


Palestine!



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ISRAEL TERRORIZES WEST BANK

On the morning of June 2, 1980, four bomb blasts rocked the West Bank: in Nablus a device attached to the ignition of Mayor Bassam Shaka'a's car exploded, causing such terrible injuries that both of the Mayors' legs had to be amputated. Almost simultaneously in Ramallah, a similar explosion blew apart the car of Mayor Karim Khalaf, whose wounds required the amputation of a foot. Mayor Ibrahim Tawil of Bireh narrowly escaped injury, and a Druse soldier in the Israeli army was blinded when a bomb rigged to the door of Tawil's garage exploded. In Hebron an Israeli fragmentation grenade blew up in the center of the city, injuring seven citizens.

The terror bombing brought to world attention a relatively new and extremely dangerous phenomenon: the settlers in the West Bank and extremists residing elsewhere but linked with the settlers have turned to violence.

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Tied to U.S. Strategic Interests

Egypt's Role in the Carter Doctrine

A squadron of 12 U.S. F4 Phantom fighter bombers from Moody Air Force Base in Georgia landed in Cairo on July 10 for three months of joint training exercises with the Egyptian Air Force. The operation, code named "Proud Phantom," called dramatic attention to the development of a military relationship between Egypt and the U.S.

The massive exercise, estimated to cost from \$20 to \$25 million, brought more than 600 U.S. troops to the Cairo West Airfield. The first to arrive were in a "rapid engineering deployment heavy operations repair unit" called Red Horse, which flew in from West Germany. They prepared the area for the Phantoms and the support personnel. Portable airconditioned "living modules" were set up to accommodate the U.S. troops; huge C141 and C5 transports brought in heavy equipment, including road graders, tractor-trailer rigs, and even a fire truck and tanker truck with a capacity of 5,000 gallons of fresh water. When the facility at Cairo West was ready, the Phantoms flew in from Georgia, refueling 10 times in mid-air.

Why the ostentatiousness of the transfer? The answer may be found in a statement by Air Force Chief of Staff Lew Allen Jr. that "our capability to deploy to the Persian Gulf will be seen by the Soviet Union as real and improving."

The operation brings in additional technicians to supplement



WEST BANKERS' TRIUMPHANT HOMECOMING FOR MAYOR Bassam Shaka'a on July 9, 1980 after hospitalization for loss of both legs in Zionist terror bombing. Shaka'a told crowds, "They wanted to kill me, but I lived. Our national will is stronger than the attempt at occupation!"

the approximately 100 U.S. personnel previously stationed at Cairo West to teach Egyptian ground crews how to maintain the Egyptian Air Force's 35 F4 Phantoms. One of the goals of "Proud Phantom" is to try to resolve the problems the Egyptians have experienced in trying to keep their Phantoms fit to fly: only an average of nine Phantoms are said to be in condition to fly on a given day, and while 50 sorties a week had been the goal, Egyptian pilots are reportedly able to fly the Phantoms only about a total of a dozen hours a week.

One of the factors behind the maintenance morass seems to be that the Phantoms were rushed to Cairo in time for Egyptian President Sadat to bolster the prestige of his politically isolated regime by showing the Phantoms off at a military parade last October. This politically determined schedule did not allow enough time for the training of Egyptian ground crews, however.

An even more serious factor is that the Phantoms sent to Egypt were reconditioned jets, in sharp contrast to the spanking new equipment ordinarily furnished to Israel. Reconditioned equipment is supposed to be harder to maintain, as many buyers of used cars would not be surprised to learn.

The U.S. Phantom pilots are flying frequent sorties from Cairo West, assembling information on the effect of desert sand on

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Israeli Mistreatment Kills Political Prisoners

Two Palestinian political prisoners have died, apparently as a result of force-feeding by Israeli jailers. Mohammed Shahada Jaafri died on July 22, and Rassim Mohammed Halawi shortly thereafter. The two had been part of a hunger strike by some 75 resistance prisoners from the new Nafha desert prison. About 100 Palestinian political prisoners were transferred to the prison on May 2. The strike began on July 14 as a protest against inhuman conditions at Nafha and with a demand for equality with Jewish prisoners.

Construction of the Nafha facility began three years ago in response to a series of hunger strikes by Palestinian prisoners demanding an improvement in their conditions. The new prison was, in the words of an Israeli press report, "designed to break the prisoners considered to be leaders."

Temperatures soar above 100° at the prison, located in the Negev desert between Eilat and Beersheba. The prisoners' most bitter complaint is that the prison cells were designed with extremely inadequate ventilation. "We need air," the prisoners said in the message released through attorney Felicia Langer. "We must breathe. We are resorting to our last weapon, a hunger strike."

Attorneys Leah Tsemel and Walid Fahoum report that in their visit to Nafha prison they found ten prisoners crowded into a single cell six yards by three yards. In their cell the prisoners are forced to eat, sleep on thin mats on the floor, and pass 23 hours a day.

Half of Israel's approximately 6,000 prisoners are "security prisoners," i.e., Palestinians jailed for resistance activity. The *Jerusalem Post* reported in July that a Prison Service source said Israeli jails have "the worst conditions in the western world."

The hunger strikers are demanding that their conditions be improved to the level at which Israeli prisoners are maintained. While the Palestinian prisoners are denied beds, for instance, Israeli prisoners are furnished with them. Palestinian prisoners are denied the right to use basic amenities like underwear, toilet paper, books, newspapers and other items which their families bring. And while Palestinian prisoners are allowed only a single half-hour visit with their families each month—and the families must travel nine hours from Jenin, or six from Jerusalem to visit Nafha—the Israeli prisoners are permitted two family visits per



Palestinian mothers protest the ill-treatment of their sons at Nafha Prison on July 22, 1980.

month.

In an attempt to break the strike, a number of the prisoners were transferred to Ramle prison. There, according to statements obtained by prisoners' attorneys, guards beat the strikers to coerce them to eat. Those who refused were forcibly fed through tubes in their nostrils or throats. Yacoub Dawani, one of the prisoners subjected to this treatment, told attorney Leah Tsemel that, "They brought an empty enema, with an attached tube the size of my little finger. Three times a guard tried to put the tube in my nostril, in and out, without liquid. Then he pushed it in and out of my throat twice and poured liquid in. I am convinced it was salt water. It was like drinking the Dead Sea. I told the nurse it went into my lungs and I coughed. All night long I felt as if there were a fire lit in my stomach. I didn't even have water to drink. I was feverish and sweating."

The two prisoners who died reportedly developed pneumonia after the substance pumped into them was drawn into the lungs. A third prisoner was hospitalized in critical condition.

The news of the hunger strike and deaths touched off demonstrations in the West Bank. Nine mothers of prisoners announced that they were joining their sons on hunger strike. Hundreds of Palestinian prisoners in other jails declared that they were joining the hunger strike as an act of solidarity. ●

WHAT YOU CAN DO: Address letters of protest to: Ambassador Ephraim Evron, Israeli Embassy, 1621 22nd Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20008; and to Ms. Pat Derian, U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Division, Washington, D.C. 20520.

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The PSC engages in a variety of solidarity activities and educational programs and produces various forms of informational material on the Palestine issue and the Mideastern policy of the U.S. government.

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SOLIDARITY NEWS



On June 1, 1980, some 350 demonstrators protested against the yearly "Salute to Israel" parade in New York City. The demonstration, called by the Palestine Solidarity Committee, was the fifth annual protest against the Zionist celebration.

On June 15, 1980, the P.S.C., working with other groups and individuals, hosted a public meeting for Mayor Mohamed Milhem, expelled from the West Bank by the Israeli occupation authorities in early May. Nearly 400 people packed a hall in New York's Riverside Church for the mayor's speech and a lively question and answer session. The presentation was interrupted twice by Zionists, who refused to stop chanting until they were forcibly removed from the room.

The PSC participated in the Coalition for a People's Alternative in 1980, which organized a counterconvention August 8 and 9 in the South Bronx as the Democrats assembled for their national convention in midtown Manhattan. The Coalition invited Mr. Zuhdi Terzi, the PLO's Permanent Representative at the U.N., to address the massive gathering which followed the march by 15,000 people to Madison Square Garden on August 10. The Coalition adopted a strong position in support of Palestinian self-determination and a slogan opposing U.S. military aid to Israel.

In addition to such activities, the PSC conducts ongoing educational work. The committee's resource center provides films, slide shows, speakers and literature in bulk for campus, church or other groups planning programs. It conducts introductory study groups on the Palestine issue, and assists researchers who wish to use its library and clipping files.

For further information, call 212-662-0708 or write to: PSC, Box 1757, Manhattanville Station, NY 10027. ●

Egypt's Role in the Carter Doctrine

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their equipment. "Our pilots will learn how to operate in a Middle Eastern desert. There's nothing like it in the U.S., with its dryness and fine dust," an Air Force colonel told the press. The Proud Phantom operation is a significant step toward development of a landbase in Egypt for U.S. air power in the Mideast and Gulf areas.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Proud Phantom was a sign of drastic change over the past decade. At the onset of the seventies, thousands of Soviet advisers were stationed in Egypt, supporting the Egyptian side in the ongoing air war of attrition along the Suez Canal. The U.S. meanwhile was pouring advanced equipment into Israel. In 1972, Sadat ordered the Soviet advisors out of Egypt: he was on the road to accepting the premise of Henry Kissinger that the USSR could provide Egypt with arms, but only the U.S. could provide peace. Six years and one war later, the U.S. produced its "peace" at Camp David: a separate treaty between Israel and Egypt which provided no answer to the central question of Palestinian national rights. Camp David was a major turning point not only in Israeli-Egyptian relations, but for the region and its relation with outside powers. In 1978, the U.S. began its military relationship with Egypt in earnest, and following the collapse of the regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi, that relationship took on a regional and strategic character.

At the time of the Camp David agreement, the U.S. put together a package arms deal for the newly reconciled Sadat and Begin which stood in ironic counterpart to Carter's accompanying rhetoric of "beating swords into ploughshares." Israel was to

get \$3 billion in special arms credits over three years; Egypt \$1.5 billion over three years.


The U.S. plan was essentially to replace equipment the Soviet Union had given to Egypt previously, by now growing obsolete and inoperable for lack of spare parts. The Chinese government was said to be trying to help Egypt maintain the MIG's, but in general the glitteringly sophisticated arsenal the USSR had sent to Egypt in the early 70s—some of it more advanced even than that furnished to North Vietnam—was becoming a rusty antique.

At the time of the signing of the Mideast treaty, Sadat made a grandiose offer to assume "responsibility for ensuring stability in a region stretching from Algeria to the west to Afghanistan and from the Mediterranean south into sub-Saharan Africa." To prepare himself for this "responsibility" Sadat suggested to the visiting Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that the U.S. send him some \$15 billion worth of military equipment.

The U.S. was neither willing to foot such a bill nor immediately enthusiastic about taking Sadat up on his offer. As Secretary Brown nodded in silent agreement, Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, commented in April 1979 that "The last thing we want to do is build up a new military colossus out there and then find it turning out like Iran, with Sadat no longer president and the whole place in chaos."

By the fall of 1979, however, U.S. strategists appear to have rethought Sadat's role. During that time, the U.S. was tilting decisively toward a new militarist stance in the region: Carter was reinforcing the U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean and with the ready assistance of the major news media, moving the public mood in the U.S. rapidly backward into the 1950's Cold War hate mongering and flag waving; much talk of the trammeling of the national honor over U.S. hostages held in Iran and the imminent threat to U.S. gas guzzlers posed by Soviet actions in

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Afghanistan.

In this context, William Perry, the Pentagon's research director, visited Egypt and came back to Washington arguing that Sadat should be equipped to play a regional role. By February 1980, when Assistant Secretary of Defense David McGiffert visited Egypt, the price tag for such a regional role was put at \$4 billion in military credits from the U.S. over a five year period. The U.S. government agreed to provide Egypt with 244 advanced M60A3 battle tanks, 550 armoured personnel carriers and 40 F16's. Israeli opposition kept Egypt from obtaining the even more sophisticated F15 jets it badly wanted for the sake of its pride, if not for the added military prowess.

Meanwhile, the Egyptian government was publicizing its readiness to assume a regional military role in the U.S. orbit. Egyptian Defense Minister Kamal Hassan Ali said in February, the treaty with Israel having been signed, "it's about time to look around us to see the dangers around the area" he did not shrink from specifying that the danger was "Soviet influence" in South Yemen, Ethiopia and Afghanistan.

Egyptian officials have openly acknowledged training Afghan "rebels," with the intention of arming them and sending them back to Afghanistan; sending arms and ammunition to King Hassan of Morocco for his war against Polisario in the Sahara; and concluding an agreement with Zaire for officer training and supply of arms and ammunition. Egyptian troops are reported to have been dispatched to Oman, where only five years ago the Shah's troops had to be called in to suppress insurgents.

The troubled Horn of Africa seems a likely arena for Sadat to show his policing capacity. Another is Libya, described by a recent House Committee on Foreign Affairs Study Mission as "with an extensive arsenal of Soviet weapons...the primary source of political and military efforts to destabilize North Africa." An anonymous "analyst" wondered in the pages of *Aviation Week* (a journal with close Pentagon links), "Does the appearance of the [Phantom] jets mean encouragement of a martial position against the Libyans? Do we want Egypt, with probably the Middle East's largest army, now that the Iranian situation has changed, to march in and take the Libyan oil fields and kick Qadhafi out?"

In addition to encouraging the "martial position" of Egypt in regard to its neighbors, the U.S. appears to be fostering the growth of Egypt's arms export industry. It is likely that the U.S. will license and assist Egypt to manufacture the F5 jet or an FX successor, a special inexpensive export model designed for the Third World.

EGYPTIAN FACILITIES

Egypt is very much the post-Shah ally, and the lessons U.S. strategists took from the Iranian revolution mean that Egypt is not to be limited to a "surrogate" role in the region. Egypt is assuming a growing importance as a land base for U.S. air power in the region. Last January American Aerial Command Aircraft were first deployed in Egypt in order to garner experience in the Mideast, and in particular over the Gulf, for possible future combat operations. The AWAC's flew at least two further missions from Egypt in February and March; now reports are that the

AWACs are permanently deployed at Qena, 300 miles south of Cairo in Upper Egypt. The U.S. seems to have secret military presence there. Sadat had publicly acknowledged that six U.S. C130 transports used Qena as a jumping off point in the abortive "hostage rescue" invasion of Iran last April.

Sadat has welcomed the establishment of a "Carter Doctrine facility in Egypt: such a "facility" is a U.S. base in the Mideast with the local flag flying overhead, U.S. personnel kept to a minimum and a low profile in order to minimize political tension, and a cache of prepositioned equipment and supplies so that the U.S. can quickly move large numbers of combat troops in should it decide to intervene militarily on a grand scale. "Why not train my people and put your planes here?" Sadat asked visiting *Washington Post* publisher Katherine Graham last May. "Whenever you choose to come, send your crew instead of long lines of communication?"

The U.S. has had significant political difficulties in establishing the facilities it needs in order to carry out the new military role articulated in the Carter Doctrine. The U.S. signed an agreement for bases in Turkey, but the instability of that regime makes those facilities a rather risky proposition. Furthermore, they are further away from the Gulf than would be ideal. At Diego Garcia, a tiny quarter-mile wide atoll in the Pacific, the U.S. is pouring funds in to construct a major air and naval base. Britain conveniently removed all the inhabitants before leasing the islet to the U.S. in 1966, so there would be no political problems on the island rising only 14 feet above the sea and bristling with military equipment. Diego Garcia, however, is 2,500 miles south of the Gulf—too far for a fully loaded C130 transport to fly in a single hop.

The U.S. has worked out a deal with Kenya to obtain port and airfield access rights at Mombassa in return for U.S. aid. The virulent antagonism between Kenya and Somalia have complicated the U.S. effort to obtain base rights in Somalia, as have the high price tag the Somalia regime has attached. The U.S. has successfully negotiated with Sultan Qabus of Oman for the right to use three airfields and two ports in this strategically located sheikhdom, but there is always the danger that the political climate in the Arab world could become so inimical that Qabus would be hard put to permit U.S. access.

Israel has made eager offers of hospitality to U.S. military aircraft, but the U.S. has been reluctant to publicly accept the offers, or to send planes for joint training exercises, as they did with Egypt; the political problems could be, as General Allen said, "overwhelming," because of the conflict between Israel and the Arabs. But the bases in Israel, particularly the new airfields which the U.S. is constructing for Israel in the Negev, are obviously awaiting the U.S. should the Administration feel the need to use them.

In a sense, the Israeli forces are already integrated into the U.S. network. As Israeli Prime Minister Begin told visiting U.S. congress members recently, "The West has only three military forces: NATO, which is untested and of questionable reliability; U.S. forces stationed outside the Middle East; and the Israel Defence Forces.

"Right now," Begin added, "the U.S. needs high quality conventional military forces in the Middle East and needs to be able to use them carefully and expeditiously."

The Camp David negotiating process has clearly not been able to bring peace to the Mideast, but it seems to have advanced the possibility of the U.S. waging war effectively in the region. The foundation for coordination of a military alliance between Israel and Egypt, under the aegis of the U.S., has been laid.

Egypt changed the course of history in the Middle East when it ejected the British bases in the mid-50s; now Sadat seems determined to bring foreign troops to Egyptian soil once again, with incalculable ramifications for Egypt and the whole region. ●

Israel Terrorizes West Bank...

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The bombings were not the first acts of violence by Israeli settlers. In March 1976, armed settlers from Kiryat Arba, near Hebron, set upon Palestinian demonstrators, beating and attacking them with trained dogs. Three Palestinian youths were kidnapped by the settlers and held for a time in a makeshift cell in a Kiryat Arba basement.

Then on March 15, 1979, Israeli settlers joined soldiers in firing upon a crowd of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators in Halhoul. Two young Palestinians were shot to death, one of them a 17-year old girl. Rabbi Ilan Tor of Kiryat Arba was arrested by Israeli authorities for her murder. At trial, however, he was found not guilty: so many Israelis had fired at the victim that the court ruled it was not proven conclusively that the fatal shot was fired from Tor's Uzi. Tor himself apparently thought that he could have fired the lethal bullet: he was accused of having changed the barrel of the submachine gun to avoid conviction.

In mid-April 1979, vandals from Kiryat Arba uprooted some 500 grape vines cultivated by Halhoul people. Several weeks later, a group of settlers, believed to be residents of Kiryat Arba, broke into several Palestinian homes in the center of Hebron, smashing windows, furniture and television sets, and demanding that the Palestinians vacate their homes.

Then in November 1979, six armed settlers drove up to the UNRWA school for girls aged 6 to 13 in the Jalazoun refugee camp. While three of the men chased youths whom they believed had thrown stones, the other three shot up the school with their automatic rifles, firing into the air above the heads of the terrified girls, breaking windows, ravaging the laboratory, breaking into the principal's office to overturn bookcases and her desk. The three men who had been chasing the youths meanwhile turned to throwing stones at women and children outside the school.

On December 18, 1979, four Israeli settlers burst into a shop in Halhoul, where they beat a mukhtar and two doctors, allegedly in retaliation for the stoning of a Kiryat Arba bus by Palestinian youngsters.

On February 27 of this year armed settlers menaced Halhoul residents with guns and smashed the windshields of a few dozen cars. Then in late April, four squads of rampaging settlers smashed the windshields of 150 cars in Ramallah, along with the windows of many homes and stores. During the 15-day curfew which the Israeli army imposed on Hebron last May as a collective punishment for the Palestinian commando action in which six settlers had been killed in Hebron, settlers from Kiryat Arba ran amok in the city. "They damaged at least 150 cars," wrote Israeli journalist Amnon Kapeliuk, leaving "broken windows and holes in the tires. They hit houses, broke windows, damaged property and stole from shops." Meanwhile, the Palestinians were confined to their homes, forbidden to leave even to care for their crops, though their vineyards and orchards, left unsprayed at a critical point, were prey to insects.

THE SOCIAL BASIS FOR MAYHEM

The social base from which these vigilantes are drawn is the rabidly Zionist population which has moved into the settlements in the West Bank, particularly during the last few years. The settlements ringing Jerusalem house some 50,000 Israeli settlers; elsewhere in the West Bank live about 11,000. Under the new settlement plan of the World Zionist Organization their number will soar dramatically to 150,000 to 200,000 over the next five years.

In the Jordan Valley live primarily Labor Party followers: people who did not allow the social democratic veneer of the party which ruled Israel until 1977 to deter them from settling other people's land. The political atmosphere is more avowedly right



An armed demonstration of the Zionist Kach movement in the streets of Hebron.

Kach leader Meir Kahane has called upon the Israeli government to undertake a two-step solution to current problems:

"1. Create a terror-against-terror group that will spread fear and shatter the souls of the Arabs in Eretz Yisrael. It is intolerable and impermissible that the Ishmaelites [Palestinians] bomb and terrorize us while they sleep and travel and shop and live their lives without fear. Let the government of Israel...make the streets, buses, shops and homes of the Ishmaelites perpetual places of terror and stark insecurity so that they will fear to raise their heads, let alone plant their bombs.

"2. And of course, the ultimate and only permanent answer...the total removal of every Ishmaelite who refuses to acknowledge total Jewish sovereignty and accept a status of noncitizen....

"Government terror against the Ishmaelites and their ultimate removal from the land. Only thus. Then we shall see the renewal of the blessing that once was ours. 'The peoples shall hear and shake, the inhabitants of Philistia shall be seized with trembling.'"

wing, however, in the settlements near the towns of the West Bank and elsewhere in the western highlands. Many of these are new colonies, established under the present regime of Prime Minister Menachem Begin; others of them were initiated during the years of the Labor Government—Kaddum near Nablus, for example, and Kiryat Arba near Hebron.

The political ideas of these right wing settlers emerge from the matrix of Revisionist Zionism. For decades Revisionism—which never relinquished the Zionist claim to Transjordan and which consistently adopted extremist and expansionist positions—had only a small and disparaged following in the Zionist movement. But in 1977, the Revisionist Zionists came into their own, when one of them—Menachem Begin—was elected Prime Minister of Israel. Yet another rather ironic indication of the general trend to the right among Zionists is that Zeev Jabotinsky, the father of Revisionism and a virtual political outcast during his lifetime, is this year, the 100th anniversary of his birth, being heaped with posthumous honor.

The leading right wing settler organization is the Gush Emunim, established under the aegis of the politically conservative and religiously orthodox National Religious Party (NRP) ministers in Begin's cabinet. The Gush has used the State Religious schools, controlled by the NRP, and its Bnei Akiva youth movement, as its recruiting ground and as a source of patronage jobs for its propagandists. Asher Wallfish of the *Jerusalem Post* wrote a telling description of the NRP's young

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people, who while religiously orthodox, had never been accepted by the students of the traditional yeshivas:

"After the Six Day War and the take-over of the [occupied] areas, the students and graduates of the Bnei Akiva institutions were like rebels ripe for a cause: they absorbed and amplified the wave of mystic nationalism which swept Israel. Suddenly they felt they could give something to the nation which set them way ahead of the old-fashioned yeshivot.

"The products of the Bnei Akiva also saw the Gush Emunim challenge as a form of emancipation. In the years since the establishment of the state, religious Zionists had tended to concentrate on a limited number of pursuits. They never had many top jobs in the government, the army, the civil service or the security services; they produced top lawyers, doctors, accountants, businessmen, and above all, academics. They carried less glory, wielded less influence and attracted less hero-worship than secular Israelis.

"Gush Emunim gave them a chance to be way out front, in the advance guard of patriotic endeavour, as it were, redeeming Judea and Samaria for the Jewish people."

The settlers the Gush Emunim brought to the West Bank were primarily young families. There most of them are supported through the employment in technical, academic or professional jobs within the Green Line; to a lesser extent, income is generated by small-scale industries within the settlements, or by capital-intensive farming on confiscated land. Some Gush activists are affiliated with the yeshivot hesder religious study institutes in which

conscripts alternate religious study with active duty army service policing the West Bank.

The politics of the Gush Emunim are those of extreme nationalist expansionism, with a heavy overtone of religious fervor. Not only did God give the West Bank—of Judea and Shomron—to the Jews, but for a Gush activist, he may also have donated East Jordan, the Golan Heights and a portion of southern Lebanon.

Other political forces at work among the settlers are the Tehiya Party of Geula Cohen—distinguished as the right opposition to Begin's Herut—and the Kach movement led by Rabbi Meir Kahane. Kahane first found notoriety as the head of the Jewish Defense League in the U.S.; he has established in Israel a movement which is quite dependent for its active cadre on immigrants—sometimes more accurately visitors—from the U.S.

SETTLER SOLDIERS

The Israeli government is taking a number of measures which have the effect of transforming the settlers of the West Bank from a troublesome group prone to vandalism and fanaticism into a fearsome, organized, unofficial military force with special influence in the official army.

Among the steps already taken are the consolidation of the settlers serving reserve military duty into the occupation army in the West Bank; the use of Gush Emunim activists as propagandists for the occupying troops; and furnishing of weapons and official liaison for the settlers "private army" on the West Bank.

Under a dangerous new plan concocted by Israeli Chief of Staff

Rafael Eitan, settlers perform their reserve service in the West Bank, thus ensuring that the core of the occupation force is a group with a special personal motivation for zeal in policing the area, and a high probability of ideological fanaticism.

Under Eitan's plan, each settlement in the occupied West Bank is a "confrontation settlement"; its reservists are organized in a framework of "area defense." Even settlers who had been formerly assigned to reserve duty in combat units have been reassigned to occupation duty. Settlers train together, reportedly engage in joint Bible study during intervals, receive weapons for their settlements through the "Area Defense" framework. They may even engage in police duty together in Palestinian towns near their own settlement. For example, settlers from Ofra, Beit Horon and Beit El police the Ramallah area, the district in which their settlements lie.

Unsurprisingly, the settler soldiers are singled out for special praise by military occupation authorities. Yehuda Litani, who covers the occupied West Bank for *Ha'artez*, wrote of the settler reservists on police duty: "A security source dealing with these matters claims 'they are the best soldiers for this task.' He says the settlers have strong discipline and most important, motivation. For them, 'a roadblock is a roadblock and a search is a search.'"

"ARABS ARE NOT HUMANS"

Beyond their direct policing role in the West Bank, settlers, and particularly Gush Emunim activists, appear to be taking a special part in encouraging Israeli soldiers who do not ordinarily reside in the West Bank to beat and humiliate Palestinians during reserve

duty on the West Bank. Dr. Israel Shahak, Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights, collected a number of accounts from Israeli reserve soldiers which mention Gush Emunim members being invited to lecture their units during May 1980.

Here is one account, by a reserve soldier in his late 20s:

"I served in the area of Hebron during the first half of May...As we arrived in the area we got a lecture from a military administration person who was accompanied by a settler from Kiryat Arba, who was presented to us as an officer in spite of the fact that on the first day he was not in uniform. They gave us a lecture about 'the Arabs, as they are.' The conclusion of their description was that the Arabs 'are not like human beings...'

"The exact instructions we received were, 'When searching inside houses the father should be beaten in front of the family...In the case that a member of the family is arrogant, and arrogance can be expressed in refusing to talk, in a look of hostility; then property should be broken, especially property that is appreciated by the family. They recommended to break televisions or furniture, especially the living room furniture or the parents' bed. The settler also recommended to ruin food, to pour the oil into the flour, etc. One of the soldiers shouted at this moment, 'Isn't it better to piss into the flour?' and the 'lecturer' replied, 'Use your own imagination.'" The reservist told Shahak that, "The military administration men and Gush Emunim men would publicly praise the soldiers and officers that did well in beating Arabs." The officers, he reported, "were afraid" of the Gush Emunim "because

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DOCUMENT

TESTIMONY OF A PALESTINIAN MAYOR

On May 2 the Israeli government expelled three Palestinian leaders from the West Bank: Mohammed Milhem, the mayor of Halhul; Fahd Qawasme, the mayor of Hebron; and Sheikh Rajab Tamimi, the Moslem religious judge of Hebron. The pretext for the expulsion was the Palestinian commando attack on Israeli settlers earlier that day in Hebron: six settlers were killed, and the commandos remain uncaptured. But it is clear that the Israeli government—which never even claimed that the three deportees were involved in violent action—had been waiting for an opportunity to remove popular leaders from the occupied areas. During the 13 years of occupation more than 1,500 persons have been summarily expelled from the occupied territories.

Mayor Milhem spoke to over 350 people at Riverside Church in New York City on June 15; the event was organized by the Palestine Solidarity Committee and other groups, and held under the sponsorship of a number of prominent persons.

Following are excerpts from Milhem's speech, which was interrupted at its beginning by two young men who unfurled an Israeli flag and chanted the slogan of Meir Kahane's extremist Kach group, "There is no Palestine!":

(Shouts: "There is no Palestine! There is no Palestine!" "Sit down everyone, remain calm please...")

As long as these disruptors are behaving like this in the U.S., do you think that those in the occupied territory behave better? In fact, those in our land are unlike these disruptors. These disruptors are peaceful preachers compared to them. They come here to say words but the settlers are there to make deeds—to expropriate land and throw the owners out; to take our people to jails and beat them; to kill and dance on the bodies of their victims.



Mohammed Milhem

I asked the Israeli Military Governor of the West Bank just a couple of weeks before I was deported, 'Look, you are unable to maintain security for our people under your occupation from attacks by your settlers. Why don't you leave these lunatic settlers with their submachine guns to us? Disarm them and we'll teach them a lesson.'

What do you think is happening to our people? What do you think is happening to our trees and crops? What do you think is happening to the West Bank Palestinian mayors who remain?

[PLO Attack on Settlers Pretext to Expel West Bank Mayors]

Was I deported because six Jewish worshippers were killed in Hebron? Worshippers. The poor worshippers! To kill worshippers is the greatest sin in the world. You know what these worshippers were doing? They were worshipping in the streets of Hebron, and by the way in Hebron we have no synagogue. What were they doing in the streets? They were breaking into this house or that house, scaring the children and the women; they were smashing the cars in West Bank towns, 40 cars in Halhoul, 150 cars in Ramallah; they were planting bombs in the busiest streets of the towns. If they were worshippers they should go to synagogues.

I know what is in your mind, some of you: some of you may say, 'But in Hebron there was a synagogue before 1929.' That is true, before 1929 there was a synagogue in Hebron. And there were thousands of mosques in Palestine before 1948 and they were demolished. All right, come and take your synagogue in Hebron and your houses and give us back our mosques and houses. Give the mayor of Hebron his four homes in West Jerusalem and take your six homes in Hebron....Well the mayor of Hebron lives now in a rented house, but what of the refugees outside of Palestine: they live in tents or sheep sheds!

The Israelis expelled the elected mayor of Hebron and the elected mayor of Halhoul. Why? Because these six were killed in

Hebron. Who killed the six? Not the mayor of Hebron and not the mayor of Halhoul.

When the Israelis expelled us, they came very gently and told us, 'Will you please come, Mr. Weizman wants to talk to you,' and they told my wife, 'Your husband will be back in 15 minutes.' Why not tell me that I was to be deported? Are you afraid of me? You have 1,000 soldiers and I am only one. I have no weapons. Do you know they are afraid to speak the truth, and they are afraid to speak the truth here tonight to you.

[Curfew Use to Impose Collective Punishment]

Let me tell you of the curfew in Halhoul last year. It started on the 15th of March, 1979. It went on for 16 days. Twenty-three hours daily, not allowing people out to get milk for the babies, not allowing food to be brought into town for the people.

Do you know why they imposed this curfew on us? Because an Israeli bus was stoned and a piece of glass worth \$40 was broken and I think a Jewish person was wounded slightly. You know what price we paid for this \$40 and that slight wound?

An Arab boy of 21 years old was killed, an Arab girl of 16 years old was killed. The curfew was on the town for 16 days. The farmers were not allowed to spray their vineyards and the crops were spoiled. About 40 houses had every single glass in every single window broken; the soldiers came and broke everything. Three major robberies by Israeli soldiers took place. All this—and the imprisonment of the people of Halhoul for 16 days of curfew—because a piece of sacred, holy glass of an Israeli bus was broken and a small amount of precious blood of an extremist was spilled. Is this justice?

[Zionist 'Security' Disguise Palestinian Usurpation]

Look, when Moshe Dayan was Minister of Defense, he came to the mayor of Hebron, who was Sheikh Ja'bara at the time and he told him that he wanted a piece of land, which he vowed by his honor was needed for an army camp for security reasons. Of course he didn't need the mayor's consent and he took a piece of ground that overlooked Hebron. You know what the

name of that piece of land is now? It is Kiryat Arba, and when you go and visit it, you will see beautiful apartments, supermarkets—why, they sell all the goods in the world there. This great settlement, is it meant for security? For the security of whom? Of the Palestinians of Hebron?

They also built a settlement near my town of Halhoul. When you pass the settlement of Kefar Etzion you will find very beautiful vineyards belonging to the villagers of Beit Umma. Not a single Arab can build a house there. You have four, five settlements around. In the middle there is the Arab land, about 2,500 acres. One Arab tried to build a small home there and the Israelis didn't allow him. He said, 'Why this is my land!' They told him, 'True, it is your land, but if you build a house there it is going to invade on the security of the settlements which were built two years ago.'

For reasons of security they are taking the land. Security for whom? For the settlers. But where is my security to be with my family, to be the owner of my land, not to have my car destroyed, not to have the school students killed? Where is my security?

[These Fanatics Are Dishonest]

I was born in Palestine, and my father is still living. He is about 86 years old, he is a simple farmer who never went to school. And my mother is still living. And in the cemetery there are the skulls of our fore-fore-fore-fathers. I have a wife and nine kids; six boys and three daughters. In 1976 I was elected mayor of Halhoul by people who wanted those who were elected to be honest, and I'll be honest to you and to my people to the end of my life.

One day you will remember what the mayor of a small town of Palestine said to you here tonight. Believe me when I tell you to forget about the dishonest propaganda some of you have been fed by the Zionists. Believe me when I tell you that these people of fanaticism are dishonest to the Jews themselves. Believe me, I am more honest when I speak to the Jews than are either Israeli Prime Minister Begin or the leading Israeli opposition leader Shimon Peres. ●

(continued from page 7)

they have direct access to the Chief of Staff and report to him about officers of the Army, not only about their actions but also about their views."

Another reservist, who also served in the West Bank during May, told Shahak that in his unit "we were lectured by a military Rabbi, who turned out to be a settler from a Gush Emunim settlement, who was 'made' into a military Rabbi in order to preach to the soldiers who go to serve in the territories." The Gush Emunim Rabbi's message: "That today's Arabs are the Canaanites and Amalekites from the Bible and that they would be made to go away voluntarily from this country, because this country was given to us by God, under the condition that we shall live in it alone, only Jews, without Gentiles..." When the Rabbi concluded his lecture, the reservist said, "Our commander got up and said, 'Whatever you do, remember what you have heard here.'"

The same reservist mentioned that the soldiers were visited by Gush Emunim members after their units had "searched" villages: "The soldiers told their officers all about the beating and especially mentioned it to the numerous Gush Emunim visitors who praised them and encouraged them to beat the Arabs more or gave them advice on various methods of beating or of humiliation."

The general arming of the settlers and the lack of any significant dividing line between settlers and soldiers has led to a situation in which dangerous fanatics, even those strongly suspected of violation of Israeli law, stroll about with submachineguns issued to them by the Israeli Army. For example, the Israeli press reported that Yossi Dayan, aide to Meir Kahane of Kach, was spotted at the funeral of a casualty of the commando action of

May 2 in Hebron, in army uniform, and bearing a submachine gun. This same Yossi Dayan was suspected by the Israeli government of having shot a Palestinian taxi driver in the neck in East Jerusalem shortly before—and even under Israeli law such an act is a crime. Numerous press reports describe other gun-toting mourners throwing stones at Palestinian homes in Hebron and inflicting other damage on their property.

THE PRIVATE ARMY

A relatively new development is the organization of a settlers' "private army" on the West Bank, an apparatus dependent upon the weapons, training and tolerance of the official occupation forces, but with its own command structure.

The organization of such a private army follows years of public threats by Israeli rightists to pull together an unofficial force which would fight to retain the occupied areas should the official resolve falter. These threats were reported by the press. In January 1979, for example, Kiryat Arba leader Elyakim Haetznu told a meeting, "On the day the Israeli army will leave the so-called Arab towns of Nablus, Tulkarm, Jenin and Kalkilya in order to establish the automomy...on the day Jews in uniform leave the towns, those Jews not in uniform will enter them. In order to do so, we shall have a list of Jews who are prepared to come when called."

The actual mobilization of such a forces seems to have waited until the spring of this year. At a meeting in May attended by some 200 settlers, settler leaders agreed to form regional security committees to "obtain arms, train settlers and collect information on Arab riots, stone-throwing and incitement." These "security

(continued on page 17)

Many Palestinians suspect that elements of the Israeli military were directly involved in the June 2 bombing of Palestinian mayors on the occupied West Bank.

Inayat Shaka'a, the wife of Nablus mayor Bassam Shaka'a, lists a number of strange occurrences which bolster that suspicion in the following interview by Mona es-Said. Mayor Shaka'a had both his legs blown off by the explosion of a bomb attached to the ignition of his car.

Inayat Shaka'a:

"On Sunday night, June 1, we heard footsteps around the house. That was around 11:30 p.m. We were sitting out in the garden, near our car, when we heard them. We paid no attention to them, because we're used to constant surveillance. We often see Israeli intelligence people around the house.

"At dawn, around 4 a.m., I was woken up by the sound of a car; I got up and looked out the window. It was an army car, and it had stopped near the garage at the entrance of the garden. The car stayed there five or ten minutes and drove off. I went back to bed.

"Just before 7:30 a.m. Bassam got a telephone call from a friend who told him that the municipality was surrounded by soldiers. People were puzzled because, as far as they knew, nothing had happened.

"Right after the call Bassam left the house. About six or seven minutes later I heard the explosion. I was sitting next to the kitchen window and I was showered with glass. Then there was a second explosion and I ran out of the house. I saw my son Nidal out there screaming, 'Father, Father!' And there was Bassam, stretched out on the floor.

"I ran to him and tried to lift him with Nidal. But his legs hung loose in my hands. I said to Nidal, 'Quick, the phone!' We ran in, but we found the phone the line had been cut.

"I said to my other son Haitham, 'Run to the hospital!'



Shaka'a's car after explosion, lower left are bloodstains where the Mayor was dragged from the car.

"He got to the hospital screaming, 'They've cut my father's legs off!' But there was no am-

bulance. The Israeli military authorities had asked it to go somewhere. Quite a coincidence, don't you think? Nothing had happened in town to require an ambulance.

"There were other coincidences. The people at the hospital went straight to the phone and started calling the doctors. They managed to get one call through—to the anesthiast—before the phone suddenly went dead. The doctor on duty and the other people at the hospital had to get into their cars and go out for the doctors. The phones of Bassam's brothers—at their homes and in their offices—were dead too.

"Do you think an illegal gang could arrange all these things—get rid of the ambulance, disconnect all these phones, and see to it that the municipality is surrounded by soldiers half an hour before the bomb exploded?

"And is a gang of extremists responsible for the failure of the Israeli army to show up as soon as the explosion was heard? Usually all you have to do is say 'boo' and you find yourself surrounded by soldiers. On that day, the army showed up around two hours after the explosions.

"Nidal stopped a passing stationwagon, carried his father into it and took him to the hospital. Other people ran through the streets of Nablus, shouting the news and urging everyone to go to the hospital and donate blood.

"When the soldiers came, they found a throng outside the hospital, trying to get in to donate their blood. They started shooting to drive them away. Some of them were laughing as they shot. Some were singing. Bassam was fighting for his life in there, and the people outside were weeping, and the soldiers were laughing and singing and shooting."

Palestine! Supplement

SETTLERS—THE CUTTING EDGE OF VIOLENCE

ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS IN WEST BANK AND GAZA

Jordan Valley area settlement.



During the summer of 1979 in the foothills of the Jordan Valley, stalks of dying wheat poked out of freshly turned earth. These lands, belonging for generations to the peasants of Akraba village, had been closed for nearly a decade by the Israeli Army for "military purposes." But during the previous winter the Palestinian farmers of the village had returned to their old fields and sowed them with winter wheat. Now men from a nearby Israeli settlement had come with tractors and, as the crop was nearing the time of harvest, they had ploughed it under.

This had not been the first time that the Akraba peasants had been thwarted in attempts to farm their lost lands. Back in 1972 they had crossed over to other parts of their closed lands and planted them with winter wheat. That time Israeli planes had swooped down and defoliated the crop, using surplus U.S. sprays granted from supplies originally intended for Vietnam.

Nine hundred acres of the seized lands of Akraba are now being tilled for vegetables by the 30 Jewish families of the settlement Gitit. Two-thirds of Akraba's lands have been taken thus far, and the struggle for their fields might serve as one paradigm of the process of usurpation and resistance caused by the Zionist colonization of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This struggle over land and resources—vital to any future determination of sovereignty—has pitted since 1967 the Palestinian residents against the edict and might of the Israeli Army; now increasingly it has also come to be embodied in a struggle against the influx of

Jewish settlers, supported, financed and issued arms by the Israeli government.

In the wake of the Israeli Army's conquest of these areas in the June 1967 war, the first Zionist settlers crossed into the West Bank and Gaza figuratively clutching a Bible in one hand and a military coordinate map in the other. For a while their presence seemed to many Palestinians rather abstract, their impact laying mostly in what they symbolized about Israeli territorial intentions; their first settlements marked out mostly underpopulated border areas which Israel announced its intent to retain for military advantage.

However, the settlements are no longer mere statements about the future: they have an immediate impact on the lives of hundreds of thousands of West Bank residents, grabbing their farmlands, altering their vistas, pumping their water and sheltering zealots who march at will with automatic rifles through Palestinian towns and cities. Now, as settlers, with significant government backing, are demanding to plant colonies in the very center of Palestinian cities, beginning with Hebron, a new factor has entered the political picture of the West Bank.

I. THE WEST BANK

What contemporary history has led us to call "the West Bank" comprises the rugged highlands running down the center of historical Palestine, along with the great below-sea valley rift of the Jordan Valley. It is the current home of 800,000 Palestinian Arabs. Before its conquest by Israel in the 1967 war, this area of 2,000 square miles was in the hands of the Palestinian residents, with the then ruling Jordan government of Amman reserving some land to itself as state lands.

Israeli Settlements in West Bank and Gaza was written by Sheila Ryan and George Cavalletto based off first hand accounts and information developed during a trip they took to Israel in the summer of 1979. The photos accompanying the text were also taken by them.

In the 13 years since occupation began, about one-third of the entire land mass of the West Bank has been taken over by the Israeli state. By 1980, 66 square miles of this confiscated land, including significant portions of the most fertile agricultural lands, has been formally transferred by Israel into the hands of about 61,000 Jewish settlers. Fifty thousand of these settlers are concentrated in the satellite communities built around East Jerusalem; about 11,000 are scattered in some 57 smaller settlements spread across the rest of the West Bank.

The pattern of these settlements gives the appearance of a crazy game of tick-tac-toe jotted down on the map of the West Bank. To the east, the Jordan Valley and its foothills are populated by agricultural settlements which were begun before 1976 by the Labor Party governments which ruled the country during that period. Most of these settlements grow crops on land previously tilled by Palestinian farmers and confiscated from them. Further west in the central highlands are many new clumps of settlements initiated for the most part after the Likud government of Menachem Begin came to power in May 1977. These settlements are primarily non-agricultural suburbs, from which the settlers commute to jobs in Jerusalem and the coastal cities of Tel Aviv and Haifa. The largest suburb settlements were begun earlier by the Labor party, however, and are situated around Arab East Jerusalem.


Prime Minister Begin's administration has down played the justification used by the earlier Labor governments that the settlements were solely a "security" measure. Guiding the Begin government's settlement policy is a plan drawn up by Matiyahu Drobles, head of the Jewish Agency's Land Settlement Department. In Drobles' "Master Plan for the Development of Settlement in Judea and Samaria, 1979-1983," he wrote that "Settlement throughout the entire land of Israel [including the West Bank and Gaza] is for security and by right, . . . making concrete and realizing our right to Eretz Israel."

The Drobles plan envisioned Jewish colonies "not only around the settlements of minorities, but also in between them." (The "minorities" are, of course, the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.) Thus the Israeli settlements are beginning to surround Palestinian towns, cutting them off from one another. This pattern of settlement is ultimately intended to eliminate the geographic continuity of the Palestinian population of the territories and thus eradicate one of the bases of a future independent Palestinian state. However the strategy of encircling Arab cities was not begun by the Begin government. The preceding Labor Party governments adopted this strategy shortly after the 1967 conquests, but directed it to only East Jerusalem.

Arab East Jerusalem

Annexed unilaterally to Israel and incorporated administratively in the Israeli Jerusalem Municipality shortly after its conquest in 1967, Arab East Jerusalem has been the scene of the most intensive settlement activity anywhere in the West Bank. With the goal of so drastically altering its demographic character that future redivision into Arab and Jewish cities would prove an impossibility, the Israeli Labor Party government of that period began hurriedly to encircle East Jerusalem with clusters of new highrise apartment, for Jewish settlers.

Huge towers of apartments occupied exclusively by Jewish settlers now loom out of the once pastoral eastern Jerusalem hills. Neve Yacov toward the north is home to 10,800 Jews. Built on land confiscated from the Palestinians of Beit Hanina, only a few



Palestinians can be seen in Neve Yakov and those in a servile capacity: here a man in a black-checked hat watering the flower garden; there two women in embroidered peasant dress peddling cactus fruit in front of a supermarket filled with shoppers speaking Hebrew, Russian and English.

By early 1980, encircling the 110,000 Palestinian residents of the old city of Jerusalem and its environs were six major new residential suburbs and satellite towns, housing over 50,000 Israeli settlers. The construction continues at a furious pace; the confiscation of another 1,000 acres of land from the people of Beit Hanina to build 10,000 apartments between French Hill and Neve Yakov was announced in March 1980. And work is in progress on another settlement complex of grave strategic significance: the Maale Adumin Block, a large expanse of land in the parched southern mountains and foothills overlooking the Jordan Valley. Targeted to become a major residential and industrial complex which will complete the encirclement of Jerusalem, when finished it will extend the municipality eastward more than eight miles towards the floor of the Jordan Valley. A major section of this eastward buildup was begun in August 1979 in Ein Shemesh, on 250 acres expropriated from Palestinian entrepreneurs who

had assembled it for a private project to house Palestinians.

Within the ring of settlements around Jerusalem the process of expelling the Palestinian population has also been extensive. The Magharibah quarter was razed very shortly after the 1967 war, and the historic homes which had housed 4,000 Palestinians were replaced with a plaza where buses now roll up to disgorge tourists at the Western Wall. The emptying of the Jewish Quarter has been slower, but no less thorough. Before 1967, 6,500 Palestinians lived in the district, but in the ensuing years they have been forced out so that their homes could be renovated and sold to Israelis. The Mayor of Jerusalem, Teddy Kollock, defended the racial restrictions used to expell the former Palestinian residents, saying, "This is a city in which everyone likes to live surrounded by his own schools and cooking odors and houses of worship."


The Jordan Valley

The settlements in the Jordan Valley and its foothills are also having the effect of dispossessing Palestinians of their homes and lands. In this, the richest, most valuable agricultural area of the West Bank, 35 square miles or about 70 percent of the cultivable land north of Jericho has been taken from Palestinian farmers and handed over to 23 Jewish settlements.


Forty percent of the settlement lands in the Jordan Valley are technically "absentee property," which is defined by an Israeli law hastily enacted at the close of the 1967 war to include the lands of any Palestinian who had fled the area during the hostilities. Given that the Jordan Valley had been strafed so heavily and indiscriminately during the war by Israeli aircraft, almost all of the residents of the area—some 75,000 persons—had in fact fled for shelter to East Jordan. Now it is popularly believed in the West Bank that lists of the "absentee landowners" from the region are kept by the Israeli Border Guards at the Allenby Bridge crossing from East Jordan, and that they are specifically prevented from re-entering, even for a family visit, for fear that they will attempt to reclaim their lands.

With the villages in the foothills ascending from the valley floor, Israel has resorted more often to direct land confiscation, rather than the use of the "absentee property" procedure. The story related at the beginning of this discussion concerning the village of Akraba, which had its lands "closed," then defoliated when the villagers still tried to plant their crops, then ploughed under when the Akraba people persisted even further in their efforts, is but one example of the fate of many of these foothill villages. Another village, Beit Furik, has also lost two-thirds of its lands: an economist familiar with the conditions in the villages estimates that Beit Furik lost half its income with the confiscations, and that every family among the 7,000 villagers had been affected by the seizure of the land. In order to sustain their families, many of the men of Beit Furik have turned to wage labor for the Israelis.

Prefab house typical of smaller West Bank settlements.



Building massive apartment complexes in Arab East Jerusalem.



The West Bank Highlands

Most of the 800,000 Palestinians of the West Bank live in the area's highlands, inhabiting its numerous ancient villages and the scattering of towns that run down the spine of the mountainous terrain. For generations the residents have farmed the small parcels of olive and grape groves encircling terraced hillsides, the fruit trees and vegetable patches spread across the meandering valley floors; the more barren hills were sowed with winter wheat to catch the seasonal rains. Such land is not well suited to the modern capital-intensive agriculture favored by Israelis on their farms in the coastal plains, the Jordan Valley or the Gaza Strip. With the exception of the urbanized projects built around East Jerusalem (and, on a smaller scale, Kiryat Arba, an urban settlement bordering the major Palestinian town of Hebron), the Labor Party governments permitted few settlements here, and toyed with ideas of turning much of this thickly populated area back to limited Jordanian rule in the event of a final peace settlement with Jordan.

Only with the assumption of power by Begin's Likud government in 1977 did a rush of settlement activity commence. In less than three years, the Begin government oversaw the creation of 16 new highland settlements, populated by 2,000 Israelis. None of these new settlements are agricultural; some have industrial projects on them, but most settlers must commute to jobs in pre-1967 Israel. By mid-1980, Israeli settlements in the highlands controlled 39 square miles of land, excluding the territory taken around East Jerusalem.

Begin's government likes to boast that these new settlements are being built on state land, previously controlled by Jordan and unilaterally transferred to the Israeli state after conquest. In reality, however, only six of these new settlements are solely on such state land; 97 percent of the area controlled by the highland settlements are on private lands confiscated from individual Palestinians, and given the shortage of appropriate state land, most new construction necessarily will be on lands taken from Palestinians.

One such instance is the settlement of Ariel. Begun in 1978, the settlement sits on 123 acres of confiscated land taken from Palestinian farmers in an area of the central highlands famous for its olive groves. New plans exist for this little cluster of prefabricated homes, now housing a nucleus of employees from the Israeli military industries to expand into a major city, with a projected population of 40,000 or more. The Israeli military government issued seizure orders in the spring of 1979 for 790 more acres of land which, the order stated, "were needed for military objectives."

Walking over the rocky hills of this recently expropriated land

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one sees groves of olive trees, small fields marked off by stones, some planted with corn, others used during winter for crops of wheat. Some patches are no longer cultivated; in a sense these had already been taken by the inflation which accompanied the occupation. A municipal council member from the nearby Palestinian town of Salfit explains: "It used to be that with hard work a family could live on crops from a little bit of land on this hill. But since 1967 with the Israeli absorption of our economy the prices have become very high, and what would feed a family before the occupation can starve them now. So people leave their land, and find jobs with the Israelis."

II. THE GAZA STRIP

Fifty miles southwest of the West Bank and separated politically from it since 1948, the Gaza Strip was also conquered by Israel in 1967 and has since faced similar extensive land confiscations, forceable removal of populations and the influx of Jewish settlers. Although the 140 square miles of the Strip make it only seven percent of the size of the West Bank, its population is considerable, with over 430,000 Palestinian residents, a majority dwelling in shanty-like refugee camps since the loss of their original homes elsewhere in Palestine with the creation of Israel in 1948. Though haunted with saddening poverty, the Strip has strong economic assets, principally its abundance of ground water and its sandy rich soil, large areas of which are covered with Palestinian owned citrus groves, producing oranges for profitable export. The Israelis have also come to prize the area's agricultural resources, especially its potential for producing hothouse vegetables and flowers for winter export to Europe.

Israeli land confiscation and settlement have been concentrated in the southern sector of the Strip. In January and February 1972, Ariel Sharon, then commander of the southern district, carried out operations designed to "clear" the approaches to Rafiah, a town at the southern end of the Strip, of its Bedouin population. In a "cleared area" of 33,000 acres, stretching across the Gaza border into northern Sinai, some 1,500 families were evicted in a brutal campaign: their homes were bulldozed, sometimes with the families' possessions still inside; wells were sealed; and the almond trees and other orchards of the Bedouin were uprooted.

Some 30 percent of this land was earmarked for Jewish settlement; the remainder was to remain "empty," as a supposed security precaution. When the Camp David Treaty was signed in March 1979 and the bordering area of the northern Sinai was scheduled for eventual return to Egypt, a new urgency was suddenly seen for the expansion of the expropriated areas of southern Gaza into a Jewish "buffer zone," to separate from the Sinai the Arab population of the Strip. Three existing settlements of the Katif block are to be supplemented by three new civilian agricultural settlements and a military settlement. Ariel Sharon, the architect of the original Rafiah evictions, and now Begin's agricultural minister is pushing for the prompt expropriation of an additional 2,800 acres, some in the vicinity of the southern Gazan Strip city of Khan Yunis, for the building of other settlements to be added to the existing Katif settlement block.

III. ISRAELI ROBBERY OF PALESTINIAN WATER

Not only is every square yard of earth, rocky or fertile, ultimately at contest in the occupied areas; each drop of water is also an object of struggle, whether it falls as rain onto the hilly western edge of the West Bank, bubbles up from a spring in the Jordan Valley, or is pumped to the surface in a Gaza well.

The West Bank highland hills are the watershed of the West Bank. To the east of the hilltops, Israel's water policies are dominated by the rising demand of its agricultural settlements; to the west; they are aimed at satisfying needs within what Israelis call the "Green Line," the old pre-1967 border.

The rainfall on the western slopes of the West Bank highlands

feeds the aquifer (the porous rock layers which transmit water) beneath the Israeli coastal plain. There it is pumped to the surface to meet the needs of Israeli agriculture, heavily dependent upon irrigation, as well as industrial and domestic demand. Approximately 30 percent of the total water Israelis use within the Green Line each year originates as rainfall in the West Bank. This is a matter of far-reaching strategic importance: Israel would face economic catastrophe if it lost its access to the rainfall of the West Bank.

A nightmare of Israeli water planners is an independent Palestinian state in the West Bank which uses its water potential for its own development, drilling wells along the West Bank anticline and catching the water for agricultural development in the West Bank before that water could flow into the water table beneath the Israeli coastal plain.

Almost immediately after returning from the Camp David talks in the U.S. in the fall of 1978, Menachem Begin appointed a committee to formulate an Israeli position on aspects of autonomy. That committee, headed by Yitzak Ben-Elissar, received a memorandum from the Israeli Water Commission, warning that not only did a free hand in establishing new settlements in the occupied areas depend upon continuing Israeli control of the West Bank's water policies under an "autonomy" scheme; but that Israeli water needs within the Green Line itself necessitated continued control of the West Bank watershed. The Ben Elissar committee in turn advised the Israeli Cabinet that Israel must have the final say in water policies under any future arrangement arrived at concerning the West Bank under the "autonomy" scheme. Israel has since consistently maintained this position in talks concerning the future of the West Bank.

Development of West Bank Domestic Water Supply Thwarted

But Israeli views on water are not only an issue in peace talks about the future; they have already had grave effects on numerous Palestinian communities. The West Bank municipality of Ramallah, for example, has been pressured into agreeing to Israeli insistence that it gain partial alleviation of its water needs by taking some water from the Israeli National Water Carrier system. This partial integration into the national Israeli water network was resisted by many Palestinians as constituting one more step in Zionist plans to integrate the occupied areas into a Greater Israel, but their final acquiescence was caused by the area's severe water shortage which Israeli policy had worked to compound. Since 1967 Israeli authorities had thwarted a number of attempts by the Ramallah Water Board to create an autonomous water supply system sufficient to meet the area's needs.

When the Israeli army conquered the West Bank in 1967, for instance, the Jordanian government was nearing completion of a project to increase the water supply to Ramallah by digging new wells 12 miles to the west at Shibteen. With the imposition of the occupation, the Israelis ordered the well diggings to stop. "The Israelis say no simply because as they see it every drop of water we pump from our own ground in Shibteen for our own use here is one drop less that will flow into their aquifer," a West Bank hydrologist comments.

Part of the water for Ramallah is pumped from a well completed before 1967 in the valley of Ein Samieh. Roman ruins in the deep valley bear mute witness to the fact that the land here has been tilled even in antiquity. Until the initiation by Jordan of the water project at Ein Samieh shortly before 1967, the land was irrigated by water coursing through earthen canals from the Ein Samieh spring. The Jordanian project was to have had wells both for agricultural use by the Ein Samieh farmers and for the domestic consumption in Ramallah. But with the occupation, Israel refused to grant a permit to the Ramallah Water Board to complete the project as planned, and in order to supply domestic consumption needs, the Board was forced to purchase the water rights of the Ein Samieh farmers. Now the land around Ein

Samieh, once locally famous for the onions grown there, is parched dry and nothing green sprouts from the earth. Many of the farmers, descendants of countless generations of farmers, have turned to wage labor, eking out a living in the nearby quarries and elsewhere. Others manage to subsist from their flocks or grow winter wheat crops. Meanwhile, the Israeli settlement of Kfar Shuba, within sight of the new desert at Ein Samieh, has seemingly no difficulty in receiving permission to bore new wells for water for its own use.

A rather similar situation has afflicted the Salfit area, west of Nablus. When the West Bank was seized by the Israelis in 1967, wells were being bored to supply a number of villages in the area. Since these villages had no municipal water supply, they were forced to buy water delivered by tank trucks in the summer when their cisterns—which collect water during the winter rains—run dry. In the summer of 1979, after refusing for 12 years permission for completion of the project, the Israeli authorities themselves



finished it; but instead of flowing to Salfit area villages, the water is pumped to the nearby Jewish settlement of Elqana.

Palestinian Agriculture Destroyed

Since 1967, the Israeli Water Company, Mekorot, has drilled 17 wells for the use of Israeli settlements in the Jordan Valley. While the 314 Palestinian agricultural wells in the entire West Bank drew 33 million cubic meters of water in 1977-78, the 17 Israeli wells just in the Jordan Valley drew 14.1 million cubic meters of water, or a remarkable 30 percent of all the water pumped for agricultural use in the West Bank.

These Israeli wells have had a number of harmful effects on the Palestinian agricultural water supply. The most direct and disastrous impact has occurred when Israeli wells are drilled near Palestinian springs or wells, lowering the water table so that the Palestinian irrigation supply is dried up.


The village of al Auja in the Jordan Valley has suffered such a fate. Since ancient times, the fields of al Auja have been irrigated by water from a spring above the village. After the conquest of the West Bank in 1967, the Israeli Military Government took over a Jordanian project to drill a supplementary well near the spring

and drilled two other deep bore wells nearby as well.

By the summer of 1979, the water in the old irrigation canals from the spring to the Palestinian farms at al Auja were dust dry. Meanwhile, the irrigation pipes leading from the three wells were cool to the touch, as water flowed from the lowered water table beneath the al Auja spring to the nearby Israeli settlements.

The loss of spring water killed the bananas of al Auja, turning some 375 acres to ugly brown stumps, bearing here and there a grotesque black fruit. The citrus groves also succumbed to irreversible damage, some 100 acres of trees full of pale brown crackling leaves, the trees forever incapable of bearing fruit. The annual loss of income has been estimated at \$2.75 million, and, of course, the Palestinian farmers have also lost their investment in their trees.

While the citrus and bananas of al Auja died, the bananas, grapes and other crops thrived in the new Israeli settlements supplied by the wells near al Auja spring: Na'aran and Kibbutz Yitav, built on 750 acres of land confiscated from al Auja villagers, are flourishing. While Palestinian women and children of the area are forced in the dry summer to carry jerry cans on donkey back to draw water from the two taps which Israeli authorities opened in the Israeli pipes to provide limited quantities of water for home consumption, a young kibbutznik at Yitav shrugged her shoulders: "Water problem? No, we have plenty here, as you can see." And, indeed, the lawns of Yitav grow green under the spray of sprinklers.



ROBBERY OF PALESTINIAN WATER: (top left) new Israeli pumping system dries up al Auja spring, (lower left) leaving only two water taps for Arab villagers and (upper right) destroying Arab citrus, while (lower right) nearby Israeli settlements have enough water to build swimming pools.

At Na'aran a swimming pool is under construction; pending its completion the settlers swim at the pool of another settlement further up the Jordan Valley.

The al Auja villagers have applied in vain to the Israeli Military Government for permission to drill a well to reestablish their water supply. "The villagers have the funds available for a well," said a worker for a voluntary agency, "so why does the Israeli government refuse the permit? Because they want the fields of al Auja to die and those of the settlements to flourish."

The drying up of the al Auja spring is unfortunately not an isolated instance. Since the occupation 12 Palestinian springs and wells used for irrigation have dried up, as the apparent result of nearby Israeli wells lowering the water table. The Palestinian villages of Bardala and Tubas are among those which have lost their agricultural water supplies.

SETTLER TRUCK STOP: At the center of the Israeli agricultural settlements of the Jordan Valley is the thriving fast food, drink and jukebox-like hangout run by Phatza'el settlement. Topped by a Coca Cola sign, it uncannily resembles similar establishments existing in rural U.S., with the exception that here the customers are usually armed with uzi sub-machine guns and it is Arab Palestinians that one finds served outside by the back door.

Overlooking the truck stop is a gigantic Israeli sculptured monument, looking a little like a giant's rifle and pointed eastward towards Jordan, which commemorates the 1967 conquest of the territories of the West Bank.



Discrimination Against Arab Farmers

Moreover, the Israelis are taking draconian measures to limit the utility of still functioning Palestinian water sources. In 1976, the Israeli Military Government ordered meters installed on the wells of Palestinians in the Jericho area, and the next year set limits to the water which the farmers could pump. Karim Khalaf, mayor of Ramallah, reports that he owns 150 acres of land in the Jordan Valley, but that now he is able to plant only 25 of those acres because of the pumping limit imposed by the Israeli Military Government.

In other instances, the refusal of Israel to permit the improvement of Palestinian agricultural water supply cannot be explained by any limitation it might put on the supply to Israeli settlements, but only by an apparent determination to prevent Palestinian development. At Jiflik, in a richly fertile valley intersecting with the Jordan Valley, the Palestinian farmers are currently irrigating their lush crops by using the traditional system of ditches. An American voluntary organization arranged funding for a project which would have replaced the open canals with pipes, thus conserving water that is now lost through evaporation, and allowing the farmers to irrigate more acreage without drawing more water. The Israeli Military Government's refusal to permit this project was justified by Ariel Sharon, Israeli Agriculture Minister, who reportedly said, "We won't let the Arabs go thirsty. But they didn't develop their water resources for agricultural use before 1967, so we won't let them do it now."

Farmers in the Gaza Strip have been hit with similar restrictive policies from the Israeli Military Government. In Gaza new Israeli settlements are exploiting the water supplies very heavily, depending on the water they use for their hothouse tomatoes and export flowers on the same aquifer that supplies the lush Palestinian citrus groves of the Strip. For that reason the Israeli Military Government has refused since 1967 to allow Gazans to plant new citrus trees, even to replace damaged or diseased ones, without a special permit. The permits, according to Gazan growers, are consistently denied by authorities citing a "water shortage." The head of the Gaza Citrus Producers Board, Hasham Attan, says that during the occupation the number of acres of citrus planted in Gaza has declined from 19,260 acres to 17,780 acres a decline explained only in part by the dying of diseased or old trees. Another more painful cause of the decline has been the uprooting of citrus trees as punishment by the Military Government for "offenses" like having the grove in proximity to a spot from which a

grenade is thrown.

The Israelis have also severely restricted the digging of new wells by Gazans, while drilling for their settlements is rapid, perhaps even reckless. Moreover, the Israeli occupation authorities have imposed meters on the existing Palestinian wells, limiting the amount of water the farmers are permitted to draw from their own wells to 4,880 cubic meters per acre.

The restrictive policies are felt very keenly by the farmers of Gaza. One citrus grower relates a perhaps apocryphal anecdote that the well on his land, adjoining an Israeli settlement, "seems to have more water on Saturday, when the Israelis don't pump."

It is only within the last year or so that Palestinians in the occupied areas have become generally aware of the reality that the Israelis are taking their water as well as their land. The Military Government has been anxious to prevent dissemination of this information, censoring, for instance, an editorial on water restrictions prepared for publication in *Al Fajr*, an Arabic daily published in East Jerusalem. But the news spreads anyway, and with it an incredulous outrage. A bitter farmer repeated the phrases on the lips of many: "They take our land. They meter our own water. Next will they put meters on our air and try to tell us how much we can breathe?"

IV. THE SETTLERS

An Israeli woman, her hair tucked under a scarf in the manner of the orthodox, stood defiantly on her hilltop settlement of Elkana and scanned the surrounding West Bank hills and valleys, referring to the territory by the Biblical names favored by the settlers: "Jews can live wherever they want anywhere else in the world. Why can't we live here in our own Shomron and Judea?"

The basic answer to her argument is the obvious one: settlements are a war crime, not an affirmation of human equality and community. The Israeli settlers are moving onto land arbitrarily confiscated from Palestinians, imposing their enclaves by force of arms, and their actions constitute a violation of Article 49(6) of the Geneva Convention, which defines the transfer of a part of the population of an occupying power into conquered territory as a war crime.

Moreover, many settlers—and most vociferously the new wave of Gush Emunim settlers—hope that they are coming to replace the Palestinians, not to live with them. Benny Katzover, a leader

of the Gush Emunim, said in an interview at Elon Moreh in the summer of 1979, "We wouldn't mind if in the future there were no Arabs here in Shomron and Judea. Of course, it is difficult to talk about these things publicly now, but we think that the Arabs will realize in time that it is our land, and they will just leave to another place. I think in 30 years there will be no more Arabs here."

Who are these settlers? From where do they come and why?

Western Jews from Israeli Middle Class

Sociologically, the settlers are by and large of Western descent, with professional or technical training. The exception to that general rule seems to be Tapuah, a new suburban settlement along the western ridge of the West Bank. It was intended to be a diamond polishing center populated by "Oriental" Jews, as those of Arab, African and Asian origin are called, but reports have it that homes there are hard to fill.

The settlements are highly homogeneous, with each containing only settlers of the same religious orientation and political leaning. The oldest settlements, particularly those put in the Jordan Valley soon after the 1967 war, contain settlers who are virtually all adherents of the Labor Party. These settlers are by and large secular, and stress—as did the Labor Party, in power when these settlements were established—the "security" value of their colonies, and downplay Biblical claims. They have not had much day-to-day tension with the Palestinian population, essentially because they are living in the splendid isolation strafed into existence for them by the Israeli Air Force during the 1967 War, which substantially depopulated extensive parts of the Valley.

The newer settlers, those from projects begun from the onset of the Likud government in 1977, tend to be associated with right-wing Zionist organizations and have a more contentious relationship with the West Bank Palestinian population. These are the settlers who are living "between and among" the "minorities," to use the words of the Drobles Master Plan for the settlements. These settlers, many of whom belong to the Gush Emunim, are living in suburban settlements scattered along the highlands of the West Bank. Most of their settlements are no older than three years, though the nuclei of some of them go back to the time of the Labor Government. The militant Kiryat Arba settlement near Hebron, for example, traces its origins to the action of Rabbi Moshe Levinger, who occupied the Park Hotel in Hebron in 1968 with a band of followers, eventually pressuring the Labor Government to tolerate their presence at a settlement adjoining Hebron.

These Gush Emunim settlers are deeply imbued with a religious ideology. They are often graduates of the State Religious School system, which has become a recruiting ground for the Gush and a source of jobs for its propagandists. These settlers have become the most aggressive political force on the Israeli scene today, and are becoming the latter-day Israeli counterparts to the Algerian *pied noirs*.

Pioneer Zionism

Life touched with dangerous adventure, infused by a renewed community, more healthy than city living—these are some of the qualities settlers attribute to their lives in the settlements. Even more strikingly, many settlers view themselves as renewing the pioneering spirit of the original Zionists who settled Palestine before 1948. "This is real Zionism, not staying in the same places our parents made," exults a woman in Ariel. Life in Petah Tikva, where she was reared, is not much different from the alienated life of a European city, she says, while "here the air is so much better, and we have so many clubs—geography clubs, chess clubs. It's really wonderful!"

These settlers live in a kind of Fort Apache of the mind. Fathers sling automatic rifles over their shoulders as they bring their



All settlements are overseen by guard towers and surrounded by elaborate barb wire defenses. Here the Kaddum settlers added a lightbulb-strung Star of David, lighting it at night so as to be seen for miles around by the Palestinian peasants of the area.

children to the playground, despite the fact that the settlement is guarded by the Israeli Army. Women say they never go to town without tucking a pistol into the glove compartment of their cars. But the danger which adds spice to their lives is often somewhat ersatz. A young woman in Ariel confided that since her settlement was built, "The PLO and the Saudis have been giving people money to build houses along the road [the newly constructed "trans-Samaritan Highway" connecting settlements through a center strip of the West Bank highlands]. We never know when they may come out of their new houses and make a roadblock. And a whole new village has been built just near the entrance to Ariel." The truth is that there are no new homes on the highway or adjoining Ariel, but the threat of imminent danger seems somehow a sustaining factor.

If some settlers see things which are not there, others do not see things which are. In general, the settlers seem oblivious to the reality of their surroundings: a dozen settlers interviewed were unable to name the Palestinian villages near their settlements. A woman in Elkana was not atypical when she pointed to the low hills around that settlement, with their Palestinian olive groves and winter wheat fields, and said, "You see, the Arabs do nothing with their land. They really want to sell it to us, but they are afraid of the Palestinians. The best thing is for the government to take it for us and to give them compensation."

"Then the Arab villagers here aren't Palestinians themselves?" "Who knows? But I don't think so. Perhaps there are Palestinians among them though, so they are afraid to sell their land to us." (Of course, in reality the villagers are all Palestinian Arabs.)

"So the government would really be doing the Arabs a favor if it seized their land?"

"Yes, I think you could say that. They don't want their land, and we do."

Personal Financial Gain

It is not difficult to understand why this particular woman of Elkana, her kitchen apron still around her waist from housework, speaks so eagerly about her settlement acquiring more land: it means that she, her husband and four children will be able to

move out of their small two room pre-fab into what she calls "a proper house." It may take a year or two, she predicts, but someday soon the government will begin building "proper houses" at Elkana. In the meantime she hardly lives in privation: her two air conditioned rooms are chock full of electrical appliances (if not to the extreme of a neighboring family who has three televisions in two rooms), and in addition to the special tax incentives for living in a settlement, she profits handsomely from the rent collected on an apartment the family owns in Bnai Brak. (Many of the settlers retain ownership of their previous apartments in metropolitan Israel, renting them out at rates far exceeding the subsidized rent and utility charges in the settlements.)

The material incentives for people living in agricultural settlements are even greater than those of the suburban settlements. The moshavim agricultural cooperatives of the Jordan Valley provide a good virtually risk-free, investmentless profit to settlers. One Jordan Valley settler, a recent Russian immigrant, took a brief break from his work—installing sophisticated plastic irrigation pipes on his land at Mehola, in a field which not long ago was cultivated by Palestinian peasants from Beit Dajan—and explained that through government grants of land, housing and agricultural equipment a man of no means can suddenly become something of an agricultural entrepreneur. About 40 percent of the settlers there, according to his estimate, subcontracted the harvesting and marketing of their fields to the recently dispossessed Palestinians, thus avoiding much of the labor, while bringing in a handsome profit. And because the agriculture of Mehola, like that in the other settlements, is subsidized by the Israeli government, the crops, when dumped on the market in the West Bank, undersell Palestinian produce.


In Gaza a young farmer in a hothouse introduces himself: he is from "Brooklyn and Far Rockaway." He had no experience as a farmer and no capital, but the government provided him with \$100,000 in infrastructure: the half acre hothouse, roads and utilities, a tractor to share with another moshav family. According to his figures, he is making a least \$20,000 a year on his tomatoes ("some do better"). In addition next year he is getting a hothouse for export of flowers, a very profitable crop, also given to him by the government. He laughs when asked about repayment of the government's loans, saying he does not even know the terms and does not expect that he will ever need to pay it back. He does not have any trouble doing all the work, he adds, explaining that when he needs help he hires a Gaza child for about \$1.60 a day. He points to a shantytown on the edge of the settlement, and says that it has grown up in the last few years as Gazans seeking work in the settlement put up huts nearby.

V. ZIONIST FUTURE, PALESTINIAN NIGHTMARE—U.S. BILLIONS

Such are major aspects of the settlement process unfolding across the Palestinian territory captured by Israel in 1967: over one third of the land already in Israeli hands, a sizeable amount of the water resources taken for Israeli use, a complex of spiritual and material incentives inspiring increasing numbers of Jews to join the settlements. The effect of this settlement process on native Palestinians has, of course, been profound, transforming their social and economic relations and in certain ways infusing them increasingly with a will and some means of resistance.

But when considering the obvious, quantifiable indicators in the struggle between settlers and the Palestinians, it appears that the battle might be distinctly unevenly matched. The settlers are backed up by the power of the Israeli state and its army of occupation—and behind that state stands the United States, with its huge aid and arms transfers.

While the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza have strong political links with their compatriots in exile, and see themselves



Israeli hothouses in Gaza Strip.

together with other Palestinian communities as represented by the Palestinian Liberation Organization, their geographic links to support are broken by well-guarded Israeli borders, by King Hussein's obstruction of PLO activity on the eastern Jordan border and Major Haddad's pro-Israeli "Enclavia of Free Lebanon" on the northern border.

It does not require a very vivid imagination to conjure up nightmare visions of Palestine in the year 2000: an asphalt ring around Jerusalem, Manhattan-thick with ugly multi-storied housing developments; a West Bank crisscrossed by lines of settlements, with agricultural colonies on all the cultivable land and on the hilltops suburbs of the cities of the coastal plain. A Gaza Strip with its citrus land and water all in the hands of settlers, the glass of their hothouses glittering in the morning sun as Palestinians stream out of the Strip each day to sweep the streets of Tel Aviv, to wait on tables for tourists at Mediterranean restaurants, to pick fruit and assemble electronic components for kibbutzim.

Such is a variant of the dream of the future which inspires many Israeli settlers; such is the nightmare which drives many a Palestinian to anguish, fervor and resistance.

But however insistent their conviction that God has given them the West Bank and Gaza, the Zionist settlers today are not expecting God to bring this dream of the future to fruition free of charge: increasingly large sums are being set aside in the Israeli government budget for settlements. In 1980 \$132 million has been officially earmarked from the Israeli government budget for the settlements. Settlement allocations, however, are buried in general budgets of the various government ministries, so the actual expenditures are higher. And in addition to official government funding, the settlements receive support through the Jewish Agency from funds collected abroad, principally in the United States. Reportedly the Jewish Agency is contributing \$78 million to settlements in 1980.

The issue, of course, is how Israel with its massive economic problems, including an inflation rate in excess of 120 percent, can sustain such massive outlays for settlements—not to mention the even more enormous military expenditures which underpin the settlements. Part of the answer lies in the social privations which the Israeli government imposes upon its own population: as Knesset member Pessah Grupper has pointed out, the amount of money which the Israeli government spent to house 17 families at the settlements of Elon Moreh and Jabal Kebir could have provided homes for 500 needy Israeli couples.

But even beyond the matter of allocation of funds in the Israeli budget, it is clear that only the infusion of huge U.S. subsidies to the general Israeli budget permits the Israeli government to indulge in the invidious luxury of settlements. For fiscal 1981, the Carter Administration is requesting nearly two billion dollars for aid to Israel, \$785 million in economic support and \$1.26 billion in military assistance. As the mayor of the Palestinian town of Halhoul, Mohammed Milhem, said in an interview before his 1980 deportation, "The blood that runs in the veins of the Israeli Military Governor is the American dollar." •

(continued from page 8)

committees" were to be responsible to the local regional council of settlements—thus clearly establishing a command structure outside the official Israeli military chain of command. However, the relations between the settlers' force and the official Israeli occupant force is very close. The concept of a settlers' military committee is said to have been suggested by a senior army officer during a meeting with representatives of West Bank settlements. The leadership of the "regional security committee" meets with the army command to discuss "daily security problems" and arrange for help in "solving" them.

Settler activists have told the press that they plan a network of people living within pre-1967 Israel but linked to each settlement and pledged to rush to the scene of an "emergency" when called.

THE TERRORISTS

In such an atmosphere, it could hardly be much of a challenge to organize a terrorist group. Meir Kahane had been calling upon the government for some time to take the initiative: "We're calling on the government to organize a Jewish terrorist group," he declared, "that would throw bombs and grenades and kill Arabs."

There is some speculation that the government, or some part of it, took Kahane's suggestion; that perhaps the Prime Minister's special anti-terrorist office, or perhaps a dissident grouping in the intelligence agencies or army was behind the bombings which left the Palestinian mayors and seven other West Bankers wounded. Evidence abounds, of course, that the Israeli government has created a climate conducive to Zionist terrorism, and by its dispensing of arms to settlers has equipped those most likely to engage in unofficial or quasi-official violence against the Palestinians of the occupied areas. But there is at yet no reason to believe that the terror groups are a government creation. Although with the opportunities the government has presented for the formation

of such groups, its responsibility for their acts is clear.

In May, yeshiva students discovered a cache of arms and ammunition on the roof of their school in the Old City in Jerusalem. Two active duty soldiers living in the yeshiva were arrested; they appear to have been associated with the Gush Emunim and Kahane's Kach. Few details were released, but on May 13, the Israeli government placed Kahane and an aide, Baruch Ben Yossef in administrative detention, saying only they were about to commit "a horrible crime."

Military sources, distressed by the government's inaction in the matter, leaked the details of the plot to *Israel and Palestine*, published in Paris. Only after publication there did the news reach the pages of the Israeli press. According to the account given to *I&P*, the conspirators planned to blow up the Al Aksa mosque, a place extremely holy to Moslems. They hoped to precipitate a crisis, during which "several" West Bank mayors were to be assassinated "starting with Karim Khalaf and Bassam Shaka'a." (This account was published before the bombing of the mayors' cars.)

The plot to bomb Al Aksa was apparently aborted with the arrest of Kahane, but as the world was soon to learn, terrorists did wire explosives to the cars of the mayors. An editor at *Haaretz*, an Israeli daily, reported a phone call from an anonymous man who "sounded like a young officer." The caller claimed to represent the "Sons of Zion," which took responsibility for the bombings of the mayors and said it would strike again: "We will fight the supporters of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Israeli Parliament, in the universities, on the West Bank."

CENTRAL AUTHORITY ERODED

The emergence of terrorist organizations signal the beginning of a disintegration of central authority in Israel. For the first time, the supposed stability of Israel is being questioned quite openly.

(continued on page 19)

The new Israeli plan for "Area Defense"—where reservists among the settlers serve in the West Bank when called to active duty—has the effect of minimizing the need to bring in soldiers who normally reside outside the area. Now, of course, the population pool in the West Bank from which reservists can be drawn is small, not more than 11,000 outside of Jerusalem, but settlement planners hope to increase that number ten-fold over the next five years.

While there has not been massive refusal of non-West Bank reservists to serve with the occupation forces, there have been some instances which must serve as worrisome omens to Israeli planners who are familiar with the growth of draft resistance in previous colonial situations. In a rather famous case in the summer of 1979, 27 Israeli high school students informed Ezer Weizman, then Minister of Defense, that "we will refuse to serve in the occupied territories." And in fact, when Dan Amir, aged 18, was ordered to board a truck for basic training at Beit El, near Ramallah, he refused, and was later sentenced to 35 days in prison. As another of the 27 students said, "on the personal level, I am unable to take part in suppressing another people. I know that I shall not be able to put down a demonstration that I myself would have like to take part in."

The policy of relying on settlers for reserve duty in the occupation forces can also minimize the political difficulties which result from bringing in young men who may be shocked by what they see in the West Bank. One group of 18-year-



PROGRESSIVE ISRAELIS OPPOSED TO OCCUPATION blocked by Army from West Bank protest on May 11, 1980.

old soldiers, for example, went to Uri Arneri, liberal member of the Israeli Knesset, to report the outrages which they had seen in the West Bank last May. They were supposed to assist the Border Guard in a West Bank town, and reported in detail on receiving wooden clubs and the following instructions from a high officer on beating curfew violators:

"Anyone you catch outside, you first beat with clubs all over the body, except the head. Have no mercy, break all his bones! If you catch a small child, order his whole family out, make

them stand in a row and beat the father in front of his children. Don't treat this beating as a privilege: it's a duty! They understand no other way."

A soldier told Avneri that "the majority of the soldiers followed the orders because they were orders and didn't think at all." He commented that while the soldiers were mistreating the Palestinians, he noticed "an atmosphere of terror and fear among the inhabitants" which reminded him of stories about "the maltreatment of the Jews during the Holocaust."

Youths targeted by State Dept., FBI, INS

Palestinians in U.S. Face Harassment

The U.S. Government has stepped up its campaign of harassment of Palestinians living in this country. Three separate cases point to increased U.S.-Israeli collaboration through U.S. courts and agencies, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the FBI and the State Department.

The main players in the case of Ziad Abu Ein are a secretive, cabinet-level committee under the direction of National Security Advisor Brzezinski, while in Elias Ayoub's case a central figure is an INS district level official in Columbus, Ohio, apparently on a personal vendetta. In the third case, that of a student at Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, the villain is a Special Agent of the FBI waging war on thoughtcrimes.

Despite these differences, however, the picture that emerges is one of increased coordination between Israel and the United States in attempting to silence the voices of Arab people who in any way speak out against U.S. policies in the Middle East.

ABU EIN FACES EXTRADITION

A 19-year old Palestinian from the West Bank, Ziad Abu Ein, has been held since August 21, 1979 without bail in Cook County Jail in Chicago, Illinois. The Israeli Government is demanding his extradition to face charges of planting an explosive device in Tiberias, Israel on May 14, 1979 that killed two people and injured 36 others.



Ziad Abu Ein

The evidence the Israeli Government presented to the U.S. to implicate Abu Ein in the bombing was a statement by a Palestinian, Jamal Yassin, made from an Israeli jail, written in Hebrew (a language Yassin does not speak), signed in Arabic and later recanted by Yassin.

Abu Ein's defense is that he never left Ramallah on the day of the bombing. His lawyers have produced nine sworn affidavits accounting for Abu Ein's movements that day, from his family, workers in the family shop, a lawyer, two doctors and the president of the Ramallah Islamic Club.

Though Abu Ein voluntarily turned himself in once the warrant for his arrest in the United States was issued, his requests for bail have been repeatedly denied.

Just a few days before the bombing in Tiberias, an event took place in San Francisco which set in motion a chain of events which was to have a major impact on Abu Ein. A Federal District Court there upheld the principle that political offenses were not extraditable and refused the British Government's request for the extradition of Peter McMullen, accused of bombing British Army Barracks at Claro in 1974. The judge in that case ruled that the Irish Republican Army conducted "terrorist or guerilla activities" but that these were "acts of political violence with a political end." Once the political character of the crime has been established, the prosecution must refute the evidence or extradition cannot take place.

This ruling was a serious blow to the U.S. Government's Special Coordination Committee on Terrorism, overseen by Zbigniew Brzezinski, and to the State Department's efforts to project a tough anti-terrorist stand internationally. Evidence indicates that in September of last year Brzezinski's committee resolved to reverse the McMullen decision by singling out the Abu Ein case for a special effort to eliminate in practice the political exception to extradition requests.

So far, things have been going according to their plan. During the hearings in September and October 1979, U.S. Magistrate Ol-

ga Jurco refused repeated defense efforts to introduce evidence that would disprove Israeli charges. She ruled against the admission of Yassin's recantation. She ruled against testimony showing the systematic use of torture against Palestinians held in Israeli jails. She ruled against the admission of the affidavits accounting for Abu Ein's whereabouts the day of the bombing. She ruled against evidence showing that Abu Ein could not receive a fair trial in Israel.

The defense was allowed to present testimony about the Israeli-Arab conflict from such witnesses as Rabbi Elmer Berger, former U.S. Vice Counsel Alexandra Johnson, George Washington University Law School Dean Charles Thomas Mallison, and Hebron Mayor Fahd Qawasme. She refused, however, to hear testimony about indiscriminate killings, bombings and other mayhem perpetrated by Israel against Arabs. But she had little hesitation in allowing the prosecution to introduce into evidence many statements on airplane hijackings, kidnapping of diplomats and other acts of violence unrelated to the Abu Ein case.

The central argument of the State Department, whose direct intervention was unprecedented in an extradition hearing, was that the case involved a "common crime" and was not of a political character. Their key witness was Louis Fields, Legal Counsel for the Office for Combating Terrorism. He explained that the bombing in Tiberias was in view of the U.S. Government the indiscriminate murder of civilians. It was a clear-cut case of terrorism, he said, and the political exception does not apply in this case, nor in any case of terrorism.

In the end, it was Fields whom the magistrate (a political appointee who usually handles arraignments and sets bonds) believed. Fields had been successful in convincing the magistrate that the security of the United States, and major international commitments made by the President, hinged on her decision. On December 18, 1979, Magistrate Jurco ruled that Abu Ein be extradited.

The aging Zionist Julius Hoffman, internationally notorious for his role in the Chicago 7 case in 1969, was assigned to hear the appeal. Hoffman is generally believed by the legal community to favor the Government when it is a party in a case; he has been active in Zionist causes and is linked, through his wife, with the Brunswick Corporation, supplier to Israel of key components for missiles and other weapons.

Hoffman was removed from the case after legal struggle over his probable bias. On March 28, 1980, Judge Frank J. McGarr upheld the extradition order.

Abu Ein's attorneys have filed further appeals. Abu Ein himself is still being denied bail, and despite the court rulings is still fighting, and winning more support from groups and individuals in the U.S.

FBI PRESSURES IBRAHIM YOUSSEF

When the FBI called Ibrahim Youssef last January, they told him to come in for a "routine check" of his immigration status. Youssef, a Palestinian graduate student at Lehigh University in Pennsylvania, grew up in refugee camps around Beirut and has been active in working for Palestinian rights while studying in Ohio and Oklahoma.

It was no "routine check". Special Agent Vincent Kapizula grilled Youssef for more than two hours, told him that he was a member of the PLO ("and that's illegal") and asked him detailed questions about his political activity and associations. The FBI, Youssef was told, had "physical evidence" that he had engaged in actions against the security of the United States. The FBI agent offered Youssef three choices. He could work for the FBI and report on active Arab students in the United States, or he could be deported to Lebanon where the U.S. would spread rumors that Youssef had been an informant for the FBI (Agent Kapizula said, "You wouldn't be safe," while pantomiming firing a pistol at Youssef). Or, the special agent said, the U.S. could jail him for 20 years.

The FBI would not take Youssef's refusal to inform as a final answer and called Youssef back a few weeks later. This time he brought with him the Chairman of his department at Lehigh. As long as Youssef's professor was there, the meeting was routine. When he left, however, Youssef was given a polygraph test. Agent Kapizula told Youssef that he failed the test, and now had only two choices. He could be deported to Israel or he could work for the FBI, finish his studies and "get a good job at Western Electric."

Undeterred by these threats and bolstered by support from others, Youssef has decided to continue to speak out on the Palestinian issue; he has refused to be intimidated by the FBI.

AYOUB THREATENED WITH DEPORTATION

Another Palestinian student is being punished for thought crimes by the U.S. without trial; he faces deportation to Israel and a possible 10 year prison sentence. Elias Ayoub, whose home is Nazareth, had been studying in this country for more than four years when he was suddenly accused of



Elias Ayoub

(continued from page 17)

In September 1979, in perhaps the first public discussion of a possible need to move away from the kind of "democratic regime" Israel has had to date, the editor of the major Hebrew daily, *Yediot Aharanot*, wrote that Israelis might "have to opt for a less democratic rule, provided it is strong enough and firm enough to assure our survival, because our existence is more important than the individual freedom of each one of us." Prime Minister Begin, in what was described as only a "half-joking" tone, explained that his refusal to appoint Ariel Sharon as Defense Minister (replacing Ezer Weizman) was the result of a fear that Sharon might "surround the Prime Minister's office with tanks" should acts of civilian government incur the displeasure of the far right.

The Israeli army is becoming more and more powerful within Israeli society: commandeering an ever-larger share of the budget; consuming the products of an increasingly important military sector of industry; establishing its direct links with the U.S. Pentagon; and asserting its own political voice. One fear is that this

violation of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) regulations.

Ayoub had been an outspoken advocate of Palestinian rights and worked on the Sami Esmail Defense Committee. Despite his grade point average of 3.67, and his degree earned in only three years at Ohio State University, the INS charged that Ayoub "lacked educational goals" and was "stalling for time to stay in the U.S."

The real story of INS' concern with Ayoub's politics, rather than his academic progress, emerged after lawyers successfully filed for documents under the Freedom of Information Act. The files indicated that the FBI had investigated him, and the files contained the allegation that Ayoub was a member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The files had no evidence to back up this charge which Ayoub says is a "big lie," but in Israel—to which the INS seeks to deport him—membership in the PFLP is a crime, punishable by up to 10 years in prison.

Demonstrations on Ayoub's behalf have occurred in several cities. Last November, when the appeal reached Washington, D.C., the INS reversed the decision of its Ohio office and sent the case back to Cincinnati. Such reversals almost always means the end of the matter, since remanding it back to the local office is a sign of disapproval by the INS in Washington. In this case, however, what almost never happens is what did happen: the Cincinnati office stood by its original order, causing some observers to speculate the District Officer was intent on making a career out of the Elias Ayoub deportation order. Now the case is before the INS in Washington again, with the outlook uncertain. Ayoub's attorneys feel that public pressure had a decisive effect on the last hearing, and hope that continued pressure will put the matter to rest once and for all.

WHAT YOU CAN DO: Letters protesting U.S. government attempts to extradite Ziad Abu Ein should be sent to Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, D.C. 20520. For additional materials on this case, you can contact the Abu Ein Defense Committee, P.O. Box 5421, Chicago, Illinois 60680.

The Elias Ayoub Defense Committee asks people to send protest letters to Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C. 20536 and to Attorney General Civiletti, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. 20530. Contact Ayoub's Defense Committee through the PSC in New York.

To counteract the widespread harassment of Arabs in the U.S. by the FBI, the Palestine Solidarity Committee in Washington, D.C. has prepared a pamphlet in both English and Arabic entitled, "You, Your Rights and the FBI." Copies can be ordered from the PSC in New York or from the Palestine Solidarity Committee, P.O. Box 57154, Washington, D.C. 20037.

military power, joined to the civilian right, could move against the parliamentary system.

Very specific concern has been voiced about what would happen should Begin's Likud Coalition government be voted out of power in the next elections. Arthur Schlesinger, a leading American liberal, wrote recently in the *Wall Street Journal* that "Israeli intellectuals fear that the recent rise in fanaticism, violence and paramilitary activity may even threaten the disintegration of Israel's democratic institutions." Schlesinger raised the spectre that should Begin lose in the elections, he would turn to "unbridled opposition," and mobilize his followers to resist withdrawal from the West Bank in a manner which could "accelerate the disintegration of Israel's democratic institutions."

Yigal Yadin, the Deputy Prime Minister, recently declared that, "If the [Labor Party] Alignment returns to power, civil war is probable." *Yediot Aharanot* commented that, "That this unclear sentence can have only one meaning: Yadin thinks that the Greater Israel fanatics will prefer civil war to obeying the orders of a legally elected government for concessions on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip."

**MEDIA WATCH MEDIA WATCH MEDIA WATCH MEDIA WATCH MEDIA WATCH MEDIA WATCH
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Who writes the *Washington Post* editorials on the Palestinian issue? The *Jerusalem Post* correspondent at the Copenhagen United Nations Conference on Women seems to be the unacknowledged co-author of the *Washington Post's* editorial on "Copenhagen and the PLO." The *Post's* August 2 editorial derided the vote of an overwhelming majority of the delegates approving an amendment to provide programs of assistance to Palestinian women "in consultation and cooperation with the Palestine Liberation Organization"; and a key piece of the *Post's* mockery appears to have lifted almost straight from Joan Borsten's dispatch in the *Jerusalem Post* of July 27.

The *Washington Post* editorial declared that "The Russian delegate shouted 'da' for the Ukrainian delegate. When the Pakistani woman, confused, voted on the other side, the assembly howled with laughter and she switched. Third World delegates exulted as the tally mounted. Once the vote was over, delegates apologized for their votes, some Western delegates—who mostly abstained—to the Arabs, and non-aligned delegates to the West."


Now read what the *Jerusalem Post* printed six days earlier in its July 27 edition: "The Russian delegate actually yelled out 'da' when the Ukrainian vote came, and then a 'da' for her own country. When Pakistan, confused, voted with the West, the assembly howled with laughter and the delegate had to change her vote....Everyone was having a great time watching the anti-West votes add up. To make matters worse, once the voting was over delegates began apologizing publicly for their vote—the West to the Arabs, the non-aligned to the West."

The inadequacies of U.S. journalism in the matter of the Copenhagen Conference exceed a bit of cribbing from the *Jerusalem Post*, however. The press generally portrayed the conference as a kind of circus which had been hijacked by a dangerous group of Palestinian terrorists—and then gave but minimal space to this remarkable version of reality, and more often than not put their skewed and sketchy coverage on the home or woman's page.

* * * * *

People in the U.S. simply are not as well-informed about affairs in the Mideast—and even about their own government's role there—as are people in other parts of the world. One stunning example of the way the U.S. media continues to "tone down" coverage of the atrocities of Israeli occupation comes from a comparison of the coverage of the June 2 bombings of two West Bank mayors, as presented by the international and domestic editions of *Newsweek*. Those who bought the June 16th issue of *Newsweek* in the U.S. saw Ted Turner grinning at them from the cover ("A Sports King Tackles TV News"). Anywhere else in the world, *Newsweek* readers saw the bomb shattered car of the Mayor of Nablus on the cover, along with an inset photo of the wounded Mayor Bassam Shaka'a. The international edition's article was more than twice as long as the domestic edition's.

The domestic edition has a distinctly differ-



The *Newsweek* cover Americans never saw.

ent slant on the probable ethnic identity of the anti-Palestinian terrorists. The international edition flatly asserts that "Israeli civilians had turned to all-out terror." But the domestic edition, while granting that even in Israel "the mayhem was widely attributed to right-wing Jewish fanatics," blandly asserted that "Israeli investigators were unable to say whether the West Bank bombs had been rigged by Jews or Arabs." (A rather remarkable statement; how could the *Newsweek* reporters ascertain whether the failure of the Israeli investigators to identify the ethnic origins of the bombers stemmed from the investigators' unwillingness or inability to do so?)

But even more significantly, the international edition carried a long sidebar on the Israeli terrorists which was omitted almost entirely from the domestic edition. U.S. readers lost the chance to read some of the strongest language yet printed in the establishment media about their compatriot Meir Kahane and his Kach organization, built largely on a cadre of U.S. citizens. This is what the international edition said about him—and what the domestic edition did not say: "Kahane's Kach...is seen as a dumping ground for young thugs. Some of them never bother to learn Hebrew and they often return home after a few months of hell-raising on the West Bank." Of the "Israeli terrorists of today," the international edition said "Some are religious fanatics. A handful of others act out of twisted personal motives. They tend to be young, foreign born misfits who mouth religious jargon but get their kicks out of Arab bashing. Says one observer, 'They are the Ku Klux Klan of Israel.'"

* * * * *

Last April when Arab Liberation Front commandos raided the Israeli kibbutz Misgav Am, the *New York Times*, the *Washington Post*, the wire services, all had the news of the death of a two year old Israeli child in great detail—his name, his parents' grief, the remark of Israeli Prime Minister Begin at his funeral, the pathetic scene in the Kibbutz nursery ("wind through the shattered windows of the children's house, whipping shredded brightly colored curtains like torn battle flags. One side of the mattress in a crib in a corner was soaked with blood. Toys stood cracked and splintered by bullets," David Shipler wrote in the *New York Times* on April 8.

It was less than two weeks later that a two year old Lebanese child—along with the child's mother and some 18 other people—were killed in an Israeli "reprisal" raid at Sarafand in Lebanon. This news was buried in paragraph nine of an AP story in the *New York Times* on April 19; it never made the headline of the story, which dealt with a clash between the UNIFIL troops and the pro-Israeli Haddad forces in southern Lebanon. The child's name never made the papers, not to mention any description of the mourning family, the funeral, or the pathos of the child's place of death. The *Washington Post* carried no mention at all of the incident.

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