

RESISTANCE in the Middle East

number 9 June 73

NIXON DOCTRINE
LEBANON
MID EAST--since 67
MOROCCO
GREECE--student revolt



SINCE 1967....

Six years ago, in June, 1967, only a limited number of Americans understood that Israel's "six-day war" against its neighbors marked an effort by imperialism to block the rising tide of the Middle East Revolution. Many who had come to understand the whys of the United States' intervention in Vietnam did not comprehend that imperialism can also wage wars through intermediaries in order to assure an uninterrupted flow of profits. It can be seen as a sign of those times that Ramparts magazine, widely regarded for its exposure of American atrocities in Vietnam and the machinations of Big Business and the C.I.A., declared "critical" support for Israel... and subsequently suffered a severe financial crisis because some of its backers were angered at even the mildest "criticisms" of Israel.

Since then, the courageous struggle of the Palestinian people and the parallel efforts of other peoples of the Middle East to free themselves from imperialist domination have won a limited degree of attention in the United States. In fairness, however, we must say that there is still an inclination to repeat an error that was widespread in 1967--namely to reduce the conflict between Zionism and Palestinians or the conflict between Israel and Arab nations to "single issues." In this way, the root of the Middle East crisis--namely imperialism's systematic looting of an entire region--is dangerously overlooked.

Resistance in the Middle East was originally established in 1971 in order to make a modest effort toward providing the American left with information and perspectives that could encourage the growth of a firmly anti-imperialist understanding of events in the Middle East. From the beginning, the magazine has sought to approach not only the "Arab-Israeli" contradiction, but such trends as the deepening conflict in the Arab Gulf or the rising opposition of Iranians to the imperialist-backed Shah.

This issue--Number-9-- reflects the continuation of our efforts...and, more important, the support of readers and subscribers, whose letters, articles, and financial contributions are indispensable. As the crisis escalates in many areas of the Middle East, we become painfully aware that the American bourgeoisie is just as capable of mystifying the public now as it was in 1967 or earlier points. The need to expose imperialism's aims and to develop solidarity with the Middle East Revolution is growing.

Accordingly, the Resistance staff offers--for your comments and criticisms--the following sketch of events since 1967, with the hope that present realities can be more fully understood in relation to their historical antecedents.

1 Since the beginning of this century, imperialist robbery of the Middle East's riches had relied, in varying degrees, upon "local agents," whether they be feudal tyrants, slavish admirers of "western democracy," or the leaders of a European settler colony. Today, six years after the brief, but decisive conflict of June, 1967, the enemies and false friends of the exploited masses are more readily identifiable than ever before. The masses themselves, recognizing that they and they alone can carry the struggle for national independence to completion, are beginning to occupy the center of the stage, shoving aside the national bourgeoisie, whose ideology had inspired the struggles of the fifties and sixties.

Sparked by the rape of Palestine in 1948, the great nationalist upsurge of the fifties, despite significant advances, did not break the imperialist stranglehold upon the Middle East. One of the first manifestations, the Mossadegh period in Iran, during which Western oil properties were temporarily nationalized, was brutally crushed by the C.I.A. and the Iranian army. Despite the overthrow of such figureheads as Farouk in Egypt or Feisal in Iraq, imperialism retained its traditional grasp upon Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Libya, the Arab Gulf, and South Yemen. Lebanon, before and after the direct American intervention of 1958, would function as a "mini-Switzerland"--a vital conduit for capital flowing into and out of the Middle East.

From this scenario, one cannot omit Israel, the settler state whose rise had meant dispossession and expulsion of the people of Palestine. Nourished by a steady flow of imperialist dollars, Israel emerged from its own 1948-54 economic crisis and, in 1956, demonstrated its unique talents by joining the Franco-British attempt to crush the Egyptians' struggle to control the Suez Canal.

After the Suez crisis, a precarious status quo appeared to develop in the previous centers of conflict. As the national bourgeoisies of Egypt and Syria turned their thoughts to domestic accumulation of capital, the Palestine Question and imperialism's role elsewhere in the Middle East were de-emphasized. In Lebanon, American marines quickly extinguished a popular uprising, and, in Jordan, King Hussein consolidated his grip. Similarly, in Iraq, a 1962 coup removed the nationalist leader Kassem, who had spoken of nationalizing oil wells and of annexing the artificial sheikdom of Kuwait.

The most intense struggles against imperialist domination momentarily shifted to the Maghreb and the Arabian Peninsula. In Algeria, in 1962, the masses succeeded in ending more than a century of direct French rule, despite the enemy's use of the most barbarous forms of repression and mass murder. In both Yemens and in Dhofar, new national liberation movements arose to confront local feudalists or British occupiers.

Elsewhere, Israel's post-Suez status went virtually unchallenged until 1965, when the Palestinian Resistance began to develop a guerilla force. Receiving only limited moral support from Egypt, Syria, and other newly independent nations, the fidayin appeared to face insuperable obstacles. It is indicative that, before 1967, more Resistance fighters died at the hands of King Hussein's forces than on operations inside Israel's "borders."

Elsewhere in the world, American imperialism had entered a flurry of activism--designed to thwart actual or potential mass struggles. Direct interventions in Indochina and the Dominican Republic were accompanied by dollar backed military coups in Brazil, Indonesia, Ghana, and Greece. The Middle East could not be an exception, even though the incipient Palestinian Resistance was one of the few clearly identifiable threats to the status quo.

Here, imperialist strategy had to assume a different form. A military coup in Egypt or Syria was not feasible, since the armed forces had led the earlier opposition to foreign exploitation. Britain and France could not intervene again and the United States itself, already deeply engaged in Indochina, could not duplicate its 1958 Lebanon operation.

For Israel, whose yearly military outlays had doubled since 1964, a quick, hard-hitting offensive against its neighbors offered a chance to topple the Egyptian and Syrian regimes and to nip the Palestinian Resistance in the bud. Yet, in terms of these political goals, the six-day blitz of 1967 was a failure. While territorial conquests cannot be underestimated as factors in Israel's recovery from a severe economic recession that had started in mid-1965, Davan's "victories" did not dampen the aspirations of the Palestinians or force an immediate right turn in Egypt and Syria.

On the other hand, Gamal Abdel Nasser and others who had led the struggle of the fifties were thrust into a dead end. The war, and the ad-hoc military alliance with such rabid supporters of imperialism as Hussein and Feisal, symbolized the end of an era. The nationalism of the bourgeoisie, however militant its external forms, had shown itself incapable of repelling the made-in U.S.A. onslaught.

King Hussein's mild-mannered acceptance of Israeli occupation of half of "Jordan" was a predictable result of his role as an American puppet, but the inability of Egypt's and Syria's leaders to develop a consistent struggle against Israel's occupation of Sinai and the Golan Heights was a surprise to many. For the Arab masses, the Palestinian Resistance now emerged as the vanguard of the struggle against imperialism's new status quo.

In late 1967, imperialism's fortunes suffered a sharp blow in the Red Sea region, as the British--unable to withstand the strength of the National Liberation Front--decided to withdraw from Aden and the rest of southern Yemen. Concurrently, the liberation forces in Dhofar intensified their struggle and adopted a perspective of creating an anti-imperialist movement throughout the Arab Gulf.

These advances were accompanied by the ascent of the Palestinian Resistance as a mass movement. Successful operations inside the areas occupied by Israel brought arduous shock to the strategists of Tel Aviv and Washington, while the pro-imperialist aristocracies of Jordan and Lebanon realized that the fidayin posed a threat to their own power.

The post-1967 upsurge of the Middle East Revolution, also symbolized by such events as the overthrow of

2 King Idris in Libya and removal of American airbases or the adoption of more militant stances by the Sudanese and Iraqi regimes, was qualitatively different from the advances of the fifties. Now a new spirit had risen--typified by the emergence of openly Marxist, Palestinian formations or by the 1968 Zinjibar Congress of the NLF of South Yemen, where "Arab Socialism" was explicitly rejected in favor of plans to build a revolutionary society. At the same time, one can point to the rise of mass opposition in Turkey, Iran, and Ethiopia, "peripheral" countries that had previously served as uncontented imperialist bases.

For Washington, a new maneuver became necessary. In the spring of 1970, a two-faced scheme was set in motion when U.S. Secretary of State William Rogers visited the Middle East. While grooming King Hussein for a butcher's role at one level, the United States promoted the infamous "Rogers Plan" at the international level.

True to American expectations, Jordan displayed "considerable interest" in the plan, whose concept of "negotiations" excludes Palestinian participation. However, the true power of the "Rogers Plan" as a pacification instrument hinged upon acceptance by the Soviet Union and by at least some of the nationalist regimes that had assumed power during the fifties.

Egypt, facing daily harassment from Israel's guns along the Suez Canal, was the first to buckle. Gamal Abdel Nasser's 1970 acceptance of the "Rogers Plan" and his subsequent efforts to limit Palestinian activities inside Egypt gave the green light to King Hussein and his American masters. Not certain whether Hussein could succeed against the fidayin, the United States and Israel made overt preparations to intervene on his behalf in case of difficulties.

There is no denial that victory for the heavily armed Jordanian forces would have been far more difficult if the Resistance had undertaken a more intense political and military mobilization of the masses prior to September, 1970. However, the relationship between this error and Hussein's "victory" does not imply that the Palestinian Resistance was "incapable" of assimilating the bitter lessons of its struggle in Jordan.

Since "Black September" of 1970 and the full expulsion of Resistance forces from Jordan in 1971, the commandos have shown a degree of tenacity that can only alarm their numerous adversaries. Because nationalist regimes and the Soviet Union have continued to support the imperialist "Rogers Plan," it would be all too easy to attribute the Resistance's courage under fire to a "nothing-to-lose" attitude. Nonetheless, such a perspective should omit the fact that the Resistance is in tune with the needs and aims of the Palestinian masses, that its strength, like that of any liberation movement, must be measured by decades and not by months or years.

Hussein's massacres, despite the heavy toll, did not represent a completion of imperialism's strategic objectives. Along Israel's "borders" and inside the occupied territories, Resistance activities have declined in the past three years, but there has been



Beirut- April '73- funeral for Resistance martyrs

no break in continuity. This point contributes to an explanation of why Israel has persistently found it necessary to make murderous raids into Lebanon and Syria or why the United States now pressures the Lebanese bourgeoisie to seek a duplication of Hussein's massacres.

Since 1970, some commentators have been inclined to speak of a growing "conservative trend" in the Middle East-- exemplified by Anwar Sadat's sharp pro-imperialist turn or by the 1971 Nimeiry counter-coup in the Sudan. This line of thought, however, fares poorly under critical analysis. There are ample signs that the "conservative trend" is a highly transparent overlay, reflecting the motions of the elites, but not of the masses. In Egypt, for example, each of Sadat's overtures to imperialism has served to fuel the discontent of patriotic students and the working class, provoking the sharpest internal struggles since the days of Farouk. The national bourgeoisie has been faithful to its own class interests, seeking to jettison the anti-imperialist stances that assured its rise during the fifties, but it is now faced by a situation that may quickly become untenable.

Today, Lebanon and the Arab Gulf constitute the two principal "hinges" of imperialist strategy. In Lebanon where the Palestinian Resistance has built solid ties with domestic opponents of the Franjeh government and where the army still lacks the cohesiveness of King Hussein's forces, expulsion of the fidayin will be far less easy than it was in Jordan. The most recent battles in Lebanon, despite heavy numerical losses by the Resistance, have ended in a temporary military gain--with the army shown unable to capture any of the refugee camps and, indeed, suffering reversals in such areas as Tyre and Saida. At the same time, significant portions of the Lebanese population--suffering under a rapidly deteriorating economy--fought alongside the fidayin. Coming months in Lebanon will unquestionably mean a difficult period for the Resistance, but there is no indication that imperialism can achieve what it seeks namely a quick "victory" that could stampede other Arab nations into negotiations with Israel under the "Rogers Plan".

Likewise, in the Arab Gulf, Britain's counterfeit "withdrawal" and the creation of the shaky "Union of Arab Emirates" have failed to divert the masses. The Popular Front for the Liberation of the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) has intensified its work throughout the region (as exemplified by its development of a militant worker's movement in Bahrain), and has consistently expanded its liberated areas in Dhofar. At present, imperialism's "front line" forces consist of Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the British, but this bulwark is exceedingly weak. Iranian and Saudi forces are usable only so long as they do not have to engage in simultaneous confrontation with mass opposition at home. To a lesser degree, the same is true for Britain, which cannot fight wars in both the Arab Gulf and northern Ireland. Thus, American imperialism, if it wishes to "protect" the Gulf's enormous oil reserves, may be compelled to intervene directly at some future juncture. Such a step, like a direct American intervention in Lebanon, would signify the failure of today's strategies and could encounter the same ultimate fate as the Indochina adventure.

In the six years since 1967, the lines of conflict in the Middle East have sharpened considerably. Imperialism has continued its day-to-day extraction of super-profits and has greatly augmented its military aid to the collection of hired guns---Israel, Iran, Turkey, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, hoping that this will suffice to suppress the anger of the exploited masses. The once-militant national bourgeoisies of Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, who had guided the limited advances of the fifties, now pursue a wavering course whose prolongation points away from confrontation with feudalism or imperialism and toward sharp clashes with the masses--the undaunted protagonist of a new era that may mark the relentless destruction of all that has come before.



On May 1, a huge workers' procession took place, marching toward the sulfur reduction plant of the BABC. Workers roamed the streets of Manammah in celebration of May Day (international workers' day). In the morning on May 2, sulfur workers gathered in the plants' halls and refused to work, demanding that May 1 be declared a holiday with full pay. In addition, they raised several other demands for improvement of the deteriorating economic conditions facing them, such as:

- 1) Wage increase of 16.5 percent in view of the high cost of living and rising food prices.
- 2) Inclusion of two hours' transportation time within the working day, with salary for these two hours.
- 3) Increased safety precautions for workers and increased compensation for those who have been injured at the work-place.
- 4) An end to dismissals without warning or proper reasons.
- 5) Consideration of holidays and Fridays as work-days with two additional hours.

As a result of the workers' insistence upon continuing the strike, the Ministry of Labor and Social Welfare sent its representative (Abdul Rahman Al-darwish) to meet with employers' representatives (Abdul Hadi Al-afu, Abdullah ibn Nass, and others) and a four-person committee representing the workers. Negotiations between the three parties began.

On the following day, workers returned to work pending the response of the Ministry of Labor to the demands which they had raised. The Ministry's reply came after a long delay on May 8. All demands except those pertaining to safety precautions were flatly rejected, and the Ministry said that these could be discussed. Consequently, the workers renewed the strike. The sulfur reduction plant issued a circular calling for suspension of work until relationships between workers and management could be rectified.

On the morning of May 9, workers waited for vehicles to go to the plant, but they waited in vain. On the following day, they went to the offices of the contractors, where the contracting company gave them their back wages and dismissed them. The contractors mentioned a new provision in the labor laws saying: "Anyone who is to work must obtain a new labor card and must sign an agreement not to strike again."

Let us ask how much these contractors get while they do nothing other than serve as a mid-point between the worker and the company. It is no secret that the con-

tractor gets 50-55 percent of the workers' wages in return for providing transportation in open lorries subject to the burning heat of the sun and for providing the safety items that the workers had demanded during their first strike. In a statement to *al-Adwha* newspaper, one of the contractors (Abdul Hadi Al-afu) said: "We understand the living conditions and are familiar with the rising costs of living and essential foods like sugar, fish, and meat." The contractor Ahmed Mansoor Al-aali told *al-Adwha*: "The interests of work and safety for the workers do not demand that we neglect this sphere." Why then did the workers strike and raise demands for provision of safety equipment if the contracting company were honest?

The Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, Ibrahim Humaidan, told the newspaper: "We do not agree with dismissal of the workers under law. The workers can raise their grievances to the employer and then to the Ministry." Does the Minister really believe that the peak of democracy and justice exists in this matter in Bahrain? Moreover, he claimed that the workers were not right in demanding a wage increase due to the high cost of living. He said: "Their wages are good and reasonable and conform to the nature of the work and the number of workers."

The reaction of the sulfur reduction company to this strike was to grant workers who returned to work on its terms a ten percent raise taking effect on May 12. This maneuver serves to punish those who took part in the strike and had been dismissed from their jobs.

Adapted from *Saut-al-thawra*, weekly bulletin of the People's Front for Liberation of Oman and the Arabian Gulf, June 2, 1973.

WFTU CONDEMNS JORDAN

In March, the World Federation of Trade Unionists (WFTU) issued a protest against repression of union members in Jordan. Since the end of 1971, many trade unionists in Jordan have been arrested, tortured, and, in some cases, executed. Presently, dozens of union members are being held in prison for their activities. Jordan is the first Arab state to be condemned by the WFTU. *Al-Haddaf*, organ of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, reported that there are at least three thousand prisoners in Jordan who have been held without trial for two years or more. During the last two months of 1972 alone, thirteen prisoners were executed, and death sentences were issued for forty-nine.

FILM

5

"DHO FAR"

"Dhofar" is a powerful film about revolution in the Arabian peninsula. It combines the slow-moving beauty of "Ramparts of Clay" (a film portraying daily life in a Tunisian village) with the force of "Battle of Algiers". In a space of 75 minutes, the audience gains a sense of the lives of the Dhofari people in their struggle for liberation against Qabus, the sultan of Oman, who is a puppet of Britain and the United States.

The film conveys the triumphs of the people's liberation army against all the Sultan's mercenary forces and his modern weapons. They triumph, despite their poor weapons, because "it is revolutionary theory that guides the gun". The military advance of the Dhofaris is described by a political cadre, who explains how it is possible to keep Salalah, the capital, under siege for days at a time. The film recounts their taking of a three-hundred mile road (one of the few roads in the region) which had formerly been used by the sultan's troops for staging attacks upon the liberated areas.

During the film, maps underscore the action, allowing the audience to take stock of the achievements that have been made under the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG). In an interview with a member of the Front, past and present conditions are dramatically contrasted. We discover that the liberation army's work is not limited solely to the Herculean task of fighting the imperialists and their mercenaries; rather, the revolutionary forces "fight with one hand and dig with the other." A road has been tediously constructed by hand so that supplies can be transferred throughout the liberated region.

Construction of irrigation facilities is likewise by hand, although the film gives us a glimpse of the only water pump in the entire country. Because even simple equipment is difficult to obtain, manual labor faces a hard challenge from the rocky, bushy terrain pictured throughout the film.

Despite the Sultan's efforts to divide tribes by urging them to compete with and exploit one another, the revolutionary programs of the Front are eliminating family and tribal rivalries through a strong emphasis upon collective efforts to develop a standard of living that was impossible under feudalism. The Front's efforts to liberate women and children are highlighted throughout the film. Bringing women out of feudal subservience into the struggle to create a new,



socialist society is a long and difficult process, but interviews with women members of the Front project how women stand to gain by destroying oppressive traditions that date back many centuries. The persistent work of the Front is contributing to the elimination of such customs as forced marriage, absence of property rights for women, or absence of the right to divorce.

In the liberated areas which now comprise two-thirds of Dhofar, the old oppressive forms of division of labor (planting, herding, etc.) are dying out. As the film shows, a non-specialized division of labor now serves to erase differences that prevented rational use of land and water.

Political education is continually presented as an integral part of the process of organizing the masses. In the film, we are told that the sultan (Qabus) "is a sly agent of the British". Although Qabus now tries to disguise himself as a would-be reformer, in contrast to his deposed autocratic father, Said Ibn Taimur, the masses receive no benefits.

Because the practice of medicine (along with wearing shoes and eating oranges) is still banned in Dhofar, ritual chanting over patients was originally used to effect a "cure", but the Front's medical cadres have patiently shown that scientific approach and not ceremonies prevents illness. The film explains that trachoma and dysentery are common diseases in Dhofar, but peasants and tribesmen have travelled hundreds of miles to reach the few tent-clinics that exist in the liberated areas.

How, in a country where medical practice is illegal, have some persons obtained training? Only through going to friendly countries or through attending the Lenin school.

This is the highlight of the film. The Lenin School (described in *Resistance* #8, Winter 1973) is the country's only school. Here, 400 children, some of whom have traveled as much as 300 miles on foot to attend, clearly show a strong, disciplined desire to learn. Academic instruction initially consists of learning arithmetic, Arabic, and English within eight months. (English is taught for use as a technical language.) In addition, the students learn to grow their own crops, slaughter animals for food, and cook. A collective system ensures that food supplies are adequate for all, even though meat is still a rarity.

Within the Lenin school, three leading instructors teach the oldest, who in turn teach younger students. As the film showed, the atmosphere of the Lenin School bears no traces of the customary "pupil-teacher" contradiction, because the entire educational process centers around collective development of political awareness and usable skills. In the Lenin school, each teaching session is closed in the name of the Revolution.

From the hard effort to create educated cadres who can serve society, the film brings us back to the actual field of battle, with enemy planes streaking overhead. British strafing of inhabitants and livestock in the liberated areas has become a frequent fact of life, but it has brought young and old, female and male closer together in the struggle against the sultan and his imperialist sponsors.

In a political sense, the film conveys the extent of the oppressive role of the sultan and British colonialism. A minor shortcoming may be the film's lack of reference to the American military and economic stake in Dhofar and throughout the Arab Gulf--where more than half of the world's oil reserves are.

The compelling final scene of "Dhofar" shows the people's army taking the offensive. "The people are in the leadership and will fight until victory!"

One leaves the film full of excitement, with a strong sense of solidarity and support for the struggle, for we know that their fight is ours, their successes our successes.

NOTE: The film "DHO FAR" is available from
Third World-Newsreel
26 West 20th Street-3rd Flr.
New York, New York

Copies are available both in Arabic and in English.

S.SUDAN: GUERRILLAS ISRAEL BACKED-- WHERE ARE THEY NOW?

Some nine thousand of the twenty-thousand-strong Anya-Nya, the Israeli- and U.S.-backed Southern rebel movement, have reportedly joined the Sudanese police force and army in the past year. In elaborate ceremonies, they swore allegiance to the Sudanese state and Gen. Nimeiry. Others are now employed in the civil service.

Joseph Lagu, the rebel chief and now a general in the Sudanese army, was quoted as saying, "The great obstacle (to peace) was the Communists, who wanted a solution of their design... They were eliminated in July 1971." Included in his plans for the future of Southern Sudan were "arrangements with foreign corporations."

Le Monde, 28-29 Jan. 1973



CLASS STRUGGLE In Egypt

The intense attack that President Sadat launched this year against the student movement in Egypt and its sympathizers in the ruling Arab Socialist Union has failed to keep the class struggle from spreading to the workers, intellectuals, and broad masses of the urban population. *Le monde* reports (April 10) that the government has been forced to take still more repressive measures against the workers themselves and the growing Marxist tendencies within the state-run trade unions. Workers were rounded up in the vital industrial suburbs of Helwan, Zeitoun, and Matruh outside Cairo. And the Minister of Labor (who is also president of the General Confederation of Trade Unions) has ordered that three of its top leaders be removed--Assistant Secretary-general Ahmed Rifai, Assistant Secretary Abdel Azim al-Maghrabi, and Foreign Relations Director Ibrahim Khalifa-- for what he labelled their "Marxist sympathies," despite an 8-3 vote of the Confederation's executive board against the removals. Several intellectuals have also been arrested after police discovered a secret printing press publishing pamphlets supporting the struggle against Sadat and his acceptance of the American-Israeli "peace plan."

The round-up of workers included the arrests of several local trade-union leaders in the textile industry, which means that the militancy long evident among steel workers at the vital Helwan complex has now spread to still another major industry. Egypt needs the manufactured cotton goods produced outside Cairo both for export to the West for hard currency and for providing a higher standard of living to the urban elites who prefer Western styles.

All this means that still more repressive measures can be expected from the regime, whose alliance with Western interests and with the anti-communist regimes of Libya and the Sudan are now becoming more widely understood in Egypt, despite harsh censorship. *Le monde* reports that the government is revamping its notorious detention camp in the Kharga oasis in upper Egypt, which, it is estimated, could hold another three thousand political prisoners. It was here that thousands of Egypt's Marxists and Communist Party members were imprisoned by Nasser until the mid-sixties.

ISRAEL

kaleidoscope

Kfar Yona is for Arabs only. It is used for "untreatable prisoners". Recently, 200 Arab detainees staged a hunger strike inside the prison. "Short rations" treatment were first applied here as an instrument of compulsion and punishment. Prisoners families charged that many "leaders" were transferred to other jails including Ashkelon high security jail. The Prisons Commissioner Arieh Nir termed the strike "a political one". The Union of Jordanian Students in their clandestine newspaper on the West Bank called for students in the occupied territories to oppose land evictions carried out by Israeli authorities and also to express support for the Arab inmates of Kfar Yona who were conducting a hunger strike.

The Jewish National Fund (Karen Kayemet Leisrael) is buying land in the occupied territories. The pattern has been to pressure Arabs into selling. Sales are completed by authorities fencing off and expropriating additional expanses of land 'for military purposes'. Near Bethlehem, 10 kilometers will be taken. Between Jericho and Jerusalem some 7,000 hectares have also been set aside. Lands belonging to Beir Dajan village near Nablus have likewise been taken. Justice Shapiro told the Knesset that the government is contemplating ways and means for private Israeli citizens to buy land in the occupied territories. In Jerusalem, 250 students rallied in support of Arab Student Committee at Hebrew University protesting against political censorship and administrative harassment by the Dean of Students office. The leaflet called attention to the confiscation and purchases of land in the occupied territories. The word occupied must be changed to conquered according to the Dean or else the Arabs would not be allowed a meeting hall.

A public opinion poll in Israel showed that a majority of 77.9 percent of all Jewish Israelis interviewed were for continued settlement of the occupied territories even if this causes difficulties to a peace settlement with the Arabs." Sharm-El-Sheik and Pituat Rafiah were emphasized. A list of Arab villagers and settlements destroyed since the creation of Israel in 1948 has been compiled by Aaref el Aaref (Palestinian historian). 385 Arab villages were razed by Israel. From 120,000 Beduins living in the Beer Sheba area in 1948, and free to roam over Palestine, only 25,000 remain and they are not allowed to leave an area of 20,000 dunams without Military Governor permits.

Five members of Siach, the "New Israeli Left" were convicted by a military court on charges of holding an illegal demonstration near the Arab village of Akraba, site of massive crop defoliation by the military authorities who are preparing the ground for massive Jewish settlement (44 settlements have been planned for the West Bank).

7 A three-judge panel in Haifa district court sentenced two of the defendants in the alleged "Syrian spy ring" to seventeen years in prison, two others to fifteen years, and a fifth to ten years. Another, who had earlier pleaded guilty to lesser charges, was sentenced to two years in prison and three years of probation. Daoud Turki, sentenced to seventeen years: "For being loyal to my Arab people, for being faithful to the rights of the Jewish people, I am prepared to receive from this court a death verdict, willfully and sincerely...To demand of me loyalty to this oppressive regime is like demanding loyalty of a Jew to the Nazi regime..I have been convicted here of contact with a foreign agent, because of contact with Khaviv Hauji who was connected with the President of Syria and its Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff. I attach great importance to the Syrian regime. I consider the Syrian regime to be progressive and working for the Arab people. I cannot see the Arab kings, Hussein and Feisal, as Arabs to whom I could be loyal--just as I cannot be loyal to the Zionist regime which oppresses me."

Ehud Adiv, sentenced to seventeen years: "It is absurd to accuse me of treason and a distortion to make a spy out of me. I do not have any illusions about succeeding in explaining my world view to this court...composed of judges who believe every word of the Security Services men and who do not believe any word of others."

Dan Vered, sentenced to ten years: "In the near future the State of Israel will celebrate its 25th anniversary. But, I ask: Independence for who and liberation for whom? ...for more than a million Arabs in Israel and the territories it is certainly no holiday and no independence. And regarding the Jews...More than 60% of them, members of the oriental communities are exploited as workers, suffer from oppression, live in primitive conditions lag educationally and culturally. What then is this independence which they must celebrate?... This is the independence of the Israeli bourgeoisie which has taken the place of British rule... instead of British imperialism comes the Zionist bureaucracy, supported by American imperialism which oppresses the Jewish and Arab worker..

Members of Matzpen, Matzpen (Marxist) and the Revolutionary Communist Alliance were arrested before the Haifa District Courthouse when demonstrating with signs: Stop Political Trials-Free Political Prisoners- Bring the torturers to Trial- Long Live Joint Jewish Arab Struggle Against Imperialism, Zionism, and Arab Reaction. The leaflet stated "Those who murdered 250 men, women, and children in Dir Yassin are sitting in the Knesseth, those who murdered in Kibya are considered national heroes, those who murdered in Kfar Kassem were pardoned..."

Al Sh'abb, an Arabic Language Weekly headlined a recent edition after the Israeli attack on Palestinian spokesmen, "Deir Yassin of Beirut". The newspaper has been in serious trouble for its 'nationalistic tone'. The Arabic weekly is distributed in 4,000 copies, throughout the West Bank and its readership is mostly young.

The reaction to the Israeli raid on Beirut was strongly voiced in the village where Kamal Nasser, Palestinian spokesman and poet was born. Davar reported that the response was both 'angry and sad'. Public announcements and regrets were published in Arabic newspapers in Jerusalem and on the West Bank. There was an attempt to demonstrated in the village, but soldiers prevented it. The Mayor of Nablus along with women and workers organizations sent a protest petition to U.N. Secretary General saying that a conspiracy to liquidate the Palestinian people which goes against all human values and justice. Some villagers thought Americans aided Israelis. Others thought Americans carried out the intire attack.

The response of Ha'aretz to the villagers was immediate "Now it becomes clear that the Arabs in the occupied territories think exactly as their brothers behind the borders." One of the Palestinians killed on the raid Abu Yussif was in charge of operations inside occupied territories.

Residents of the city of Gaza and neighboring refugee camps have apparently not cooperated with Israeli authorities in the process of choosing a new mayor. Several months ago, Gaza mayor Rashid al-Shawa resigned in a disagreement with the military government and he was temporarily replaced by an Israeli army officer. Ha'aretz reported on February 21 that plans to nominate a new candidate have failed. The nominating committee resigned after the murder of one candidate and the attempted killing of another. The paper also reports that Israeli authorities are not willing to hold municipal elections in Gaza because they fear the population will boycott them. On February 16, three members of the PFLP were killed by Israeli forces. The Palestine News Agency reported an attack on an Israeli military patrol in one of the refugee camps; in "reprisal," 20 "suspects" were rounded up. George Habash, head of the PFLP, stated in a broadcast over "Voice of Palestine": "...The enemy will never destroy our will to fight or divert us from the road of the just, protracted people's war of liberation, a war which will bring us victory as it did in Vietnam despite the tons of bombs and all the destruction."

At least thirty Druse in Israel have recently been accused of espionage. The most recent case is the son of a Majdal Shams village elder, Aissat Abu Jamal, who was killed while crossing the border into Syria, allegedly in order to give military information to the Syrian army. At least three thousand of the five thousand inhabitants of Majdal Shams participated in the burial, which military authorities termed a political demonstration. The fact that many Druse presently serve within the Israeli armed forces is of particular concern to authorities.

Each book used in West Bank schools must bear the imprimatur of Israel's Minister of Education and Culture. Military officers make surprise raids on schools to determine whether forbidden texts are being used. Among forbidden books: any work in which the name "Palestine" is used, all "Geography of Palestine" texts, all works on modern Algeria and the Algerian war for independence, and all high school texts on Arab countries' geography. Likewise, all texts dealing with society in the kingdom of Jordan are proscribed, as well as many other books pertaining to Arab culture, history, and achievements.



Just prior to Israel's May "independence" day celebrations, widespread arrests were carried out on the West Bank "in order to prevent sabotage actions." Residents reported to foreign journalists that the number arrested must have exceeded two hundred. In Jerusalem, one hundred Israelis held a "mock parade" expressing their protest against the massive military parade. Art students, teachers, and other sympathizers participated. They carried broomsticks, vegetables, and toys. Police in full riot gear arrived with sticks, water cannons, and shields. During the ensuing police attack, many persons were beaten and dragged to paddy wagons. Five arrests, as well as two cases of serious injuries, were reported.

A prestige-operation intended for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the creation of the State of Israel, the "Independence Cruise" was very costly to Jerusalem. Firstly, there is the bill from the British Defense Ministry, which offered air cover and a naval escort for the ship, as well as thirty secret S.A.S. agents drawn from Belfast. Fear of a Palestinian attack discouraged travellers. 1200 to 1600 were expected, but there were only 566. Jerusalem is going to sue the promoter of this trip, Garber Travel Service (Boston, Mass.) who landed the "Queen" in Ashdod on a Saturday.

NEW REFUGEES

excerpts from "Le nouvel exode des palestiniens," by Marie Christine Aulas, Afrique-Asie, April, 1973

Under the camouflage of a so-called temporary occupation of the territories, Israel is recreating the facets of classic colonialism: that is, the search for economic profits and acquisition of new lands. In the process, it adds its own personal element: expulsion of the population...

It should be noticed that all these workers (the 39,000 citizens of the occupied territories who work inside the pre-1967 "borders" of Israel) are uniquely channeled into what are typically called "dirty jobs," the worst jobs, for which Israel previously lacked laborers. The majority of this proletariat (59 percent) is engaged in construction jobs, such as that at Ramat Eshkol in Jerusalem, which are purely temporary. No one knows what will happen to them later. At present, Israel has no shortage of projects, but it is so short of unskilled labor that even Arab children under sixteen years of age are hired, in contradiction with Israel's own work-laws. Despite their meager salaries (25 or 30 Israeli pounds per day that must be considered in relation to the high cost of living), many workers are encouraged to undertake expenses that were once impossible, such as drinking and gambling, which permit them to avoid "subversive" situations.

Aside from the 39,000 workers who migrate each day from Gaza and the West Bank to Israel, and, at night, return to sleep in tents, the rest of the Palestinians in the occupied territories have limited chances of obtaining jobs. Many of those whose businesses had flourished abandoned them during the war or liquidated them later

under various pressures. In Gaza, for example, eighty percent of the shops have been closed forever, since their owners had no hope of being able to re-open. Young men, who had diplomas or were anxious to enter a profession, have practically no possibilities, except to become day-laborers.

As for the base of the region's economy, namely agriculture, there is no basis for optimism: the situation of farmers in Samaria and Gaza is desperate. The occupiers' means of discouragement show great diversity: dispossession of lands without any compensation, as has been the case around Jerusalem in sectors designed for urbanization (this has been the case with Ramat Eshkol) or intimidation of the peasants as in Akkraba where crops were destroyed with chemical products. Aside from these measures, one tends to forget the plight reserved for the small farmer who lives on a few dunams (4 dunams= 1 acre). As in industry, the majority of agricultural production goes to Jordan and then suffers the laws of the market. We discover that the West Bank farmer must buy his fertilizer in Israel now at Israeli prices, but without receiving any of the subsidies given to Israeli agriculture. He can no longer hire workers and his situation does not permit mechanization. He remains alone, with his family, to work his lands until the point at which, swamped with the evidence, he must seek another solution: to become a laborer in Israel or to leave...

Gaza is known, in effect, for having the highest citrus production per acre in the world. Until 1967, Gaza citrus was sold abroad, in Arab countries and in Europe, and the quality allowed all prices. Now production has fallen under Israeli control, which fixes the price for the producer and sets its own prices abroad. Present revenues no longer permit peasants to invest in replacement of outworn citrus trees. Thus, they are driven into the same situation as their counterparts on the West Bank. In Gaza, one finds that, today, fish, which used to be available in any market, is impossible to buy. Then it is learned that the Gaza fishermen, limited to a specific zone, can no longer make the miraculous catches of the old days. Strategic and military reasons? This answer can be ruled out since the Israelis now exploit the "forbidden zones" in order to supply their own fish canneries.



Gaza workers at Israeli checkpoint

greece: students

"Greece is among the most free countries in the world where students benefit from so many advantages," stated Byron Stamatopoulos, Secretary of State in Charge of Information. In reference to the recent student uprising, he said: "It is clear that at no moment did the students care to resolve corporative questions; to the contrary, their actions have been purely political." (Le Monde, March 26)

In March, 1973, student demands for unrigged and democratically supervised elections of university student union representatives were refused. According to students at the Athens Polytechnic Institute, freely elected representatives had found their draft deferments lifted and were sent to the army.

After these actions by the Junta, students submitted demands for draft repeal, as well as removal of government commissioners, police informers, and members of the fascist group "EKOS". It is reported that the majority of Greece's 80,000 university students participated in strikes and protests subsequently, although the military regime claims that only one percent were involved. The six-week protest by students at the universities of Athens and Salonika attests to growing anger and political awareness that have emerged in Greece since the coup d'etat six years ago. Despite official government bans, public demonstrations continued to take place through March and April.

At Athens Polytechnic, student walk-outs had been provoked by drafting of a charter that intended to regulate even more tightly the over-all relationships between faculty and students. Constantine Toundas, the rector of Athens University advised students not to insist on formal elections, but to choose their representatives "informally". As students continued their strike, Toundas warned, "You will be sorry for this; you will find that you will get plain military rule in the University." The regime's intensification of police repression inside the universities and its refusal to allow fair elections resulted ultimately in resignation of the entire Athens University senate (April

In the early phases of the protests, March 14, after students had occupied the law school for the second time, police brutally attacked the 800 occupiers. The International Federation for the Rights of Man reported many injuries, and even deaths were rumored. Written protests were issued by such "non-partisan" sources as the Association of Foreign Journalists against the beating and deportation of two Journalists.

Professor Ionnis Pasmazoglu, recently charged with "recurring conspiracy" was exiled to a remote village for six months. Lawyer George Mançakis, who had defended opponents of the regime in more than forty trials, was charged with setting up a "gang for committing misdemeanors." After mass demonstrations, six other lawyers were arrested.

When former Prime Minister Karamanlis, now in exile, protested the regime's actions, newspapers that had reported his comments were seized by the police.

10 Many striking students were charged with possession of subversive leaflets and assaults against policeman. The New York Times, (April 1), reported that some were charged with upsetting the spirit compatible with the existing constitutional and social system."

The student strikes, like earlier demonstrations this year in protest against Richard Nixon's decision to provide the regime with 70 million dollars worth of arms (including Phantom jets) reflect the growing anger of the people against Papadopoulos' government. During the strikes the slogan "Out with the Americans" was frequently heard. As one student related to a foreign correspondent, "Our main objective from now on will be to maintain this solidarity which is a harbinger of mass opposition to the regime."

junta totters

The student demonstrations which broke out in Greece in February have continued into the spring of 1973 and have reached the broader Greek population. During one occupation of the university, crowds of up to 100,000 demonstrated between Omonia and Constitution Square. Our correspondents in Athens report that the people now talk openly and confidently of being able to overthrow the regime without the intervention of outside powers.

Runaway inflation, the murder of at least two students, and general dissatisfaction with the Junta have produced serious splits within the ruling group and have strengthened the demand of traditional conservative circles that the government be given back to them before the situation erupts in mass violence. The internal contradictions of the Junta are evidenced by frequent shifting of officers and key units to the provinces and by outright replacement of key members of the ruling group with men more loyal to Colonel Papadopoulos. The conservatives have been calling for the return of Costas Karamanlis as head of a caretaker government. Karamanlis went into exile in 1963 after nearly a decade of tight-fisted rule. He was premier during the time when Gregory Lambrakis was assassinated by the Thessaloniki police in the events made famous by the motion picture "Z."


The Karamanlis solution has long been proposed by Greek conservatives and by members of the U.S. State Department. Karamanlis is solidly pro-American and is an able administrator. The Center Union (liberals) would accept him since it would afford them a chance to work legally in the electoral field. The Communist Party (both factions) would accept him if he would legalize the party, a concession he would make by simply stating that all persons and parties persecuted by the Junta would be allowed full political freedom. This legalization by the back door would probably result in a unification of the factions, a move made easier by recent personal shifts in both factions.

The revolutionary Marxist Left can neither support nor oppose the Karamanlis solution. Opposition to him would put them in the position of not wanting the political prisoners released. However, support would put them in the company of the liberals and traditional left, destroying the distinctions they have been trying to draw. Obviously the return of Karamanlis would revert Greece

to the murky situation of the late fifties. He represents little if any long term gain for revolutionary forces. His return with the support of the Center and the Communist Party would tend to portray the revolutionary forces as sectarian forces unable to cope with a "normal" political situation. Several groups have already gone on record as saying they will begin their opposition to him the day he returns to Greece and that they will agitate for an immediate end to the monarchy.

The Junta has tried to defelct the growing internal storm by creating a right-wing clandestine military force in Cyprus under General Grivas. This group calls for immediate unity of Cyprus with Greece, a demand that could touch off a crisis with Turkey, a traditional antagonist of Greece. This might allow the Junta to rally the nation behind patriotic and jingoist slogans. Archbishop Makarios, for his part, represents an honest, if conservative, Greek nationalism. Since the Junta came to power, he has dropped his own previous goal of union with Greece. Makarios enjoys the support of the powerful Cypriot Communist Party and has the majority of the Armenian and Greek Cypriot population, but he does not command the kind of fanatical followers Grivas has, nor does he have the financial and technical advantages of the U.S.-equipped junta. There has been a mini-civil war going on in which Grivas has attacked police stations and Makarios has replied with limited operations against areas friendly to Grivas. So far, the wily Makarios remains in control.

The revival of the Turkish crisis also serves to head off the growing solidarity between anti-Junta forces and Turkish revolutionaries. There have been several messages of solidarity and even some joint contacts in the Middle East. All of these developments need to be seen in the context of a developing Mediterranean crisis. Several coup plots in which the Greek government had a hand have been uncovered by the Italian press. Overt fascist violence with covert police support in Italy has been mounting. This has been met with massive strike action. The solutions are rapidly narrowing to two possibilities: either the Communist Party enters the government in a Chilean-style government, or the U.S. okays a Greek-style government for Italy in a massive power play. In any event, the summer of '73 in the Mediterranean may not be the tourism-as-usual situation of the past few years.



(This article was prepared by a special correspondent of The Front Line, Box 5128, Clinton, New Jersey, 08809

MOROCCO - credits & debits

The 1906 colonialists' conference at Algeciras unilaterally declared Morocco "open door" to "free trade" with European countries--on their terms, of course. Six years later, the French Protectorate was established giving France the right to "advise" the Sultan on internal affairs and to "handle" Morocco's external affairs.

In 1956, more than six years before Algeria, Morocco was "granted independence" by France. But to this day Morocco has remained very much "open" to imperialist penetration and mishandling. The country's economic and political condition reflects King Hassan's feudal mentality combined with a total subservience to imperialism. Over the years, his (and his father's) governments have enacted or confirmed an incredible array of concessions designed to accommodate imperialist investors, largely from France, the U.S., West Germany and Italy.

Squeezed between imperialist appropriation on the one hand and feudal rule on the other, the people of Morocco have found less and less wealth to share. The gross national product per capita itself has been declining (it's about \$200) for the past 15 years, and what new wealth that has been created has passed into the hands of foreigners, the King, or feudal landlords. The country has been buffeted by the capricious character of foreign investments. These have varied wildly in recent years--300% variation, up-and-down from year to year has not been unusual. For example, investments totaled 683 million dirhams (about 5 dirhams to the dollar) in 1967 and just 208 million in 1969, and even less in some years since then. Unplanned, uneven in their application, and often downright undesirable, these investments have done little towards building a viable, productive economy in Morocco. 22% of investments in 1967 were earmarked for tourism, and an incredible 38% in 1969.

Little investment has been directed towards industrial development of any kind. Furthermore, withdrawal from production in Morocco has been almost as frequent as new ventures since 1956--and the withdrawals are facilitated by governmental guarantees to investors of the right to repatriate profits and/or capital in convertible currency. It is not surprising then that mismanagement is the rule of the industrial sector, and that few plants can operate at even 70% capacity. One result is unemployment in urban areas that ranges up to 40% and is widely estimated to average 30%!

To make things bleaker in a country where two-thirds of the population is still rural, "land-reform" since independence has been a cruel joke. Large-scale farms once owned by French colonists have been "redistributed" to feudal landlords. Even land widely adv-

ertised (in newspapers and elsewhere) as having been handed to peasants has fallen into the landlords' hands. And under a 1969 law, all farms in newly-irrigated or "improved" areas are required to meet certain minimum standards of efficiency--for example farms of less than five hectares are no longer permitted. The heavy hand of A.I.D., the World Bank and its McNamaras is evident here.

Not surprisingly, between Hassan's policies and the "improvement and efficiency" measures, Morocco has become unable to meet its food requirements. It has shifted in recent years from exporting wheat to heavy importing, not only of wheat, but of other cereals, dairy products, potatoes and the like. Indeed, according to a Stanford Research Institute contract study for A.I.D., per-capita agricultural productivity in 1964 was just 71% of the 1954-57 level.

Considering the widespread disarray and gross economic oppression and exploitation (tourism is the only "industry" really growing), it is not surprising that the political and social picture is one of chaos, repression -- and resistance. The extraordinary point has been reached where there is not one Moroccan Hassan feels he can trust, or who trusts him. It is rumored that the main purpose of his trip to France last August (1972) had as its major object the arranging of a takeover by the French army of key posts in the King's own armed forces. It was returning from that trip, (which he had carefully planned for months) that his Boeing was attacked. The situation preceding and following that attempted coup was ridiculous. Even though it had been clear that his Prime Minister-in-charge-of-all-government, Gen.Oufkir, had betrayed him in the July 1971 "birthday party" coup (Oufkir had apparently told one of the conspiring generals, "If you succeed, I'm with you; if you fail, I will necessarily crush you"), the King was unable to find anyone but Oufkir to run the government. Oufkir of course tried again the next year, and was shot by two conspirators out to prove their loyalty when that attempt failed. (He did not commit suicide as was widely reported.)


Oufkir's crimes, his life as well as his violent death, are a dialectical reminder of his living opposite, Mehdi Ben Barka, a genuine revolutionary hero of the war of independence and a founder of the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires. After being elected to the National Assembly in 1963, Ben Barka was condemned to death for "plotting to overthrow the monarchy" and was chased from Egypt to North Vietnam to Cuba and elsewhere by Oufkir, the CIA and the Gaullists.

In 1965, addressing the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Conference, Ben Barka warned that "every care must be taken for independence to be immediately expressed by the effective and total transfer of power to the genuine representatives of national Revolution in the country concerned, even if this causes a resumption of armed struggle." (Our emphasis.) By the "genuine representatives of national Revolution", Ben Barka clearly meant anti-capitalist anti-imperialists. For his efforts, Ben Barka was killed gang-land style in France in 1965, with Oufkir, the CIA, the French Deuxieme Bureau, and the Israeli secret service, the Mossad, all implicated.

12 Despite his isolation, in an interview broadcast over French T.V. in February of 1973, the King managed to say, "When I take account of my life, I find the credits to outweigh the debits...In the midst of my people, to use Mao's words, I am like a fish in water." However, he always manages to stay out of the water and opposition to him, despite severe repression, has become extremely widespread. (For a brief moment in July 1971, when it was believed that the coup had succeeded, people rushed to the streets to tear down his posters and statues!) In desperation, Hassan has turned to Iranians and even Zionists--along with the U.S. (which gave \$60 million in aid last year), France, the World Bank and West Germany. (Hassan's, and his father's, collaboration with the Zionists is a notorious one dating from the 'fifties.)

In an extremely effective tactic the opposition parties have joined to boycott the various elections called by the King and have refused to participate in any way in his governments. Despite very deep differences in political beliefs, Istiqlal (a rightist, nationalist party that held power immediately after independence) and the left Union National des Forces Populaires (UNFP) have agreed --and even united briefly--in their goal of getting rid of the incredible burden represented by their king; and a number of smaller, often petty-bourgeois parties have also set this as a primary goal.

Students at high schools and universities have been on strike on-and-off for most of the past three years. Since part of Hassan's (and imperialism's) strategy is to run the country using a technocratic elite, the student strikes have been especially frustrating. After a riot in a slum of Rabat earlier this year in which two policemen were injured (one dying later), the government decided to close the universities and banned the national union of students in Morocco. It also promised to fire any teachers and expel any students participating in strikes, and to withdraw scholarships of students not "steeped in their studies."



There is a history of rural and slum uprisings in Morocco. The government response, similar to the French's, has usually been extreme violence. In one instance, during a disturbance by a famished crowd in Casablanca in 1967, Oufkir himself boasted of killing dozens with a machine gun --from his helicopter. All in all, some 300 were killed in that incident.

It is not surprising, therefore, that there are now widespread rumors--and facts--of growing organized guerilla warfare in Morocco. Two incidents, occurring far apart but simultaneously the night of March 2, 1973, have caused near-panic in the government. One took place against a police post in Moulay-Bouazza in the Middle-Atlas; the other at Goulmina, on the edge of the Sahara. Bombs have been placed under the car of the American consul-general, in the U.S. cultural center in Casablanca, in a Western-oriented thea-

ter in Rabat. In Oujda, on March 21, four bombs exploded inside government buildings, causing considerable damage. Similarly, two bombs rocked the northern town of Nador, near the Algerian border. And large amounts of weapons and ammunition were discovered in Figuig, some three-hundred miles south-east of Nador.

At Goulmina, the guerilla movement lost one of its first heroic figures, Mohammed Bennouna, a 35-year old electronic engineer who had been broadcasting rigorous, anti-Hassan, anti-imperialist speeches from a Kadhafi-supported radio station in Tripoli. Bennouna, who had trained and fought with the Palestinian resistance, was but one of three guerillas killed in that action. To mark its new stance, the movement issued a statement which read in part, "...it has become evident that the feudal power personified by Hassan II is a fundamental obstacle to all democratic evolution within our country and constitutes a docile instrument of colonialism and neo-colonialism....It is equally evident to us that within the framework of this repression, a minority of feudal landlords are getting rich at the expense of the laboring masses while these latter remain impoverished and miserable....Faced with the impossibility of using democratic methods within this country...we have decided to begin an armed popular revolution to destroy this feudal power..."

The government has been prompt to respond with its usual finesse: kidnappings, torture, letter-bombs, banning of parties (the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires was "banned" on April 2). Clearly, Hassan's, and his government's, days are numbered unless he gets immediate help, especially in personnel--since he trusts no one--from his U.S., French, West German, British, Iranian and/or Zionist friends. The present feudal-imperialist rule is extremely vulnerable to any disciplined movement that takes force. The major question at this moment is whether it will be dominated by Kadhafi-supported fundamentalists not opposed in principle to private property (or investment), or by a Marxist-Leninist party. The two may actually be joining hands, taking a nationalist approach inimical to at least portions of present foreign investment as well as the feudal property. Rather clearly, the circumstances in Morocco require that they assume such a stance.

FOREIGN AID AND FOREIGN INVESTMENTS--MOROCCO 1971

Where Foreign Aid Comes From
U.S. 33.7% France 18.1% W.Germany 16.6% World Bank-
IDA 14.7% U.S.S.R. 4.7% Kuwait 1.6% Iran 1.6%

Where Foreign Investments Come From
U.S. 19.4% France 22.8% W.Germany 13.3% Italy 13.2%

Source: Banque Marocaine du Commerce Extérieur, Bulletin Mensuel d'Informations, Sept.1972

13

A PALESTINIAN ON NATIONALISMS....

This letter appeared in the March, 1973 issue of Israel and Palestine, within the framework of an ongoing debate. It answers an earlier article by I & P editor, Maxim Ghilan, who had argued that both Palestinians and Israelis can have a "national existence as an independent entity" in the Middle East.

Dear Maxim,

I write in response to your "Letter to an Activist" with much diffidence, for it is clear that the political distance which separates us is great. However, because of the basic nature of some of the points at issue, and because of the possibility that they will be appreciated by some of your readers, I am nevertheless answering you.

Two basic misconceptions seem to me to mar the reasoning of your letter. The first relates to the nature of nationalism, for you say that according to the thinking of a "mentally well Israeli", there is no contradiction between the mutual co-existence of the Israeli and Palestinian nations, and that the territorial contradiction is only "apparent". Nationalism, according to most definitions, is based in large part upon the existence of a specifically defined 'national' territory, and upon some sort of exclusivist principle in relation to this territory. Within my conception of the future, as well presumably as yours, the Palestinian and Israeli peoples will ultimately be able to live within the same land once socialism has been established and the chauvinist elements of their nationalisms--Zionist and Arab--have been overcome. As long, however, as the national territory of each is in dispute--an it will continue to be, as long as chauvinism rather than revolutionary nationalism animates both peoples (for 'nationalist' Palestinians will no more be willing to 'give up' say Jaffa than will 'nationalist' Israelis to 'give up' say Hebron)--no solution such as you suggest is feasible even in theory.

In practice such a solution--"the creation of a truly independent Palestinian state"--is also utterly impracticable. How is a "truly independent" state to be created in a situation where it will necessarily have to be a puppet either of Israel or of that quintessential puppet-state, Jordan? The maximum Israel is prepared to concede--and this is as yet only accepted by a wing of the ruling Labor bureaucracy--is some sort of latter-day Bantustan, which will relieve the Israeli regime of the difficulties of day-to-day control over the West Bank and Gaza, while at the same time retaining the services of the population for exploitation by the expanding Israeli economy. Absorption of the same areas by the semi-fascist Jordanian regime would result in an identical situation economically--for the Israeli economy has grown dependent upon its small army of cheap Arab laborers--with an equally illusory political autonomy for the Palestinian people. Against the opposition of Zionism, Arab reaction, and their joint imperialist backer, the creation of a "truly independent" Palestine is clearly impossible, and will continue to be so until these forces have been decisively defeated. In the int-

erim, such a scheme can only serve the interests of one¹⁴ or all of these three antagonists of the Arab and Palestinian people.

There remains the question of whether such a solution is desirable, and this brings to what I see as your second major misconception. Throughout your "Letter" you seem to equate the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, and to balance rights and duties as if these can be discussed for both in approximately the same fashion. I do not deny that the Israelis have become a people, nor that they have the right to exist as such within Palestine as long as the exercise of this 'national right' does not infringe upon the rights of the Arab people of Palestine: which means in effect once Zionism and Arab chauvinism have been overcome and a socialist society established. While accepting this right, however, I deny vehemently the idea that it constitutes a justification for treating the oppressor on the same terms as the oppressed, or the world power (albeit second class) on the same terms as the wretched of the earth. That the Israeli people have the right of self-determination, as outlined above, does not mean that the Zionist regime which represents them at present has carte blanche for her present and past misdeeds.

The Israelis came to Palestine as part of a colonizing enterprise the aim of which was the creation of a Jewish state through the dispossession and expulsion of the Arab peasantry of the country. The state created as a result of the success of this endeavour retains all the original attributes of the Zionist movement, its aggressive expansionism, its exclusivist racist nature, and its integral ties with imperialism, with which it shares the objective of keeping the Arab people weak, divided both politically and geographically, and under the rule of reactionary and corrupt regimes. What is required of the people who live in this state, who consider themselves in other words Israelis, is fundamentally different from what can be asked of the oppressed, scattered and desperately poor Palestinians. It is necessary first of all that members of the oppressor nationality realize that Israeli military expansion is not a "cancerous symptom" which can be alleviated by "surgical intervention", that it did not begin in 1967, but rather 20 years earlier and even before, and that it is inherent in the nature and ideology of the state. It is necessary, moreover, that they realize that the State of Israel as presently constituted is in fundamental contradiction with the right of the Palestinian people to live not as chattels but as a co-sovereign people in their native land. And it is necessary finally that they realize that what we ask of them--their opposition and struggle against a regime which oppresses us and works ultimately against their self-interest--cannot be discussed in the same breath as what can be expected of us in terms of criticism of our movement for national liberation and the overthrow of the Arab exploiting classes.

It is true that all Palestinian revolutionaries have the responsibility to make such criticism--but not primarily for the consumption of a hostile outside world or for our enemies to use to help futher the dissension within the ranks of the revolution which is one of their strongest allies. Their criticisms should above all be constructive, and directed either towards fellow revolutionaries or towards the people. To ask a Pales-

tinian revolutionary to criticize the Resistance (as did Mohamed Ismaili in several articles which I considered very ill-advised) in a paper whose political coloring is undefined, and seems to run along the spectrum from 'left' Zionism to a position to the right of Matzpen, is to ask him to supply a group, some of whom at least must be numbered among the enemies of the Palestinian and Arab peoples, with ammunition to be used against them. It is entirely different for me to ask you, Maxim, to criticize Zionism and the Israeli state, two entities which must be done away with before either the Palestinian or Israeli peoples can be liberated. The Palestinian and Arab revolutionary movements do not have as a sine qua non the national non-existence of the Israeli people. On the contrary, within the context of a socialist Middle East in which both Zionism and Arab chauvinism will have been done away with, and the national aspirations of the Palestinian people achieved, they fully recognize the national right of self-determination of the Israeli people. The forces of reaction within the Arab world--whose strongest support of course is the American-Israeli axis--do not recognize these rights, for they are totally chauvinist, and thereby truly analogous to Zionism. These forces, within and especially without the Resistance, are at present our foremost enemies--and are the real enemies of the Israeli people as well, allied though they are at present with Zionism.

These forces, and the reactionary and savage regimes they control do not in any way, moreover, represent the Resistance, or for that matter the Palestinian and the Arab peoples. To assume that they do, and that the Arabs are all religiously-motivated national fanatics as you seem to do in your "Letter", is to make a grave and dangerous mistake.


The Arab people and foremost among them the Palestinians are struggling to be free, free from imperialism, the animator of their direct antagonists and ultimate beneficiary of their miseries, from Zionism which leaves them homeless and maims them physically and psychologically, and from the parasitical and incompetent ruling classes which exploit them in the name of religion, nationalism, and even 'socialism'. Until and unless one understands their struggle in this light, unless one supports it as a just struggle, one cannot enter into a discussion of means, for there does not exist in fact a common aim.

by SUBHI AL-GHAZI



LEBANON battles rage

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Thousands of peasants from the south fled to Beirut and other urban centers, for the army gave no protection against Israeli operations and the government offered no compensation for ruined crops and homes. During the autumn of 1972, as Israel staged unprecedented attacks after the Munich events, the army enforced the harshest possible restrictions upon fidayin and the peasantry, simultaneously letting Israeli forces occupy villages for days at a time.

In Lebanon's major cities, as well as the rural north, mass discontent steadily increases as the national economy continues to deteriorate. In November, 1972, when soldiers killed several striking workers at the Gandour chocolate factory in Tripoli, Lebanon experienced its first general strike in years, followed by separate strikes at many work-places.

Meanwhile, Palestinian organizations, understanding how isolation from the Jordanian masses had facilitated King Hussein's actions, have developed strong links with anti-imperialist forces in Lebanon. One result has been creation of the Arab Front for Solidarity with the Palestinian Revolution, which includes all of Lebanon's left parties, as well as communist parties, guerrilla movements, and nationalist parties from other areas of the Middle East. With Kamal Jumblatt, leader of Lebanon's Progressive Socialist Party, as its general secretary, the Front constituted a new counterweight to government efforts against the Resistance.

In late February, the planned visits of Golda Meir, King Hussein, and Egyptian envoy Hafez Ismail to the U.S. inspired a new wave of "peace rumors," but Israel quickly tried to maximize its bargaining position. On February 24, a sea attack was staged against Nahr-el-Baired, a large refugee camp in northern Lebanon---on the very same day that Israeli jets over Sinai downed a Libyan civilian plane with 100 passengers aboard.

At Nahr-el-Baired, Israeli shock forces refrained from attacking civilians, but made calculated efforts to destroy storehouses and weapons concentrations, as well as track down fidayin leaders. A map left behind by the attackers precisely indicated all targets, including the tents of individual fidayin who were being trained for secret missions. Moreover, the Beirut Daily Star on February 27 reported that Lebanese army officers in the area had ignored repeated requests for help from the in-

I. The New Plan

Because "peace in the Middle East," on Israel's terms, on King Hussein's terms, or on Anwar el Sadat's terms will not permit Palestinian refugees to return to their homes and will not erase the results of decades of oppression, a new priority has been placed upon halting the rise of the next generation of Resistance fighters. Israel's "retaliatory" onslaughts upon fidayin bases and refugee camps have been temporarily de-emphasized, for such operations can only deepen the anger of the Arab masses and awaken international opinion against the designs of Israeli and American leaders.

The present plan seeks to isolate Palestinians within their respective "host countries" such as Lebanon and to liquidate leaders who may guide the regeneration of the Resistance. King Hussein's 1970-71 offensive against the commandos in Jordan taught Israeli and American strategists that "Vietnamization," or "Arabs fighting Arabs" is far more effective than direct attacks. At the same time, a wave of assassinations of Palestinian spokesmen, such as Ghassan Kanafani (Beirut), Wael Zuaiter (Rome), and Mahmoud Hamshari (Paris) has been aimed at disruption of the Resistance's internal continuity. Here, Mossad, Israel's counterpart to the C.I.A., has played a prominent role (See article on Israel's intelligence network in Resistance #8, Winter, 1973).

Though Lebanon's governments have traditionally been pro-imperialist, comparisons with Jordan are highly misleading. Unlike the Hashemite monarchy and its retainers, the Lebanese bourgeoisie has operated within a pseudo-democratic framework reflecting its extensive financial and commercial interests. In the past, Lebanese bankers and businessmen have maintained a "pluralist" exterior that has allowed them to deal with "anti-imperialist" nationalists and subservient feudalists alike.

To conserve this atmosphere, Lebanon's government saw fit to accept the Cairo Agreements of 1969, after right-wingers within the army, such as General Iskander Ghannem, had unsuccessfully attempted to quash the fidayin. Since 1969, however, Lebanon's bourgeoisie has slowly overcome its internal divisions. Gradually, the government has beefed up the armed forces, using U.S. dollars to buy the latest equipment from France and Great Britain. Israel, in the meantime, has stimulated the process by repeated demonstrations of its readiness to attack Arab nations that do not "discipline" the fidayin as King Hussein did in Jordan.

In southern Lebanon, army efforts to turn the peasantry against the fidayin met with failure. Last July, when Israel's bloody "retaliations" killed many civilians and destroyed a number of villages, the army changed its tactics. Before Israeli attacks, army units would retreat from the region, returning afterwards to prevent the Resistance from re-establishing its bases.

habitants of Nahr-el-Baired, allowing the attackers complete freedom to perform their mission.

At a rally in Beirut, Nayef Hawatmeh, spokesman of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP), declared that the government had warned commandos to leave Lebanon "because a peaceful settlement is coming in the Middle East." Suleiman Franjeh, Lebanon's president hotly denied this charge, claiming that the fidayin would always receive the "hospitality and good treatment" of Lebanon. However, the army did not remove previous restrictions against fidayin presence in the south, and the government made only the most feeble of protests against the Israeli raid.

The United States said nothing against Israel's February terror outburst. Its silence, punctuated by Black September's execution of two American diplomats in the Sudan, preceded what appeared to be an even heavier "tilt" toward Israel, symbolized by Nixon's March 11 promise to increase Israel's 1973 allotment of Phantom jets and other sophisticated American weaponry.

This step clearly cannot be attributed to the deeds of Black September. On the contrary, the American stance, dictated by an awareness that the Palestinian Resistance is a serious obstacle to implementation of the infamous "Rogers Plan," was a green light to the generals of both Israel and Lebanon. The stage was now set for a broader onslaught against the fidayin.

II. Beirut Murders

For both the United States and Israel, the possibilities were manifest---a series of swift and dramatic blows against the Resistance could possibly sow demoralization and force temporary inactivity while new diplomatic initiatives could be pursued. On April 7, in Teheran, Joseph Sisco, the under-secretary of State, chaired a meeting of all American ambassadors to Middle Eastern nations. Here, it is probable that Israel's plans for a Beirut raid, as well as possible actions by the Lebanese army, were discussed. Since the Munich events, efforts have been made to obtain the fullest possible coordination against the fidayin. Armin H. Meyer, a former ambassador to Lebanon, heads a special committee created by Nixon in September, 1972 in order to "prevent terrorist activity worldwide." Meyer's advisory committee is complemented by the activities of the C.I.A.'s clandestine operations section, now led by William Colby, a former director of C.I.A. operations in Vietnam who has become implicated in the Watergate scandal. Under Colby, special efforts were made to augment the number of agents in Lebanon and to infiltrate Resistance organizations.

The specifics of Israel's April 10 operation leave little doubt of American cooperation. It has been widely acknowledged that, during the attack, "foreign tourists" guided the attackers, who landed on a beach close to the American embassy. The 30-man Israeli shock force, traveling in Avis rent-a-cars procured by their guides, systematically proceeded to the homes of victims. At the apartment of Mohammed Yussuf Najjar, the director of Fateh's operations inside Israel and the occupied territories, they murdered fourteen persons. Nearby, they assassinated Kamal Adwan and Kamal Nasser, two key spokesmen

16 of the Palestine Liberation Organization, and destroyed the offices of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). When the attackers withdrew, they proceeded in the direction of the American Embassy toward a rendez-vous with Israeli naval craft. They accidentally left behind firearms manufactured by the American firm O.F. Mossberg and Sons (North Haven, Connecticut).

In the aftermath of the raid, fidayin spokesmen charged that the U.S. embassy in Beirut had provided information on the whereabouts of the murdered Palestinian leaders. In reply, Secretary of State William Rogers personally telephoned Arab ambassadors in Washington to denounce "false accusations," while John Scali, the U.S. envoy to the United Nations, accused the Palestinian Resistance of using the "big lie technique."

In Israel, officials jubilantly claimed that the attack was designed to prevent "terrorists" from disrupting celebrations of Israel's twenty-fifth anniversary. Abba Eban, in an April 13 interview with Yediot Aharonot, declared that he was "quite excited and could not believe his ears when the plan of the raid was brought to the government for approval."

The raid's immediate results, within Lebanon, proved to be the exact opposite of American-Israeli expectations. Premier Saeb Salam, a Moslem, resigned, protesting the failure of army leaders to explain why they had not ordered their troops to intervene against the attackers. For the funerals of the slain Resistance leaders, 250,000 persons assembled---the largest demonstration in Lebanon's history! Many of the mourners chanted "The enemy didn't come from the sea---they came from the U.S. Embassy!"

This irrefutable evidence of the Palestinian Resistance's mass base and of growing political awareness made reliance upon the Lebanese army all the more necessary for the United States and Israel. The Lebanese army would now be set in motion to accomplish that which a chain of raids and assassinations had failed to do.

III. The Lebanese Army---Fighting for Imperialism

In the tense days following the April 10 raid, the Lebanese army quickly stationed troops to protect American targets from the reprisals that Resistance leaders had called for. On April 13, four members of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DPFLP) were arrested near the American embassy and were accused of carrying explosives inside transistor radios. This incident coincided with a series of arrests of other Palestinians and Lebanese leftists undertaken by the army and the police.

On April 14, a large oil storage tank at the Aramco refineries in Zahrani was destroyed. Credit for the deed was claimed by a previously unheard of group, the Lebanese Revolutionary Guard, but the Palestine Liberation Organization immediately denied knowledge of the attack and suggested that Israeli agents may have been responsible. This hypothesis was confirmed by testimony from the four Lebanese guards at the refinery, who had been bound and gagged by the attackers. At the same time, Resistance units stationed in the area had warned the Lebanese army of an Israeli naval presence several hours prior to the attack. On April 18 Falastin al-Thawra no-

ted that, within hours of the refinery explosion, an American official had called for armed intervention in the Middle East. Speaking at an energy symposium in Philadelphia on April 15, Elmer Bennett, of the U.S. Office of Emergency Preparedness, had stated that Americans would have to choose between cutting their oil consumption and sending troops to the Middle East. Bennet stated that "the Middle East would make Vietnam seem like a picnic."

During the remainder of April, there was a series of incidents that sowed confusion in Lebanon. It was widely believed among Palestinians that agents provocateurs were being used to create a situation that would provide the Lebanese government with a pretext for an attack. On April 29, the government charged that fidayin had kidnapped three policemen as a reprisal for the arrest of DPFLP members near the American Embassy on April 13.

With the "kidnapped policemen pretext," the Lebanese armed forces unleashed their offensive during the first week of May. Their commander-in-chief was none other than General Iskander Ghanem, who had headed the unsuccessful 1969 effort to dislodge the Resistance. According to Palestinian sources, Ghanem had been reinstated through direct pressure from the American embassy upon the Franjeh regime.

At first, infantry units attempted to surround and seize the Palestinian refugee camps that ring Beirut and other urban centers. In the Beirut area, the army's attacks caused considerable damage to the camps and neighborhoods surrounding them. However, the Resistance succeeded in carrying out a full mobilization of the refugee population, returning the army's fire with mortars and rockets. Ultimately, Ghanem ordered the use of tanks and jet bombers against the camps.

Military movements within the capital were seriously hindered by mobilizations of the Lebanese left. Militia units from the Progressive Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Communist Action Organization, and the Ba'ath manned barricades in several key neighborhoods and interdicted troop movements.

Elsewhere in Lebanon, the government plan met with several significant defeats. In Tyre, the headquarters for tank units was seized by fidayin, and, in Tripoli, half the town was under the military control of the fidayin and the militia of the Lebanese left. In the south, near the Syrian border, fidayin encircled the citadel of Rashaya, which serves as the headquarters for the entire region.

At the same time, discipline began to break down within some sectors of the Lebanese army. At the camp of Dbaya, when it was discovered that Christian officers had massacred captured fidayin, many Moslem enlisted men deserted.

Under these conditions, the government could only stage a tactical retreat. After two attempts at negotiations, a shaky ceasefire was established on May 15. In the continuing negotiations since the ceasefire, Franjeh and the Lebanese armed forces have insisted upon withdrawal of fidayin from two large camps near Beirut and upon removal of heavy artillery and rockets from all refugee camps. To date, no conclusive agreements have been established.

Despite their successful handling of the imperialist-inspired offensive, the fidayin remain in a precarious situation due to the minimal support shown by Arab regimes. Whereas Egypt only pleaded for an end to the fighting,

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Lebanese army tanks- Beirut, May, 73

ing, Col. Muammar Qaddafi of Libya merely gave verbal support to the Resistance.

Only the Ba'ath regime of Syria can be seen to have taken decisive measures in behalf of the Resistance. Its lifting of a previous ban against fidayin movements into southern Lebanon allowed large numbers of commandos to penetrate the area and initiate the siege of Rashaya. At the same time, Syria closed its borders to Lebanese commerce, thereby stimulating small merchants' opposition to the government's actions.

During the uneasy ceasefire, which has lasted for more than a month, there are strong indications that the Lebanese army is trying to regroup. Large quantities of light arms from NATO stockpiles continue to arrive, mainly from West Germany. Several units have been reorganized at the officer level, and it is now common policy to use only Christian soldiers to participate in the joint Lebanese-Palestinian ceasefire patrols.

The Franjeh government persists in its claims that it cannot tolerate a "state within a state," demanding that Palestinian political control of the refugee camps be ended. In the half month of bitter fighting, the 12000-man army learned for the first time that whoever controls the camps also controls the hills overlooking Beirut.

The imperialist-encouraged attempt to create "another Amman" met with failure this time, but the present situation clearly indicates that future attempts cannot be ruled out. For the Palestinian Resistance, its hard-won military victories against Lebanon's army can only become meaningful if followed up by a continued effort to mobilize the masses against ever-present dangers.

The Franjeh government, now fully exposed as an imperialist puppet, will undoubtedly escalate its machinations, for neither Israel nor the United States have altered their desire to destroy the Palestinian Resistance and dictate a "peace" to the Arab World. At this point, however, the credibility of the Franjeh government, and even more, the morale of its army have been seriously shaken.

For the time being, the Resistance's difficult efforts to regroup after the 1970-71 expulsion from Jordan have paid off, giving the lie to many foreign commentators who had prematurely concluded that the Resistance had been eliminated as a vanguard of the Arab masses.

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THE MYSTIQUE OF KATHAFFI

(Excerpts from a highly important analysis of the policies of the Libyan regime, printed in Al-Hurriya, 4/23/73)

The wavering of Kathaffi's position is not a recent phenomenon...and it stems basically from the stratum represented by the "new Libyan military" who overthrew the old monarchy. The ideas of Kathaffi are a mixture of Nasserism, dogmatic religious thought, and the ideas of the "military elite" of an underdeveloped country who disrespect the masses as much as they claim to have faith in them. The particularities of the Libyan situation distinctly add to this "mixture of ideas"---as a result of the cultural/educational ("thaccafi") underdevelopment and backwardness to which come the oil revenues giving rise to commotion and chaos on the social and ideological levels. This affects the "middle class," whose interests are interwoven with expansion of state institutions and projects through high oil income, and also its nationalism, the latter wavering in relation to this unnatural social situation.

Therefore this stratum goes to extremes in its nationalism to compensate for its unnatural "wealth" and, simultaneously, there is an intensification of its religious attachments and ideological conservatism because of its fear that its fortune may drag it into the "abyss of Western culture" and what it sees as moral disintegration. Thus, it intensifies its verbal animosity toward foreign culture and tries--especially in its early stages--to exhibit strict "moral rectitude" as through prohibition of use of alcohol and foreign names. Its animosity intensifies absolutely in relation to which its fate and material wealth (and oil) are still in the hands of foreign monopolies. This stratum knows that its material interests are continuous with the interests of monopolies that exploit the oil resources and leave it a margin of "high income."

Hence it continually maintains this relationship in order to ensure that this income is not interrupted, but it compensates with increased cultural and ideological extremism in order to rationalize to itself what provides its own material sustenance! Its cultural and ideological extremism is pivoted in particular against progressive and Marxist thought, which it elevates to the level of an enemy, assigning itself the task of fighting and combatting such thought in the name of religion. Such thought creates a danger for this stratum by spotlighting its social and class position. by spotlighting the reality that Colonel Kathaffi calls the "economic factor," which he regards as coming "fourth, fifth, or sixth" according to claims he made in a forum in Cairo some months ago!

This "economic factor" is what the ruling class actually lives on in its relation to the oil companies; therefore, it denies this factor and is apprehensive of all thought that clarifies the relationship. Marxism--of which Kathaffi knows nothing other than that it is predicated on the "economic factor"--is the danger...the "middle class" increases its animosity toward Marxism and fights it as a prime enemy, for this stratum fears a realistic description of its own economic and social position or of Libya's true economic relation to the oil companies...The "economic position" is denied, and the religious and spiritual factor is treated as basic. The focus upon the latter is intensified as this stratum deepens its focus upon fighting all "materialist" progressive thought!

Thus, we have the "cultural revolution" that Kathaffi has called for lately...burning books, destroying imported thinking and writing--whether eastern or western--fighting capitalist, communist, and Jewish thought...

And the "middle class" does not distinguish among these, for they are all "dangers and evils"...its own confused mixing, this mixing of capitalist, communist, and Jewish thought--a mixture that Arab reaction centers upon--saves the middle class from the accusation that it solely fights progressive thought. The accusation is "negated" by putting all the ideas into the same bag...all "imported" thought is fought in the name of tradition and religion!

After it had fulfilled its national mission domestically--which was limited to expulsion of foreign military presence, with economic imperialism maintaining its hold--it began to expand its nationalism to the outside... It is "incapable" of fulfilling its national mission domestically by nationalizing the oil and liberating the Libyan economy from neo-colonial domination by U.S. and international monopolies. It compensates for this on the Arab world arena by emphasizing the slogan of Arab unity, together with the Palestine Question.

If we were to consider Kathaffi's stands toward the Palestinian Resistance, we would find this wavering in its clearest form...for he supports the Resistance, but fights all its leftist organizations. He backs it financially and limits it, setting all types of conditions, threatening it with stoppage of financial aid. He understands its national unity as he does "Arab unity"---in reactionary and idealist terms so that it becomes a weapon in the hands of the surrendered domestic "nationalism."

19 Finally, as a result of his national feeling, he declares that the Palestinian Resistance is "finished" and "that it has only become broadcasting stations." Thus, he encourages the people to stop donating, for it "no longer exists." After opening the door to recruitment, he now says that he has called back all recruits and will not send more because the Arab states prohibit their arrival in order to perform actions against Israel... And since these states prohibit the Resistance from carrying out its operations, Kathaffi now says the Resistance is "finished."

Where do these positions ultimately flow?

In precisely the same direction as his enmity toward progressive thinking,--ultimately in opposing the Revolution in the Arab Gulf and in supporting Sultan Qabus in his holy war against "heretics," in finding his own position to be that of Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Britain against the Revolution. Thus, in his new stand against the Resistance, he finds his position to be that of those who call for its liquidation... at the same time that Israel attacks the Palestinian Resistance in Lebanon, at the same time that the U.S. demands closing of Palestinian broadcasting stations, and at the same time as the already surrendered forces tell the Resistance to dissolve and to cease its activity, its broadcasts and its propaganda, at precisely this time Kathaffi's nationalist voice is raised to say that the Resistance is finished.

"NATIONALIZATION" ?

On June 11, 1973, Libya announced that it had nationalized Nelson Bunker Hunt's 50% interest in the attractive Sarir field. The other half of the field, once owned by British Petroleum, was nationalized in December 1971.


The nationalization was announced by Kathaffi in a speech to a rally in Tripoli marking the third anniversary of U.S. leave from Wheelus Air Force Base. Kathaffi said Hunt's holdings were nationalized to avenge Arabs for American backing of Israel. But he made no mention of the U.S. oil monopolies that control the great majority of Libyan oil.

Apparently Libya's break with Hunt came when he refused to market the oil which had been expropriated from B.P. Hunt announced from Dallas that he had no choice but "to pursue all available legal remedies." The next day, B.P. made known that it would step up its efforts to block any sales of oil from the Sarir field to any non-Communist country. Although B.P. had announced with great fanfare back in 1971 that it would block sales of the oil from the field, it actually did little because it was apparently wary of jeopardizing Hunt's position. "We will claim either the oil itself or the value of

the oil," a B.P. official said. B.P. is trying to get some \$625 million in "compensation" for the nationalization of the Sarir field.

In the meantime, negotiations are on-going between the oil companies and Libya in Tripoli. Libya has said that it is seeking "100% control" of the companies, but under the Libyan take-over terms, the companies would be retained as service contractors. And Libya would pay compensation to the companies on the basis of net-book asset value, and would then sell the oil to the former concessionaires at market prices. The net effect of this "nationalization" is not clear.

Wall Street Journal, 6/12



MME. BINH EXPOSES ISRAEL-THIEU TIES

According to Al anwar (March 29, 1973), Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh, head of the Paris delegation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, sharply condemned Israel's support for the Thieu regime at a press conference in Damascus. She pointed out that Israel and the Thieu regime had established formal diplomatic ties in December, 1972 and said: "There are reports that cooperation between the two of them has reached a point where the U.S. has decided to send Israeli military advisers to Saigon." Mme. Binh added: "When the people of South Vietnam establish their state along the lines of the Paris agreement and free elections, that state will no longer be prepared to have diplomatic relations with reactionary regimes such as that of Israel."

THE NIXON DOCTRINE



(EDITORS' NOTE: The following is a condensed and adapted version of a vital article that appeared in The Gulf Solidarity, February-March, 1973--which is published by the Support Committee for the Liberation Movement in the Gulf, c/o P.O. Box 16348, San Francisco, California, 94116. For copies of the original article, which we strongly recommend, inquiries can be made to the Support Committee at the above address. The February-March issue of The Gulf Solidarity costs fifty cents.

Portions of the article have been updated with inclusion of recent news items, particularly on new U.S. arms shipments to the Gulf region. Part II of "The Nixon Doctrine & the Imperialist Strategy in the Arabian Gulf" will be published in the next issue of Resistance.)

With the slow-down of direct armed involvement by U.S. imperialism in Vietnam, and with the creation of the "energy crisis", great attention has been focused lately on the Middle East and in particular the Arabian Gulf. This area is one of the most disturbing "trouble spots" in the world because the stakes to imperialism are so high. "Impressed anew with the importance of the Gulf region," Assistant Secretary of State Joseph J. Sisco explained that "The American interest in the Gulf tends to be characterized in terms of oil. Undoubtedly the United States has major strategic and economic interests in the Gulf states... From these interests and our long-standing good relations with the peoples of the Gulf derives an American interest in orderly political development there and regional cooperation to assure the tranquility and progress of the area." It is precisely the fact that the economic and strategic interests are so vitally important to the imperialists and that, at the same time, the entire Middle East is so unbearably unstable and undependable politically which is making Nixon and company tremble in their boots. Nixon verbalized his anxiety when he described the area as combining "intense local conflict with great power involvement". He then made the rather significant statement that this is "all the more dangerous because the outside powers' interests are greater than their control."

What Led to the Nixon Doctrine?

The imperialist nations emerged from World War II on the whole weak, disorganized or collapsed as in the case of Japan, Germany and Italy. The change in the balance of power had not yet been consolidated. Thus the alliances of many imperialist countries with their puppet regimes were undecided or in transition, thereby undependable. The exception was the U.S. which

20 was unscathed and in fact economically stimulated by the war. It also enjoyed a monopoly over nuclear weapons and a superiority in conventional weapons. Therefore, the U.S. emerged as the undisputed leader of the "free world", a position of responsibility both eagerly assumed by the U.S. and imposed on it by the above conditions. At the same time, the U.S. was facing both a united and growing socialist bloc, as well as expanding national liberation struggles. The socialist camp had expanded with the victory of the revolution in China. Revolution had become the main trend, presenting a direct threat to imperialism's vital needs. In view of its newly acquired responsibility and in face of the rising wave of people's struggle, the U.S. imperialists formulated their global strategy of isolating and containing the socialist bloc in general and the Soviet Union in particular. "They believed they could easily attack the Soviet Union which had suffered tremendous destruction by the war and which did not possess the atomic weapons as yet." (Vietnamese Studies #26) U.S. policy vis-a-vis the third world countries was thus determined in terms of its global strategy which was itself defined mainly by Washington's fear of the bastion of world revolution, the socialist camp.

But the post World War II period has ended and changes have reshaped the international situation. It was clear to Nixon when he was elected in 1968 that U.S. imperialism could no longer afford economically or politically to remain the policeman of the "free world." He was forced to adopt a neo-colonial policy which he formulated into the Nixon Doctrine in 1970. In this doctrine he outlined three ingredients of "peace"--partnership, strength and negotiation. The concept of partnership clearly evolved from the new world situation. It is directed at both the imperialist countries and the puppet allies. To the imperialist countries Nixon was saying that the U.S. is no longer willing to bear the burden of protecting them and moreover the U.S. expects them to bear part of the responsibility for "keeping the world free from communism". To the puppet allies, Nixon was saying that we realize that you are threatened from within your countries, however we are not willing to repeat our ghastly Vietnam experience. Therefore we will provide you with all the military aid and training you need, but you will have to carry out the fight yourselves.

The concept of strength is nothing new. It simply means that the U.S. must continue to maintain and develop its own technological and military superiority so as not to be superseded by any other power.

The concept of negotiation is the new guideline for U.S. imperialism to follow in dealing with the socialist countries. The U.S. now had to reckon with them since it had failed so miserably in its policy of isolation of the socialist bloc and since the socialist countries had consolidated themselves and become powerful forces. In this way, the U.S. was forced to re-evaluate its former policy of blackmail and enter into a period of dialogue, avoiding a direct confrontation which would be much too costly.

The Importance of the Gulf

There are a number of reasons why Nixon and his friends should be interested in the Gulf, and these can be cat-

egorized into three areas--economic, strategic, and the changes taking place there.

The most obvious economic factor, of course, is oil. The growing dependence of the imperialist countries on oil as their main source of energy and on oil by-products for the new chemical and petro-chemical industries is becoming an increasingly publicized issue. The importance of the Middle East, particularly the Gulf, as the prime supplier of this oil has increased proportionately to the growing oil need.

At present, Western Europe relies on the Gulf--mostly through U.S. monopolies--for 75% of its oil, and likewise Japan for 90%. India, Pakistan, Israel and Australia and New Zealand are similarly dependent. Even the U.S. itself which has up to now been able to rely on its own resources will import 55% of its oil from the Gulf by the end of the '80s. Since the Gulf is abundant in oil, which is 30 times cheaper to produce than Texan or Alaskan oil, the revenues have made a substantial contribution to the economies of the U.S. and Britain.

Aside from the oil interests, the Gulf as an area which has been developing, in Sisco's words, "from poverty to a number of areas of affluence," offers a vast untapped market for dumping U.S. goods.

In particular, the U.S. has two economic markets in mind--a commercial one and a military one. Already, Saudi supermarkets abound with U.S.-made goods, and the smaller Gulf states are the newest targets for the deodorants, hair sprays and Monopoly game sets. On the military side, there has been a flood of recent announcements of Gulf state purchases of sophisticated ultra-weapons from the U.S. and its allies. In February '73, there was the nearly \$3 billion defense contract arranged by the Pentagon with Iran that led to widespread rioting in that country. "Both Defense and State Department officials emphasized that...the deal was entered into because it will be highly profitable to the U.S. in helping American arms manufacturers caught in a post-Vietnam slump in orders...." (N.Y. Times, Feb. 23) And since then there have been announcements of billion dollar "military modernization program" for "Saudi" Arabia with the U.S. offering 24 to 30 F-4 Phantoms, and now a half-billion dollar package, again including F-4s, for Kuwait.

In making these sales, U.S. officials have said that "experience had shown that particularly in developing countries, the military played a major role in policy and that it was to the U.S.' advantage to have influence with the policy makers...Another reason... (for pushing the sales) is that with the decline in arms for the Vietnam war, American producers need new markets..." (N.Y. Times, June 8, 1973) Most recently the military journal Aviation Week and Space Technology has said that the U.S. would be making available on a near-emergency basis (within 6 months) some 50 F-8 H/K jet fighters to Kuwait. These would be flown, "at least initially, by 'resigned' U.S. Navy and Marine pilots...and would give the country an instant air defense capability." (Aviation Week itself put "resigned" in quotation marks.) The same Aviation Week article reported that "a U.S. Defense Dept. team had surveyed Kuwait's needs in February, 1972, with a goal of determining what equipment the nation might need to develop a force capable of fighting a holding action 'for a few days, until help could arrive' according to Sisco." The article blamed the "Saudi" Arabian "needs" for arms on "a border clash with South Yemeni forces in late March in which the South Yemenis were supported by Soviet-built Mig fighters..." Significantly, the article also reported that "Israeli reaction opposed the sale of Phantoms to the two Arab states, but informally the Israelis said they were not 'making a big thing' about it." (Aviation Week June 11, 1973) Also of significance is that Egypt has been cooperating with the "Saudis" in the decisions on what arms to buy.

A further economic interest of the U.S in the Gulf is, in Sisco's words, "wealth providing surplus capital for investment abroad and economic development throughout the world." Translated, this means two things: 1) the extra profits from oil production can be used for investments in other areas of the world besides the Gulf. 2) The share of the profit given to the Gulf states can be put into Western banks or invested in stock by those states. Given the immensity of the profit drawn from Gulf oil, both of these possibilities are highly enticing to the imperialists.

women in the middle east

Interviews and Essays written by women include material on revolutionary struggles being waged in the Middle East. The economic and social role of women within Middle Eastern society is well analysed. Send 50 cents, C/O P.O. Box 134, West Newton Mass. 02156 for Women in the Middle East pamphlet.

U.S. aid to middle east nations fiscal 1972


The figures below are the first to be compiled under an amendment to the 1972 Foreign Assistance Act that requires a comprehensive listing of all funds paid out under a variety of programs. These figures summarize aid from six government agencies and are almost three times as high as previous estimates that have been published. Even these figures--in spite of the valuable per capita breakdown--still underestimate actual U.S. aid, as in the case of certain countries receiving clandestine weapons shipments (Israel, Lebanon, Ethiopia, etc.)

Country	Total Economic Aid (in millions of dollars)	Total Military Aid	Total Aid Per Capita (in dollars)
Algeria	80.3	---	5.70
Cyprus	4.7	---	8.00
Egyptian A.R.	9.8	---	.30
Ethiopia	33.6	11.2	1.70
Greece	48.2	228.5	31.00
Iran	140.0	617.7	25.25
Iraq	0.2*	---	.02
Israel**	191.4	667.9	318.00
Jordan	5.2	105.7	44.00
Kuwait	14.0	---	17.50
Lebanon	26.8	10.2	12.33
Libyan A.R.	1.2	3.4	2.80
Morocco	46.8	16.5	4.00
"Saudi" Arabia	19.1	0.5	2.45
Sudan	4.0	---	.25
Syrian A.R.	0.3*	---	.05
Tunisia	41.9	4.1	9.20
Turkey	141.8	157.7	8.33

* "Food for Peace" shipments

** Figures for Israel do not include donations made tax-free by American citizens.

Congressional Record, 3/22/73, pp. S5434-45



"So you are the cause of starvation."
From AL-THORA, Damascus

harrassment of iranians

On March 9, the FBI was ordered by the U.S. Justice Department to investigate charges that a group of Iranian students had assaulted three officials from the Iranian consulate in San Francisco. The alleged attack on Jafar Faghiih (deputy consul-general) occurred after a public meeting sponsored by the World Affairs Council. Under the U.S. Criminal Code, an assault upon a foreign diplomat or guest may bring three years in jail and a stiff fine, if weapons are not involved.

Faghiih claims that he recognized at least 16 of the 50 or 60 Iranian students who are alleged to have assaulted him. He claims that he suffered stomach, rib, and leg injuries.

The incident occurred about 6:30 P.M. on March 6 during a lecture by Herrick Young, president of the Near East Foundation. At 5:30 P.M., Richard Heggie, director of the San Francisco World Affairs Council, had telephoned police when it was noted that at least 60 Iranian students had entered the auditorium where Young was speaking. Heggie claims that extra police were unavailable at that time and that no police arrived until after the incident. He stated that an unscheduled speech by Faghiih "triggered the violence."

At a March 9 press conference, the Iranian Students Association of Northern California challenged the claims of Faghiih and World Affairs Council spokesmen. Parviz Azarioon, president of the I.S.A.-N.C., stated that the Iranian government has sentenced 230 Bay Area members of the Association to in absentia prison terms of 3 to 6 years. Not conceding whether the alleged attack took place, he said that the consular officer (Faghiih), during his speech, had stated that 68 persons recently executed in Iran were "opium or heroin smugglers."

Azarioon said: "These people were executed because they sympathized with us...The allegations are in line with Iranian government and consular policies here to distort the nature of the activities of Iranian students in the Bay Area--who represent an open and democratic opposition to the Iranian regime."

(Adapted from the San Francisco Chronicle, March 10, 1973)


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