing at it. Having failed to find an interpretation in the world of reason for his plight, disintegration, and rejection, the Palestinian Arab is forced to delve into the world of magic.

The belief that Israel and the Zionist Organization are implementing a thought out plan does not only lack evidence but is also contrary to the nature of Zionism. Had there been such a plan, the problem would have been much simpler, as there would be at least limits to Zionist aspirations. Israel is acting like all imperial states in history, and no imperial conqueror had laid down an exact plan for what he had to achieve. He would be a foolish emperor who set limits on the national ambitions of his country. The only maxim applicable for an expansionist state is to expand and dominate the maximum of other lands under the given circumstances and with the available potentialities.

Permanent Threat across the Border

The Demarcation Lines of 1949 stretched to 589 miles, distributed as follows:

	<i>Kms.</i>	<i>Miles</i>
Israel — Lebanon Border	79	49
Israel — Syria Border	76	47
Israel — Jordan Border	531	329
Israel — Egypt and Gaza Border	265	164

Jordan had by far the longest frontier with Israel, and with its limited resources and small population, it has endured the greatest anxiety over its territorial integrity. The pocket-sized Kingdom had become the whipping boy for Israel, which had persistently claimed parts of the defenceless country including Jerusalem and the West Bank. The Jordanians kept a watchful eye on the increasing strength

(3) In reply to a listener, Cairo Radio mentioned that Arab persistent belligerence, despite the repeated defeats, is actuated by Israel's determination to expand from the Nile to the Euphrates. (Cairo Radio to Asia, 22 October 1968).

of Israel, particularly its population growth, whose natural outlet would be the two banks of the Jordan. The fellahin of the West Bank who chanted to King Abdulla the refrain of, "Ya Abu Talal hamina," (Oh, father of Talal protect us), were summing up their precarious position aptly. The *Jewish Chronicle* drew Israel's attention:

"There is no reason to doubt the King's sincerity when he claimed that one factor among many inhibiting some settlement is the Jordanian Government's fear of Israel. The situation here is one of great complexity. Israel must of necessity remain strong *vis à vis* the Arabs as a whole in order to obviate all hankerings after a revanchists solution by force of arms, of the kind again promised by President Nasser and Amer, his Vice President, only this week. But, at the same time, Israel must understand that Jordanian fears of Israeli intentions are very real and she should make the utmost efforts to dispel them once and for all."⁴

Until June 1967, Syria was perhaps less worried than the other states because of her short frontier and her command over the difficult Golan Heights, but the picture completely changed after the Six Day War. Lebanon, which was fairly oblivious of Israeli ambitions, began to look around and re-examine the position. The Lebanese have kept themselves partially aloof from the Israel-Arab embroilment, but the change of the territorial scene following the Six Day War and the discovery of the extent to which Zionist dreams could go, sobered up the politicians. The Government commissioned Abd al-Wahhad Kayali to do research on Zionist blueprints on their country. In his published report, Kayali traced the Zionist ambitions to the early days of Herzl's Political Zionism and linked it up with their recent Qatr Project published by the Israeli Government in 1954. The Project provides for the drawing of water from the Litani River whose source, course and mouth are all in the territory of Lebanon.⁵

The report, if nothing else, underlines the new fears of a carefree country like Lebanon. It took only a few weeks more for the authorities to recognise the validity of their worries. In May 1968, and following the usual excuse of guerrilla activities, the Israeli radio and press threatened Lebanon with a similar fate as befell Jordan, Syria and Egypt. The Lebanese Government hastened to send a message to the President of the U.N. General Assembly calling attention to the Israeli threats broadcast by Kol Israel which "constitute a clear and explicit danger of invading and holding the southern part of Lebanon."⁶ In another message to the United Nations, the Government was so overwhelmed with anxiety that they disowned their own officials and disassociated themselves from any irresponsible statements which they might have made. The message was followed by the Foreign Minister who was sent on tour to western capitals to seek assurances against Israeli expansion northward. But the Israelis seemed determined to drag Lebanon into the conflict. On 15 June, they opened fire on Meis al-Jabal destroying five houses and wounding five people. It was the second attack in a month.⁷

(4) *Jewish Chronicle*, 29 July 1966.

(5) The Arab, Arab League Office, London, March 1968.

(6) *Al-Jarida*, Beirut, 21 May 1968.

(7) *Observer*, 16 June 1968.

The Beirut press had, in fact, reported with alarm, earlier in the year, unusual Jewish purchases of lands in the south and called on the authorities to step in. A few months later, the Beirut airport was subjected to its first devastating air raid. The attack on Beirut followed a visit by Shimon Peres to Paris where he had studied Lebanon's moods and reactions and reported back in Tel Aviv Lebanon's anticipations of an Israeli advance to the Litani River.⁸ The small country's feeling of Israel's hot breath on its neck after the 1967 war was a repetition of an earlier experience following the 1948 war. Zionist sources spoke then of a "Free Lebanese Movement" in Israel, and the Israeli delegate at the U.N. informed the Security Council, in November 1948, that some southern Lebanese villages had asked Israel to include them under her authority. Those villages were already under Israeli military occupation following the October campaign.⁹

Egypt, which has the Sinai desert to separate it from Palestine, learned from its repeated reverses that the Israeli forces were quite capable of straddling the Suez Canal, its life-line, within hours. Neither the population preponderance nor the geographical disposition proved a deterrent to Tel Aviv. Nasser's repeated references to the unpreparedness of Egypt were a frank admission of his feelings. These fears are further reinforced by the organisation of the Israeli Army, with its swift and secret mobilisation and the local recruitment of the units, which cannot but increase the nervousness of the Arab commanders. The terrible efficiency exhibited over and over again has unsettled the enemy and made the possibility of any detente more unattainable. The fact that Israel can fight regardless of cost, thanks to the fund raisers, has made matters no better.

Israel's reply to the Arabs in this connection is logical. If you are worried about any expansion, come and sign peace treaties and insure against it. The logical argument unfortunately is not always the practical one. Does a peace treaty really insure against the expansionist attempts and military adventures? Is this actually what history has taught us across the years, and, most of all, does it alter the structure and character of any state? Will it, for example, change the Zionist nature of Israel?

The thesis of the present work is expansion as an integral part of the Zionist structure. It is the Jews who gave the worst epithet to Chamberlain for coming back satisfied with a scrap of paper from the Machiavellian Nazi. Israel's moderate politicians could not themselves pull the Zionist state away from its militarist course. Why should the Arabs feel more confident in achieving that?

The fear over the Zionist territorial expansion is not an exclusively Arab phobia or a recent development. It was not the Egyptians, but Lord Cromer, who had his misgivings on Zionist expansion from Al-Arish to the Suez Canal. The same premonition was ventilated by M. Berthelot during the Peace Conference, when he spoke of France's fears of a Zionist advance to Damascus, once they

(9) Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 288.

(8) *Ha'aretz*, 18 December 1968.

were allowed over the hills.¹⁰ The UNSCOP report admitted the danger of Israeli expansion and provided measures for combating it. These measures were effectively demolished in the 1948 fighting, and it was left to U.S. Secretary of State, Mr. Dulles, to draw attention once more to the anxiety over Israel's expansion as a factor behind the Middle East tension. In fact, even Ben Gurion had appreciated in his memoirs the validity of such Arab fears.

The Dimensions and Extent of Fear

Peace with a Zionist state can mean only a transfer of Israel's expansion to a new field, and the Arabs are not unaware of this danger. The Arab-Israeli conflict is one of the few national conflicts which matter to the general masses of the people. While the professional class of army officers, politicians and intelligentsia have their own axe to grind, the rising bourgeois, the peasantry and the working class happen to have their own interests as well. The professionals are certainly apprehensive of the merciless competition which they would encounter from their Israeli opposite number. Israel's resources and Zionist ruthless zeal backfire in this field as in many others.

It has been a common idea postulated by many people that Israel and the Arab states are complementary. In his statement to the U.N. Special Committee on Palestine on 4 July 1947, Ben Gurion said, "The historic interests and aspirations of the Jews and Arabs are not mutually exclusive—they are complementary and inter-connected. Each one of them has in abundance what the other needs."¹¹ On the face of it, the appearances supported such an optimistic view, at least in 1947. The facts and figures of the subsequent development and the strides made by the Arab revolution erased much of the authenticity of the claim. The fact that Israel produces oranges and Lebanon apples does not make them complementary. It is exactly the production of citrus fruit which is bringing Israel into direct economic conflict with Algeria and Morocco, the two citrus exporting Arab countries. Israel will become complementary when she makes cheaper water pumps and machine tools, which is far beyond her natural resources. The following table shows the main items in Israel's exports in 1963. (in \$1,000)

Agricultural goods including: ¹²	
Foodstuffs	103,109
Cotton	1,666
Oil seeds	1,528
Manufactured goods including:	
Textile yarn and thread	13,176
Clothing	11,603
Textile fabrics	3,344
Rubber articles	8,994

(10) *British Documents*, First Series, Vol. IV, p. 601.

(11) *Israel's Peace Offers*, Jerusalem, 1958.

(12) Based on figures given in *Statistical Abstract of Israel*. 1964

Plastic articles	1,733
Cement and building materials	1,894
Glass	1,415
Veneers, plywood and treated wood	6,026
Pearls and precious and semi-precious stones	116,016
Manufactured metals	17,031
Chemicals including:	
Fertilizers	5,472
Organic chemicals	2,347
Petroleum products	7,678
Vegetable oils	5,431

Except for the polished diamonds of which Israel is a main exporter, the bulk of these items are goods which the Arab world is producing now and for which it is striving to find markets. It is one reason why Israel finds in Egypt her main enemy, and why Arab nationalism and opposition to Israel has moved to Cairo since the heavy industrialisation of revolutionary Egypt. True, Israel has the know-how, but the Arabs have the cheap labour to make the competition sharper. George Kirk saw in the economic threat which Israel presented to Lebanon a cause for the anti-Zionist opposition maintained by the Lebanese circles.¹³ The Arab world has also become the haven of international engineering and construction companies after the spectacular rise in the oil royalties received by many Arab countries. Lebanese and Egyptian companies took a big share of most of the projects. Their main asset in the competition is their proximity and knowledge of the region. Israel offers formidable competition on both points. Jewish Palestinian enterprise had, in fact, shown its teeth during the Mandate by taking on engineering projects in some of the neighbouring Arab countries. The fear of Israeli enterprise alarms the Arabs by its recognised international backing. This was the kind of fear conveyed by Naqrashi, the Egyptian Prime Minister, during the 1948 war, to Count Bernadotte when he spoke of the Jews' commercial and economic resources which could easily dominate the Arabs.¹⁴ The recent meeting of 500 leading Jewish financiers and industrialists, including such figures as Edmond de Rothschild, Isaac Wolfson, Lord Sieff and Siegmund Warburg, in Jerusalem, for the purpose of widening Israel's financial base must have made a lasting impression on the Arabs. Through Tel Aviv, American capital is flowing into Africa, where the name of America is not a favourite. Towards the end of 1968, dollar capital investment returned to anti-American Syria when a cattle breeding scheme worth a million Israeli pounds, provided by American investors, was announced for the Golan Heights. The banishment of western capital investment from Egypt, Syria and Iraq is the force behind America's increased backing for Israel.

(13) Kirk, *The Middle East in the War*, p. 295.

(14) Bernadotte, *op. cit.*, p. 27. The Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry (1946) draws attention to the financial supremacy and its dangers to the Arabs, and urges that principal projects of the country must be kept clear of such a financial control regardless of any pledges or assurance given by the Jewish Agency.

Following the sweeping annexations after the Six Day War, Israel followed on the heels of the former imperialists and demanded the Arab markets as part of the peaceful agreement. "End your boycott and blockade to be given back some of your land," is a demand which was understandably supported by the Americans. The Arab middle class, whether the bourgeois of private enterprise or the bureaucracy of the nationalised industry sensed the danger. Their answer was simple: No peace with Israel at whatever cost.

It is, however, strange how the Zionist leadership thought of their national home as a competitor against the Arab world long before the present situation. Chaim Weizmann had dreamt, before Israel was made a state, of producing cheap petroleum synthetically. A canal parallel to the Suez Canal was another scheme of his, often considered by the Zionists.¹⁵ Abba Eban renewed the old dream in 1958, so that Israel might become a bridge to Asia and the world might "be liberated from exclusive reliance on the Suez Canal . . ."¹⁶ This particular competition came nearer to reality in 1968 when the Israelis started to lay their own oil pipeline from Eilat to the Mediterranean. Egypt had to hurry up and commission a British firm to lay a similar pipeline west of the Suez Canal and give its warning, through its Minister of Industry, Aziz Sidqi, that all oil companies which use the Israeli pipeline would be blacklisted in the Arab world.¹⁷

The Fears of the Working People

The Arab working class is in solidarity with the other social strata on this point. Israel has a chronic unemployment problem; so have all the Arab countries. The fear here is underlined by the previous experiences of the Palestinian and Arab immigrant workers during the Zionist boycott of their labour. The Jewish Agency advocated this policy with vigour and justified it without any embarrassment. "We want the colonies to be Jewish and to be worked by Jews, and I beg of our friends the Arabs to understand that it is an elementary postulate for those who desire to build up a Jewish country that this should be done by Jewish labour and by Jewish intellect . . ." warned Dr. Weizmann, shortly after the Balfour Declaration, in Manchester on 29 December 1917. The Israelis will continue to pay for the sins of their early days. The Poale Zionists were even more diligent in applying the discriminatory policy and dictated it on all Jewish employers regardless of cost or inconvenience, and often against their opposition.¹⁸ The Zionist Executive denounced the Jewish farmers in Kfar Saba for employing Arab labourers and called on them "not to lend a hand to their work of destruction."¹⁹ According to its report, there were 2,000 Arabs altogether working for Jewish employers before 1934. When the work fell under the au-

(15) Weizmann, *op. cit.*, p. 545; p. 562.

(16) Eban, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

(17) *Al-Abram*, 10 June 1968.

(18) The economic dislocation led to violent results at times. The Zionist Bulletin wrote in June 1914 "Unfortunately the labour question is very serious and caused a long strike at Sedjera. The demand for excluding all non-Jewish labour is premature."

(19) Report of the Zionist Executive to the XIX Congress, 1935, p. 72.

thority of the Histadrut, the policy of pure Jewish labour was strictly observed. Outside its scope, anti-Arab picketing was applied, especially in connection with the building industry—a practice which led to many clashes in which the police had to interfere. The Government stepped in and introduced, in 1934, the Intimidation Ordinance so as to exclude disputes related to racial clauses from the category of industrial disputes.

Had the Zionists realised all their demands from the British Administration they would have simply monopolised the entire market, and achieved the 1948 Arab exodus in 1936 by starvation instead of terror. Poale Zion demanded that "The carrying out of public works, such as the construction of means of communications by land and by water, the exploitation of natural resources, the provision of light and water, and other works of public utility, shall be offered in the first place to the Executive of the Jewish people.²⁰ The British Government could only accede in the matter of the major projects. Had they done otherwise, the Arabs would have been virtually kept out of employment, as the Zionist Executive not only insisted on pure Jewish labour in its own enterprises, but also stipulated that the private employer who neglected the observance of the rule must be expelled from the organization.²¹ The insistence of the authorities in awarding contracts to the Arabs led to exasperating squabbles between the Jewish Agency and the Administration on the proportion to be allocated for each of the communities. The question was further complicated by the Jewish demand that not only the percentage of the population should be taken into consideration, but also the percentage of the taxes paid by the two communities. The Jews who were richer paid more taxes and they insisted on taking that into consideration, against the simple democratic principle according to which the rich subsidise the poor by taxes. The Jewish Agency also demanded the inclusion of yet another factor in the calculation. The Jewish population was not static but increasing with annual immigration. What was computed in one year would be outdated in the following year. The demand had created insoluble problems for the Administration in regard to the employment roles, which could not be modified every year by sacking one batch of a racial group and replacing it with another to attain the numerical equilibrium.

In the early thirties, the Jewish Agency managed to reach an agreement with the Administration that the Jews should receive 33 per cent of the wage bill. The ultra anti-Arab nature of the agreement is that the Jews were in no need of the allocated jobs. The Report of the Executive admits that they could not take up all the vacancies because of the shortage of Jewish labour. In 1933, the Government answered the Zionist charge that not enough tenders were given to the Histadrut by mentioning thirteen tenders offered with the result of only one taken up. The reason was the same lack of Jewish workers. The Histadrut had even abandoned some contracts and paid the legal penalties for the same

(20) The Peel Commission dealt with this controversy. cf. Cmd. 5479, 1937, pp. 318, 324.

(21) Report of the Zionist Executive, *op. cit.*, p. 82.

reason and because of its unwillingness to employ Arabs. Eventually two contracts were undertaken and carried out regardless of economic considerations in order to maintain the claims against the Arabs in employment. "Although," reported the Executive cynically, "The Jewish Labour Federation found itself confronted with exceptional difficulties in its efforts to secure the necessary labour supply, the importance of the position thus regained, even within such limited scope made the sacrifices involved worthwhile."²²

The impact of this wrangling on the mind of the Arab worker needs no elucidation. The ironic side of it is that the Jews have always brought the charge of racial discrimination and anti-Semitism against any government or organization which applied the *numerus clausus* to the admission of Jews to the Universities and professions. But the Jews who became the Zionists of the National Home lost no time in invoking and applying their former curse. Mr. Ben Gurion pioneered the anti-Arab labour movement and made it the cornerstone of his "socialist" policies when he became the Secretary General of the Histadrut. He did not take "Workers of all lands unite" for his motto, as all socialists do, but preferred to go back some two thousand years and adopt, "Ye shall have Jewish labour."²³ Dr. G.D. Scholtz of the apartheid mouthpiece, *Die Transvaler*, praised Ben Gurion's racial policies in boycotting Arab labour and recommended his methods to South Africa.²⁴

Like the advocates of apartheid, the Zionists have their own justification for the policy and many people in the western world undoubtedly accept it, but it can make no impression on the victim concerned. To expect the Arab worker, after this long record, to view Israeli presence in his market with anything but the utmost apprehension is a heavy demand on his optimism. Zionist sources claim that the lot of the Arab worker had improved in the thirties as a result of their enterprise, which is possibly true, but certainly in an indirect way. The influx of the fairly affluent German immigrants and the funds which poured in for their settlement led to a general high tempo in economic activities which could not fail to affect the Arab section. The phenomenon loses its value when we realise that in the twenties the reverse had occurred. Jewish immigration led to unemployment then (8,440 Jewish workers were idle in August 1927) and a slump which affected the Arabs and resulted in the 1929 massacres.²⁵ During the 1936 revolution in which the Arab proletariat played for the first time a distinct role and maintained a prolonged general strike, the rebels vented their wrath by destroying thirteen Jewish factories costing \$500,000. In other parts of the present work, references are made to the conditions of the Arab worker within the State of Israel, his lower wages, his inability to join the Histadrut, and his permanent status of last in, first out.

(22) Report of the Zionist Executive, 1935, p. 471.

(23) Ben Gurion, *Rebirth and Destiny*, p. 64.

(24) *Zionist Record*, 18 April 1958.

(25) Cf. Cmd. 3530, 1930.

The Fears of the Peasants

A similar story is repeated in the countryside. As the Jewish Agency reserved work for which they had no available labour force and kept the unemployed Arabs to their sector, they likewise acquired lands, drove the peasants out, and kept the lands fallow because they did not have Jewish tillers of their own. Whilst the fellahin were sitting in the Souk, the Jewish National Fund was in possession of 270,000 dunums, of which only 114,329 dunums were cultivated in 1929, the year of high unemployment and massacres.²⁶ In 1937, there were eleven settlements listed as "unpopulated" in the Report of the Executive to the XXth Zionist Congress. The story of the Palestinian fellahin has been dealt with by most writers on the subject and studied by the various commissions and experts sent to Palestine. What an illiterate and defenceless peasant suffers in the face of high powered organizations and ruthless influential landlords is a matter beyond the scope of any commission or inspector anywhere in the world. The Palestinians have weird stories about the way in which their homes or farms were passed over to the Jewish Agency.

The Zionists denied any real hardship caused to the Arabs, and cited the various petitions submitted by them against the restrictions imposed on the sale of lands as stipulated in the series of Land Ordinances. The petitions, it was alleged, were evidence of Arab-Zionist compatible interests.²⁷ It was a shameless case of solidarity between the socialist Zionist and the feudal lords against the fellah. Colonel Wedgwood said in Parliament that with the money which the fellah received, he was able to set up in business and lead a prosperous life! The Government finally decided to allocate two million pounds for the re-employment of the displaced fellahin. Only £85,796 of this amount was used up between 1934 and 1938, and that was an indication, according to Israel Cohen, that all was well with the fellah.²⁸ The argument was the familiar one heard a few generations before in England, Scotland and other places when the peasant was put on the road, with the difference that the peasant in such countries was welcomed by the factory, whilst in Palestine the cause of his displacement barred him racially from such a prospect. Having probably taken a second wife, or gone on pilgrimage to Mecca, the Palestinian fellah joined the disgruntled urban proletariat.

The fellah's fears of the colonists is the outcome of the colonist's fears of the fellah, with his cheap products and available labour. The destruction of the Palestinian peasantry has been a major target in the strategy of the Jewish Agency. Far from lending a helping hand, they protested to the Administration against the grant of loans to the fellah as early as 1919²⁹

Second to the fellah comes the nomad to whom Jewish acquisition of land means the loss of his historical grazing rights. The steady and ruthless reprisals of the State of Israel in later years added the finishing touches to the tragedy of

(26) Cmd. 3530, 1930, p. 43.

(27) Kirk, *The Middle East in the War*, p. 234.

(28) Cohen, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

(29) *Documents 1919-1939*, First Series, Vol. IV, p. 335.

the border fellahin and bedouins. The loss of the fellah's field or water source, the spasmodic bombardment of his village, the dispersion of his once well-knit family, the encroachment on the small land as is left with, will continue to haunt the memory of the peasant class. The dislocation of agricultural marketing whereby the natural and traditional market towns and transport facilities were distorted or lost as a result of Zionist expansion and transgression on the UNSCOP more economical plan, heightened the fears of the fellah.

It can be, therefore, safely assumed that the fear of Israeli expansion is a truly national, all-class feeling in the Arab World, with probably the exception of some professional politicians, middle men and racketeers. This feeling will continuously make the existence of the Zionist state a spectre with which peace cannot be made and from which all evil must be expected.

A Matter of Privilege

Zionism has maintained that its object is producing a Jewish nation like other nations. The result is a nation which is neither Jewish nor like other nations. They justify their failure, or reluctance to produce the latter condition, by qualifying Israel as a "unique" state—in other words, a privileged state. Here lies one half of the trouble. Nor could the Zionists produce the Jewish nation envisaged. As far as religion is concerned, the Israelis are the least religious Jewish community. Characteristically, the Israelis are not the Jews we know traditionally. There are two Jewish types we usually have in mind, i.e., the hard working Jew whose main interest is to eke out a decent living for his large family, and help others with his charity. The other type is the sensitive intellectual, often an artist or scientist. Both types are inherently and traditionally pacifist. Anyone who mixed with the sabra generation of the Israelis cannot fail to see the difference. Instead of eking out a living they think they have come into an inheritance in New York, and instead of aspiring to become charitable wealthy gentlemen, they spend their time scheming more ingenious plans to get more charity from abroad.³⁰ Gone is the scintillating intellectual conversation; what impresses the listener in the new Jew of Israel is his wealth of military knowledge and his sound observations on mine detection and tank manoeuvring. Gone also is the old business tradition of the Jew that trust is the key to success. It is replaced by the new Jews of Israel with might. And this is the second half of the trouble.

The "uniqueness" of Israel has only the one synonym, "abnormality." It is a quality which, by its very sound, arouses suspicion and opposition. It is the slogan of the Zionists "Like other nations" which needs implementation. The

(30) The State Controller shocked Israel with his 1968 report on the waste of Israeli economy. The universal shortage of houses, for example, was transformed in Israel into a national surplus of 1,350 units which had to be abandoned for other purposes. *Haolam Hazeh* commented (19 April 1966): "The citizens of Israel seek in vain an answer to the question how it could have happened that Jews, famous throughout the world as excellent businessmen, conduct the affairs of their own national economy in a manner that is a disgrace to our good name."

Israelis should become part of the Middle East, sever their abnormal relations with the diaspora and start thinking more of the confidence of their Arab neighbour than of the distant American. This is not a sinister gentile opinion, but the opinion of the best friends of the Zionist programme including Mr. Arthur Koestler:

"These conclusions, reached by one who has been a supporter of the Zionist Movement for a quarter-century, while his cultural allegiance belonged to Western Europe, are mainly addressed to the many others in a similar situation. They have done what they could to help to secure a haven for the homeless in the teeth of prejudice, violence and political treachery. Now that the State of Israel is firmly established, they are at last free to do what they could not do before: to wish it good luck and go their own way, with an occasional friendly glance back and a helpful gesture. But, nevertheless, to go their own way, with the nation whose life and culture they share, without reservations or split loyalties."³¹

The Zionists did not listen to the advice of the Koestlers and are not going to listen now to the cunning advice of the Arabs, for it is not a question of advice. No one discards his knapsack when it carries millions of dollars. Kosestler's advice was directed to the diaspora Jews who should have been more thoughtful of their own position and of the future of the Israelis, but the diaspora Jew cannot help it either. What can he do for his sense of guilt if no atonement money was gratefully received and blessed? He helps Israel, right or wrong, not because he is mindful of the Talmudic concept "Although he sinned he is an Israelite," but because he is worried about his own conscience and *not* the conscience of Israel.

The result was the emergence of an abnormal Middle East state and a privileged community. The following figures give the annual income per capita for the countries in the area at the start of the Israeli-Arab conflict.³²

	U.S. \$
Afghanistan	50
Egypt	100
Ethiopia	40
Iran	85
Lebanon	125
Saudi Arabia	40
Syria	100
Turkey	125
Israel	395

It was four times the standard of Egypt and Syria and ten times that of Saudi Arabia. The privileged position of Israel must have had its impact on the story of the subsequent twenty years. It is understandable that the Israelis do not feel like closing the gap by lowering their own standard of living. It is in their own interests, however, to help the Arabs improve their own standards. If the Israelis want to quarrel with the efficacy of the laws of social disorder, they can

(31) Koestler, A., *Promise and Fulfilment*.

(32) Final Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, 1949.

at least draw from their own experiences. The Arabs were at their worst towards Israel whenever their economic and internal position deteriorated. A happy, proud and confident man is always less inclined to bear grudges or dig out old accounts. Yet Israel has been engaged on nothing but destroying the economy of her opponents and inspiring civil strife. Even opium was produced in Israel and smuggled into the Arab world to enhance the process of decay. She is motivated here, as always, by her short term necessities and expansionist objectives. A ruined country is less capable of affording military resistance.

A long-term objective started to emerge, however, towards the end of 1968. In a raid on Jordan the main bridges leading to the Gulf of Aqaba were destroyed, and in another raid on Egypt, Israeli commandos attempted blow up two Nile bridges and a power switch station conveying the Aswan Dam power to the industrial north. Both raids aimed at hitting the export potentialities of the two countries. The new policy revealed its shape in the outrageous attack on Beirut's international airport in which 13 Arab airliners were demolished. The seemingly inexplicable act carried out as a reprisal for one Israeli dead at Athens airport was aimed at the successful Middle East Airways and the prosperous touristic and communication centre of Beirut. The act was rightly called the second Intra Bank disaster for the defenceless country which gave the least trouble to Israel. Tel Aviv is determined to become the future centre of the Middle East by demolishing the other competitive Arab centres.

In June 1969, a contingent of Israeli "Defence" Forces crossed the Jordan cease-fire line and destroyed the irrigation work channelling the Yarmuk waters into the Ghor Canal, in a raid on "fida'iyyin positions." Tampering with the water supply of another country, as pointed out by *The Times* to the Israeli Government,³³ constitutes a crime according to International Law, but in this particular case it constituted, in addition, a sin against the elementary principles of humanity, as the Ghor project was the only extensive agricultural scheme left in the hands of Jordan to feed its one million paupers.

The inevitable clash between the poor and the rich is not limited to the individuals or social classes only but also to the nations and countries. The conflict between the Arabs and an artificially prosperous Israel cannot pass peacefully, and the contradictions must explode in violence.

One of the fundamentals of Zionism is that the Jews are strangers in Europe and their only place is Palestine. Palestine is in the Middle East. The nearest people to the ancient Hebrews are the Palestinian Arabs, and most probably they are their descendants. If the Zionists find them repulsive, if they find the standard of the Middle East too low, the music and arts too primitive, the slow tempo and easy ways of "never mind" irresponsible, the enjoyment of the golden sun, and not the golden bullions, lazy—then obviously the Zionists did not know what they were talking about. The place for the European Jews is, accordingly, the Occident and not the Orient. The Middle East is a mosaic of nationalities

(33) *The Times*, 24 June 1969.

and religions. But they all share the same way of life, the same philosophy, problems, aspirations, culture, arts and music. There are many acute political differences, but they have never affected, for example, their stand against imperialism. Israel cannot expect to become a partner in the Middle East while planting bombs in Cairo to scare the British into staying, conspiring with France against the Algerian Revolution, arguing with Britain to keep her troops in Aden and the south, and inviting America to intervene in Lebanon.

In putting the Zionist case, it was argued that the Jews were returning to Palestine fully aware of the poverty of the country, but motivated by idealistic and religious attachment to the land. The test is to remove the Zionist pressure and the Zionist fund collections and allow Israel to normalise itself. Those who feel really at home and accept the Middle Eastern standard and way of life will remain, and those who want the luxury and culture of Europe will be better off in the west. The Zionists will not heed Koestler's advice and will insist on maintaining their state as a western outpost in the East. Arab reaction to this state is the natural protective reaction to a foreign body. The harmony of nature is broken by the intrusion of this body and the tension will continue until the foreign body is expelled or modified and a new form of harmony is created (through de-Zionisation or Arab-Jewish partnership for example). In this operation the Arabs are no more than the tools of the natural and social laws.

In the ensuing conflict, the Arabs can either destroy the Zionist State or be destroyed and the Middle East become a backwater of Europe and an American sphere of influence. To achieve this goal, Israel must conquer the whole vast Arab world and subjugate its one hundred million people. Israel is like a hole in the Arab world; the deeper they dig in it, the deeper they will sink and the more Arabs they will have to cope with.

The Arabs, on the other hand, have only to get one chance to liquidate the problem—and history is not short of such chances. The National Home was born as a result of international circumstances. Is it so improbable that a different set of circumstances may occur, give the Arabs the appropriate allies and put the Israelis at their mercy? They have a bigger world, richer in essential resources, strategic in position and populated by one hundred million souls. Foreign powers are bound to be influenced by such factors at times of crisis and war. The Israelis pride themselves now on their military supremacy and technical skill and forget, according to other racial ideologies, that less than thirty years ago the Jews had been held in contempt for centuries for lack of courage and military valour. The Arabs have a better record on that score and technical knowledge is something which can run in anybody's blood, a fact which is well illustrated by the recent successes of the Palestinian commando organisations.

It is futile to make any predictions on the future of the Israel-Arab conflict whose stage is the unpredictable Arabia Deserta. The laws of causation do not seem to have any domain in the lands of the desert where gradual changes are

replaced by explosion-like transformations. It is a mark which stamped the entire history, culture and philosophy of its inhabitants. Long spells of dead silence, monotony and quietude, interrupted by sudden, seemingly inexplicable convulsions. Anyone who thought, in the seventh century, that the nomads of Arabia were going to march on Constantinople a few years later, would have been accused of stark madness. As long as the Israelis ride the meek camel, they will have to watch for his moment of violent revenge.

The Israelis claim for themselves—and not without some justification—an excellent knowledge of the area, and ridicule all their western allies for their groundless views on the region. How is it, then, that they fail to see such elementary facts as set out above? The answer is that they have not failed to see it, as Ben Gurion had already observed in July 1962:

"We could defeat the Egyptians five times, ten times and Egypt will remain. But if the Egyptians should defeat us once, that would be for good. They might do with the two million people in Israel what Hitler did with six million Jews."³⁴ Ben Gurion has appreciated the position well. Notwithstanding, he continued to draw the Egyptians to one round after another, a policy in which he was supported by all the leadership of the Zionist Movement and the overwhelming majority of Israel. The impression, which cannot be helped, leads us back to the death wish of which more was said before,³⁵ and which may primarily constitute the *raison d'être* of Israel's intransigence. This fact, which may be dismissed or overlooked, is probably best appreciated by the Arabs. The Arab, simple and inarticulate as he is, has his own shrewd ways and intuitive understanding of his world, and his own Brechtian technique of treatment. Peculiarly, it was during his worst disaster with Israel after the Six Day War that glimpses of his work began to show. The state of Zionism had never looked as doomed as it did after its victory. The Arab realises that a Zionist state, an outpost of western imperialism and European way of life, a privileged community, a racist and discriminatory state, is something which is not to live or to be lived with next door.

The Middle East is a land of primary colours. The inhabitant has no appreciation of half measures and if he accepts them it will entail a complete psychological, and consequently, effectual surrender. That is why Israel is so desperately trying to break one small gap in the Arab attitude towards her. This small gap would lay down all the barriers that keep her from the Arab World. The Arab boycott is beginning to pay dividends. The Zionists are destroying the economy of the Arabs, but the Arab World is destroying the soul of Israel. The effect of living among people who do not speak your language, refuse to talk to you, bar you from entering the local pub and shop, cannot fail to corrode your spirit. This is the psychological cause for the Israelis' persistence in trying to attend conferences with the Arabs, play football against them, invite

(34) *Ner*, September-November 1962.

(35) Chapter III

them to parties and meetings abroad, and speak to Arab students and expatriates. Arab students and diplomats have long stories to tell of how they are often embarrassed by such attempts. The Arabs are accentuating the neurosis of Israel at the height of her exhilarating glory by the simple formula of intransigence, by deepening her sense of loneliness, guilt and depression.

Before the Mandate was declared, the Zionist leadership swore that the whole Arab opposition was the work of the Catholic intriguers of France. During the Mandate, their scapegoat was found in Britain, whose interference in Arab-Jewish relations and transactions had upset the apple-cart. If only she had kept out of it! Once the Jewish State was a *fait accompli*, they asserted in 1947, the whole course of friction with the Palestinians would disappear and the Arabs would accept them and entertain them in their madifs. After the establishment of Israel the imperialists, in general, were blamed for the trouble with the Arabs. Now, of course, it is only if Russia keeps out. Not once did the question occur to them: "Is there something wrong with me?"

Having failed to deliver the goods, the Zionist leadership promised to fulfil its word by force. For twenty years they fought the Arabs, and every year peace receded further and further away. The true face of Zionism was unmasked in the process. Prime Minister Ben Gurion lectured his general staff on the eternity of wars and human conflict and the futility of trying to trace or treat their economic or political causes:

"In the history of peoples, to this hour, there had always been political conflict between nations, which from time to time has been transformed into a physical contest between states, into military strife. Like others, the Jewish people in the past have been involved in political duels with adjoining peoples, and more than once fought in battle against them. It was thus in the days of the Judges, it was thus in the era of the Kings, in the days of the first Temple, and in the days of the second Temple."³⁶

No one in the audience completed his passage with, "And it was thus that the First and the Second Temples were destroyed and the people were led into captivity."

Henceforth the only peace for Israel was through war and expansion. After the 1967 conquests the Government and moulders of public opinion indoctrinated the people with words identical to Hitler's words after the annexations of Austria and Czechoslovakia, "We have given Central Europe a great piece of good fortune, namely peace—peace that will be protected by German might." The process for building up the Israeli forces was therefore stepped up. Although the Six Day War solved the immediate problems for the Government, the Israeli housewife was the one who received more problems in her daily budgeting. As the Defence Minister attacked the Egyptians on 5 June, the Finance Minister attacked her purse with a 10 per cent increase in income tax. Soon after the victory, the budgetary security expenditure was increased by £60,000,000. Two fifths of the original sum were collected by cutting back the development

(36) *Israel Government Yearbook*, 1950, p. 8.

budget, according to the Finance Minister. A contribution of 50 per cent of one month's earnings was also levied from the tax payers. Military service, already the longest in the world, was increased by another six months. The Israelis who escaped from the claustrophobic walls of the East European ghettos, paid £3,000,000 to construct a fence around themselves all along the border with Jordan.

General Dayan called upon the people to dispense with their luxuries and give him the money to make another war for them. "The time has come to change our way of life and sacrifice our standard of living for preparedness in the military, psychological and technical fields."³⁷ His preparedness in the military field took away two thirds of the total taxes contributed by the people in 1968 so as to raise the security budget of 1968/9 to \$629,000,000, or twice its volume in the previous year.

The war which was fought for the security and safety of the people ended with a victory which forced the settlers opposite the Syrian and Jordanian territories to live permanently at night in underground bunkers. Children were taught to watch out for certain objects on the ground, to report anything and anybody unusual, and to take nothing from strangers. Members of the green bereted Civil Defence were planted everywhere, to discover bombs on street corners and keep their eyes fixed on the pavement. Only in Israel are the Jews still unable to lift their eyes and look at the face of Almighty. The Jews have experienced all kinds of afflictions, but never in history were their children reared in underground war shelters as a matter of course.

The Zionist leadership are leading their flock to disaster. They are even preparing the minds for such a disaster, so much so that the ordinary Israelis are beginning to accept their eventual expulsion with such phrases as, "What does it matter if it happens after a hundred years?", "But we shall also bring to ruin our enemy," or as Dayan puts it, "We shall fight to the last drop of our enemy's blood." Sacrifice of human blood is the only oath which one has to take seriously from the Zionists. They have sent down to the bottom of the Mediterranean hundreds of innocent Jews, and sent to the German extermination camps thousands of others. They will not hesitate at all in seeing the two million Jews and one hundred million Arabs wiped off the earth rather than shut the doors of the Jewish Agency or close the accounts of its fund raisers.

International Responsibility

The only rational address which one can make on this conflict must be made to the outside world. Palestine is the country whose future was not decided by self-determination. It was determined this way not because of the Jews, but because of the international, or power, interests in the country. Although the Middle East is down-graded now, its importance is still of a primary international concern. In fact, it was the periodic Arab-Israeli fighting which led to

(37) *Jewish Chronicle*, 7 June and 20 September 1968.

the decline of the area in view of the ensuing Suez Canal closures, airline dislocations and oil supply interruptions. The Mediterranean has never ceased to be the true heart of the world. What goes on in Palestine was not in 1917 or 1940 a matter of Arab-Jewish concern only. There is also the moral responsibility. Palestine was divided by the United Nations and its authority should be as valid or invalid now as it was valid or invalid in 1948. The partition was based on this assumption:

"It is recognised that partition has been strongly opposed by Arabs, but it is felt that the opposition will be lessened by a solution which definitely fixes the extent of territory to be allotted to the Jews with its implicit limitation on immigration. The fact that the solution carries the sanction of the United Nations involves a finality which should allay Arab fears of further expansion of the Jewish State."³⁸

It was the failure of the United Nations to see to it that its resolution was implemented in part and in whole, which led to the cult of the *fait accompli* principle. How true has the early warning of the *Economist* proved when it insisted during the armistice talks of 1949 on implementing the resolution to the letter,

"U.N. control can never come into being, nor any international boundary be instituted, unless the U.N. is willing to exercise some form of power over those who by force, stealth or ingenuity invalidate its decisions."³⁹

There are many countries which can easily ignore the good will of the world, but Israel cannot. There is no need even for sanctions. The withdrawal of aid and the obstruction of the flow of funds would be enough to give her a new orientation. The mere threat of this measure made her withdraw in 1948 and 1956. Had the world at large shown the moral courage, or at least concern for its own interests, this problem would not have reached its present proportions. It is still not too late for the international community to step in and stop the rot.

The abnormality of Israel is not only a threat to the world's interests in the Middle East, but also to the internal stability and peace of every state that has a Jewish minority. The Zionists can say what they like, as they have always done, but the problem of double loyalty will remain and get more intense with the present abnormal claim of Israel on the Jews of other countries. Anti-Semitism erupts when there is a deep recession or a national defeat, and what country can ensure against that? The cries of "Go to Israel" have already been heard in most countries. The Zionists and anti-Semites will be gratified to hear that, but not those interested in the brotherhood of mankind and the equality of all races and religions. Jews have already been disqualified from filling various posts in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, France, Britain and America because of the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁴⁰

(38) Report of United Nations Special Committee on Palestine.

(39) *Economist*, 18 February 1949.

(40) Discrimination against the Jews is strictly observed by Britain and America in posting diplomats, officials and army officers to the Arab countries. The oil companies and many other companies dealing with the Arab World apply similar discrimination.

The normalisation of the position of the Israeli people is the urgent issue of our time. This cannot happen except by the overthrow of Zionism and the closure of its fund raising accounts. Zionism cannot exist without expansion, and its expansion cannot be carried out without the funds received from abroad, as was pointed out above.

The 1948 expansion was carried out at the cost of over £1,000,000,000. Nearly all this sum was received from abroad. The budget for the following year disclosed that only 25 per cent of the security expenditure came from state revenue of the ordinary budget. The rest had come from abroad in various forms. In the next eighteen years the Jewish Agency spent 2,200 million dollars in carrying out its plans.

The 1967 impressive expansion was made possible by the West German supplies and funds spread over six years, in the name of the Jewish "people,"⁴¹ in addition to the other funds received through the usual channels:

	<i>Million Dollars</i>
<i>Total Gross Capital Imports 1950-1967</i> ⁴²	
German Personal Restitutions	1,190
German Reparations	775
Institutional Transfers and Grants, mainly through the Jewish Agency	2,055
Loans	3,362
Israeli Bonds	1,260
Other Loans	2,102

Out of such vast sums the Government was able to build up its foreign reserves to 750 million dollars. It was pointed out that Israel would never have dared to attack without these solid reserves at the banks. One of the lessons learned from 1956 was to provide for sufficient funds so that the country might sustain the financial pressure easily. The Economics Editor of *Jerusalem Post* published an analysis, soon after the June victory, in which he pointed out that, in 1957, dollar reserves reached 50 million only against a trade gap of 300 million. In June 1967, the dollar reserves were 730 million against a trade gap of 450 (1966, expected to drop to 410 million in 1967). He reached his conclusion that Israel could sustain the financial pressure this time and "live off its fat."⁴³ This is the fuel for Israel's intransigence, and not its stories about a secure border or peace.

The Six Day War brought in further supplies of foreign currency. It was estimated that the military operations had cost Israel about £40,000,000 and brought £100,000,000 in contributions. War has become, for Israel, a profitable

(41) It is hardly known that 600,000 gypsies were also exterminated by Hitler. No one made a representation on behalf of the "Gypsy people"—nor did they receive a penny in compensation.

(42) *New Middle East*, December 1968.

(43) *Jerusalem Post*, 16 June 1967.

business indeed. According to Finance Minister, Mr. Sapir, the total funds raised were 350,000,000 dollars⁴⁴ The sale of Israeli bonds had shot up in similar proportions. The war had also brought about 7,500 volunteers who kept the agricultural and industrial work going, and of whom a few hundred had settled on the land. They helped in setting up 16 new colonies, some of which were in the newly conquered territories.⁴⁵

The Arabs should find it difficult to quarrel with the West⁴⁶ had these vast sums been contributed by the local Zionists whose association with Israel, rightly or wrongly, could not be helped. But this is not the case—these sums were contributed tax-free, in the name of charity.⁴⁷ Given the present income tax system in the West, the bulk of the funds becomes moneys contributed by the ordinary tax-payer of any religion or origin. This is a question which not only arouses the anti-imperialist outcry in the Middle East, but will arouse at any moment the anti-Semitic cry in the West. The 1967 contributions were sent during a mild economic crisis in the capitalist world When there was a squeeze on foreign exchange and holiday allowances in Britain, Mr. Callaghan, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, stepped in, unsuccessfully, to try to control the funds sent to Israel. The United States had to vary its exchange restrictions and include Israel with the under-developed countries. What would happen if the crisis was on the scale of the 1930's slump, or if American imperialist interests did not coincide with those of Israel in 1967? Nothing but an upsurge of anti-Semitism and "Go to Israel." This is not just a supposition. During the civil rights fight, the American negroes raised their voices in a quasi-anti-Semitic manner, called the Jews Israeli agents, asked them to go to their home, and called on the authorities to use the tax free contributions destined for Israel on the improvement of the negroes' conditions in America.⁴⁸ In Britain, the Jewish poor were hit substantially by the moneys sent to Israel's war of expansion. The Jewish Welfare Board reported that its income dropped, during the second half of 1967, by 12 per cent, and that its annual bazaar was cancelled because all the goods were sent to Israel's bazaars.⁴⁹

By facilitating the fund raising work of the WZO, the Western states are helping in the abnormalisation of Israel on the one hand and the local Jewries on the other. It is the latest instalment of the anti-Semitic bourgeoisie in its long effort of keeping the Jews "apart," "unique," "peculiar," "aliens," "orientals,"

(44) *New York Times*, 16 November 1967. For comparative study, see diagram in Chapter III.

(45) *Jewish Chronicle*, 11 August 1967. *Jerusalem Post*, 2 July 1967.

(46) The Jordanian U.N. Representative voiced his country's denunciation of U.S. funds raised for Israel, at the Security Council on 22 March 1968. He mentioned that at one function held in New York on 21 March, 16 million dollars were raised.

(47) To all intents and purposes, it is impossible to specify the exact destination of the funds. Mr. J.P. Warburg led a futile struggle in America to make the UJA separate the amounts going directly to Israel's Treasury and those spent on culture and relief. He had to content himself by refusing to pay any more. (*New York Times*, 29 November 1957.)

(48) *Jewish Chronicle*, 6 September 1968.

(49) *Jewish Chronicle*, 1 September 1967.

etc., and of expanding Israel so that it can take all the Jews who will get expelled.

There have been many calls made by even some moderate Zionists for the normalisation of Israel and its transformation into a Middle Eastern State. The pious appeals will remain a day dream unless the economic element is found for the transformation. The Israelis will become part of the Middle East when their roots, their economic sources, are put in the Middle East and not in New York. When their standard of living drops to the realistic and Middle Eastern level, a number of Israelis will undoubtedly leave, and no one should be sorry for their departure. They did not come to Palestine for the love of the land, the spiritual attachment of the old home or to live among a Jewish nation. They are people who want to enjoy luxury as parasites on their fellow Jews and gentiles somewhere else. The Zionist machinery will lie idle and expansion will be neither profitable nor possible. A re-adjustment in Israeli politics and a shift away from Zionism will become unavoidable.

The government of the United States, Britain and other western countries could undertake the responsibility of normalising the relationship between their local Jewries and Israel by reminding them at times of recession that charity begins at home, by making their contributions subject to income tax deduction and foreign exchange restrictions and by applying a more equitable distribution of aid to the Middle Eastern states. The imperialist could not do that because Israel is a member of his club and has been performing useful tasks in the area on his behalf. Israel is also his dumping ground for any number of Jews he may want to send away any time. Far from lending a helping hand in normalising and stabilising the Middle East, the imperialist world has strengthened the differences between the Arabs and the Israelis, and widened the economic gap between them. Israel, which represents only 2.5 per cent of the population of the Arab World, gets 23 per cent of the total aid given by the United States to the area and 10 per cent of the total aid given by the western world to all the under-developed countries. Israel, with its two million and a half people received loans from the World Bank to the tune of 100 million dollars, whilst the entire Arab World of one hundred million received 170 million dollars only. The result was a further widening of the gap which had already been wide enough in 1948, as in the following table:

	<i>Annual National Income in Dollars per capita</i>	
	1948	1965 ⁵⁰
Egypt	100	161
Syria	100	163 (1963)
Israel	395	1,076

The most determined enemies of Israel are found among the Palestinian refugees who provide ready manpower for the guerrilla organisations. The Pales-

(50) Statistical Abstract of U.N. (1967).

tinian refugee is supposed to subsist on an annual income of 30 dollars, whilst the annual income of the Israeli is put at 1,500 dollars (almost as much as Britain or Belgium). The appalling discrepancy between the dispossessed and the dispossessor is multiplied by the volume of international aid given to the two parties in a ratio of 1:9 in favour of the Israelis.⁵¹

The final outcome of such policies will soon be another shock to their authors, without whose like social upheavals could never have been made. It is a sad reflection to consider that the Trumans and the Johnsons will be denied their statues in the future order of the Middle East as much as the Bourbons and the Romanofs were denied their own statues by the French Republicans and the Russian Bolsheviks. After all, progress is not the result of the master strokes of the genius, but of the idiotic follies of the bunglers.

(51) Corm, G., *Les Finances d'Israel*, Beirut, Institute for Palestine Studies, pp. 47-49.

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
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
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MAP II


THE KINGDOM OF SOLOMON AND DAVID,
MENTIONED BY HERZL AS THE ENVISAGED
JEWISH STATE






MAP III
PALESTINE UNDER TURKISH
ADMINISTRATION




MAP V
PALESTINE IN THE
SYKES-PICOT AGREEMENT
1916



-  International Rule
-  British Rule
-  French Rule


MAP VI

SETTLEMENT OF THE NORTHERN FRONTIER OF PALESTINE 1919-1923




- Agreed International Frontier
- + + + Zionist Demand
- British Demand
- - - - French Demand

MAP VII
 BRITISH MILITARY
 ADMINISTRATION
 OF PALESTINE. 1918
 (OCCUPIED ENEMY TERRITORY
 ADMINISTRATION-SOUTH)




- International Frontier
- - - - OETA Frontier
- + + + + Sykes-Picot Frontier

MAP VIII
ISRAEL ACCORDING THE RABBI S.H. ISAACS




MAP IX
ISRAEL ACCORDING TO HARRY
SACHER




MAP X


ISRAEL AS DEMANDED BY THE ZIONIST ORGANIZATION 1919



MAP XI
THE JEWISH STATE AS
DRAWN IN 1937




MAP XII
THE JEWISH STATE AS
PROPOSED BY THE JEWISH
AGENCY IN 1946




MAP XIII

EARLY JEWISH COLONISATION PENETRATING THE COUNTRY



MAP XIV

NEW COLONIES SET UP
WITH THE OBJECT OF
PUSHING THE PARTITION
BORDERS BACK




- Palestine Frontier
- UNSCOP Partition Borders, 1947
- Partition Borders of 1937
- xxx New Colonies set up between 1937 and 1947


MAP XV

JEWISH SETTLEMENTS

1947




MAP XVI
PARTITION AUTONOMY PLAN
PROPOSED BY THE BRITISH
GOVERNMENT IN JULY 1946



MAP XVII

UNSCOP PARTITION AND THE ARAB AND ZIONIST MILITARY RESPONSE TO IT




→ Hagana attacks outside Jewish territory before 15 May 1948

▶ Attacks by Arab Armies, all inside Arab territory


MAP XVIII

MORE TERRITORY SEIZED BY ISRAEL 18 JULY 1948




MAP XIX

MORE LANDS SEIZED BY ISRAEL
FROM UNSCOP ARAB TERRITORY
BETWEEN THE SECOND TRUCE
18 JULY 1948 AND THE CONCLUSION
OF THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS IN
1949, BY FORCE AND DIRECT TALKS



MAP XX
MORE LANDS SEIZED BY ISRAEL
AS A RESULT OF THE 1967 WAR



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