

PALESTINE BOOKS – No. 20

SELECTED ESSAYS
ON
THE PALESTINE QUESTION

Edited by

Ibrahim Al-Abid

I. Abu-Lughod, U. Avnery, C. Bassiouni, J. Davis,
I. Deutcher, Van der Hoeven Leonhard, A. Nutting, A. Leon,
M. Rodinson, I.F. Stone, H. Sharabi, G. Tomeh



PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION
RESEARCH CENTER

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Palestine Liberation Organization

Research Center

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EDITOR'S NOTE

These collected essays on the Palestine Question represent the different points of view of a number of prominent scholars, authors, and diplomats of different origins and beliefs on varying aspects of the sober and long conflict of the Palestinian Arab people against Zionism and imperialism.

The material reproduced in this volume, therefore, expresses the opinion of each author and does not necessarily reflect the views of either the P.L.O. Research Center or the editor. This is not meant to belittle any of the ideas or proposals presented in the articles. On the contrary, we welcome all such discussions and believe in the necessity of a free scholarly, and objective exchange of ideas and thoughts on the conflict.

It is true that the articles come out with several proposals and conclusions that reflect divergent methods of analysis and thinking, but it is also true that nearly all of them, including the articles of Deutscher, Rodinson, and Avnery, agree on at least one main point which is the crux of the conflict: Israel has been built on an injustice done to the indigenous population of Palestine and that any fair, durable, and acceptable solution to the conflict has to be based on eliminating this injustice.

The Editor

THE TRUTH ABOUT THE PALESTINE PROBLEM*

by L.M.C. van der Hoeven Leonhard

A State of Israel—armed up to the teeth Hostile Arab neighbouring states, boycotting and blockading it. Refugee camps of twelve years' standing along its borders. That is, in its simplest outline, the Palestine Problem.

Why these refugees? This hostility? Did not the Arabs or Islam tolerate any Jews in Palestine? Was hostility inherent in the Arab attitude towards Jews?

Since the coming of the Arabs and of Islam to Palestine in the 7th century A.D. the country, including Jerusalem, had been open to Jewish immigration and settlement.¹ At the time of the Arab Caliphate, Jews who were being persecuted elsewhere found refuge in Arab countries under Islamic rule, including Palestine.² This Arab-Islamic tradition was continued by the Ottoman-Turkish Caliphate from the 16th to the 20th century.³ Islam thus had no objection whatsoever to Jewish settlement in Palestine. And Arabs, "unlike some other peoples, have no inherent dislike of the Jew, certainly they did not have it. Jews lived among them in perfect amity before and during the war (1914-1918)."⁴

(*) Translation from the article "*Het Palestina-vraagstuk in zijn ware gedaante*," published in "*Libertas*" (Holland) Lustrum number 1960.

(1) Cf. James Parkes: *A History of Palestine from 135 A.D. to Modern Times* (London, 1949), p. 179; Jacob Mann: *The Jews in Egypt and in Palestine under the Fatimid Caliphs* (London, 1920-1922), Vol. I, pp. 43-47; Albert Champdor: *Saladin* (Paris, 1951), p. 188.

(2) Albert M. Hyamson: *Palestine* (London, 1917), pp. 31, 38; H. Graetz: *Geschichte der Juden* (Leipzig, 1863-1874), Sechster Band, p. 305; Norman Bentwich: *Palestine of the Jews* (London, 1919), pp. 15, 16.

(3) Graetz: *op. cit.*, VIII, pp. 201, 202; Cecil Roth: *A Short History of the Jewish People* (London, 1948), p. 279.

(4) *Brandeis on Zionism*. A Collection of Addresses and Statements by Louis D. Brandeis (Washington, 1942), p. 152.

A change did indeed become noticeable after that first world war. But it resulted from a previous development.



Jewish immigration into Palestine had for centuries been inspired mainly by religious motives. Moreover, Palestine, unlike other Arab and Turkish Islamic countries in which the economic possibilities were much greater, was only able to attract a small number of Jews. It is estimated that in 1523 less than four thousand Jews were living in Palestine,⁵ and five thousand in 1770⁶—a fraction of the total population. With the exception of an isolated village,⁷ this Jewish minority was not rooted in the country. Ever since ancient times Jewish emigration from Palestine had been taking place whenever conditions were unfavourable.⁸

The opposite was the case with the Arab native population. It consisted mainly of peasants—fellahin. Investigation has shown that this population was to a large extent descended from the oldest, pre-Israelitic inhabitants of the country.⁹ Having been successively Judaized and Christianized, they were finally Arabized and for the most part Islamized by the large influx of Arabs who poured into the country in the 7th century and have in turn become rooted there for thirteen centuries. During the first centuries of the rule of these Arabs Palestine attained great prosperity.¹⁰ It was they who

(5) Albert M. Hyamson: *Palestine under the Mandate* (London, 1950), p. 13.

(6) Norman Bentwich: *Palestine* (London, 1934), p. 64.

(7) Parkes: *op. cit.*, p. 182.

(8) Salo Wittmayer Baron: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, 1953, in the course of publication), Vol. II, pp. 123, 124; D. Emil Schürer: *Geschichte des Jüdischen Volkes im Zeitalter Jesu Christi* (Leipzig, 1901-1911), Dritter Band, p. 3; Hyamson: *Palestine*, pp. 37, 43; Frank E. Manuel: *The Realities of American-Palestine Relations* (Washington, 1949), p. 70; Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August, 1929 (Command paper 3530, 1930), p. 22.

(9) Hyamson: *Palestine under the Mandate*, p. 74, note 1; see also Parkes: *op. cit.*, pp. 244, 250. Remnants of foreign invaders, including Greeks, Romans, Crusaders, amalgamated with the original stock. Cf. Parkes: *op. cit.*, pp. 205, 206, 245; George Adam Smith: *Syria and the Holy Land* (London, etc., 1918), p. 38; Fannie Fern Andrews: *The Holy Land under Mandate* (Boston, etc., 1931), Vol. II, p. 33, note 1, quoting a letter from Philip K. Hitti; George E. Kirk: *A Short History of the Middle East* (London, 1948), p. 224; Charles D. Matthews: *Palestine—Mohammedan Holy Land* (New Haven, 1949), p. XXIX.

(10) Cf. Parkes: *op. cit.*, p. 97; Guy le Strange: *Palestine under the Moslems* (London, 1890), pp. 15-17; Hyamson: *Palestine*, p. 15.

introduced, among other things, the orange-apple into the country.¹¹ However, this prosperity was not permanent. As a result of its geographical position and spiritual importance, Palestine has from of old been predestined to be an international battlefield. Its peasant population bore the brunt of this fate. But, right up to our own time, none of the country's numerous troubles: natural catastrophes, epidemics, famines, devastating armies, foreign occupiers and tax collectors, have driven this population from its native soil.¹² The Palestine Arab peasant was intelligent, competent and hard-working;¹³ with his slender resources, he tried to recover from the various disasters that had befallen the country. The Jewish thinker Achad Haam reported after a journey through Palestine in 1891 that it was difficult to find any still uncultivated farmland there.¹⁴ Other 19th century sources report on the cultivation of various fruits.¹⁵ In the plain of Esdraelon in 1883 "almost every acre was in the highest state of cultivation;"¹⁶ this was still the case in 1914.¹⁷ Around Jaffa the Arabs grew oranges the exceptional size of which attracted attention as early as the 18th century.¹⁸



The rise of political Zionism in the course of the 19th century brought about a radical change in the Jewish attitude with respect to Palestine. This Zionism desired a Jewish state in Palestine (Zion) and surrounding areas,¹⁹

(11) Maçoudi: *Les Prairies d'Or* (Paris, 1861-1877), Tome Deuxième, pp. 438, 439; S. Tolkowsky: *The Gateway of Palestine* (London, 1924), p. 178.

(12) Cf. Parkes: *op. cit.*, p. 245; Martin North: *Geschichte Israels* (Berlin, 1953), pp. 131, 178.

(13) John Hope Simpson: *Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development* (Command paper 3686, 1930), pp. 64, 66; cf. Claude Reignier Conder: *Heth and Moab* (London, 1883), p. 368; Arthur Ruppin: *Die landwirtschaftliche Kolonisation der Zionistischen Organisation in Palästina* (Berlin, 1925), p. 12.

(14) Achad Haam: *Am Scheidewege* (Berlin, 1923), Erster Band, p. 87; see also Richard Lichtheim in "Jüdische Rundschau" (Berlin) 28-II-1919, p. 118, and Protokoll des XII Zionisten Kongresses (Berlin, 1922), p. 304; cf. Arthur Ruppin: *Der Aufbau des Landes Israel* (Berlin, 1919), p. 114.

(15) C.R. Conder: *Palestine* (London, 1889), p. 63; John Murray: *Handbook for Travellers in Syria and Palestine* (London, 1875), pp. 111, 112, 271, 278; Hyamson: *Palestine*, pp. 92, 93; Achad Haam: *op. cit.*, II, p. 359.

(16) L. Oliphant. *Haifa*; or, *Life in Modern Palestine* (London, 1887), p. 60.

(17) Frances E. Newton: *Fifty Years in Palestine* (London, etc., 1948), p. 97.

(18) Tolkowsky: *op. cit.*, p. 144.

(19) For the extent of Zionist territorial aspirations see notes 127-130 and corresponding text.

large-scale Jewish immigration and cultivation of the country by the Jews themselves.²⁰

From 1798 onward Zionist colonization was presented in turn to France and England as a foothold for their influence in these countries.²¹ The cooperation between Zionism and imperialism did not escape the notice of the Turkish sovereign over Palestine. When, in 1882, England occupied Egypt, Palestine—for the first time in its history under Islam—was closed to Jewish immigration.²²

In the corruption of Turkish officials and in the Capitulations, the Jews found ways of evading the prohibition.²³ Precisely at this time political Zionism was entering upon the stage of practical realization. With the help of Turkish officials, Arabs were expelled from their villages for the benefit of Jews.²⁴ Achad Haam concluded from Jewish behaviour towards the Arabs that the Jews had evidently learned nothing from their history. This history proved the necessity of avoiding disgraceful acts towards the native population. "Und was tun unsere Brüder in Palästina? Just das Gegenteil! Knechte waren sie im Lande ihrer Verbannung, und plötzlich finden sie sich selbst in einer Freiheit ohne Grenzen, in einer ungezügelter Freiheit, wie sie sich nur in der Türkei finden lässt. Dieser plötzliche Wandel hat in ihnen eine Neigung zum Despotismus entstehen lassen, wie das stets der Fall ist, 'wenn ein Knecht zur Herrschaft kommt,' und sie behandeln die Araber feindselig und grausam, verkürzen ihr Recht auf unredliche Weise, beleidigen sie ohne jeden genügenden Grund und rühmen sich solcher Taten noch; und niemand tritt gegen diese verächtliche und gefährliche Neigung auf." (And what are our brothers

(20) Adolf Böhm: *Die Zionistische Bewegung* (Berlin, 1935 — Jerusalem, 1937), I. Band, pp. 98, 111; Nahum Sokolow: *History of Zionism 1600..1918* (London, 1919), Vol. I, pp. 116, 20; Hyamson: *Palestine*, p. 104.

(21) Sokolow: *op. cit.*, II, pp. 220-222; Albert M. Hyamson: *The British Consulate in Jerusalem* (London, 1939-1941), Part I, pp. xlix, 42-46. For ensuing imperialist proposals and related Zionist interests see Israel Cohen: *The Zionist Movement* (London, 1945), pp. 44, 45; Manuel: *op. cit.*, pp. 49, 51, 53, 58; cf. Moses Hess: *Rom und Jerusalem* (Wien und Berlin, 1919; first published in 1862), pp. 129-140, 149, 151, 158.

(22) Cf. Manuel: *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 55.

(23) Chaim Weizmann: *Trial and Error* (London, 1949), p. 41; Hyamson: *The British Consulate in Jerusalem*, II, pp. 534-535; cf. Manuel: *op. cit.*, Chapter II; S. Landshut: *Jewish Communities in the Muslim Countries of the Middle East* (London, 1950), p. 19.

(24) H.M. Kalvarisky: *Jewish-Arab Relations before the Great War* (Jewish-Arab Affairs, Jerusalem, June 1931, pp. 12, 13); see also Achad Haam: *op. cit.*, II, pp. 397, 398, note 2; Eugène Jung: *La Révolte Arabe* (Paris, 1924), I, p. 17.

in Palestine doing? The very opposite! They were servants in the country of their exile, and they suddenly find themselves in a state of unbounded liberty, of unbridled liberty such as can only be found in Turkey. This sudden change has brought about within them a tendency towards despotism as is always the case 'when a servant becomes a master,' and they treat the Arabs with hostility and cruelty, curtail their rights in an unreasonable manner, insult them without any sufficient reason and actually pride themselves upon such acts; and nobody takes any action against this despicable and dangerous tendency.)²⁵



Meanwhile, in Europe, an Austrian Jewish journalist, Theodor Herzl, gave Zionism its definitive ideological foundations and organizational structure.

According to him, anti-Semitism, which was at the root of the Jewish problem, was ineradicable; the Jews constituted a people in the sense of a nation, and the Jewish problem was consequently a national problem, which could only be solved by the gathering into one state of all Jews who wished to retain their Jewish identity, and by the complete assimilation and effacement as Jews of the remnant still scattered among the nations.²⁶ Essential parts of this concept were published by him in 1896 in his pamphlet "Der Judenstaat" (The State of the Jews). In the countries of the Emancipation Herzl's aspirations met with widespread Jewish resistance.²⁷ By various means, among which were extorting,²⁸ and stimulation of anti-Semitism,²⁹ he tried to gain Jewish support for Zionism.

(25) Achad Haam: *op. cit.*, I, p. 107.

(26) Theodor Herzl: *Gesammelte Zionistische Werke* (Tel Aviv, 1934), I. Band, pp. 25, 104, 112, 141, 143-145, 180, 186, 190; II, pp. 122, 131 (cf. 280); III, pp. 268, 273; V, p. 498; cf. Böhm: *op. cit.*, I, Kapitel XII-XXII, in particular p. 279; Alex Bein: Theodor Herzl, Biographie (Wien, 1934), cf. in particular p. 693.

(27) Böhm: *op. cit.*, I, pp. 169-171, 173, 174; Alex Bein: *op. cit.*, pp. 282, 360; Joseph Heller: *Geschichte des Zionismus* (Berlin, 1935), pp. 17, 18; Cohen: *op. cit.*, p. 70.

(28) Herzl: II, p. 537, in connection with p. 507; see also III, p. 69, and pp. 49-52 in connection with I, pp. 238, 239.

(29) References on this subject include such statements, addressed to Jews, as were certain to reach non-Jews as well. See Herzl: I, pp. 39-41, 193, 209-215, 237-239, 313, 314, 398, 445; V, pp. 496-499, 515; see also notes 42, 43, 4.

It was by armed force that he would have preferred to conquer the country earmarked for his state.³⁰ In the absence of Jewish power he sought support among non-Jewish powers. His means for obtaining such support included the trading of Jewish influence in Press³¹ and Finance,³² and of the Jews themselves as being ten million secret agents;³³ the playing off of colonial ambitions against each other,³⁴ and the promotion of antagonisms.³⁵ Zionism, he believed, should make headway through the medium of jealousy between churches and between states.³⁶ A new European war could not harm Zionism, but could only urge it forward.³⁷ Herzl spent large sums on bribery;³⁸ together with the Zionist Actions Committee he had a notorious extortioner in permanent services.³⁹ Approvingly he quoted: "Qui veut la fin, veut les moyens." (He who desires the end, desires the means.)⁴⁰

As he constantly alarmed Jews by representing anti-Semitism as ineradicable,⁴¹ so he tried to instil into non-Jews fear of the Jews, of their power, and especially of their revolutionary mentality.⁴² Wherever possible he forced European statesmen into the dilemma: Zionism or Jew-fomented revolution.⁴³

(30) Cf. Herzl: I, p. 114, and Christopher Sykes: *Two Studies in Virtue* (New York, 1953), p. 161. Military force was an essential component of Herzl's projects, cf. Herzl: II, pp. 50, 58, 78, 102; III, p. 526.

(31) *Ibid.*, II, pp. 415, 420, 630; III, pp. 460, 520.

(32) *Ibid.*, II, pp. 415, 420, 631, 632, 633; III, pp. 3, 312, 313, 387, 388, 406, 520, 541; IV, pp. 15, 35, 37, 525.

(33) *Ibid.*, IV, pp. 303, 304; see also I, p. 178.

(34) *Ibid.*, III, pp. 93, 94, 96; cf. p. 97; IV, pp. 96, 97.

(35) *Ibid.*, IV, p. 90.

(36) *Ibid.*, II, p. 380; III, p. 94; IV, p. 413; cf. II, p. 58.

(37) *Ibid.*, II, p. 73; cf. Herzl's considerations concerning the division of Turkey in I, pp. 153, 205; II, pp. 309, 387; III, p. 94; IV, p. 146.

(38) See indexes of Marvin Lowenthal: *The Diaries of Theodor Herzl* (New York, 1956), and of Herzl: IV, both under Nevlinski, N(uri) bey, Lippay; cf. Bein: *op. cit.*, pp. 461, 466; Herzl: *op. cit.*, III, p. 341; Siegmund Münz: *Theodor Herzl and his Diaries* (The Contemporary Review, July-December, 1924, pp. 57-60). Herzl obtained his audience with the Pope through bribery (see Lowenthal: *op. cit.*, pp. 416-419, 432, 433; Münz: *op. cit.*, p. 59)I; cf. Herzl: III, p. 66; IV, p. 151.

(39) See conjointly Münz: *op. cit.*, pp. 57, 58; Lowenthal: *op. cit.*, pp. 301-311, and Herzl: III, pp. 289-303.

(40) *Ibid.*, III, p. 77.

(41) *Ibid.*, I, pp. 25, 110, 111, 119, 125, 126, 145, 189, 190, 193, 235, 275, 376, 397, 425; II, p. 52.

(42) References on this subject include such statements, addressed to Jews, as were certain to reach non-Jews as well. See Herzl: I, pp. 37, 40, 41, 180, 203, 233, 238, 239, 313, 398; II, p. 135; V, pp. 496-499; see also note 43.

(43) *Ibid.*, III, pp. 125, 274, 391, 394; IV, pp. 432, 467, 499; see also II, p. 70; III, pp. 38, 109, 110, 122, 158, 269, 364, 371; V, pp. 497-499.

All who did not wish "dasz die Juden alles zersetzen" (that the Jews corrupt everything) had to support Zionism.⁴⁴



With respect to the non-Jewish population of the country in view, it was suggested in "Der Judenstaat" that this population would have equal rights.⁴⁵ However, according to the project for this state in Herzl's "Tagebücher" (Diaries)—not published until 26 years later—the existing landed property was to be gently expropriated, any subsequent resale to the original owners was prohibited, and all immovables had to remain in exclusively Jewish hands.⁴⁶

The poor population was to be worked across the frontier "unbemerkt" (supreptitiously),⁴⁷ after having for Jewish benefit rid the country of any existing wild animals, such as snakes.⁴⁸ This population was to be refused all employment in the land of its birth.⁴⁹

In March 1899 Herzl had a letter forwarded to him, addressed by a former Arab burgomaster of Jerusalem to the Chief Rabbi of Paris. This letter contained warnings against the Zionist claims as being impracticable on account of Turkey, the Holy Places, and the resistance of the existing population. Herzl replied to this letter, asking who would think of removing the non-Jewish population? This population would, on the contrary, find excellent brothers in the Jews.⁵⁰

A few months later Herzl began to write a novel, "Altneuland" (Old-Newland): a future vision of a Jewish Palestine 20 years later, a model state, which would enrapture visitors. A distinguished Arab who appears on the scene of "Altneuland," shows these visitors a prosperous Arab village with happy inhabitants, and voices the love of the Palestine Arabs for the Jewish brothers to whom they owe so much.⁵¹

(44) *Ibid.*, I, p. 314.

(45) *Ibid.*, I, p. 95.

(46) *Ibid.*, II, pp. 98, 99.

(47) *Ibid.*, II, p. 96.

(48) *Ibid.*, II, pp. 108, 109.

(49) *Ibid.*, II, p. 98.

(50) Bein: *op. cit.*, p. 558; Herzl: V, pp. 484-486.

(51) Herzl: V, pp. 245-248.

"Altneuland" was written by Herzl primarily for the world, not for the Zionists. It had propagandist aims: Herzl wanted to win over non-Jewish opinion for Zionism.⁵²

In 1901, when "Altneuland" was nearly finished, Herzl tried in Constantinople to obtain a Charter for rights, duties and privileges of a "Jüdisch-Ottomanische Land-Companie zur Besiedelung von Palästina und Syrien" (Jewish-Ottoman Colonization Association for the Settlement of Palestine and Syria). In his archives the draft-Charter was preserved for exactly such an instrument of colonization. After his death the new leader of the Zionist Organization tried to obtain from Turkey a similar Charter⁵³ Article III of Herzl's draft Charter gave the Jews the right to deport the native population.⁵⁴



Herzl did not succeed in getting his Charter approved by Turkey. In that same year, 1901, the 5th Zionist Congress founded, under his leadership, the Jewish National Fund. According to its bye-laws, acquired land became inalienable Jewish property and could no longer be sold or leased to non-Jews.⁵⁵

In 1907, three years after Herzl's death, began the exclusion of the native population from labour on Jewish land, contemplated by him. In that year the first kibbutz (collective agricultural community) came into being as a means to eliminate Arab labour and conquer the country by Jewish labour.⁵⁶ The exterritorialization of Palestine soil, together with the boycott of Arab labour—supplemented by a boycott of Arab goods when the Jews themselves began to produce goods for sale⁵⁷—inaugurated the "unbemerkte" (surrepti-

(52) Bein: *op. cit.*, pp. 562, 564; cf. Cohen: *op. cit.*, p. 78.

(53) Böhm: *op. cit.*, I, p. 387.

(54) *Ibid.*, I, p. 706.

(55) *Ibid.*, I, pp. 227, 619.

(56) *Zionistisches Handbuch*, herausgegeben von Gerhard Holdheim (Berlin, 1923), pp. 235, 259, 382; cf. Böhm: *op. cit.*, I, pp. 414, 430.

(57) *Palestine. A Study of Jewish, Arab, and British Policies*. Published for the Esco Foundation for Palestine, Inc. (New Haven, 1947), Vol. I, pp. 559, 560, and Vol. II, pp. 1160, 1165; see also *Palestine. Disturbances in May, 1921*. Reports of the Commission of Inquiry with Correspondence relating Thereto (Command paper 1540, 1921), p. 52; Bahaaddin Bey in "*Hatsharat Balfur Vatoldoteba*" by N.M. Gelber (Jerusalem, 1939), p. 190, as quoted by Nevill Barbour in "*Nisi Dominus*" (London, 1946), p. 53.

tious) ousting of the native population, which Herzl had planned. Intensive Jewish militarization, also intended by Herzl,⁵⁸ was introduced in the same year.⁵⁹ It was preceded by a discussion between two youthful Jewish pioneers in the settlement of Sejera. One of them, David, wished to establish a Jewish so-called self-defence. The other, Shlomo, opposed this. They had returned, he said, to the Land of the Book in order to lead a peaceful life. If they stirred up the Arabs, there would be no shalom, no peace, ever. David persisted—this was a world in which force and force alone won respect.⁶⁰

Shlomo departed, to Paris. David remained. David Ben Gurion.



Unrest grew among the Palestine Arabs. The boycott of Arab labour created tension.⁶¹ The fear arose among the Arabs that the Jews wanted to expel them from the country.⁶²

In November 1914 Turkey took the side of Germany in the war against the Allies. By appealing to underground Arab liberation movements and by promising to recognize Arab independence in Arab areas including Palestine,⁶³ Britain managed to enlist the support of these movements in the fight against the Turks. The promise, made in October 1915 in a treaty⁶⁴ between Britain and the representative of the Arabs, Sharif (later King) Hussein, was

(58) Herzl: II, pp. 78, 102; cf. pp. 25, 35, 44, 50, 58, 61, 64, 72.

(59) Moshe Pearlman: *The Army of Israel* (New York, 1950), p. 12.

(60) Robert St. John: *Ben Gurion* (New York, 1959), pp. 31, 32.

(61) S.M. Perlmann: *Chapters of Arab-Jewish Diplomacy, 1918-22* (Jewish Social Studies, New York, April 1944, p. 126)

(62) Chaim Weizmann: *Reden und Aufsätze 1901-1936* (Tel Aviv, 1937), p. 26.

(63) For the correspondence which included the pledge see Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif Hussein of Mecca July 1915-March 1916 (Command paper 5957, 1939). For the inclusion of Palestine see Palestine. Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organization (Command paper 1700, 1922), p. 26, and "compare the Arab version of the words of the pledge with the British 'interpretation' of their meaning, p. 20. Note that the Colonial Office do not impugn the accuracy of the Arab version. They merely say it means what the words did not mean" (E.T. Richmond: "'England' in Palestine" in *The Nineteenth Century and after*, July 1925, p. 48). See also Kirk: *op. cit.*, p. 146, note 1; Ramsay MacDonald: *Zionism and Palestine* (*The Contemporary Review*, April 1922, p. 434); cf. Sykes: *op. cit.*, p. 182; Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939, First Series, Vol. IV, 1919 (London, 1952), No. 242, pp. 342-345; Cmd. (Command paper) 3530, 1930, pp. 126, 127.

(64) David Lloyd George: *The Truth about the Peace Treaties* (London, 1938), Vol. II, p. 1063.

subsequently repeated in different forms, lastly in the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918.⁶⁵ The Zionists saw in the world war "Zion's opportunity,"⁶⁶ in the spirit of Herzl. The Zionist Organization took a neutral stand,⁶⁷ members of the Executive spread rapidly over various belligerent and neutral capitals.⁶⁸ Throughout the war contact was maintained even between hostile centres.⁶⁹ In this way progress which the Zionists made with one of the conflicting parties could be played off against the other, and Weizmann was able at an appropriate moment to utter the threat (successfully) at the London Foreign Office that Jews might be induced by a German offer "to transfer their loyalty."⁷⁰ As had previously been done by Herzl, international Jewish implements of power and the advantages of a Jewish state for imperialist purposes were offered to the belligerents in exchange for their support in the establishment of the proposed state.⁷¹ The representation, made in October 1916, according to which America might be won for the Allies by powerful American Jewish influence via the Zionist leader Justice Brandeis, to whom President Wilson was said to be bound by ties of peculiar hardness because, as was suggested, Brandeis had once saved him from appearing in a damaging law-suit,⁷² was decisive in its effect.

(65) For the whole series of pledges see Report of a Committee set up to consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sharif of Mecca in 1915 and 1916 (Cmd. 5974, 1939). See also Documents ... 1919-1939, First Series, IV, 1919, *loc. cit.*

(66) *Zionism: Problems and Views*. Edited by Paul Goodman and Arthur D. Lewis (London, 1916), p. 68; see also pp. 60, 101, 230.

(67) Oskar K. Rabinowicz: *Fifty Years of Zionism* (London, 1950), p. 74.

(68) *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

(69) Böhm: *op. cit.*, I, pp. 626, 627; Holdheim: *op. cit.*, pp. 53, 54; see also Sokolow: *op. cit.*, II, pp. 21-23; Rabinowicz: *op. cit.*, p. 75.

(70) Sykes: *op. cit.*, p. 207; cf. Stephen Wise and Jacob de Haas: *The Great Betrayal* (New York, 1930), p. 37.

(71) Gelber: *op. cit.*, as quoted by Perlmann: *op. cit.*, p. 128, and by Barbour: *op. cit.*, pp. 54, 55; Viscount Samuel: *Memoirs* (London, 1945), pp. 139-141; Weizmann: *Trial*, pp. 191, 225, 243; cf. George Kirk: *The Middle East in the War* (Survey of International Affairs 1939-1946, London, 1954), p. 246, note 1, quoting Sir Charles Webster; John Marlowe: *The Seat of Pilate* (London, 1959), pp. 28, 29.

(72) Sykes: *op. cit.*, p. 183. James Malcolm, who made this proposal to Sir Mark Sykes, was a financier of Armenian origin, who looked after the interests of Armenians dwelling under Allied Governments. For the Zionist forces behind his move cf. Anita Engle: *The Nili Spies* (London, 1959), pp. 73, 74; Samuel Landman: *Origins of the Balfour Declaration: Dr. Herzl's Contribution* (Essays. In honour of the Very Rev. Dr. J.H. Hertz on the occasion of his Seventieth Birthday, September 25, 1942, London), pp. 264, 265; cf. Alan R. Taylor: *Prelude to Israel* (New York, 1959), p. 17. It was Herzl who set the example to his successors in using Armenian interests to further the Zionist cause (see Herzl: IV, index under Armenier, Armenische Frage, Armenische Komitees).

There still remained, however, the chance that after the war, when Zionist services would become more or less unnecessary, political rights which had been previously promised to the Arabs and which were known to the Zionists,⁷³ would be given priority. In order to avoid this, Zionist services or threats had to be produced which would extend beyond the armistice. Again following the policy of Herzl, and favoured by the developments in Russia, the Zionist leaders pressed the "maszgebende Persönlichkeiten" (leading personalities) into the dilemma: Zionism or revolution. In case of opposition, they threatened, "wird sich unsere aufbauende Kraft in eine zerstörende verwandeln, die die ganze Welt in Gärung bringen wird" (our building-up power will be transformed into a destructive power which will put the whole world into a state of ferment).⁷⁴

It was largely on the strength of this threat that after the war the Zionists succeeded in having the concrete promise to the Arabs of October 1915 superseded by the vaguely formulated Balfour Declaration of 2nd November 1917.⁷⁵



While the war was still going on, rumours of the Balfour Declaration reached the ears of the Arabs. Their help, necessary for Palestine's liberation from the Turks, called for their confidence that this was actually their own liberation. They were then assured by the British Government that the Balfour Declaration guaranteed "the freedom of the existing population, both economic and political,"⁷⁶ whereas in fact it only guaranteed their civil and religious rights.

(73) Apart from the question as to what Herbert Samuel, "a keen Zionist" (Lloyd George: *op. cit.*, II, p. 1192), could know about the McMahon pledges to the Arabs in his capacity as a member of the Cabinet, and apart from the probability that Zionist leaders knew about them since October, 1916 (see Sykes: *op. cit.*, pp. 182, 185), it is certain (*ibid.*, p. 204; Weizmann: *Trial*, p. 241), that since April 16, 1917, Weizmann was informed about Arab rights according to the Sykes-Picot Treaty, which provided for an Arab right of say regarding Central Palestine and for an Arab State or Confederation of States comprising Southern Palestine and Transjordan, which territories Zionism was to claim for itself. Cf. H.F. Frischwasser-Ra'anan: *The Frontiers of a Nation* (London, 1955), pp. 83-96.

(74) *Jüdische Rundschau*, 16-I-1920, p. 24; see also Protokoll des XII. Zionisten Kongresses, p. 280.

(75) Cf. Documents 1919-1939, First Series, IV, 1919, No. 242, p. 345, and Appendix (ii), p. 1276.

(76) Statements made on behalf of His Majesty's Government during the year 1918 in regard to the Future Status of certain parts of the Ottoman Empire (Cmd. 5964, 1939), p. 3.

Weizmann for his part, during a visit to Palestine in the spring of 1918, warned Arab leaders in Jerusalem to beware of the treacherous insinuation that Zionists were seeking political power (in Palestine).⁷⁷

During this same visit he proposed to the Palestine Jews, in their own circle, that, since Jewish power was still inadequate, a strong Power should be appointed to rule "our state" until the time when the Jews would be able to do so themselves.⁷⁸



In British and Zionist quarters it was apparently found necessary to submit to the delegations at the Peace Conference a proof of official Arab agreement with the Balfour Declaration. This would give the semblance that the right of self-determination—the Allied war banner and underlying principle of what was to become par. 4 of article XXII of the Covenant of the League of Nations—was duly respected. Emir Feisal, who was present at the Peace Conference as representative of his father, King Hussein, was handed a treaty with Weizmann for signature. Feisal found himself in a difficult position, under strong British pressure, and he knew practically no English. When signing the treaty he added a codicil containing such severe reserves that the document was on that account practically worthless to the interested British and Zionist parties.⁷⁹ Nevertheless, it appears to have been circulated at the Peace Conference—as can be gathered from David Hunter Miller's diary on that conference, without the codicil.⁸⁰

Against this there appeared in "Le Matin" on 1st March the report of an interview with Feisal in which he bade the Jews welcome to Palestine, but warned against the setting up of a Jewish state, from which he expected disaster. Weizmann and Frankfurter, the American Zionist leader at the Peace Conference, circulated shortly afterwards a letter which, according to Weizmann, had been written by Feisal to Frankfurter by way of denial of the inter-

(77) Ronald Storrs: *Orientalism* (London, 1937), p. 400; cf. Weizmann: *Reden* p. 47; *The Jewish Chronicle* (London), May 10, 1918, p. 11, and *Jüdische Rundschau*, Berlin, 31-5-1918, p. 167.

(78) Palestine (Esco Foundation), I, p. 131.

(79) See for text of codicil J.M.N. Jeffries: *Palestine: The Reality* (London, 1939), p. 253.

(80) David Hunter Miller: *My Diary at the Conference of Paris*, Vol. III, Document 141, pp. 188, 189.

view and which contained an extensive appreciation and endorsement of the Zionist aspirations by the Arab delegation.⁸¹ In Zionist quarters great importance was attached to this document. It constituted an assurance to those who hesitated to support Zionism from fear that it might lead to a conflict in Palestine. What further objections could there be to Zionism if it were backed by so authoritative an Arab leader?

The "Frankfurter letter"—it was under this name that the document passed into history—was characterized by Sir Boyd Merriman as spokesman of the Palestine Zionist Executive, as a basis of the Mandate over Palestine.⁸² The "Frankfurter letter" is consequently also a basis for the present State of Israel. And a shaky basis it is. For it was falsified.^{82a} The falsifiers were Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the first President of the state resting on this basis, and Prof. Felix Frankfurter, since 1939 Associate Justice at the United States Supreme Court.



Over and over again Zionist quarters proclaimed intentions to cooperate with the Arabs and to develop the country jointly with them.⁸³ Plans for dominating or ousting the Arabs were repeatedly denied;⁸⁴ Arab views on Zionism as having this intent were attributed to deception and agitation.⁸⁵ Meanwhile the Zionists considered among each other nationalization and expropriation,⁸⁶ for which advantage was to be taken of the deficient registra-

(81) Reports of the Executive of the Zionist Organization to The XII. Zionist Congress. *I. Political Report* (London, 1921), pp. 23, 24.

(82) Colonial Office: *Palestine Commission on the Disturbances of August 1929. Evidences Heard and a Selection of Exhibits.* (Colonial No. 48, London, 1930), Vol. I, p. 486.

(82a) The detailed account of the Frankfurter Affair by the present writer is to be published shortly.

(83) Storrs: *op. cit.*, p. 400; Protokoll des XII. Zionisten Kongresses, p. 769; see also quotations and comment in Cmd. 3686, 1930, p. 54.

(84) Robert Weltsch: *A Tragedy of Leadership* (Jewish Social Studies, July 1951, New York, p. 220).

(85) Cf. Documents 1919-1939, First Series, IV, 1919, pp. 284, 304, 338, 339, 368, 369, 425, 426, 470, 472, 508, 616; and Cmd. 1540, 1921, pp. 43-45, 50-57; Weizmann (*Jewish Chronicle*, November 8, 1918, p. 14 and May 16, 1919, p. 19); Sokolow: *op. cit.*, II, p. XXIX.

(86) *Jüdische Rundschau*, 7-1-1919, p. 4; 28-2-1919, p. 118; 2-5-1919, pp. 238, 239, 240; 6-6-1919, p. 319; 25-7-1919, p. 404; Political Report of the Zionist Executive, 1921, p. 81; *The Jewish Chronicle*, December 13, 1918, p. 12.

tion of Arab landed property,⁸⁷ as a means of getting the land into their hands as quickly as possible; next to this, Jewish mass immigration was to bring about a Jewish majority of the population and, conjointly with Jewish landholding, a Jewish state.⁸⁸ A basis for Jewish-Arab negotiations on which Feisal insisted, and according to which Jews, Christians and Muslims were to be regarded as equally at home in Palestine, was rejected by the entire Palestine-Jewish community, including Labour, as a "ridiculous and dangerous scheme."⁸⁹ A British project for granting loans to assist Palestine-Arab peasants who had been reduced by the war to a state of distress, was opposed by Weizmann.⁹⁰ The British Zionist Zangwill, who, like other Zionists, openly proposed to deport the Palestine Arabs,⁹¹ considered this method finer than Weizmann's tactics to "snow" them "under."⁹²

At rare moments, a Jewish voice uttered a different note. Thus, in February 1919: "Wir die wir in der ganzen Welt unter Verfolgungen leiden und alle Menschenrechte für uns in Anspruch nehmen, wir gehen nach Palästina und kehren den Spiesz um." (We who are suffering persecutions throughout the world and who claim all human rights for ourselves, are going to Palestine reversing the roles.)⁹³



At that time Palestine was an almost entirely Arab country. It had for centuries formed part of Syria. Over 91 per cent of the population was Arab, less than 9 per cent Jewish.⁹⁴ The Palestine Arabs, Christians and Muslims,

(87) Weizmann (*The Jewish Chronicle*, March 14, 1919, p. 18).

(88) Weizmann (*The Jewish Chronicle*, December 13, 1918, p. 18); "Rasswiet," unter der Redaktion von Wladimir Jabotinsky (Berlin, 1925), p. 20; cf. John Marlowe: *op. cit.*, p. 143.

(89) Medzini, quoted by Perlman; *op. cit.*, p. 143. Vol. II, p. 347, quoting Ussishkin; Jung: *op. cit.*, II, p. 90, referring to Israel Zangwill

(90) Documents 1919-1939, First Series, IV, 1919, No. 238 (Enclosure) pp. 332, 335; see also Philip Graves: *Palestine, the Land of Three Faiths* (London, 1923), p. 174.

(91) *The Jewish Chronicle*, December 13, 1918, pp. 5, 12; January 3, 1919, p. 19; January 10, 1919, p. 14; Palestine (Esco Foundation), I, pp. 158, 159; cf. *The Jewish Chronicle*, February 7, 1919, p. 5, and March 7, 1919, p. 26. See also Salo Wittmayer Baron: *A Social and Religious History of the Jews* (New York, First Edition 1937), Vol. II, p. 347, quoting Ussishkin; Jung: *op. cit.*, II, p. 90, referring to Israel Zangwill and Israel Bogovine; cf. Curt Nawratzki: *Das neue Jüdische Palästina* (Berlin, 1919), pp. 196, 197.

(92) *The Jewish Chronicle*, December 20, 1918, p. 15.

(93) W. Brünn in "Die Jüdische Rundschau," 18-2-1919, p. 98.

(94) Hyamson: *Palestine under the Mandate*, p. 108.

protested unanimously against the Allied proposal to cut off Palestine from the Syrian mother-country, and against Zionism as being in conflict, *inter alia*, with their rights under the Covenant of the League of Nations and according to Allied declarations on Palestine. Legally their position was unassailably strong; measured by power standards it was extremely weak.

According to statements made by Balfour himself in a Memorandum of August 11, 1919 and in a previous conference with Brandeis, the Covenant qualified the Palestine Arabs as an independent nation; Zionism was contrary to the Covenant, to the right of self-determination and to the Anglo-French Declaration of November 1918, and the Powers had made "no declaration of policy (regarding Palestine) which, at least in the letter, they have not always intended to violate."⁹⁵

However, considerations of self-interest bound Britain, and hence the Allies, to Zionism, and thus brought factors of power on to the Zionist side which the Arabs, after the war when their services were no longer needed, lacked entirely. It was primarily Balfour himself who made the Allied ties with Zionism prevail internationally. In this way Zionism obtained its positive legal basis in the Mandate for Palestine, in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied and elaborated. According to a characterization from judicial quarters this Mandate was "not a legal but an essentially political document."⁹⁶

According to Ben Gurion, on the other hand, it represented a decision between Jews and Arabs by the "world tribunal."⁹⁷ It is true, as shown by the Dreyfus affair, that verdicts of tribunals may be revised in cases, for instance, of falsification. But even for this a certain measure of power is needed, such as the possibility of an appeal to public opinion. The Arabs did not possess this resource either, whilst the Zionists, following the example of Herzl, made use of Jewish influence in the international Press as a medium of political barter.⁹⁸ Moreover, the most striking proof of the violation of Arab rights by Zionism: Balfour's own testimony, was kept secret until 1952.

(95) Documents 1919-1939, First Series, IV, 1919, No. 242, pp. 342-345; Appendix (ii), p. 1277.

(96) Quoted by John Garstang in "Palestine in Peril" (*The Observer*, September 20, 1936); cf. quotation by Bentwich in "Palestine," p. 114.

(97) U.N. Document A/364, Add. 2, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, Vol. III, Annex A: oral evidence presented at public meetings, General Assembly: Official Records: Second Session: Supplement No. 11, New York, 1947, p. 48.

(98) Gelber, quoted by Barbour: *op. cit.*, p. 54.

And the falsification of the "Frankfurter letter" remained undiscovered for forty years and is disclosed for the first time in this article.

Thus, with the Mandate, the following paradoxical relation between semblance and reality was established which, consolidated in 1947 by the U.N. Partition Resolution for Palestine, has characterized the Arab-Zionist/Israeli conflict up to the present day:

Arab resistance to the Mandate as an instrument for the realization of Zionism was essentially defensive: self-defence against the violation of rights that had been acknowledged in Allied treaties and declarations as well as in the Covenant.

By the Mandate for Palestine, however, the violation of existing rights by an inherently aggressive Zionism was legalized; Arab self-defence against it could be formally stamped as aggression, and it was the Zionists who acquired the status of innocent victims of aggression who could henceforth represent their armed forces and military actions as defensive.



Thanks specifically to the privileges assigned to them in the Mandate, drawn up mainly by themselves, the Zionists, within ten years, were in possession of all the economic key positions in Palestine.⁹⁹

As a result of the continued exterritorialization of acquired territory—small in area, but situated in the most fertile regions and therefore formerly densely populated—and the intensified boycott of Arab labour and products,¹⁰⁰ the ousting of the native population slowly went on.¹⁰¹ A perfectly closed,

(99) Hans Kohn: *Nationalismus und Imperialismus im Vorderen Orient* (Frankfurt am Main, 1931), p. 220.

(100) Palestine (Esco Foundation), I, pp. 559, 560; II, p. 1160; Vladimir Jabotinski: *Die Idee des Betar* (Lyck, 1935), pp. 20, 21; Cmd. 3686, 1930, pp. 53-56; David Ben Gurion: *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* (New York, 1954), pp. 45-83; Palestine Royal Commission Report (Cmd. 5479, 1937), p. 241: "Picketing (by Jews of Arab labour) in the post-war settlements in the Sharon was on such a scale as to require legislation—the Prevention of Intimidation Ordinance of 1927 (amended in 1936)."

(101) Cmd. 3686, 1930, pp. 51, 54-56; Cmd. 5479, 1937, pp. 239-242; Kirk: *The Middle East in the War*, p. 235; cf. Ruppin: *Die landwirtschaftliche Kolonisation*, p. 79; Cmd. 3530, 1930, pp. 123, 124, 151; Richard Crossman: *Palestine Mission* (London, 1947), p. 159.

exclusive Zionist community developed.¹⁰² Disturbances broke out. Investigation showed at the very outset that Zionist exclusivism was at their root¹⁰³ and that the resistance comprised all strata of the Arab population who felt to be nationally and materially menaced by Zionism.¹⁰⁴ It is true that a Jewish state and an "offensive policy" were now openly demanded only by so-called extremists.¹⁰⁵ Actually, however, the supposed moderates such as Weizmann proved to be aiming at the same object, but along more gradual lines.¹⁰⁶ The Arabs were aware of this.



The seizure of power by Hitler in 1933 and its tragic consequences to European Jews gave a strong impetus to Jewish immigration into Palestine. The Arabs became increasingly alarmed to see the floods of foreigners overrunning their small country—nearly sixty-two thousand in 1935 alone.¹⁰⁷ In 1936 the great Arab rebellion against the Mandate broke out, which lasted nearly three years.

In 1939, with a new war in sight and good prospects for the Axis among the Arab desperadoes, Britain issued a White Paper restricting Jewish immigration and the purchase of land. By this White Paper, Britain exchanged

(102) Arthur Koestler: *Promise and Fulfilment* (London, 1949), pp. 34, 35, 315; see also Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry regarding the problems of European Jewry and Palestine (Cmd. 6808, 1946), pp. 34, 35; Marlowe: *op. cit.*, pp. 100, 101.

(103) Cmd. 1540, 1921, p. 57.

(104) *Ibid.*, p. 45.

(105) These "extremists"—the Zionist Revisionists—proclaimed in 1925: "The aim of Zionism is the gradual transformation of Palestine (Transjordan included) into a Jewish Commonwealth, that is, into a *selfgoverning Commonwealth under the auspices of an established Jewish Majority*" (Jabotinsky in "*Rasswjet*," p. 123; see also p. 20). According to Jabotinsky the words in italics in this program—which was always maintained—were literally quoted from an address, delivered in 1919 by the Rt. Hon. Herbert Samuel, the Zionist Jew who became the first High Commissioner for Palestine under the Mandate (from 1920-1925). Referring to the Revisionist program at a later date Sir Herbert Samuel declared that it "would be definitely destructive of legitimate Arab interests" (Great Britain and Palestine. The Second Lucien Wolf Memorial Lecture, November 25th, 1935, London, p. 20). Regarding the Revisionists see also Heller: *op. cit.*, pp. 138, 139.

(106) Shmarya Levin, quoted in "*The Jewish Chronicle*," September 19, 1919, p. 20; "*New Palestine*," quoted in Cmd. 3530, 1930, p. 110; cf. Crossman: *op. cit.*, p. 133; Marlowe: *op. cit.*, p. 107.

(107) A Survey of Palestine (Palestine, 1946), Vol. I, p. 185.

the offensive function towards the native population which had been assigned to her by the Zionists, for a defensive one.

For the Zionists this meant that the British phase of their stage-by-stage advance towards their goal had come to an end. They were now confronted with two tasks: the gaining of support for the next phase, and the elimination of the old one: Mandate and Mandatary.



The centre of Zionist political activity now moved from Britain to America. Large-scale campaigns were conducted for the mobilization of public opinion, Congress and Government against the British White Paper and in favour of a Jewish state.¹⁰⁸ For now the state was openly demanded also by the so-called moderate leaders.¹⁰⁹

Moreover, several projects for a Jewish state henceforward included the "transfer"—though "voluntary"—of the Arab native population.¹¹⁰ In Palestine itself, according to a high-ranking officer of the British Colonial Police, a lady missionary with experience of former Greco-Turkish evacuations of population was asked by Jews in 1949 to give a lecture on this subject and was questioned in detail in connection with a contemplated eviction (openly asserted) of the Arab native population when the British would withdraw.¹¹¹



The Zionist terror against the Mandatary, which started after the publication of the White Paper, ceased with the outbreak of war, but was resumed while the war was still going on.¹¹² Illegal immigrants were smuggled into Palestine in large numbers. For the Zionists, however, assistance to Jewish

(108) Taylor: *op. cit.*, pp. 60-64, chapter VIII.

(109) *Ibid.*, pp. 57-60.

(110) Palestine (Esco Foundation), II, pp. 1133, 1139, 1186; Chaim Weizmann: *Palestine's Role in the Solution of the Jewish Problem* (Foreign Affairs, January 1942, pp. 337, 338); Katznelson quoted by Kirk: *The Middle East in the War*, p. 243; see also Hannah Arendt: *Zionism Reconsidered* (*The Menorah Journal*, October-December 1945, pp. 164, 167).

(111) Geoffrey Jackson Morton: *Just the Job* (London, 1957), p. 156.

(112) "...directly impeding the war effort of Great Britain..." as according to an official announcement quoted by Kirk: *The Middle East in the War*, p. 322. See also p. 321, and A Survey of Palestine, I, pp. 71-73.

refugees had essentially political motives.¹¹³ Humanitarian considerations were sacrificed where necessary. The means of propaganda for the political object included a deliberate mass murder of Jewish refugees, ordered by the Palestine Zionist authorities.¹¹⁴



(113) The underlying Zionist idea was that the Jews, being a nation, should be helped not by humanitarian, but by political means. See Herzl: I, p. 112; V, p. 456; Max Nordau's *Zionistische Schriften* (Köln, etc., 1909), pp. 174, 175; *Zionistisches Handbuch*, pp. 200, 201. Cf. Hyamson: *Palestine under the Mandate*, p. 69, reporting that at the time when the position of the Jews in Germany was the most urgent, the Zionist Organization distributed less than a quarter of the Immigration Certificates at its disposal to German Jews, and almost all of the remainder to Eastern Europe, especially Poland (the ideological breeding-place of political Zionism); and Jon and David Kimche: *The Secret Roads* (London, 1955), pp. 15-31, recording the deal between Gestapo and S.S. leaders (including Eichmann) and Zionist emissaries who "had not come to Nazi Germany to save German Jews; that was not their job" (p. 27), but who had come to select and train prospective Jewish immigrants for Palestine with Jewish-nationalist and fighting dispositions. See also statements by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, published in "*The Zionist Review*" of August 10, 1945, in "*The New Palestine*" of November 30, 1945, and in "*New Judea*" of December 1946—January 1947 (quoted by Kirk in "*The Middle East in the War*," First Edition, 1952, p. 11): "The classic textbook of Zionism is not how to find a home for... refugees. The classic textbook of our movement is the Jewish State;" cf. Crossman: *op. cit.*, p. 38.

For Zionist torpedoing of Roosevelt's project for an overall haven for the oppressed Jews of Europe, reported by Morris L. Ernst, see Morris C. Lazaron: *Bridges not Walls* (New York, 1959), pp. 133, 134; for Zionist pressures against other plans for admitting Jews to countries outside Palestine or Israel after World War II, and after the recent Jewish "exodus" from Rumania, as well as in the 30's and 40's, "where Jewish lives were literally thrown away" see "*Freeland*," October-November 1959 (New York).

(114) In 1940, in the harbour of Haifa, two shiploads of illegal Jewish immigrants, refugees from Europe, were transferred to the Patria, bound for the British island of Mauritius, where they were to be kept for the duration of the war. The ship was blown up; 250 people were killed, many of them women and children. According to Zionist information as given by Koestler (*op. cit.*, p. 60) and J. Melkman ("*Israel*," Amsterdam, etc., 1949, p. 218) the refugees themselves blew up the Patria. The ship was made a symbol of Jewish heroism. The anniversary of its loss was celebrated in Israel with much pomp and ceremony, with speeches, trumpets, a memorial service in Haifa Bay, and the hoisting of the Israeli flag on the wreck, still partly visible. What really happened to the Patria was revealed in 1958 by Rosenblum, in 1940 a member of the Zionist Actions Committee. It is this Committee—the highest Zionist body next to the Congress, and the shadow cabinet of the Palestine Jews before the establishment of their state—that, notwithstanding Rosenblum's protests, decided to blow up the ship Haganah agents smuggled the bombs aboard. The refugees were never asked. "...We murdered with our bare hands our own children, their mothers, sisters and dear ones...", wrote Rosenblum. According to William Zukerman, whose "*Jewish Newsletter*" of November 3, 1958, carried the Patria story, it was "a brutal calculated act of deliberate mass-murder for purposes of nationalistic propaganda." The success, in terms of feelings raised against Britain, was considerable.

After the war the Zionist terror against the Mandatary increased in vehemence. Secret collaboration between terrorists and Jewish Agency came to light.¹¹⁵

In 1947 Britain brought the Palestine problem before the United Nations. The latter sent a committee to that country, the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), the majority of which proposed a Plan of Partition for Palestine. The plan gave the Jews the largest and viable part of the country. This part comprised the fertile coastal strip of the former Philistines, where the Jews had now for the most part established themselves, and with it practically the entire citrus area, half of which was Arab property. The Arabs received the smaller, non-viable part, mainly the poor country of Judea—the “land of the fathers”—where practically no Jews had settled. This Arab state had to be kept alive by an “economic union,” i.e. subsidies from the Jewish state. This ruled out independence for the Palestine Arabs. Jews alone would be independent in Palestine.



The Arabs rejected the Partition Plan. The Zionists accepted it—apparently, for their acceptance was coupled with such territorial and other reserves¹¹⁶ that it was virtually a rejection. However, they wished to secure its international acceptance: sovereignty was indispensable to their next phase. The Partition Resolution was in fact carried internationally—according to Israel’s first U.N. representative, Eban, one more decision of the “world tribunal”¹¹⁷ and a relief to the Christian conscience as well.¹¹⁸ This conscience thus relieved itself at the cost of the Arabs, who were in no way to blame for the Jewish problem. And as to the “world tribunal”—as ad hoc Committee of the U.N. it was unable to produce a sufficient majority for the General Assembly. But an American Presidential election year was in the offing. In the few days that remained before the final decision, prominent Zionists and those who believed in a “Jewish vote” conducted an unparalleled

(115) Palestine. Statement of Information Relating to Acts of Violence (Cmd. 6873, 1946).

(116) United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question. Summary Records of Meetings 25 September—25 November, 1947, General Assembly: Official Record: Second Session, New York, pp. 16, 114, 125.

(117) Abba Eban: *Voice of Israel* (London, 1958), p. 129.

(118) *Ibid.*, pp. 118, 119; see also p. 23.

international pressure campaign.¹¹⁹ "By direct order of the White House every form of pressure, direct or indirect, was brought to bear by American officials upon those countries outside the Moslem world that were known to be either uncertain or opposed to partition. Representatives or intermediaries were employed by the White House to make sure that the necessary majority would at least be secured."¹²⁰ In these few days a number of countries who were in some way dependent upon the U.S. changed their position.¹²¹ The Partition Plan was carried.

Next to this manipulation of the "world tribunal" which "bordered closely on scandal,"¹²² a fundamental lack of insight into the relevant subject-matter formed the basis of its decision. The Partition Plan was accompanied by a recommendation according to which the solution for Palestine could not be one for the Jewish problem,¹²³ and it was justified with the argument, among others, that a definitive demarcation of the Jewish state implied a limitation of its immigration.¹²⁴ But the solution of the Jewish problem was the *raison d'être* of Zionism and of its demand for a state; this solution implied that the *whole* of Jewry was to be "gathered" into the said state. It was in no way intended that this should only be effected in a part of Palestine. Already at the time of the investigation by UNSCOP, acceptance of possible partition was being advocated among the Palestine Jews with the argument, "Boundaries are not eternal thing."¹²⁵ This pointed to considerations such as those, voiced by Ben Gurion, of the 20th Zionist Congress, with respect to a partition plan proposed in 1937: "The Debate has not been for or against the indivisibility of the Land of Israel. No Zionist can forgo

(119) *The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman* (London, 1955-1956), Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope 1946-1953, pp. 168, 169; Kermit Roosevelt: *The Partition of Palestine. A Lesson in Pressure Politics* (*The Middle East Journal*, January 1948); Millar Burrows: *Palestine is our Business* (Philadelphia, 1949), pp. 70, 71; Alfred Lilienthal: *What Price Israel* (Chicago, 1953), chapters III, V; Donald C. Blaisdell: *Zionism and the National Interest* (*Issues*, Winter, 1958-1959, New York).

(120) Sumner Welles: *We need not fail* (Boston, etc., 1948), p. 63.

(121) The three Benelux Countries and France, Haiti, Liberia, New Zealand, which had abstained from voting, were now in favour; so were the Philippines and Paraguay, which had been absent; Siam, which had opposed, was now absent.

(122) *The Forrestal Diaries* (Ed. Walter Millis, New York, 1951), p. 363.

(123) U.N. Document A/364, 3 September 1947, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine, Report to the General Assembly, Vol. I, 1947, General Assembly: Official Records: Second Session: Supplement No. 11, p. 46.

(124) *Ibid.*, p. 47.

(125) U.N. Document A/364, Add. 2, Vol. III, Annex A: Oral Evidence Presented at Public Meetings, p. 185.

the smallest portion of the Land of Israel. The Debate concerned which of the two routes would lead quicker to the common goal."¹²⁶

The area of this "Land of Israel," according to Jewish religious claims, appears to be constant: it extends from the Euphrates to the river of Egypt (the Wadi el Arish in the Sinai peninsula).¹²⁷

Secularized Zionists use the same term, witness Ben Gurion. But their claims shrank or swelled according to circumstances, and ranged between still wider boundaries, comprising Northern Egypt and the Sinai peninsula, and further between the Euphrates, the mountain ranges of the Taurus (north of Syria) and the Mediterranean Sea.¹²⁸

A connection between expansion and ingathering was already indicated by Herzl: "Wir verlangen, was wir brauchen—jesmehr Einwanderer desto mehr Land." (We demand what we need—the more immigrants, the more land.)¹²⁹ According to Weizmann the Jews would for ever be hungering for

(126) Quoted by Barbour: *op. cit.*, pp. 184, 185.

(127) Norman Bentwich: *Palesine of the Jews* (London, 1919), p. 204; U.N. Document A/364, Add. 2, p. 103. See also H.F. Frischwasser-Ra'anan: *The Frontiers of a Nation* (London, 1955), pp. 86, 87; Marlowe: *op. cit.*, p. 150.

(128) For claims including Transjordan, or "Palestine on both sides of the Jordan," see Jabotinsky: *Rassujet*, pp. 123, 124; "Facts and Figures" (Israel Office of Information, New York, 1955), p. 18; Max Reisel: *Het Jodendom in de Moderne Samenleving* ('s-Gravenhage, 1959), p. 126; see also Zionist claims mentioned by Kirk in *The Middle East in the War*, p. 243 and in *The Middle East 1945-1950* (Survey of International Affairs, London, 1954), p. 209.

For claims including Syria see N.M. Gelber: *Zur Vorgeschichte des Zionismus* (Wien, 1927), pp. 75, 265, 266; Herzl: III, pp. 106, 175, 247; Achad Haam: II, pp. 89, 90; *Zionistisches Handbuch*, p. 99; Böhm: I, p. 705; cf. Morton: *op. cit.*, p. 156, mentioning Zionist claim including (besides Syria together with Jordan and the Lebanon) also Cyprus.

For claims including the Sinai peninsula see Sokolow: *op. cit.*, II, p. 221 (including also Northern Egypt); Herzl: IV, pp. 219, 222, 296; Böhm: I, p. 197 (all of these except Sokolow including also Cyprus); statement by Ben Gurion on November 7, 1956 (see note 184).

For claims on "the smaller historical area," supplemented according to military and economic needs, see Frischwasser-Ra'anan: *op. cit.*, pp. 87-89, 91, 96, 101, 102; Political Report of the Zionist Executive, 1921, pp. 75, 79.

For claims on undefined neighbouring territories of Palestine, or on "The Land (of Israel)," or on "the entire Homeland" as comprising such territories, see Herzl: IV, p. 584; "Facts and Figures," p. 20; David Ben Gurion: *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* (New York, 1954), p. 466; statement by Isaiah Bernstein at the 24th Zionist Congress, held in Jerusalem, Israel, April-May 1956, Bulletin of the Press Bureau, issued by the Information Department of the Jewish Agency, Jerusalem, No. 15.

Cf. also "Palestina inde Verenigde Naties" (Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken. No. 6, 's-Gravenhage, 1947), p. 70.

(129) Herzl: III, p. 160; cf. I, p. 460.

more land, and Palestine was to be a key that would open to them an area extending from the Jordan to the Euphrates and from the Euphrates to the Indian Ocean.¹³⁰

Weizmann's tactics consisted in creating facts in as unobtrusive a manner as possible, thereby building up positions of power which would in turn serve as stepping stones to a further aim.¹³¹ Where necessary he denied aims.¹³² As far back as 1921 he pointed to Jewish overpopulation in Palestine as a means of expansion into Transjordan.¹³³ The so-called extremists pursued the same aims by a shorter and more open course. In September 1947, when UNSCOP announced its Partition Plan, the Irgun—the foremost Zionist terrorist organization¹³⁴—proclaimed promptly that they would not accept the UNSCOP recommendations and would fight till they got all their rights.¹³⁵ By this the Palestine Arabs as well as the Arab neighbouring states knew, and the members of the "world tribunal" might have known, where they stood. For, in the history of political Zionism, the openly proclaimed aims of so-called extremists have in course of time always proved to be those of so-called moderates also. Only at a much later date did it become known that in that same month of September—two months before the acceptance of the Partition Plan by the U.N. and eight months before the intervention of the Arab States—the Haganah (the underground army of the Jewish Agency), too, already had its plan for the conquest of areas not assigned to the Jews.¹³⁶ And that as early as June 1945 Ben Gurion had secretly made in New York all the arrangements, and ordered heavy war material, for a war with the Arabs when

(130) Weizmann: *Reden*, p. 242.

(131) *Ibid.*, p. 125; see also Weizmann: *Trial*, p. 582; cf. Herbert Sidebotham: *British Interests in Palestine* (London, 1934), p. 12: "He belonged to the *faire sans dire* school..."

(132) Cf. e.g. his attitudes regarding the Jewish State as a Zionist aim: 1. with Feisal—see "*Lawrence the Rebel*" by Edward Robinson (London, 1946), p. 156; 2. with Palestine Arabs—see Storrs: *op. cit.*, p. 400; 3. with Palestine Jews—see Palestine (Esco Foundation), I, p. 131; 4. at the Peace Conference—see Political Report of the *Zionist Executive*, 1921, pp. 22, 23; 5. in 1930 and 1931—see Robert Weltsch: "*A Tragedy of Leadership*" (Jewish Social Studies, July 1951, pp. 220-222) and Weizmann: *Reden*, pp. 230-237; 6. with Churchill in 1939, and subsequently in America—see Taylor: *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 57. See, finally, his answer, when reminded of former contradictory statements, in U.N. Document A/364, Add. 2, p. 85.

(133) Protokoll des XII. Zionisten Kongresses, p. 284.

(134) The Irgun was formed in 1935; its insignia consisted of an outline of Palestine and Transjordan, superimposed by a rifle grasped by a forearm and surmounted by the Hebrew words Rak Kach (Only Thus!) (A Survey of Palestine, II, p. 601).

(135) R.M. Graves: *Experiment in Anarchy* (London, 1949), p. 79.

(136) Harry Sacher: *Israel: The Establishment of a State* (London, 1952), p. 217.

the British left Palestine.¹³⁷ And that in 1947, under a false name, an American-Jewish colonel secretly reorganized, trained and instructed the Haganah and provided for its military supplies.¹³⁸



It was in vain that in October 1947 Judah Magnes, President of the Hebrew University on Mount Scopus, speaking in the name of a Judaism whose deepest values he deemed violated by this Zionism, called a last warning to his people against its "spirit of aggression and conquest—not of defence..."¹³⁹ And in vain did the Palestine Arabs plead that the defence of their very existence in the country demanded resistance to a Jewish state.¹⁴⁰ Just as the Mandate had previously outlawed defence instead of aggression, so did a new document of positive international law—the Partition Resolution on Palestine—now permit the final self-defence of the Palestine Arabs in their country to be branded as aggression. Yet, the Irgun had reacted to this very document with the following declaration: "The Partition of the Homeland is illegal. It will never be recognized. The signature by institutions and individuals of the partition agreement is invalid. It will not bind the Jewish people. Jerusalem was and will for ever be our capital. Eretz Israel will be restored to the people of Israel. All of it. And for ever."¹⁴¹



Shortly after the adoption of the Partition Plan by the U.N., the Jewish Agency, which was supposed to have accepted this plan, entered into secret negotiations with the Irgun,¹⁴² which had openly rejected it. The negotia-

(137) Robert St. John: *op. cit.*, pp. 99-102.

(138) *De Stem van Israel*, 28 January, 1949; Ben Gurion: *op. cit.*, p. 296; Perlman: *op. cit.*, pp. 143, 144; John Bagot Glubb: *A Soldier with the Arabs* (London, 1957), p. 133; Jeanette Rachmuth: *The Story of Mikey Marcus (The New Palestine)*, February, 1951).

(139) J.L. Magnes: *Responsibility. Address opening the academic year 1947-48*, October 29, 1947 (Jerusalem), p. 13.

(140) *Destin de la Palestine*. Etude rédigée par le Bureau Arabe à Londres, 1947; Statement by Musa Bey Alami, Director General of the Arab Offices, on the United Nations' Decision in Favour of Partition (*Arab News Bulletin*, 12th December, 1947).

(141) Menachem Begin: *The Revolt. Story of the Irgun* (New York, 1951), p. 335.

(142) Sacher: *op. cit.*, pp. 192, 193; Begin: *op. cit.*, pp. 341-347.

tions lasted a considerable time, whilst the guerilla warfare in the country increased.

At the beginning of April the negotiations ended in an agreement.¹⁴³ Immediately after, on 9th April 1948, i.e. five weeks before the proclamation of the State of Israel and the intervention of the neighbouring states, the raid on Deir Yassin was made. Deir Yassin was a small, unarmed Arab village,¹⁴⁴ situated in the zone of Jerusalem that was to be internationalized, i.e. in area that had not been assigned to the Jews. There had been no attack or provocation of any kind from that village against the Zionists.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, of the 400 citizens, about 250, mostly women and children—the men being at work in town or in the fields—were slaughtered in cold blood with hand grenades and knives by an Irgun gang.¹⁴⁶ After the slaughter Irgun leaders held a press conference at which the commander declared: "We have to fight, conquer, hold."¹⁴⁷ A small group of villagers had previously been loaded on a truck and were paraded later in the day through the Jewish part of Jerusalem, insulted and spat upon, and afterwards released.¹⁴⁸ They could then communicate to others their horrible experiences and their panic.

The Jewish Agency officially expressed its horror and disgust. The raid had, however, been made in concert with the district commander of the Haganah, who desired and actually obtained an aerodrome at this place.¹⁴⁹ And the agreement with the Irgun was now ratified.¹⁵⁰

Deir Yassin gave impetus to the mass flight of Palestine Arabs. When tidings of the massacre spread among them, they caused, according to the chief of the International Red Cross Mission in Palestine, "une terreur géné-

(143) Kirk: *The Middle East 1945-1950*, p. 261.

(144) Jacques de Reynier: *A Jérusalem un drapeau flottait sur la ligne de feu* (Neuchâtel, 1950), p. 72.

(145) Compare Begin: *op. cit.*, pp. 162-165, and accounts given in *New York Times* and *New York Herald Tribune*, both of April 10, 1948, with De Reynier: *op. cit.*, pp. 72, 213; R.M. Graves: *op. cit.*, p. 179; Jon Kimche: *Seven Fallen Pillars* (London, 1950), pp. 217, 218, and the account given in *New York Herald Tribune*, April 12, 1948 by Fitzhugh Turner. See also Kirk: *The Middle East 1945-1950*, p. 260, referring to "New Judea" (January-February 1948, pp. 64-65).

(146) De Reynier: *op. cit.*, pp. 73, 74, 213.

(147) *New York Herald Tribune*, April 10, 1948.

(148) *Daily Telegraph*, April 12, 1948; see also Koestler: *op. cit.*, p. 160, and M.C. Macinnes: *The Arab Refugee Problem* (Royal Central Asian Journal, April 1949, p. 180).

(149) Begin: *op. cit.*, p. 163.

(150) Kirk: *The Middle East 1945-1950*, p. 261; Koestler: *op. cit.*, pp. 169, 170.

ralisée que les Juifs se sont toujours habilement arrangés à entretenir" (widespread terror which the Jews have always skilfully arranged to maintain).¹⁵¹ This was done notably by means of psychological warfare,¹⁵² such as threatening the people with the fate of Deir Yassin.¹⁵³

The Zionist campaign of terror against the Palestine Arabs swept away any feelings of hesitation in the neighbouring countries regarding the use of force and led directly to the Palestine war after the proclamation of the State of Israel on 14th May 1948.¹⁵⁴ During that war the Israeli army drove Arab civil populations out of towns and villages it had occupied.¹⁵⁵ In this way, primarily as a result of the terror initiated in Deir Yassin, the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees came into being.



(151) De Reynier: *op. cit.*, p. 76.

(152) Koestler: *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 215; Sacher: *op. cit.*, p. 245; De Reynier: *op. cit.*, p. 214; Harry Levin: *Jerusalem Embattled* (London, 1950), p. 160; Edgar O'Ballance: *The Arab-Israeli War 1948* (London, 1956), p. 64. For expulsions of Arab civilians by Zionists before the end of the Mandate, see also Don Perez: *Arabs vs. Israelis: Fiction and Fact* (*Issues*, Fall 1959, p. 2); R.M. Graves: *op. cit.*, p. 143; Macinnes: *op. cit.*, p. 181.

(153) Bertha Spafford Vester: Supplement to "*Our Jerusalem*," p. 19. When her book "*Our Jerusalem*" appeared, Mrs. Vester, a prominent Protestant medical missionary in Jerusalem, discovered that it was incomplete: the part concerning the Palestine problem, including personal experiences, some connected with Deir Yassin, had been omitted. She published this part as a supplement to the book.

(154) Kimche: *op. cit.*, pp. 223-225; cf. Marlowe: *op. cit.*, p. 246.

(155) U.N. Document A/648, Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, General Assembly: Official Records: Third Session: Supplement No. 11, p. 40, para. 17 and p. 14, para. 6; Kirk: *The Middle East 1945-1950*, p. 264; *Zionism in Holy Land, Documents*, Paris, 1948 (Statements by representatives of Christian communities in Palestine), p. 14; Glubb: *op. cit.*, pp. 162, 205, 211; Macinnes: *op. cit.*, p. 182 (cf. Kenneth Bilby: "New Star in the Near East," New York, 1950, pp. 43, 44); O'Ballance: *op. cit.*, pp. 63, 64, 150, 171, 172, 209. For expulsions of Arab civilians before and during the Arab-Israeli war see also Nathan Chofshi: *The Bitter Truth about the Arab Refugees* (*Jewish Newsletter*, February 9, 1959). For such expulsions after the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli Armistice Agreements see U.N. Document S/1797, pp. 2-3, paras. 1, 2 and 5; Security Council: Official Records, Fifth Year, 517th Meeting: 30 October 1950, No. 59, p. 19; J.B. Glubb: *Violence on the Jordan-Israel Border* (Foreign Affairs, July 1954), pp. 554, 555; E.H. Hutchison: *Violent Truce* (New York, 1956), Chapter IV; Note No. 205 (from the Egyptian-Israeli Mixed Armistice Commission) to Correspondents, 6 October 1959 (Resolution on the expulsion of 350 bedouins from Israel). In the meanwhile the surreptitious ousting of Arabs from Israel continues along the lines indicated by Herzl. Unable to find jobs as a result of official and unofficial discrimination, educated Israeli Arabs are forced to emigrate. See Leo Heiman: *The "Lost Generation"* (Reprinted from "*The Reconstructionist*" in "*Ner*," Jerusalem/Israel, February-April 1960, pp. XIV-XVIII).

In the report in which he had attacked Zionist fundamentals, on account of which he was murdered by Israeli terrorists, Count Bernadotte, the U.N. Mediator appointed in May 1948, wrote regarding the Arab refugees:

"It would be an offence against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and, indeed, at least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries."¹⁵⁶

On 11th December 1948 the General Assembly of the U.N. decided upon a solution of the Arab refugee problem which gives the refugees the choice between repatriation or compensation. From the outset the vast majority of the refugees chose to return.¹⁵⁷ But Israel refused admission and advocated integration into Arab neighbouring states. These states in turn refused. But their refusal—whatever considerations of their own national interest may be involved—upholds the refugees' own choice as well as the decision of the U.N. and, in fact, constitutes the only effective protection of what the refugees persistently include among their most cherished possessions: the right to return. Israel's refusal to allow this return is a violation of the elemental human right of war victims which had been acknowledged by the U.N., and is a usurpation of the right of choice that was awarded to the refugees and not to Israel. The more so because the Palestine Arabs are essentially the victims not only of acts of war but of deliberate expulsion initiated 50 years previously by gradual means and then accelerated by violence. Regarding the opportuneness of this process—under leaders "always seeing decades ahead"¹⁵⁸—Weltsch testifies as follows: "When the removal of the Arab population from that part of Palestine which became Israel had taken place, it proved to be a pre-conditioning for large-scale immigration which otherwise would not have found even that scarce and modest living space attained so far."¹⁵⁹

It is true that the Arabs are said to have sold their country entirely to the

(156) U.N. Document A/648, p. 14.

(157) U.N. Document A/1106, 17 November 1949, Palestine, First Interim Report of the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East, General Assembly, Fourth Session, p. 15.

(158) Weizmann: *Trial*, p. 243.

(159) Weltsch: *op. cit.*, pp. 224, 225.

Jews,¹⁶⁰ after having neglected it themselves for centuries.¹⁶¹ It thus looks as if the refugees would be returning to a country paid for and developed by others. But on 4th July 1947 Ben Gurion stated before the UNSCOP: "The Arabs own 94 per cent of the land, the Jews only 6 per cent."¹⁶² When the State of Israel was established these Jewish holdings formed 7 per cent of Palestine, amounting to 9 per cent of Israel. More than eighty per cent of Israel's total area is land abandoned by the refugees. They abandoned whole cities like Jaffa, Acre, Lydda, Ramleh, Beit Shan, Migdal-Gad, and a further 388 towns and villages as well as large parts of 94 others, containing nearly a quarter of all the buildings in Israel in 1953—apart from property deliberately destroyed by Zionists and Israelis to prevent the return of refugees;¹⁶³ furthermore, commercial stocks, industrial and agricultural equipment, motor vehicles and cattle; 52 stone quarries, nearly 95 per cent of Israel's olive groves existing at the time of the establishment of the State of Israel, as well as vineyards and orchards. In 1954 more than a third of Israel's Jewish population was living on such refugee land and a quarter of a million Israelis on Arab urban property. In 1949 the Arab olive produce was Israel's third largest export. In 1951-52 the Arab citrus fruits formed nearly half of Israel's citrus exports—in foreign currency value to nearly 29 per cent of Israel's export earnings. Arab property "not only provided shelter, economic sustenance, and employment for the new immigrants, but has done much to determine the pattern of their social integration into Israel."¹⁶⁴

From the Ihud—a small group of Magnes' supporters, who survived him—a protest was still raised by solitary individuals who could not reconcile

(160) Elsevier's *Weekblad*, 24 October 1959, p. 3.

(161) Eban: *op. cit.*, p. 70; Ben Gurion: *op. cit.*, pp. 466, 507. Regarding the Vale of Esdraelon, represented by Zionists (cf. Koestler: *op. cit.*, p. 26) as an illustration of Jewish achievement as against previous Arab neglect, Sir John Hope Simpson stated: "It is a mistake to assume that the Vale of Esdraelon was a wilderness before the arrival of the Jewish settlers and that it is now a paradise. A very large amount of money has been spent by the various Jewish agencies, and great improvements have been made... It is, however, unjust to the poverty-stricken fellah who has been removed from these lands that the suggestion should continually be made that he was a useless lumberer of the ground and produced nothing from it. It should be quite obvious that this is not the fact" (Cmd. 3686, 1930, p. 17. See also notes 16 and 17 and corresponding text).

(162) U.N. Document A/364, Add. 2, p. 17.

(163) De Reynier: *op. cit.*, pp. 214, 221; Bilby: *op. cit.*, p. 3. The preceding and following data on refugees' property were all taken from Don Perez: *Problems of Arab Refugee Compensation* (*The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1954, pp. 403-406). See also "Israel and the Palestine Arabs" by the same author (Washington, 1958), Chapter VIII.

(164) Don Perez: *Problems*, p. 405.

themselves to the establishment of a Jewish state in such a manner: "In the end we must come out publicly with the truth: that we have no moral right whatever to oppose the return of the Arab refugees to their land... that until we have begun to redeem our sin against the Arab refugees, we have no right to continue the Ingathering of the Exiles. We have no right to demand that American Jews leave their country to which they have become attached, and settle in a land that has been stolen from others, while the owners of it are homeless and miserable... We had no right to build a settlement and to realize the ideal of Zionism with other people's property. To do this is robbery."¹⁶⁵

But characteristic of the general attitude is the statement by Weizmann's close collaborator Samuel: "We could not readmit the Arabs; we would have to fight the war all over again to prevent it."¹⁶⁶

Thus the Palestine Arab refugee people was converted by Israel into a people of exiles. Tourists in Israel are shown a modern welfare state and many impressive achievements. Hidden from their eyes are the foundations on which the state and the achievements rest. Fragments of these foundations have here been disclosed: deceit and falsification, robbery, mass murder and refugee misery.¹⁶⁷



The right of the refugees to return was acknowledged regardless of the cause of their flight. In cases where the cause is known, however, that right naturally finds far more support. It was not for nothing that, according to Herzl, the policy of working the poor native population across the frontier had to be carried out "unbemerkt" (surreptitiously). Therefore, public knowledge of the existence of Palestine Arab refugees represents an ideological as well as a practical Zionist failure. And therefore, too, Zionists and Israel are making vigorous efforts to prevent the existence of these refugees, and espe-

(165) *Ner*, July 1955; December 1957/January 1958.

(166) Maurice Samuel: *Level Sunlight* (New York, 1953), p. 69.

(167) Compare facts, exposed in this article, with verdicts by prominent Jews, quoted in the "*Jewish Newsletter*" of June 24, 1957; December 1, 1958; February 9 and November 30, 1959.

cially the cause of their flight and criticism relating to it, from becoming known.¹⁶⁸ Even humanitarian aid to them is being opposed.¹⁶⁹

In order to exculpate themselves from blame for the flight of the Arabs, Zionists and Israel represent Jewish appeals to the Arabs in Haifa to remain, as being illustrative of the general Jewish attitude;¹⁷⁰ they shift the blame on to Arab leaders by accusing them of having instigated the flight.¹⁷¹ Investigation has shown that such appeals in Haifa were, to begin with, exceptional and that, moreover, they were only made after the campaigns of terror and expulsion had successfully done their work and the flight had already com-

(168) See Dutch Christian and Jewish protest against a request by the Israeli Embassy in The Hague—"illuminating for Israel's attitude abroad"—to Mrs. Gertrud Kurz, the Swiss leader of the "Mouvement Chrétien pour la Paix", not to mention the Arab refugee problem on a lecture tour through Holland (*Ner*, July-September 1958, p. 29). "Representative Celler of New York, chairman of the House judiciary committee, is not doing the state of Israel or his co-religionists in this country any good and he is certainly not increasing his own stature by his efforts to prevent a hearing by a Senate judiciary subcommittee of spokesmen for Arab refugees and for the relief organizations which are taking care of them" (*The Courier-Journal*, Louisville, Kentucky, September 4, 1949). For Zionist pressures against the "Holy Land Emergency Program" see Lilienthal: *op. cit.*, pp. 129-131. Zukerman, in "*The Whip of Antisemitism*" (*Jewish Newsletter*, February 24, 1958), exposes the use by Zionists of the stigma of anti-Semitism, either in outright attacks or in whispering campaigns, against those "who refuse to join their bandwagon and particularly those who criticize Israel." He enumerates some of the more famous and comparatively recent victims of this Zionist practice, all of whom criticised Israel's handling of the Arab refugees: Prof. Arnold Toynbee, Norman Thomas, Dorothy Thompson, Dean Virginia Gildersleeve, Prof. William Ernest Hocking, Howard K. Smith, Dr. Edith Summerskill, Freda Utley, Reverend Elson.

(169) Personal experiences of the present writer. See also Zukerman's account of Zionist and Israeli pressure squashing American-Jewish efforts to start a fund for the Arab refugees, in the "*Jewish Newsletter*," April 15, 1957.

(170) For Israeli sources see "*The Arabs in Israel*" (published by the Government of Israel, 1955), pp. 11, 12; Walter Eytan: *The First Ten Years* (London, 1958), p. 114; J. Soetendorp (of Dutch as well as Israeli nationality): *Israël toetssteen van de vredeswil der Volkeren!* (Amsterdam, 1957), pp. 12, 13; for an example of further propagation of these arguments in Holland see F. Th. Witkamp: *The Refugee Problem in the Middle East* (R.E.M.P.—Research Group for European Migration Problems—Bulletin, January/March 1957, p. 11).

(171) Same sources as sub. 170. For Holland see also E. van Raalte: *Israël en zijn Buurstaten* (Internationale Spectator, 8 January 1956, pp. 64, 65, 66), and B. Raptchinsky: *De Arabische vluchtelingen* (Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, June 1957, p. 137).

menced.¹⁷² The alleged Arab policy of evacuation of the Palestine Arabs has never been documented in a tenable manner; whilst, on the other hand, imperative Arab warnings against evacuation are an established fact.¹⁷³

Only two testimonies cited in evidence of Arab responsibility are from authoritative persons and were used, for instance, by Eban in a speech before the General Assembly of the U.N.¹⁷⁴ It was found on investigation that by omission of its context the first of these testimonies—that of the Secretary of the Arab Higher Committee, Emile Ghoury—was given an altogether different meaning from what it had in this context.^{174a} The second—that of Archbishop George Hakim of Galilee—is based, according to a letter from

(172) The conclusion that the case of Haifa was an exception was confirmed by a statement of Nathan Chofshi: "The truth is that the only place where the Arabs were asked to remain was city of Haifa..." (*Jewish Newsletter*, February 9, 1959). For the circumstances invalidating these appeals compare the Zionist data on the Haifa story as given by Kimche: *op. cit.*, pp. 218-222; Sacher: *op. cit.*, pp. 239-244; Begin: *op. cit.*, p. 165; Koestler: *op. cit.*, pp. 207, 215, and Pearlman: *op. cit.*, pp. 116, 117 (whose manipulated photostatic copies of reports without signature, mentioning Jewish appeals to the Arabs to remain, are dated 26th and 28th April, 1948, that is, 5 and 7 days after the Arab mass flight had been brought about by Zionist action), with the Arab analysis by Walid Khalidy, "*The Fall of Haifa*" (*Middle East Forum*, Beirut, December 1959, pp. 22-32); the photostatic copy he gives of "*The Palestine Post*" of April 23, 1948, and the testimonies to which he refers in the "*Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*" of November 13 and December 18, 1953; July 15, 1956; August 14, September 11 and 18, 1959.

(173) According to *The Palestine Post* of April 27th, 1948, the Arab National Committee threatened to punish severely any one spreading reports leading residents of Jerusalem to leave. In the B.B.C. Monitor scripts between November 30, 1947, and June 30, 1948 (the crucial months), there is a reference (on April 26) to an evacuation of non-combatants out of the immediate focus of battle (Jaffa) as a temporary military measure; but there is not one single radio order or appeal to quit from any Arab station, inside or outside Palestine. While, on the other hand, there was a continuous Zionist radio campaign in Arabic trying to break Arab morale, Arab warnings against leaving were broadcast on March 29, April 4, 24, 25, and May 5, 13, 15. Archdeacon Maciness mentions a "very definite" Arab attempt to prevent people from leaving Musrara, and states: "I never found any evidence for the propaganda put out that the Arabs were ordered to leave by some higher authority" (*op. cit.*, p. 179).

(174) Eban: *op. cit.*, pp. 169, 170. These testimonies are also given by the Israeli Government in "*The Arabs in Israel*." Eban dates one of them, that of Emile Ghoury, September 15, 1948. The Israeli Government dates it September 6. The correct date, however, is August 6. Both testimonies were taken over by numerous Zionist and pro-Zionist writers. Thus in Holland van Raalte (*op. cit.*, p. 64) tried to demonstrate Arab responsibility with the quotation of "no less a person than Emile Ghoury," which quotation was not, however, taken from the original source, for he reproduces the wrong date given by the Israeli Government (the same applies for Soetendorp: *op. cit.*, p. 12); Witkamp (*op. cit.*, p. 8), out of "overwhelming proof that considerable pressure was exerted on the Arab population to evacuate Palestine," chose the quotation from Mgr. Hakim.

(174a) This testimony was taken from an interview with Emile Ghoury which appeared in the Beirut *Telegraph*, August 6, 1948, pp. 1 and 4.

the Archbishop himself,^{174b} on misconstruction and misuse of his words by the Israeli authorities. In this letter the Archbishop lays the responsibility for the Arab flight entirely upon Israel, on account of terror and deliberate expulsion.



A small minority of the Palestine Arabs remained behind in Israel. By means of special laws they were deprived of a large part of their land: "a case of wholesale robbery with a legal coating."¹⁷⁵ Once more in vain did protests from the Ihud rise against the treatment meted out also against this section of the Palestine Arab people, against the segregation into separate ghettos to which they had been subjected ever since the founding of the state, with the "special military laws... administrative arrests without warrant or trial... military court trials without the right of appeal... arbitrary deportations... collective fines imposed on Arab villages for crimes committed by one individual... in short, the system of second-class citizenship... which has reduced the erstwhile owners of the country into a group of humiliated, degraded, discriminated and persecuted human beings in constant fear of their conquerers—the Israeli master race."¹⁷⁶

Ben Gurion defended his maintenance of this status of the Arab minority by a reference to "an emotional bond" which he said they had with the neighbouring peoples.¹⁷⁷ Koestler's characterization of the emotional attitude of the

(174b) The letter from Archbishop Hakim was addressed to the Irish author Erskine B. Childers, and is made use of by the present writer with the permission of both the Archbishop and Mr. Childers.

(175) Moshe Keren, quoted in the *Jewish Newsletter*, July 8, 1957. See also Don Perez: *The Arab Minority in Israel* (*The Middle East Journal*, Spring 1954, pp. 143, 144), and *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*, p. 126.

(176) Nathan Chofshi, quoted in the *Jewish Newsletter*, February 4, 1957. There are Jews who realise that national security, brought forward as a justification for the discrimination against the Israeli Arabs, is all the more threatened by the feelings this discrimination engenders; that the resulting increase of Jewish suspicion against the Arabs can but perpetuate and even intensify the discrimination, and that Arab-Israeli relations in Israel have thus been caught in a vicious circle from which there seems to be no escape (see Leo Heiman: *op. cit.*, p. XVI).

(177) Quoted in the *Jewish Newsletter*, September 7, 1959. Ben Gurion's linking up of Israel's discrimination against its Arab minority with the absence of peace with Israel's neighbours, merely reveals another aspect of the vicious circle indicated above: the worse Israel's Arabs are treated, the more their "emotional bond" with Arab neighbouring states will be strengthened.

majority constitutes a reference to deeper motives: "Each Jew, Marxist or not, regarded himself as a member of the chosen race, and the Arab as his inferior."¹⁷⁸



When Israel was fully and firmly established, although still in conflict with its neighbours, the next phase of Zionist self-realization began. The state that had once been denied as an objective and that had seemed later on to be the final goal, was declared by Ben Gurion in 1948 to be: "not in itself an aim: it is a means to an end, the end of Zionism." Limited immigration and hence a sparse population "would not change the destiny of Jewry, or fulfil our historic covenant. Immigration in the myriads that only sovereignty allows, settlement upon a scale never before possible—these alone will justify it. It is without wit or profit to argue whether immigrants are to be counted in thousands or in hundreds of thousands: the duty of the State is to end Galuth (exile) at last."¹⁷⁹ Although the attending intensification of the Israelization of World Jewry by Israel and the Zionist organizations, and the resistance to this process from the side of anti-Zionist Jews on grounds of ethical considerations and existing national loyalties¹⁸⁰ are of far-reaching significance,

(178) Koestler: *op. cit.*, p. 34; see also Crossman: *op. cit.*, p. 151; and Elizabeth Monroe: "The Arab-Israeli Frontier" in *International Affairs*, October 1953, p. 444; cf. Herzl: *op. cit.*, II, p. 591 and *Zionistisches Handbuch*, p. 5.

(179) Ben Gurion: *op. cit.*, pp. 276, 277.

(180) The basic incompatibility of Jewish nationalism (political Zionism) with the position that Jews, like other religious communities, owe their national loyalty to the state of which they are citizens, is evident from the Zionist program, which requires as a duty of Zionists uncompromising support of the State of Israel, "ingathering of the exiles" and development among World Jewry of a "national" consciousness: the view that all Jews everywhere form one nation of which the State of Israel is the centre (Moses Lasky: "Between Truth and Repose," San Francisco, 1956, conclusion, facing p. 1).

The basic incompatibility of Jewish nationalism with the position that Judaism is an ethical-religious system manifests itself in the Israeli-Zionist attitude towards the Arab refugees and their right to return, on ground of Jewish national interest. Jews of high moral standing in Israel and the Diaspora "repeatedly warned that the Arab refugee problem was primarily a 'Jewish problem,' a problem of Jewish conscience and moral integrity. The Arabs have lost, by the emergence of the state of Israel, their homes, fields and country which, as history has shown, can be regained. But the Jews are in mortal danger of losing their souls and status as a people of justice and mercy which was their most precious possession for centuries" (William Zukerman in the *Jewish Newsletter*, November 30, 1959).

The greatest exponents of Jewish anti-Zionism are the Executive Vice-President of the (anti-Zionist) American Council for Judaism, Rabbi Elmer Berger (author of "The Jewish Dilemma," New York, 1946; "A Partisan History of Judaism," New York, 1951; "Who knows better must say so," New York, 1955; "Judaism or Jewish Nationalism," New York, 1957), and William Zukerman, Editor of the *Jewish Newsletter*.

they can only be touched upon in the present context. The inherent expansionism of the new state, particularly in regard to what was to become the Arab state according to the Partition Plan, found official expression, at the very moment when the state of Israel was established, in its Proclamation of Independence. Up to the present time a wrong translation into Western languages of the relevant passage in the original Hebrew text has concealed this fact from the eye of the outside world.¹⁸¹

After the armistices with the Arab neighbouring states in 1949 there followed new expansionist declarations which showed these states what they could expect in spite of the armistices. These declarations did not only emanate from the Herut—the parliamentary party into which the Irgun had transformed itself. According to statements by Prime Minister Ben Gurion in Israel's Government Yearbooks 1951 and 1952 the Jews were now in possession of only a portion of their territory,¹⁸² which, according to Yearbook 1955, "by no means derogates from the scope of historical Eretz Israel."¹⁸³

When Israel, in its so-called defensive Sinai offensive, had occupied the Sinai peninsula and reached the Suez Canal, Ben Gurion declared that the territory of the land of Egypt had not been violated by Israel's army.¹⁸⁴

After the campaign the Ihud issued a Resolution containing, among others, the following warning: "...we, and especially our Government, must stop using such irredentist expressions as 'liberation and redemption' with

(181) The passage under consideration concerns the economic union which, according to the U.N. Plan of Partition, was to be established for the whole of *Palestine* (my italics). Correctly translated, the passage reads: The State of Israel... will take steps to bring about the Economic Union over *the Land of Israel* (my italics) in its entirety. This means that in Israel's very Declaration of Independence the land of the independent Arab state-to-be (and of the City of Jerusalem that was to be internationalized) was represented—and implicitly claimed—as land of Israel. In Zionist and Israeli publications in Western languages the term "the Land of Israel" is currently used. Yet, in official and unofficial translations of the Proclamation of Independence, "the Land of Israel," in this crucial context, is systematically and wrongly rendered "Palestine."

(182) State of Israel. Government Yearbook 5712 (1951/52), pp. X, XXXIX (note, in the reprint in Ben Gurion's *Rebirth and Destiny of Israel* p. 434, the addition of the word "ancient" to the words "our territory" in the original text); Government Yearbook 5713 (1952), p. 15; cf. p. 13.

(183) Government Yearbook 5716/1955, p. 320.

(184) *Jewish Observer and Middle East Review*, November 16, 1956, p. 11. According to the excerpts from Ben Gurion's statement as supplied by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency he declared that the Sinai peninsula had been freed by the Israeli army (*The New York Times*, November 8, 1956).

respect to all those parts of Eretz Israel which are beyond the frontiers of the State of Israel.”¹⁸⁵



The Arabs saw in the Sinai campaign merely one more piece of evidence of the character of Israel. Notwithstanding Israel's show of military force, they proved in 1956 as they had done in 1948 the untenability of the standpoint which Zionism had taken from the commencement, that from a position of power it would be able to secure Arab acceptance.¹⁸⁶ Even the most powerless party in the conflict—the million exiles around Israel's borders—refuses to surrender its rights.

Inopportunity or insufficiency of military resources is being compensated by the Arabs according to the Zionist example. The system of boycott, indicated by Herzl and introduced into the Near East by his successors at the beginning of the present century as a means of ousting the Palestine Arabs as long as no concrete implements of power could be employed, is now being used by the Arab states in turn as a weapon against Israel.

In building up its state Zionism thus succeeded in creating a fact of power, but not an accepted and hence accomplished fact. The Arabs have long realized that any acceptance on their part would be merely an instrument in Zionist hands to pave the way for the next fact of power. Herzl wrote in his “Tagebücher” in regard to the states which he hoped to win over to the acceptance of Jewish settlement in their midst: “Eines der wichtigsten Zugeständnisse, das sie uns machen müssen, ist die Gestattung der Schutztruppen. Anfangs brauchen wir ihre Erlaubnis. Allmählich werden wir erstarcken, uns selbst alles gewähren, was wir brauchen, und allen Trotz bieten können.” (One of the most important concessions they have to grant us is the leave to have protective troops. In the beginning we shall need their permission. Gradually we shall become stronger, we shall grant ourselves everything we need and be able to defy everybody.)¹⁸⁷ There is evidence that

(185) Quoted in the *Jewish Newsletter*, December 10, 1956.

(186) The position as it remained throughout was characterized by the statement of Kurt Blumenfeld in 1921: “Mit unserer Stärke wird man sich versöhnen” (Our strength will make us acceptable) (Protokoll des XII. Zionisten Kongresses, p. 204). See also *Zionistisches Handbuch*, p. 162; Weizmann: *Trial*, p. 534; Ben Gurion: *op. cit.*, p. 123.

(187) Herzl: II, p. 78.

“was wir brauchen” (what we need) in the phase of Zionist self-realization which has now commenced, is not yet “alles” (everything).

The Truth about the Palestine problem lies in the succession of historical facts, in the chain of actions and reactions which created and continue to create these facts, and in the driving forces behind them.

This truth demonstrates that with the Arabs the driving forces did not spring from aggressiveness or innate hostility towards Jews, but from the elementary urge to self-preservation.

They were called forth as counterforces by a political Zionism which did not seek salvation in friendly cooperation but which, shunning no method expedient to its end, built up in the heart of the Arab world an exclusive, expansionist position of power which no other nation would willingly accept in its midst or at its frontiers; a Zionism that is alienating World Jewry from its environment and mobilizing it for new facts of power which will bring catastrophes in the Near East ever nearer; a Zionism which, while preaching peace, is by its very nature endangering peace more and more.

Herzl, too, presented Zionism as striving for peace.¹⁸⁸ But in answer to the possible objection that it would be better to do away with old frontiers than to set up new barriers between people, he said: “Die allgemeine Verbrüderung ist nicht einmal ein schöner Traum. Der Feind ist nötig für die höchsten Anstrengungen der Persönlichkeit.” (Universal brotherhood is not even a beautiful dream. The enemy is essential to the highest efforts of the personality.)¹⁸⁹

In this, too, Herzl’s postulate was realized. Israel has no lack of enemies. For a correct understanding of the further development of the Palestine problem, and for tackling it in a manner aiming at real peace, it is necessary to remember how Israel made these enemies.

(188) *Ibid.*, I, pp. 104, 148, 180.

(189) *Ibid.*, I, p. 101.

THE TRAGEDY OF PALESTINE
FROM THE BALFOUR DECLARATION TO TODAY*

by Anthony Nutting

Fifty years ago today His Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Rt. Hon. Arthur James Balfour, issued on behalf of Britain's wartime government the famous Declaration that was to bear his name: "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done to prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine."

Ladies and gentlemen, today, fifty tortured, bitter years afterwards, the national home for the Jewish people has become the national state of Israel and the civil rights of the Arabs of Palestine lie trampled under the heel of an Israeli army of occupation. Now, how has this happened, how has this seemingly great humanitarian gesture, the Balfour Declaration, turned so sour and left such a trail of bitterness and agony in its wake? And what are we going to do about it? Mr. President, I hope I may be forgiven if I take a little time this evening to review briefly the tragic sequence of events in Palestine which followed the Balfour Declaration and the establishment of the British mandate, because if we are to understand—still more to resolve—the current political crisis arising out of the Arab-Israeli war of last June, it is essential that we should recall just how this present impasse was reached.

First, we cannot forget—for if we forget no Arab will forget—that in 1915 Great Britain promised to Sheikh Hussein of Mecca that in return for the help of his Arab armies in the campaign against Turkey, Germany's ally

(*) Reprinted from "Issues" magazine. It was originally delivered as a public address preceding the twenty third Annual Conference of American Council for Judaism in New York City on November 2, 1967.

in World War I, all Palestine plus Iraq, Syria and Transjordan and the Arabian Peninsula would be free and independent once their Turkish rulers had been defeated. No sooner had this pledge been given and the Arab armies mobilized in response, in the common allied cause, than Great Britain and France got together and, in the infamous Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, agreed to parcel out Syria, Iraq and Transjordan between them as the spoils of war. Following upon this, to complete the double-cross, in November 1917, exactly 50 years ago today, Great Britain decided to take over Palestine as a strategic base from which to defend the Suez Canal under the humanitarian umbrella of the Balfour Declaration.

Ladies and gentlemen, small wonder that the Arabs felt betrayed by this cynical breach of the solemn pledges of independence which had been given to Sheikh Hussein and to the Arab peoples. But still, because of a touching faith in their erstwhile allies, they allowed themselves to be mollified by a further series of pledges and assurances. The national home, they were assured, would not be allowed to become a national state and the civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities—which, to say the least, was a quaint, if not a rather sinister, description of an overwhelming Arab majority—would be safeguarded. Therefore, the Arabs felt that perhaps, after all, the denial of the pledges of independence might only be temporary. When all was said and done the Arabs of Palestine did then number 92 per cent of the population and the Jews, only 8 per cent. And so, armed with these assurances, such Arab leaders as the Emir Feisal agreed to cooperate in the creation of a refuge for the Jewish people in Palestine from the persecutions of Europe.

After all, such cooperation was in full and total harmony with the traditional hospitality which the Arabs had extended down the centuries to the persecuted Jews of Europe, from the Spanish Inquisition right through to the progroms of Czarist Russia. The one people, the only people, in the whole so-called civilized world who had never persecuted Jews were the Arabs. In Palestine, even as late as 1948, so close was the relationship between Jew and Arab that each and every child born in the same week, whether Jewish or Arab, became automatically a foster brother and foster sister of the other. Ladies and gentlemen, I defy anybody to find a closer human relationship between two segments of the same race. Even the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem himself, who led the Arab rebellion from 1936 to 1939 against the Zionist

agents in Palestine, even the arch-enemy of Jewish settlement, Haj Amin al Husseini, had three Jewish foster brothers.

Thus, provided that the rights of the Arabs were not threatened, in all the circumstances and with all the history of Arab-Jewish cooperation, it seemed both natural and right, as the Emir Feisal had agreed with Dr. Chaim Weizmann in 1919, that "all necessary measures shall be taken to encourage Jewish immigration on a large scale and to settle Jewish immigrants upon the land." Alas, poor Feisal and his fellow Arab leaders, both inside and outside Palestine, did not reckon with the determination of the Zionist Movement to create, not a home, but a state and a state which, in the words of Dr. Weizmann, would be "as Jewish as Britain is British." Nor did Emir Feisal reckon with the weakness of successive British governments in the face of this determined Zionist pressure, a weakness which allowed the Jewish Agency to be established and to become a government within the Mandatory government of Palestine, while the Arabs were denied any effective say in the administration of their country whatsoever, a weakness which permitted the Zionist Agency to buy at knock-down prices land owned by Syrian and Lebanese landowners who were cut off from their properties by the international frontiers separating British from French mandated territories. That weakness also permitted the Zionist Agency to evict thousands of Arab tenant and farm workers to make way for Jewish settlers from Europe, compensating these tenants and workers at times with as little as ten dollars per family.

After nearly ten years of this treatment, Britain in 1930 at long last appeared to recognize the need to protect the rights of the Arabs by a closer control of Jewish immigration and by protection for the Arab peasants and tenant farmers. But it only required the threat of Dr. Weizmann to resign the presidency of the World Zionist Organization to force Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the British prime minister, to reverse his position and to revert to the policy of giving the Zionists a free hand in Palestine. Soon after this the rise of Hitler in Nazi Germany created a steep rise in Jewish immigration. The Jewish proportion of the population climbed from 8 per cent to 30 per cent. The Arabs protested that they were being squeezed out. And again for a brief moment the British government recognized their claims and offered a legislative assembly, to be elected by proportional representation, which would give the Arabs a majority vote— not much after the other Arab man-

dated territories under Britain, Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt, had become completely independent. But once again the British government was forced to back down in face of protests from the Zionists, who feared that a legislative assembly with an Arab majority would threaten their plans to create a national Jewish state in Palestine.

The Arabs, now driven to desperation, decided that armed rebellion was the only way to assert their rights. From 1936 to 1939 the rebellion continued, led by the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. The Arabs lost far more heavily in human lives and treasure than either the Jews or the British, but still they carried on the struggle. By 1939 the British government was finally driven to accept the fact that the Arabs had a case and that something must be done to make amends for the shameful way in which they had been betrayed and their rights had been ignored. A conference was called in London of all parties to the Palestine dispute and when, inevitably, no agreement was reached, the British government decided to impose a solution, the famous White Paper solution of 1939. Palestine, it was decided, after an interval of ten years was to be an independent, binational state with Arabs and Jews sharing in the government and insuring the essential interests of both communities. Immigration was to continue for five years at a predetermined rate of 15,000 a year after which any further immigration was to be by agreement with the Arabs. And the Arabs were to be protected against land purchase and land acquisition by the Zionist Agency.

This was by far the best, the wisest and the fairest solution yet contrived and had World War II not broken out a few months later it might have resolved the problem. But with Germany at her throat, Great Britain was no longer in a position to impose any solution on Palestine and by the end of the war Britain was too exhausted to cope any longer. The unspeakable atrocities of the gas chambers of Nazi Germany and of the occupied territories of Europe had turned the flow of Jewish migrants into Palestine into a flood totally beyond the capacity of Great Britain to control. In desperation, the British government handed its Mandate over Palestine back to the League of Nations' successor, the United Nations, to do their worst. Which is precisely what they did, by partitioning Palestine into six areas, three for the Jews and three for the Arabs—and incidentally, in a manner which gave to the Jewish areas all the best of the land and left the Arabs with the wilderness of Judea and the hills of northern Galilee.

Now from this moment when the United Nations passed this partition resolution, in November, 1947, until the departure of the British forces from Palestine in May 1948, when the Israeli state was formally established, the Zionists, aided by Irgun and the Stern gang, went to work; went to work to persuade the Arabs to leave the areas which were to form the Israeli state. To reinforce the argument that such Arabs would have no place in Israel, Irgun as some of you will remember, selected a few villages such as Deir Yassin to stage a massacre of the Arab inhabitants to create a general state of panic and hence an exodus of the Arab population. So that by May 1948, when Britain formally and finally abandoned her responsibility for Palestine, more than 300,000 Arabs had been evicted from their homes and farms and had become the first installment of that hapless, hopeless, homeless group of suffering humanity known today as the Palestine refugees.

Ladies and gentlemen, Zionist propaganda would have us believe that the Palestine refugees are the product of the Arab attack on Israel in 1948 and that they were ordered to flee from their homes by their own Arab leaders, who promised that they would be restored when the Arabs had liquidated the state of Israel. The truth is the exact opposite. Before the Arabs attacked in May 1948, the Arab refugees numbered over 300,000; they had been ordered—nay forced—to leave by the Zionists who had neither use nor room for them in the areas of Palestine allotted to the Israeli state. Thus it would be truer to say that the refugees were the cause of the first Arab-Israeli war and not the result.

Of course, when the Arabs subsequently lost the war, in 1949, the first war, and lost northern Galilee and much of the territory allotted to them under the partition plan, the number of refugees increased considerably; doubled in fact, by the exodus from the areas newly conquered by the Israeli army. But just as, last June, it did not require exhortation from their leaders—indeed last June, if you remember, the Arabs left the west bank of Jordan against the exhortation of their leaders who told them to stay, and yet 175,000 still left—just like last June, it did not require exhortation from their leaders to make them leave in 1948 and 1949. The Arabs left because they panicked, as civil populations do panic in war, as the army of the conquering hordes spreads across their land, as the French and the Belgians and the Dutch panicked in 1940; or because they were evicted to make way for Israeli settlement of the conquered territories. Suffice is to say that when the dust of battle had cleared, the Arabs were worse off than ever in terms of territory, nearly

700,000 of them dependent on their fellows from the other Arab states and the United Nations for a bare subsistence and denied the opportunity to return to lands which they and their ancestors had owned and worked for thirteen centuries of human history.

And as the humiliation at their defeat and at the injustice done to the Arabs of Palestine rose in the throats of all the Arab world, they cast about for an explanation: How had this come upon them? Britain, they reckoned, had taken Palestine in the first place, in violation of her pledges to the Arabs, for imperialist and strategic reasons to establish a base from which to exercise a dominant influence in and around the Arab world. There was too much truth in this theory for it to be easily dismissed. World War II, they reckoned, had exhausted Britain's resources and she was no longer able to sustain such a base for herself. So, she and her Western allies had introduced this alien, Western, European state of Israel to do for her and for them what she could no longer do for herself: to take over the garrison role which Britain no longer had the capacity to sustain; to act as a beachhead for British and Western purposes and designs upon the Arab world. These dark suspicions were tragically confirmed at Suez in 1956 when Britain and France, using Israel as their stalking-horse, invaded Egypt in a desperate attempt to seize control of the Suez Canal.

Ladies and gentlemen, so much for the background to this tragic conflict between the Arabs and Israel. The rest is too well known for me to need to repeat it tonight: the refusal of the Arab states to recognize the state of Israel and the refusal of Israel to repatriate the Palestine refugees; the continuation of the state of war and the denial of passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba and the long stalemate broken by the Suez episode in 1956, which we might call round two, and punctuated by raids and reprisals across Israel's borders—a long stalemate which lasted until June of this year.

What we have to do now, and what I ask you to do now with me, is to address ourselves to the present day and to examine what, if anything, can be done to bring about a just and honorable settlement.

Mr. President, to put it bluntly, we have a situation today in which Israel, after the third round in the bitter running conflict with the Arabs, bestrides not just the U.N. partition frontiers nor just the frontiers which she gained by conquest in 1949, but the whole of the former state of Pales-

tine, including the old city of Jerusalem, the third holy city in the Muslim world, together, for good measure, with the Sinai peninsula. And Israel, it appears, is determined to stay in these areas, even to introduce Jewish settlements into them, while, for her own part, she still refuses to acknowledge any debt to the Palestine refugees who paid the price and are still paying the price for what Europe did to the Jewish people—paying the debt which Europe owes to the persecuted Jews of the world, Israel has made great play with the refusal in the past years of the Arabs to recognize her existence. Likewise, she has claimed that the continued state of belligerency on the part of the Arabs constitutes a permanent threat to her existence. And she has complained bitterly about the refusal of the Arabs to allow her freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, which, as you remember, was the immediate cause of the outbreak of the war in June of this year.

But now the Arabs are prepared to concede all these demands, as has been evidenced by their endorsement of the Indian and Latin American resolutions before the United Nations Security Council. The Arabs will recognize more than that. They will respect the territorial integrity and political independence of the state of Israel. That is in the resolution. The Arabs will terminate the state of belligerency. That is in the resolution. And they will guarantee freedom of navigation through the international waterways in the area. That, too, is in the resolution if, in return, Israel will withdraw from the Arab territory which she seized last June and will contribute to a just settlement of the Arab refugees.

Mr. President, surely no impartial observer could find fault with such terms. Yet it seems that this is not enough for the state of Israel. From the latest utterances of Premier Eshkol it seems that, having pocketed these far-reaching and fundamental concessions from the Arabs which could give Israel all the security and peace that she seeks, Israel is not prepared to withdraw, still less to settle the Palestine refugees in their own homeland, and now demands individual negotiations with each individual, separate Arab state, and negotiations under the duress of Israeli occupation of that state's territory. Ladies and gentlemen, this is the doctrine of "divide and conquer" and these are conquerors' terms. If Israel persists in these terms, there will be no peace in the Middle East. Counsels of moderation such as Abdul Nasser was able to impose upon his colleagues in the recent Khartoum summit conference of Arab states will be rejected. The doves will have lost out and the hawks will

say "we told you so." And I don't have to tell you who the Arab hawks will be. And conflict will continue between the Arab states and Israel until a fourth or a fifth or a sixth round finally plunges the whole Middle East into a holocaust, when one or possibly both sides dispose of the nuclear weapon.

There is a dangerous tendency among many Arabs to equate the present situation with that of the Crusades. "It took us," I've heard this often said by Arabs, "It took us 200 years to get rid of the Crusaders. All right! If Israel will make no terms, if Israel will make no amends to the Palestine people, we will wait 200 years and we will get rid of them in the end as we got rid of the Crusaders, another alien state, another European incursion, another western beachhead upon our shores. We will get rid of it."

Ladies and gentlemen, this is dangerous talk because Saladin, who finally destroyed the Crusader state, fought Richard Cœur-de-Lion with swords and lances and not with atomic bombs, and yet this is the prospect for the Middle East in the fourth or the fifth or the sixth or some round, if nothing is done to bring a just and honorable settlement today.

Meanwhile, the relative calm on the West Bank of today which we hear about from the Zionists—how happy the Arabs are to be selling post-cards to all those nice tourists from Israel—this relative calm, ladies and gentlemen, is largely due to the state of shock of the inhabitants, and it will give way, all too soon, if nothing is done, to a state of guerrilla war in which the Israelis will be driven to use ever more brutal methods of suppression, just as the Germans and the Japanese and the Italians were forced to escalate their suppression of national resistance movements in occupied territories in World War II. I was in France in 1940 and I remember exactly the same feeling, the same atmosphere amongst the French people as I am told now exists on the West Bank of the Jordan. How pleased the French were to be out of the war! How thankful they were that the Germans, far from being terrible people, behaved so correctly! No women were raped, no babies were butchered. And yet, ladies and gentlemen, not many months afterwards, somebody lost his head and somebody else lost his temper and somebody started shooting and the Germans shot back. And by 1944, innocent men and women were being taken out and shot as hostages because somebody had blown a bridge five miles away.

I don't care who the occupying power is. These are the sort of bestialities to which occupation gets driven by national resistance movements such as will come on the West Bank of the Jordan, and in the Gaza Strip, so long as Israel struts and strides in those areas, insisting upon conqueror's terms. And it is surely inconceivable that sane men in Israel or anywhere else, however callous they may be to the sufferings of humanity, it is surely inconceivable that sane men could invite such a prospect upon themselves. It is surely inconceivable that the United Nations could permit such a disaster to be perpetrated. Yet if nothing is done, and if nothing is done now; if the United Nations fails to endorse the terms and the concessions offered by the Arab states for a settlement: recognition, termination of the state of belligerency and freedom of passage for Israeli shipping through Suez and Aqaba; and if Israel cannot be induced to accept and to honor these terms and to do, for her part, what is necessary to bring about a settlement—then, ladies and gentlemen, these disasters will happen as surely as we are sitting in this hall tonight, however much it may cost the Arab world.

There is an old Arab couplet by an unknown poet which demonstrates my argument far more eloquently than I could.

Let none be with us proud or overbearing,

For we can be more foolish and more daring.

And however foolish or foolhardy it may seem to some people, the Arabs will never abandon the cause of their dispossessed brothers of Palestine and will never accept that the land of Palestine shall remain as it is today under the occupation of an alien western state. Everything else, everything else—Aqaba, Suez, frontiers, Syrian Heights, Gaza Strip, even the city of Jerusalem—everything else is comparatively a side issue relative to this basic human issue of the people of Palestine. This is what this conflict is all about and this is the issue that has to be settled.

You and I know, ladies and gentlemen, that there is only one nation in the world today which can induce the Israelis to settle it, to accept the terms now offered by the Arabs, and to redress the wrongs done to the people of Palestine. There is only one nation that can do this and that is the United States of America. In 1956, when Israel had conquered far less territory than

today, after the Suez episode, the United States told her to withdraw. Britain and France objected; they had to: they had gone into the thing with Israel. They said: "These people are misunderstood, they've suffered a terrible injustice, they should not be asked to withdraw unconditionally." But the United States said, "Withdraw!" and so the Israelis withdrew. Today no such American pressures seem to be available and Israel is able, indeed encouraged, by this totally negative attitude in Washington to stand pat upon her conquests. And once again to the Arabs the Western world seems to be encouraging Israel to expand at the expense of the Arabs. Once again the suspicions of the Arabs are confirmed that Israel was created and is still being used as a Western outpost to dominate an Eastern race.

Through you therefore, ladies and gentlemen, tonight I would issue this appeal on this historic occasion, the fiftieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration. I would issue this appeal through you to the government of the United States. In the name of everything that you want to see created in the Middle East, stability, security and peace for all nations in the area, and in the interests of America's best relations with the Arab and the Muslim world, use your influence on Israel to accept an honorable and just peace such as is now within her grasp, such as the Arabs have now offered, and to work out through the United Nations the means by which such terms can be translated into effect.

Perhaps I might be permitted to add this further thought as to what sort of settlement might emerge for the future and I hope I shall not be thought too starry-eyed an idealist in what I have to propose. I think I've said enough of the dangers and the disasters that are implicit in the present stalemate. There is, however, one aspect of the situation, of this highly explosive and dangerous situation in the Middle East today, which might be turned to the account of a truly imaginative solution.

I have always felt, and many people who knew Palestine in the old days agree with me on this that, quite apart from the human problems that are involved, the human suffering of the people of Palestine, one of the worst results of creating a Western Zionist state in the Middle East was that, in doing so, we destroyed the state of Palestine by carving it into two or rather into six different parts. For the state of Palestine, notwithstanding all that happened in the 1920's and the 1930's, was by far the most cultured and educated state in the Arab world and had been so ever since the days of the

Ottoman Empire. Now, it just so happens that geographically Palestine has been reunited—by conquest and occupation, yes—but reunited, nonetheless. Is it too much to hope that such counsels of wisdom and imagination might prevail even at this late hour amongst Israel's leaders as would enable the state of Palestine to be recreated not just geographically but politically as a binational, multiracial state? Is it too much to ask that Israel should say openly, and mean it, that the Palestinian Arabs should share on equal terms with their Jewish cousins in the running of their country, insuring that the essential interests of each community are safeguarded and preserved?

Now, ladies and gentlemen, before any of you dismiss this idea as the ravings of a lunatic internationalist, which perhaps I may be, let me ask you what you would have thought in World War II if I had come to you and said that the answer to the problem of Europe was for France and Germany together to create a European community in which they would pool their economic resources and work toward the creation of a European political federation: You would have said, "He is a raving lunatic internationalist." And yet, ladies and gentlemen, twelve years after the war ended this is precisely what France and Germany did, and are doing today. Twelve years after the end of World War II! And France and Germany, after all, had a tradition of mutual enmity, jealousy and hatred which has never existed, could not exist, between Arab and Jew. Is it so impossible to create a binational state out of what are after all two segments of the same race?

Now it may be argued that this would fly in the face of all that Zionism stands for. But even before June fifth the Zionist dream of the state "as Jewish as Britain was British" had not been fulfilled. Even before June fifth Israel had an Arab residue of 300,000, the ones they couldn't evict, the ones who stuck it out, and stayed behind, which was about 15 per cent of the total population. And today Israel occupies an area with nearly a million-and-a-half Arab inhabitants in it; that is almost 40 per cent of the combined population, which scarcely accords with the old Zionist concept of a racially pure Jewish state in the Middle East. 40 per cent Arab! What would the old Zionists say? Thus, whatever final frontiers Israel might, in her present mood of intransigent euphoria be ready to settle for, there will always be, as there must, a sizeable Arab complement in that area.

But the smaller the area, the less physically able the Israelis will be to resettle Palestine refugees, and Palestine refugee resettlement lies at the

heart of any peace settlement with the Arabs. Only the whole of Palestine offers enough scope, given the rate of Jewish settlement both before and after the creation of Israel, and given the natural increase in the numbers of the Palestine refugees. Only the whole of Palestine offers enough scope for a solution of the Palestine refugee problem.

Therefore, I put it to you, if sufficient sanity could be brought to bear upon these issues, it seems that here we have a marriage of necessity and opportunity. The need to solve the problems of the Arabs of Palestine requires the reunification of Palestine and the opportunity to recreate a politically unified Palestine could be seized from the existing situation where Palestine has already been reunified, if only as a geographical entity. Likewise, in the creation of a binational state in Palestine lies the best hope of eradicating the suspicion of the Arabs that the sole aim of the West is to create a Western beachhead in the Middle East. The benefits which could flow from this are almost unbelievable and certainly infinite in number.

Yet no one could deny that such a bold step as the offer to recreate a binational state in Palestine would require a great act of faith on the part of all concerned. For the Jews to admit so large an Arab minority would require as much courage as for the Arabs to accept to live in a state with so great a Jewish majority. Clearly too, other problems such as the loss of the West Bank to the state of Jordan would also have to be resolved by some economic arrangement with the reconstituted state of Palestine. And there would probably have to be a cooling-off period to allow for tempers to subside, where perhaps the United Nations could help by taking the West Bank under some form of trusteeship until the final arrangements could be worked out to knit together the two parts of Palestine, Jewish and Arab. But if the Jewish people are to find any security in the Middle East then they must live with the Arabs and let the Arabs live with them. Apartheid, whether it is practiced in South Africa against the Bantu or in Israel against the Arabs is both as repugnant as it is ultimately impractical.

And however long it takes, and however much it costs, in human effort and financial outlay, it is imperative that a start should be made now along this road and that means the earliest possible initiative by the United States

of America with the government of Israel. Mr. President, the alternatives in human suffering and material destruction which a failure to act now could visit upon Jews and Arabs alike are too hideous to contemplate. Today on the fiftieth anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, the Middle East is poised as never before upon the edge of the most awesome precipice. Yet today the Arab world is ready as never before to play its part in settling with Israel on the basis of a just and honorable peace. This, therefore, is probably the best chance that has ever been offered to the peacemakers to end this tragic conflict. But let us be under no illusions: it may well be the last!

THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION: SOME COMMENTS ON THE FUTURE *

by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

It is difficult at this point, given the distortions and myopic visions to which we have become accustomed in the American environment, to present a somewhat accurate account of the confrontation between the Palestinian People and the European Jews over Palestine which constitutes the basis of the confrontation between the Arab people and the Israelis and their Euro-American supporters. To try to predict the future of that confrontation seems to be an act of madness. Yet it seems possible, on the basis of past experience, to delineate the salient features of the path which Arab-Israeli relations are likely to traverse. For in the final analysis that path will have been in part charted by the course which the two communities have taken in the past, by the configuration of ideological factors and the reality of the environment, and finally by the international forces in whose context the confrontation over Palestine was effected.

At the Twentieth Zionist Congress held in Zurich in 1937, Chaim Weizmann, the First President and one of the most venerated architects of the State of Israel stated "...There was no lack of understanding for it (the Jewish State) in the world at that time (1919), not even among the Arabs. At that time, the Emir Feisal was held to be able to speak for the Arabs but now it is the Mufti. With Feisal, who fully understood our aims, we were able to reach an agreement. In 1919 and 1920 there were other Arabs as well as Feisal with whom we could negotiate." Almost fifty years later, in November, 1967, the Organization of the Arab Students in the United States and Canada issued a press release which in part read as follows: "We regard any negotiations with the Israeli expansionists as an act of treason. We consider any Arab official—be it Hussein or Feisal, the Baath Party or Nasser, Boumedienne

(*) Text of the lecture delivered at the symposium on the Arab-Israeli conflict at McGill University, December 3, 1967.

or Aref—who enters into such negotiations, or makes any concessions, or gives recognition to the State of Israel, a traitor.”

I should like, before I stress the significance of the two contrasting statements, to remind you that the latter statement was made by an organization that comprehends in its membership thousands of individuals who have spent several years in the United States and Canada preparing themselves for positions of leadership in their *patriae* in the sciences, arts, and technology; furthermore, these individuals have had excellent opportunities to witness the growth and maturity of the State of Israel as well as the development of the Arab national community in its several locales; and finally, they have had full exposure to, and thereby infinite opportunities to observe at close range, the various persuasions and activities of Zionists in the U.S. and in Canada. Their statement must be assessed in the light of these factors and our prognosis of the future should in part be based upon the fact that some of these individuals will assume, upon their return, positions of political leadership in their *patriae*. For it is starkly clear that tomorrow’s Arab leaders—participating in the shaping of a future Arab society and implementing policies calculated to enhance the prosperity and capabilities of the Arab people—will be drawn from among their ranks. They have already indicated the kind of thought which governs their assessment of the encounter between the Arab people on the one hand and the Israelis and their Euro-American supporters on the other.

By juxtaposing the two statements of a Zionist leader and the potential leaders of the Arab national community, we are in a peculiar position to understand the essence of the tragic experience of the two communities with each other in recent times. It should be recalled that the two communities, the Arabs and the Jews, have been historically connected by the most basic bonds and organically linked with each other throughout history. By all natural and social laws, the ethnic solidarity, the religious affinities, and the physical and cultural contacts of the two communities should have led, by the twentieth century, to a most creative partnership between the two peoples for the prosperity and enrichment of both in a tranquil environment; a partnership that would have enhanced the capacity of both communities to make a modest contribution to a world order based on justice and liberty. Yet we all are too painfully aware that the relationship between these two communities has been anything but creative. In the twentieth century, the two communities faced each other with suspicion, extending to hostility and ultimately to military confrontation. We have not witnessed the end of the conflict; its end

may be accomplished by the physical destruction of one, or the other or perhaps both communities and in the process may envelop larger communities of the world. The question that springs to mind is what went wrong? Could it be rectified and thereby revert to the natural and social laws which would generate the necessary conditions for a creative partnership? Or are we doomed to witness the inexorable fate of military destruction to which we are becoming increasingly accustomed? To put it another way, is the chasm so wide that no bridge can be built between the two communities so that we can anticipate a more constructive future?

It is reasonably difficult to foretell the future. But it is certain that an adequate appreciation of the path which the Arab-Israeli confrontation is likely to traverse must depend on a dispassionate and objective assessment of the forces and issues which have brought about the present disarray. It is to these that one must turn for a beginning in wisdom.

Up to very recent times, the conflict with which we are presently concerned used to be known as the Palestine Conflict, yet at present it is referred to as the Arab-Israeli Conflict. The change in the designation itself is significant for it reveals the extent to which the conflict has been generalised and extended, thereby involving greater numbers of people in territories transcending the original home of the conflict. Therefore, let us examine the nature of the original conflict and try to isolate the factors which have given rise to the wider one.

At the core of the Palestine conflict were two conceptions of reality that were diametrically opposed to each other and were bound, if not dealt with constructively and imaginatively, to clash and lead to a collision. On the one hand, we were informed, and there is abundant literature on that subject, that there was a peculiar European phenomena, within the European setting, with distinctive European flavor, that received the designation of the Jewish Problem. Whatever the nature and significance of that problem may have been, we were informed by the Zionist diagnosticians of that problem, that because of the "peculiarity" of the Jewish people or because of the "peculiarity" of the Gentile environment that has been the home of the majority of the Jews of the world, an environment that was peculiarly incapable of absorbing its citizens of Jewish Faith fully and according them full rights and privileges of that citizenship, there has grown a problem whose solution cannot be effected within that environment. Accordingly, the only solution

is the reconstitution of the Jewish people, who up to that time had lived between inverted commas, in a specific territorial confine. By doing so they would be elevated to the ranks of ordinary people. Hence the imperative need of the moment was to locate an appropriate territory that would become the habitat of Jews and Jews only. Should this become a reality, then the so-called "Jewish problem" would have found a solution, for the Jewish people would become a Jewish nation in the proper sense of the term.

Posing that problem in that form, a logical solution offered itself to the Zionists. The task awaiting the Zionist movement became that of locating a territory which could be obtained and to which Jews would be exported from the various countries of the world in which they found themselves at that peculiar moment. Thus their efforts were directed towards the land. Initially, the Zionists were not firm in their need for a particular area; what they, or a significant number of them, wanted was simply *any* land that could be obtained. Even the ardent articulator of the Zionist Movement, Theodore Herzl, maintained, up to the First Zionist Congress in 1897, that any territory would do just as well. His early efforts towards the attainment of the territory had no particular focus; it was in the context of that ambiguity that Herzl entertained such a possible site as Uganda.

Yet the reluctance of the Zionists to pin down their desire for a specific territory, finally gave way in 1897, when the First Zionist Congress met in Basle and debated the issue at length; by majority vote the Zionist Congress adopted a resolution to the effect that the reconstitution of the Jewish nation should be effected in Palestine, a territory which then, as much later on, was already inhabited by the Arabs. But the reconstitution of the Jewish nation in a territory that was already inhabited posed serious problems of a moral as well as of a physical nature. For one thing, it implied, at best, that the people of Palestine would have of necessity to be subordinated to its would-be Jewish colonizers and at worst they would have to be excised from the territory to make room for the newcomers. In other words, the people of Palestine would have to be condemned to death to be replaced by Jewish immigrants who would eventually pour in. This was quite clear then as now to all who were concerned with the question.

To surmount the moral scruples of the conscientious objectors, who were likely to object to the implementation of the death verdict on a people whom they had never seen nor been harmed by in any way, the Zionists provided an

ingenious answer which lies at the root of the conflict. Again we may quote Mr. Weizmann's conception of the problem; summing up the early history of Zionism, he observed that Zionists thought in purely mechanical terms and for them the problem was not only simple, but was conceived in the following fashion: "There is a country which happens to be called Palestine, a country *without* a people, and on the other hand there exists the Jewish People and it as no country. What else is necessary, then, than to fit the gem into the ring, to unite this people with this country?" For several years in the early part of this century, the Zionists attempted, with some measure of success, to formulate the problem in this fashion and to so inform the world at large. The logical conclusion to be drawn from this simple formulation was obvious: the need of the moment was to generate pressure on the important powers so that they could, in turn, pressure the government of the Ottoman Empire to grant them a concession to settle the empty land of Palestine and make its deserts bloom.

Increasingly of course this farce became obvious and untenable. Even in an era of pronounced prejudices and poor communication there was more information about Palestine than the Zionists were willing to confront. And a certain modification in their presentation of the issue became increasingly evident. For upon the startling discovery that Palestine was a prosperous country, measured by the standards of the day, and that its population was extensive and carried out its tasks of cultivating the soil in relative peace and made its contribution to the development of the Arab community at large, certain defections from the Zionist movement took place and increasingly there appeared certain groups who had sympathized with the Jewish plight but could not use this sympathy to inflict a greater plight on an innocent population elsewhere. The major component of the Zionist movement, however, could not be dissuaded by the sentimentality of such weaklings. That component decided as an alternative to meet the problem headlong, confess to the existence of an extensive population in Palestine which would be seriously and adversely affected if the Zionists were to achieve their ambition but give it a meaning other than a conventional one. Their strategy, once their farce was discovered for what it was, called upon them to invent a euphemism which would assuage the liberal conscience of the conscientious objectors and thereby enable the Zionists to carry out their scheme in any case; hence, they had recourse to the term "inhabitant" to designate the existing population of Palestine. Increasingly the Zionists resorted to this term to indicate that they knew that

there were people in Palestine, but that these people in fact were subnormal, for they lacked any national identity and lacked all the rudiments of civilization which would have elevated their status in the eyes of the potential supporters of Zionism. That this strategy succeeded immensely in influencing the mode of thought of the Europeans of the first part of the century is borne out by the infamous declaration issued by the British Government in support of the Zionist movement. For it will be recalled that the Balfour Declaration of 1917, which in part reflected the commitment of the British Government to support the establishment of a Jewish Homeland in Palestine, avoided scrupulously any mention of the type of people who would be adversely affected by the implementation of that declaration. That declaration did not see fit to dignify the people of Palestine with any designation. It simply referred to them as "inhabitants" and went on to say that their religious and civil rights should not be prejudiced by the implementation of the British policy to reconstitute the Jewish nation. The implication was quite clear to all: if these people of Palestine lacked any identity, by the European standards of the time, which were fully "racial," then they were not *real* people. Their ultimate destruction should not evoke the same kind of response which is reserved for civilized people.

By depriving the people of Palestine of their real identity as part and parcel of the larger Arab family, the Zionists scored an initial success that was to play an important part in determining the strategy for the second assault on the identity and personality of the Palestinian people. For no sooner had the term inhabitant been adopted than another, and equally sinister expression gained further currency. Those of us who are familiar with the literature in European languages on Palestine are impressed by the specific designation of the inhabitants once they needed a label. The Zionists and their European supporters resorted to the term Beduins to designate the "inhabitants" of Palestine. Again the problem was posed in simple terms so that the reluctant members of the European community would rally to the support of the Zionists to carry out their projected scheme. For it became increasingly evident to these potential supporters, whether in Government or in the private sector, that indeed the inhabitants of Palestine would be affected by the increasing European Jewish migration to Palestine which eventually would bring about the establishment of the Jewish homeland, but that effect would be altogether beneficial to those inhabitants. Since they were no more than a bunch of roving nomads, pillaging the fertile soil of Palestine and bringing about in-

creasing devastation to that beautiful land, the European coming to Palestine would indeed be a blessing. For that European was the carrier of a superior civilization, the master of European technology and was in a position to bestow the blessings of that civilization on the nomadic inhabitants of Palestine. For the ordinary untutored European of the time, the Zionist dream and ambition would have been nothing more than his own support of Europe's colonial expansion under the guise of "mission civilisatrice."

The Zionist accomplishment by the use of various euphemisms can be summed up briefly; first, they appealed to the ignorance and/or racial prejudice of Europe and impressed upon the potential supporters of Zionism, whether Jewish or Christian, that the attainment of the Zionist dream would in no way affect adversely anyone. But once this was discovered to be a farce, then they admitted the existence of a people but denigrated their identity, achievements, and aspiration and presented the realization of the Zionist dream as a factor that would improve immeasurably the conditions of the inhabitants of the people of Palestine. The Balfour Declaration itself spoke solemnly of the "religious" and "civil" rights of these people but also assumed that the actualization of the Jewish homeland not only would not conflict with these rights but would in fact contribute to their viability and strength. Yet despite the potential and projected environmental improvement which might occur as a result of the Jewish migration to Palestine under the aegis of the Zionists and British, it was quite explicit from the beginning that the ultimate objective of the Zionist movement was to create a State for the Jews in which the "inhabitants" of Palestine would play a subordinate, if any, role. This was indeed the import of the Zionist strategy to deny the existence first and then to denigrate the identity of the "inhabitants" of Palestine.

The strategy of the Zionists worked and worked so well that those who were to be most affected by the Zionist assault on Palestine were totally oblivious of the subtle implications of the Zionist argument and presentation of the issue. It was only in this context that the old Arab leadership was willing to negotiate with the Zionists in Paris. It was this atmosphere of ambiguity which was most tantalizing to Weizmann. So long as the situation was sufficiently ambiguous and so long as those who were condemned to death by the Zionists were unaware of the death verdict, it was feasible for the aggressor and the intended victims to negotiate. But once the victim became aware of what awaited him, he refused to collaborate with his hangman and all discussion came to an abrupt end.

There was, however, a second side to the ambiguity and fluidity of the Zionist dream which might account also for Feisal's willingness to negotiate with Weizmann and the refusal of all subsequent Palestinian and ultimately Arab leaders to negotiate. Granted that the Zionist dream was founded on the premise that the persecuted Jew needed a place where he no longer need feel alien; once that place was defined as Palestine, the next question became obvious. What constituted Palestine? Where did its frontiers lie? What would happen to the people of Palestine?

Up to the present, it has been reasonably impossible to define the exact territorial aspirations of the Zionist movement and its reality in Israel. While at Basle, the Zionists spoke of Palestine; yet, before and after Basle, the Zionists continued to speak of Palestine and Eretz Israel. Are the two synonymous? Are they coterminous? Or does one include the other? Should we be able to answer this question, we would be in a superior position to predict with much accuracy the possible path of Arab-Israeli relations.

Nowhere in the official pronouncements of the Zionist movement or of the Israeli government do we get a statement indicating the territorial ambitions of either. Thus we must search the records which might give a clue and construct the process by which the territorial ambitions becomes a reality. For that purpose we would do very well if we examined the map which the Zionists submitted to the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, a map which by the definition of the Zionists represented the "minimum" aspiration necessary for the reconstitution of the Jewish nation. That map as is well known includes territories that transcend the geographic confines of Palestine of the traditional geographers. For it includes, for reasons known only to the Zionist experts of the period, historic Palestine, Southern Lebanon up to the Litani river, Southern Syria including the sources of the River Jordan, territories on the East bank of the River Jordan which would run parallel to the river and traversing the capital Amman, as well as portions of Sinai, traditionally part of Egypt. Generously, the Zionists were willing in 1919 to acquiesce to a Palestine in which they could reconstruct the historic Jewish Nation—one that excluded those portions of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and Egypt that were included in their "minimum" plan.

Subsequent events were to demonstrate beyond any doubt that their territorial ambition was not to be abandoned. They accepted the constricted definition of Palestine as a tactical measure to gain time and flexibility without

abandoning their ultimate objective. The progression of expansion is simply a reaffirmation of their original intent, and so should it be viewed.

Whatever the territorial ambition the Zionists dreamed of may have been, there was another side to the ambiguity of the aspiration that gained clarity with the passing of time, namely the nature of the transformation of the territory of Palestine under Zionist control. Initially and from all accounts, the Zionist aspiration was simply for the reconstitution of a Jewish homeland. But what did that mean? Did it mean a place where Jews could practice their faith without the interference of the ghastly Gentiles? Did it mean a place where the Jews could give rise to a specifically Jewish Culture undiluted by the germs of a Gentile environment? Where the culture would be based upon a Hebrew language and creativity? And, finally, did it mean a State with all the accoutrements of Statehood? It is easy now to dismiss the question on the basis of the rewriting of history and of *a posteriori* facts. But let us remember that the Zionists themselves agonised—if they are capable of any agony—over the nature of their aspiration. Initially, they desired a homeland, whatever the term meant. It seems they either were unclear in their own minds, or they were deliberate in their vagueness to give a concrete meaning to that Homeland. Not until 1936 did the major stream of Zionism express its unalterable belief in the necessity of the establishment of a Jewish State; and only then did they state clearly that the Jewish State was what they had been after from the beginning. That this was the stated ambition of a minority within the ranks of the Zionists was obvious from the beginning. But this minority was dismissed as representing the lunatic fringe of the movement. The traditional division between so-called moderates and extremists was not only concerned with the means of the establishment of the Jewish homeland, but was more intimately connected with the precise definition of the territorial confines within which that homeland was to be realized as well as the exact meaning of the Homeland. Historically speaking, the Moderates succeeded, while being constantly attacked by the Extremists, in attaining a concession—whether it was in the form of the Balfour Declaration, or the Peel Plan or the Partition Plan of the United Nations—but no sooner had the Moderates' maximum demand been met, than they moved and adopted the Extremists' demand for more; simultaneously, the Extremists enlarged their own. No better illustration of the dynamic of the movement can be found than a comparison between what was acceptable to each faction at each specific point in time. Weizmann moved from an acceptance of the Homeland prin-

ciple, to the State; from a certain number of Jewish migrants to an extreme view while retaining the label "moderate" to the bitter end. Jabotinsky, on the other hand, remained an Extremist to be succeeded by Begin, by Allon and Dayan. What happened in fact is that Weizmann and Ben Gurion gradually realized the aspiration of Jabotinsky whose program was in turn expanded to become the program of Begin *et al.*

The clarification that was so badly needed from Zionism began to assume concrete shape in the mid-thirties. That clarification became obvious in terms of the objectives of Zionism and in terms of the means by which Zionism was to attain those objectives. It was only in that period that the world was to become aware of the true nature of Zionism and its aspirations. In so far as the Arabs were concerned, especially the People of Palestine, that clarification simply confirmed their worst fears.

The clarification involved a number of related items. First, it became clear that the Zionists wanted to establish a Jewish State in Palestine, that was as Jewish as England was English (a phrase recently used anew by Mr. Dayan to lay the confusion of the world at rest). What that meant, then as now, was that the projected State, which the Zionists wished to call Israel, would be *free* of non-Jewish elements so that it could qualify for the designation of being as Jewish as England was English. Second, while the Zionists continued to debate the absorptive capacity of Palestine, Weizmann himself confessed that *his* hope was pinned on a population of six million people, at a time when the entire Jewish population of Palestine was no more than 350,000. He added however, that since he was aware of the physical laws involved he knew that Palestine could not absorb more than two million Jews and accordingly he would guarantee the ultimate establishment of the State of Israel as that State was conceived by its advocates. Accordingly, Weizmann called upon, and obtained the approval of, the Zionist Congress of 1937 to accept the Peel Commission's proposals for the partition of Palestine on the grounds that it brought the dream of the Zionists closer to achievement. He stated that "The choice lies between a Jewish minority in the whole of Palestine (since the Arabs were in the majority at the time) or a compact Jewish State in a part, which would offer a basis for genuine growth of Jewish life... in quality and in *volume*... The point here is not to calculate in percentage what part of *Eretz Israel* is being offered to us. We can all count. But our task is to forecast the answer which life will give..." Aware of the difficulties and problems that lay ahead, and knowing fully that what he was recommending

was simply expedient and would be used as a point of departure, he reminded the Zionist Congress that Eretz Israel would eventually be established: "...a time will come when there shall be neither *enemies* nor *frontiers*, when war shall be no more... Then Eretz Israel will be ours." The statement is quite clear in its expression. What the *moderate* leader of Zionism in those days wished the world to know was that Zionists were willing to accept less than Eretz Israel (again undefined explicitly) on the assumption that the smaller portion would provide the basis for the actualization of the latter. What the latter entailed was simply the obliteration of all frontiers which obstructed Eretz Israel and the physical destruction of the enemy who would interfere with the Jewish character of Eretz Israel.

To the Arabs this was as clear a demand as could be presented. What they were asked to do in those days, as in our own, was to negotiate their exit from the area of Eretz Israel, voluntarily; should they fail to do so, the future would see to it that they would be evicted from those territories to make room for Eretz Israel. Need we wonder why the Palestine leadership of 1937, as well as of 1967, shied away from accepting the fate envisaged for them by the Zionists?

A slightly better fate awaited the Arab people of Palestine at the hands of the "extremist" Jabotinsky. Whereas Weizmann's statement disguises some of the important issues, Jabotinsky was much more explicit in his "reasonable" demands. Testifying before the Peel Commission in 1936, he stated:

"I am going to make a 'terrible' confession. Our demand for a Jewish majority is not our maximum—it is our minimum: it is just an inevitable stage if only we are allowed to go on salvaging our people. The point when the Jews will reach a majority in that country will not be the point of saturation yet—because with 1,000,000 more Jews in Palestine today you could already have a Jewish majority, but there are certainly 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 in the East who are virtually knocking at the door asking for admission, i.e. for salvation."

"I have the profoundest feeling for the Arab case, in so far as that Arab case is not exaggerated. This Commission has already been able to make up its mind as to whether there is any individual hardship to the Arabs of Palestine as men, deriving from the Jewish colonization. We maintain unanimously that the economic position of the Palestinian Arabs, under the Jewish colonization and owing to the

Jewish colonization, has become the object of envy in all the surrounding Arab countries, so that the Arabs from those countries show a clear tendency to immigrate into Palestine. I have also shown to you already that, in our submission, there is no question of ousting the Arabs. On the contrary, the idea is that Palestine on both sides of the Jordan should hold the Arabs, their progeny, *and* many millions of Jews. What I do not deny is that in that process the Arabs of Palestine will necessarily become a minority in the country of Palestine. What I do deny is that *that* is a hardship. It is not a hardship on any race, any nation, possessing so many National States now and so many more National States in the future. One fraction, one branch of that race, and not a big one, will have to live in someone else's State: Well, that is the case with all the mightiest nations of the world. I could hardly mention one of the big nations, having their States, mighty and powerful, who had not one branch living in someone else's State."

From this explicit statement, three obvious facts were spelled out: first, that Palestine, the site of the projected Jewish State, included historic Palestine as well as Jordan in its entirety; second, that the population of that State was to exceed anything then contemplated; and, finally, that the Arab people of Palestine and Jordan should voluntarily accept their subordination to the Jewish citizens of the projected State—but as we shall point out shortly, even this subordination was merely a euphemism for their excision from the land. This was stated at a time when the total Jewish population of Palestine was in the vicinity of 350,000 while the Arab people of Palestine and Jordan numbered close to 1,500,000. Both Jabotinsky and Weizmann were then calling upon the World community to assist them in their endeavour to obliterate the people of Palestine and also called upon the Arabs to collaborate with the Zionists in their attempt.

By the mid-thirties, both parties were quite aware of the gulf that separated them. A people who had been on the land since time immemorial were being asked, first gently, and later on by the systematic use of coercion, to give way to an alien European community, assisted by forces of imperialism, to be planted systematically in the land; they were further informed by the facts of social existence that they could not survive in the midst of this alien European community as a dignified minority. For this dignified survival was negated in the most starkly clear terms by another aspect of the Zionist program and ideology. For it will be recalled that one of the most fundamental

aspects of Zionism is its basis in Jewishness. As a nationalist movement, it was based solely on the religious affirmation of the potential adherent or supporter. Zionism formulated an exclusive doctrine which was to set a peculiar group of individuals apart from all others. Whatever social or economic or humanitarian programs the Zionist movement entailed they were applicable exclusively to Jewish individuals. The possibility of brotherhood, or coexistence with other men of different religious beliefs was excluded by Zionism's theoretical premises. Hence the possibility that the European Jew could coexist with the Palestinian Arab in the Holy Land was negated from the very beginning by all Zionist spokesmen, with the possible exception of Rabbi Magnes whose call for coexistence with the Arabs was decisively negated and denounced by his religious kinsmen.

Zionists may occasionally argue that this interpretation which stresses the racist elements in Zionism, its exclusiveness, is perhaps a mistaken one. But the facts of Jewish colonization in Palestine and the practices of the Zionist colonizers are a good reflection of their theoretical premises. Those of us who are familiar with Zionist patterns of life in Palestine prior to 1948 are fully aware of what Zionist colonization entailed. For by its very nature, Zionism imposed a type of social and economic existence that was exclusivist to the highest degree. It will be recalled, for example, that the Jewish Federation of Labor, the Histadrut, was based on the religious principle. No Moslem or Christian member of the proletariat was eligible for membership nor was he ever admitted into the ranks of a presumably labor federation. That organization thought of itself as an instrument of Zionism whose principal objective was to advance the cause of *Jewish* colonization in Palestine, not the cause of the working classes of Palestine. The same was true of Zionist agricultural and industrial organizations. It will also be recalled that no sooner had the Zionist purchased a piece of arable land, which had been cultivated by Arab farmers for generations, than these were expelled from that land. Numerous regulations issued by the Jewish National Fund and other Zionist organizations prohibited the employment of these farmers on Jewish owned lands. And the Histadrut saw to it that no Jewish industrial enterprise employed Arab labor during the period of the Mandate.

These exclusivist practices were studied ones; although the original Jewish colonizers had professed a socialist belief in an earlier period, their socialism turned out to be a national one. What the Zionists desired to establish in Palestine—regardless of the defined frontiers of that land—was a socialist

system of production that was geared towards the support of a nationalist, racist, exclusivist State. Over the years, it became evident even to those broad-minded and sympathetic elements in the population, that within the Zionist framework there was no possibility for an Arab-Jewish cooperative arrangement. What the Zionists aspired to was the establishment of a racist State that was as Jewish as England was English. This determined effort on the part of the Zionist colonizers in Palestine led from the very beginning to a systematic expulsion of the people from areas that came under Jewish control. Increasingly, the Arab peasantry became pauperised and over the years the urban population began to feel the adverse effect of increasing Jewish migration and colonization in Palestine. The process of excision was evident from the very beginning.

Yet the Arab people of Palestine responded, in an attempt to bridge the gulf that was bound to separate these kindred people, in the idiom of the time. Prior to the implementation of the British Mandate over Palestine, the Palestinians advanced their claim to self-government and pressed for ultimate independence. In all programs advanced by the leadership of Palestine, two principles were always evident. In the first place, Palestine should become independent, with equal and full rights for all its inhabitants regardless of religion, national origin or ethnic extraction. The second principle was the establishment of a democratic system of government in which the principle of "one man one vote" was the dominant principle of organizing the State. And as a consequence of this, the affairs of Palestine and its development would be the exclusive concern of Palestine and its inhabitants, not alien Europeans resident in London, Paris, or New York.

As we all know, the Palestinian demand for independence was decisively rebuffed by Great Britain which had committed itself almost till the end of the Mandate, to assist the Zionists in their attempt to establish a racist State in Palestine. Responding to this rebuff and Zionist success in forcibly transforming the demographic structure of the land and gradual establishment of a nucleus State within Palestine, the Palestinians staged various national revolutions. From 1924 till 1948, Palestine witnessed no less than six major revolutions by the People of Palestine against their foreign conquerors and colonizers.

The Palestinians knew full well that their chances for success were indeed minimal. The Zionists were allied to Great Britain, then the world's mightiest power. The scale of power was tipped too heavily on one side, and while

the Palestinians could cause troubles, they could not possibly succeed in their endeavour to translate to reality the dream of setting up a democratic system of State and government in Palestine. The outcome of the confrontation between the Arab people of Palestine and the Zionist-British axis was foredoomed: allied with Great Britain, later on with the United States which displaced Great Britain as the major supporter of Zionism, the Zionists obtained a sanction for their colonial effort from the United Nations in November, 1947, and proceeded to translate their Program into reality. No sooner had the United Nations voted for the Partition of Palestine, than a major civil war ensued between the two communities of Palestine. Between November, 1947, and May, 1948, the people of Palestine staged a desperate effort to let justice prevail in the Holy Land. But as in earlier struggles they were defeated by the European Jews and by May, 1948, the major Arab population of Palestine had been evicted from its land—as in earlier, more peaceful eras when they were evicted as a result of land transfer—to make room for newer waves of Jewish migration.

Increasing Jewish migration, coupled with the extension of territory that became *de facto* part of the State of Israel and the total collapse of the Palestinian resistance brought the Israelis face to face, for the first time in the confrontation over Palestine, with the neighboring Arab community. The inconclusive war between May and June resulted in direct hostile action against other Arabs in order to widen the territory of Israel and to revamp the United Nations decision to partition Palestine so as the new State would have more viable frontiers.

By the summer of 1948, Israel was a State in which Jews constituted the major part of the population. It was at this point that the new State exercised its option; it seems to me that the options then were quite open to it: on the one hand, it could have chosen the path of peace, reassured its neighbors that it had no further territorial ambitions, and recognized the injustice it had done to the people of Palestine and dealt with them accordingly. While officially the State accepted the *de facto* frontiers, various spokesmen of the State indicated repeatedly that these were not the ultimate ones. An expansion was necessary which would enable the State to ingather more of the Jews of the world. Second, the State refused to acknowledge that it had committed the basic injustice against the people of Palestine which the world, expressing its sentiment through the United Nations, had acknowledged and finally, for

purposes of internal Israeli politics, the Government came to the conclusion that a policy of war with the Arabs was a necessity so that the international community and particularly the Jewish community would rally behind Israel, financially as well as morally. Accordingly Israel opted for a policy of war against the Arab people in general.

The next phase in the confrontation witnessed a further deterioration in the relations between Arabs and Israelis. Caught as they were in the midst of their own struggle to free their countries from the last vestiges of European colonialism, the Arab States had to contend with the threat of a new European colonial power planted in their midst. It so happened, as in an earlier period, that the Israelis succeeded in forging a community of interests with the old colonial powers which were then on the defensive in the Arab world. It became increasingly difficult, from then on, to deal with the Palestine Conflict outside the context of the cold war. And within that framework, Israel forged an implicit alliance first with France, which became Israel's major supplier of arms and other material and later on with the United States, whose principal purpose was to retard the development of the Arab national community, destroy the new liberal trends in the area and thus enable Israel to expand into the adjacent Arab territories. Over the years, it became evident to the Arab people, just as it was evident to the Arab people of Palestine before, that Israel was not only a racist exclusivist State but one which was happy to act as an instrument of world imperialism. The identity of policies adopted by Israel in the fifties with those of the major Western powers need not detain us at this point. Increasingly, the Arab people forged an identity with the people of the Third World while Israel forged one with imperialism. A newer type of confrontation was thus effected, in which the chances of Arab success to withstand the combined offensive were quite minimal.

Now this development, namely the close working relationship between Israel and the Western powers, was not a capricious development. The Israelis are calculating people and the totally hostile policy which they adopted *vis-à-vis* the Arabs was not accidental. Had they wanted peace in the fifties, the price was minimal; all they had to do then was to accept the United Nations' resolutions on Palestine. Instead, however, they allied themselves with France, then with England and France to launch the infamous attack in 1956 on Egypt and then to effect a new alliance with the United States and launch another attack on the Arabs in 1967. While the 1956 aggression paid them

certain dividends, it demonstrated beyond any doubt that their interest in peace was minimal. What they were, and still are, interested in is concessions from the Arab States, further territorial aggrandizement, and complete ratification on the part of the Arabs of the death penalty which the Israelis have passed on the people of Palestine. To the Arabs, the 1956 attack reflected the colossal danger to the entire Arab community from that small enclave of European Jews acting in collusion with World Imperialism.

The more recent attack on the Arab States, assisted and abetted by the United States, represents simply another phase in the Zionist Program in which Weizmann's prophetic statement would be realized. For, by Zionist calculation, it was time for the new State to expand so as to be ready to absorb fresher waves of migrants, to deal with its serious economic problems and to fuse further the identity of Jew and Zionist. Their success in the attack on the Arabs not only resulted in the further absorption of territory, but at the same time resulted in a further eviction of people from Palestine proper as well as from territories that traditionally were outside the traditional frontiers of Palestine (100,000 from Syria). Over the past few months we have been entertained by Israelis and their agents ceaselessly as to the legitimate right of the Israelis to this or that piece of newly conquered territory. At the same time, Israel has given every indication that it will not withdraw from these territories, regardless of the pressure being exercised by the world community outside the Western powers. And should any withdrawal be effected, it will be so only as a result of direct negotiation between her and the Arab States. Now as far as we know, not a single power—not even the United States—and certainly no Arab State has sanctioned this Israeli territorial aggrandizement. The question which could be posed at this point is this: Would Israel be satisfied with any bilateral negotiation even if it led to some kind of peaceful arrangements? My answer to this question, on the basis of past Israeli practices, Zionist ideology, and aspiration, is rather negative. The history of the Zionist movement, the flexibility and elasticity of its demands and its symbiotic dependence on the powers of imperialism and capitalism lead me to conclude that the Israelis are no more interested today than they were twenty years ago in reaching a peaceful settlement with their Arab neighbors. What they are seeking today, as they sought in the past, is merely a sanction for their conquest, a treaty which would legitimize their newly acquired territory and an arrangement which would assure them the brutal exploitation of the Arab national community. They would accept such an

arrangement only as a temporary measure until they were ready for the next phase of conquest which would realize their dream of Eretz Israel. In other words, negotiation now means capitulation to Israeli demands, recognition of their right to conquer and evict the people of Palestine from their territory and further eviction of other Arabs from adjacent areas which should become part and parcel of Eretz Israel. It seems to me that the statement made by the Organization of Arab Students, quoted earlier, reflects their proper assessment of the import of negotiation between the Arabs and Israelis. They have indicated already that they will not collaborate in bringing about the destruction of the Arab community.

I have already shown what Israel really wants in the Arab world. Whether it is related to the so-called Jewish Problem of the world or not is at this point a moot question. What we are dealing with is a type of colonialism which has a historic precedent. The Arab people as a whole tend to view Israel merely as a newer version of an old colonialism, a colonialism with which the world is quite familiar. It is the European colonialism of the 19th and 20th centuries, in which Europeans exercised control either directly over Asian and African territories for economic gain, or through colonial settlements planted in the midst of these territories to assure a greater degree of control and exploitation. With this type of colonialism the Arab people are quite familiar, whether practiced in Egypt or Iraq or with more destructive results as in Algeria and Libya. In all these cases, the people were mercilessly exploited, and the land plundered for the benefit of a small European elite. It seems to me that the Arabs, in their attempts at self-defence, view Israel essentially in this light. And the Arabs may derive solace from this by pointing out that, even if it takes more than a century, ultimately colonialism can be defeated once the national energies are harnessed sufficiently to bring about successful resistance.

Of course there are enough similarities between Israel's occupation of Palestine and other Arab territories to lend some credence to this theory. The slow process of "relocation," the exploitation of the land and the people by the European Jews of Israel assisted by large-scale Jewish capitalists around the world in search of cheap labor, point to the similarities between the Israeli colonial experience and its parent type. Yet one must not be satisfied with this prognosis of the future. To understand the Israel experience fully, one must look at the period preceding the 19th century European explosion.

For it seems to me, on the basis of my analysis of Israeli practices and policies, that what they are doing in the 20th century is to replicate the American experience. The colonialism with which the Arabs are confronted is more akin to the American experience of the 17th and 18th centuries in which an entire population was systematically destroyed and the handful of survivors relegated to the reservation camps. Israel's development of bacteriological and nuclear warfare has this objective in mind. And they are seeking Arab cooperation in their endeavour. Unless superior and more rational forces intervene diverting the Israelis from their intentions, the Arab-Israeli confrontation is likely to assume this form.

SOME LEGAL ASPECTS
OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT*

by Chérif Bassiouni

This article will touch upon some of the legal aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is not an ontology of the whole problem. Particular emphasis is placed on those issues which are proximately connected to the events leading to the June, 1967, war. Facts and issues which bear upon those events but which are grounded in the history of the conflict will be discussed but not analyzed in depth in view of the scope of this symposium.

International law derives from four sources: international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted by law; international conventions; general principles recognized by civilized nations; and development and acceptance of doctrines and judicial decisions. But it should be noted that the customs and practices embodied in world law are of European origin. International conventions which have contributed to the formulation of international law were negotiated or imposed by European governments. In practice, the term "civilized nations" has meant European or European-affiliated states. American contributions to world law must be included in this category because the customs, traditions, and political institutions of the United States have all been derived from European sources. The customs and traditions of non-European states have made virtually no impact on international law.

Israel must be regarded as representative of the European cultural tradition despite its geographic setting. The Arab countries, then, deriving their concepts and traditions from a non-Western culture, find themselves engaged in a contest for which their adversaries have written all the rules. Arab circles have represented their position as one based on right—a mixture of legal and moral righteousness—foreswearing considerations of a purely political nature.

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For the Arabs, Israel is itself the original wrong, and the Arab position proceeds on the theory that a poisonous tree can produce only poisonous fruit. From the Israeli viewpoint, Arab conduct is judged on the basis of each separate act without relation to the chain of events or the original illegality of the Israeli position.

FORMULATION OF THE ISSUES IN AN HISTORICAL CONTEXT: THE CREATION OF A ZIONIST "HOMELAND"

The State of Israel, proclaimed in 1948, was born from the Zionist claim that the Jews of the world constitute a separate nation entitled to a land of their own and sovereign statehood. The demand for the creation of a Jewish "homeland" in Palestine was pursued by the World Zionist Organization which was founded in Basle, Switzerland, in 1897 and which grew rapidly in number and effectiveness under the pressure of anti-Semitism in Europe. When Turkey entered World War I as an ally of Germany, the Arab people seized the occasion to align themselves with Great Britain and secure their independence. The 1915 McMahon Agreement with Sherif Hussein of Mecca confirms this fact. But the Sykes-Picot Agreement, later the same year, between Britain and France, and the November 2, 1917, Balfour Declaration revealed the emptiness of the British alliance with the Arab people. The first steps toward the realization of Zionist ambitions to take over Palestine may be dated from the Balfour Declaration of 1917 in which British Foreign Secretary, A.J. Balfour, with the support of the Allies, proposed "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people." The Balfour Declaration was accorded international recognition when it was incorporated into the preamble of the League of Nations agreement assigning Palestine to Britain as a mandated territory. The Treaty of Lausanne of 1924 and the League of Nations Council confirmed the Middle Eastern mandates of Great Britain and France embodying the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration.

The World Zionist Organization may be said to have won recognition as an international body under world law when it was invited to take part in the drafting of the mandate agreement. Under the terms of the mandate, the British Government was to encourage Jewish immigration into Palestine. The right, however, of the League of Nations under international law to approve a British-protected Zionist invasion of Palestine is as questionable as the subsequent attempt of its successor, the United Nations Organization, to

apportion Palestine into Arab and Jewish states in the 1947 Partition Plan. The wishes of the people whose home had been in Palestine for 1300 years were totally disregarded and their right to self-determination was never considered. (It is important to note that the British Government, before adoption of the mandate, had already detached that portion of Palestine east of the Jordan River and established the emirate of Transjordan, in which Britain asserted the terms of the Balfour Declaration would not apply.) The mandate created a Jewish Agency (which was financed by the World Zionist Organization) to represent Jewish interests in Palestine and an Arab Higher Committee to serve Arab rights there. Both agencies were very clearly intended to function under direct British control and possessed no international juridical status *per se*. No Arab state was at that time a member of the League of Nations, and no authorized Arab representative ever consented to the League's decision to allow Zionist immigration into Palestine.

The following facts reveal the progression of the British-sponsored Zionist invasion of Palestine in the interwar period:

Up to 1920, the population of Palestine was approximately 90 per cent Arab; after 1920, the allowed rate of European Jewish immigration was set at 10,000 persons annually; by 1930, the Jewish population rose to 19 per cent; by 1940, it became 30 per cent of a total population of 1,530,000. Even though Great Britain in a 1939 White Paper pledged to keep the population ratio at one-third Jewish and two-thirds Arab, the pressures of World War II displaced Jews resulted in a massive influx of those whom the rest of the world was refusing to accept. The price of European atrocities was now to be paid by the Arabs in exchange for their efforts to help the Allies in both World Wars defeat Germany and its allies.

It should be noted that on June 3, 1922, Great Britain restricted the intent of the Balfour Declaration in a statement that it did not contemplate "the disappearance or subordination of the Arabic population, language or customs in Palestine" or "the imposition of Jewish nationality upon Palestinian Arabs."¹ In May, 1939, Britain reasserted this view in a White Paper on Palestine and pledged that Jewish immigration would be limited to a total of 75,000 during the ensuing five years. At the end of this period no immi-

(1) Great Britain, Foreign Office, *Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939*, ed. by E.L. Woodward and R. Butler (London: H.M. Stationery Office).

grants would be admitted without specific Arab approval. Meanwhile the High Commissioner for Palestine was authorized to regulate, limit, or prohibit all further transfers of land to Zionist ownership. There were then about 500,000 Jews in the country—some were citizens but many were not lawful residents—and approximately a million Arabs. Zionists owned approximately 12 per cent of the land.

Issuance of the White Paper initiated a direct confrontation between the Zionists and the British. In New York on May 11, 1942, the American Zionist Organization adopted a manifesto that quickly became known as the Biltmore Program.² It posed four demands: 1) the mandate over Palestine must be terminated; 2) Palestine must be recognized as a sovereign Jewish state; 3) a national Jewish army must be created; 4) a Jewish government must be established for Palestine. In Jerusalem, the Jewish Agency denounced the Balfour Declaration and adopted the Biltmore Program as official Zionist policy.³ This action by the Jewish Agency amounted to a renunciation of its function as an arm of the mandate administration (its only legal basis) and it would therefore appear to have terminated its status as a public body under international law. Surrender or abrogation of its status as an agent of the mandate left it with only *de facto* existence; but for the Zionists the time had come to reap the benefits of the disguised invasion by openly seeking statehood. The administrative structure of the Jewish Agency was to form the core of the provisional government of the State of Israel.

THE PARTITION PLAN

In 1945 hundreds of thousands of hopeless, stateless Jews lived in hastily built displaced persons camps in Western Europe. No Western nation was ready to receive more than a token handful of them. With an eye on its own domestic politics, the United States Government demanded that Britain disregard its earlier Palestine policy and accept 100,000 refugees into Palestine at once. Britain refused. The growing spirit of revolt in her Arab empire made her unwilling to increase Arab anger against her. Openly encouraged by Washington and financed almost entirely by private American gifts, Zionists

(2) *New York Times*, May 12, 1942.

(3) William Yale, *The Near East* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1958), pp. 404-406.

smuggled great numbers of Jews from Europe into Palestine past an effective British blockade.

By 1947 there were approximately 700,000 Jews in Palestine and a secret army, the Haganah (together with Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang), operated against both the Arab population and the British administration. In February, 1947, Britain announced that it was "not prepared to govern Palestine" any longer under these conditions.⁴ On April 2, 1947, she invited the United Nations General Assembly to "make recommendations under Article 10 of the Charter for the future government of Palestine."

Five Arab states asked the Assembly to recognize Palestine as an independent Arab nation. Both the General Committee of the Assembly and the Assembly itself refused to put the Arab proposal on the agenda. The Assembly instead named a Special Palestine Committee, which reported two suggestions on September 7: a majority recommendation for the creation of separate Arab and Jewish states in Palestine, and a minority proposal for one federal state with autonomous Arab and Jewish regions. Both called for an international zone to include Jerusalem and its immediate vicinity in recognition of Jerusalem's importance as a Holy City for Jew, Moslem, and Christian. On November 29, 1947, the General Assembly adopted the majority proposal, recommending, with Solomonian Justice, the partition of Palestine into two states. The Zionists accepted the plan and the Arabs rejected it. Arabs still owned over 80 per cent of the land, either privately or by public domain, but the partition granted the Jewish minority—at least half of whom were neither citizens nor lawful residents, having been illegally smuggled into the country—56 per cent of the territory of Palestine. After an international zone was set aside, the Arab majority was asked to be content with what was left. (When the Arabs rejected this historically unprecedented and legally unjust solution and when hostilities started, Israel, after declaring its independence, annexed 23 per cent more of Palestine, thus increasing the share allowed by the partition by almost 45 per cent. In a draft resolution presented to the Security Council on November 11, 1947, before the Partition Plan was adopted, the Arab States posed a series of legal questions and asked that they be referred to the International Court of Justice.⁵ The chief points were those of 1) the

(4) *New York Times*, February 13, 1947.

(5) A/AC. 13/32, U.N. GAOR. II, *Ad Hoc Commission on Palestine Question*, pp. 209-301.

legal right of the United Nations to dispose arbitrarily of Arab territory, and 2) the inherent right of an indigenous population to determine its own constitution and government. Other legal problems were posed including that of the legal effect of promises made to Arab leaders by Britain and France during World War I for the establishment of a free Arab state; that of the legal status of the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate which were created without Arab participation or approval; the question of British authority in Palestine under a mandate from a league that no longer existed; and the related question of the authority of the United Nations to deal with Palestine on the basis of that mandate. The Arab resolution failed adoption by 20 to 21, with 13 abstentions. The then European majority control in the U.N., in the name of international law, had unilaterally abrogated the Palestinian's right to self-determination—a tragic lesson in practical world politics.

PROCLAMATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL

Britain pulled out of Palestine on May 14, 1948. On that same day a provisional government in Tel Aviv proclaimed the State of Israel. Barely minutes after that announcement, President Harry S. Truman extended American recognition to the new state. It may be properly asserted, however, that Israel's creation had no recognizable sanction in international law. Recognition by other states was and is a political—not a legal—decision. Such recognition has no more significance in world law than the decision of the United States *not* to recognize mainland China.

Since an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Partition Plan had not been obtained because it was blocked by political partisanship, the extent of Article 80 of the U.N. Charter and its protection of the Arab population was left to a political rather than to a legal determination and the questions of the legality of a Jewish state remained. Thus, it seems that the partition was a violation of the rights of the Arab population protected by the League of Nations Mandate, of the Trusteeship Articles of the U.N., and of Article 80 which provides that in no manner can a trusteeship under the U.N. alter the existing rights of peoples.

The partition had resulted in the displacement of Arab peoples and outright usurpation of their property, as well as violation of the right of the people to self-determination. The Arab people were thus authorized to refuse acceptance of the partition. The illegality of the partition likewise would give

no rights to the Jewish population to set up their state on illegally appropriated territory.

Israel's only claim to the territories it holds—either those originally incorporated in the newborn state of 1948 or those seized in the latest phase of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1967—rests solely on military conquest. The principle has long been accepted in international law that military conquest does not confer lawful sovereignty—*jus ex injuria non oritur*, rights do not arise from wrongs.

Given the illegality of the Israeli position, however, the ensuing struggle with the Palestinian Arabs must be regarded as civil strife and not war. A question arises under international law as to foreign third-party intervention; but regardless of the validity of the Arab States' intervention, the foundation of the State of Israel remains either an illicit act by the U.N. or an invalid declaration of independence on usurped territory. Both cases would not afford a legally valid basis for what is today a state recognized by the U.N. and most countries of the world.

Most other legal issues stem from that original source, including the state of belligerency that the Arab States claim still exists.

THE STATE OF WAR

The assertion by the Arab States that a state of war continues presupposes its original existence. If the initial conflict between Palestinian Arabs and Jews aided by non-Palestinian Jews who entered the land illegally were a civil strife, then Israel would today be the state successor of Palestine. All rights and obligations of the former state would, therefore, inure to the latter. If Israel's right to sovereignty (as a state and a nation) is denied, then a state of war could not legally exist with a non-state entity. Niceties of that sort could produce interesting academic arguments. A state of military confrontation has existed and still exists between opposing contentious parties, and all the effects of war have resulted from this confrontation. The issues raised by the creation and existence of Israel are still relevant to the present context. (The Egyptian position on the right to visit and search vessels using the Suez Canal, for instance, represents an exercise of the rights of a party in a state of war.)

On May 11, 1949, the General Assembly voted to accept Israel as a member of the United Nations. Paragraph 4 of the preamble to this resolution took

note of the declaration by the State of Israel that it "unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United Nations." But not only the obligations to which Israel would be bound as a successor state,⁶ but even those which were specifically imposed upon it by the U.N. (especially the resolutions establishing the right of the Palestinians to return to their homes or to claim compensation and those regarding the status of Jerusalem) are flouted by Israel with impunity. The world community outlawed war as early as 1929,⁷ and the U.N. Charter reiterates this prohibition. The world community and the U.N., however, have not, in the name of preserving peace, condoned the violation of the Charter's decisions with respect to the preservation of the human and political rights of the exiled Palestinian people. The Arab States maintain their responsibility for the preservation of the Palestinians' rights on the same ground of kinship as the Jews of Israel have claimed for their European brothers in faith.

As events unfolded, Israeli aggressiveness gave rise to the right of individual and collective Arab self-defense. Israeli expansionism was manifested by the gradual takeover of the rest of Palestine, its aggression on Egypt in 1956 and 1967 and other aggressive acts. The principles of state of war and justifiable self-defense can be analogized to the story of the chicken and the egg. The Arab States and Israel justify their respective conduct by that of their opponent. If the vertical chain of events is to be logically followed, one would be back to the question of the validity of the creation and existence of Israel as a sovereign state and to its unfulfilled ensuing obligations.

THE BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL

The boundaries of Israel are certainly a legal issue but they are a derivative one. Their derivation is from the actions and issues pertaining to the very creation of the state. If the birthright of Israel is the 1947 Partition, then the answer is clear; but as we have seen, the question of the legality of the

(6) See, for example, Keith, *Theory of State Succession*, 1908, p. 5; Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, 1943, pp. 360-377; I. Hyde, *International Law*, 2nd ed., 1945, pp. 358-438; O'Connell, *The Law of State Succession*, 1956; L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, Lauterpacht, 8th ed., 1955, pp. 156-169, 571-573, 944-945.

(7) The Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929. See Q. Wright, "The Meaning of the Pact of Paris," *American Journal of International Law*, 27, 1932; and Q. Wright, *The Outlawry of War and the Law of War*, 1953.

Partition Plan remains untested. (In 1949 the United Nations Conciliation Commission in Lausanne proposed territorial adjustments which Israel rejected.) But if the boundaries of Israel are set by its declaration of independence of 1948, then the territory it occupies must be regarded as wholly usurped or at least conquered. That Israel can declare the occupied territory as its own would be violative of international law if it were not for the color of legality assumed by the U.N. grant of the partitioned territory. It should be noted, however, that Israel cannot consistently maintain its right to statehood based on the territorial grant of the U.N. and also claim historical biblical rationalizations for its conquest and declaration of independence.

The armistice demarcation lines, or cease-fire lines, can by no stretch of the legal imagination become the basis of permanently legal territory without the express approval of the Arab sovereign owners. Such territory as Israel occupies today is not *territorium nullius* but claimed territory upon which the sovereign Arab States exercised their jurisdiction and sovereignty—sovereignty which cannot be conferred upon an aggressor by reason of conquest. Israel cannot claim right to such territories beyond the questionably allocated territory of 1947, either by conquest or by prescription. Consequently no rights of sovereignty under international law inure to Israel from such forceful and illegal seizure of another (equal) sovereign's territory.

Title to territory cannot be acquired through conquest in a legal order wherein war is outlawed (Article 2, U.N. Charter). A state resorting to war, or seizing territory belonging to another, acts contrary to its obligation. Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations established the inviolability of national sovereignty,⁸ as did the Inter-American Convention on Rights and Duties of States (Article 11), and the Draft Declaration on Rights and Duties of States (Articles 9-10-11). This notion lies at the very heart of the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1929 and the U.N. Charter (Article 2, paragraph 4). It is part of American concepts of international law.⁹ These principles are so well established in international law that the unanimous resolution of the Security Council of November 22, 1967, stated: "*Emphasizing* the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war ..., (i) withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict" is called for. The fact that the Arab States whose territory was thus taken refuse to recognize the State of

(8) See *American Journal of International Law Supplement*, 15, 7, 1921.

(9) The Stimson Doctrine, *American Journal of International Law*, 1932, p. 342.

Israel or claim belligerency does not warrant Israel's occupation and certainly not its usurpations of any such Arab territory.

Israeli refusal to withdraw from the occupied territory is in deliberate violation of the U.N. order, and is a clear indication of Israel's intention to pursue a course of territorial expansion at the cost of its neighbors and in disregard of the orders of the United Nations of which it is a member. Israeli intentions were made manifest in the 1967 occupation of Jerusalem (which lies in Jordanian territory) by force and the subsequent annexation of Jerusalem as Israeli territory—an act which could not be accomplished under any rule except the rule of might. The U.N. promptly reacted and adopted two resolutions on July 4 and 14, 1967, the latter by 100 to 0 with 18 abstentions (including the U.S.) which declared Israel's action "invalid" and called upon Israel "to rescind all measures already taken and desist forthwith from taking any action which would alter the status of Jerusalem." This did not deter Israel's implementation of its program of annexation which went on unabated by world condemnation.

THE REFUGEES

There are presently 140 nations in the world community, and not one has been established with a people composed of disparate nationalities linked together by the vague contours of a political doctrine claiming to be based on religious premises.

The requirement under international law that a state have a composite population has always meant the present people living on the land and linked by a concept of nationhood. Nowhere is there any precedent or justification for the implantation of other persons gathered literally from the four corners of the world to base their association on "race" or religion. Theoretically nothing precludes such an occurrence if we were dealing with a *territorium nullius*, which does not have an indigenous population. The Zionists did not "discover" Palestine, but came upon an existing entity declared by the League of Nations as provisionally independent with sovereign territoriality and an established population.

During the first phase of the Arab-Israeli war (1947-49), over 800,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes by Zionist military forces. They found refuge in Jordan, Egypt, Syria, and Lebanon, where the

United Nations' UNRWA undertook to assist them. Today there are 1,344,576 registered refugees.

In June, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly dispatched Count Folke Bernadotte, Vice-President of the Swedish Red Cross, to mediate the Arab-Israeli armed conflict. He achieved short-lived truce agreements, and on September 19, 1948, he sent a report of his mission to the Secretary General of the United Nations, Trygve Lie. A substantial portion of that report referred to the plight and the rights of the refugees, and read, in part:

"The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to be returned to their homes should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who choose not to return."

"The liability of the provisional government of Israel to restore private property to its private owners and to indemnify those owners for property wantonly destroyed is clear ... [it would be] an offense against the principles of elemental justice if those innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine ... and offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries."¹⁰

On September 20, Zionist gunmen assassinated Bernadotte in Jerusalem, but the recommendations he had made for the treatment of the refugee problem were incorporated in a General Assembly resolution that called for repatriation of all refugees who wished to return, compensation for those who chose not to return, and indemnities for all private property destroyed by Israeli forces.¹¹

The enunciation of the Palestinians' rights notwithstanding, Israel continues to deny them, and is therefore in permanent violation of its international obligations.

It is a true paradox that is real: the state created for the stateless, has in effect made stateless the citizens of the state where they sought refuge. The most significant reason for the upsurge of human rights in modern inter-

(10) United Nations Security Council, S/801, May, 1948; Supp., pp. 103-104.

(11) United Nations GAOR, Res. 194 (1948).

national law and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was the events of World War II, whose major victims were European Jews. It is those same persons who today, in the eyes of many, are guilty of precisely that which they once suffered.

Palestinians enjoyed the privileges of citizenship and carried Palestinian passports irrespective of their faith. This was specified by Articles 5 and 7 of the Mandate. British policy since 1922 aimed at maintaining the Palestinian character of that provisionally independent state and reasserted this policy frequently. The Partition Plan of 1947 was also careful in safeguarding the civil, political, economic, religious, and all human rights and fundamental freedoms of all people concerned.¹²

On December 11, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly adopted resolution 194, of which paragraph 11 stated:

“...that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property, which, under principles of International Law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible.”¹³

The same resolution established a Conciliation Commission with the purpose of implementing the above quoted paragraph. On May 12, 1949, under the auspices of the U.N. Conciliation Commission, the Lausanne Protocol,¹⁴ in which Israel pledged, among other things, to implement the General Assembly's resolution 194, was signed. Subsequent to the admission of Israel to membership in the United Nations, which was conditioned upon its acceptance of resolution 194, Israel renounced its earlier pledge.

For the next twenty years, the General Assembly in twenty-two resolutions was to reaffirm its resolution 194 only to be consistently disregarded by Israel.

(12) Great Britain, Parliament, *Parliamentary Papers, 1922*, Cmd 1700 (London, 1922), at 18; Cmd. 1785 (London, 1922); *Parliamentary Papers, 1938-39*, Cmd. 6019 (London, 1939), at 2 and 3.

(13) U.N. GAOR, Res. 21-24 (1948).

(14) U.N. GAOR, Vol. II, p. 6; U.N. Doc. A/927 (1949).

THE JORDAN RIVER

Israeli diversion of the waters of the Jordan River system presents a situation on which the law of nations and the laws of individual states are clear and unequivocal.

In 1939, the Jewish Agency for Palestine asked an American engineer, Walter Lowdermilk, to study Palestine's irrigation problems. The Lowdermilk scheme proposed diversion of the flow of the Jordan River system far beyond the Jordan Valley watershed. Later studies by two other Americans, James B. Hayes and J.V. Savage, consultants to the Jewish Agency, incorporated the Lowdermilk proposal. Its undisguised purpose was "to take as much as possible of the Jordan's waters right out of the Jordan's own valley, away from the people of it, and run it over the watershed of the basin to irrigate lands far away."¹⁵ In 1956 Israel adopted a ten-year plan which provided for diversion of 700 million cubic meters from the Jordan River system to irrigate agricultural land and meet municipal needs inside her own territory. Since the total flow of the Jordan above Lake Tiberias was only 600 million cubic meters, it seemed obvious that Israel also intended to divert much of the water supplied by the Yarmuk River, which enters the Jordan below Tiberias from Jordanian territory.

In 1951 Sir Murdoch Macdonald and Partners, a British firm, suggested to the Kingdom of Jordan an alternative plan for joint utilization of the river waters by all riparian states, including Israel. It differed sharply from the Lowdermilk-Hayes scheme in that it proposed utilization of all the flow of the river system within the Jordan River valley. Macdonald based his program on the general principle, which to our mind has an undoubted moral and natural basis, that the waters in a catchment area should not be diverted outside this area unless the requirements of all who use or genuinely intend to use the water within the area have been satisfied.¹⁶

Miles Bunger, an American associated with the U.S. Technical Cooperation Agency (Point Four) proposed distribution of the Jordan River system's water between Israel and her three Arab neighbors on the basis of need, taking

(15) M.C. Ionides, "The Disputed Waters of the Jordan," *Middle East Journal*, VII, 1953, p. 157. See also James B. Hayes, *T.V.A. on the Jordan* (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948).

(16) Murdoch MacDonal and Partners, *Report on the Proposal Extension of Irrigation in the Jordan River Valley*, London, 1954.

into account particularly the fact that almost all this water originated in Arab countries.¹⁷ The United Nations Relief and Works Agency and the Technical Cooperation Agency approved the Bunger Plan, and work under it began in December, 1953. Abruptly, and without explanation, the United States withdrew its support and offered a new program (generally called the Johnston Plan) which was essentially the original Lowdermilk-Hayes scheme.

But before the Bunger Plan had been approved, Israel, in 1951, had undertaken a project to deepen and straighten the bed of the Jordan at the south end of Lake Huleh, but desisted when the chief of the U.N. Armistice Commission ruled that this project violated the Syrian-Israeli Armistice. On September 2, 1953, in response to a Syrian complaint, the Armistice Commission again ordered Israel to abandon a plan to alter the Jordan River's course to bring it inside Israeli territory. Israel then began to build diversion works inside her own territory on the south shore of Lake Tiberias, with a system of canals, tunnels, and pumping stations to carry the water into the Negev region. In 1964 this system went into operation.

The issue of the use of the flow of streams that touch more than one state has been before European and American courts many times, and the principles governing riparian rights to interstate streams are well established in international law.

A statement on the use of interstate streams was made by the General Conference on Communication and Transit established by the League of Nations,¹⁸ and in 1951, the Economic Commission of Europe compiled a record of international conventions concerned with the use of waterways for purposes other than irrigation. In its 1958 meeting in New York, the International Law Association took up the question of international streams, and adopted this principle:

"Except as provided by treaty or other instruments or customs binding upon the parties, each coriparian state is entitled to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial use of the waters of the drainage basin. What amounts to a reasonable and equitable share is a question

(17) Omar Z. Ghobashy, *The Development of the Jordan* (New York: Arab Information Center, 1961), pp. 13-15.

(18) Sevette, *Legal Aspects of the Jordan Valley Development* (Geneva, 1953), p. 27.

to be determined in the light of all the relevant factors in each particular case.”¹⁹

At Dubrovnik, Yugoslavia, in August, 1966, the International Law Association unanimously adopted a statement of legal principles governing the use of international waterways.²⁰

International jurists appear to agree that the right of national sovereignty does not give any state the right to divert the waters of an international river to the detriment and substantial injury of coriparian states. Oppenheim, recognized as the leading authority among writers on world law, said:

“The flow of international rivers is not within the arbitrary power of one of the riparian states, for it is a rule of international law that no state is allowed to alter the natural conditions of the territory of a neighboring state. For this reason, a state is not only forbidden to stop or divert the flow of a river which runs from its own to a neighboring state, but likewise to make such use of the water of the river as either cause danger to the neighboring state or prevents it from making proper use of the flow of the river on its part.”²¹

It is not only forbidden that one riparian state divert or otherwise use the flow of an international stream if this act causes injury to coriparian states, but international law also recognizes that every riparian state has specific rights in the waters of a river that flows through or past its territory. Those rights include a right to the volume of water actually used by it for irrigation and a reserved right to use some of the surplus quantity not already used for irrigation by other riparian states and which is lost by the river at its mouth. A similar right exists to the use of surplus water resulting from development plans saving water by prevention of evaporation, drainage, canals, dams, and better storage facilities. On this subject an English authority, Professor Smith, wrote:

“A riparian state is entitled to as much of the waters of an international river as she was actually using for irrigation prior to any claim by another riparian state.”²²

(19) United Nations, *Integrated River Basin Development*, E/3066 (1958), pp. 33-34.

(20) *Ibid.*

(21) Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, p. 474.

(22) H.A. Smith, *American Supreme Court and International Tribunals*, 1920, pp. 79-80.

It follows that any claim put forward by Israel is necessarily subrogated to the uses of the waters of the Jordan River by coriparian Arab States prior to the establishment of the Zionist state. This prior right has been consistently recognized by the United States and is known as the right of prior appropriation.

Existing treaty obligations at the time of the establishment of Israel, which would appear to be binding on Israel in accordance with accepted practices in the matter of state succession, conferred definite riparian rights on the Arab States. These are found specifically in the exchange of notes between Great Britain and France dated March 7, 1923, concerning the boundary between Syria and Palestine, which provided existing Syrian rights in the use of the waters of the Jordan River would be maintained unimpaired. If Israel is a successor state, regardless of the manner and circumstances of its creation, it cannot in law at once claim statehood and reject the legal obligations imposed upon it by a treaty that remained in full force and effect when Israel succeeded to the territory covered by that treaty.

On the basis of all principles of international law, Israel's unilateral diversion of the Jordan River is illegal and unjustifiable.

NAVIGATION RIGHTS IN THE SUEZ CANAL

Israel's most insistent demand in its quarrel with the U.A.R. has been for the use of the Suez Canal. This demand, supported by the United States and some other governments, has been based on the theory that the Canal is an international waterway open on equal terms to all states.

The Maritime Suez Canal links the Red and Mediterranean Seas across the Isthmus of Suez. It has been and is still governed by the terms of the Constantinople Convention of October 29, 1888.²³ The parties to this convention were France, Germany, the Empire of Austria-Hungary, Spain, Great Britain, Italy, Holland, Russia, and Turkey. When Egypt achieved independence she succeeded to the rights and obligations of Turkey, across whose territory the waterway was constructed, in accordance with international law governing successor states. Article 8 of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1954 reasserted that "The Maritime Suez Canal ... is an integral part of Egypt."

(23) M. Cherif Bassiouni, "The Nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the Illicit Act in International Law," *De Paul Law Review*, 14, 1965, p. 258.

In addition, Egypt enjoyed certain rights and bore certain obligations specifically set forth in the 1888 Convention.

The Convention delegated to Egypt execution of the principles and obligations established by the agreement, with these words in Article 9:

“The Egyptian Government is to take ... the necessary measures to enforce the execution of said treaty ...”

The language is specific, and Egypt remains the sole judge as to the measures required to be taken for implementation of the treaty. This cannot be considered a discretionary power to take measures that do not conform to the terms of the Convention.²⁴ Article 14 of the Convention stipulated also that obligations imposed by that treaty were not to be limited in time to “the duration of the concessions granted the Universal Company of the Suez Canal,” and this article assumes special significance because it clearly distinguishes between the Canal itself and the Universal Maritime Suez Canal as the operating agency for the waterway.²⁵

Article 14 of the 1888 Convention amounted to a clear acknowledgement that Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal and the rights and obligations of the company were two separate matters, in fact and in law.

The Universal Maritime Suez Canal Company was an Egyptian corporation, established under Egyptian law and, like any other private corporation, subject to that law²⁶. It was set up to perform a specific, needed public service: construction and operation of a waterway between two seas. It had no independent existence outside the terms of its establishment and no rights or authority beyond those specifically granted to it by the Government of Egypt. Its character was no different from that of a public utility corporation, say, in the United States, authorized to distribute electric power to communities and individuals within the area prescribed by the terms of its charter and subject to regulation under the laws of the chartering government. That the shares of the company were all owned outside Egypt had no bearing whatever on the character or status of the company. A corporation is in itself a legal entity, whoever may own or control its stock.

(24) *Ibid.*, p. 265.

(25) *Ibid.*, p. 266 *et. seq.*

(26) Mustapha El-Hefnawy, *Les Problèmes Contemporains du Canal de Suez* (Paris, 1953).

The Egyptian decree of July 26, 1956, nationalized the assets of the Canal Company. It did not nationalize the Suez Canal because there was neither need nor reason to assert Egyptian control over what had always been Egypt's own. The right to transmit through the Suez Canal had been spelled out in the Convention of 1888, the terms of which Egypt was obliged to carry out. In law the decree of July 26, 1956, altered none of the rights and obligations arising under international law, but merely substituted one operating agency for another. It did, however, have a powerful political impact, and this—a dramatic shift of political power in the whole Middle East region—created the situation that faced the world in the year 1956.

Great Britain and France, strongly supported by the United States and less eagerly by some other governments, attempted not only to compel Egypt to permit operation of the Canal on their terms but even to undermine Egypt's territorial sovereignty in the Canal Zone.²⁷ Britain, France, and Israel resorted to war to achieve these aims but abandoned their aggression in the face of overwhelming pressure from the United Nations and world opinion. This conclusion of the 1956 Suez affair settled for all time the question of Egyptian sovereignty over the Canal and the juridical status of the Suez Canal Authority. Unrestricted use of the Suez Canal, however, remains a prime political and economic goal of the State of Israel.

The Treaty of Constantinople guarantees the right of free navigation in the Canal, and it still stands today as the basic document guaranteeing that freedom.²⁸

Of prime importance in the Treaty are Articles 1 and 4 which establish the principle of freedom of passage.²⁹ Article 1 provides:

"The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war, without distinction of flag."

"Consequently, the High Contracting Parties agree not in any way to interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace."

(27) Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson* (New York: Potter, 1967), pp. 52-71.

(28) Simcha Dinitz, "The Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Blockade of the Suez Canal," *Georgetown Law Journal*, 45, 1956-1957, p. 175.

(29) See also U.S. Department of State, *The Suez Canal Problem* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1956), pp. 16-19.

"The Canal shall never be subjected to the exercise of the right of blockade."

The first paragraph of Article 4 declares:

"The Maritime Canal remaining open in time of war as a free passage, even to ships of war of belligerents, according to the terms of Article 1 of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties agree that no right of war, no act of hostility, nor any act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be committed in the Canal and its ports of access, as well as within a radius of three marine miles from these ports, even though the Ottoman Empire should be one of the belligerent Powers."

Israel was not, of course, in existence when the 1888 Convention pledged the right of passage to ships of all nations in peace and war. It has been argued that this right accrued to it as a continuing right available to all states. Authorities have pointed out, however, that this dedication—a stipulation in favor of third parties—is a concept of domestic private law and has no place in international law because it is alien to the techniques and incompatible with the characteristics of this discipline. In 1929 the International Court of Justice ruled specifically that stipulation in favor of third states is not a rule of international law."³⁰

It thus appears that Israel acquired no right to the beneficial use of the Suez Canal under the Convention of 1888 and that, having never acquired such a right subsequently through the implied unanimous consent of all contracting parties by unobstructed habitual transit of the Canal,³¹ there is no avenue open to Israel under international law now to assert such a right.

On May 4, 1948, Israel declared its independence, and on the same day Egypt, as a member of the Arab bloc, established a general blockade against Israel in the Suez Maritime Canal.

On February 6, 1950, King Farouk I of Egypt issued a decree on the procedure of ship and airplane searches and seizure of contraband goods in

(30) International Court of Justice, *Case of The Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Cos*, 19 August, 1929. See also *Report of Committee on Uses of International Rivers and Canals*, International Law Association Conference, Hamburg, 1960, p. 58.

(31) Oppenheim, *op. cit.*, pp. 926-927.

connection with the Palestine War. This decree, known as the Embargo Act of February 6, 1950, provided for the continuance of "visit and search" practices. Article 2 of the Act provided for customs officials to inspect the suspected ship's manifest and cargo for such contraband as arms, munitions, war material, or other war contraband. In Article 3 it was stated that "force may be used at all times against any ship attempting to avoid search, where necessary, by firing so as to force the ship to stop and submit to search." An amendment to the decree added to the list of contraband, "foodstuffs and all other commodities which are likely to strengthen the war potential of the Zionists in Palestine in any way whatever." The Egyptian authorities drew up a "black list" of ships known to be carrying certain materials to Israel and also established a Prize Court at Alexandria to dispose of confiscated goods.

The most frequent argument raised against Egypt's actions of visit, search, and confiscation pursuant to the Embargo Act of 1950, states that such blockade actions are a direct breach of the Treaty of Constantinople which guaranteed free passage and prohibited blockades in Articles 1 and 4. This argument can be resolved by an examination of Article 10 of that Treaty which provides:

"Similarly, the provisions of Articles 4, 5, 7, and 8 shall not interfere with the measures which His Majesty the Sultan and His Highness the Khedive, in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and within the limits of the Firmans granted, might find it necessary to take for securing by their own forces the defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public order."

It is in reliance on this provision of the Treaty that Egypt exercised her sovereignty right of search for reasons of her own defense. One writer comments:

"For though there is an explicit freedom of use, even in wartime, laid down in the Convention of Constantinople, there is also a provision in Article 10 that neither that liberty nor the other stipulations of the agreements shall hinder measures necessary for the defense of Egypt and the maintenance of public order. In any event, it would be less than realistic to expect a state at war to allow free passage through any portion of its territory to the ships, supplies or nationals of an enemy."³²

(32) P.E. Corbett, *Law and Society in the Relations of States*, 1951.

It should also be noted that in Article 9 of the Treaty of Constantinople it is declared that, "the Egyptian Government is to take the necessary measures to enforce the execution of the Treaty," and Article 12 provides "...that all rights of Turkey [to which Egypt is the successor state] as the territorial power are still reserved."

Taking a historical approach, Egypt's actions are certainly not without precedent. During both World Wars Great Britain blockaded the Canal against use by Germany and her allies. The procedure used by Great Britain was first to stop and search the enemy vessel at the entrance to the Canal, and if contraband was found, the vessel was directed to proceed through the Canal. Having passed safely through, the enemy halted the vessel and seized the contraband, the effect being a *de facto* blockade.

Another argument advanced against the blockade practices of Egypt in the Suez Maritime Canal, and the Gulf of Aqaba as well, contends that the Armistice signed at Rhodes by Egypt and Israel on February 24, 1949, prohibited any further hostilities by the opposing parties and that Egypt's actions pursuant to the Embargo Act of February, 1950, after the Armistice had been signed, constitute acts of aggression in violation of the Armistice. But paragraph 2 of Article 2 of that Armistice declares:

"No element of the land, sea or military or para-military forces of either party, including non-regular forces, shall commit any warlike or hostile act against the military or para-military forces of the other party ..."

As was noted above, under the provisions of the Embargo Act of 1950, it is provided that visit and search of Israeli and suspect neutral ships be conducted by regular Egyptian customs officials. Strictly interpreting the above article of the Armistice, customs officials are neither military nor para-military forces.

A further interpretation of the crucial Article 2 of the Armistice is contained in a statement by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization:

"...interference with the passage of goods destined for Israel through the Suez Canal is a hostile act, but not necessarily against the General Armistice Agreement, because of the limitations imposed on the term

'hostile act' in the text of Article 2, paragraph 2 of the General Armistice Agreement."³³

The crux of the argument, and the point which was never resolved, centered about the interpretation to be given the effect of the Armistice by the parties.

The Egyptian Representative told the United Nations Special Committee of the Mixed Armistice Commission on June 12, 1951, that, "We are exercising a right of war. ... We are still legally at war with Israel. An Armistice does not put an end to a state of war. It does not prohibit a country from exercising certain rights of war."³⁴

Oppenheim has stated the effect of Armistices as they are traditionally considered:

"Armistice or truces, in the wider sense of the term, are all agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities. They are in no wise to be compared to peace ... because the condition of war remains between the belligerents themselves, and between belligerents and neutrals, on all points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities. In spite of such cessation the right of visit and search over neutral merchantment therefore remains intact."³⁵

In July, 1951, the Representative of Israel complained to the Security Council of the United Nations that the Armistice signed at Rhodes had terminated the Egypt-Israeli war, yet Egypt continued to blockade Israeli vessels and neutral vessels destined for Israeli ports. As a result, the Security Council passed a resolution on September 1, 1951, calling upon Egypt to lift its blockade.

Commenting on this action of the Security Council, Colonel Howard S. Levie wrote:

"It is considered more likely that the Security Council's action was based on a desire to bring an end to a situation fraught with potential

(33) Treaty No. 654, between Israel and Egypt, signed at Rhodes, February 24, 1949.

(34) Bloomfield, *Egypt Israel, and the Gulf of Aqaba in International Law*, 1957, p. 50.

(35) L. Oppenheim, *International Law: Disputes, War and Neutrality*, Lauterpacht, ed., 1952, pp. 546-551.

danger to peace than it was attempting to change a long established rule of international law. By now it has surely become fairly obvious that the Israeli-Arab General Armistice Agreement did not create even a *de facto* termination of the war between those states.”³⁶

Before the Security Council, the Representative of Egypt stated the position of his Government on the General Armistice Agreement:

“The fact that the Armistice Agreement is silent on this point [i.e., the right of visit and search] although it is fairly common practice to include a provision on this subject in armistice agreements, shows, as indeed the Mixed Armistice Commission has confirmed, that the Armistice Agreement of the classical type concluded between Egypt and Israel expressed the joint will of the signatories and left them free to exercise their legitimate right of visit and search.”³⁷

On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces invaded the Sinai peninsula, and within a few days occupied Sharm al-Shaikh, thereby gaining control of the Gulf of Aqaba. This invasion by Israel brought an end to the General Armistice Agreement, and in the words of Premier Ben Gurion of Israel to the Israeli Knesset in November, 1956, “...the Armistice with Egypt is dead and so are the Armistice lines. No magician can bring back life to those lines.”³⁸

After Israeli forces withdrew from the Sinai peninsula and were replaced by the United Nations Expeditionary Force, the Egyptian Government, which had nationalized the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal, availed itself of the rights of a belligerent and continued to adhere to its interpretation of the Constantinople Convention. On July 18, 1957, however, Egypt accepted the “compulsory” jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all matters relating to the interpretation of the Constantinople Convention or freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. While Egypt is willing to permit the entire question to be settled through the International Court of Justice, Israel has not communicated a corresponding intent.

(36) Howard S. Levie, “The Nature and Scope of the Armistice Agreement,” *American Journal of International Law*, 50, 1956, pp. 880-906.

(37) United Nations, Security Council, *Official Records*, 661st Meeting, March 12, 1954, pp. 9-13.

(38) United Arab Republic, Information Department, *Navigation in the Suez Canal* (Cairo, 1962), p. 33.

NAVIGATION IN AND THROUGH THE GULF OF AQABA³⁹

The Gulf of Aqaba is the eastern arm of two arms of water into which the Sinai peninsula separates the Red Sea at its northern extremity. The western arm constitutes the Gulf of Suez. The Gulf of Aqaba is somewhat over one hundred miles in length and varies from three to seventeen miles in width. At the mouth of the Gulf, the distance from the Sinai peninsula headland to the Saudi Arabian Peninsula headland measures nine miles, and since each of these countries claims a territorial sea extending six miles from its coastline, their respective territorial waters therefore overlap.

At the entrance to the Gulf are located the islands of Tiran and Sanafir, which are under the control of Saudi Arabia. The only navigable passage into the Gulf is through the strait on the western side of the island of Tiran, and ships passing through this strait also pass through the territorial waters of the United Arab Republic.⁴⁰

In 1841 the Ottoman Empire recognized the Port and Gulf of Aqaba as belonging to Egypt, as well as the Sinai peninsula.⁴¹

Since Egypt obtained its independence in 1922, it has clearly been sovereign of the western shore of the Gulf of Aqaba from Ras Tabah southwards, while Saudi Arabia has been sovereign of the eastern shore of the Gulf from a point two miles south of the port of Aqaba to the Gulf's entrance.

Presently, the United Arab Republic occupies the western shore of the Gulf from the town of Tabah to the southern-most part of the Gulf, while Saudi Arabia occupies the area mentioned above. The ten-mile northern shore is occupied to the extent of a four-mile northeastern segment by Jordan, and a five-mile northwestern segment by Israel.

Israel bases her claim to the right of free passage through the Straits of Tiran and into the Gulf of Aqaba on her geographical position as one of the

(39) See "The Legality of the UAR's Position," *Arab News and Views*, vol. XII, No. 10, 1967. See also A.E. Hogan, *Pacific Blockade* (Oxford, 1908); and Sidney, *The Allied Blockade of Germany 1914-1916*, 1957. See also authorities cited in Wilson, *Handbook of International Law*, 1939, pp. 247-248 and 379; Hyde, *International Law*, 2nd ed., 1945, p. 1669; Philip Jessup, *A Modern Law of Nations*, 1950, p. 176; U.S. Department of State, *Bulletin*, 46, 1962, 278, 279.

(40) Charles B. Selak, Jr., "A Consideration of the Legal Status of the Gulf of Aqaba," *American Journal of International Law*, 52, 1958, p. 660.

(41) Israel, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Background Paper on the Gulf of Aqaba*, May, 1956, p. 5.

four littoral states bounding the Gulf. This five-mile coastal area now occupied by Israel was not within the temporary borders established for that state by the United Nations Security Council resolution of July 15, 1948. Within two weeks after the signing of the General Armistice Agreement at Rhodes, the Israeli army invaded the Negev desert and proceeded southward to the Gulf of Aqaba, occupying the village of Um Rashrash, today known as the port of Eilat. As a result of this action on the part of Israel, the Egyptian Government as well as the entire Arab bloc has refused to accept the occupation of this area by Israel as anything else but a belligerent occupation by virtue of military aggression.

Concerning belligerent occupations, Oppenheim states that, "An occupant in no wise acquires sovereignty over such territory through the mere fact of having occupied it."⁴² The clearly recognized principle in international law that annexing of a territory occupied by military force can have legal effects only if the state of war ends by the conclusion of a peace treaty has been discussed above. As yet, no such treaty has been signed by the United Arab Republic and Israel, and therefore it would appear that Israel remains a belligerent occupant of the area. Considering these facts, the United Arab Republic is justified in blockading the Gulf of Aqaba, inasmuch as the right to free and innocent passage through such waters is suspended to nations which are at war as well as to nations which carry strategic goods to a belligerent nation and seek passage through the territorial waters of a nation which is a party to the belligerence.

In addition to the argument advanced by the Arab bloc that Israel is a belligerent occupier on the Gulf of Aqaba, the Arab countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, have also proposed that the Gulf of Aqaba itself is a closed sea, or a *mare clausum*, and is governed under the general rules of international law which provide for free and innocent passage in time of peace to all nations who border on the inland sea. The rule applicable in time of war is set out in the preceding paragraph.

Of great importance in the overall discussion of the rights of the littoral states on the Gulf of Aqaba has been this argument between the belligerents, as well as between neutrals in the United Nations, as to the exact nature of the Gulf of Aqaba. Unless the nature of the Gulf itself is determined, the

(42) L. Oppenheim, *International Law*, 1955, p. 433.

task of applying the international law applicable to the littoral states is extraordinarily difficult.

The Arab position in reference to the nature of the Gulf of Aqaba was made clear in the statement of the Representative of Saudi Arabia to the General Assembly on October 2, 1957. He stated:

“The Gulf of Aqaba, basically is not an international question...The Gulf of Aqaba is a national inland waterway, subject to absolute Arab sovereignty. The geographical location of the Gulf is conclusive proof of its national character. It is separated from the Red Sea by a chain of islands, the largest being Sanafir and Tiran. The only navigable entrance—which, itself, is within Arab territory—does not exceed 500 metres. Thus, by its configuration, the Gulf is in the nature of a *mare clausum*, which does not belong to the class of international waterways ... The Gulf is so narrow that the territorial areas of the littoral States are bound to overlap among themselves, under any kind of measurement, even if we assume that the Gulf comprehends part of the high seas.”

“In the second place, the Gulf of Aqaba is of the category of historical gulfs that fall outside the sphere of international law. The Gulf is the historical route to the holy places in Mecca. Pilgrims from different Muslim countries have been streaming through the Gulf, year after year, for fourteen centuries. Ever since, the Gulf has been an exclusive Arab route under Arab sovereignty. It is due to this undisputed fact that not a single international authority makes any mention whatsoever of the Gulf as an international waterway open for international navigation.”

“Israel...has no right to any part of the Gulf. Israel's claim...could only be argued on the United Nations' Plan of Partition or the Armistice lines. On either ground, the claim of Israel falls to the ground. On the plan of partition, Israel cannot claim Eilat because Israel is confined to the lines of the plan ... With regards to agreements, ... under the express provisions of the armistice agreements, the armistice lines are purely 'dictated' by 'military considerations' and have no political significance.”

“Thus the area under Israel is nothing but military control without sovereignty whatsoever. Israel has no sovereign status in the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel’s position is one of aggression. ...”⁴³

In 1958 the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea met in Geneva, Switzerland. One of its primary, though undeclared purposes, was to formulate a set of international maritime laws that would be applicable to the Gulf of Aqaba. The end product was the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and the Convention on the High Seas.

The law declared in the Convention as applies to the Gulf of Aqaba so closely parallels the position taken by the United States Government shortly after Israel’s invasion of the Sinai peninsula, that a brief examination of the events at that time is necessary.

On February 2, 1957, the United Nations passed two resolutions calling on Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the armistice demarcation line without further delay. Israel stated that it was reluctant to do so, unless it had a guarantee that in return for withdrawal, the Gulf of Aqaba would remain open to its shipping and that it would be unequivocally recognized as an international waterway.

President Eisenhower stated on February 20, 1957, that

“With reference to the passage into and through the Gulf of Aqaba, we expressed the conviction that the Gulf constitutes international waters and that no nation has the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf. We announced that the United States was prepared to exercise this right itself and to join with others to secure recognition of this right.”⁴⁴

In reliance upon the United States position, the Israeli Government announced a full and prompt withdrawal from the Sharm al-Shaikh area and the Gaza Strip, in compliance with the General Assembly resolution of February 2, 1957. Foreign Minister Golda Meir of Israel, in addressing the General Assembly commented:

“My Government has subsequently learned with gratification that the other leading maritime powers are prepared to subscribe to the

(43) United Nations, General Assembly, 12th Session, *Official Records*, 697th Plenary Meeting, October 2, 1957, p. 233.

(44) United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. 36, 1957, p. 389.

doctrine set out in the U.S. memorandum of 11 February and have a similar intention to exercise their rights of free and innocent passage in the Gulf and the Straits.”⁴⁵

Secretary of State Dulles referred to the Gulf of Aqaba as a “highly complicated question of international law,” and went on to say:

“...in one sense of the world the Straits of Tiran are territorial, because they are less than six miles wide and the generally accepted zone of territorial control is three miles ... But it is also a principle of international law that even though waters are territorial, if they give access to a body of water which comprehends international waterways, there is a right of free and innocent passage ... the United States’ view is that the passage should be open unless there is a contrary decision by the International Court of Justice.”⁴⁶

In its deliberations on the right to free and innocent passage through straits, the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea was considerably aided by a decision rendered eleven years earlier in the *Corfu Channel Case*. The court stated the law thus:

“It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance with international custom that states in time of peace have a right to send their warships through straits used for international navigation between two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal state, provided that the passage is innocent.”⁴⁷

The rule was somewhat modified to fit the Straits of Tiran, which do not link two parts of the high seas. Article 16, paragraph 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea provides:

“There shall be no suspension of innocent passage of foreign ships through Straits which are used for international navigation between one part of the high seas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.”

(45) United Nations, General Assembly, 11th Session, *Official Records*, 666th Plenary Meeting, March 1, 1957, p. 1275.

(46) United States, Department of State, *Bulletin*, Vol. 36, 1957, pp. 482-489.

(47) International Court of Justice, *Corfu Channel Case*, *Report* 28, 1949.

Article 14, paragraph 4 declares that:

“Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.”

In summary, even accepting the Geneva Convention's Article concerning the right to free and innocent passage, the United Arab Republic, which still considers itself at war with Israel, could continue to blockade the Gulf of Aqaba insofar as Israeli ships and neutral ships bound for the Israeli port of Eilat are not engaged in an innocent passage.

Were Israel to occupy the status of a *de facto* littoral state, the United Arab Republic would still have the right of visit and search since Israeli ships would be forced to pass through territorial waters of the United Arab Republic, and these ships would be flying the flag of a belligerent nation. The result would be the same regardless if the Gulf of Aqaba were considered a closed inland sea or a non-territorial inland sea as Israel suggests. In either case, both the United Arab Republic and Israel are belligerents, and the law of war, and rights thereof, apply to the parties.

CONCLUSION

In the history of modern world conflicts there is no other instance where the very nature of the conflict can be examined and resolved in its entirety in a legal context. This does not imply that a legal determination is possible in the present practice of world affairs. Almost all the “political” issues of the Palestine question and the conflict between Israel and some of the Arab States are superimposed on legal claims and moral rationalizations. Thus it is theoretically possible and even realistic, in an anachronistic sense, to resolve the entirety of the Arab-Israeli conflict on a legal basis. Therefore the Arab States, and the U.A.R. in particular, seek to submit all or some of these legal issues to the International Court of Justice, but Israel consistently refuses.

The lack of compulsory international adjudication of world conflicts provides the perfect escape for any nation which lives in the world community by means of self-serving might, to the detriment of the peace-serving maintenance of world public order. The resolution of world conflicts by the rule of force and not by the rule of law is the most constant threat to world public order.

Those who by destiny or by choice are dedicated to the historical pursuit of truth and reject the hysterical search for pragmatic palliatives must reassert their commitment to the quest for world peace through the rule of law as the only attainable means for peace and human dignity.

LEGAL STATUS OF THE ARAB REFUGEES*

*by George J. Tomeb**

INTRODUCTION

It is a source of special gratification to participate in a symposium on the Middle East Crisis, in which not only is attention focused on the basic legal issues but in which these issues are considered as a test of international law. If in the course of the last fifty or even the last twenty years the underlying legal principles had been observed—respect for the rights of peoples, the duties and responsibilities of states, and the sanctity of international pledges and undertakings—the recent history of the Middle East would not have been the tragic sequence we have witnessed. Now, in this moment of anxiety and concern experienced by the Arab states, it is understandable that the Arabs should plead unremittingly for their usurped rights. They expect to make this plea in an environment of understanding for the great issues of mankind, the issues of war and peace, of equity, of sovereign and human rights—the environment of our world's faltering steps toward international law and under such law.

I

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

The problem of the legal status of the Arab refugees involves the issue of their rights, the basis of these rights, how these rights have been affirmed or denied, what recourse is open to the refugees and what recourse is open to those concerned on their behalf, against the denial of their rights.

(*) Reprinted from "Land and Contemporary Problems" School of Law. Duke University, Vol. XXXIII, Winter, 1968, No. 1, pp. 110-124.

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A. DEFINITION AND NUMBER OF REFUGEES

The Palestinian Arab refugees are primarily those victims of the 1947-48 tragedy, resulting in a mass exodus of the Arabs of Palestine, who have been living in exile since then. These are the *old refugees*. They number 1,344,576 registered with the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) according to the last census, with 722,687 in Jordan, 316,776 in Gaza, 160,723 in Lebanon, and 144,390 in Syria.¹ There is a second generation of refugees, children of parents themselves born after May 1948. These and the inhabitants of border villages who lost their property or their livelihood, or both, but did not lose the bare walls of their homes, have been ineligible for UNRWA assistance, despite extreme need.² UNRWA relief has always been withheld from 282,000 in villages on the Jordan frontier and in the Gaza Strip. Unquestionably, any Palestinian shut out from his homeland and stripped of money and property falls within the category of refugee. Half a million Palestinian Arabs, however, in addition to the numbers above given, have migrated and are self-supporting in the Arab states, the United States, Canada, South America, and other countries.

A second category of *intermediate refugees* includes over 11,000 Arab inhabitants of the Demilitarized Zones between Israel and the neighboring Arab countries and other areas who were made refugees without provision for help from UNRWA because they were expelled by Israel after July 1, 1952, the deadline for eligibility.³

The *new Arab refugees* are the victims of the June 5 war. According to the Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA submitted to the Twenty-second Session of the U.N. General Assembly, 234,000 Arabs were refugees from Jordan, Syria, and the Sinai peninsula following the crisis of June 5, 1967, in addition to 100,000 "old" refugees who fled their refugee camps (where they were registered with UNRWA) when these were overrun by the Israeli army.⁴ These numbers are on the increase day by day while the Israelis, systematically as in the past, apply terrorist methods to empty the Arab lands of their Arab inhabitants.

(1) Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 13, tables 1 and 2, at 59, 60, U.N. Doc. A/6713 (1967).

(2) Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency, 20 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 13, at 4-5, U.N. Doc. A/6013 (1965).

(3) *Ibid.*, at 4.

(4) Report of the Commissioner-General, *supra* note 1, at II.

II

RIGHTS OF THE REFUGEES

A. BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS

Since the events of the June 5 war, which are still fresh in our minds, the rights of the new refugees have been definitely defined. The Security Council on June 14, 1967 adopted Resolution 237,⁵ and the General Assembly reaffirmed it by an overwhelming majority on July 4.⁶ The Security Council Resolution specifically calls upon the Government of Israel "to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities." Both resolutions requested the Secretary General to follow their effective implementation and to report thereon. The Secretary General did report on these matters on September 15, 1967, after having sent a Special Representative, Nils Gussing, to the Middle East.⁷ As therein reported and subsequently up until the present time, Israel has persistently refused to implement the two resolutions and has adopted further illegitimate measures against the civilian population left in the occupied territories.

We submit it is clear that the Palestinian Arab refugees have certain inalienable rights:

1. the right of sovereignty over Palestine
2. the right to nationality—the Palestinian nationality
3. the right to individual property, together with the right to compensation for property arbitrarily expropriated or taken by force
4. the right of return
5. civil and religious rights
6. the right of visitation to the Holy Places
7. the rights of Palestinians inside Palestine.

These rights are not mere claims. There are international documents to validate them—treaties, statements, declarations, pledges, and scores of U.N.

(5) 22 U.N. SCOR, 1361st meeting 1 (1967).

(6) G.A. Res. 2252, U.N. GAOR, 5th Emer. Spec. Sess., Supp. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (1967).

(7) U.N. Doc. A/6797, Sept. 15, 1967.

resolutions. The denial of these rights constitutes, in essence, what is referred to as the Problem of the Palestine Arab Refugees, which has been and will continue to be the powderkeg of the Middle East. The first such transgression of these rights was the Balfour Declaration,⁸ which Henry Cattán has denounced in the following words:

"The Balfour Declaration of 1917 which the Zionists have utilized almost as a document of title for the establishment of a national home in Palestine has never possessed any juridical value. Emanating from the British Government which at no moment possessed any right of sovereignty over Palestine the Balfour Declaration could not validly recognize a right of sovereignty in favour of the Jews because a donor can not dispose of what does not belong to him."⁹

Historically, Syria, an integral part of the Arab world, stretched from the Taurus mountains on the north to Egypt on the south, with no intervening linguistic, natural, or racial boundaries of importance, and unbroken, in the nineteenth century, by any national frontier. The sea on the west, the mountains on the north, the desert south and east gave it unity. But by 1922 this area had been carved up in the interests of power politics. Palestine was one of the fragments, created to implement the Balfour Declaration and satisfy World Zionism. The official report of the Shaw Commission, which the British sent to Palestine in 1929, contained the comment: "Viewed in the light of the history of at least the last six centuries, Palestine is an artificial conception."¹⁰

In spite of these transgressions, pledges came from the Great Powers to safeguard Arab rights. One could cite the safeguard clause of the Balfour Declaration itself: "...it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." The Anglo-French Declaration to the Arabs of (undivided) Syria and Mesopotamia on November 7, 1918 is explicit: "The object aimed at by France and Great Britain ... is ... the establishment of National Governments and administrations deriving their authority from the initiative and free choice of the indigenous populations."¹¹

(8) The text is officially quoted in Cmd. No. 5479, at 22 (1937).

(9) H. Cattán, *To Whom Does Palestine Belong?* 5 (1967).

(10) Cmd. No. 3530 (1930), reprinted in J.M.N. Jeffries, *Palestine, The Reality* 2 (1939).

(11) Joint Anglo-French Declaration, Nov. 7, 1918, reprinted in Cmd No. 5479, at 25 (1937).

The King-Crane Commission, which was dispatched to the area by President Wilson so that he could ascertain the wishes of the population, recommended, in its report issued June 29, 1919, "that the unity of Syria be preserved, in accordance with the earnest petition of the great majority of the people of Syria." In the words of the report:

"The Commissioners began their study of Zionism with minds predisposed in its favour, but the actual facts in Palestine coupled with the force of the general principles proclaimed by the Allies and accepted by the Syrians have driven them to the recommendation here made."

....

"...For 'a national home for the Jewish people' is not equivalent to making Palestine into a Jewish State; nor can the creation of such a Jewish State be accomplished without the gravest trespass upon the 'civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine...' "12

Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations signed on June 22, 1919 is of particular importance, because it was the basis of what later came to be known as the "A" Mandates over Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria: "there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilization and that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant."13

Remembering the rights of the Palestine Arab refugees claimed above, let us very briefly look into the Palestine Mandate itself. Article 5 stipulated that "The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under control of, the Government of any foreign Power;" article 7 stated that "The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestine citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine."14

(12) [1919] 12 Foreign Rel. U.S. 745, 792 (1949), reprinted in J. Hurewitz, *Diplomacy in the Middle East—A Documentary Record 1914-1956*, Vol. II, at 66, 69, 70 (1956).

(13) *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements between the United States and Other Powers 1910-1923*, at 3336 3342 (Redmond ed., 1923).

(14) Cmd. No. 1785 (1922), reprinted in J. Hurewitz, Vol. II, *supra* note 12, at 106, 108.

Specific attention should be paid to article 7, because of the right of the refugees to Palestinian nationality, which has been referred to above. The article is unequivocal that the nationality is the Palestinian nationality, that the Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine may take up this nationality. Now this same nationality is denied to the people who comprised, when that article was formulated, ninety-eight per cent of the total population of Palestine, namely, the Arabs.

The history of Palestine from the institution of the Mandate until 1939 was the history of an Arab people in almost continuous armed rebellion as they saw themselves gradually subjugated by piecemeal conquest which became full conquest in 1947. They saw their right to self-determination being denied and minority status imposed upon them.

Meanwhile, the British government realized the conflict of interests between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. It would be cumbersome to discuss all the British statements of policy issued during this period affirming, time after time, Arab rights under the Mandate. Only two will be mentioned here. First, the Churchill Memorandum or "White Paper" of 1922, which states:

"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become 'as Jewish as England is English.' His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view. Nor have they at any time contemplated, as appears to be feared by the Arab Delegation, the disappearance or the subordination of the Arabic population, language or culture in Palestine. They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded *in Palestine*."¹⁵

Second, the British statement of May 1939, known as the MacDonald "White Paper," reaffirmed the obligation under the Mandate "to safeguard the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine," and asserted that "His Majesty's Government believe that the framers of the Mandate in which the Balfour Declaration was embodied could not have intended that

(15) *British Policy in Palestine*, Cmd. No. 1700, at 18 (1922), reprinted in J. Hurewitz, Vol. II, *supra* note 12, at 103, 104.

Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country.”¹⁶

These documents and pledges are not obsolete—not matters of academic interest only. They are ineradicable facts, to be reckoned with in assessing later events, and the denial to the Arab people of Palestine, by the act of the Great Powers in backing Zionist nationality claims and institutions, of their right to self-determination. That was the “original sin.” One has to remember that Syria, Lebanon, Transjordan, and Iraq all became independent states. Palestine alone, of the “A” Mandate countries, did not, and this was not a mere accident of history.

Even fifty years ago, according to the pronouncements of the Great Powers, the indissoluble, immutable character of fundamental human rights and the concept of right could not be altered by any act of man. If legality and ethics have not been dissipated in the interval, we must observe that the Zionist state of Israel, the aggressor in the June 5 war, had dubious rights to be in Palestine in the first place. Small wonder, then, that in the League of Nations and now in the United Nations the Palestine problem with its derivative disputes has been interminably on their agenda.

B. RIGHTS AS RECOGNIZED BY UNITED NATIONS

We turn now to the present, to see in what manner Israel has acted while the United Nations attempts, in debate and through processes of law, to adjudicate the derivative disputes.

The birth certificate of the State of Israel was General Assembly Resolution 181 of November 29, 1947,¹⁷ recommending the annexed Plan of Partition with Economic Union.¹⁸ Political forces were then at play to secure a favorable vote on Partition, at any cost and by any means. The Arab delegations requested that legal aspects of the Palestine question be referred to the International Court of Justice,¹⁹ as the recourse provided by article 36 of the U.N. Charter, and by article 26 of the Mandate, which provided:

(16) *Palestine: Statement of Policy*, Cmd. No. 6019, at 2, 3 (1939), reprinted in J. Hurewitz, Vol. II, *supra* note 12, at 218, 219, 220.

(17) 2 U.N. GAOR, Resolutions, at 131 (1947).

(18) *Ibid.*, at 132.

(19) 2 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question 299-300 (1947).

“The Mandatory agrees that if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another Member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice. ...”

It should be noted that Egypt and Iraq, which were among the sponsors of this request, had been members of the League of Nations, which made the provision just quoted unequivocal in its application. When the most important of these requests for adjudication was voted on, however, the count was 20 for, 21 against.²⁰ One vote decided the fate of Palestine.

This same birth certificate outlined the provisions of the declaration of independence of Israel. Article 10 of Part I of the Plan of Partition stipulated that “The Constituent Assembly of each State [*i.e.*, the proposed Jewish and Arab states] shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the [U.N. Palestine] Commission.” The constitution, according to paragraph (d) of this article, was to guarantee “equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms.”

On May 14, 1948 Count Folke Bernadotte was appointed Mediator²¹ pursuant to a resolution of the General Assembly.²² In his report to the Third Session of the General Assembly, he stated:

“6. [N]o settlement can be just and complete if recognition is not accorded to the right of the Arab refugee to return to the home from which he has been dislodged by the hazards and strategy of the armed conflict between Arabs and Jews in Palestine. The majority of these refugees have come from territory which, under the Assembly resolution of 29 November, was to be included in the Jewish State. ... It would be an offence against the principles of elemental justice if these innocent victims of the conflict were denied the right to return to their homes while Jewish immigrants flow into Palestine, and, indeed, at

(20) *Ibid.*, at 203.

(21) 3 U.N. SCOR, 299th meeting 4 (1948).

(22) G.A. Res. 186, U.N. GAOR, 2nd Spec. Sess., Supp. 2, at 5 (1948).

least offer the threat of permanent replacement of the Arab refugees who have been rooted in the land for centuries.”²³

Obviously the Zionists, who wanted a state as Jewish as England is English, could not have kept the Arabs in their state, since they would have constituted a majority in that state. Count Bernadotte goes on to affirm the large-scale looting, pillaging, plundering, and the destruction of villages without apparent military necessity. He states further: “The liability of the Provisional Government of Israel to restore private property to its Arab owners and to indemnify those owners for property wantonly destroyed is clear, irrespective of any indemnities which the Provisional Government may claim from the Arab States.”²⁴

But Count Bernadotte was assassinated, with one of his aides, in September 1948, in the holy city of Jerusalem, and the Security Council could only express shock at the “cowardly act” of a “criminal group of terrorists.”²⁵ A month later the Security Council noted with concern “that the Provisional Government of Israel has to date submitted no report to the Security Council or to the Acting Mediator regarding the progress of the investigation into the assassinations,” and reminded “...the Governments and authorities concerned that all the obligations and responsibilities set forth are to be discharged fully and in good faith.”²⁶

On December 11, 1948 the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 194, paragraph 11 of which

“...*resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible.”²⁷

The same resolution established a Conciliation Commission with the purpose of implementing the above-quoted paragraph.

(23) Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, 3 U.N. GAOR, Supp. II, at 14, U.N. Doc A/148 (1948).

(24) *Ibid.*

(25) S.C. Res. 57 (1948).

(26) S.C. Res. 59 (1948).

(27) U.N. GAOR, Resolutions, at 21, 24 (1948).

On May 11, 1949, the General Assembly voted to accept Israel as a member of the United Nations. Paragraph 4 of the preamble to this resolution took note of "the declaration by the State of Israel that it 'unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a Member of the United Nations.'"²⁸

On May 12, 1949, under the auspices of the U.N. Conciliation Commission, the Lausanne Protocol was signed.²⁹ In the text it is stated that

"The United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, anxious to achieve as quickly as possible the objectives of the General Assembly resolution of December 11, 1948, regarding refugees, the respect for their rights and the preservation of their property, as well as territorial and other questions, has proposed to the delegation of Israel and to the delegations of the Arab States that the "working documents" attached hereto be taken as basis for discussion with the Commission."³⁰

To this document was annexed a map on which were indicated the boundaries defined in the General Assembly Resolution 181(II) of November 29, 1947, which was taken as the basis of discussion with the Commission.³¹

What took place later is described by the Conciliation Commission in paragraph 23 of the Third Progress Report: "The signing of the Protocol of 12 May 1949 provided both a starting-point and framework for the discussion of territorial questions."³² The delegation of Israel submitted proposals regarding the territorial questions, demanding that the international frontiers of Mandatory Palestine be considered the frontiers of Israel. When the Arab delegations protested that these proposals constituted a repudiation by Israel of the terms of the Protocol signed on May 12, the Israeli delegation replied that "it could not accept a certain proportionate distribution of territory agreed upon in 1947 as a criterion for a territorial settlement in present circumstances."³³

(28) G.A. Res. 273, 3 U.N. GAOR, pt. 2, Resolutions, at 18 (1949). The quoted words are those of the Foreign Minister on behalf of the Israeli State Council. 3 U.N. SCOR, Supp. Dec. 1948, at 118, U.N. Doc. S/1093 (1948).

(29) Third Progress Report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, 4 U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Pol. Comm., Annex, Vol. II, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/927 (1949).

(30) *Ibid.*, at 9.

(31) G.A. Res. 181, *supra* note 17, at 150.

(32) Third Progress Report of the Palestine Conciliation Commission, *supra* note 29, at 7.

(33) *Ibid.*, at 8.

When the Israeli army stands where it stands today, in occupied territories of three Arab states, members of the United Nations, and makes the withdrawal of its troops conditional on having "secure and agreed upon borders," one can, ironically, see how history repeats itself.

C. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PARAGRAPH 11 OF RESOLUTION 194 OF DECEMBER 11, 1948

The provisions of paragraph 11, sub-paragraph 1, of the General Assembly Resolution 194 of December 11, 1948 affirm the right of the refugees to return to their homes and their right to compensation, classified as compensation to refugees *not* choosing to return, and compensation to refugees for loss of or damage to property.³⁴ These rights, according to paragraph 11, are to be implemented "under principles of international law or in equity." What is involved here?

In a working paper prepared by the Legal Department of the U.N. Secretariat in March 1950 for the guidance of the Conciliation Commission on the implementation of Paragraph 11 of Resolution 194,³⁵ the principles of repatriation and compensation were dealt with at length and many precedents cited, from the periods before and after the Second World War. It points out that in the former Axis and Axis-occupied countries—France, Rumania, Italy, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Holland, and Yugoslavia—various laws were passed between November 1944 and May 1945 for restitution or compensation to the victims of Nazi action. In the United States occupied zone of Germany a General Claims law was passed in 1949 for restitution to those Nazi victims who had "suffered damage to life and limb, health, liberty, possessions, property or economic advancement."

It further points out that during the Second World War the Institute of Jewish Affairs of the World Jewish Congress took up the question of compensation for Jewish refugees and in 1944 published a book, *Indemnities and Reparations*, by Nehemiah Robinson.³⁶ The thesis was that great injustice

(34) 3 U.N. GAOR, Resolutions, at 21, 24 (1948).

(35) Historical Survey of Efforts of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine to Secure Implementation of Paragraph II of G.A. Res. 194(III), U.N. Doc. A/AC.25/W81/Rev. 2 (1961).

(36) N. Robinson, *Indemnities and Reparations* (1944).

would result from following the general rule that states may seek indemnification from foreign nations only on behalf of their own citizens who were also their citizens at the time the injury occurred. Victims of Axis countries who later acquired the citizenship of these states or merely became residents there would be excluded. As to victims who remained in or would be willing to return to their homeland, the author makes a strong case that the United Nations must intervene on their behalf.

The working paper also refers to a refugee problem of comparatively recent date which presents some similarity with the problem of the Palestine refugees:

"The Pakistan and India Governments agreed on the principle that the ownership of refugees' property, movable as well as immovable, should remain vested in the refugees. Custodians were appointed to look after and manage such property on behalf of the owners. Similarly, registrars of claims were appointed and instructed to make records of the property left behind by the evacuees."³⁷

In contrast to all this, and the fact that Israeli, Zionist and Jewish organizations and Jewish individuals have had over a billion dollars in reparations from Germany,³⁸ we find Israeli legislation providing for confiscation of lands of "absentee" Arab owners. In three laws passed in 1948-49 (the Abandoned Areas Ordinance, the Absentee Property Regulations, and the Emergency Cultivation of Waste Lands Regulations) an "absentee" is defined as any person who was, on or after November 29, 1947 (the date of the General Assembly Resolution concerning partition of Palestine)—

- (a) a citizen or subject of any of the Arab states
- (b) in any of these states, for any length of time
- (c) in any part of Palestine outside the Israeli-occupied area
- (d) in any place other than his habitual residence, even if such place as well as his habitual abode were within Israeli-occupied territory.³⁹

A conquered, surrendered, or deserted area was declared to be abandoned and sold by the Israeli Custodian to a Development Authority.⁴⁰

(37) Historical Survey of Efforts, *supra* note 35.

(38) Selzer, *The Diplomacy of Atonement: Germany, Israel and the Jews*, Issues, Summer 1967, at 23.

(39) Absentees' Property Law, [1950] Laws of the State of Israel, Vol. 4, p. 68; reprinted in *Fundamental Laws of the State of Israel* 129 (J. Badi ed., 1961).

(40) See S. Hadawi, *Palestine, Loss of a Heritage*, 52 (1963).

Enquiry into this matter from the standpoint of the ownership of land in Palestine shows the unbelievable dimensions and grave iniquity of the liquidation of Arab rights and interests. It is established by official statistics of the Mandatory Government of Palestine,⁴¹ submitted to the United Nations in 1947, that Jewish property in Palestine did not exceed a proportion of 5.66 per cent of the total area of the country. The document contains a breakdown of the areas owned in each district. In 1948, in violation of the territorial limits proposed by the U.N. Partition Resolution, and in 1949, in violation of the armistice agreements concluded with the neighboring countries, Israel seized another 1,400 square miles of the territory of Palestine, gaining control over seventy-one per cent of the total area of the country. Under the Israeli legislation referred to, the Israeli authorities have legalized the seizure of Arab refugee property and assets and provided for the subsequent wholesale confiscation of further property belonging to Arabs, whether refugees or not.

For twenty years now the Conciliation Commission has failed to secure legitimate Arab rights. Nineteen resolutions passed from 1949 up till now, affirming and reaffirming those rights, regretting or deploring the non-implementation by Israel of previous resolutions, have been completely disregarded.

As to the rights of the "intermediate" refugees, article V of the General Armistice Agreement with Syria provided for the "return of civilians to villages and settlement in the Demilitarized Zone"⁴² and Security Council resolutions have urged on Israel their return forthwith. We get a picture of the situation from the Secretary General's Report on the Present Status of the Demilitarized Zone Set Up by the General Armistice Agreement Between Israel and Syria:

"16. The part of the central sector of the D/Zone which is on the eastern bank of the Jordan River is a narrow strip of land, generally controlled by Syria, while the western bank, generally controlled by Israel, is a large area. On the western bank Arab villages have been demolished, their inhabitants evacuated. The inhabitants of the villages of Baqqara and Ghanname returned following the Security Council resolution of 18 May 1951 (S/2517). They were later (on 30 October

(41) U.N. GAOR, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestine Question, Annex 25, at 270, 292-93; Appendix VI, at 307, U.N. Doc. A/AC.14/32 (1947).

(42) U.N. SCOR, Spec. Supp. 2, at 4 (1949).

1956) forced to cross into Syria where they are still living. Their lands on the western bank of the river, and Khoury Farm in the same area, are cultivated by Israel nationals."⁴³

The question duly arises here: Does the rule of force or a political decision terminate a legal right? Does conquest give the conqueror legal title to an occupied territory? Philip Marshal Brown has given one answer: "Military occupation by itself does not confer title or extinguish a nation. ... [S]o long as a people do not accept military conquest; so long as they can manifest, in one way or another, their inalterable will to regain freedom, their sovereignty even though flouted, restricted, and sent in exile still persists."⁴⁴

III

RESPONSIBILITY FOR INITIATION HOSTILITIES

Now, it is widely assumed that the Arabs themselves were responsible for the misfortunes that befell them, because they were the ones who defied the U.N. Partition Resolution, and that all went peacefully in Palestine from November 29, 1947 until May 14, 1948, when the establishment of Israel was declared, with the Arabs attacking the new state. It has been concluded that the Arabs brought about the loss of their own rights through their aggression. Such is not the case. Emphasis on the real facts of the history of this period is not only relevant but necessary in the assessment of Arab claims.

To put the matter in perspective, I cite two official communications, one a letter sent by Brigadier General Patrick J. Hurley, Personal Representative of President Roosevelt, to the President from Cairo on May 5, 1943:⁴⁵

"For its part, the Zionist organization in Palestine has indicated its commitment to an enlarged program for (1) a sovereign Jewish State which would embrace Palestine and probably Transjordan, (2) an eventual transfer of the Arab population from Palestine to Iraq, and (3) Jewish leadership for the whole Middle East in the fields of economic development and control."

(43) U.N. Doc. S/7573, at 4-5, Nov. 2, 1966.

(44) Brown, *Sovereignty in Exile*, 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 666, 667 (1941).

(45) Letter from Brig. Gen. Patrick Hurley to President Roosevelt, [1943] 4 Foreign Rel. U.S. 776, 777 (1964).

The other was a telegram sent from Cairo by U.S. Minister Kirk in Egypt to the Secretary of State on January 23, 1943:

"On the Jewish side I have found Zionist officials of the Jewish Agency uncompromisingly outspoken in their determination that Palestine at end of this war shall become not merely a national home for the Jews, but a Jewish state despite any opposition from the 1,000,000 Arabs living there. In various ways main result of many of their efforts seems to be to goad Palestinian Arabs into breaking informal truce that has existed since war began. ..."

"It is no secret that the Haganah, their secret Jewish military organization, has plans fully made and is well equipped not only with small arms, but also with tommy-guns and machine guns many of them purchased from Vichy French forces in Syria and smuggled into Palestine during past 2 years."⁴⁶

As to what really happened, rather than the propagandized version, we have the aid of I.F. Stone, American author of *Underground to Palestine* and *This is Israel*, who tells us that he

"first arrived in Palestine on Balfour Day, November 2, 1945, the day the Haganah blew up bridges and watch towers to begin its struggle against the British and immigration restrictions. The following spring I was the first newspaperman to travel with illegal Jewish immigrants from the Polish-Czech border through the British blockade. In 1947 I celebrated Passover in the British detention camps in Cyprus and in 1948 I covered the Arab-Jewish war."⁴⁷

In an article published August 3, 1967 he goes on to say:

"Jewish terrorism, not only by the Irgun, in such savage massacres as Deir Yassin, but in milder form by the Haganah, itself "encouraged" Arabs to leave areas the Jews wished to take over for strategic or demographic reasons. They tried to make as much of Israel as free of Arabs as possible."⁴⁸

(46) Letter from Minister Kirk to Secretary of State, [1943] 4 Foreign Rel. U.S. 747-48 (1964).

(47) I.F. Stone, in review of special issue of *Les Temps Modernes* entitled *Le Conflit Israëlo-Arabe*, The New York Review of Books, Aug. 3, 1967, at 12, col. 4. (Article reprinted in this book).

(48) *Ibid.*, at 10, col. 3.

He also points out that:

"The myth that the Arab refugees fled because the Arab radios urged them to do so was analyzed by Erskine B. Childers in the London *Spectator* May 12, 1961. An examination of British and U.S. radio monitoring records turned up no such appeals and 'even orders to the civilians of Palestine, to stay put'."⁴⁹

Irrefutable proof that the Zionists were the first aggressors in the war of 1947-48 is given by Menachem Begin, the alleged perpetrator of the Deir Yassin massacre, in his book *The Revolt*.⁵⁰ He tells us how the Haganah, the recognized "defense" force of the Zionist establishment in Palestine, having gone over to the principle of "offensive defense," joined forces with the Irgun, the terrorist group, and of the signing of a secret agreement between the Jewish Agency, as the supreme authority over the Haganah, and the Irgun Zvai Leumi for attack on the Arabs. This was in January 1948, while the duly constituted Commission of the United Nations was still seeking a peaceful implementation of the General Assembly's recommendation. In a chapter entitled "The Conquest of Jaffa" he states:

"In the months preceding the Arab invasion ... we continued to make sallies into the Arab area. In the early days of 1948, we were explaining to our officers and men, however, that this was not enough. Attacks of this nature carried out by any Jewish forces were indeed of great psychological importance; and their military effect, to the extent that they widened the Arab front and forced the enemies on to the defensive, was not without value. But it was clear to us that even most daring sallies carried out by partisan troops would never be able to decide the issue. Our hope lay in gaining control of territory."

"At the end of January, 1948, at a meeting of the Command of the Irgun in which the Planning Section participated, we outlined four strategic objectives: (1) Jerusalem; (2) Jaffa; (3) the Lydda-Ramleh plain; and (4) the Triangle."⁵¹

(According to the Partition plan, Jerusalem was to be a *corpus separatum*, and Jaffa was definitely to be part of the Arab state.) On April 25, 1948

(49) *Ibid.*, at 10, col. 2.

(50) M. Begin, *The Revolt, Story of the Irgun* (1951).

(51) *Ibid.*, at 348.

(three weeks before the alleged Arab initiation of hostilities), Begin addressed his troops, en route to Jaffa: "Men of the Irgun! We are going out to conquer Jaffa. We are going into one of the decisive battles for the independence of Israel."⁵² After an account of the battle, he assures us that "The conquest of Jaffa was one of the fateful events in the Hebrew war of independence."⁵³

Thus the Palestine refugee problem originated, for Jaffa was practically all Arab in population. Before any Arab soldier set foot on the soil of Palestine, 400,000 Arabs had fled their Palestinian homeland in terror.

Of course, the Zionists had their own view of activities such as this, expressed by a member of the Haganah, Munya M. Mardor (now Director-General of the Israel Weapons Research and Development Authority) in a book entitled *Haganah*.⁵⁴ He tells of secret arms purchases in foreign countries: "We were conspirators, outside the law, and yet obeying what to us was a higher law."⁵⁵

In the name of compromise, realism, and *fait accompli*, the Arabs are asked to recognize these achievements "outside the law" and admit the "conspirators" as lawful and legal successors to their land and rights.

CONCLUSION

It must have become clear that the legal imperatives affirming Arab rights in Palestine are firm and unequivocal, but that Israel and World Zionism have been able to flout them and disregard not only all international safeguards and guarantees prior to 1947, but also the scores of U.N. resolutions concerning Arab rights.

The argument has time and again been made that the Arabs should accept the *fait accompli* established by Israel, but between 1957 and today there has been not one but several *faits accomplis* to subvert Arab rights.

The Arabs prefer to see not only what is, but what ought to be and what might be, and agree with U.S. Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz

(52) *Ibid.*, at 354.

(53) *Ibid.*, at 371.

(54) M. Mardor, *Haganah* (1957).

(55) *Ibid.*, at 230.

when he told the Labor Ministers' Conference in Venezuela: "Change is our ally, and we face squarely those who fight change because the status quo has been good to them. The divine right of the successful is as false a notion as the divine right of kings."⁵⁶

Does a *fait accompli* constitute a norm for international law and behavior—since we are dealing with basic legal considerations? We hold, with the two American legal authorities quoted below, that no *fait accompli* can establish a precedent to be accepted in international law so long as the victims of the *fait accompli* object to it.

In 1954 the Legal Adviser to the State Department, Mr. Herman Phleger, made this statement:

"International law has been defined as those rules for international conduct which have met general acceptance among the community of nations. ..."

....

"But there is such a thing as international law. It has had a long and honorable, though chequered, career. I predict that it will play an even more important role in world affairs in the future than it has in the past. Indeed, in this rapidly shrinking world, it becomes increasingly evident that our survival may depend upon our success in substituting the rule of law for the rule of force."⁵⁷

From the American Law Institute comes a *Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States*, which contains the following:

" e. *Objection to practise as means of preventing its acceptance as rule of law.* The growth of practice into a rule of international law depends on the degree of its acceptance by the international community. If a state initiates a practice for which there is no precedent in international law, the fact that other states do not object to it is significant evidence that they do not regard it as illegal. If this practice becomes more general without objections from other states, the practice may give rise to a rule of international law. Because failure to object to practice may amount to recognition of it, the objection by a state to a

(56) *New York Times*, May 11, 1966, at 18, col. 2.

(57) M. Whiteman, *Digest of International Law* 2 (1963).

practice of another is an important means of preventing or controlling in some degree the development of rules of international law.”⁵⁸

The *fait accompli* of Israel, doing away with Arab rights, has been objected to not only by the Arab states, but by the majority of Members of the United Nations, who throughout twenty years past have affirmed and reaffirmed the rights of Arab refugees for return or compensation. The United States Government has voted consistently in favor of those resolutions, while regrettably opposing draft resolutions designed to safeguard Arab property rights.

The most succinct and telling objection to Israel's *fait accompli* that I call to mind is implicit in the words of Secretary General U Thant, in his Annual Report to the 22nd Session of the General Assembly: “People everywhere, and this certainly applies to the Palestinian refugees, have a natural right to be in their homeland and to have a future.”⁵⁹

(58) Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § I, comment *e* (1965).

(59) 22 U.N. GAOR, Supp. IA, at 7, U.N. Doc. A/6701/Add. I (1967).

THE PALESTINE REFUGEE PROBLEM*

by John H. Davis

A tragic by-product of the creation of the State of Israel has been the emergence of a Palestine refugee problem of sizeable proportion, for which no solution has been effected. In December 1949, the United Nations Economic Survey Mission for the Middle East reported that an estimated 726,000 Palestinians, who had fled from their homes during the 1948 conflict, were now refugees because their return home was being blocked by Israel. Of these, 652,000 were in need.¹

The working definition of a refugee eligible for assistance used by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA)² has, from the beginning, been a restricted one which excluded more than 200,000 needy persons from among the permanent residents of the Gaza Strip, the frontier villages of Jordan and certain Bedouin tribes: persons who had lost their means of livelihood, but not their actual homes. In general, the economic status of these people has been just as precarious as that of the refugees cared for by UNRWA.

By May 31, 1967, the number of refugees registered with UNRWA totalled 1,345,000, of whom 846,000 were full ration recipients. Of this total, 723,000 lived in Jordan, 317,000 in the Gaza Strip, 161,000 in Lebanon and 144,000 in Syria.³ Fifty per cent of them were 17 years of age or younger,

(*) Reprinted from *The Evasive Peace* by the author (London: John Murray, 1968), pp. 53-72.

(1) United Nations document A/AC.25/6, Part I, p. 22. Israel has contended that the number of refugees was about 400,000: see *The Arab refugees: Arab Statements and the Facts*, Jerusalem, 1961.

(2) This definition is 'a person whose normal residence was Palestine for a minimum of two years immediately preceding the outbreak of the conflict in 1948 and who, as a result of this conflict, has lost both his home and his means of livelihood.' It has been extended to cover the children of such persons.

(3) United Nations document A/6713, tables I and 2, pp. 59-60.

70 per cent came from rural, and 30 per cent from urban backgrounds, and 93 per cent were of the Moslem faith, the remainder being mostly Christians. At that time an estimated 75 per cent of the male population were physically fit for strenuous work.

Palestine in 1948 had been among the most advanced areas of the Arab world, particularly in terms of general economic growth, an emerging middle class, and literacy. As late as 1954, Don Peretz estimated that 350 of the approximately 400 Jewish settlements created after 1948 were on refugee property, and that two-thirds of the cultivated land acquired by Israel had been refugee-owned.⁴ Although the United Nations, with the almost unanimous support of its members, has annually reaffirmed that the Palestine refugees should be repatriated or compensated for their losses, neither action has been taken, with the result that the number of refugees has grown through natural increase year by year.

The question of the cause of the Arab flight from Palestine at the time Israel was created has been much debated, often with more heat than light. The United Nations Palestine Commission informed the Security Council that, as early as January 1948, the British High Commissioner had reported a 'steady exodus' of Arab middle class families, who could afford to leave the country and who took with them their household possessions.⁵ By March 1948, according to Zionist sources, some 40,000 Arabs had left the Arab town of Jaffa and the mixed Arab-Jewish city of Haifa. In so doing, they were repeating a behaviour pattern pursued during the disordered years of the so-called 1936-1939 Arab rebellion when, it is calculated, a similar number temporarily left Palestine, the majority to return as soon as calm was restored. But in 1948, the more well-to-do were soon followed by the fellahin and villagers. The flight gathered strength, and after the massacres of Deir Yassin and Katamon, it became a stampede. By May 15, some 250,000 refugees had left Jewish-occupied territory.⁶

Deir Yassin, an Arab village to the west of Jerusalem, was attacked on April 9, 1948 by the two Jewish terrorist groups, the Irgun Zvai Leumi

(4) Don Peretz, *Israel and the Palestine Arabs*.

(5) United Nations document A/AC.21/9.

(6) For a full discussion of the Arab flight from Palestine and its causes, see Rony E. Gabbay, *A Political Study of the Arab-Jewish Conflict: The Arab Refugee Problem (A Case Study)*, Chapter I, Librairie E. Droz, Geneva, 1959.

and the Stern Gang. According to the eye-witness account of the International Red Cross Representative, 254 men, women and children were slaughtered and many of their bodies stuffed into a well.⁷ Writing of the consequences of this act, the commander of the Irgun, Menachem Beigin, subsequently wrote that the Arabs throughout the country

“were seized with limitless panic and started to flee for their lives. Thus Kolonia village which had previously repulsed every attack of the Haganah, was evacuated overnight and fell without further fighting. Beit-Ikso was also evacuated. Those two villages overlooked the main road and their fall, together with the capture of Kastel by the Haganah, made it possible to keep open the route to Jerusalem. In the rest of the country, too, the Arabs began to flee in terror even before they clashed with Jewish forces.”⁸

Once the second phase of the war commenced on May 15, 1948, after Israel became a State, the Arab exodus gained momentum. Whenever the Israelis advanced into Arab areas, the population fled before them towards the Arab lines or frontiers. By the time the second truce began on July 12, only 170,000 Arabs remained in Israel.

The causes of the panic flight of nearly three-quarters of a million men, women and children from their homes have been obscured by veils of propaganda. It is only recently that careful sifting of the evidence has helped to clarify the picture. For long, a widely publicized view was that the refugees left voluntarily or because the Arab authorities themselves ordered them to leave, to clear the way of the advancing armies of the Arab States. As General Glubb has pointed out, voluntary emigrants do not leave their homes with only the clothes they stand up in, or in such hurry and confusion that husbands lose sight of wives and parents of their children.⁹ Nor does there appear to be one shred of evidence to substantiate the claim that the fleeing refugees were obeying Arab orders. An exhaustive examination of the minutes, resolutions and press releases of the Arab League, of the files of leading Arabic newspapers, of day-by-day monitorings of broadcasts from Arab capitals and secret Arab radio stations, failed to reveal a single reference, direct or indirect,

(7) Jacques de Reynier, *A Jérusalem un drapeau flottait sur la ligne de feu*, Neuchâtel, 1950, pp. 71-78.

(8) Menachem Beigin, *The Revolt: The Story of the Irgun*, New York, 1951, p. 164.

(9) Glubb, *op. cit.*, p. 251.

to an order given to the Arabs of Palestine to leave.¹⁰ All the evidence is to the contrary; that the Arab authorities continuously exhorted the Palestinian Arabs not to leave the country. Thus, on March 7 and April 4, 1948, Damascus radio broadcast an Arab Higher Committee communiqué urging all government employees and police to remain at their posts. On May 4, in a message relayed by the *Sharq el Adna* radio station, King Abdullah of Transjordan appealed to all Arabs who had left Palestine to return there, while Beirut radio reported a general call-up of all Palestinian males between the ages of 18 and 58 for military service. On May 15, the Arab radio stations reiterated these appeals and called also on religious functionaries to carry on their duties. At this point, even the Haganah radio repeated Arab announcements that visas were to be denied to departing Arabs and levies made on refugees moving from district to district. What now seems clear, however, is that the Arab Governments, by inept and exaggerated publicising of Jewish atrocities in press and radio in an effort to justify to the world the impending arrival of their troops in Palestine to 'restore order,'¹¹ in fact unwittingly added to the panic and confusion in a population that had for years witnessed the spectacle of Jewish terrorists holding the armed might of the Mandatory Power to ransom and therefore had cause to fear the ruthless efficiency of their tactics.

Panic and bewilderment thus played decisive parts in the flight. But the extent to which the refugees were savagely driven out by the Israelis as part of a deliberate master-plan has been insufficiently recognized.

With hindsight, it seems improbable that it should have been otherwise. The partition boundaries approved by the United Nations in November 1947 had left the Jewish State with a total of 495,000 Arabs, including 90,000 Bedouin, as compared with 498,000 Jews. Through subsequent armed conquest and as a result of the Armistice conditions, Israel received a further 3,496 square kilometres, which contained an Arab and a Jewish population of 397,000 and 157,000 persons respectively—bringing the Arab numbers in the larger area to 892,000, in contrast to a total of 655,000 Jews. Had the Arabs remained in their homes, they would thus have outnumbered the Jews

(10) Walid Khalidi, "Why Did the Palestinians Leave?", *Middle East Forum*, July 1959. See also Erskine Childers' article in *The Spectator*, May 12, 1961, and subsequent correspondence.

(11) See cables of the Egyptian and Jordanian Governments to the Security Council, United Nations documents S/743 and S/748 of May 15 and 17, 1948.

by a ratio of roughly four to three. Significantly, this would have placed the Arabs in a decisive majority position in a newly established Jewish State. For tactical reasons, the Zionists had accepted at the United Nations the huge Arab minority envisaged by the partition plan, just as they had accepted the equally distasteful internationalization of Jerusalem. But, in fact, the little State had overwhelming reasons, over and above ordinary considerations of Arab enmity, for wishing to get rid of its Arab minority. As we have seen, the whole Zionist concept, from the days of Herzl onwards, rested on the basis of a State existing in Palestine for the benefit of a Jewish population. How could the new State of Israel fulfil this role unless the Jewish population constituted a strong majority?

In the first months after the United Nations vote on November 29, 1947, however, the Jewish official line was to make no overt attempt to drive the Arabs from Palestine; its aim, quite obviously, being that of showing the world that, as envisaged in the partition plan, a Jewish State with Jews and Arabs living side by side could actually work. Accordingly, in daily broadcasts, the Haganah mobile stations admonished the Arab population to remain quiet; but added such stern warnings as "Haganah values the cooperation of peaceful Arabs but is resolved to tame the wicked."¹² This policy did not change until March 1948, when United States support for partition at the United Nations wavered and all but flickered out, and when the Zionists rallied their full strength to ensure that their State could nevertheless be proclaimed as a *fait accompli*. It was then that they shifted to a policy of deliberate pressure on the Arabs to flee, ranging from expert psychological warfare to ruthless expulsion by force.

That this was a deliberate and organized campaign to motivate Arab departure was clear to neutral observers on the spot. The representative of the Red Cross, impeded for days in his attempts to investigate the Irgun's butchery at Deir Yassin, reported that it had all the evidence of a "deliberate massacre" by a band "admirably disciplined and acting only under orders."¹³ When Reynier returned to Jerusalem, the Jewish authorities expressed horror and disgust at his report, but on that very same day ratified an agreement, which had been concluded several days before the massacre, subordinating Irgun forces to Haganah control within the official army of the emerging State.¹⁴

(12) A Haganah broadcast on January 20, 1948, quoted by Gabbay, p. 67.

(13) Reynier, pp. 71-74.

(14) Kirk, *op. cit.*, p. 261.

Evidence that the wholesale clearance of the Arab population from areas allotted to the Zionists, or seized by them, was no coincidence, but the result of an overall preconceived Zionist plan, has now been put on the record (and in English) by Professor Khalidi in a published account of the Zionist "Plan Dalat" taken from official Zionist sources.¹⁵ This was the Zionist High Command's general plan for military operations in April and early May 1948, entailing the destruction of the Palestine Arab community and the expulsion of the bulk of the Arabs living in areas which were to form the State of Israel. "Plan Dalat," or "Plan D," for short, visualized a series of operations which, if the regular Arab armies had not intervened and the United Nations had not succeeded in imposing truces, might have resulted in a Zionist occupation of the whole of Palestine—this being its goal. Among the operations that were successfully carried out were the capture of Haifa and the rout of its Arab inhabitants (half of the city's population); the capture of the Arab city of Jaffa and the expulsion of its population; the clearance of eastern Galilee of Arabs, and the destruction of the Arab villages connecting that area with Tiberias; the occupation of Beisan, and the ejection of the semi-nomadic Bedouin communities in the neighbourhood; the occupation of the Arab residential quarters of the New City of Jerusalem and the occupation of Acre and the expulsion of the Arab inhabitants of Western Galilee (allotted to the Arabs under the partition plan). Yigal Allon, head of the Palmach (the striking force of the Haganah), referring to the tactics used in the Galilee campaign, subsequently wrote:

"There were left before us only five days before the threatening date, May 15. We saw a need to clear the inner Galilee and to create a Jewish territorial succession in the entire area of upper Galilee. The long battles had weakened our forces, and before us stood great duties of blocking the routes of the Arab invasion. We therefore looked for means which did not force us into employing force in order to cause the tens of thousands of sulky Arabs who remained in Galilee to flee... I gathered all of the Jewish mukhtars, who have contact with Arabs in different villages and asked them to whisper in the ears of some Arabs that a great Jewish reinforcement has arrived in Galilee and that it is going to burn all of the villages of the Huleh. They should suggest to these Arabs, as their friends, to escape while there is still time...

(15) Walid Khalidi, "Plan Dalat—The Zionist Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine," *Middle East Forum*, Beirut, November, 1961.

The tactic reached its goal completely. The building of the police station at Halsa fell into our hands without a shot. The wide areas were cleaned..."¹⁶

The result of "Plan D" and of the equally ruthless expulsions which followed during the later course of the war was that, by September 1948, hundreds of thousands of Arab people had lost their homes, their possessions and their means of livelihood.

On September 16, 1948, the United Nations Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, declared—one day before his assassination—that

"the right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes should be affirmed and made effective."¹⁷

On the basis of Bernadotte's initiative, the General Assembly, on December 11, 1948, adopted resolution 194 (III) which, among other things, called for action designed to assist the Palestine refugees through a combination of programmes that would provide repatriation, compensation and resettlement. The pertinent paragraph of the resolution reads as follows:

"The General Assembly...

II. *Resolves* that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation..."

As yet, no significant progress has been made under this policy to assist the refugees of 1948. Nor has any effective programme of implementation yet been launched by the United Nations. The Arab Governments have consistently

(16) Yigal Allon, *Ha Sepher Ha Palmach*, Vol. II, p. 268. (Translation quoted in Professor Khalidi's article, *op. cit.*).

(17) United Nations Document A/648.

supported the Palestine Arabs in their refusal to accept compensation for property unless it were accompanied by the opportunity freely to choose repatriation. In addition, the Arab Governments have requested that an annual rental equivalent be paid to the refugees for the full period during which Israel has occupied their properties. Israel has consistently refused repatriation—except to unite individuals with families still living within her borders, under which concession some 40,000 Palestine Arabs have returned home, mostly during the period 1948-1950—and has rejected payment of a rental equivalent.¹⁸ The result is that for almost twenty years the people of Israel have occupied and used the properties that belong to these refugees, without payment of rentals, indemnities or compensation, and without granting the refugees the right of repatriation

The fact is that the Palestine refugee problem has never been well understood in the Western world. One common belief, even among responsible persons, is that the refugees have remained unsettled and unemployed largely because the Arab Governments have inhibited their settlement or have even held them as hostages by not allowing them to settle or go to work. Supposedly, their motivation has been the desire to keep alive the Palestine issue in the eyes of the world. The evidence is quite to the contrary. Following the upheaval of 1948, virtually all able-bodied male refugees who possessed skills needed in Arab countries or, for that matter, elsewhere, found jobs almost immediately and became self-supporting and have never been dependent on international charity. This group comprised some twenty per cent of the total working force which left their homes in Palestine in 1948-1949; for the most part they were persons from the urban sector of Palestine, their good fortune being that the world needed the skills which they possessed.

In contrast, the farming sector of the refugee population, which comprised about 70 per cent of the total refugee numbers in 1948, did not fare so well. Their problem has been, and is, that as refugees they became surplus farm workers in an era when the world at large, and Arab countries in par-

(18) This figure is disputed by certain Arab experts. For example, Sami Hadawi contends that 35,000 of this number were Palestine Arabs who left their homes during the height of the 1948 conflict but remained within the area that is now Israel; some of them were for a while lost to their families and others blocked from returning home and forced to settle elsewhere. Reference is made later in this chapter to arrangements made for the return to Israel-occupied areas of some of the persons who fled or were displaced during the hostilities of June 1967.

ticular, already had a surplus of people in their rural sectors. In fact, in the Arab countries as a group rural youth is still reaching maturity at a rate per generation more than three times that required to replace the farm parents; a situation that is further aggravated by the fact that the typical rural holding is already too small adequately to support a family of eight to ten persons, or use modern equipment efficiently. Hence, it was the rural refugees from Palestine who, for the most part, became dependent on international charity. The reason they became dependent was not that they were held as hostages, but that they were unemployable under the competitive employment conditions which then prevailed, and for that matter prevail to this day.

But the problem of the initial refugees was only the beginning. Since 1948, an average of about 30,000 children from dependent refugee families have grown to maturity each year. This means that, during an interval of almost two decades, a total of over 500,000 young refugees have reached maturity. To understand their plight, one has merely to consider that in the Middle East, as in all developing areas of the world, well over 95 per cent of all youths learn work habits and skills by working beside their fathers. Because, in general, rural refugee fathers have been unemployed, their sons have had but limited opportunity, if any at all, to learn even the self-discipline of work or the skills of their fathers. Therefore, in competition with other young people, particularly the indigenous rural boys, who are migrating from farms to urban centres in vast numbers, the maturing refugee boy has been and is at a serious disadvantage. This is not, however, because he is being held as a hostage, or because he does not want to work, but because to a serious degree he, too, is unemployable in the existing labour market. The greater tragedy is that these young people, as well as their fathers, are not just unemployable in the countries where they reside, but in the world at large, and it is for this reason, above others, that they continue to be forced to live the life of dependent refugees.

Most particularly those refugee youths who have reached maturity during the past decade will never be strong competitors for jobs as farmers because they did not grow up working on the land and did not otherwise receive agricultural training. (Since land was not available for them, little purpose would have been served by giving them such training.) Furthermore, the indigenous rural population in all Arab countries, and throughout the world, is producing far more strong candidates for agricultural work—candidates who have had farming experience—than available farm land can possibly accommodate.

Even today, one frequently hears the argument that all able-bodied Palestine refugees might readily be employed on the soil in Syria and Iraq, if land development were accelerated in those countries. This is, of course, not true, and will not be true in the future; nor would it be true if one were able to set aside all political considerations, including the fact that the Arab Governments, starting from the premise that the refugees have a right to return to their homeland, do not give them priority over their own citizens for land and jobs. The point is that the indigenous sons of the rural sector of these countries are, and will continue to be, stronger candidates for employment in agriculture than the young refugees, who have not had the advantage of growing up working the land with their fathers.

Yet, even against this background, it can be stated categorically that the Palestine refugee problem has always been, and remains today, capable of gradual solution. The essential ingredients are the presence of jobs, mostly urban, and the provision of appropriate training for the young people. These factors, together, hold the key to making the Palestine refugees both employable and employed.

It is in the field of education that the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) has made its most significant contribution towards solving the refugee problem. Set up by the United Nations General Assembly in 1949, UNRWA has, through the years, provided food, shelter, health and welfare services for a refugee community which now numbers well over a million persons. It has also provided education for a school population of more than a quarter of a million young people, including general education, vocational and teacher training, and university education. Virtually all of the more than 6,000 young men and women who have passed through its training centres have found employment. In addition, some 1,500 of the 5,000 refugee teachers employed in UNRWA schools are now annually being given in-service training for the purpose of improving teaching standards, up-grading student performance, and enabling UNRWA teachers to become accredited in the respective host countries—all of which contributes further towards making the refugees employable. Parenthetically one might add that these services provided by UNRWA have added materially to the stability of the region—a factor often overlooked in assessing the work of the Agency.

In carrying out its task, UNRWA has enjoyed good cooperation with other United Nations agencies, such as the World Health Organization and

the United Nations Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization, and has been assisted by the valiant efforts of the numerous voluntary agencies that work in the region, some of which carried, with United Nations financial assistance, the full burden of refugee relief during the months immediately following the 1948 conflict, before UNRWA came into being.

The refugee host countries of Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Lebanon have themselves been generous and hospitable to the refugees. In terms of direct assistance, they have spent more than \$100,000,000, mostly for education, health services, camp sites, housing and road improvement, and the maintenance of security in the refugee camps. In addition, the people of these countries have borne with courage the economic, social and other sacrifices and hardships resulting from the presence of large numbers of refugees within their borders. Contrary to much Western thinking, the Arab host Governments have also helped qualified young refugees to obtain employment, both within the host countries and elsewhere. The result is that today tens of thousands of young Palestinians—mostly men, but an ever-growing number of women—are employed outside the host countries, thousands even in Western countries, particularly in Europe. In 1963, Sweden accepted, at her expense, fifty selected graduates from UNRWA vocational training schools for a year's factory experience and advanced training in Sweden. This experiment proved so successful that in each subsequent year Sweden has taken a similar new group of UNRWA graduates for training. In addition, Sweden has financed, through UNRWA, the building and equipping of an advanced technical training institute in Lebanon, where selected individuals from amongst the young men who have had a year's experience abroad can have a further year's training to qualify them as vocational training instructors or industrial foremen. This work is now well established and has had the support of Arab Governments. Recently other countries, notably Federal Germany, Switzerland and France, have begun taking UNRWA graduates for employment or for advanced factory experience and training; all of which has taken place without opposition from the Arab Governments. In general, the young men who go abroad to work, help to support their families at home.

For more than a decade UNRWA has also awarded from 600 to 800 university scholarships per year to outstanding refugee candidates—mostly for undergraduate studies in Arab countries. This means that each year some 200 young refugees sponsored by UNRWA graduate from universities. In addition, a significant number of refugees have found it possible to get advanced

education under the sponsorship of Arab Governments or international voluntary organizations, or through grants from business firms, individuals or other members of their own family already gainfully employed.

In general, the Arab people and Governments have looked favourably on education for the refugees, as evidenced by their cooperation with UNRWA and their own investment of tens of millions of dollars for refugee education. Education for refugees is regarded by most Arabs as essential, regardless of the way in which Arab-Israeli conflict is ultimately resolved; they recognize that young people must be made employable, wherever they may live, even in the case of those who might at some future date be repatriated.

This belief in education is further evidenced by the fact that when UNRWA decided to support advanced secondary education, it was able to negotiate with the host Governments to provide the facilities and schooling, with UNRWA merely compensating them on a per student basis for the services rendered. When UNRWA, because of budgetary limitations, rigidly limited the number of secondary students it could support, the Governments proceeded to admit additional refugee students at their own expense. This happened to such an extent that in certain countries the total enrolment of secondary refugee students has become more than twice the number supported by UNRWA.¹⁹

Considering that the number of young refugees who have reached maturity since 1948 is now in excess of half a million, whereas the number of persons who have received assistance towards vocational, teacher or university training is about 10,000, it is not difficult to see why the number of refugees receiving assistance from UNRWA has grown steadily, year by year. Had the world community or, for that matter, the major powers, from 1950 onward launched a vital programme in support of education and general economic development, with appropriate emphasis on specialized training in the host countries, the refugee problem would by now be well on its way to solution. Had this been done, it is probable that UNRWA would not have found it necessary to enter the educational field as extensively as it has done, if at all. The strongest evidence in support of this conclusion is the Agency's success in securing the agreement of the host Governments to provide upper secondary education for the refugees, with UNRWA merely subsidizing part of the cost.

(19) United Nations document A/6713, p. 72, table 14.

With such an approach, had it worked, the education programme for refugees could have become merged with that of the host countries. This, combined with appropriate international assistance for development, would have done much to raise the level of economic progress throughout the Middle East, giving employment to both refugees and others. Despite UNRWA's failure, on several occasions, to settle refugees on the land or through special works projects, there is solid reason to believe that emphasis on a broad education effort, coupled with a general development programme, would have succeeded.

In general, opposition to UNRWA's land settlement projects, which have been by far its largest undertaking, arose because these projects involved the award of land to refugee settlers, in preference to the thousands of indigenous farmers' sons who were eager for land; a type of opposition one would expect to find in any developing area where arable land was scarce. Thus, the widespread Western belief that the Arab host Governments have opposed the settlement of the refugees as part of a policy of holding them as hostages in their struggle against Israel is mostly a myth. So, too, is the assumption that a solution to the refugee problem would have brought to an end Arab hostility towards Israel. As will be explained subsequently, the refugee problem is but a side aspect of a more complex and basic cause of conflict.

In the aftermath of the war of 1967 and of Israel's occupation of the West Bank area of Jordan, the Sinai peninsula, the Gaza Strip and the Golan Heights of Syria, a critical new refugee problem emerged. By December 1967, an estimated 245,000 persons had fled from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip into the area of Jordan East of the river; 116,000 had left the Israeli-occupied area of Syria, and some 61,000 persons, including 11,000 from Gaza and 50,000 from the Sinai peninsula had taken refuge in Egypt. Of this total, about 145,000 were UNRWA-supported refugees, who had been uprooted for a second time.

At the Special Session of the General Assembly, convened in June 1967, a resolution was adopted calling on Israel to permit these new refugees to return to their homes in the occupied areas. Although some 85 per cent of those who had fled to the East Bank filled out applications asking to return, as of January 1, 1968, only about 15,000 had been admitted by Israel. Meanwhile, additional refugees continued to flee from the Gaza Strip and the West Bank area to East Jordan—the total number moving in that direction

during the months of September, October and November exceeding the total number of refugees re-admitted to the West Bank area by Israel.

On January 1, 1968, there lived within Israel and the areas under her occupation an estimated 2.5 million Jews and 1.6 million Arabs. Of these, almost all the Jews and about 300,000 Arabs lived in Israel itself, and 1,400,000 Arabs resided in the occupied areas. Thus, of the combined population only about 60 per cent were Jews and the remaining 40 per cent were almost entirely Arabs.

Israel's desire for land, and for minimizing the Arab population on that land, is also reflected in her policy of land seizure and occupation following the fighting of June 1967. Prime Minister Eshkol, in a statement on October 30, 1967, opening a session of the Knesset, said: "It is our intention to continue to develop East Jerusalem [the former Jordanian section] ... A special team is preparing a comprehensive master plan for the eastern city. It will include about 1,000 to 1,500 housing units."²⁰ In the same address, commenting on other occupied areas, the Prime Minister said: "I must add that the area that was under Jordanian occupation, and the Gaza region, which the Egyptians ruled, were held by them not of right but by force, as the result of military aggression and occupation." The strong implication is that Israel now has acquired a right to hold these areas by "military aggression and occupation" and even without reference to the wishes of the 1.4 million indigenous Arabs who live there.

In an interview carried on the Columbia Broadcasting System's programme 'Face the Nation' on June 11, 1967, General Moshe Dayan replied as follows to a question as to Israel's ability to absorb the Arab population in the newly occupied areas:

"Economically we can; but I think that is not in accord with our aims in the future. It would turn Israel into either a binational or poly-Arab-Jewish state instead of a Jewish state, and we want to have a Jewish state."²¹

(20) *New York Times*, October 31, 1967—article datelined Jerusalem October 31, carrying statement "Following are excerpts from a speech by Premier Levi Eshkol in the Knesset today."

(21) Quoted by I.F. Stone in "From a New Approach to the Israeli-Arab Conflict," *The New York Review of Books*, August 3, 1967, p. 3. (Article reprinted in this book).

Israel's insistence that peace talks must take place directly between herself and the Arab States and before she withdraws her forces from any of the occupied areas, places her in the position that she can argue over territorial boundaries and even claim land in addition to that held on June 1967. Thus, it would seem that Israel's decisive action to hold occupied territory is motivated by a combination of a desire for land for settlement, a belief that the new boundaries provide greater security, and an intention to be in a strong bargaining position at the conference table, if and when negotiations take place.

Any attempt to examine the Palestine refugee problem in its various aspects would be incomplete unless some thought is given to the refugees as people. As one would expect, basically they are much like people everywhere—particularly rural people, since, as already mentioned, most of the dependent refugees were farmers and peasants in Palestine. By nature the Palestinian Arabs are a friendly and an orderly people. They are also an inately industrious people—notwithstanding the impression to the contrary that a casual observer might gain from visiting a large refugee camp today. This is borne out by the fact that all refugees who could find jobs in 1948, and all who have acquired specialized skills since, have taken jobs and become self-supporting. Almost universally, refugee parents want their children to receive an education that will make them independent. Whereas in 1950 only a limited number of refugee girls—particularly those from rural areas—received formal education, and most of these only for two or three years, by 1966-67 the enrolment of girls in schools was approaching that of boys and extending increasingly to the lower secondary level.²² Also noteworthy is the fact that the refugee camps and the host countries have never been harrassed by hooliganism or unruly bands of youth with idle hours on their hands—not even in the Gaza Strip, where employment opportunity is minimal. The life of the refugees has been hard and full of bitter disappointments. Even greater than the physical privation has been the lack of hope—hope that for years was nurtured by the annual passage of unfulfilled resolutions in the United Nations General Assembly calling for repatriation or compensation by Israel.

(22) United Nations document A/6713, tables 13 to 16, pp. 71-74.

If and when the refugee problem moves towards solution, there will still be several hundred thousand older refugees who will remain as welfare cases, unless an extraordinary effort of rehabilitation is undertaken. This group includes both older refugees who have been mostly idle since 1948, and younger ones who have had inadequate opportunity to learn work disciplines and habits before reaching maturity. Looking back, it is regrettable that a greater effort has not been made by the world community to make the Palestine refugees employable through rehabilitation programmes and education in skills.

Prelude to War

THE CRISIS OF MAY-JUNE 1969

by Hisham Sharabi

WHAT TRIGGERED THE CRISIS?

In early May, 1967, certain indications led many observers to believe that Israel was preparing for massive military action against Syria. In the previous month on April 7 retaliatory action had been carried out against Syria which involved Israeli air-strikes only a few miles from Damascus. A few months earlier, on November 3, 1966, massive action had been taken against the Jordanian village of Al-Sammu, in which a number of Jordanian civilians and soldiers had been killed and a large part of the village leveled. The cause of these attacks, according to official Israeli statements, was the increasing Arab guerrilla activity on the Israeli side of the armistice line.

The crisis took shape as intelligence reports began to come in about Israeli troop deployment along the Syrian-Israeli border. On May 8, two Syrian intelligence officers arrived in Cairo and informed President Nasser of an impending Israeli attack against Damascus. Information concerning troop movements was corroborated by Lebanese sources. By May 10, according to Eric Rouleau, *Le Monde's* Cairo correspondent, President Nasser had become convinced that Israel was in fact making preparations to attack Damascus and overthrow the Ba'th regime. His view was confirmed when the Russians informed him that the Israelis had timed a swift strike at the Syrian regime for the end of May, "in order to crush it and then carry the fighting over into the territory of the U.A.R." In Tel Aviv, Israeli leaders (including General I. Rabin) spoke publicly of attacking Damascus, demanding the immediate cessation of guerrilla activity. The *New York Times* correspondent in Tel Aviv re-

(*) Reprinted from "The Arab World" Special Issue, Vol. XIV, Nos. 10-11, October-November 1968.

ported on May 12 that Israeli authorities had already decided that the use of force against Syria "may be the only way to curtail increasing terrorism." President Nasser believed, according to Rouleau, that the Israeli attack would take place within the next few days, on or about May 17.

In retrospect, it is ironic to note how Israel's actions in May, 1967, served to intensify precisely those conditions which they were supposed to alleviate. Israel was determined to put an end to the nascent Palestinian guerrilla movement. The Israeli leaders had begun to realize that the long-dormant Palestinian Arabs were engaged in a serious effort at organizing themselves as an independent force and that a Palestinian revolutionary movement was afoot. *Fatah*, the Palestine Movement of National Liberation, now appeared as more than a mere handful of "infiltrators" and "terrorists." Israel, by persistently attributing resistance activity to Syrians, Egyptians, and Jordanians, had succeeded in obscuring the real nature of this activity as an autonomous Palestinian revolutionary movement. Israel's policy was always to refuse to recognize the existence of the Palestinian Arabs by constantly referring to them simply as "the Arab refugees." This has enabled Israel to fight the guerrillas by means of retaliatory action against its neighbors, in accordance with its basic strategic principle of always waging war on Arab soil, never on its own.

It is probably in large part because of the new dimension which the Palestinian guerrilla movement represented—as an *internal* movement of resistance it violated the fundamental principles upon which the concept of Israeli "defense" was based—that the reaction to increasing activity by *Fatah* was so strong in early 1967. Israel's theory of "punitive retaliation" underwent radical transformation both in structure and goal. It was no longer sufficient to "teach its neighbors a lesson;" it was now necessary to impose its explicit will on them. Thus, the retaliatory raid would give way to military strikes aimed at repressing or overthrowing recalcitrant and undesirable regimes. With this new policy Israel could kill two birds with one stone: it could destroy the Palestinian resistance movement in embryo and maintain "peace" and "stability" in the surrounding regimes. In May, 1967, the crisis gathered momentum as a direct result of Israel's intention to do something about the Ba'th regime in Damascus. This marked not only an escalation of Israel's political and military aggressiveness, but also a self-conscious expansion of its role in the broader context of U.S.-Soviet confrontation in the Middle East.

Seen in this light, the situation in May looked ominous, even by Middle Eastern standards. For Israel's immediate neighbors it appeared that unless

something were done they might have to submit to a new kind of threat; they would henceforth not dare to displease Israel. Their first obligation, however, in the threat directed against Syria was to suppress the Palestinian movement in their midst.

Israel's new attitude implied another and equally serious warning. The U.A.R., as well as the other "progressive" states, were convinced that the overthrow of the Ba'th regime would seriously upset the balance of forces in the Arab world in favor of Zionism and its allies—the "conservative" regimes, and colonialism. There was a general consensus among all revolutionary elements in the Arab world that the American-Israeli offensive in the area would have to be arrested. Syria was not the real issue, rather the symbol and immediate cause of the confrontation.

As in past years, when collectively threatened, the Arabs turned to the U.A.R. and Gamal Abdul Nasser for guidance and leadership. In the U.A.R. events followed rapidly. The armed forces were put under a state of emergency on May 16; later the same day the Commander of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in Sinai was handed a letter from General Fawzi, the Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, asking him "to withdraw all U.N. troops immediately" from the Egyptian-Israeli border and from Sharm al-Sheikh. On May 18, U Thant gave orders to UNEF to withdraw from the U.A.R. He said he had serious misgivings about this move but could not refuse the U.A.R. "without putting into question the sovereign authority of the government of the United Arab Republic within its own territory." On the same day, Foreign Minister Mahmoud Riad explained to the representatives of the nations with troops in UNEF that the emergency force had completed its tasks and was no longer needed in the Gaza Strip and the U.A.R.

On the following day, May 19, Israel conveyed to the Western powers that it would fight any move to close Aqaba and cut off shipping. It maintained that former President Eisenhower had agreed that such an event would entitle Israel to rectify the situation with U.N. support. On May 22, in a speech given at air force headquarters in Sinai, President Nasser announced the closure of the Straits of Tiran to all ships flying the Israeli flag or carrying strategic materials to Israel.

"We are now face to face with Israel and if they want to try their luck without Britain and France we await them. The Israeli flag will

not pass through the Gulf of Aqaba and our sovereignty over the entrance to the Gulf is not negotiable. If Israel wants to threaten us with war they are welcome."

On May 30, Jordan (followed later by Iraq) concluded a mutual defense pact with the U.A.R.

It was probably at this point, or perhaps a day or two earlier, that the Egyptian President decided that the Israeli threat to attack Syria had abated sufficiently to allow him to de-escalate Egyptian military pressure. At a press conference attended by representatives of the world's major newspapers and news agencies on May 30, he declared that the U.A.R. did not want war but that if attacked it would have to repel aggression. He suggested that the Palestine Mixed Armistice Commission be revived to supervise the phased withdrawal of Egyptian and Israeli forces from the armistice lines and offered to take the question of the Straits of Tiran to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. In an interview on June 3 with Anthony Nutting he emphasized that as far as the U.A.R. was concerned, the Middle East crisis had eased and that no further escalation was planned. He was reported to have given the impression that he shared the Soviet and French view that war should definitely be avoided.

At the time that Nasser, and behind him the U.S.S.R., was seeking a way to avoid war, Israel had apparently opted for war.

In Amman, on June 4, King Hussein warned Britain and the United States that they stood to lose their friends in the Arab world "forever" if they fell into the "Zionist trap." And in Tel Aviv the appointment of Moshe Dayan as Defense Minister was welcomed by the Israeli army with relief. ("Now we may see some action.") In Washington, on June 4, a warm Sunday afternoon, the atmosphere was alive with rumors of an impending explosion in the Middle East.

For Tel Aviv (as well as Washington) sufficient intelligence had been available to show with certainty that a pre-emptive strike by Israel would result in a swift Israeli victory which within days would bring about the collapse not only of the Ba'th regime in Damascus but also of Nasser in the U.A.R. When Israeli planes attacked shortly after sunrise on Monday, June 5, a new chapter was being written in the political life of the Arab world.

WHY DID THE U.A.R. FAIL TO GO TO WAR?

Looking back at Egyptian military and diplomatic moves in May and early June, one is struck by their overwhelmingly deterrent character. Note, for instance, the theatrical aspect of Egyptian troop movements through the main streets of Cairo in the middle of the day. A near-festive mood was generated by blatant broadcasts reporting every move of Egyptian troops in Sinai. From the beginning of the crisis the U.A.R. was making signals to dissuade Israel from going through with its threats against Damascus. The U.A.R. was addressing not only Israel but also the United States.

In May and June, 1967, the U.A.R. was not prepared to go to war. For one thing, some 50,000 Egyptian troops were committed to Yemen, including some of the best trained soldiers. President Nasser had no illusions as to the military capability of the Arab world. Earlier at Port Said he had put it plainly. "I am not in a position to go to war; I tell you this frankly, and it is not shameful to say it publicly. To go to war without having the sufficient means would be to lead the country and the people to disaster."

He had read the report put out by the Institute for Strategic Studies in 1965 and probably agreed with its conclusions. In armor the Israelis could expect to knock out at least two Arab tanks for every one of their own, and in the air the "kill ratio" was two-to-three Arab planes to one Israeli plane.

The Israelis said they would regard the closing of the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping as an act of war. From the Egyptian standpoint this act was not considered to be irrevocable nor was it thought to be an act that would inevitably lead to war. Nasser thought that he enjoyed enough room to maneuver without getting too close to the brink. The problem of sovereignty over the Gulf was far from settled by American assurances to Israel in 1957. At a news conference on July 16, 1957, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had acknowledged the questionable status of the Gulf.

"There is and always has been a difference of opinion about the international status of the Gulf of Aqaba. The Arab countries believe that the six-mile limit applies rather than the three-mile limit; and that, since the position of Israel on the Gulf is not fixed by any permanent boundary decision, Israel does not have the right to claim a voice in the access to the Gulf; and that, if the countries which do have permanent boundaries to the Gulf, namely, Egypt, Jordan, and

Saudi Arabia, agree to close the Gulf, they think that they have the right to do it. There is a certain amount of plausibility from the standpoint of international law, perhaps, to those claims. This is not the view of the United States."

On May 24, 1967, President Nasser outlined to U Thant in Cairo the following points: the Straits of Tiran should be recognized as Egyptian territorial waters; Israel should fully accept the provisions of the 1949 armistice agreement; the U.N. should be responsible for policing *all* frontiers and demarcation lines; and Israel should strictly observe the demilitarized zones. Nasser's intention was not to restore the *status quo ante bellum* obtained before the Israeli attack of 1956, but that of 1948. As his hand seemed to grow stronger, Nasser thought more and more in terms of the totality of the Palestine problem. In a speech to the Pan-Arab Workers Federation on May 26, he declared that, "the Arabs insist on their rights and are determined to regain the rights of the Palestinian people;" and on May 29 he told the members of the Egyptian National Assembly that, "the question today is not of Aqaba nor is it the Tiran Straits or the United Nations Emergency Force. It is the rights of the people of Palestine."

President Nasser had achieved a diplomatic victory and was ready to negotiate a political settlement. It is not certain whether the Israeli leaders (or the White House for that matter) fully appreciated this element in the crisis. Now, perhaps for the first time since 1948, the Arab side was in a position to tackle a political settlement of the Palestine problem. The Egyptian President, spokesman for all the Arabs, was now capable not only of entering into negotiations, but also of contemplating concessions hitherto unthinkable. The central problem was, of course, connected with the rights of the Palestinians. Nasser publicly made it clear that all other problems (including passage through the Suez Canal) were ancillary to the acknowledgement of the rights of the Palestinian Arabs.

As late as June 4, Charles Yost, United States Special Envoy to Cairo, observed, "there does not seem to have been any intention in Cairo to initiate a war." In an interview two days earlier (broadcast in part in the United States on the evening of June 4), President Nasser told British MP Christopher Mayhew that if the Israelis do not attack, "we will leave them alone. We have no intention of attacking Israel." The U.A.R. sent firm assurances to the United States to this effect and maintained a dialogue with Washington

until the hour of the Israeli attack. Agreement was reached on a proposed visit by U.A.R. Vice-President Zakaria Mohieddin to Washington and a subsequent return visit by Vice-President Hubert Humphrey.

According to Eric Rouleau, the *Le Monde* correspondent in Cairo, all that the U.A.R. now required to withdraw its troops from the frontiers was a public declaration by Israel renouncing its intention to attack Syria.

It is probably true that both Washington and Tel Aviv were aware of this fact, but neither seemed willing to leave the U.A.R. with a strong hand. It is now obvious that for Israel the real problem was not one of security: a country which has demonstrated that it can dominate its neighbors militarily could not have entertained serious fears about its security. It seems certain that the Israeli leaders had full knowledge of the U.A.R. military condition (certainly the White House had), and Israel's military superiority was indisputable. It is also probable that the report submitted in late May to President Johnson by Pentagon analysts contained a forecast very close to the events which actually took place in the week of June 5.

In this light, the events of the preceding days of crisis had favored Israeli interests. Indeed, the situation was slowly building up in a way that was giving Israel increasing freedom of action. In retrospect, it is evident that Israel's real intention was not to "damp" the crisis or to "de-fuse" it. The problem for Israel's leaders was to choose the appropriate moment to strike. This decision was tied to certain preconditions. What were these preconditions? One, certainly, was a favorable world opinion siding with a "beleaguered little country" defending itself against numerically superior forces. On the diplomatic level, another was a disunited and neutralized United Nations. But the backing, or at least tacit approval, of the United States was an essential factor.

Did the United States give the green light to Israel? Was there American-Israeli collusion? And, after the outbreak of war, was there American assistance, or a promise of assistance in case things went wrong? Of course, definite answers to these questions cannot be given now and will have to await revelations which only time will make possible.

It is not surprising that President Nasser's signaled promises—withdrawal of troops, adjudication of the Aqaba question, political settlement of outstand-

ing issues, etc.,—were ignored. From Israel's standpoint, the anticipated rewards of military action certainly exceeded those of diplomatic negotiations. Israel acted, not spontaneously in fear or in anger, but calmly, in the light of careful calculations based on extensive intelligence and highly sophisticated analysis of the overall political and military situation. For the Arabs, the cost of miscalculating was enormous: a crushing military defeat, with some 20,000 soldiers killed; over 500,000 new refugees, including 120,000 and 250,000 Egyptians; and the occupation of the entire area from the Suez Canal to the Jordan River and the Syrian Golan Heights some thirty miles from Damascus.

How did the war start? Ambassador Yost expressed the view of many observers when he stated, "no government plotted or intended to start the war"—the war was the product of circumstances beyond the control of any of the parties involved. But what were the conditions under which the situation went out of control? Why did Israel spurn a political settlement when this was possible? How can we explain Israel's overnight transformation from a supposedly threatened, helpless country to a conquering military power?

The answers to these questions are to be sought not in the crisis itself but in an analysis of Israel's overall strategy.

WHAT ARE THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS AND GOALS OF ISRAELI STRATEGY?

Israel, like the United States, bases its strategy on the principle of total preparedness, on the theory of total force. It is a policy predicated on the belief that the all-consuming passion of one's enemy is to destroy it; only his realization of Israel's invincibility and of his own vulnerability prevents him from doing so. Hence the overriding concern of this policy is to determine the costs required to maintain military superiority and to preserve a correct estimate of the enemy's awareness of and responses to it.

Israel can have only an "aggressive" policy, not only because of strategic considerations (small territory, long borders, population size, etc.), but because it is rooted in a movement of colonization. It acts with the knowledge that in the eyes of its adversaries it is not a "state," but a usurper, a force existing on conquered land. Its relationship with its adversary is thus based solely on force—a relationship which precludes any objective grounds of legitimation that might allow for bargaining in terms of a mutually acceptable "maximum." Settlement for Israel has to be *enforced*. In its view, the adversary should have

only one position from which to bargain, that of the conquered. And precisely because of the lack of any binding legitimacy the adversary has to be kept in a condition of constant and *effective threat*. This position necessitates an offensive posture not only in war but also in peace; a *dominating* diplomacy becomes the condition of every non-military approach. What are the aims of this diplomacy? They are, simply, to keep the adversary constantly on the receiving end, where he will always be eager to receive but always incapable of determining the price of what he receives. This is the substitute for legitimation which sets the relation between conqueror and conquered on a level where enforced equilibrium provides for the conqueror the promise of progressively increasing stability.

A distinctive characteristic of Zionist strategy is that it is directed not at *resolving* conflict but at *protracting* it. The resolution of conflict would necessarily require concessions and the relinquishing of gains forcibly acquired; it threatens not only to stifle the expansive orientation but to undermine Israeli strategy at its inception. Thus a primary tactic of Zionist diplomacy is to bring about those conditions which would temporarily suspend conflict but which would introduce no radical change in the *status quo*. By disengagement, by creating distance and blocking or channeling contact, a *modus vivendi* is created out of a violently accomplished fact, and the conditions for equilibrium are set up which in time would bring about a sense of community and mutual benefits to the two sides. For the conquered the payoff is necessarily assessed in relative terms; hence every little gain would represent a bonus and an incentive to acquiesce.

To Israel, attitudes of compromise on the Arab side (from the Geneva Protocol of 1949, on) have always been a source of embarrassment and have always been spurned. President Habib Bourguiba's conciliatory position regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, far from bringing relief to Tel Aviv, provoked profound discomfort in Israel's leadership circles. A compromising attitude on the part of Israel would require a radical transformation in its diplomatic-military thinking, and a shift from offensive to conciliatory strategy. Israel is not yet prepared for such a shift. The statement is probably correct that Israel needs some fifty years of friction and tension to enable it to build itself economically and to establish strong and stable institutions capable of bringing about conditions of permanent equilibrium. Thus from the standpoint of Israel's dominating diplomacy, the final resolution of conflict is possible only when the tactics of protracted conflict reach their limit and become irrelevant.

This goal can be achieved only at the point where a position of domination has been reached and continuing conflict is no longer required to sustain equilibrium.

This diplomatic-military strategy must assign high priority to the policy of territorial expansion. Expansionism is an expression of a policy of force, but it is also a reaction to a "yielding environment." As Arthur Koestler (a former Zionist) put it, "A yielding environment acts as a vacuum, a constant incentive for further expansion." It may be necessary to add that beyond a certain point it would be disadvantageous for Israel to expand. What is the limit of Israeli expansion? Its final determination will depend mainly on the outcome of the diplomatic-military conflict. But the general outline of the territorial extent of the Jewish State has been adumbrated by various spokesmen since 1919. One of the more recent statements was made by the Israeli Prime Minister following the war of 1967 (as quoted by Rouleau):

"We are not disposed to give up one inch of our territory; negotiations must begin from the recognition of the existing territorial *status quo*. Palestine was cut up in the course of the First World War by the Sykes-Picot Agreement; it was divided a second time by the creation of Transjordan by Churchill; and it was divided a third time in 1948. We cannot accept a fourth amputation ... No more than 20,000 kilometers are left of old Palestine. It is our hope that in the next few decades millions of Jews will be able to emigrate from Russia, Europe, and the United States."

The Suez Canal in the U.A.R., the Litani River in Lebanon, the Jabal Druz in Syria, and the eastern boundaries of Jordan are the frontiers of a Greater Israel which would be acceptable to all Israelis, from Gahal to the Zionist faction of the Communist Party. Israel's optimum policy would aim to surround itself with a ring of weak and subservient states—a Maronite state, a Druze state, a "Palestinian state," a Kurdish state, from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean—and to enforce a *Pax Judaica* over the entire region.

A cardinal principle of this hard strategy, which is at the basis of all Israeli political and military thinking, is the necessity always to carry "defensive" war outside Israel's boundaries and never to allow its boundaries to be penetrated. (Guerrilla warfare and people's "war of liberation," since they are not subject to this principle, represent a threat which requires a different strategy.) Thus defensive war is necessarily preventive war. Israel cannot

allow itself to give up the incentive to pre-empt territory. For it equates its security with the capacity of at all times to anticipate and thwart the enemy's power of pre-emption. An important corollary of this strategic thinking is related to the problem of boundaries. So long as the objective possibilities for pursuing a hard strategy exist, Israel will seek to adjust its boundaries through territorial expansion. It has no other choice, given the external conditions of surrounding Arab weakness. Next to military preparedness, the question of boundaries constitutes the most important element of Israeli diplomatic-military strategy.

Under what conditions, in terms of this hard strategy, would Israel consider itself compelled to engage in all-out "defensive" (preventive) war? Precisely when the fundamental principles on which its hard strategy is based are violated: for example, when the U.A.R. (or any other neighboring Arab State) acquires new weapons which might upset Israel's position of unconditional viability; when its real or "distant" boundaries are seriously threatened (for example, Egyptian action in the Straits of Tiran); or when a nationalist revolutionary government takes over in Jordan or Lebanon. In the future Israel may also feel it necessary to launch a "defensive" war against its neighbors in order to put an end to Palestinian guerrilla activity. During periods of peace Israel depends on circumscribed retaliatory expeditions following punitive threats as a primary weapon of limited action. In this situation the threat is to be regarded as a diplomatic weapon decisive in the process of bargaining. Diplomacy, as a system of threats (and promises), gives way to retaliation or war only when it fails or when it breaks down. Short of military action, the threat of war, "punitive" or "defensive," is the crucial element dominating the course of conflict.

What makes the Israeli threat convincing and therefore effective? Or, viewed from the Arab standpoint, what makes the Israeli threat credible? The carrying out of any threat depends on two things, the *means* at one's disposal and the *will* to use them. The credibility of threats depends then on a *sufficient proportion* of threats being carried out to make the party threatened take them seriously. And the efficacy of threats lies in the power to elicit or at least greatly influence the performance of the threatened party in the desired manner.

Israel's strategic position focuses on four different levels, of which two may be regarded as decisive. The first is concerned with Jordan, Syria, Leba-

non, and Iraq; the second with the Arab states in general, including those of North Africa; the third and fourth with the U.A.R. and the Palestinian Arabs. The latter two are the decisive ones, at least for the foreseeable future.

Israel's position toward the Palestinians is one of an occupying power to a conquered people. Dispossessed and in disarray, the Palestinians have lost all viability as a people. But out of total negation there has arisen a resistance which has now taken the form of organized total revolution (negation of the negation). In contrast, Arab opposition to Israel in North Africa and Arabia is still only potentially effective, and in its present state stands at the opposite pole to the urgent actuality of Palestinian resistance. Israel's position *vis-à-vis* Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq is one of strength with the potential for domination. Only with respect to the U.A.R. is Israel's superiority conditional, placing the two states in a relationship of conditional viability toward one another. It is this mutually conditional viability which tends to make the Arab-Israeli conflict (on the formal military and formal diplomatic levels) a primarily Egyptian-Israeli conflict. For Israel, the only real military threat is the U.A.R. Similarly no decisive political action can be undertaken with any other Arab state without the U.A.R.'s participation or tacit consent.

It is worth noting here that there exists a factor which could radically transform Israel's position with regard to the U.A.R. and its other Arab neighbors, but not necessarily with regard to the Palestinian guerrilla fighters. Israel's acquisition of an effective rocket system (for example, the MD680) together with a nuclear tactical weapons system would render it unconditionally viable and at the same time reduce its neighbors including the U.A.R. to virtual impotence.

What are the political consequences of such a situation? The acquisition of a similar weapons system by the U.A.R. would restore the balance of arms but would create a new situation—though still in Israel's favor—for the neutralization of the conflict military which will set it permanently against a strictly *political* background. Under these conditions the *fait accompli* becomes the core of the *status quo*, and with time then solidifies into permanent structures. It is at this point that Israel's hard strategy reaches its final limit and is transformed into a conciliatory strategy. The need for protracted conflict would no longer obtain.

WHERE DID THE ARABS FAIL?

Here one has to make certain clarifications. First there is the argument regarding the need for a "scientific" or "modern" mentality. Self-criticism after the Arab defeat tended to begin at this point: in order to confront Israel, the Arabs must acquire an advanced scientific and technological culture. The theoretical validity of this principle is obvious, but it lacks practical relevance to immediate problems. The situation of conflict is a *concrete historical* situation to which any desideratum, whether of mental attitude or of technological proficiency, is only ideally related; that is, it is related only theoretically and in an abstract way. What is decisive to the outcome of conflict, particularly to a political-military conflict having immediate bearing on the fate of millions of people, is not *potential* power but rather available *actualized* power. Ultimately, in terms of spiritual and material potential, the Arabs have the upper hand and the outcome of the struggle is, in these terms, a foregone conclusion. But this is an abstract projection of things still out of reach.

Certainly, to be effective, especially in war, one has to modernize and acquire the requisite technological know-how. But this is a two-way argument. Can the Arabs modernize while they are locked in unequal combat? That is to say, can they, when their freedom of social and political action is threatened daily, plan for modernization?

It is wise for realistic analysis to play shy of theoretical generalizations, especially when one is seized by the concrete and the historical.

The Arabs' shortcomings are much nearer at hand and can be seen plainly without much recourse to theoretical analysis. On the technical level the Arabs suffered from such things as miscalculation, faulty intelligence, inability to convey messages, and inadequate communication. Necessity may still bring to bear the required funds and energies to insure needed reforms. Response here is not to a desired goal that one sets up but to *vital necessity*. There is a qualitative difference in action animated by the will to survive and mere incentive to reform. The revolutionary element is set into motion by the first, the second comes in its train. In the end what is *available* in will, energy, and material resources is decisive for revolutionary change. Thus only what is concretely accomplished will determine Arab viability in the continuing conflict.

To conclude, the interrelated points deserve mention.

In the first place, the Arab side, by the nature of its position, has had restricted or limited freedom of action on both the diplomatic and military

levels. This is plainly illustrated by the decisions and events of the critical days preceding the Israeli attack on the U.A.R., Jordan, and Syria in June, 1967. The Arabs, incapable of devising a unified strategy, were incapable of carrying out a rational military plan. Because they could not admit the principle of compromise in the diplomatic field, they were always forced into a position of inflexibility and retreat before the highly mobile diplomacy of their adversary.

The Arab side denied itself the advantage of the political and diplomatic offensive by placing itself in a position where it could not make fundamental concessions. Israel, basing its policy on a hard strategy which also precluded basic concessions, was able to use Arab inflexibility to appear always willing to reach a reasonable settlement. The same structural limitation which has prevented the Arabs from seizing the political and diplomatic initiative has prevented them from seizing the military initiative. In the May-June crisis President Nasser's hand was from the very beginning greatly weakened by his adversary's knowledge that the U.A.R. was not likely to preempt a strike. Thus, for the U.A.R., in spite of a dazzling diplomatic performance, the chips were down even before the first bet was placed.

Arab diplomacy always gave Israel's hard strategy optimum advantages in both war and peace. In peace it contributed to Israel's capacity to sustain the stable disequilibrium which always worked in its favor, for it served to consolidate the *fait accompli*. And in war it enabled Israel to engage in "punitive" and "defensive" strikes which have hitherto enabled it to expand territorially and to establish the effective system of retaliatory threats that have safeguarded its gains.

Secondly, one must consider the inescapably "irrational," or at least only partly-rational, character of decisions and choices of Arab diplomacy. A fundamental premise of Israeli diplomatic-military action is predicated on this irrationality.

What is the cause of Arab irrationality? Again, the problem on this level of analysis is only formally related to the "technological" or "scientific" mentality or to the question of modernization as such. What we call the Arab side does not in reality constitute a single entity; it has no coordinated organizational arrangements, no unified political or military structure, no adequate communications and information systems. Inherent in Arab "agreements" is a

multiplicity of conflicting decisions, desires, intentions; all formal collective agreements lack substantive content and as a result have little practical import. Israel's dependence on this fragmentation of Arab will, and on its corresponding practical ineffectiveness, figures significantly in Israeli strategy thinking and action.

Finally, the Arab position is bound to a "radical" view of the Palestine question; this is at once a source of great strength and of great weakness. Arab opinion, official as well as popular, is founded on right as the basis of all claims to Palestine. From this perspective it is difficult to separate the ancillary problems from the central problem of right. Zionism, on the other hand, takes as its starting point the opposite position. It *assumes* a given *status quo* and ignores all historical perspectives, focusing on the individual issue. For the Arabs all military effort ultimately aims at "restoring Arab rights in Palestine." In the Israeli perspective, this is equated with driving the Israelis into the sea. All Israeli effort, both military and political, seeks to preserve, consolidate, and expand Zionist presence. It necessarily turns away from fundamental claims and focuses on the singular problem at hand. It knows that its cause is tactically best served by concentrating on individual problems—boundary adjustments, transit rights, shipping, hydraulic claims.

The May-June crisis thus signified different things to Arabs and Israelis. It was (as President Nasser put it) not the Gulf of Aqaba, nor the Suez Canal, nor any other limited problem which was behind the crisis, but the "right of the Palestinian Arabs to their land and homes." For the Israelis this was not the issue; for in the logic of Israel's hard strategy all this belonged, as the question of Jerusalem does now, to the *non-negotiable* category of the conflict.

What from the Arab standpoint constitutes the heart of the matter for the Israelis constitutes the settled and "non-negotiable" aspect of it. This Arab position on "right to land and home" has forced the Arab States to view problems ultimately in terms of fundamental human rights. While as a principle of political orientation this has greatly restricted Arab maneuverability, it has also preserved intact the Arab claim to Palestine. On the psychological level, and on the level of legality, this constitutes a major source of strength for the Arab side.

One minor point remains to be disposed of. American writers every now and then advise the Arabs that they should submit to the facts of life and

reconcile themselves to the existence of the Zionist state "however unjust its creation appears to them" and that they would do well "not to threaten and harass ... (Israel or) ... arouse among their people false hopes about its dissolution. ..." Arab writers have noted with irony that such advice comes from people whose country has, to safeguard its security and prosperity at home, seen fit to engage in wars thousands of miles away from its coasts. The war against Zionism, these writers say, far from aiming to preserve "security and prosperity" aims to prevent a new and vicious type of colonialism from enslaving them at home; furthermore, they are defending themselves not in some distant land, but on their own invaded soil.

WRONG CONCEPTS ON THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT*

by Maxime Rodinson

The origin of the conflict lies in the settlement of a new population on a territory already occupied by a people unwilling to accept that settlement. This is as undeniable as it is obvious. The settlement may be justified, in whole or in part; but it cannot be denied. Likewise the refusal of the indigenous population to accept it may be thought justifiable, or it may not.

This was, indeed, a new population, radically different from the old. It is true that it claimed to have inhabited Palestinian territory in ancient times, to have formed a state there of which it had been forcibly dispossessed and from which it had been forcibly driven. With certain reservations this is true, as everybody knows. It is generally admitted that a people continues to be such, as a collective entity, however many times its constituents are renewed. In the case of the Jews the number of renewals since Antiquity has certainly been enormous, but this is consequently not a pertinent factor. Moreover while the Jewish people certainly did witness the destruction of their state by force (by the Romans), they were not driven from Palestinian territory except to a very minor extent. More serious is the fact that the Jews, while they incontestably were one people in Antiquity, could later no longer be termed such except in a very special sense. Even in this special sense they lost the characteristic from the time of the emancipation, which differed from country to country. From that time they ceased to be a collective entity, but individuals connected sometimes by ties of religion, sometimes and in some countries by a common but localized culture (so that several distinct 'Jewish peoples' emerged), sometimes simply by the memory of a common ancestry (again only partial). Nonetheless, for the sake of argument and to simplify matters, it may be accepted that those Jews who wished once again to form

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a Jewish people and a community of the national type, were continuing the Jewish religious community of the Middle Ages, which retained certain national characteristics, and, beyond that community, the Jewish people of Antiquity.

This in no way diminishes the difference. Certainly the Zionist Jews who were 'returning' to Palestine were in some measure anthropologically 'related', in the physical sense, to the Palestinian Arabs. Despite innumerable mixtures of blood they must, in very differing degrees, have included among their ancestors Jews from ancient Palestine, and have retained something of those ancestors in their genetic heritage. Moreover in spite of an equally large number of admixtures, the basis of the Palestinian Arab population, as explained earlier, must likewise have been descendants of these same Jews or Hebrews of Antiquity. But this implies no homogeneity between the two peoples in the sociological sense. What does count, if at all, in the conflicts and compact between peoples is the identification as a people, or as an ethnic group. The English, the French, the Spaniards, the Germans also have a great number of ancestors in common and are the bearers, in different proportions, of the same genetic heritage. This fact has not in the very least prevented wars between them, nor the desperate assertion of independence of the one on the part of the other, nor a hatred which has often reached a pitch which it would be difficult to exceed.

The same is true of the linguistic relationship, often misleadingly defined by the assertion that both peoples are 'Semites'. This means one thing only, that the Hebrew and Arabic languages are linguistically related, they derive from the same root tongue, they both belong to the linguistic group conventionally termed 'Semitic'. The Hebrew language was the ancient tongue of the Jews, and had become a dead language some centuries before the Christian era. It had been preserved as an erudite, 'holy' tongue, to some extent as a literary language among the Jewish communities, and was resuscitated in the twentieth century by Eliazar Ben Yehuda to serve as a living tongue, common to Jews of different origins called to colonize Palestine. It should be noted in passing that the great majority of Zionists did not know this Semitic tongue, neo-Hebrew, when they first set foot on Palestine soil, although they were shortly to learn it. However, none of this is of the slightest importance. Kinship between languages (often implying some anthropological kinship, in very different degrees, between some at least of those who speak those languages)

has never prevented antagonism between peoples. The Spanish and the Portuguese have often been in violent opposition to one another, although Portuguese is only another Iberian dialect. The French of the '*Langue d'oïl*' in the north conquered by force the France of the '*Langue d'oc*' in the south, despite the fact that the southern dialects are fairly closely related to those of the north. The Pakistanis and the Indians speak Indo-Aryan languages, sometimes the same ones. Is it necessary to recall the bloody struggles between the Greek city-states? To repeat: what counts is the identification as a special unit or ethnic group.

Palestine therefore was being populated anew. Not only did they have no community of identification, in the sociological sense, with the native inhabitants, their difference was also accentuated by a gross cultural disparity. The great majority of the newcomers spoke a different language from the local population in more senses than one: they had different values, different customs, different modes of behaviour, different attitudes to life. They were altogether of a different world—the European world. Not only were they foreigners, they were also Europeans, that is to say there came from that world which was everywhere known as the world of the colonizers, of peoples who dominated their neighbours by their technical and military power and by their wealth. That they may have been the poorest and most underprivileged of this other world mattered not—they were of it.

The only ones in whom the difference was not so marked were the Oriental or Orientalized Jews, such as already lived in Palestine. But the moving spirits of the Jewish colony and then of the State of Israel regarded them as backward elements, which somehow had to be assimilated. They had to be impregnated with the values of the Western Jews, their social customs and their attitudes would have to be made to conform. The numbers of these Oriental Jews became very great in the years which followed 1948, mainly through the emigration to Israel of Jews from the Arab countries. These were undoubtedly much closer to the Arab population of Palestine. Indeed many of them might, if the problem had followed a different line of development, have become or remained Jewish Arabs; they even spoke various dialects of the same language. However, they were sharply divided from the Muslim and Christian Arabs by communal hostility and a long-standing grudge; as well as this, the Western Jews conducted a vigorous campaign to assimilate them, fearing 'levantinization' of the state more than anything else. Hence these

Middle Eastern Jews tried to model themselves on their Western cousins, whose culture they envied. I should like to quote an example insignificant in itself, but symbolic of what was happening. The Yemeni Jews, who pronounced Hebrew with its ancient Semitic consonants, which appear in the written language and are preserved in their Arabic vernacular, are making strenuous efforts, in Israel, to lose these 'bad habits'. They are learning to repronounce Hebrew in the manner of the European Jews, i.e. leaving out consonants which the latter have forgotten how to pronounce for twenty centuries, confusing others, etc. In other words, they are moving as far as possible away from the standard of the Hebrew once spoken in Palestine in ancient times, and away from the Semitic model which they had partially preserved.

A foreign people had come and imposed itself on a native population. The Arab population of Palestine were native in all the usual senses of that word. Ignorance, sometimes backed up by hypocritical propaganda, has spread a number of misconceptions on this subject, unfortunately very widely held. It has been said that since the Arabs took the country by military conquest in the seventh century, they are occupiers like any others, like the Romans, the Crusaders and the Turks. Why therefore should they be regarded as any more native than the others, and in particular than the Jews, who were native to that country in ancient times, or at least occupiers of longer standing? To the historian the answer is obvious. A small contingent of Arabs from Arabia did indeed conquer the country in the seventh century. But as a result of factors which were briefly outlined in the first chapter of this book, the Palestinian population soon became Arabized under Arab domination, just as earlier it had been Hebraicized, Aramaicized, to some degree even Hellenized. It became Arab in a way that it was never to become latinized or Ottomanized. The invaded melted with the invaders. It is ridiculous to call the English of today invaders and occupiers, on the grounds that England was conquered from Celtic peoples by the Angles, Saxons and Jutes in the fifth and sixth centuries. The population was 'Anglicized' and nobody suggests that the peoples which have more or less preserved the Celtic tongues—the Irish, the Welsh or the Bretons—should be regarded as the true natives of Kent or Suffolk, with greater titles to these territories than the English who live in those countries.

The native population did not accept the settlement of what must be regarded as foreigners, who, moreover, presented themselves as colonists, as is demonstrated by the titles which they gave to their own institutions. Again,

the Arabs have been condemned for this. Without for the moment attempting to assign moral values to the various attitudes which might be taken, it must be made clear that their reaction was entirely understandable. It is certainly true that at other periods alien peoples have succeeded in imposing themselves on a given territory, and that sooner or later custom and law ratified the deed. Usually this was initially effected by force. The best example for present purposes is furnished by the Arabs themselves. The Arabs imposed themselves by force and the native population gave little resistance, then allowed itself to be assimilated by its conquerors. But this native population was already subject to foreign rule, and merely changed masters. Similarly, when Jewish colonization first started, the Palestinians were subjects of the Ottoman Empire, which was dominated by the Turks. Why not accept the new domination which might, as in earlier times, have been followed by assimilation?

This might indeed have happened were it to have taken place some centuries or even some decades earlier. But the Zionists were unlucky. The conscience of the world has developed, and no longer accepted right of conquest, or accepted it more reluctantly. Cultural assimilation between peoples is possible; but each people now tends to cling fiercely to its own identity. This is a fact that nobody can do anything about. Zionism began as a living force in the era of nationalism, of which it was itself a manifestation, and it pursued its career during the era of decolonization. Peoples are no longer willing to accept conquest and will fight to preserve their identity and to keep or win back their independence. Once delivered from Turkish tutelage, the Palestinian Arabs desired domination neither by the British nor by the Zionists. They wished neither to become Englishmen nor Israelis, although they accepted gratefully many elements of that European culture which both brought with them and which the Arabs had slowly been absorbing in small doses for a long time. They wanted to keep their Arab identity, and therefore they wanted to live under the rule of an Arab state. In view of the division of Arab Asia Minor in 1920, they tended to form a Palestinian national community within the framework of the various different Arab national communities, which were pledged to some degree of unity in accordance with certain widely held conceptions. They consequently hoped to see an Arab state in Palestine. Moreover the conscience of the world now supports peoples fighting to defend their identity. It seemed to the Palestinians a flagrant injustice that an exception should be made of them on the sole grounds that the colonists were Jews. The whole world was proclaiming 'Down with colonialism!' They

had recently seen many Frenchmen renounce the proviso '—except for French colonialism' and many Englishmen their proviso '—except for British colonialism'. All they wanted was to do away with the reservation '—except for Jewish colonialism'.

The natives had not accepted the foreigners. One point remains to be clarified. The Arab world has frequently accepted foreign settlement on its territory—witness the example of the Armenians, fleeing from Turkish persecution in 1920, who came and settled in the Arab countries. Many had come even earlier than this. As a general rule, they had been accepted. Yet the majority of the refugees, especially those in the latest migration, wanted to preserve their identity as a people, their language, their culture, their own special traditions. It is possible that if this partial refusal to assimilate persists it will one day be the source of conflict. Nonetheless up to the present time, there has been no hostility towards them comparable with that felt towards Zionist immigration. To all appearances this is due to the fact that the Armenians had no intention of constructing an Armenian state in territory populated by Arabs. If they do still harbour any claims of the 'Zionist' type, these relate to territory which is currently Turkish. Similarly no opposition to Jewish settlement existed until Jewish immigration took on its Zionist aspect. Arab opposition manifested itself the moment that the Zionist intention to establish a Jewish state by detaching Palestine territory from the Arab world became clear. This opposition mounted as the true nature of the Zionist project became obvious, and grew more irreconcilable as the Zionists came nearer to success. Therefore the Arabs were not rejecting the foreigners as such; they were rejecting foreign occupation of their territory—whether we choose to classify this phenomenon as colonialism or not.

The conflict therefore appears essentially as the struggle of an indigenous population against the occupation of part of its national territory by foreigners. Of course there are many other sides to the conflict which could be brought out. None of these, however, seems relevant to its basic definition.

I have often been reproached with not taking sufficient account of the millennial Jewish vision of the Return to Zion, the nostalgia for the lost homeland conveyed in Jewish literature and folklore, the settlement by individuals and small groups of Jews in Palestine. In answer it must be said that Zionism had inadmissibly reinterpreted religious aspirations in terms of modern nationalism. These religious aspirations hinged upon a messianic vision of the

end of time, when the final Golden Age would unfold in Palestine. As has been explained above, for many years the Zionists had no more implacable enemies than the Jewish rabbis. On the other hand, it is possible that the religious vision itself contained an element of primitive nationalism. Zionism could then be viewed as the secularization of a religious tendency with a partly nationalist content. This proposition would need closer study. Whatever the truth of the matter, it is hard to see how an analysis of these tendencies—with all the sympathy and admiration which some might feel for them—is relevant in defining the basis of the conflict. When a people is subjected to foreign conquest, the moral wound it receives is in no way alleviated by the spiritual tendencies observable within the conquering group, nor by the motives for the conquest or the aspirations which they express.

The same is true of the qualities and defects which may be ascribed to the Jews—even if these qualities and defects were better attested than is generally the case. Again, the same applies to the sufferings of the Jews. Those sufferings might, perhaps, justify the aspirations felt by some Jews to form an independent state. The Arabs cannot be made to see this as sufficient reason why such a state should be formed at their expense. To stretch a point, the idea of the collective guilt of the Germans might be invoked to justify Czech reoccupation of the Sudetenland and the amputation of German territory to the East in favour of Poland. But no collective guilt of this sort attaches to the Arabs for the sufferings undergone by the Jews in Europe. They are perfectly justified in maintaining that if the Europeans feel responsibility for the Jews, it is up to them to provide them with a territory, not to make the Arabs give up some of theirs. Many Arab spokesmen have stated that they are ready to make a contribution to international aid for Jewish victims of persecution if such aid were decided upon, but only on a reasonable *pro rata* basis. They are not willing to pay the full reparation for wrongs committed by others. There can be no possible objection to such a position.

It may be interpolated here that Zionism has not fully achieved its desired objectives. It has, indeed, created a Jewish state. But the creation of that Jewish state was not regarded by the Zionist pioneers as an end in itself, only as a necessary condition for the achievement of other ends. These ends were the regeneration of the Jewish people, supposedly 'alienated' by the Dispersion; and the liquidation of anti-Semitism. However, just as after the 'Zionism' of Zorobabel in the sixth century B.C., the number of Jews remaining outside

Israel is much greater than the number which has 'returned'. The creation of Israel has undoubtedly had an effect on their mentality, but this effect has been less uniquely fortunate than foreseen or maintained by the Zionists. As for anti-Semitism, while it has greatly declined in virulence, there is nothing to show that the existence of Israel has had any significant effect on this development. Moreover it concerns only Western Europe and America. In the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies at the end of the Stalin era, the Zionist ideology and the creation of Israel were a powerful factor in the resurgence of official and ill-disguised anti-Semitism. In the Arab countries, above all, Zionism has led to an anti-Zionism which could hardly fail, as has been seen, to result in many cases in anti-Semitism. Very many Jews in the Arab countries have discovered this, to their own misfortune. Finally, life in an Israel under continual military threat hardly seems an ideal alternative to life in the Dispersion under the threat of a possible rebirth of anti-Semitism. At all events the Zionist contribution towards solving the 'Jewish problem' has been ambiguous, to say the least.

In just the same way, the qualities and faults which may be attributed to the Arabs, and the various judgements which might be expressed on their political or social structures, have no bearing on the analysis of the nature of the conflict. It is self-evident that no-one has the right to make the lordly judgement that a people or group of peoples has such faults that it deserves to have slices of its territory forcibly taken away. Pharisaical judgements of this kind have been made by many conquerors in the past; but they are repellent to the contemporary conscience. In any case, no arguments which could be advanced on this level would alter the fact that the struggle is one between a native population and foreign occupiers.

Nor is it, as has often been claimed, a struggle for development. It is indubitable that Israel has brought to the Middle East the example of a more highly developed society, industrialized or on the way to becoming so, technically advanced, with a large and valuable technocracy. Her superiority in this respect over the surrounding countries is undeniable, and her victories are merely the manifestation of this fact on the military plane. But the case is exactly the same as that of the European colonies which did not eliminate the populations at whose expense they installed themselves. The technical lessons to be learned from the invader were in every case accepted, in principle at least. Nevertheless the local population revolted against the domina-

tion or annexation imposed from outside. The value of Israel's example is diminished to the extent that the Arabs can take their lessons from many other sources, from Europe direct or from America, for instance. They do not need to pay for them by the cession of territory. Moreover the enemy may be admired, even imitated, as witness France's attitude towards her conqueror Germany between 1871 and 1914. This in no way diminishes the hostility and desire for revenge which the conquered feel towards the victorious conqueror.

Again, the struggle is not a struggle for democracy. It is true enough that Israel has parliamentary institutions which may be regarded as models of their kind. This does not mean, any more than it does elsewhere, that the will of the majority of the population and its interests are bound to prevail over the wishes and interests of small but economically or politically powerful pressure-groups. In any case, Israel's political institutions are intimately bound up with her high level of economic development. Once again, there are other examples which the Arabs could turn to, and the value which they might attach to such institutions in no way reduces their hostility. It should be added that given the social, economic and cultural conditions of the Arab nations, the most perfect parliamentary system would only ensure that the most reactionary social groups would be guaranteed power. Parliamentary institutions are not the panacea that the Americans take them to be. This is well illustrated by the case of Egypt between 1923 and 1952. The illiteracy of the masses and the great social power wielded by the large landed proprietors meant that universal suffrage merely underwrote the political power of the latter class. Moreover when the state has to make choices which entail drastic limitations on popular aspirations in order to make the investment necessary to development, it may be said that parliamentary institutions are the enemy of economic development.

Neither does the conflict reside in the struggle between Israeli socialism and the reactionary or Fascist Arab societies, as one version fairly widely accepted in some Left-wing circles would have it. The Zionists settled in Palestine as pioneers of a Jewish state, not as apostles of socialism. I have already given my opinion on the interpretation to be placed on the socialist ideological currents in Israel and on the socialist sector of the Israeli economy. At the very least, it may be said without reservation that Israeli society is not as a whole a socialist society, and that the State of Israel's foreign policy is not directed towards the extension of the socialist system. The Arabs are not op-

posing the propagation of socialism, but an expansionist encroachment on their national territory. If the Arabs wanted a model, they could find it elsewhere; even if they were to imitate some of Israel's achievements in some respects, this would not weaken their hostility.

The contrary thesis, according to which the struggle is one between Arab socialism and Israeli colonialism, stands on firmer ground, but is not wholly acceptable nevertheless. It is true that Israel is a colonial phenomenon. But only some of the Arab states have a structure which may, in part, be classified as 'socialist' or are ideologically oriented towards socialism. The others accept the ideology of free enterprise, or ideologies which are older still, and their structure exhibits a mixture of archaic and capitalist features. In their attitude to Israel, however, they all stand united, whether they would or no, at least at times when the problem reaches crisis-point. Their claims are the national claims supported by the Arab people as a whole, which no Arab state dare oppose, whatever its internal social structure. It is true that, on a different level, this struggle can be seen as part of the Third World's struggle against imperialism. I shall return to this point later.

It must be emphasized once again that the conflict cannot be reduced to just another manifestation of anti-Semitism. The prevailing confusion on this latter concept is enormous. The attribution of an evil and diabolical 'essence' to Jews of every kind throughout the ages, which is the fundamental thesis of anti-Semitism, is of course morally and scientifically indefensible and must be vigorously combated. This does not mean that every Jew or group of Jews is automatically protected by taboo. Everyone must be judged according to his merits and his faults, all actions weighed according to their own true value. If these actions harm individuals or groups, those individuals or groups should be allowed to defend their position, their rights, etc., without being denounced as exponents of a doctrine which is repugnant in itself. Any other view would entail either that every Jew or group of Jews can, by definition, only desire and do good, or else that none of their ideas or actions must ever be criticized. Obviously both attitudes are wholly unacceptable, both rationally and ethically.

It is true, conversely, that every action or word directed against the Jews, even though justified, may lead to generalizations which fall within the category of anti-Semitism. Any conflict in which a group of Jews is a protagonist is liable to degenerate in this way. Likewise every war throughout history, though perhaps fought for thoroughly insignificant reasons, has led

to abusive generalizations directed against the nature, the very essence, of the opponent. This is what I prefer to term 'war racialism'. Plentiful examples can be found in the 1914-18 war, among others. Among the Allies, it was common to think of the Germans as an accursed race. It was dangerous to point out that certain pure-bred Germans had been moderately competent musicians, for instance, or that others had made some small contribution to Western philosophy. This is a deplorable phenomenon, but apparently inherent in the human species as we know it. It is a particularly dangerous phenomenon in the case of the Jews. It is distressing and dangerous to observe the growth of philosophies which when pressed to extremes have, in the very recent past, led to the massacre of millions. Every effort must be made to combat these pernicious abusive generalizations. We must ask the Arabs to understand, even though the Zionists have done them a great wrong, that this wrong, too, is a normal symptom, not particularly diabolical, of relations between groups of human beings. They must appreciate that they themselves have perpetrated similar wrongs (and are still doing so, in some places) on other peoples. Secondly, they must recognize that this wrong was the doing of the Jewish Zionists, and not of all Jews, past, present and future. Of course as long as the problem created by the Zionists lasts, persuasion is likely to have limited success. It is made still more difficult by the fact that the Zionists freely proclaim that Zionism is the natural outcome of the whole of Jewish history, something which belongs to the very essence of Judaism and to which all the world's Jews owe allegiance. What is more, they have in many cases actually won such allegiance. However understandable these demonstrations of solidarity may be, it should be understood that they contribute towards turning the Arabs' anti-Zionism into anti-Semitism.

In any case, a clear distinction must be drawn between European anti-Semitism, founded on mythical grievances, and Arab anti-Zionism, which has occasionally flared into anti-Semitism. Although some of the criticism of the Jews made by European anti-Semites might appear to some people to have some small foundation—such as their over-exclusive attachment to certain professions and the character-traits said to result from it—this is only because Christian society had imposed these professions on the Jews. By contrast, in the case of the Israeli-Arab conflict, the first move was a gratuitous act on the part of a group of Jews—namely the project of Zionism. However much one might wish to justify this project, it certainly cannot be claimed that it was imposed by Arab society! The conflict is therefore in no way a new mani-

festation of congenital Arab anti-Semitism, or of the hostility of Islam towards the Jewish faith. Those Europeans who have been struck by certain similarities in expression between the Arab anti-Zionist struggle and Hitler-type anti-Semitism, concluding that they are the same, are making a serious mistake. As has already been said, they are reducing the problem of the conflict to the categories with which they are familiar. The Muslim faith is certainly hostile to Judaism, but rather less than is Christianity. It allows Judaism some degree of validity, and with few exceptions has not attempted to convert the Jews by force. Many Jews fleeing from Christian persecution have found a refuge in the territory of Islam. The relations between religious communities in the Muslim world were, like relations between the nations, characterized by a finely balanced mixture of hostility and coexistence. The Jews were a minority, defeated and subject community living amongst a Muslim majority which held power. Like the Christians, who shared their status, they were forced into a position of humility and therefore despised. But these conditions, which still held true for the traditional Muslim world, began to change in the course of the nineteenth century. A trend towards a secular society on the European model was beginning to manifest itself. This evolutionary trend was partly stemmed, first by the reaction to the Zionist movement and subsequently by the creation of the State of Israel. Like all similar movements, hostility to Zionism used every weapon that lay to hand. The after-effects of religious hostility to Judaism were exploited, and so were the feelings of contempt for the Jews, a relic of the Middle Ages. However, there can be no doubt that any foreign occupation, Chinese, Katangese, Christian or Buddhist, would have aroused the same hostility.

There is, finally, a popular Zionist theory which regards the conflict as a manifestation of 'pan-Arabism'. It would seem that the reasoning behind this theory accepts that every Arab country should defend its own interests—the Tunisians the interests of Tunisia, the Syrians those of Syria, etc.; but when all the Arab nations unite in the cause of the Arabs of Palestine, that is 'imperialism'. This theory is often accompanied by the rider that if it were only the Palestinians with whom Israel had to deal, nothing would be simpler than to come to some mutually satisfactory agreement—a strange assertion, in view of the fact that the Palestinians are the most fervent and active exponents of the struggle against Israel. More generally, it is also curious to note that the legitimacy of feelings of solidarity among the Arabs should be contested by those who declare that it is the duty of all Jews to stand behind Israel.

There have been ties of common history and culture between Arabs of different countries for many centuries, since they have throughout lived in collective groups with significant national characteristics. By contrast, the ties between Jews were very much weaker; they did not even have a common language, the minimum requirement for community of culture. Whether the Arabs unite or remain separate is a matter of indifference to the outside world; there are no possible grounds for condemning either complete or informal union between them, as long as they do not use it for the purpose of conquering other territories. Piedmont was not condemned, during the struggle for Italian unity, for coming to the aid of Lombardy and Venetia, then occupied by Austria-Hungary.

The Arabs of Iraq may be reproached for their recurrent oppressive policy towards the Kurds, the Arabs of north Sudan may be criticized for their policy towards the Negroes of the south. These are not symptoms of pan-Arabism, however; these are no grand schemes for the subjugation of non-Arab countries by the Arab states acting in concert.

It is true that the struggle against Israel may be seen as the conquest of one country by a group of its neighbors, and this is the standpoint from which the great majority of non-Arab governments and peoples view the question. More will be said of this later on. What is certain is that the Arabs reject this point of view, and maintain that their struggle is directed towards retrieving lost Arab territory, taken from them by a process of colonization. Their 'pan-Arab' solidarity is founded on this basis. No such solidarity has been exhibited when Arab states have put forward claims to non-Arablands—claims which may always have existed, or at least for a very long time. No support has been found for those who may have wished to Arabize or place under Arab domination various non-Arab peoples. Thus the efforts of the north Sudanese to Arabize the south have not awakened any Arab solidarity; the Iraqis' war against the Kurds has been condemned by Nasser himself; Syria's claims to the Sanjak of Alexandretta (now Iskenderun), with its largely Turkish population, have left the other Arab states cold. The Arabs' astonishing solidarity against Israel is explained by the fact that no Arab can overlook the colonial character of the Jewish occupation of Palestine.

The mechanism of the conflict's development can only be explained if we recognize this fact—that it is a struggle against unaccepted foreign domination.

FOR A NEW APPROACH
TO THE ISRAELI-ARAB COFLICT*

I.F. Stone

Stripped of propoganda and sentiment, the Palestine problem is, simply, the struggle of two different peoples for the same strip of land. For the Jews, the establishment of Israel was a Return, with all the mystical significance the capital R implies. For the Arabs it was another invasion. This has led to three wars between them in twenty years. Each has been a victory for the Jews. With each victory the size of Israel has grown. So has the number of Arab homeless.

Now to find a solution which will satisfy both peoples is like trying to square a circle. In the language of mathematics, the aspirations of the Jews and the Arabs are incommensurable. Their conflicting ambitions cannot be fitted into the confines of any ethical system which transcends the tribalistic. This is what frustrates the benevolent outsider, anxious to satisfy both peoples. For two years Jean-Paul Sartre has been trying to draw Israelis and Arabs into a confrontation in a special number of his review, *Les Temps Modernes*. The third war between them broke out while it was on the press.

This long-awaited special issue on *Le conflit israëlo-arabe* is the first confrontation in print of Arab and Israeli intellectuals. But it turns out to be 991 pages not so much of dialogue as of dual monologue. The two sets of contributors sit not just in separate rooms, like employers and strikers in a bitter labor dispute, but in separate universes where the simplest fact often turns out to have diametrically opposite meanings. Physics has begun to uncover a new conundrum in the worlds of matter and anti-matter, occupying the same space and time but locked off from each other by their obverse natures, forever twin yet forever sundered. The Israeli-Arab quarrel is the closest analogue in the realm of international politics.

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The conditions exacted for the joint appearance of Israelis and Arabs in the same issue of *Les Temps Modernes* excluded not only collaboration but normal editorial mediation or midwifery. Claude Lanzmann, who edited this special issue, explains in his Introduction that the choice of authors and of subjects had to be left "in full sovereignty" (*en toute souveraineté*) to each of the two parties. The Arabs threatened to withdraw if an article was included by A. Razak Abdel-Kader, an Algerian who is an advocate of Israeli-Arab reconciliation. When the Israelis objected that *Les Temps Modernes* at least allow Abdel-Kader to express himself as an individual, the Arabs insisted on an absolute veto: there would be no issue if Abdel-Kader were in it.

In his Preface Jean-Paul Sartre lays bare the conflicting emotions which led him to embark on so difficult a task as to attempt the role—in some degree—of peacemaker between Arab and Israeli. They awaken the memories of his finest hours. One was that of the Resistance. "For all those who went through this experience," M. Sartre writes, "it is unbearable to imagine that another Jewish community, wherever it may be, whatever it may be, should endure this Calvary anew and furnish martyrs to a new massacre." The other was Sartre's aid to the Arabs in their struggle for Algerian independence. These memories bind him to both peoples, and give him the respect of both, as the welcome he received in both Egypt and Israel last year attests. His aim in presenting their views is, he says wistfully, merely to *inform*. His hope is that information in itself will prove pacifying "because it tends more or less slowly to replace passion by knowledge." But the roots of this struggle lie deeper than reason. It is not at all certain that information will replace passion with knowledge.

The experiences from which M. Sartre draws his emotional ties are irrelevant to this new struggle. Both sides draw from them conclusions which must horrify the man of rationalist tradition and universalist ideals. The bulk of the Jews and the Israelis draw from the Hitler period the conviction that, in this world, when threatened one must be prepared to kill or be killed. The Arabs draw from the Algerian conflict the conviction that, even in dealing with so rational and civilized a people as the French, liberation was made possible only by resorting to the gun and the knife. Both Israeli and Arabs in other words feel that only force can assure justice. In this they agree, and this sets them on a collision course. For the Jews believe justice requires the recognition of Israel as a fact: for the Arabs, to recognize the fact is to ac-

quiesce in the wrong done them by the conquest of Palestine. If God as some now say is dead, He no doubt died of trying to find an equitable solution to the Arab-Jewish problem.

The argument between them begins with the Bible. "I give this country to your posterity," God said to Abraham (Gen. XV: 18) "from the river of Egypt up to the great river, Euphrates." Among the Jews, whether religious or secular mystics, this is the origin of their right to the Promised Land. The opening article in the Arab section of *Les Temps Modernes* retorts that the "posterity" referred to in Genesis includes the descendants of Ishmael since he was the son of Abraham by his concubine Ketirah, and the ancestor of all the Arabs, Christian or Muslim.

All this may seem anachronistic nonsense, but this is an anachronistic quarrel. The Bible is still the best guide to it. Nowhere else can one find a parallel for its ethnocentric fury. Nowhere that I know of is there a word of pity in the Bible for the Canaanites whom the Hebrews slaughtered in taking possession. Of all the nonsense which marks the Jewish-Arab quarrel none is more nonsensical than the talk from both sides about the Holy Land as a symbol of peace. No bit of territory on earth has been soaked in the blood of more battles. Nowhere has religion been so zestful an excuse for fratricidal strife. The Hebrew *shalom* and the Arabic *salaam* are equally shams, relics of a common past as Bedouins. To this day inter-tribal war is the favorite sport of the Bedouins; to announce "peace" in the very first word is a necessity if any chance encounter is not to precipitate bloodshed.

In biblical perspective the Jews have been going in and out of Palestine for 3,000 years. They came down from the Euphrates under Abraham; returned from Egypt under Moses and Joshua; came back again from the Babylonian captivity and were dispersed again after Jerusalem fell to the Romans in 70 A.D. This is the third return. The Arabs feel they have a superior claim because they stayed put. This appearance side by side in *Les Temps Modernes* provides less than the full and undiluted flavor of an ancient sibling rivalry. Both sides have put their better foot forward. The Arab section includes no sample of the bloodcurdling broadcasts in which the Arab radios indulge; the Israeli, no contribution from the right-wing Zionists who dream of a greater Israel from the Nile to the Euphrates (as promised in Genesis) with complete indifference to the fate of the Arab inhabitants. On neither side is there a frank exposition of the *Realpolitik* which led Arab nationalists like Nasser

to see war on Israel as the one way to achieve Arab unity, and leads Jewish nationalists like Ben Gurion and Dayan to see Arab disunity and backwardness as essential elements for Israeli security and growth. No voice on the Arab side preaches a Holy War in which all Israel would be massacred, while no voice on the Israeli side expresses the cheerfully cynical view one may hear in private that Israel has no realistic alternative but to hand the Arabs a bloody nose every five or ten years until they accept the loss of Palestine as irreversible.

The picture, however, is not wholly symmetrical. There is first of all the asymmetry of the victorious and the defeated. The victor is ready to talk with the defeated if the latter will acquiesce in defeat. The defeated, naturally, is less inclined to this kind of objectivity. The editor, Claude Lanzmann, speaks of an "asymmetry between the two collections of articles which derives at one and the same time from a radical difference in their way of looking at the conflict and from the difference in the nature of the political regimes in the countries involved." Even if not expressly authorized by their governments or organizations to participate, M. Lanzmann explains, all the Arabs except the North Africans wrote only after consultation and defend a common position while the Israelis "as is normal in a Western style democracy" speak either for themselves or for one of their numerous parties. But this diversity may be exaggerated. On the fundamental issue which divides the two sides, no Arab contributor is prepared to advocate recognition of the State of Israel, while only one Israeli contributor is prepared to advocate its transformation into something other than a basically Jewish state.

The depth of this nationalistic difference may be measured by what happened to Israel's Communist party. Elsewhere national centrifugal tendencies have made their appearance in the once monolithic world of communism. In Israel the same nationalist tendencies split the Communist party into two, one Jewish the other Arab. The days when Arab Communists faithfully followed Moscow's line straight into the jails of Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and Jordan by supporting the 1947 partition plan have long passed away. Today Arab and Jewish Communists no longer find common ground.¹ It would be hard to find an Arab who would agree with Moshe Sneh, head of the Jewish Com-

(1) The relative strength of the two since the split may be seen from the fact that the Jewish branch was able to elect only one deputy while the Arab branch, which draws the largest vote among the Arab minority, elected three, two Arabs and one Jew.

unist party (Maki) in Israel, when he told *L'Express* (June 19-25), "our war is just and legitimate. What united the 13 Arab States against us, irrespective of their regime, was not anti-imperialism but pan-Arabism and anti-Jewish chauvinism." He added boldly that Moscow in supporting the Arabs had "turned its back on the politics of the international left and on the spirit of Tashkent." But even Sneh's bitter rival, Meir Vilner, the Jewish leader of, and one of the few Jews left in, the Arab Communist party (Rakka) expresses himself in *Les Temps Modernes* in terms with which no Arab contributor to it agrees. M. Vilner is for the return of all the refugees who wish it, for full equality to Arabs in Israel and for a neutralist policy, but he defends the existence of Israel as a legitimate fact and denies that "one can in any way compare the people [of Israel] to Algerian colons or the Crusaders." The comparisons rejected by the leader of the Arab Communist party in Israel are the favorite comparisons of the Arabs outside Israel. The diversity of viewpoint on the Israeli side thus ends with the basic agreement on its right to exist, and to exist as a Jewish state. This is precisely where the Arab disagreement begins.

The gulf between Arab and Jewish views becomes even clearer when one reads two supplementary pieces contributed by two French Jews. Maxime Rodinson, a distinguished sociologist and Orientalist, and Robert Misrahi, a well-known writer of the Left. The former takes the Arab and the latter the Zionist side. But while M. Misrahi's article appears with the Israelis, M. Rodinson's contribution—by far the most brilliant in the whole volume—appears alone. He refused, for reasons of principle, to appear in the Arab ensemble. It is not hard to see why. For while M. Rodinson gives strong support to every basic Arab historical contention, he is too much the humanist (and in the last analysis no doubt the Jew) to welcome an apocalyptic solution at the expense of Israel's existence. There is still a gulf between M. Rodinson's pro-Arab position and the most moderate view any Arab statesman has yet dared express, that of Tunisia's President Bourguiba. Bourguiba's famous speech in Jericho, March 3, 1965, is reprinted in an appendix by *Les Temps Modernes*, along with an interview he gave *Le Nouvel Observateur* (April 15) a month later. But Bourguiba's speech, though it created a sensation by its relative moderation, merely suggested that the Arabs proceed to regain Palestine as they did Tunisia by a series of more or less peaceful compromises. When *Le Nouvel Observateur* asked him whether this did not imply the progressive

disappearance of the State of Israel, he would not go beyond the cryptic reply, "That is not certain."

The Arab section of the symposium is nevertheless far from being uniform. A Moroccan, Abdallah Laroui, a professor of literature in Rabat, not only ends by saying that the possibilities of peaceful settlement must be kept open because a war would settle nothing, but even goes so far as to express the hope that the time may come when a settlement is possible without making a new exile, i.e., of the Israelis, pay for the end of another exile, i.e. of the Arabs from Palestine. He even suggests that under certain conditions, a Jewish community "with or without political authority"—a most daring remark—may prove compatible with Arab progress and development.

When we examine these conditions, we come to the heart of the fears expressed by the Arabs in this symposium. The Palestinian Arabs, from the first beginnings of Zionism, foresaw the danger of being swamped and dislodged by Jewish immigration. Neighboring Arab States feared that this immigration would stimulate a continuous territorial expansion at their expense and create a Jewish state powerful enough to dominate the area. The relative size and population of Israel when compared to its Arab neighbors are deceptive and may make these fears seem foolish, but historically the Middle East has often been conquered and dominated by relatively small bands of determined intruders. Even now, as the recent fighting showed, tiny Israel could without difficulty have occupied Damascus, Amman and Cairo, and—were it not for the big powers and the UN—dictated terms to its Arab neighbors.

It was the attempt of the British to allay Arab apprehension by setting limits on Jewish immigration that precipitated the struggle between the British and the Jews. The 1917 Balfour Declaration, when it promised a "Jewish National Home" in Palestine, also said—in a passage Zionists have always preferred to forget—"that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of the existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine." British White Papers in 1922, in 1930, and again in 1939 tried to fulfill this companion pledge by steps which would have kept the Jews a permanent minority. It is this persistent and—as events have shown—justifiable Arab fear which is reflected in M. Laroui's article. In calling the Palestine problem "A Problem of the Occident" his basic point is that if the Occident wipes out anti-Semitism, or keeps it within harmless proportions, making refuge in

Israel unnecessary for the bulk of Jewry, and Israel divorces its politics from the Zionist dream of gathering in all the Jews from Exile, this will end the danger of an inexorable expansion in search of "*lebensraum*" at the expense of the Palestinian Arabs, and finally make peace possible between the two peoples. Since immigration into Israel has dwindled in recent years, this Arab fear seems at the moment less a matter of reality than of Zionist theory and of a past experience which leads them to take it seriously.

The suggestion that Israel abandon its supra-nationalist dream finds its only echo on the other side of this collection of essays in Israel's No. 1 maverick and champion of Arab rights, Uri Avnery. Avnery was born in Germany in 1923 and went to Palestine at the age of ten, the year Hitler took power. He began his political career on the far nationalist right, as a member of the Irgun terrorist group in the struggle against the British, but has since swung over to the far left of Israeli opinion, to the point where he is considered anti-nationalist. In the wake of the first Suez war, he supported the Egyptian demand for evacuation of the Canal Zone and in 1959 he formed an Israeli committee to aid the Algerian rebels. At one time he organized a movement which asserted that the Israelis were no longer Jews but "Canaanites" and therefore one with the Arabs, forcibly converted remnants of the same indigenous stock. When this far-out conception attracted few Jews and even fewer Canaanites, he formed a "Semitic Action" movement which has now become the "Movement of New Forces." This polled 1.2 per cent of the vote in the 1965 elections and by virtue of proportional representation put Avnery into Parliament. Avnery has been more successful as a publisher. He has made his weekly *Haolam Hazev* ("This World") the largest in Israel by combining non-conformist politics with what the rather puritanical Israelis call pornography, though that weekly's girlie pictures would seem as old-fashioned as the *Police Gazette* in America.

Avnery writes in *Les Temps Modernes* that he would turn *Israel into a secular, pluralist, and multi-national state. He would abolish the Law of Return which gives every Jew the right to enter Israel and automatically become a citizen.* Avnery says this pan-Judaism of Zionism feeds the anti-Zionism of pan-Arabism by keeping alive "the myth of an Israel submerged by millions of immigrants who, finding no place to settle, would oblige the government to expand the country by force of arms."

Yet Avnery, who asks Israel to give up its Zionist essence, turns out to be a Jewish nationalist, too. After sketching out a plan for an Arab Palestinian state west of the Jordan, Avnery writes, "The Arabic reader will justly ask at this point, 'And the return of Israel to the limits of the UN plan of 1947?'" Since Israel in the 1947-48 fighting seized about 23 per cent more territory than was allotted to it in the 1947 partition plan, this implies a modification of frontiers in favor of the Arab state which was supposed to be linked with it in an economically united Palestine. But to this natural Arab question Avnery replies,² "Frankly we see no possibility of this kind. The Arab armies are already 15 kilometers from Israel's most populous city (Tel Aviv) and at Nathanya are even closer to the sea." The Arabs may feel that Avnery is as unwilling to give up the fruits of conquest as any non-"Canaanite." Avnery is as reluctant as any conventional Zionist to see his fellow Canaanite too close to Tel Aviv.

It is easy to understand why neither side trusts the other. In any case M. Sartre's symposium is a confrontation largely of moderates and Leftists, and on neither side do these elements command majority support. Another complexity is that while in settled societies the Left tends to be less nationalistic than the Right, in colonial societies the revolutionary left is often more nationalistic than the native conservative and propertied classes.

The overwhelming majority opinion on both sides, even as expressed in a symposium as skewed leftward as this one, shows little tendency to compromise. The Arabs argue that Israel is a colonialist implantation in the Middle East, supported from the beginning by imperialist powers; that it is an enemy of Arab union and progress; that the sufferings of the Jews in the West were the consequence of an anti-Semitism the Arabs have never shared; and that there is no reason why the Arabs of Palestine should be displaced from their homes in recompense for wrongs committed by Hitler Germany. M. Laroui alone is sympathetic enough to say that if the Jewish National Home had been established in Uganda, the Arabs who felt compassion for the sufferings of the Jews of Europe would have shown themselves as uncomprehending of the rights of the natives as the West has been in Palestine. At the other end of the Arab spectrum a fellow Moroccan, a journalist, Tahar Benziane, ends up in classic anti-Semitism, blaming the Jews themselves,

(2) Avnery was writing, of course, before the new outbreak of warfare had again changed these borders to Israel's advantage.

their separatist and their sense of superiority, for the prejudice against them. Ben-Zion sees the only solution not just in the liquidation of Israel but in the disappearance of world Jewry through assimilation. His would indeed be a Final Solution. This bitter and hateful opinion, widespread in the Arab world, explains why Nazism found so ready an echo before the war in the Middle East and Nazi criminals so welcome a refuge in Egypt. It also disposes of the semantic nonsense that Arabs being Semite cannot be anti-Semitic!

The Zionist argument is that the Jewish immigration was a return to the Jewish homeland. Robert Misrahi even goes so far as to argue that the Jews had an older claim to Palestine than the Arabs since the Jews had lived there in the ancient kingdom of the Hebrews long before the Hegira of Mohammed! Misrahi argues the familiar Zionist thesis that their struggle against Britain proves them to be anti-imperialist, that their colonies are socialist, that their enemies are the feudal elements in the Arab world, and that the Arab refugees are the moral responsibility of the Arab leaders since it was on their urging that the Arabs ran away.

There is a good deal of simplistic sophistry in the Zionist case. The whole earth would have to be reshuffled if claims 2,000 years old to *irredenta* were suddenly to be allowed. Zionism from its beginning tried to gain its aims by offering to serve as outpost in the Arab world for one of the great empires. Herzl sought to win first the Sultan and then the Kaiser by such arguments. Considerations of imperial strategy finally won the Balfour Declaration from Britain. The fact that the Jewish community in Palestine afterwards fought the British is no more evidence of its not being a colonial implantation than similar wars of British colonists against the mother country, from the American Revolution to Rhodesia. In the case of Palestine, as of other such struggles, the Mother Country was assailed because it showed more concern for the native majority than was palatable to the colonist minority. The argument that the refugees ran away "voluntarily" or because their leaders urged them to do so until after the fighting was over not only rests on a myth but is irrelevant. Have refugees no right to return? Have German Jews no right to recover their properties because they too fled?

The myth that the Arab refugees fled because the Arab radios urged them to do so was analyzed by Erskine B. Childers in the London *Spectator* May 12, 1961. An examination of British and US radio monitoring records turned up no such appeals; on the contrary there were appeals and "even orders to the

civilians of Palestine, *to stay put.*' The most balanced and humane discussion of the question may be found in Christopher Sykes's book *Crossroads to Israel: 1917-48* (at pages 350-57). "It can be said with a high degree of certainty," Mr. Sykes wrote, "that most of the time in the first half of 1948 the mass exodus was the natural, thoughtless, pitiful movement of ignorant people who had been badly led and who in the day of trial found themselves forsaken by their leaders . . . But if the exodus was by and large an accident of war in the first stage, in the later stages it was consciously and mercilessly helped on by Jewish threats and aggression toward Arab populations . . . It is to be noted, however, that where the Arabs had leaders who refused to be stampeded into panic flight, the people came to no harm." Jewish terrorism, not only by the Irgun, in such savage massacres as Deir Yassin, but in milder form by the Haganah, itself "encouraged" Arabs to leave areas the Jews wished to take over for strategic or demographic reasons. They tried to make as much of Israel as free of Arabs as possible.

The effort to equate the expulsion of the Arabs from Palestine with the new Jewish immigration out of the Arab countries is not to simple nor so equitable as it is made to appear in Zionist propaganda. The Palestinian Arabs feel about this "swap" as German Jews would if denied restitution on the grounds that they had been "swapped" for German refugees from the Sudetenland. In a sanely conceived settlement, some allowance should equitably be made for Jewish properties left behind in Arab countries. What is objectionable in the simplified version of this question is the idea that Palestinian Arabs whom Israel didn't want should have no objection to being "exchanged" for Arabic Jews it did want. One uprooting cannot morally be equated with the other.

A certain moral imbecility marks all ethnocentric movements. The Others are always either less than human, and thus their interests may be ignored, or more than human, and therefore so dangerous that it is right to destroy them. The latter is the underlying pan-Arab attitude toward the Jews; the former is Zionism's basic attitude toward the Arabs. M. Avnery notes that Herzl in his book *The Jewish State*, which launched the modern Zionist movement, dealt with working hours, housing for workers, and even the national flag but had not one word to say about the Arabs! For the Zionists the Arab was the Invisible Man. Psychologically he was not there. Achad Ha-Am, the Russian Jew who became a great Hebrew philosopher, tried to draw attention

as early as 1891 to the fact that Palestine was not an empty territory and that this posed problems. But as little attention was paid to him as was later accorded his successors in "spiritual Zionism," men like Buber and Judah Magnes who tried to preach, *Ichud*, "unity", i.e. with the Arabs. Of all the formulas with which Zionism comforted itself none was more false and more enduring than Israel Zangwill's phrase about "a land without people for a people without a land." Buber related that Max Nordau, hearing for the first time that there was an Arab population in Palestine, ran to Herzl crying, "I didn't know that—but then we are committing an injustice." R.J. Zwi Werblowsky, Dean of the faculty of letters at the Hebrew University, in the first article of this anthology's Israeli section, writes with admirable objectivity, "There can be no doubt that if Nordau's reaction had been more general, it would seriously have paralyzed the *élan* of the Zionist movement." It took refuge, he writes, in "a moral myopia."

This moral myopia makes it possible for Zionists to dwell on the 1,900 years of Exile in which the Jews have longed for Palestine but dismiss as nugatory the nineteen years in which Arab refugees have also longed for it. "Homelessness" is the major theme of Zionism but this pathetic passion is denied to Arab refugees. Even Meir Yaari, the head of Mapam, the leader of the "Marxist" Zionists of Hashomer Hatzair, who long preached bi-nationalism, says Israel can only accept a minority of the Arab refugees because the essential reason for the creation of Israel was to "welcome the mass of immigrant Jews returning to their historic fatherland!" If there is not room enough for both, the Jews must have precedence. This is what leads Gebran Majdalany, a Baath Socialist, to write that Israel is "a racist state founded from its start on discrimination between Jew and non-Jew." He compares the Zionists to the Muslim Brotherhood who "dream of a Muslim Israel in which the non-Muslims will be the gentiles, second class citizens sometimes tolerated but more often repressed." It is painful to hear his bitter reproach—

"Some people admit the inevitably racist character of Israel but justify it by the continual persecutions to which the Jews have been subjected during the history of Europe and by the massacres of the Second World War. We consider that, far from serving as justification, these facts constitute an aggravating circumstance; for those who have known the effects of racism and of discrimination in their own flesh

and human dignity, are less excusably racist than those who can only imagine the negative effects of prejudice.”

When Israel's Defense Minister, Moshe Dayan, was on *Face the Nation* June 11, after Israel's latest victories, this colloquy occurred.

Sydney Gruson: (*New York Times*): Is there any possible way that Israel could absorb the huge number of Arabs whose territory it has gained control of now?

Gen. Dayan: Economically we can; but I think that is not in accord with our aims in the future. It would turn Israel into either a bi-national or poly-Arab-Jewish state instead of the Jewish state, and we want to have a Jewish state. We can absorb them, but then it won't be the same country.

Mr. Gruson: And it is necessary in your opinion to maintain this as a Jewish state and purely a Jewish state?

Gen. Dayan: Absolutely—absolutely. We want a Jewish state like the French have a French state.

This must deeply disturb the thoughtful Jewish reader. Ferdinand and Isabella in expelling the Jews and Moors from Spain were in the same way saying they wanted a Spain as “Spanish” (i.e. Christian) as France was French. It is not hard to recall more recent parallels.

It is a pity the editors of *Les Temps Modernes* didn't widen their symposium to include a Jewish as distinct from an Israeli point of view. For *Israel is creating a kind of moral schizophrenia in world Jewry. In the outside world the welfare of Jewry depends on the maintenance of secular, non-racial, pluralistic societies. In Israel, Jewry finds itself defending a society in which mixed marriages cannot be legalized, in which non-Jews have a lesser status than Jews, and in which the ideal is racial and exclusionist. Jews must fight elsewhere for their very security and existence—against principles and practices they find themselves defending in Israel. Those from the outside world, even in their moments of greatest enthusiasm amid Israel's accomplishments, feel twinges of claustrophobia, not just geographical but spiritual. Those caught up in Prophetic fervor soon begin to feel that the light they hoped to see out of Zion is only that of another narrow nationalism.*

Such moments lead to a reexamination of Zionist ideology. That longing for Zion on which it is predicated may be exaggerated. Its reality is indisputable but its strength can easily be overestimated. Not until after World War II was it ever strong enough to attract more than a trickle of Jews to the Holy Land. By the tragic dialectic of history, Israel would not have been born without Hitler. It took the murder of six million in his human ovens to awaken sufficient nationalist zeal in Jewry and sufficient humanitarian compassion in the West to bring a Jewish state to birth in Palestine. Even then humanitarian compassion was not strong enough to open the gates of the West to Jewish immigration in contrition. The capitalist West and the Communist East preferred to displace Arabs than to welcome the Jewish "displaced persons" in Europe's postwar refugee camps.

It must also be recognized, despite Zionist ideology, that the periods of greatest Jewish creative accomplishment have been associated with pluralistic civilization in their time of expansion and tolerance: in the Hellenistic period, in the Arab civilization of North Africa and Spain, and in Western Europe and America. Universal values can only be the fruit of a universal vision; the greatness of the Prophets lay in their overcoming of ethnocentricity. A Lilliputian nationalism cannot distill truths for all mankind. Here lie the roots of a growing divergence between Jew and Israeli, the former with a sense of mission as a Witness in the human wilderness, the latter concerned only with his own tribe's welfare.

But Jewry can no more turn its back on Israel than Israel on Jewry. The ideal solution would allow the Jews to make their contributions as citizens in the diverse societies and nations which are their homes while Israel finds acceptance as a Jewish State in a renascent Arab civilization. This would end Arab fears of a huge inflow to Israel. The Jews have as much reason to be apprehensive about that prospect as the Arabs.

It can only come as the result of a sharp recrudescence in persecution elsewhere in the world. Zionism grows on Jewish catastrophe. Even now it casts longing eyes on Russian Jewry. But would it not be better, more humanizing, and more just, were the Soviet Union to wipe out anti-Semitism and to accord its Jews the same rights of cultural autonomy and expression it gives all its other nationalities? The Russian Jews have fought for Russia, bled for the Revolution, made no small contribution to Russian literature and thought; why should they be cast out? This would be a spiritual catastrophe for Russia

as well as Jewry even though it would supply another flow of desperate refugees to an Israel already short of Jews if it is to expand as the Zionist militants hope to expand it.

Israel has deprived anti-Semitism of its mystique. For the visitor to Israel, anti-Semitism no longer seems a mysterious anomaly but only another variant of minority-majority friction. *Es is schwer zu sein eid Yid* ("It's hard to be a Jew") was the title of Sholom Aleichem's most famous story. Now we see that it's hard to be a goy in Tel Aviv, especially an Arab goy. Mohammad Watad, a Muslim Israeli, one of the five Arabic contributors to the Israeli side of this symposium, begins his essay with words which startlingly resemble the hostile dialogue Jews encounter elsewhere. "I am often asked," he writes, "about my 'double' life which is at one and the same time that of an Arab and that of an Israeli citizen." Another Arab contributor from Israel, Ibrahim Shabath, a Christian who teaches Hebrew in Arabic schools and is editor-in-chief of *Al-Mirsad*, the Mapam paper in Arabic, deplures the fact that nineteen years after the creation of Israel "the Arabs are still considered strangers by the Jews." He relates a recent conversation with Ben Gurion. "You must know," Ben Gurion told him, "that Israel is the country of the Jews and only of the Jews. Every Arab who lives here has the same rights as any minority citizen in any country of the world, but he must admit the fact that he lives in a Jewish country." The implications must chill Jews in the outside world.

The Arab citizen of Israel, Shabath complains, "is the victim today of the same prejudices and the same generalizations as the Jewish people elsewhere." The bitterest account of what they undergo may be found in an anonymous report sent to the United Nations in 1964 by a group of Arabs who tried unsuccessfully to found an independent socialist Arab movement and publication. Military authorities despite a Supreme Court order refused to permit this, and the courts declined to overrule the military. Their petition is reprinted in the Israeli section of this symposium. Though the military rule complained of was abolished last year, and police regulations substituted, it is too soon—especially because of the new outbreak of warfare—to determine what the effect will be on Arab civil liberties. Israelis admit with pleasure that neither in the Christian villages of Central Galilee nor in the Muslim villages of the so-called "Triangle" was there the slightest evidence of any Fifth Column activity. Those Israelis who have fought for an end of all dis-

crimination against the Arabs argue that they have demonstrated their loyalty and deserve fully to be trusted.

It is to Israel's credit that the Arab minority is given place in its section to voice these complaints while no similar place is opened for ethnic minority opinion in the Arabic section. Indeed except for Lebanon and to some degree Tunisia there is no place in the Arab world where the dissident of any kind enjoys freedom of the press. There is no frank discussion of this in the Arab section. One of the most vigorous and acute expositions of the Arab point of view, for example, is an article by an Egyptian writer, Lotfallah Soliman, who has played a distinguished role in bringing modern ideas to the young intellectuals of his country since World War II. His autobiographical sketch says cryptically if discreetly "He lives presently in Paris." I stumbled on a more candid explanation. In preparing for this review, I read an earlier article in *Les Temps Modernes* (Aug.-Sept. 1960) by Adel Montasser on *La répression anti-démocratique en Egypte*. Appended to it was a list of intellectuals imprisoned by Nasser. Among them was Lotfallah Soliman. Obviously it's hard to be a free Egyptian intellectual in Nasser's Egypt. Many of those then imprisoned have since been freed, but it is significant that a writer as trenchant and devoted as Soliman has to work in exile.

It is true that the full roster of Arab minority complaints in Israel had to be presented anonymously for fear of the authorities. But in the Arab section of this book no place was allowed even anonymously for the Jewish and the various Christian minorities to voice their complaints. As a result the Arab contributors were able to write as if their countries, unlike Europe, were models of tolerance. They hark back to the great days of Arabic Spain where (except for certain interludes not mentioned) Christian and Jew enjoyed full equality, religious, cultural, and political, with the Muslim: Spain did not become synonymous with intolerance, Inquisition, and obscurantism until the Christian Reconquest. But today no Arab country except, precariously, Lebanon, dimly resembles Moorish Spain. As a result the Jews from the Arabic countries tend to hate the Arab far more than Jews from Europe who have never lived under his rule, which often recalls medieval Christendom. A glimpse of these realities may be found in the most moving article in this whole symposium. This is by Atallah Mansour, a young Christian Arabic Israeli novelist of peasant origin who has published two novels, one in Arabic and the other in Hebrew, and worked as a journalist on Avnery's paper

Haolam Hazeh and on the staff of *Haaretz*, Israel's best and most objective daily paper. M. Mansour knows doubly what it is to be a "Jew". He is as an Arab a "Jew" to the Israelis and as a Christian a "Jew" to the Muslims. He tells a touching story of an accidental encounter in (of all places) the Paris Metro with a young man who turned out like him to be Greek-rite Christian, though from Egypt. They exchanged stories of their troubles, like two Jews in the Diaspora. "We in Egypt," the young stranger told him, "have the same feelings as you. There is no law discriminating between us and the Muslims. But the governmental administration, at least on the everyday level, prefers Mahmoud to Boulos and Achmed to Samaan"—i.e. the man with the Muslim name to the man with the Christian. "Omar Cherif the well known movie actor," the Egyptian Christian added, "is Christian in origin. But he had to change his Christian name for a Muslim to please the public." In Israel, similarly, Ibrahim often becomes Abraham to pass as a Jew and to avoid widespread housing discrimination.

If in this account I have given more space to the Arab than the Israeli side it is because as a Jew, closely bound emotionally with the birth of Israel,³ I feel honor bound to report the Arab side, especially since the US press is so overwhelmingly pro-Zionist. For me, the Arab-Jewish struggle is a tragedy. The essence of tragedy is a struggle of right against right. Its catharsis is the cleansing pity of seeing how good men do evil despite themselves out of unavoidable circumstance and irresistible compulsion. When evil men do evil, their deeds belong to the realm of pathology. But when good men do evil, we confront the essence of human tragedy. In a tragic struggle, the victors become the guilty and must make amends to the defeated. *For me the Arab problem is also the No. 1 Jewish problem. How we act toward the Arabs will determine what kind of people we become: either oppressors and racists*

(3) I first arrived in Palestine on Balfour Day Nov. 2, 1945, the day the Haganah blew up bridges and watch towers to begin its struggle against the British and immigration restrictions. The following spring I was the first newspaperman to travel with illegal Jewish immigrants from the Polish-Czech border through the British blockade. In 1947 I celebrated Passover in the British detention camps in Cyprus and in 1948 I covered the Arab-Jewish war. See my *Underground to Palestine* (1946) and *This is Israel* (1948). I was back in 1949, 1950, 1951, 1956, and 1964.

in our turn like those from whom we have suffered, or a nobler race able to transcend the tribal xenophobias that afflict mankind.⁴

Israel's swift and extraordinary victories have suddenly transmuted this ideal from the realm of impractical sentiment to urgent necessity. The new frontiers of military conquest have gathered in most of the Arab refugees. Zionism's dream, the "ingathering of the exiles," has been achieved though in an ironic form; it is the Arab exiles who are back. They cannot be gotten rid of as easily as in 1948. Something in the order of 100,000 have again been "encouraged" to leave, but the impact on public opinion abroad and in Israel has forced the State to declare that it will allow them to return. While the UN proves impotent to settle the conflict and the Arab powers are unwilling to negotiate from a situation of weakness, Israel can to some degree determine its future by the way in which it treats its new Arab subjects or citizens. The wrangles of the powers will go on for months but these people must be fed, clothed, and housed. How they are treated will change the world's picture of Israel and of Jewry, soften or intensify Arab anger, build a bridge to peace or make new war certain. To establish an Arab state on the West Bank and to link it with Israel, perhaps also with Jordan, in a Confederation would turn these Arab neighbors, if fraternally treated, from enemies into a buffer, and give Israel the protection of strategic frontiers. But it would be better to give the West Bank back to Jordan than to try to create a puppet state—a kind of Arab Bantustan—consigning the Arabs to second-class status under Israel's control. This would only foster Arab resentment. To avoid giving the Arabs first-class citizenship by putting them in the reservation of a second-class state is too transparently clever.

What is required in the treatment of the Arab refugees Israel has gathered in is the conquest both of Jewish exclusivism and the resentful hostility of the Arabs. Even the malarial marshes of the Emek and the sandy

(4) In September, Black Star will publish a vigorous little book *The Aryanization of the Jewish State* by Michael Selzer, a young Pakistani Jew who lived in Israel. It may help Jewry and Israel to understand that the way to a fraternal life with the Arabs inside and outside Israel must begin with the eradication of the prejudices that greet the Oriental and Arabic-speaking Jews in Israel who now make up over half the population of the country. The bias against the Arab extends to a bias against the Jews from the Arab countries. In this, as in so many other respects, Israel presents in miniature all the problems of the outside world. Were the rest of the planet to disappear, Israel could regenerate from itself—as from a new Ark—all the bigotries, follies, and feuds of a vanished mankind (as well as some of its most splendid accomplishments).

wastes of the Negev could not have looked more bleakly forbidding to earlier generations of Zionist pioneers than these steep and arid mountains of prejudice. But I for one have a glimmer of hope. Every year I have gone to Palestine and later Israel I have found situations which seemed impossible. Yet Zionist zeal and intelligence overcame them. Perhaps this extraordinarily dynamic, progressive, and devoted community can even if need be transcend its essential self.

I was encouraged to find in this volume that the most objective view of the Arab question on the Israeli side was written by Yehudah Harkabi, a Haifa-born professional soldier, a brigadier general, but a general who holds a diploma in philosophy and Arabic studies from the Hebrew University and from Harvard. He has written a book on *Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace*. His article "Hawks or Doves" is extraordinary in its ability to rise above prejudice and sentiment. He does not shut his eyes at all to the Arab case. He feels peace can come only if we have the strength to confront its full human reality. "Marx affirms," he concludes, "that knowledge of the truth frees man from the determinism of history." It is only, General Harkabi says, when Israel is prepared "to accept the truth in its entirety that it will find the new strength necessary to maintain and consolidate its existence." The path to safety and the path to greatness lies in reconciliation. The other route, now that the West Bank and Gaza are under Israeli jurisdiction, leads to two new perils. The Arab populations now in the conquered territories make guerrilla war possible within Israel's own boundaries. And externally, if enmity deepens and tension rises between Israel and the Arab states, both sides will by one means or another obtain nuclear weapons for the next round.

This will change the whole situation. No longer will Israeli and Arab be able to play the game of war in anachronistic fashion as an extension of politics by other means. Neither will they be able to depend on a mutual balance of terror like the great powers with their "second strike" capacity. In this pygmy struggle the first strike will determine the outcome and leave nothing behind. Nor will the great powers be able to stand aside and let their satellites play out their little war, as in 1948, 1956, and 1967. I have not dwelt here on the responsibility of the great powers, because if they did not exist the essential differences in the Arab-Israeli quarrel would still remain, and because both sides use the great power question as an excuse to ignore their own responsibilities. The problem for the new generation of Arabs is

the social reconstruction of their decayed societies; the problem will not go away if Israel disappears. Indeed their task is made more difficult by the failure to recognize Israel, since that means a continued emphasis on militarization, diversion of resources, and domination by military men. For Israel, the problem is reconciliation with the Arabs; the problem will not go away even if Moscow and Washington lie down together like the lion and the lamb or blow each other to bits. But the great powers for their part cannot continue the cynical game of arming both sides in a struggle for influence when the nuclear stage is reached. It is significant that the one place where the Israeli and Arab contributors to this symposium tend to common conclusions is in the essays discussing the common nuclear danger. To denuclearize the Middle East, to defuse it, will require some kind of neutralization. Otherwise the Arab-Israeli conflict may some day set off a wider Final Solution. That irascible Old Testament God of Vengeance is fully capable, if provoked, of turning the whole planet into a crematorium.

THE ISRAELI-ARAB WAR, JUNE 1967*

by Isaac Deutscher

The war and the 'miracle' of Israel's victory have solved none of the problems that confront Israel and the Arab states. They have, on the contrary, aggravated all the old issues and created new, more dangerous ones. They have not increased Israel's security, but have rendered it more vulnerable than it had been before 5 June 1967. This 'six days wonder,' this latest, all-too-easy triumph of Israeli arms will be seen one day, in a not very remote future, to have been a disaster in the first instance for Israel itself.

Let us consider the international background. We have to relate this war to the great power struggle and ideological conflicts in the world which form its context. In these last years American imperialism, and the forces associated with it and supported by it, have been engaged in a tremendous political, ideological, economic, and military offensive over a vast area of Asia and Africa; while the forces opposed to the American penetration, the Soviet Union in the first instance, have barely held their ground or have been in retreat. This trend emerges from a long series of events: the Ghanaian upheaval, in which Nkrumah's government was overthrown; the growth of reaction in various Afro-Asian countries; the bloody triumph of anti-Communism in Indonesia, which was a huge victory for counter-revolution in Asia; the escalation of the American war in Vietnam; and the 'marginal' right-wing military coup in Greece. The Arab-Israeli war was not an isolated affair; it belongs to this category of events. The counter-trend has manifested itself in revolutionary ferment in various parts of India, the radicalization of the political mood in Arab countries, the effective struggle of the National Front of Liberation in Vietnam; and the world-wide growth of opposition to American intervention. The advance of American imperialism and of Afro-Asian

(*) Reprinted from *The Non-Jewish Jew* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968, pp. 126-152), by the author.

counter-revolution has not gone unopposed, but its success everywhere outside Vietnam has been evident.

In the Middle East the American forward push has been of relatively recent date. During the Suez war, the United States still adopted an 'anti-colonialist' stance. It acted, in seeming accord with the Soviet Union, to bring about the British and French withdrawal. The logic of American policy was still the same as in the late 1940s, when the State of Israel was in the making. As long as the American ruling class was interested primarily in squeezing out the old colonial Powers from Africa and Asia, the White House was a mainstay of 'anti-colonialism'. But having contributed to the débâcle of the old Empires, the United States took fright at the 'power vacuum' that might be filled by native revolutionary forces or the Soviet Union or a combination of both. Yankee anti-colonialism faded out, and America 'stepped in'. In the Middle East this happened during the period between the Suez crisis and the last Israeli war. The American military landings in Lebanon in 1958 were designed to stem a high tide of revolution in that area, especially in Iraq. Since then the United States, no doubt relying to some extent on Soviet 'moderation', has avoided open and direct military involvement in the Middle East and maintained a posture of detachment. This posture does not make the American presence there any less real.



The Israelis have, of course, acted on their own motives, and not merely to suit the convenience of American policy. That their leaders and the great mass of Israelis believe themselves to be menaced by Arab hostility need not be doubted. That some 'bloodthirsty' Arab declarations about 'wiping Israel off the map' made Israeli flesh creep is evident. The Israelis are haunted by the memories of the Jewish tragedy in Europe and now feel isolated and encircled by the 'teeming' millions of a hostile Arab world. Nothing was easier for their own propagandists, aided by Arab verbal excesses, than to play up the fear of another 'final solution' threatening the Jews, this time in Asia. Conjuring up Biblical myths and all the ancient religious-national symbols of Jewish history, the propagandists whipped up that frenzy of belligerence, arrogance, and fanaticism of which the Israelis gave such startling displays as they rushed to Sinai and the Wailing Wall and to Jordan and the walls of Jericho. Behind the frenzy and arrogance there lay Israel's suppressed sense

of guilt towards the Arabs, the feeling that the Arabs would never forget or forgive the blows Israel had inflicted on them: the seizure of their land, the fate of a million or more refugees, and repeated military defeats and humiliations. Driven half-mad by fear of Arab revenge, the Israelis have, in their overwhelming majority, accepted the 'doctrine' inspiring their government's policy, the 'doctrine' that holds that Israel's security lies in periodic warfare which every few years must reduce the Arab states to impotence.

Yet, whatever their own motives and fears, the Israelis are not and cannot be independent agents. The factors of Israel's dependence were to some extent 'built in' in its history over the last two decades. All Israeli governments have staked Israel's existence on the 'Western orientation'. This alone would have sufficed to turn Israel into a Western outpost in the Middle East, and so to involve it in the great conflict between imperialism (or neo-colonialism) and the Arab peoples struggling for their emancipation. Other factors have been in play as well. Israel's economy has depended for its tenuous balance and growth on foreign Zionist financial aid, especially on American donations. These donations have been a curse in disguise for the new state. They have enabled the government to manage its balance of payments in a way in which no country in the world can do it, without engaging in any trade with its neighbours. The influx of foreign funds has distorted Israel's economic structure by encouraging the growth of a large, unproductive sector and a standard of living which is not related to the country's own productivity and earnings.¹ This has, of course, unfailingly kept Israel well within the 'western sphere of influence'. Israel has in effect lived far above its means. Over many years nearly half of Israel's food was imported from the West. As the American administration exempts from taxation earnings and profits earmarked as donations for Israel, the Treasury in Washington has held its hand on the purses on which Israel's economy depends. Washington could at any time hit Israel by refusing the tax exemption (even though this would lose it the Jewish vote in elections). The threat of such a sanction, never uttered but always present, and occasionally hinted at, has been enough to align Israeli policy firmly with the United States.

(1) In recent years Israel has been receiving up to 250 million dollars annually in grants and loans from the western powers, in aid from the United States, and in contributions from Jews abroad. This amounts to nearly 125 dollars a year per head of the Israeli population.

Years ago, when I visited Israel, a high Israeli official listed to me the factories that they could not build because of American objections—among them steel mills and plants producing agricultural machinery. On the other hand, there was a list of virtually useless factories turning out fantastic amounts of plastic kitchen utensils, toys, etc. Nor could any Israeli administration ever feel free to consider seriously Israel's vital, long-term need for trade and close economic ties with its Arab neighbours or for improving economic relations with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

Economic dependence has affected Israel's domestic policy and 'cultural atmosphere' in other ways as well. The American donor is also the most important foreign investor operating in the Holy Land. A wealthy American Jew, a 'worldly businessman' among his gentile associates and friends in New York, Philadelphia or Detroit, is at heart proud to be a member of the Chosen People, and in Israel he exercises his influence in favour of religious obscurantism and reaction. A fervent believer in free enterprise, he views with a hostile eye even the mild 'socialism' of the Histadruth and the kibbutzim, and has done his bit in taming it. Above all, he has helped the rabbis to maintain their stranglehold on legislation and much of the education and so to keep alive the spirit of racial-talmudic exclusiveness and superiority. All this has fed and inflamed the antagonism towards the Arabs.

The cold war imparted great momentum to the reactionary trends in Israel and exacerbated the Arab-Jewish conflict. Israel was firmly committed to anti-communism. True, Stalin's policy in his last years, outbreaks of anti-semitism in the U.S.S.R., anti-Jewish *motifs* in the trials of Slansky, Rajk, and Kostov, and Soviet encouragement of even the most irrational forms of Arab nationalism, all bear their share of responsibility for Israel's attitude. Yet it should not be forgotten that Stalin had been Israel's god-father; that it was with Czechoslovak munitions, supplied on Stalin's orders, that the Jews had fought the British occupation army—and the Arabs—in 1947-48; and that the Soviet envoy was the first to vote for the recognition of the State of Israel by the United Nations. It may be argued that Stalin's change of attitude towards Israel was itself a reaction to Israel's alignment with the West. And in the post-Stalin era the Israeli governments have persisted in this alignment.

Irreconcilable hostility to Arab aspirations to unity and national emancipation from the West thus became *the* axiom of Israeli policy. Hence

Israel's role in 1956, in the Suez war. Israel's Social Democratic ministers, no less than Western colonialists, have embraced a *raison d'état* which sees its highest wisdom in keeping the Arabs divided and backward and in playing their reactionary Hashemite and other feudal elements against the Republican, national-revolutionary forces. Early in 1967, when it seemed that a republican uprising or coup might overthrow King Hussein, Mr. Eshkol's government made no bones about it that, in case of a 'Nasserite coup' in Amman, Israeli troops would march into Jordan. And the prelude to the events of last June was provided by Israel's adoption of a menacing attitude towards Syria's new régime which it denounced as 'Nasserite' or even 'ultra-Nasserite' (for Syria's government appeared to be a shade more anti-imperialist and radical than Egypt's).

Did Israel, in fact, plan to attack Syria some time in May, as Soviet Intelligence Services believed and as Moscow warned Nasser? We do not know. It was as a result of this warning, and with Soviet encouragement, that Nasser ordered mobilization and concentration of troops on the Sinai frontier. If Israel had such a plan, Nasser's move may have delayed the attack on Syria by a few weeks. If Israel had no such plan, its behaviour gave to its anti-Syrian threats the kind of plausibility that Arab threats had in Israeli eyes. In any case, Israel's rulers were quite confident that their aggressiveness *vis-à-vis* either Syria or Egypt would meet with Western sympathy and bring them reward. This calculation underlay their decision to strike the preemptive blow on June 5th. They were absolutely sure of American, and to some extent British, moral, political, and economic support. They knew that no matter however far they went in attacking the Arabs, they could count on American diplomatic protection or, at the very least, on American official indulgence. And they were not mistaken. The White House and the Pentagon could not fail to appreciate men who for their own reasons, were determined to put down the Arab enemies of American neo-colonialism. General Dayan acted as a kind of Marshal Ky for the Middle East and appeared to be doing his job with startling speed, efficiency, and ruthlessness. He was, and is, a much cheaper and far less embarrassing ally than Ky.



The Arab behaviour, especially Nasser's divided mind and hesitation on the eve of hostilities, presents a striking contrast to Israel's determination and uninhibited aggressiveness. Having, with Soviet encouragement, moved his

troops to the Sinai frontier, and even put his Russian-made missiles in position, Nasser then, without consulting Moscow, proclaimed the blockade of the Straits of Tiran. This was a provocative move, though practically of very limited significance. The western powers did not consider it important enough to try and 'test' the blockade. It provided Nasser with a prestige gain and enabled him to claim that he had wrested from Israel the last fruit of their 1956 victory. (Before the Suez war Israeli ships could not pass these Straits.) The Israelis played up the blockade as a mortal danger to their economy, which it was not; and they replied by mobilizing their forces and moving them to the frontiers.

Soviet propaganda still continued to encourage the Arabs in public. However, a conference of Middle Eastern Communist Parties held in May (its resolutions were summarized in *Pravda*) was strangely reticent about the crisis and allusively critical of Nasser. More important were the curious diplomatic manoeuvres behind the scenes. On 26 May, in the dead of night (at 2.30 a.m.) the Soviet Ambassador woke up Nasser to give him a grave warning that the Egyptian army must not be the first to open fire. Nasser complied. The compliance was so thorough that he not only refrained from starting hostilities, but took no precautions whatsoever against the possibility of an Israeli attack: he left his airfields undefended and his planes grounded and uncamouflaged. He did not even bother to mine the Tiran Straits or to place a few guns on their shores (as the Israelis found to their surprise when they got there).

All this suggests hopeless bungling on Nasser's part and on the part of the Egyptian Command. But the real bunglers sat in the Kremlin. Brezhnev's and Kosygin's behaviour during these events was reminiscent of Khrushchev's during the Cuban crisis, though it was even more muddle-headed. The pattern was the same. In the first phase there was needless provocation of the other side and a reckless move towards the 'brink'; in the next sudden panic and a hasty retreat; and then followed frantic attempts to save face and cover up the traces. Having excited Arab fears, encouraged them to risky moves, promised to stand by them, and having brought out their own naval units into the Mediterranean to counter the moves of the American Sixth Fleet, the Russians then tied Nasser hand and foot.

Why did they do it? As the tension was mounting, the 'hot line' between the Kremlin and the White House went into action. The two super-powers

agreed to avoid direct intervention and to curb the parties to the conflict. If the Americans went through the motions of curbing the Israelis, they must have done it so perfunctorily, or with so many winks that the Israelis felt, in fact, encouraged to go ahead with their plan for the pre-emptive blow. (We have, at any rate, not heard of the American Ambassador waking up the Israeli Prime Minister to warn him that the Israelis must not be the first to open fire.) The Soviet curb on Nasser was heavy, rude, and effective. Even so, Nasser's failure to take elementary military precautions remains something of a puzzle. Did the Soviet Ambassador in the course of his nocturnal visit tell Nasser that Moscow was sure that the Israelis would not strike first? Had Washington given Moscow such an assurance? And was Moscow so gullible as to take it at face value and act on it? It seems almost incredible that this should have been so. But only some such version of the events can account for Nasser's inactivity and for Moscow's stunned surprise at the outbreak of hostilities.

Behind all this bungling there loomed the central contradiction of Soviet policy. On the one hand the Soviet leaders see in the preservation of the international *status quo*, including the social *status quo*, the essential condition of their national security and of 'peaceful coexistence'. They are therefore anxious to keep at a 'safe distance' from storm centres of class conflict in the world and to avoid dangerous foreign entanglements. On the other hand, they cannot, for ideological and power-political reasons, avoid altogether dangerous entanglements. They cannot quite keep at a safe distance when American neo-colonialism clashed directly or indirectly with its Afro-Asian and Latin-American enemies, who look to Moscow as their friend and protector. In normal times this contradiction is only latent, Moscow works for *détente* and *rap-prochement* with the U.S.A.; and it cautiously aids and arms its Afro-Asian or Cuban friends. But sooner or later the moment of crisis comes and the contradiction explodes in Moscow's face. Soviet policy must then choose between its allies and protégés working against the *status quo*, and its own commitment to the *status quo*. When the choice is pressing and ineluctable, it opts for the *status quo*.

The dilemma is real and in the nuclear age dangerous enough. But it confronts the U.S.A. as well, for the U.S.A. is just as much interested as is the U.S.S.R. in avoiding world war and nuclear conflict. This, however, limits its freedom of action and of political-ideological offensive far less than

it restricts Soviet freedom. Washington is far less afraid of the possibility that some move by one of its protégés, or its own military intervention, might lead to a direct confrontation of the super powers. After the Cuban crisis and the war in Vietnam, the Arab-Israeli war has once again sharply illuminated the difference.



To some extent the present situation has been determined by the whole course of Arab-Israeli relations since the second World War and even since the first. Yet I believe that some options were open to the Israelis. There is a parable with the help of which I once tried to present this problem to an Israeli audience.

A man once jumped from the top floor of a burning house in which many members of his family had already perished. He managed to save his life; but as he was falling he hit a person standing down below and broke that person's legs and arms. The jumping man had no choice; yet to the man with the broken limbs he was the cause of his misfortune. If both behaved rationally, they would not become enemies. The man who escaped from the blazing house, having recovered, would have tried to help and console the other sufferer; and the latter might have realized that he was the victim of circumstances over which neither of them had control. But look what happens when these people behave irrationally. The injured man blames the other for his misery and swears to make him pay for it. The other, afraid of the crippled man's revenge, insults him, kicks him, and beats him up whenever they meet. The kicked man again swears revenge and is again punched and punished. The bitter enmity, so fortuitous at first, hardens and comes to overshadow the whole existence of both men and to poison their minds.

You will, I am sure, recognize yourselves (I said to my Israeli audience), the remnants to European Jewry in Israel, in the man who jumped from the blazing house. The other character represents, of course, the Palestine Arabs, more than a million of them, who have lost their lands and their homes. They are resentful; they gaze from across the frontiers on their old native places; they raid you stealthily, and swear revenge. You punch and kick them mercilessly; you have shown that you know how to do it. But what is the sense of it? And what is the prospect?

The responsibility for the tragedy of European Jews, for Auschwitz, Majdanek, and the slaughters in the ghetto, rests entirely on our western bourgeois 'civilization', of which Nazism was the legitimate, even though degenerate, off-spring. Yet it was the Arabs who were made to pay the price for the crimes the West committed towards the Jews. They are still made to pay it, for the 'guilty conscience' of the West is, of course, pro-Israeli and anti-Arab. And how easily Israel has allowed itself to be bribed and fooled by the false 'conscience money'.

A rational relationship between Israelis and Arabs might have been possible if Israel had at least attempted to establish it, if the man who threw himself down from the burning house had tried to make friends with the innocent victim of his jump and to compensate him. This did not happen. Israel never even recognized the Arab grievance. From the outset Zionism worked towards the creation of a purely Jewish state and was glad to rid the country of its Arab inhabitants. No Israeli government has ever seriously looked for any opportunity to remove or assuage the grievance. They refused even to consider the fate of the huge mass of refugees unless the Arab states first recognized Israel, unless, that is, the Arabs surrendered politically before starting negotiations. Perhaps this might still be excused as bargaining tactics. The disastrous aggravation of Arab-Israeli relations was brought about by the Suez war, when Israel unashamedly acted as the spearhead of the old bankrupt European imperialisms in their last common stand in the Middle East, in their last attempt to maintain their grip on Egypt. The Israelis did not have to align themselves with the shareholders of the Suez Canal Company. The pros and cons were clear; there was no question of any mixture of rights and wrongs on either side. The Israelis put themselves totally in the wrong, morally and politically.

On the face of it, the Arab-Israeli conflict is only a clash of two rival nationalisms, each moving within the vicious circle of its self-righteous and inflated ambitions. From the viewpoint of an abstract internationalism nothing would be easier than to dismiss both as equally worthless and reactionary. However, such a view would ignore the social and political realities of the situation. The nationalism of the people in semi-colonial or colonial countries, fighting for their independence, must not be put on the same moral-political level as the nationalism of conquerors and oppressors. The former has its historic justification and progressive aspect which the latter has not.

Clearly, Arab nationalism, unlike the Israeli, still belongs to the former category.

Yet even the nationalism of the exploited and oppressed should not be viewed uncritically, for there are various phases in its development. In one phase progressive aspirations prevail; in another reactionary tendencies come to the surface. From the moment independence is won or nearly won, nationalism tends to shed its revolutionary aspect altogether and turns into a retrograde ideology. We have seen this happening in India, Indonesia, Israel, and to some extent even in China. And even in the revolutionary phase each nationalism has its streak of irrationality, an inclination to exclusiveness, national egoism and racism. Arab nationalism, despite all its historic merits and progressive functions, has also carried within itself these reactionary ingredients.

The June crisis has revealed some of the basic weaknesses of Arab political thought and action: the lack of political strategy; a proneness to emotional self-intoxication; and an excessive reliance on nationalist demagoguery. These weaknesses were among the decisive causes of the Arab defeat. By indulging in threats of the destruction of Israel and even of 'extermination'—and how empty these threats were has been amply demonstrated by the Arabs' utter military unpreparedness—some of Egypt's and Jordan's propagandists provided plenty of grist to Israeli chauvinism, and enabled Israel's government to work up the mass of its people into the paroxysms of fear and ferocious aggressiveness which then burst upon Arab heads.

It is a truism that war is a continuation of policy. The six day's war has shown up the relative immaturity of the present Arab régimes. The Israelis owe their triumph not merely to the pre-emptive blow, but also to a more modern economic, political, and military organizations. To some extent the war drew a balance on the decade of Arab development since the Suez war and has revealed its grave inadequacies. The modernization of the socio-economic structures of Egypt and the other Arab states and of Arab political thinking has proceeded far more slowly than people, inclined to idealize the present Arab régimes, have assumed.

The persisting backwardness is, of course, rooted in socio-economic conditions. But Arab ideology and methods of organization are in themselves factors of weakness. I have in mind the single party system, the cult of Nas-

serism, and the absence of free discussion. All this has greatly hampered the political education of the masses and the work of socialist enlightenment. The negative results have made themselves felt on various levels. When major decisions of policy depend on a more or less autocratic Leader, there is in normal times no genuine popular participation in the political processes, no vigilant and active consciousness, no initiative from below. This has had many consequences, even military ones. The Israeli pre-emptive blow, delivered with conventional weapons, would not have had such devastating impact if Egypt's armed forces had been accustomed to rely on the initiative of individual officers and soldiers. Local commanders would then have taken the elementary defensive precautions without waiting for orders from above. Military inefficiency reflected here a wider and deeper, social-political weakness. The military-bureaucratic methods of Nasserism also hamper the political integration of the Arab movement of liberation. Nationalist demagoguery flourishes all too easily; but it is no substitute for a real impulse to national unity and for a real mobilization of popular forces against the divisive, feudal and reactionary elements. We have seen how, during the emergency, excessive reliance on a single Leader made the fate of the Arab states dependent in fact on Great Power intervention and accidents of diplomatic manoeuvre.



Paradoxically and grotesquely, the Israelis appear now in the role of the Prussians of the Middle East. They have now won three wars against their Arab neighbours. Just so did the Prussians a century ago defeat all their neighbours within a few years, the Danes, the Austrians, and the French. The succession of victories bred in them an absolute confidence in their own efficiency, a blind reliance on the force of their arms, chauvinistic arrogance, and contempt for other peoples. I fear that a similar degeneration—for degeneration it is—may be taking place in the political character of Israel. Yet as the Prussia of the Middle East, Israel can be only a feeble parody of the original. The Prussians were at least able to use their victories for uniting in their Reich all German-speaking peoples living outside the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Germany's neighbours were divided among themselves by interest, history, religion, and language. Bismarck, Wilhelm II, and Hitler could play them off against one another. The Israelis are surrounded by Arabs only. Attempts to play off the Arab states against one another are bound to fail in the end. The Arabs were at loggerheads with one another in 1948, when Israel waged its

first war; they were far less divided in 1956, during Israel's second war; and they formed a common front in 1967. They may prove far more firmly united in any future confrontation with Israel.

The Germans have summed up their own experience in the bitter phrase: *'Man kann sich totsiegen!*' 'You can drive yourself victoriously into your grave'. This is what the Israelis have been doing. They have bitten off much more than they can swallow. In the conquered territories and in Israel there are now nearly a million and a half Arabs, well over forty per cent of the total population. Will the Israelis expel this mass of Arabs in order to hold 'securely' the conquered lands? This would create a new refugee problem, more dangerous and larger than the old one. Will they give up the conquered territories? No, say most of their leaders. Ben Gurion, the evil spirit of Israeli chauvinism, urges the creation of an 'Arab Palestinian State' on the Jordan, that would be an Israeli Protectorate. Can Israel expect that the Arabs will accept such a Protectorate? That they will not fight it tooth and nail, None of the Israeli parties is prepared even to contemplate a bi-national Arab-Israeli state. Meanwhile great numbers of Arabs have been 'induced' to leave their homes on the Jordan, and the treatment of those who have stayed behind is far worse than that of the Arab minority in Israel that was kept under martial law for nineteen years. Yes, this victory is worse for Israel than a defeat. Far from giving Israel a higher degree of security, it has rendered it much more insecure. If Arab revenge and extermination is what the Israelis feared, they have behaved as if they were bent on turning a bogey into an actual menace.



There was a moment, at the cease-fire, when it looked as if Egypt's defeat had led to Nasser's downfall and to the undoing of the policy associated with his name. If that had happened, the Middle East would have almost certainly been brought back into the Western sphere of influence. Egypt might have become another Ghana or Indonesia. This did not happen, however. The Arab masses who came out in the streets and squares of Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut to demand that Nasser should stay in office, prevented it happening. This was one of those rare historic popular impulses that redress or upset a political balance within a few moments. This time, in the hour of defeat, the initiative from below worked with immediate impact. There are only very few cases in history when a people have stood by a de-

feated leader in this way. The situation is, of course, still fluid. Reactionary influences will go on working within the Arab states to achieve something like a Ghanaian or Indonesian coup. But for the time being neo-colonialism has been denied the fruit of Israel's 'victory'.



'The Russians have let us down!' was the bitter cry that came from Cairo, Damascus, and Beirut in June. And when the Arabs saw the Soviet delegate at the United Nations voting, in unison with the Americans, for a cease-fire to which no condition for a withdrawal of the Israeli troops was attached, they felt utterly betrayed. 'The Soviet Union will now sink to the rank of a second- or fourth-rate power', Nasser was reported to have told the Soviet Ambassador. The events appeared to justify the Chinese accusation of Soviet collusion with the United States. The débâcle aroused an alarm in Eastern Europe as well. 'If the Soviet Union could let Egypt down like this, may it not also let us down when we are once again confronted by German aggression?' the Poles and the Czechs wondered. The Yugoslavs, too, were outraged. Tito, Gomulka, and other leaders rushed to Moscow to demand an explanation and a rescue operation for the Arabs. This was all the more remarkable as the demand came from the 'moderates' and the 'revisionists' who normally stand for 'peaceful coexistence' and *rapprochement* with the U.S.A. It was they who now spoke of Soviet 'collusion with American imperialism'.

The Soviet leaders had to do something. The fact that the intervention of the Arab masses had saved the Nasser régime, unexpectedly provided Moscow with fresh scope for manoeuvre. After the great let down, the Soviet leaders again came to the fore as the friends and protectors of the Arab states. A few spectacular gestures, breaking off diplomatic relations with Israel, and speeches at the United Nations, cost them little. Even the White House showed 'understanding' for Moscow's 'predicament' and for the 'tactical necessity' which presently brought Kosygin to the United Nations Assembly.

However, something more than gestures was required to restore the Soviet position. The Arabs demanded that the Soviet Union should at once help them to re-build their military strength, the strength they had lost through compliance with Soviet advice. They asked for new planes, new tanks, new guns, new stocks of munitions. But apart from the cost this involved—

the value of the military equipment lost by Egypt alone is put at a billion pounds—the reconstitution of the Arab armed forces carries, from Moscow's viewpoint, major political risks. The Arabs refuse to negotiate with Israel; they may well afford to leave Israel to choke on its victory. Rearmament is Cairo's top priority. Israel has taught the Egyptians a lesson: next time the Egyptian air force may strike the pre-emptive blow. And Moscow has had to decide whether it will supply the weapons for that blow.

Moscow cannot favour the idea of such an Arab retaliation, but neither can it refuse to rearm Egypt. Yet Arab rearmament will almost certainly tempt Israel to interrupt the process and strike another pre-emptive blow in which case the Soviet Union would once again be faced with the dilemma which has worsted it in May and June. If Egypt were to strike first, the United States would almost certainly intervene. Its Sixth Fleet would not look on from the Mediterranean if the Israeli air force were knocked out and the Arabs were about to march into Jerusalem or Tel Aviv. If the U.S.S.R. again kept out of the conflict, it would irretrievably destroy its international power position.

A week after the cease-fire the Soviet Chief of Staff was in Cairo; and Soviet advisers and experts crowded the hotels there, beginning to work on the reconstitution of Egypt's armed forces. Yet Moscow cannot face with equanimity the prospect of an Arab-Israeli competition in pre-emptive blows and its wider implications. Probably the Soviet experts in Cairo were making haste slowly, while Soviet diplomacy tried to 'win the peace' for the Arabs after it had lost them the war. But even the most clever playing for time cannot solve the central issue of Soviet policy. How much longer can the Soviet Union adapt itself to the American forward push? How far can it retreat before the American economic-political and military offensives across the Afro-Asian area? Not for nothing did *Krasnaya Zvezda* already in June suggest that the current Soviet conception of peaceful coexistence might be in need of some revision. The military, and not they alone, fear that Soviet retreats are increasing the dynamic of the American forward push; and that if this goes on a direct Soviet-American clash may become inevitable. If Brejnev and Kosygin do not manage to cope with this issue, changes in leadership are quite possible. The Cuban and Vietnamese crises contributed to Khrushchev's downfall. The full consequences of the Middle Eastern crisis have yet to unfold.



I do not believe that the conflict between Arabs and Israelis can be resolved by military means. To be sure, no one can deny the Arab states the right to reconstitute their armed forces to some extent. But what they need far more urgently is a social and political strategy and new methods in their struggle for emancipation. This cannot be a purely negative strategy dominated by the anti-Israeli obsession. They may refuse to parley with Israel as long as Israel has not given up its conquests. They will necessarily resist the occupation régime on the Jordan and in the Gaza strip. But this need not mean a renewal of war.

The strategy that can yield the Arabs far greater gain than those that can be obtained in any Holy War or through a pre-emptive blow, a strategy that would bring them real victory, a civilized victory, must be centred on the imperative and urgent need for an intensive modernization of the structure of the Arab economy and of Arab politics and on the need for a genuine integration of Arab national life, which is still broken up by the old, inherited and imperialist-sponsored frontiers and divisions. These aims can be promoted only if the revolutionary and socialist tendencies in Arab politics are strengthened and developed.

Finally, Arab nationalism will be incomparably more effective as a liberating force if it is disciplined and nationalized by an element of internationalism that will enable the Arabs to approach the problem of Israel more realistically than hitherto. They cannot go on denying Israel's right to exist and indulging in bloodthirsty rhetoric. Economic growth, industrialization, education, more efficient organization and more sober policies are bound to give the Arabs what sheer numbers and anti-Israeli fury have not been able to give them, namely an actual preponderance which should almost automatically reduce Israel to its modest proportions and its proper role in the Middle East.

This is not, of course, a short term programme. Yet its realization need not take too much time; and there is no shorter way to emancipation. The short cuts of demagogy, revenge, and war have proved disastrous enough. Meanwhile, Arab policy should be based on a direct appeal to the Israeli people over the heads of the Israeli government, on an appeal to the workers and the kibbutzim. The latter should be freed from their fears by clear assurances and pledges that Israel's legitimate interests are respected and that Israel may even be welcome as a member of a future Middle Eastern Federa-

tion. This would cause the orgy of Israeli chauvinism to subside and would stimulate opposition to Eshkol's and Dayan's policy of conquest and domination. The capacity of Israeli workers to respond to such an appeal should not be underrated.

More independence from the Great Power game is also necessary. That game has distorted the social-political development of the Middle East. I have shown how much American influence has done to give Israel's policy its present repulsive and reactionary character. But Russian influence has also done something to warp Arab minds by feeding them with arid slogans, by encouraging demagoguery, while Moscow's egoism and opportunism have fostered disillusionment and cynicism. If Middle East policy continues to be merely a plaything of the Great Powers, the prospect will be bleak indeed. Neither Jews nor Arabs will be able to break out of their vicious spirals. This is what we, of the Left, should be telling both the Arabs and the Jews as clearly and bluntly as we can.



The confusion of the international Left has been undeniable and widespread. I shall not speak here of such 'friends of Israel' as M. Mollet and his company, who, like Lord Avon and Selwyn Lloyd, saw in this war a continuation of the Suez campaign and their revenge for their discomfiture in 1956. Nor shall I waste words on the right-wing Zionist lobby in the Labour Party. But even on the 'extreme Left' of that party men like Sidney Silverman behaved in a way that might have been designed to illustrate someone's saying: 'Scratch a Jewish left-winger and you find only a Zionist.'

But the confusion showed itself even further on the Left and affected people with an otherwise unimpeachable record of struggle against imperialism. A French writer known for his courageous stand against the wars in Algeria and Vietnam this time called for solidarity with Israel, declaring that, if Israel's survival demanded American intervention, he would favour it and even raise the cry '*Vive le Président Johnson.*' Didn't it occur to him how incongruous it was to cry '*A bas Johnson!*' in Vietnam and '*Vive!*' in Israel? Jean-Paul Sartre also called, though with reservations, for solidarity with Israel, but then spoke frankly of the confusion in his own mind and its reasons. During the second World War, he said, as a member of the Resistance

he learned to look upon the Jew as upon a brother to be defended in all circumstances. During the Algerian war the Arabs were his brothers, and he stood by them. The present conflict was therefore for him a fratricidal struggle in which he was unable to exercise cool judgment and was overwhelmed by conflicting emotions.

Still, we must exercise our judgment and must not allow it to be clouded by emotions and memories, however deep or haunting. We should not allow even invocations of Auschwitz to blackmail us into supporting the wrong cause. I am speaking as a Marxist of Jewish origin, whose next-of-kin perished in Auschwitz and whose relatives live in Israel. To justify or condone Israel's wars against the Arabs is to render Israel a very bad service indeed and to harm its own long-term interest. Israel's security, let me repeat, was not enhanced by the wars of 1956 and 1967; it was undermined and compromised by them. The 'friends of Israel' have in fact abetted Israel in a ruinous course.

They have also, willy-nilly, abetted the reactionary mood that took hold of Israel during the crisis. It was only with disgust that I could watch on television the scenes from Israel in those days; the displays of the conquerors' pride and brutality; the outbursts of chauvinism; and the wild celebrations of the inglorious triumph, all contrasting sharply with the pictures of Arab suffering and desolation, the treks of Jordanian refugees and the bodies of Egyptian soldiers killed by thirst in the desert. I looked at the medieval figures of the rabbis and *khassidim* jumping with joy at the Wailing Wall; and I felt how the ghosts of Talmudic obscurantism—and I know these only too well—crowded in on the country, and how the reactionary atmosphere in Israel had grown dense and stifling. Then came the many interviews with General Dayan, the hero and saviour, with the political mind of a regimental sergeant-major, ranting about annexations and venting a raucous callousness about the fate of the Arabs in the conquered areas. ('What do they matter to me?' 'As far as I am concerned, they may stay or they may go.') Already wrapped in a phoney military legend—the legend is phoney for Dayan neither planned nor conducted the six days' campaign—he cut a rather sinister figure, suggesting a candidate for the dictator's post: the hint was conveyed that if the civilian parties get too 'soft' on the Arabs this new Joshua, this mini-de Gaulle, will teach them a lesson, himself take power, and raise Israel's 'glory' even higher. And behind Dayan there was Beigin, Minister and leader of the extreme right-wing Zionists, who had long claimed even Trans-Jordania

as part of 'historic' Israel. A reactionary war inevitably breeds the heroes, the moods, and the consequences in which its character and aims are faithfully mirrored.

On a deeper historical level the Jewish tragedy finds in Israel a dismal sequel. Israel's leaders exploit in self-justification, and over-exploit Auschwitz and Treblinka; but their actions mock the real meaning of the Jewish tragedy.

European Jews paid a horrible price for the role they had played in past ages, and not of their own choosing, as representatives of a market economy, of 'money', among peoples living in a natural, money-less, agricultural economy. They were the conspicuous carriers of early capitalism, traders and money lenders, in pre-capitalist society. The image of the rich Jewish merchant and usurer lived on in gentile folklore and remained engraved on the popular mind, stirring distrust and fear. The Nazis seized this image, magnified it to colossal dimensions, and constantly held it before the eyes of the masses.

August Bebel once said that anti-semitism is the 'socialism of the fools'. There was plenty of that kind of 'socialism' about, and all too little of the genuine socialism, in the era of the Great Slump, and of the mass unemployment and mass despair of the 1930s. The European working classes were unable to overthrow the bourgeois order; but the hatred of capitalism was intense and widespread enough to force an outlet for itself and focus on a scapegoat. Among the lower middle classes, the *lumpenbourgeoisie* and the *lumpenproletariat*, a frustrated anti-capitalism merged with fear of communism and neurotic xenophobia. The impact of Nazi Jew-baiting was so powerful in part because the image of the Jew as the alien and vicious 'blood-sucker' was to all too many people still an actuality. This accounted also for the relative indifference and the passivity with which so many non-Germans viewed the slaughter of the Jews. The socialism of the fools gleefully watched Shylock led to the gas chamber.

Israel promised not merely to give the survivors of the European-Jewish communities a 'National Home' but also to free them from the fatal stigma. This was the message of the kibbutzim, the Histadruth, and even of Zionism at large. The Jews were to cease to be unproductive elements, shopkeepers, economic and cultural interlopers, carriers of capitalism. They were to settle in 'their own land' as 'productive workers'.

Yet they now appear in the Middle East once again in the invidious role of agents not so much of their own, relatively feeble, capitalism, but of powerful western vested interests and as *protégés* of neo-colonialism. This is how the Arab world sees them, not without reason. Once again they arouse bitter emotions and hatreds in their neighbors, in all those who have ever been or still are victims of imperialism. What a fate it is for the Jewish people to be made to appear in this role! As agents of early capitalism they were still pioneers of progress in feudal society; as agents of the late, over-ripe, imperialist capitalism of our days, their role is altogether lamentable; and they are placed once again in the position of potential scapegoats. Is Jewish history to come full circle in such a way? This may well be the outcome of Israel's 'victories'; and of this Israel's real friends must warn it.

The Arabs, on the other hand, need to be put on guard against the socialism or the anti-imperialism of the fools. We trust that they will not succumb to it; and that they will learn from their defeat and recover to lay the foundations of a truly progressive, a socialist Middle East.

ISRAEL'S ARAB POLICY*

by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

Most students of the Middle East agree that the Palestine Conflict, and in consequence the Arab-Israeli conflict, represents a long drawn-out struggle for the ultimate possession of Palestine and the final disposition of the Palestinian people. The latest conflict of June, 1967, is simply the most recent eruption of that struggle. Depending upon their perspectives and the facts at their command, scholars are prone to attribute somewhat different causes to each periodic eruption. Each outbreak, it is true, represents a different configuration of precipitating factors and, to that extent, scholars are justified in dealing with each one separately. However, for a proper comprehension of the total conflict it is imperative to place each eruption in proper perspective. Viewed in this light, a separate assessment of the various forces that generated the latest conflict between Israel and the adjacent Arab states cannot but be incomplete.

For purposes of this essay, we are concerned with Israel's Arab Policy insofar as that policy may have constituted an important and a precipitating factor in Israel's attack on the adjacent states on June 5, 1967. However, the reservation noted above applies with equal logic to a separate consideration of Israel's Arab Policy in relation to the outbreak of that conflict. For, although there may have been slight shifts in Israel's Arab Policy in the mid-sixties which ultimately led to conflict, that Policy and its accompanying shifts should be placed within the context of the totality of Zionist premises concerning Palestine.

Two factors—namely, ideology and practical exigencies—guided the Zionists in their behavior towards the Palestinian community and, subsequently, Israel's policy toward the Arab states. Accordingly, to speak of Israel's Arab

(*) Reprinted from "The Arab World" Special Issue, Vol. XIV, Nos. 10-11, October-November 1968.

Policy requires us first to consider the ideological components of Zionism. In the second place, we must not assume that ideology alone determines external relations. It is obvious that foreign policy is frequently related to national interests, even when these contravene the ideology of the regime.

Israel's relations with the Arab states are no exception. From the very beginning, one can isolate the ideological factors inherent in Zionism which made it imperative for all Zionist groups, regardless of their differences, to adopt a specific policy toward the Palestinian community. That policy's principal objective was to denigrate the cultural and national affinities of the Palestinians and ultimately to excise them from Palestine. But as time passed, the increasing complexity of the situation required Zionists and Israelis to adopt certain courses of action in order to attain limited objectives at particular junctures of history, even though these apparently deviated from the ideological stance.¹

Those who assert that conflict is a permanent feature of relations between Zionists and Palestinians, and consequently between Israelis and Arabs, derive their conclusions chiefly from the ideological components of the Zionist movement. If these are the sole or determining elements, there can be no real resolution to the conflict short of the political elimination of one or the other protagonist—a conclusion that has already been advanced by some observers of the scene.²

On the other hand, if one assumes that conflict is not a permanent condition of the area but results from competing aspirations and ambitions that can be accommodated in some way, then conflict is related to a certain set of empirical factors which give rise to it. The hopeful among the observers—and there are many—contend accordingly that the way to avert further conflict is

(1) The tactical modifications in the policies of the Zionist movement are noted in practically all literature on the Palestine Conflict. For recent illustrations, see Christopher Sykes, *Crossroads to Israel*, London, 1965; and I. Abu-Lughod, "The Arab-Israeli Confrontation; Some Thoughts on the Future," *The Arab Journal*, New York, 1968, Vol. 5, Nos. 1 & 2, pp. 13-23. (Article reprinted in this book.)

(2) The leadership of the Palestinian community perceived this some time ago. Moshe Dayan made the Israeli perception explicit in "A Soldier Reflects on Peace Hopes," *Jerusalem Post*, Jerusalem, September 30, 1968, pp. 6-7. (All references to *Jerusalem Post* unless otherwise indicated are to the airmail weekly edition). Even third parties such as the pro-Israeli "American Professors for Peace in the Middle East" suggest this in their report on their recent mission to the area of conflicts; see *Jerusalem Post*, October 17 and November 11, 1968, p. 15.

to solve specific problems and to settle specific areas of contention. Under this assumption, one might define the Palestine "refugees" as an unresolved problem and advance certain programs which, if carried out, would not only solve the specific problem itself, but would facilitate further cooperation between the present protagonists. One can think of a number of similar specific 'problems' that might be solved in a practical sense, if one views the conflict largely in terms of temporary exigencies.

Each of these two approaches has a different implication. If the first view is maintained, then it follows that conflict is inherent in the relationship, regardless of the immediate issues of contention. Issues simply offer convenient pretexts at particular moments in history so that the conflict may be resumed to consummate tasks left uncompleted by a preceding eruption. Accordingly, it becomes slightly irrelevant to consider the *casus belli* at any particular time. Furthermore, one can consistently blame the party one initially considers responsible for the conflict regardless of the exact details of each confrontation.

If, however, one adheres to the second view, one is in a better position to assess the forces generating each separate conflict, to examine the specific issues of contention, and to judge the parties accordingly. Most of the literature dealing with the June, 1967, war, especially that contributed by third parties to the conflict, has adhered to the second view.³

In contrast, it should be noted that Arabs and Zionists alike more frequently adhere to the first position. Our premise in this essay is that there exists a number of factors which left unchecked tend to give credence to the first position; these factors encourage one or the other of the protagonists to adopt policies leading to further conflict. At the same time, we recognize the presence of some specific situational factors that reinforce this basic tendency toward a renewal of conflict and others which may inhibit this impulse.

In the case of the recent war, one can see both ideological and situational factors working together to produce conflict. These factors are related to three

(3) Ignoring the frankly partisan material published in the U.S., certain types of serious analysis illustrate this approach: Charles Yost, "The Arab-Israeli War; How It Began," *Foreign Affairs* 46, 2 (January, 1968), pp. 304-320; John Badeau, "The Arabs, 1967," *The Atlantic*, New York, December, 1967, pp. 102-110, 1968; C. Ernest Dawn, "The Egyptian Remilitarization of Sinai," *Journal of Contemporary History*, London, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 201-224, and Alan Horton, "The Arab-Israeli Conflict of June 1967," *American Universities Field Staff*, Vol. XIII, No. 2.

basic elements: first, the underlying Zionist premises concerning 'the Arab' and how he should be dealt with; second, Israel's specific internal problems in the mid-sixties (which made an aggressive policy towards the Arabs particularly attractive to certain policy makers in Israel); and finally, Israel's evaluation of the appropriateness of the regional and international climate within which to launch its attack on June 5, 1967.

To restate our assumption in a different way, we are asserting that the most recent conflict between Arabs and Zionists—in the form of an Arab-Israeli confrontation in June, 1967—represented an inevitable conflict that, at least in part, grew out of Israel's Arab Policy. While this policy has been more or less ascertainable from the inception of the Zionist movement, each eruption of conflict has represented a somewhat different combination of factors. Thus, in order to deal effectively with the June conflict, one must briefly delineate the historic development of that policy.



Three distinct phases in Zionist-Palestinian and Israeli-Arab relations can be easily recognized. The first phase began with the introduction of the Mandate system in Palestine and ended with the emergence of the State of Israel. During this period, two principal objectives of the Zionist movement were to gain acceptance by the resident Palestinian community of their efforts to establish a Jewish State in Palestine and to remove the Palestinians from areas essential for the growth and development of that state. However, from the very beginning of the Mandate, the Palestinian community would not acquiesce to the fate envisioned for it by the Zionist movement. Accordingly, a policy of direct military confrontation was adopted by both protagonists. The aim of the Zionists was to surmount Palestinian opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state, while the Palestinian objective was to frustrate the Zionist goal. At no point during the period of the Mandate did either of the protagonists alter its position with regard to the other.

The outcome of that confrontation is well known and need not detain us at this point. The emergence of the State of Israel in Palestine signified the initial success of the Zionists. However, that success was only partial, for two basic problems survived. On the one hand, the territorial objectives of the Zionist movement were not fulfilled by the *de facto* frontiers of the new State

of Israel; on the other hand, the Palestinian community did not surrender. These two problems, plus a number of questions arising from Israel's unique experience as a foreign-supported state led to the second phase of Israel's Arab Policy.

This phase began with the commencement of relations governed by the Armistice Agreements between Israel and each of the adjacent states. This second phase of Israel's Arab Policy had a trifold objective: first, to break the backbone of what remained of Palestinian resistance; second, to serve notice to the adjacent states that, should they tolerate Palestinian resistance from territories under their jurisdiction, they would automatically invite intervention by Israeli armed forces in their domestic affairs; and third, to maintain a high but tolerable level of tension on Israel's frontiers in order to serve internal political purposes of the new state—namely, strengthening the bond of its citizens and consolidating its hold over external supporters.⁴ The latter would assure the inflow of badly needed capital to sustain the new state and tie the donor and the receiver in an indissoluble bond.

This interpretation of the underlying motives of Israel's actions toward the Arab states is not one to which most Israelis would subscribe. An Israeli observer would not disagree with the factual account itself, namely, that a high degree of tension characterized the relations between Israel and the adjacent states but he would attribute this tension solely to Arab 'irrationality,' 'aggressive designs', and continued Arab 'harassment' of Israel.

Regardless of which view a third party might hold, he could scarcely deny the existence or nature of the tension. Within the second phase of Israel's Arab Policy, we discern a simple pattern of continued violence. Until about 1953-54, this violence was concentrated along the Israeli-Jordanian armistice lines where large-scale villages and settlements, made up of Palestinians indigenous to the area or those displaced by Israel, were located. Although the Palestinian community had been defeated in the war of 1947-48, it had not capitulated to Israel nor had its resolve to liberate its homeland been weakened and naturally it continued its defense measures. By the same token, it was natural for the Israelis to continue their measures of harassment, to convince

(4) The psychic need for a certain degree of opposition to consolidate Zionism and Jewish Nationalism was recognized by Theodore Herzl in *The Jewish State*, New York, 1946 (edition by American Zionist Emergency Council), pp. 79, 92.

the Palestinians that their efforts could not succeed. The conflicting tendencies of both communities led to continuous friction along the Jordanian armistice line. Intermittently, large-scale military adventures were undertaken by Israel's armed forces which resulted in repeated condemnation by various bodies of the United Nations.⁵

Lest the reader think that this was the only reason for the border incidents, we hasten to add that, during that period, there was some tendency on Israel's part to think in terms of the conclusion of a peace treaty to legitimize its previous conquests. For quite some time, the Jordanian Government exhibited receptivity to Israel's pressures, but the sudden assassination of the late King Abdullah of Transjordan, who was the principal architect of that accommodation, brought this tendency to an abrupt halt. When that happened, Israel's Arab 'experts' suggested an alternative approach, namely, systematic coercion. The Israelis presumed that the only language which Arabs could understand was the language of force.⁶ Israel therefore applied this force systematically to make Jordan sue for peace. A basic assumption of that period was that peace with Jordan would lead to peace with the rest of the Arab states.

By 1953 it had become clear that Israel's principal assumption were mistaken. The resistance of the Palestinians did not decline. Further, Jordan's willingness to accommodate Israel was limited and, after the assassination of King Abdullah, no official in the Jordanian Government would risk a similar fate. Finally, Israel's strong measures against Jordan produced the opposite of what Israel's Arab 'experts' had predicted. Although Jordanians recognized Israel's superior armed strength, this merely stimulated measures for their own defense. Instead of suing for peace, they began to undertake more seriously the task of arming the Jordanian population, particularly in those areas adjacent to Israel.

(5) For this period see Commodore E.H. Hutchison, *Violent Truce*, London, 1956, Earl Berger, *The Covenant and The Sword: Arab-Israeli Relations, 1948-1956*, London, 1965, and E.L.M. Burns, *Between Arab and Israeli*, Toronto, 1962.

(6) For a typical illustration of this assumption see Walter Eytan, *The First Ten Years*, London, 1958, and the Round Table discussion organized by the Israeli newspaper *Maariv* and recorded as "How to Speak to the Arabs" in the *Middle East Journal*, Washington, D.C., Spring, 1964, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 143-162. See also Aharon Cohen, "How to Talk to the Arabs," *New Outlook*, Vol. VII, No. 1 (59) Tel Aviv, January, 1964, pp. 10-15. Also useful is M. Bar-Zohar. *The Armed Prophet: A Biography of David Ben Gurion*, London, 1967, particularly p. 212.

Israel then shifted the direction of its pressure. The failure of Israel's Jordanian policy, coupled with an international exigency, produced this shift recognized by Zionist as well as non-Zionist observers of the Middle East scene.⁷ Instead of the Jordanian lines, Israel's southern armistice lines with Egypt became the major scene of continual violence. The Palestinians assembled in the Gaza Strip, although not as numerous as those on the West Bank of the Jordan, were equally determined to continue the resistance. The trauma of the exodus of 1948 had for a while left them paralyzed, but by 1953 they were slowly recovering their capacities and had begun to undertake measures of defense that were quite clearly inimical to Israel. Secondly, Israel's Arab 'experts' recognized that any kind of Arab-Israeli accommodation would have to start with Egypt, which by that time had already succumbed to the growing Arab Revolution. Thus, Israel was faced with two options. On the one hand, it could wait until the Arab Revolution had completed its course; then, hopefully, Egypt would come to terms with Israel. On the other hand, there was danger that the Arab Revolution would merely succeed in strengthening the capacity of Egypt to withstand mounting pressures from Israel.⁸ Neither of these outcomes could be predicted accurately, but an early diagnosis led Israeli leaders to conclude that, should the Arab Revolution succeed, it would improve the posture of Arab defense and reduce their inclination to accept Israel's terms for peace. Finally, Israel was at a stage in its internal development that required a certain amount of friction with Egypt. For by then Israel was interested in developing its external trade with Asia and Africa. Israeli ships, however, were barred from the Suez Canal and Israel was still working to complete its port at Eilat. Soon this port would be ready to receive ships.

Fortunately for Israel, France was then in the midst of its suppressive acts in North Africa and soon would experience the bloodiest of revolutions. The militarists of both states suddenly discovered that they had much in common and developed a close working relationship which had the destruction of the new revolutionary system in Egypt as its object. However, it should be pointed out that, although the militarists pushed for the alliance between

(7) On this shift in Israel's object of attack and the underlying reasons for it see Leonard Binder, "The Middle East as a Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, Vol. X, No. 3, Princeton, 1957, p. 422, Uri Avnery, *Israel Without Zionists*, New York, 1968, pp. 110-112, and E. Stocke, *Israel on the Road to Suez*, New York, 1968.

(8) Uri Avnery, a member of the Israeli Knesset calls attention to this aspect of Israel's dilemma, *op. cit.*, 103.

the two partners, it was David Ben Gurion who called attention to the utility of working in concert with France at that particular moment.⁹

The deterioration of the frontier situation in the south of Palestine is now part of history. It led ultimately to the tripartite invasion of Egypt in 1956.¹⁰ By then, Israel had a set of limited objectives which no longer included a peace treaty. Why Israel abandoned the idea of peace still needs investigation, but for our purposes it is sufficient to call attention to it. Otherwise, Israel hoped to gain freedom of navigation for Israeli ships in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba, since by that time Eilat was completed and ready to receive ships; sought to suppress the Palestinian resistance that was mounting in the Gaza Strip; and wanted to destroy Egypt's capacity to utilize the arms it had bought and to undermine President Nasser's increasingly central position of leadership in the Arab world.

Israel managed to accomplish some of these objectives in the 1956 campaign. Freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba was acquired *de facto*. Tranquillity on the southern armistice lines was obtained, largely through the separation of the combatants by the interposition of the United Nations Emergency Force. Finally, Egypt's defensive capability was significantly retarded by the heavy blow inflicted on its armed forces and by the capture of a good deal of its armaments. These were important gains, no doubt, but certain frustrations remained. It became increasingly obvious that President Nasser had lost none of his charismatic qualities; indeed his central role in the Arab community was accentuated as a result of the attack. Navigation in the canal was not obtained by force nor, interestingly enough, was it subsequently sought through accepted peaceful channels such as the International Court of Justice. Relations between the Arabs and Israelis assumed greater rigidity.

The world-wide condemnation which Israel received for launching its attack in concert with old-fashioned imperialists, plus the limited gains acquired as a result of the attack, may account for the relative quiet that characterized the frontiers in subsequent years. In addition, Israel as well as the

(9) M. Bar-Zohar, *Suez: Ultra Secret*, Paris, 1964 and *The Armed Prophet*, p. 200 and *Israel Government Yearbook*, 5720 (1959/60), Jerusalem, 1960, especially pp. 71-77.

(10) The most important books that deal with the tripartite attack on Egypt in 1956 are Terence Robertson, *Crisis, The Inside Story of the Suez Conspiracy*, Toronto, 1960, Erskine Childers, *The Road to Suez*, London, 1962, Anthony Nutting, *No End of a Lesson*, London, 1967 and Hugh Thomas, *The Suez Affair*, London, 1967.

adjacent Arab States were quite preoccupied with problems of internal development. These preoccupations as well as world opinion restrained them from colliding with one another for some time to come. And certainly the presence of United Nations forces inhibited incidents that could have escalated into major operations.



For the next ten years, then, the armistice lines remained reasonably tranquil, considering their potential explosiveness. That there were incidents and counter-measures is obvious, but these contrast quite sharply in terms of their intensity or frequency with pre-1956 conditions. The relative lull of the ten-year period was the result of a mutually satisfactory, although temporary, desire on the part of both protagonists for a *modus vivendi*.

The Arabs believed that they had at long last succeeded in effecting a *de facto* containment policy which, in its simplest form, accepted the existence of Israel within the confines of the Armistice Agreement but in no way assisted Israel in its attempt to grow and expand; hence the economic boycott assumed a more important role. Palestinian activity within Israel's territory faced increasing opposition from Jordan, out of fear that such activity might precipitate a premature and highly undesirable confrontation. Finally, whether rationalizing an immediate weakness or reflecting a genuine belief, there developed an attitude concerning a solution to the Palestine conflict. Increasingly, the articulate segment of the Arab intelligentsia and certain Arab government circles asserted that the Palestine conflict would not be resolved favorably from an Arab standpoint until the Arab Revolution was first consummated in each of the Arab countries. The solution of the Palestine conflict was made dependent on the economic, social, and political transformation of the Arab community. This dictated the logical strategy of concentrating attention on the Arab community and away from Israel. It was during the ten-year period following the tripartite attack on Egypt that the most fundamental programs of social and economic reconstruction were initiated in the Arab world at large. It was also during this period that the Arabs attempted, with limited success, to experiment with various forms of political unification.

From Israel's standpoint, the situation likewise demanded that a mild course of action be adopted *vis-à-vis* the Arabs. Israel was still absorbing im-

migrants. Its economic development was (as it still is) dependent on external sources of support—whether from governmental sources, such as German reparations, official United States support, or from private Jewish contributions. The domestic tasks facing Israel were many and had to be accomplished in relative peace.

Thus, for ten years the basic ideological premises of both parties were submerged and not permitted to interfere with the concrete implementation of public policies insofar as Israeli-Arab relations were concerned. Both parties were concerned with pressing environmental realities.

Some observers interpreted the lull as signifying a potential for peace in the future. Increasingly, possible approaches were put forth for the resolution of the endemic conflict between Arabs and Israelis. Proposals for conflict resolution were made intermittently up to as late as 1966 and received favorable publicity in the Israeli periodical, *New Outlook*.¹¹ But suddenly, the realities of 1967 emerged and a sudden confrontation seemed imminent. Either the earlier diagnosis was illusory or a new congruence of factors impelled the parties to an unavoidable conflict.

At this juncture it is perhaps impossible to give a completely accurate picture of the imperceptible changes in Arab-Israeli relations that took place in the mid-sixties and led to conflict. It might be asserted that conflict was actively sought at that particular moment because it served a specific purpose. In evaluating events, two things should be kept in mind. On the one hand, the intermittent activity of the Palestinians in the preceding years had not appreciably disturbed the lull along the armistice lines nor had it affected the major orientation of either protagonist. On the other hand, there was what seemed to be a sudden shift which sought to destroy that *de facto* lull and to create conditions that would lead to an armed clash. Two symbols of the contradiction illustrate its empirical reality. On the one hand, the mission of the French philosopher, Jean-Paul Sartre, to the region in the hope of bringing about a dialogue between Arabs and Israelis symbolized the belief that the

(11) The reader is reminded that this hope seems to have been shared by the U.N. Palestine Conciliation Commission which dispatched Mr. Joseph Johnson, President of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, to the Middle East for another attempt at conciliation in the early 60's. Though his report remains "confidential," his comments at the time suggested that a mutually acceptable settlement was as remote than as it had been in previous periods. See also *New Outlook*, Vol. 7, No. 6, Tel Aviv, 1964, pp. 16-24.

time had come for the two protagonists to initiate steps leading to a peaceful resolution.¹² Almost simultaneously, throughout 1966 and 1967, the Secretary General of the United Nations was sounding alarms that tension was mounting; his warnings had a specific reference, namely the Syrian-Israeli armistice lines. The two symbolized different conditions. One referred to the past; the other to the future. Sartre's mission focused on the ten-year abatement of the conflict and optimistically envisaged further amelioration. U Thant's apprehensions were based upon a more realistic assessment of events which were likely to result from the basic reorientation of policies then occurring on the part of the protagonists. It is to these that one must turn to explain the eruption of conflict in June, 1967.

Again, the reader is reminded that two factors underlie Arab-Israeli relations: the ideological and the situational. By 1965, both factors were again united to propel Israel to shift emphasis in its relations with the Arabs. There was an empirical reality which pressed itself on the Israeli Government and demanded some kind of solution. Israel's unilateral diversion of the Jordan River, in violation of the principles of international law, had not yielded the anticipated results. For purely technical reasons, Israel was unable to benefit fully from the water it had fought so hard to divert, a fact reported at the time in the *Jerusalem Post* (daily ed. April 14, 1965, p. 4) and the *New York Times* (April 17, 1965, p. 2). To deal effectively with the technical failure, Israel needed control of the headwaters of the River, but these were located in the territory of a sovereign state, Syria. Second, Israel was still not permitted to use the Suez Canal. Significantly, Israel had not sought during the intervening period to put its proclaimed right to use the Canal to a legal test, even though the U.A.R. had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice with regard to this issue. Nevertheless, the Canal problem remained.

Israel's policy makers had to contend with other temporal problems. All cannot be discussed here, but one in particular is immediately relevant to the eruption of June, 1967. Although Palestinian resistance to Israel occupation in those portions of Palestine not granted them by the Partition Plan of 1947 continued intermittently throughout the post-1948 period, in 1965 a new

(12) *New Outlook*, Vol. 8, Nos. I, II, Vol. 9, No. 4. The publication of the special issue of *Les Temps Modernes*, "Le Conflit Israélo-Arabe," June, 1967, was conceived in that light.

development began to affect the type of resistance being waged. By then, the semi-organized resistance assumed greater cohesion and attracted wider support from a young generation who had become active members of the Palestinian community in the intervening period. These youths had come of age by 1965 and were conceiving important ways of recovering their homeland as well as organizing the struggle for their rights more effectively. By 1965, several major organizations had assumed a leading role in channeling resistance to Israeli occupation of Palestine; these commanded a high level of support from the Arab community at large as well as from Arab Governments. The Palestine Liberation Organization, the Popular Liberation Front, and the Front for the Liberation of Palestine asserted their presence and, although only the PLO received legal recognition from the Arab States, the other two were no less active, nor were they denied some measure of public support from certain states in the region.¹³ (While these developments in themselves call for investigation by serious students of the Middle East, our task here is simply to show the relevance of this development to the 1967 conflict.) By 1965 it had become obvious that the Palestinian people—whom the world had relegated to oblivion and had classified as passive ‘refugees’ allegedly being used as a ‘political football’ by the Arab States—were determined to continue their resistance with even greater tenacity and discipline. The increasing confrontations with Israeli occupation forces across the demarcation lines was becoming a fact with which the Israelis were reluctant to live.

Along with the changing nature of objective relations between Israelis and Arabs, Israel was undergoing important changes at home and its outlook on the Arabs as well as the world was being altered. While we cannot go into the details of this fundamental change in the internal structure of Israeli politics or institutions, we can single out some issues of immediate relevance to the June, 1967, war.

The German reparations payments, so important in terms of their contribution to Israel economic development during the preceding ten years, came to an end by 1965: a substitute source of funds had to be found. Although Israel continued to be supported whole-heartedly by Jewish capitalists throughout the world, its economic needs required an even greater inflow of

(13) Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War*, London, 1967 (2nd ed.), p. 151, calls attention to the implications of the PLO not only to inter-Arab politics, but to the whole nature of the official relations between Israel and the Arab States.

foreign capital. The increasing recession in Israel's economy, a matter of public and international knowledge, reached alarming levels in the year 1967. Israelis and Zionists widely debated causes as well as remedies, but it was obvious that a surgical operation of major proportions was needed to halt this economic decline.¹⁴ It was during this period that some peculiar solutions to the economic problems of Israel commended themselves to certain Israeli policy makers. These solutions were in the direction of an armed conflict that would attain certain economic objectives.

Short of an immediate conflagration between the protagonists, some relief from economic problems could be gained through increased commercial transactions with markets in the immediate vicinity of Israel. Increasingly, it became evident that there was no substitute for a normalization of trade with the adjacent Arab States, especially since the African markets so much talked about were in fact illusory from Israel's standpoint. Although a certain amount of trade went on between Israel and Africa, its volume was low and its proportion of the Israeli export market remained negligible. In fact, it was declining, despite the improvement in Israel's relations with several African States.¹⁵

There were other issues as well. Although established by Western Powers and considering itself a Western nation, Israel nevertheless had entertained the idea of belonging to the wider Afro-Asian world, even if its action often did not correspond to the idea. International politics precluded serious identification and, by the mid-sixties Israel had gone as far as it could in establishing viable relations with powers that counted in the Third World. It was quite clear to Israelis, their allies, and their adversaries that the Third World viewed Israel with a good measure of ambivalence.



(14) The reader's attention is called to the dismissal by the Israeli Government of the English Zionist Jon Kimche, editor of *The Jewish Observer and Middle East Review* for his frank discussion in March 1967 of Israel's artificial economic policies that led to the recession. See also "Israel's Economy Slows Down," *New Outlook*, June, 1966, pp. 9-18; "Anatomy of a Crisis," *New Outlook*, March/April, 1967, pp. 21-25; and *Israel Horizons*, X, pp. 21-25.

(15) A summary of Israel's trade problems with African countries can be found in Stuart Schaar, Patterns of Aid and Trade in East Africa, *American Universities Field Staff*, Vol. VII, No. 1, March, 1968. Also highly informative is Odeyo Ayagu, "Africa's Dilemma in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," *Pan-African Journal*, Vol. 1, No. 219, New York, 1968, especially p. 114.

By the end of 1965, the time was appropriate for a total reevaluation of Israel's relations with the world. A major public debate on this question indicated that something was afoot in Israel, especially since that debate engaged all the leading public figures: Moshe Dayan, Shimon Perez, former Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense and one of the architects of the French-Israeli alliance of the 1950's, and Abba Eban, at that time Deputy Prime Minister of Israel, were some of the public spokesmen who discussed the challenge to Israel's foreign policy in the next decade. Two major positions emerged which, while not in fundamental disagreement, differed in their approach. Before examining the areas of difference and contention, we might summarize the broad areas of agreement, since these undoubtedly entered into the subsequent formulation of Israel's policy.

Both parties agreed that Israel's relations with the outside world were as good as could be hoped for. All derived satisfaction from the close working relationship between Israel and the European-American community. Although the United States and Western Europe had stood solidly behind Israel in the past and had assisted it extensively in its efforts to surmount difficulties in the region, the relative power of each member of this community had undergone important changes. In the previous decades, the alliance between Britain and Israel, and later between France and Israel, had served Israel's needs satisfactorily. But by the sixties it was apparent that Israel's aspirations would require the support of the senior member of that alliance, namely, the United States. The lesson the Israelis derived from this diagnosis was very simple: their future course of action must of necessity see the United States committed legally and morally to Israel's strategies.¹⁶

There was a compelling consensus among the debaters that Israel's Arab Policy not only had made no progress since 1948, but in fact had suffered serious rigidification. In certain periods in the past, Arabs and Israelis had at least spoken with one another—for example, during the negotiations at Rhodes, Lausanne and, from time to time, in other European centers. Intermediaries had shuffled back and forth. Negotiations of sorts had been conducted through the Mixed Armistice Commissions along the armistice lines, and some gifts had even been exchanged between responsible Arabs and Is-

(16) The English Zionist Jon Kimche, *The Unromantics*, London, 1968, p. 82, stresses the need for an alliance to replace the former Zionist British alliance.

raelis.¹⁷ Yet all these interchanges had come to an end by the mid-sixties, and the protagonists, though appearing peaceful, had hardened sufficiently so as to preclude serious discussions. The policy debate acknowledged that Arab-Israeli relations had in fact regressed. There was substantial agreement among the participants that the greatest challenge to Israel's foreign policy in the next decade remained in its immediate environment. Israel's energies would have to be directed to that region so that its long-range objective of a settlement with the Arabs could be attained.¹⁸

There was a broad consensus; however, due to their private perspectives and varied predilections, Israeli leaders differed about a course of action. Generally speaking, two lines of action were proposed. On the one hand, Perez, Dayan and others of their persuasion bluntly stated that there was only one way to solve the problem conclusively, and that was by defeating the Arabs so decisively in battle that they would be forced to accept a dictated settlement at the conference table. This was based on the premise, so fondly nurtured by various Israeli 'experts' on the Arabs, that force was, after all, what Arabs understood best.

An alternative diagnosis and prescription was offered by Abba Eban. While its outcome was not fundamentally different from the Perez-Dayan proposal, its strategy was subtler, requiring a greater degree of skill in execution. Eban looked at the Arab scene and perceived that events tended to disunite the Arabs, to propel each state to a greater attachment to its separate sovereignty, and that the Arabs were leaning towards greater recognition of Israeli legitimacy. If this spirit were to prevail, ultimately Israel could be accepted by the Arab States within the framework of separate sovereignties in the region, all associated with one another, voluntarily and for mutual benefit. He noted that the attempt by one state to influence others, let alone merge with them, had been seriously undermined in recent years and that further

(17) See *inter alia*, *Avnery, op. cit.*, pp. 105-106, *New Outlook*, Vol. 7, No. 8, 1964, pp. 45-46 and No. 9, pp. 78-89.

(18) It is useful to point out in this connection that a relevant contribution to this discussion by the late Moshe Sharett, perennial Foreign Minister and at one time Prime Minister of the State, was resurrected and given a certain degree of circulation. The substance of his argument was that Israel's problems with the Arab States will continue until Israel recognizes the rights of, and the harm inflicted by Israel on, the Palestinian community. Israel's relations with the Arab States will continue to be abnormal until Israel finds a way to accommodate positively the rights of the Palestinian people. See the *Jerusalem Post*, October 18, 1966 (daily edition).

fragmentation could be anticipated in the region. Eban recommended that this trend be encouraged and strengthened; if it became dominant, Israel's problem with the states of the region would be eased considerably. Until that occurred, however, Israel's security and safety would have to be assured. Whatever pressure could be exerted on the Arabs to move them to accept a peace settlement with Israel ought to be encouraged. Accordingly, in Eban's view, the challenge to Israel's foreign policy lay in its ability to organize pressure on the Arabs to normalize their relationship with Israel and, at the same time, make it crystal clear that, under no circumstances would the Arabs ever be in a position to bring about a solution other than one envisaged by Israel. This, properly encouraged by international pressure, would lead the Arabs to accept Israel's terms for the conclusion of peace. Eban's diagnosis did not preclude the use of force; he merely drew attention to the importance of a judicious use of international pressure as a preliminary and necessary step prior to its use.¹⁹

This, in brief, was Eban's assessment, the assessment which seems to have carried the day. The question was: what concrete mechanisms could be employed to bring about the necessary international pressure? It will be recalled that when Eban made this speech he was Deputy Prime Minister. Soon thereafter, in January, 1966, he became the Foreign Minister and was in a position to implement his own plan of action with the approval of the Cabinet. His 'task force' committees undoubtedly helped clarify the problems and specify means for implementing his policy. Not long afterwards, the actual plan of action emerged.

This plan of action assumed, first, that direct negotiations with the Arabs were not yet possible. The second assumption was that the road to a Middle East settlement must pass through Washington and Moscow, and, to a lesser extent, London and Paris. These powers had to be persuaded that peace in the Middle East was of direct concern to them and they would have to take certain initiatives to bring it about. Peace could be attained by two means. Positive influence could be exerted on the Arab States—with Moscow pres-

(19) Eban's views and assessments are to be found in various issues of the *Jerusalem Post* and *Israel Digest*. See for example, *Jerusalem Post* of October 17, 1966, January 28, 1966 (his speech to the Histadrut convention on January 3, 1966 and *Israel Digest*, January 14, 1966, February 11, 1966, February 25, 1966 and January 27, 1967. See also his "Reality and Vision in the Middle East," in *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 43, July, 1965, pp. 626-638.

sure the progressive regimes and Washington influencing the conservative ones. Second, negative sanctions could be imposed: arms could be withheld from their respective Arab allies, thus depriving them of the capacity to counter Israel's power.

While the major powers had the means to hasten a settlement, at this time these same powers were scarcely concerned with the Middle East. Pre-occupied as they were with an immediate conflict elsewhere and lulled into false security by the relative tranquillity along the Arab-Israeli armistice lines, they more or less ignored the Middle East. Even though verbal reminders of the problem would have had some influence, Eban thought a graphic reminder to the major powers of the potentially explosive character of Arab-Israeli relations was necessary.

Two types of activities were simultaneously undertaken by Israel. On the diplomatic level, prominent Israeli leaders made extensive tours of various world capitals through 1966. At the same time 'incidents', particularly along the Syrian-Israeli armistice lines, intensified. Through escalation, Israel sought to increase its military offensive capability and succeeded in obtaining additional arms, particularly from the United States. By the systematic application of diplomatic pressure and by escalating the military situation along the Syrian-Israeli armistice lines, Israel succeeded in realerting the Powers to the explosiveness of the situation in the region. The Powers, however duly impressed, did not seem to share Israel's confidence that they could exert pressure on the protagonists. Significantly, the United States Government, particularly President Johnson, thought that such an opportunity could be utilized for a purpose other than the one Israel intended. Apparently President Johnson decided to assist Israel at that time—not only diplomatically but militarily as well—in return for certain support which he needed in the Vietnam conflict.

By 1966, President Johnson was not winning the war in Vietnam; yet, instead of seeking an immediate end to that brutal war, he sought further intensification. There was a considerable amount of internal opposition to the Vietnam war—opposition that transcended ethnic or religious lines. (Why President Johnson singled out the American Jewish community to chasten for criticism of his war effort in Vietnam is an interesting question in itself.) Evidently, by 1966 he considered the American Jewish community unduly critical of the war: it perhaps more than others, should have understood Viet-

nam's significance for Israel. According to his logic (which may or may not have been faulty), America's war in Vietnam resembled that of Israel's in the Middle East. He argued that American Jews continually exerted pressure on various American Administrations to commit the United States government to Israel and that they expected the U.S. to stand by its commitments. How could the Jews oppose similar commitments to South Vietnam? Thus, he sought to undermine the opposition by the American Jewish community to his war effort.

The exact timing of this offensive is not known, but President Johnson raised the question with Mr. Eban during the latter's visit to the President in February, 1966. It is also certain that offensive weapons were promised Israel following this visit, that Israel increasingly supported the U.S. effort in Vietnam, and that Eban ultimately supported the U.S. proposals for 'peace' in Vietnam in his speech before the General Assembly of the United Nations on October 4, 1967. Almost simultaneously with this reorientation of Israel's policy towards Vietnam—a reorientation that was to culminate in Israeli recognition of South Vietnam—the *New York Times* reported the gist of letters exchanged between President Johnson and leading members of the American Jewish community. On September 11, 1966, it reported that President Johnson had sent a letter to Mr. Malcolm Tarlov, President of the Jewish War Veterans, in which he criticized Jewish opposition to the war and pointed out the inconsistency of this position with regard to Vietnam and Israel. It was further pointed out by the *New York Times* that this question was raised with Israel as well as with leading members of the American Jewish community. Conveniently for Israel, it was then in the midst of negotiations for the delivery of American arms, particularly missiles and aircraft, as well as atomic-powered desalinization plants. These negotiations were rather successful. The price may have been that Israel, and its supporters in the United States, agreed to work to muzzle Jewish opposition to the war in Vietnam.²⁰

Obviously, this crude attack by the President did not go unchallenged. Leading members of the American Jewish community, including Rabbi Joa-

(20) The full documentation of the link between Israel and Vietnam, insofar as President Johnson's view is concerned, is not yet part of the public record. The reader can get an insight into it by consulting the *New York Times* of September 11, 13, 14, 15, 18 and November 2, 7, of 1966. The delivery of American arms to Israel, subsequent to Mr. Eban's visit to President Johnson on February 3, 1966, by which the U.S. sought Israel's support for war in Vietnam, was revealed on July 24, 1967, by the *New York Times*.

chim Prinz, then President of the Conference of Presidents of Jewish Organizations as well as Jay Kaufman and William Wexler, President and Vice-President of the B'nai B'rith, demanded an immediate explanation. Ultimately they were given one by Mr. Arthur Goldberg, then chief of the American Delegation to U.N. Presumably, after several conferences, the Jewish Organizations 'understood' the aims of President Johnson.

What those aims were and what commitments were made in the process still remain shrouded in secrecy. Certain consequences, however, are now part of the public record. The link between Vietnam and the Arab-Israeli conflict was thus forged between the United States and Israel. President Johnson hoped that, in exchange for America's support of Israel, Israeli leaders and their supporters in the United States would use their influence to abate Jewish criticism of the war in Vietnam. The link was further cemented by the visits of Mr. Dayan (who held *no* official position in Israel at *that* time) to Vietnam and of General Westmoreland to Israel.

But this was not enough. Beginning in July, 1966, and continuing throughout 1967, the escalation of hostilities—to call attention to the Middle East—progressed. Israel's constant attacks on Syria, each time under a convenient pretext, became a permanent feature of the Middle East scene and resulted in frequent condemnations of Israel by the United Nations all of which heightened U Thant's periodic alarm.²¹

The concert of action between the U.S. and Israel had more than a specific reference; it should be pointed out that the period following the assassination of President Kennedy witnessed a major offensive by the United States against the non-aligned nations of the world. In the context of this general offensive, the Johnson Administration hoped to remove President Nasser, and strike a crippling blow against the U.A.R. A careful student of

(21) The reader will recall at least three major attacks in 1966 and 1967: two air attacks on Syria and one against Jordan (Samu'). The reader is also reminded of the visits to Israel by three important figures in the Johnson Administration: Lucius Battle, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Mr. Harold Sanders, White House Adviser on Near Eastern Affairs (Intelligence), and Mr. Townsend Hobbs, of the Department of Defence visited Israel, and on the 14th of March, 1967, had a conference with Eshkol. On the 24th of March General Rabin, former Chief of Staff of the Israeli Armed Forces, declared that the arms balance had definitely tipped in favor of Israel and it would continue to be so in the future. Significantly, he added that there was no chance for a peaceful settlement with the Arabs and that in case of war Israel would win. See *Israel Digest*, New York, April 7, 1967, p. 7.

American policy in the Middle East would be struck by the increasing degree of hostility which the Johnson Administration exhibited against the U.A.R.—the central power in the Middle East, as well as one of the most active promoters of non-alignment in the world. Within the Middle East, American policy actively encouraged the polarization of those willing to accept America's leadership and those following an independent line. The independents were increasingly identified as part and parcel of the Communist camp.

The conclusion drawn in the United States from this polarization was that peace and stability in the region were in fact being threatened not by the unresolved Arab-Israeli dispute, but by the policies pursued by the United Arab Republic and its allies in the area. The reader will recall, for example, the hearings held by the Congressional Subcommittee on Peace in the Middle East which, in April, 1967 gathered testimony from diverse sources. It concluded that peace in the Middle East was in fact threatened by the progressive policies of the United Arab Republic and its allies, which, it was thought, were affecting American and British interests in the area adversely and were promoting the cause of Communism.²² By the Spring of 1967, a major offensive against the progressive regimes in the Middle East was already underway, which appears to have been linked to both Vietnam and Israel. This new American foreign policy took it for granted that Israel would play a dominant role in the next phase.

What we have suggested earlier concerning Arab-Israeli relations served, during this particular period, to propel the parties to military confrontation as the major form of policy. By the Spring of 1967, specific issues pressed Israel into a more aggressive policy. In addition, the regional and international climate of opinion was construed by Israeli leaders as favorable to that policy. Finally, Israel's ideological drive was not in conflict with the situational factors leading to the confrontation.

We would summarize these complex factors as they appeared by the Spring of 1967, as follows: the immediate problem revolving around the

(22) Senator Joseph Clark's *War or Peace in the Middle East* was offered as testimony to that committee. The brochure is quite "frank" in its conclusions, namely that the obstacle to "peace" in the region is the U.A.R. and its progressive orientation. Accordingly, Senator Clark called for the destruction of the progressive regimes in the Arab world and a greater commitment to Israel as the bulwark of American interests in the region. The increasing hostility of the U.S. under President Johnson has been documented by the former Chargé d'Affairs at the American Embassy in Cairo, Mr. David Ness in *The June War in the Middle East*, Boulder, Colorado, 1968.

sources of the River Jordan (the reader will undoubtedly recall that Israel's unilateral diversion of the River was not interfered with by the Arab States, despite the threats they had earlier voiced); navigation in the Suez Canal; the disposition of the Palestinian People, especially since their resistance was assuming an increasingly organized form; and Israel's need to open new markets.

In addition, although Israel had predicted increased fragmentation of the Arab world, the opposite was true. For the first time in centuries, Arabs were in a position to determine the kind of political, social and economic system that would fulfill their communal aspirations; in this situation the underlying forces for unity were proving stronger than the surface indications of fragmentation. In short, for the first time in centuries, Arabs were in a position to exercise their options; they rejected the concept of forced options.

Finally, Israel's underlying ideology was assuming greater importance. It should not be forgotten that the concept of *Eretz Israel*, so long a guiding principle for various sectors of Israeli society, had a territorial counterpart. While the exact extent of that territorial entity remains a mystery to most students of the politics of Zionism, the boundaries of the Partition Plan of 1947 and even the armistice lines of 1949 assuredly fell far short of the territorial ambitions held by even the most moderate of Zionist wings. Israel's commitment to adjust those frontiers is public record, even if the exact limits of these adjustments remain the most fluid part of Israel's design. Furthermore, Israel's commitment to the 'ingathering' of the Jews and the belief, unequivocally expressed, that the life of the Jew in exile is an impossible anomaly, has led Israel to generate various pressures to accelerate emigration of Jews from various countries of the world. The reader is simply reminded here of Israel's persistent demand throughout the year 1967 for increased immigration, particularly by American Jews, and for the 'release' of Russian Jewry.



So much for the motivations; what of the feasibilities? In the first place, Israel needed some assurance that a war with the adjacent states would result in speedy and absolute triumph. Only if the quality and quantity of Israel's arms were thought adequate to inflict sufficient damage on its opponents would that triumph be guaranteed. Second, it needed a firm commitment from

the United States—the one country whose interests in 1967 coalesced with Israel's. The U.S. Administration at that time seems to have made some kind of commitment, the nature of which is still in dispute. What is not in dispute, however, is that the commitment made by President Johnson to Israel was legally as well as morally construed and that it enabled Israel to plan its attack on the adjacent states without the slightest fear of an adverse political or military reaction.²³ Third, Israel needed to be certain that its adversaries were not in a position either to assume the initiative or to withstand a surprise attack. The U.A.R.'s preoccupation with the Arab Revolution in Yemen and Southern Arabia, plus its constant counsel to other Arab States to avoid a premature confrontation with Israel, were reasonably well known, not only to Israel but to the United States as well. If anything was clear by the Spring of 1967, it was that the United Arab Republic was neither in a position to attack Israel nor to withstand a surprise assault.²⁴ That world public opinion was led to believe otherwise simply testifies to the skillfulness of Israel's public 'misinformation' campaign.

The outbreak of the war and the events immediately following are not our concern at this point. Israel attacked the adjacent states, subsequently justifying and defending its actions by citing the insecurity arising from the U.A.R.'s declaration closing the Gulf of Aqaba and the withdrawal of UNEF. These were, of course, convenient pretexts—perhaps *too* convenient. The precipitating events occurred toward the end of May, but the decision to go to war had apparently been made by Israel a few weeks earlier. The reader may recall Mr. Eshkol's statements of May 9 and May 12, in which he clearly outlined the objectives of Israel's next offensive. He declared that,

"We shall hit when, where, and how we chose . . . Israel will continue to take action to prevent any and all attempts to perpetuate sabotage within her territory [i.e., will wipe out the Palestinian resistance]. Israel will continue to foil every scheme to divert the *sources* (*italics*)

(23) Referring to the nature of the U.S. commitment to Israel, Senator Joseph Clark, endorsed by Senators Dirksen and Javits, announced following a "briefing" with Secretary of State Rusk on June 6, 1967, "Legally, we are an ally of Israel," *New York Times*, June 7, 1967, p. 18.

(24) Despite their convoluted way of examining the various issues that led to the conflict in June, 1967, Michael Howard and Robert Hunter, *Israel and the Arabs; The Crisis of 1967*, Adelphi Papers, No. 41, London, October 1967, recognize this on p. 11, Kerr, *op. cit.*, p. 151; and Alan Horton, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

added) of the Jordan River and will defend its rights to free navigation in the Red Sea."²⁵

The reader is reminded that this statement was made following a declaration by Israel's Chief-of-Staff that the Arabs would never be allowed to interfere with the sources of the River. It was made *before* any discussion had taken place concerning the withdrawal of UNEF and before there had been any interference with Israeli shipping in the Gulf of Aqaba.

On the basis of Israel's own assessment, then, the time was ripe indeed to effect a crippling blow to the combined capabilities of the adjacent states and, at the same time, to deal effectively with the resistance of the Palestinian community. The decision to go to war seems to have been taken some time in early May; various groups sympathetically affiliated with Israel seem to have been informed.²⁶ There cannot be the slightest doubt that the United States was informed of that decision. Certainly, by the 1st of June the United States already anticipated the attack, for on that day all American F-104 Jets, sold to Jordan and placed there with their American pilots (who were 'training' their Jordanian counterparts) were ordered out of Jordan for safety.²⁷

A new phase in Arab-Israeli relations begins with the ceasefire of June 9, 1967. It does not promise to be any more peaceful than previous ones. Ominously, Israel's Arab Policy is already assuming a more concrete shape that is bound to lead to further situations of conflict.

(25) Howard and Hunter, *op. cit.*, p. 14, *Israel Digest*, May 19, 1967, p. 5.

(26) In the light of Eshkol's bellicose declarations, of May 9, and 12, 1967, top American Jewish leaders seem to have been instructed to proceed for "urgent" consultations with Israeli leaders. Between the 15th and 25th of May many of these descended on Israel and were taken on a tour of the front. Two conclusions were "drawn" from that visit, at least by Rabbi Herbert Friedman, Chairman of the United Jewish Appeal: one, that war is the "only solution," and the official launching, on the 22nd of May, 1967, of the Israel Emergency Fund (in the U.S., Canada and England) to finance that war. See the *Jerusalem Post*, July 3, 1967. On May 29, 1967, Eshkol announced, "The Israel Defence Forces are capable today of meeting any test with the same capacity that they demonstrated in the past—and knowing the situation as I do, I would say even more." *Israel Digest*, June 2, 1967. (Italics added).

(27) *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, July 3, 1967, p. 21.

CRUSADERS AND ZIONISTS*

by Uri Avnery

In September, 1967, on the seventieth anniversary of the First Zionist Congress, General Yitzhak Rabin was invited to address a commemorative meeting. It was held in the hall of the original congress in Basle. Toward the end of his speech, the victor of the Six Day War startled everyone. He compared Israel to the Crusaders' Kingdom of Jerusalem and drew the conclusion that the main danger to Israel is the dwindling of immigration, much as the Crusaders state decayed because of a lack of new blood.

To an outsider this may not sound particularly startling, but for an Israeli, and a Chief of Staff at that, to compare Israel to the Crusaders approaches heresy. One reason for this is that the average Israeli learns very little about the Crusaders' two hundred-year stay in Palestine, but very much about what the Crusaders did on the way there. The atrocities committed by the Crusaders, and those who pretended to be Crusaders, in Southern Germany and elsewhere left an indelible imprint on Jewish history.

But there is a second reason. The Crusaders came to a bad end. After ceaseless fighting for eight consecutive generations, they were finally, literally, thrown into the sea. Israelis fear that the very analogy may cast an evil spell on their own historical experiment. For precisely the same reasons, Arabs like to compare the Zionists to the Crusaders, an "automatic" comparison of course, quite childish. History doesn't repeat itself in quite this mechanical fashion. The analogy between Israel and the Crusaders' kingdom of Jerusalem is interesting nevertheless, both for the similarities and the dissimilarities it reveals.



(*) Reprinted from *Israel Without Zionists* by the author. (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), pp. 68-77.

The Crusader bug bit me a few years after Israel's War of Liberation. I had rather casually started to read Steven Runciman's excellent *History of the Crusades*. Coming to the chapter about the fortifications the Crusaders built opposite the Gaza Strip to defend their kingdom against the Egyptians, I was suddenly struck by the idea that as a soldier in the Army of Israel I had occupied exactly the same positions.

As I continued my reading with a fresh eye, hundreds of large and small similarities sprang to mind. This can become an obsession. One begins to identify not only great events and institutions, but also personalities, kings, dukes and knights, wondering who is the Zionist prince of Galilee and who the duke of Transjordan.

The similarities are indeed striking. The Crusaders' movement, like the Zionist one, was a revolution so profound, so far-reaching, that it defies rational explanation. Of the many reasons attributed to this phenomenon—political, social, cultural—none is completely satisfactory.

The Crusaders, much as the Zionists, make one wonder what induces people suddenly to leave their homes and comfortable lives, marching for thousands of miles among innumerable perils to a distant and uninviting country, to live there in unending struggle, fighting unknown diseases and an implacable foe. What combination of glorious visions, selfless idealism, craving for loot, sheer disgust with the old life, and the promise of a new Jerusalem only dimly imagined, was needed to raise such a human tidal wave?

The Crusaders had their "Herzl" in Pope Urban. Their "First Zionist Congress" was their Council of Clermont, in November, 1095, eight hundred and two years before the historical gathering in Basle. The cry of "God wills it" echoes in the cry of "Let's go, Children of Jacob" which became the motto of the first Zionist *aliyah*.

Yet there was a significant difference in the conscious objectives of the two movements. The Crusaders went to Palestine to wrest the Holy Land from the hands of the Infidel. Settling in the land was only incidental to the necessity of guarding the holy places once regained. The ethos of the movement was anti-Moslem in its very essence. Zionism, on the contrary, was essentially a colonizing movement. The fight against the Arabs was only incidental, and, as we have seen, totally unexpected. The Zionists thought that Palestine

was empty. The Crusaders went there because it was not empty. Yet these differences of motivation did not lead to vastly different results. Whether they wanted war or not, both movements had to fight, to settle the land, to guard its possessions.

Another difference is that the Crusaders came as conquerors, taking possession of the country in one big military campaign, settling on the land after their victory. The Zionists came as settlers, bought land piecemeal, set up their fortified villages and took over the country in a war they did not want after creating a base strong enough to sustain a sovereign state.

But both of these differences, important as they may be, are negligible compared with the striking similarity in the general direction of the two movements. Like the Philistines before them, they came from the west, partly by sea. Every seaborne invasion of Palestine has created the necessity of establishing a beachhead, fortifying it against the surrounding land, with supplies and reinforcements coming by ship. It creates, even unconsciously, a posture of facing the hostile hinterland with one's back to the sea as a secure base. Correspondingly, among the population of the surrounding area, it raises the spectre of foreign invasion by an alien body, to which the country has to react. In this the invasions from the west seem different, in the history of Palestine, from the traditional Semitic invasions, coming from the deserts in the east, such as the Israelite invasion of Biblical times and the Arab invasion of the seventh century. The Eastern invaders, infiltrating the country, speaking a similar language, looking much like the inhabitants who themselves are the descendants of former invaders, are easily absorbed into the mainstream of Palestinian culture, which has always been a melting pot of varied Semitic influences



Like Israel, the Crusaders' state had its problems with diverse elements of the population—the European (Frankish or Ashkenazi) ruling class; the native members of the state (the Poulains, as oriental Christians were called, or the Sephardim, as we call the oriental Jews today), and the native Muslim population left within the frontiers of the new state without really belonging to it.

Like the Israelis, the Crusaders excelled in battle, knowing that their security rested on their readiness to withstand enemy attack. Like the Kingdom of the Star of David, the Kingdom of the Cross continued to expand by warfare long after it was first established. At their height, the Crusaders' states controlled a far greater area than that conquered by Israel even in the 1967 war; it included the whole of the Syrian and Lebanese seaboard, as well as eastern Turkey and at least a foothold in the Transjordanian hills.

Much as some Israelis tend to consider themselves as establishing a beach-head for the whole Jewish people and look down upon other Jews as shirkers and deserters, the Crusaders thought of themselves as the vanguard of Christendom acting and fighting for all the Christians of the world. The deep concern of Jews everywhere for the fate of Israel during the 1967 war echoed the waves of anxiety that would awaken Europe whenever the kingdom of Jerusalem was in danger. This relationship formed in both instances the basis of the economy. Long before the gap in the international balance of payments was invented, the Kingdom of Jerusalem was dependent upon a heavy and continuous flow of capital from Europe in the form of gifts, religious and secular grants, alms, and pilgrims' taxes. The whole of Europe became the domain of a kind of United Crusaders Appeal.

If the *kibbutzim* are a unique creation of Zionism, so were the great military orders an authentic invention of the Crusaders. Settlement followed a strikingly similar pattern. A fortress manned by the Knights of the Temple or the Hospital would be established deep in Arab territory, much like Israel's frontier *kibbutzim*, some of which, in fact, are built around the ruins of Crusaders' castles. Around the castle, relying on it for defense, individual settlers would slowly create a pattern of colonization. Some of the villages seem to have had a kind of cooperative organization, like modern Israel's *moshavim*. The military orders increasingly overshadowed the government of the kingdom. Their strength was based upon a combination of their military potential and economic importance. In this, they resemble some of the modern Israeli party organizations based on *kibbutzim* and a multitude of economic enterprises, giving them a disproportionately important voice in the government.

One could go on making these comparisons, right down to details. Was King Baldwin I so dissimilar to old David Ben Gurion, Who resembles Moshe Dayan more than Reynald of Châtillon, the raider of Moslem caravans, the

hawk of the kingdom, the man who became so obnoxious to the Arabs that Saladin personally saw fit to cut off his head?



In rejecting the analogy in toto, the Zionists point out what they consider the decisive difference. The Crusaders, they believe, never were a majority in their own states. They were but a small layer of conquerors superimposed on the native population.

This point is highly debatable. If one includes in Crusader society the native oriental Christians, as certainly one must, the Crusaders seem to have been well in the majority. If Israel, on the other hand, annexes the newly occupied territories, Hebrew society may well find itself soon enough a minority in its own state.

Were the Crusaders a nation, rooted in Palestine in the way that the new Hebrew nation certainly is? This question must be answered in any comparison between the two. It is, of course, difficult to apply a modern term like "nation" to a time in the past in which the very notion of nationality was unknown and inconceivable. I use the term here in the sense of a community that thinks of itself as a distinctive entity, tied to a specific territory. Did the Crusaders, even those who were eight-generation *sabras* (as we nowadays call Israeli-born Jews) consider themselves Palestinians, destined to live and die in their country, or did they think of themselves rather as Franks, Germans and Italians, serving on a foreign shore, who could go back any time to their real homeland? One rather thinks that many of those descendants of the old established Crusader families, and certainly the oriental Christians, considered Palestine, by the end of the thirteenth century, their only true homeland. But nothing like the Israeli nationality, with its fierce sense of belonging to the country—with a new and common language uniting all newcomers from many lands—seems to have evolved.

In summing up his *History of the Crusades*, Runciman records these memorable words:

"Outremer (meaning "beyond the sea," as the Europeans called the Crusader states) was permanently poised on the horns of a dilemma. It was founded by a blend of religious fervor and adventurous

land-hunger. But if it was to endure healthily, it could not remain dependent upon a steady supply of men and money from the West. It must justify its existence economically. This could only be done if it came to terms with its neighbors. If they were friendly and prosperous, it too would prosper. But to seek amity with the Moslems seemed a complete betrayal of Crusader ideals; and the Moslems for their part could never quite reconcile themselves to the presence of an alien and intrusive state in lands that they regarded as their own . . . The Crusaders made many mistakes. Their policy was often hesitant and changeable. But they cannot be entirely blamed for failing to solve a problem for which, in fact, there was no solution."

Yet Runciman shows that even among the Knights of the Cross, there arose a party which favored integration of the kingdom into the Middle East, which sought to turn the Crusading state into a partner of the Arab world. The same basic idea, presently being voiced by us in Israel, seems to have much more chance of success.

The Zionists and their Israeli descendants have never thought of themselves as having a holy mission to fight the Arabs. On the contrary, most of them sincerely believe that the animosity of the Arabs to their state rests on a regrettable misunderstanding. This, of course, is an illusion, but the very fact that such an illusion can exist shows the basic difference. No Crusader could ever have believed that the war between the Christians and the Moslems was anything but willed by God. Thus, without disregarding the disturbing implications of the Crusading period for the future of Israel, no one, neither Israeli nor Arab, should carry this analogy too far and derive from it a fatalistic fear or hope. Rather, this analogy should be seen as a lesson from which useful conclusions can be drawn for the guidance of our future actions. As one eminent historian once told me discussing this analogy, "Israelis should view the *History of the Crusades* as a practical guidebook of how not to do it."



The Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem seems to have doomed itself to oblivion by relying solely on its superior military organization and valor. Yet the astonishing feats of arms that carried the Crusaders into the heart of Egypt tend to obscure the real problems which determined their destiny in

the long run. These same problems are valid today in an Israeli context. Without a mental readiness to become a part of the Middle East, without a policy aimed at securing acceptance by the peoples in the region, any security could only be temporary.

The Crusaders captured Jerusalem in July, 1099, celebrating the event with a terrible massacre, killing Muslims and Jews alike until they had to pick their way through corpses and blood that reached up to their knees, as a contemporary, Raymond of Aguilers, described it. The last of the Crusaders was evicted from Acre in 1291. In all these hundred and ninety-two years, despite many truces, armistices and ceasefires, the Crusaders knew not one day of real peace. In this respect, the analogy with Israel is complete.

In fact, thinking about the 1967 war, which sprang up so suddenly and unexpectedly, I am reminded of a story from the time of the Crusades which has always seemed to me the epitome of the very existence of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In the year 1183, only four years before the armies of the kingdom were crushed by Saladin at the Horns of Hattin, a little hill overlooking the Sea of Tiberias, a marriage was celebrated in the castle of Kerak, whose ruins today overlook the Dead Sea from the east. The Lord of the castle, the notorious Reynald, Lord of Transjordan and leader of the war party, was presiding over the marriage of a seventeen year-old nobleman to an eleven-year-old princess. From all the far-flung territories of the Crusading states, from the north of Syria to the frontiers of Egypt, the barons and noblewomen rode to the event. Some must have ridden for two weeks, carrying with them their armor, without which life was unthinkable. The celebration was in full swing when suddenly the Muslim army under Saladin materialized from the desert and fell upon the town. Before the Crusaders could rally, Saladin forced an entrance. Reynald himself was able to escape back into the castle, owing to the heroism of one of his Knights, who, single-handedly, defended the bridge over the fosse between the town and the citadel until it could be destroyed behind him.

As Runciman describes the scene:

"With a fine show of bravura the wedding ceremonies were continued in the castle. While rocks were hurled at its walls, the singing and dancing went on within. The Lady Stephanie, mother of the bridegroom, herself prepared dishes from the bridal feast which she sent

out to Saladin. He, in return, asked in which tower the young pair were housed and gave orders that it should not be bombarded by his siege-engines. But otherwise he did not relax his efforts. His nine great mangonels were in continuous action, and his workmen almost filled up the fosse. Messengers had hurried to Jerusalem to beg the King for help. He summoned the royal army, which he put under the command of Count Raymond; but he insisted on coming himself in his litter with his men. They hastened down past Jericho and up the road by Mount Nebo. On his approach Saladin, whose engines had made little effect on the mighty walls of the fortress, lifted the siege and on December 4 moved back toward Damascus. The King was carried in triumph into Kerak; and the wedding-guests were free to go home."

In a more modern and less chivalrous setting, this is more or less what happened during May and June, 1967, except for the fact that Reynald was not appointed Minister of Defense of the Kingdom, and he did not sally forth from the besieged fortress to attack Saladin's army and destroy its mangonels before they had time to mount the attack themselves.

This happened before and will happen again, unless Israel succeeds in gaining acceptance in the region and integrates itself into its framework. Otherwise it must be ready to fight every single day of its existence—ever prepared for all-out war, which may break out quite unexpectedly at all times, as it did in the summer of 1967.

ZIONISM: A MARXIST ANALYSIS*

by Abram Leon

Zionism was born in the light of the incendiary fires of the Russian pogroms of 1882 and in the tumult of the Dreyfus Affair—two events which expressed the sharpness that the Jewish problem began to assume at the end of the Nineteenth Century.

The rapid capitalist development of Russian economy after the reform of 1863 made the situation of the Jewish masses in the small towns untenable. In the West, the middle classes, shattered by capitalist concentration, began to turn against the Jewish element whose competition aggravated their situation. In Russia, the association of the "Lovers of Zion" was founded. Leo Pinsker wrote *Auto-Emancipation*, in which he called for a return to Palestine as the sole possible solution of the Jewish question. In Paris, Baron Rothschild, who like all the Jewish magnates viewed with very little favor the mass arrival of Jewish immigrants in the western countries, became interested in Jewish colonization in Palestine. To help "their unfortunate brothers" to return to the land of their "ancestors," that is to say, to go as far away as possible, contained nothing displeasing to the Jewish bourgeoisie of the West, who with reason feared the rise of anti-Semitism. A short while after the publication of Leo Pinsker's book, a Jewish journalist of Budapest, Theodor Herzl, saw anti-Semitic demonstrations at Paris provoked by the Dreyfus Affair. Soon he wrote *The Jewish State*, which to this day remains the bible of the Zionist movement. From its inception, Zionism appeared as a reaction of the Jewish petty bourgeoisie (which still forms the core of Judaism), hard hit by the mounting anti-Semitic wave, kicked from one country to another, and striving to attain the Promised Land where it might find shelter from the tempests sweeping the modern world.

(*) Reprinted from *The Jewish Question: A Marxist Analysis* by the author (New York: Merit Publishers, 1950), pp. 206-218. This book was written around 1944.

Zionism is thus a very young movement; it is the youngest of the European national movements. That does not prevent it from pretending, even more than all other nationalisms, that it draws its substance from a far distant past. Whereas Zionism is in fact the product of the last phase of capitalism, of capitalism beginning to decay, it pretends to draw its origin from a past more than two thousand years old. Whereas Zionism is essentially a reaction against the situation created for Judaism by the combination of the destruction of feudalism and the decay of capitalism, it affirms that it constitutes a reaction against the state of things existing since the fall of Jerusalem in the year 70 of the Christian era. Its recent birth is naturally the best reply to these pretensions. As a matter of fact, how can one believe that the remedy for an evil existing for two thousand years was discovered only at the end of the Nineteenth Century? But like all nationalisms—and even more intensely—Zionism views the historic past in the light of the present. In this way, too, it distorts the present-day picture. Just as France is represented to French children as existing since the Gaul of Vercingetorix; just as the children of Provence are told that the victories that the kings of Ile de France won over their ancestors were their own successes, in the same way Zionism tries to create the myth of an eternal Judaism, eternally the prey of the same persecutions. Zionism sees in the fall of Jerusalem the cause of the dispersion, and consequently, the fountain-head of all Jewish misfortunes of the past, present and future. "The source of all the misfortunes of the Jewish people is the loss of its historic country and its dispersion in all countries," declares the Marxist delegation of the "Poale-Zion" to the Dutch-Scandinavian committee. After the violent dispersion of the Jews by the Romans, their tragic history continues. Driven out of their country, the Jews did not wish (oh beauty of free will!) to assimilate. Imbued with their "national cohesiveness," "with a superior ethical feeling," and with "an indestructible belief in a single God" . . . they have resisted all attempts at assimilation. Their sole hope during these somber days which lasted two thousand years has been the vision of a return to their ancient country.

Zionism has never seriously posed this question: Why, during these two thousand years, have not the Jews really tried to return to this country? Why was it necessary to wait until the end of the Nineteenth Century for a Herzl to succeed in convincing them of this necessity? Why were all the predecessors of Herzl, like the famous Sabbatai Zebi, treated as false Messiahs? Why were the adherents of Sabbatai Zebi fiercely persecuted by orthodox Judaism?

Naturally, in replying to these interesting questions, refuge is sought behind religion. "As long as the masses believed that they had to remain in the Diaspora until the advent of the Messiah, they had to suffer in silence," states Zitlovski,¹ whose Zionism is moreover quite conditional. Nevertheless this explanation tells us nothing. What is required is precisely an answer to the question of why the Jewish masses believed that they had to await the Messiah in order to be able to "return to their country." Religion being an ideological reflection of social interests, it must perforce correspond to them. Today religion does not at all constitute an obstacle to Zionism.²

In reality just so long as Judaism was incorporated in the feudal system, the "dream of Zion" was nothing but a dream and did not correspond to any real interest of Judaism. The Jewish tavern owner or "farmer" of Sixteenth-Century Poland thought as little of "returning" to Palestine as does the Jewish millionaire in America today. Jewish religious Messianism was no whit different from the Messianism belonging to other religions. Jewish pilgrims who went to Palestine met Catholic, Orthodox and Moslem pilgrims. Besides it was not so much the "return to Palestine" which constituted the foundation of this Messianism as the belief in the rebuilding of the temple of Jerusalem.

All of these idealist conceptions of Zionism are naturally inseparable from the dogma of eternal anti-Semitism. "As long as the Jews will live in the Diaspora, they will be hated by the 'natives'." This essential point of view for Zionism, its spinal column so to speak, is naturally given different nuances by its various currents. Zionism transposes modern anti-Semitism to all of history; it saves itself the trouble of studying the various forms of anti-Semitism and their evolution. However, we have seen that in different historical periods, Judaism made up part of the possessing classes and was treated as such. To sum up (the idealist conception), the sources of Zionism must be sought in the impossibility of assimilation because of "eternal" anti-Semitism and of the will to safeguard the "treasures of Judaism."³

In reality, Zionist ideology, like all ideologies, is only the distorted reflection of the interests of a class. It is the ideology of the Jewish petty bour-

(1) *Materialism and the National Question.*

(2) There is a religious Zionist bourgeois party, *Misrakbi*, and a religious Zionist workers' party, *poale-Misrakbi*.

(3) Adolf Bohm, *Die Zionistische Bewegung*, Berlin, 1935, Vol. I, Chapter 3.

geoisie, suffocating between feudalism in ruins and capitalism in decay. The refutation of the ideological fantasies of Zionism does not naturally refute the real needs which brought them into being. It is modern anti-Semitism, and not mythical "eternal" anti-Semitism, which is the best agitator in favor of Zionism. Similarly, the basic question to determine is: To what extent is Zionism capable of resolving not the "eternal" Jewish problem but the Jewish question in the period of capitalist decay?

Zionist theoreticians like to compare Zionism with all other national movements. But in reality, the foundations of the national movements and that of Zionism are altogether different. The national movement of the European bourgeoisie is the consequence of capitalist development; it reflects the will of the bourgeoisie to create the national bases for production, to abolish feudal remnants. The national movement of the European bourgeoisie is closely linked with the ascending phase of capitalism. But in the Nineteenth Century, in the period of the flowering of nationalisms, far from being "Zionist," the Jewish bourgeoisie was profoundly assimilationist. The economic process from which the modern nations issued laid the foundations for integration of the Jewish bourgeoisie into the bourgeois nation.

It is only when the process of the formation of nations approaches its end, when the productive forces have for a long time found themselves constricted within national boundaries, that the process of expulsion of Jews from capitalist society begins to manifest itself, that modern anti-Semitism begins to develop. The elimination of Judaism accompanies the decline of capitalism. Far from being a product of the development of the productive forces, Zionism is precisely the consequence of the complete halt of this development, the result of the product of the ascending period of capitalism, Zionism is the product of the imperialist era. The Jewish tragedy of the Twentieth Century is a direct consequence of the decline of capitalism.

Therein lies the principal obstacle to the realization of Zionism. Capitalist decay—basis for the growth of Zionism—is also the cause of the impossibility of its realization. The Jewish bourgeoisie is compelled to create a national state, to assure itself of the objective framework for the development of its productive forces, precisely in the period when the conditions for such a development have long since disappeared. The conditions of the decline of capitalism which have posed so sharply the Jewish question make its solution

equally impossible along the Zionist road. And there is nothing astonishing in that. An evil cannot be suppressed without destroying its causes. But Zionism wishes to resolve the Jewish question without destroying capitalism, which is the principal source of the suffering of the Jews.

At the end of the Nineteenth Century, in the period when the Jewish problem was just beginning to be posed in all its sharpness, 150,000 Jews each year left their countries of origin. Between 1881 and 1925, nearly four million Jews emigrated. Despite these enormous figures, the Jewish population of Eastern Europe rose from 6 to 8 million.

Thus, even when capitalism was still developing, even when the countries across the ocean were still receiving immigrants, the Jewish question could not even begin to be resolved (in the Zionist sense); far from diminishing, the Jewish population showed a bad penchant of wanting to grow. In order to begin to resolve the Jewish question, that is to say, in order to begin really to transplant the Jewish masses, it would be necessary for the countries of immigration to absorb at least a little more than the natural growth of Jews in the Diaspora, that is at least 300,000 Jews per year. And if such a figure could not be reached before the first imperialist war, when all the conditions were still favorable for emigration, when all developed countries such as the United States were permitting the mass entry of immigrants, then how can we think that it is possible in the period of the continuous crisis of capitalism, in the period of almost incessant wars?

Naturally there are enough ships in the world to transport hundreds of thousands, even millions of Jews. But if all countries have closed their doors to immigrants, it is because there is an overproduction of labor forces just as there is an over production of commodities. Contrary to Malthus, who believed that there would be too many people because there would be too few goods, it is precisely the abundance of goods which is the cause of the "plethora" of human beings. By what miracle, in a period when the world markets are saturated with goods, in a period when unemployment has everywhere become a permanent fixture, by what miracle can a country, however great and rich it may be (we pass over the data relating to poor and small Palestine), develop its productive forces to the point of being able to welcome 300,000 immigrants each year? In reality the possibilities for Jewish emigration diminish at the same time that the need for it increases. The causes which promote the

need for emigration are the same as those which prevent its realization; they all spring from the decline of capitalism.

It is from this fundamental contradiction between the necessity for and the possibility of emigration that the political difficulties of Zionism flow. The period of development of the European nations was also the period of an intensive colonization in the countries across the ocean. It was at the beginning and middle of the Nineteenth Century, in the golden age of European nationalism, that North America was colonized; it was also in this period that South America and Australia began to be developed. Vast areas of the earth were practically without a master and lent themselves marvellously to the establishment of millions of European emigrants. In that period, for reason that we have studied, the Jews gave almost no thought to emigrating.

Today the whole world is colonized, industrialized and divided among the various imperialisms. Everywhere Jewish emigrants come into collision at one and the same time with the nationalism of the "natives" and with the ruling imperialism. In Palestine, Jewish nationalism collides with an increasingly aggressive Arab nationalism.

The development of Palestine by Jewish immigration tends to increase the intensity of this Arab nationalism. The economic development of the country results in the growth of the Arab population, its social differentiation, the growth of a national capitalism. To overcome Arab resistance the Jews need English imperialism. But its "support" is as harmful as is Arab resistance. English imperialism views with a favorable eye a weak Jewish immigration to constitute a counterweight to the Arab factor, but it is intensely hostile to the establishment of a big Jewish population in Palestine, to its industrial development, to the growth of its proletariat. It merely uses the Jews as a counterweight to the Arab threat but does everything to raise difficulties for Jewish immigration. Thus, to the increasing difficulties flowing from Arab resistance, there is added the perfidious game of British imperialism.

Finally, we must draw still one more conclusion from the fundamental premises which have been established. Because of its necessarily artificial character, because of the slim perspectives for a rapid and normal development of Palestinian economy in our period, the task of Zionist colonization requires considerable capital. Zionism demands incessantly increasing sacrifices

from the Jewish communities of the world. But so long as the situation of the Jews is more or less bearable in the Diaspora, no Jewish class feels the necessity of making these sacrifices. To the extent that the Jewish masses feel the necessity of having a "country," to the extent also that persecutions mount in intensity, so much the less are the Jewish masses able to contribute to Zionist construction. "A strong Jewish people in the Diaspora is necessary for Palestinian reconstruction," states Ruppin. But so long as the Jewish people is strong in the Diaspora, it feels no need for Palestinian reconstruction. When it strongly feels this necessity, the possibility for realizing it no longer exists. It would be difficult today to ask European Jews, who have a pressing need to emigrate, to give aid for the rebuilding of Palestine. The day when they will be able to do it, it is a safe assumption that their enthusiasm for this task will have considerably cooled.

A relative success for Zionism, along the lines of creating a Jewish majority in Palestine and even of the formation of a "Jewish state," that is to say, a state placed under the complete domination of English or American imperialism, cannot, naturally, be excluded. This would in some ways be a return to the state of things which existed in Palestine before the destruction of Jerusalem and, from this point of view, there will be "reparation of a two-thousand-year-old injustice." But this tiny "independent" Jewish state in the midst of a world-wide Diaspora will be only an apparent return to the state of things before the year 70. It will not even be the beginning of the solution of the Jewish question. The Jewish Diaspora of the Roman era was in effect based on solid economic ground; the Jews played an important economic role in the world. The existence or absence of a Palestinian mother country had for the Jews of this period only a secondary importance. Today it is not a question of giving the Jews a political or spiritual center (as Achaad Haam would have it). It is a question of saving Judaism from the annihilation which threatens it in the Diaspora. But in what way will the existence of a small Jewish state in Palestine change anything in the situation of the Polish or German Jews, Admitting even that all the Jews in the world were today Palestinian citizens, would the policy of Hitler have been any different?

One must be stricken with an incurable juridical cretinism to believe that the creation of a small Jewish state in Palestine can change anything at all in the situation of the Jews throughout the world, especially in the present period. The situation after the eventual creation of a Jewish state in Palestine

will resemble the state of things that existed in the Roman era only in the fact that in both cases the existence of a small Jewish state in Palestine could in no way influence the situation of the Jews in the Diaspora. In the Roman era, the economic and social position of Judaism in the Diaspora was very strong, so that the disappearance of this Jewish state did not in any way compromise it. Today the situation of the Jews in the world is very bad; so the re-establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine cannot in any way restore it. In both cases the situation of the Jews does not at all depend on the existence of a state in Palestine but is a function of the general economic, social and political situation. Even supposing that the Zionist dream is realized and the "secular injustice" is undone—and we are still very far from that—the situation of Judaism throughout the world will in no way be modified by that. The temple will perhaps be rebuilt but the faithful will continue to suffer.

The history of Zionism is the best illustration of the insurmountable difficulties that it encounters, difficulties resulting, in the last analysis, from the fundamental contradiction which tears it apart: The contradiction between the growing necessity of resolving the Jewish question and the growing impossibility of resolving it under the conditions of decaying capitalism. Immediately following the first imperialist war, Jewish emigration to Palestine encountered no great obstacles in its path. Despite that, there were relatively few immigrants; the economic conditions of capitalist countries after the war made the need to emigrate less pressing. It was, moreover, because of this light emigration that the British government did not feel obliged to set up bars to the entry of Jews into Palestine. In the years 1924, 1925, 1926, the Polish bourgeoisie opened an economic offensive against the Jewish masses. These years are also the period of a very important immigration into Palestine. But this massive immigration soon collided with insurmountable economic difficulties. The ebb was almost as great as was the floodtide. Up to 1933, the date of Hitler's arrival to power, immigration was of little importance. After this date, tens of thousands of Jews began to arrive in Palestine. But this "conjuncture" was soon arrested by a storm of anti-Jewish demonstrations and massacres. The Arabs seriously feared becoming a minority in the country. The Arab feudal elements feared being submerged by the capitalist wave. British imperialism profited from this tension by piling up obstacles to the entry of the Jews, by working to deepen the gulf existing between the Jews and the Arabs, by proposing the partition of Palestine. Up to the second imperialist war, Zionism thus found itself in the grip of mounting difficulties. The Pales-

tinian population lived in a state of permanent terror. Precisely when the situation of the Jews became ever more desperate, Zionism showed itself absolutely incapable of providing a remedy. "Illegal" Jewish immigrants were greeted with rifle fire by their British "protectors."

The Zionist illusion began to lose its attractiveness even in the eyes of the most uninformed. In Poland, the last elections revealed that the Jewish masses were turning completely away from Zionism. The Jewish masses began to understand that Zionism not only could not seriously improve their situation, but that it was furnishing weapons to the anti-Semites by its theories of the "objective necessity of Jewish emigration." The imperialist war and the triumph of Hitlerism in Europe are an unprecedented disaster for Judaism. Judaism is confronted with the threat of total extinction. What can Zionism do to counteract such a disaster? Is it not obvious that the Jewish question is very little dependent upon the future destiny of Tel Aviv but very greatly upon the regime which will be set up tomorrow in Europe and in the world? The Zionists have a great deal of faith in a victory of Anglo-American imperialism. But is there a single reason for believing that the attitude of the Anglo-American imperialists will differ after their eventual victory from their prewar attitude? It is obvious that there is none. Even admitting that Anglo-American imperialism will create some kind of abortive Jewish state, we have seen that the situation of world Judaism will hardly be affected. A great Jewish immigration into Palestine after this war will confront the same difficulties as previously. Under conditions of capitalist decay, it is impossible to transplant millions of Jews. Only a world-wide socialist planned economy would be capable of such a miracle. Naturally this presupposes the proletarian revolution.

But Zionism wishes precisely to resolve the Jewish question independently of the world revolution. By misconstruing the real sources of the Jewish question in our period, by lulling itself with puerile dreams and silly hopes, Zionism proves that it is an ideological excrescence and not a scientific doctrine.⁴

(4) In this chapter, Zionism has been treated only insofar as it is linked with the Jewish question. The role of Zionism in Palestine naturally constitutes another problem.

APPENDIX

A NOTE ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE BOLSHEVIKS TO ZIONISM

It is a matter of common knowledge that the Bolsheviks opposed the idea of Zionist settlement in Palestine. Lenin and the other Bolsheviks shared this outlook with most socialist leaders of the day. In an article entitled "The Bund's Position within the Party," appearing on October 22, 1903, in *Iskra*, Lenin wrote that the Zionist idea of a Jewish nation "is entirely false and reactionary in its essence."⁵ He then quoted Karl Kautship's statement that a nation is inconceivable without a territory. Lenin believed that the downfall of medievalism and the development of political freedom would bring about the emancipation and final assimilation of the Jew. He concluded his article by rejecting "the idea of a Jewish nationality" as manifestly reactionary, not only when put forward by its consistent partisans (the Zionists), but also when put forward by those who try to make it agree with the ideas of Social Democracy (the Bundists).⁶ In 1912 and 1913 the notion of a "Jewish nation" aroused Lenin's indignation no less than it had in 1903. Throughout his life, Lenin remained opposed to the reactionary concept of a "Jewish nation."

The reasons for the Bolshevik opposition to Zionist ideology were two-fold. First, the idea of a Jewish nationality was considered to be against the interests of the Jewish proletariat, "for, directly and indirectly, it engenders in its ranks a mood hostile to assimilation, a 'ghetto' mood,"⁷ as Lenin observed. (It is a tribute to Lenin's historical acumen that he could see the close bonds between the Zionist's and the anti-semites' outlooks). This "ghetto" mood obscured the class interests of the Jewish Proletariat and only benefited the Jewish bourgeoisie. The Zionists gather "around themselves petty-bourgeois elements and erect a thick barrier between the Jewish masses and the Russian Revolution."⁸

From the point of view of internal Soviet politics, Zionism was found to be a residual, reactionary, petty-bourgeois force. On the international level,

(5) Quoted by Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1951), p. 50.

(6) *Ibid.*

(7) *Ibid.*

(8) Quoted by Guido G. Goldman, *Zionism Under Soviet Rule: (1917-1928)* (New York: Herzl Press, 1960), p. 38.

the Bolsheviks were not less aware of its reactionary nature. Zionism was serving British foreign policy objectives in Palestine and the Arab Middle East. The second conference of the representatives of the regional sections and commissariates that met in Moscow in June, 1919, adopted a resolution specifically directed against the Zionist movement:

“Through its Palestine policy the Zionist Party becomes an instrument in the hands of Imperialism in its war against the proletarian revolution.”⁹

The reactionary activities of the Zionists against the new socialist state and against Palestine intensified. The *Tseire Zion*, the most popular Zionist party, was a counter-revolutionary party with particular strength in the Ukraine. Many of its members were arrested in April, 1922, while holding an illegal conference in Kiev. During their trial, the collaboration between Jabotinsky and Petliura's political lieutenant, Slavinsky, was first made public. The trial opened on August 26th, and the indictment read as follows:

“The *Tseire Zion* is a popular wing of the Zionist Party, which under the mask of democracy, seeks to . . . throw the Jewish youth into the arms of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in the interests of Anglo-French Capitalism. To restore the Palestine state, these representatives of the Jewish bourgeoisie rely on reactionary forces, ranging from Tiontounik and Petliura to such rapacious Imperialists as Poincaré, Lloyd George, and the Pope.”¹⁰

A resolution condemning Zionist activities in Palestine was adopted by the Second Congress of the Comintern in 1920.¹¹ In 1924, Karl Radek, chief of the Communist International Middle East Section, recommended that the Palestinian Communist Party “become a party of Arab workers, and to admit Jews only if they have become acclimatized, rooted in Palestine, and can speak Arabic.”¹² On the other hand when the *Paole Zion*, a leftist Zionist party,

(9) *Ibid.*, p. 41.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 76.

(11) Walter Z. Laquer, *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 34.

(12) Judd L. Teller, *The Kremlin, the Jews, and the Middle East* (New York: Thomas Yoseloff, 1957), p. 149.

applied for membership in the Comintern, its application was rejected on the grounds that Zionism was a "counter-revolutionary" ideal,

"because the goal of that particular ideology is, in the end, colonization work in Palestine, work which in the final summation strengthens the position of British Imperialism in Palestine."¹³

The rejection of Zionism by the Bolsheviks was indeed total and unequivocal.

(13) *Zionism under Soviet Rule*, p. 92.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES ON THE WRITERS OF THE ESSAYS IN THIS BOOK

L.M.C. VAN DER HOEVEN LEONHARD is the President of the Committee for Netherlands-Arab relations. She is currently writing a book on the Palestine Problem which will be published shortly.

ANTHONY NUTTING was a former British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office (1951-1954) and Minister of State at the Foreign Office until his resignation over Suez in 1956. His most recent books are *Lawrence of Arabia* (1961), *The Arabs* (1964), *Gordon of Khartoum* (1966), and *No End of a Lesson* (1967).

IBRAHIM ABU-LUGHOD is of Palestinian origin and Professor of Political Science at Northwestern University.

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HISHAM SHARABI is Professor of Government at Georgetown University. He is of Palestinian origin. His writings include *Government and Politics of the Middle East in the 20th Century* and *Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World*.

MAXIME RODINSON of French Jewish origin. His father was one of the founders of the Jewish Workers Trade Unions in Paris. He is a Marxist and since 1955 Professor of Old Ethiopic and Old South Arabian Languages in the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes at the Sorbonne.

I.F. STONE is an American Jewish Journalist who has been very close to the Birth of Israel. For the last 15 years he has been editor and publisher of an independent Washington newsletter, *I.F. Stone's Weekly*. Among his books are *Underground to Palestine* (1946), and *This is Israel* (1948).

ISAAC DEUTSCHER was of Polish Jewish origin. He went to Britain in 1938 as a journalist. He worked for *The Economist*, and *The Observer*. Among his published works are *Sialin*, *A Political Biography*, *The Prophet Armed*, *The Prophet Unarmed*, and *The Prophet Outcast*. He was G.M. Trevelyan Lecturer at Cambridge for 1966-67.

URI AVNERY emigrated to Palestine at the age of 10. In his youth he was a member of the right-wing terrorist group Irgun. In 1958 he founded the magazine *Haolam Haze'b* which called upon Israel to support the Arab Nationalist Movement and integrate itself with the peoples of the Middle East. He was elected to Parliament in 1965, after founding his own party, of which he is the only elected member.

ABRAM LEONARD born of a Zionist family which emigrated to Palestine and then left in 1926. He tried to reconcile Zionism with Marxism—but when he found this impossible rejected Zionism. He was arrested by the Gestapo and died in Auschwitz at the age of 26.

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