



# PALESTINE RESISTANCE BULLETIN

In Solidarity with the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine


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## SEPTEMBER COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN JORDAN! a critical analysis PARTS 2+3



Demonstration in Amman against Roger's "Peace" plan

### EDITORIAL:

#### WILL 1971 BE ANOTHER 1948?

The royalist counter-revolution in Jordan last September — to which we have devoted two issues of the Bulletin — has clearly exposed the bankruptcy of the bourgeois leadership of the Palestinian people and its inability to continue on the road of national liberation. The war of 1967 — in a similar fashion — had exposed to the Arab masses the rotten character of "their" "progressive" regimes. It also dealt an ideological defeat to the pseudo-socialism of petty-bourgeois Arab nationalism; that of Nasserism and that of the Ba'ath Party.

The meeting of the eighth Palestinian National Council in Cairo last month demonstrated that major contingents of the resistance movement have not yet absorbed the lessons of September, despite the heavy toll, paid with blood by Palestinian and Jordanian martyrs. These weaknesses expressed themselves in two ways: On the one hand we witness a collaborationist tendency from some who are taking conciliatory positions toward the Jordanian regime under the guise of 'taking tactical advantages of contradictions (!) within the monarchy'. The disarming of large sections of the people's militia in Amman, and the steady squeeze of the feda'yeen by the army toward the countryside, and away from the cities (and the

masses) are the first fruits of this 'tactical' retreat. On the other hand, there emerge elements in the movement (spearheaded by Brig. General Abdul Razzaq Yahya of the P.L.A.) openly calling for an imposed 'merger' as a step towards a national unity of all resistance contingents. The suggested platform of the P.L.O. which ignores — among other things — the necessity for a strategy of struggle against Arab counter-revolution, and Jordanian reaction in particular.

Such a strategy is a central requirement for continuing the struggle against the Zionist occupation in the light of the *acceleration of the Rogers 'Peace' Plan by the imperialists and the revisionists?* Every party to this settlement has taken full opportunity of the Palestinian retreat. Thus Sadat informally (and indefinitely) extends the cease-fire and the Jarring 'Peace' talks (UN), which are temporarily suspended, seem to have achieved their objectives. Golda Meir, in a recent interview with the *Times* of London (March 13, 1971), outlines in extreme detail the territories Israel will annex permanently as her conditions for a settlement. Finally, while Nixon suddenly recognizes the "rights of the Palestinian people" (as opposed to the 'Arab refugees'), an 'independent peace mission' headed by Prof. Roger Fisher (of Harvard) meets with some resistance groups and "high Palestinian personalities" in Beirut. Fischer, in these meetings, puts out feelers dealing with the feasibility of a final settlement based on the establishment of a Palestinian State in the West Bank.

Such are the dimensions of this plan which has been appropriately called "Peace of the Vultures"! The united front of the imperialists, the Zionists and their objective (and subjective) allies among the Arab ruling classes cannot be confronted by a simple "merger" of all resistance groups. It can only be met by a opening a wide, anti-imperialist, united front of all revolutionary movements that can mobilize the most oppressed classes of the Arab masses for a long and protracted war. In the East Jordanian front this adds new burdens on the resistance movement — which has been, and still is, the vanguard of all Arab national liberation movements. Organizationally, the resistance must develop a united front with a political platform containing a minimum (anti-imperialist) progressive program as a basis of coordination between the separate organizations. A program for guiding the daily struggle of the resistance and the masses against the ruling reaction. Politically the left must strive to ensure the hegemony of proletarian ideology over the developing United Front. Militarily, the United Front must not allow its encirclement by Jordanian reaction to sidetrack her from facing the dual task of fighting Zionist occupation. The Israelis and their imperialist allies must realize that the Palestinian people will not budge.

The resistance movement is at the crossroads: it can transform the lessons of September 1970 and the present retreat into a victory for the Jordanian-Palestinian people and the forces of Arab liberation throughout the Middle East; or history can look back and regard 1971 as a second '48 for the Palestinian people: a defeat followed by a long, dark rule of reaction.

—the Editors  
mid-March, 1971

#### SEPTEMBER COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN JORDAN

#### PART II: PRESENT REALITIES OF THE RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

##### The Internal Structure of the Resistance

The royalist campaign of September has clearly demonstrated the correctness of the line put forward by the Democratic Front throughout the past period concerning the internal (ideological, political and military) structure of the resistance movement. The

resistance has paid the full price for the "absence of theory" from its strategy and daily tactical practice, whether in the Jordanian-Palestinian arena, in the Arab countries, or even in its international relations with national liberation movements and socialist movements and states—a fact which confirms that "there can be no revolution without revolutionary theory."

The absence of revolutionary theory in the movement, and the prevalence of spontaneous nationalist trends in the life and practices of the resistance have stripped it of the ability to build internal revolutionary realities—ideologically, and militarily, and caused the following results:

1. **Parasitism.** The resistance movement was flooded with organizational privileges and suffered material and moral negligence which isolated it from the class oppression of the masses. This affluence, was brought about by the reactionary and bourgeois support given to the movement by the Arab states. Its direct results were the low level of awareness against enemy designs and the spread of bureaucratic relations (offices, cars, unnecessary expenditures, semi-traditional military relations between command and its bases, etc.), and an anxiousness to perpetuate these privileges by the insistence on maintaining relations with all Arab sources which bestowed upon the "revolution" this easy life.

2. **Absence of a Correct Analysis for Relations With the Masses in the Jordanian-Palestinian Arena.** This led certain leaderships (rightist) of the resistance in the direction of 'Palestinization' of the Palestinian struggle under the slogan of "non-interference in internal Arab affairs." In East-Jordan this slogan was translated into a series of wrong practices which effectively contributed to disruption of the unity among the Jordanian-Palestinian people, because of the insistence on maintaining separate Palestinian institutions (e.g. Red Crescent, Martyrs Institute, children's societies, etc.) and separate trade union and vocational organizations. This Palestinization process was reinforced by the absence of attempts to isolate counter-revolutionary class elements from the ranks of the people in the revolutionary movement, and absence of development of a national (united front) class program to organize the relations of the resistance with the Jordanian masses.

Thus regional leanings (basically nurtured by the reactionary regime) were strengthened and increasingly placed the Jordanian masses in a narrow corner, since they had little in common with the revolutionary movement besides common patriotic sentiment. Despite our endeavors to provide a revolutionary alternative to this line by stressing the unity of the

Jordanian-Palestinian national front, unity of common social and trade-union organizations, etc., and despite the victory of the call for abolishing existing sectional institutions in the Seventh Palestinian National Congress (Amman, August, 1970), these steps came too late and only after a bitter struggle within the Congress. Furthermore, they were never fully implemented.

The reactionary regime took full advantage of this situation, and the resistance reaped its most painful consequences in the September campaign and in the retreat currently taking place.

3. **Incorrect Analysis of the Nature and Scope of Conflict Between Jordanian and Arab Reaction, and the National Liberation Movement in the Jordanian-Palestinian Arena.** Under the slogan of "giving priority to the main contradiction with the enemy (i.e. the national contradiction) over the secondary contradiction with reaction," several Resistance groups were unable to deduce the laws of conflict within the "secondary" contradictions. Despite the insistence of reaction on settling the secondary contradiction (i.e. liquidating the Resistance) before the main one, the Resistance movement failed to understand and appreciate the "real size" of this conflict, and to see that the struggle against reaction (particularly the permanent bleeding inflicted upon it by reaction and imperialism) paralyzed most of its capabilities in the face of the Zionist imperialist enemy. To put it more precisely, those groups ignored or forgot (and the result is one) that the law of giving priority to the main contradiction with imperialism-Zionism over the secondary contradiction with reaction applies only to the extent that reaction responds positively to the national program of mobilizing class forces capable of fighting the Zionist and imperialist enemy (the main contradiction). But reaction always insisting on liquidating the revolution, forcefully pushes the secondary contradiction to the fore and makes it supersede the main contradiction in its daily program. For reaction, by virtue of its class formation and its linkage with imperialism, refuses practically and objectively to take up arms against the national enemy (i.e. Zionism and imperialism). Hence the thesis of "giving priority to the main contradiction over the secondary ones" crumbles because of the non-fulfillment of its basic requirements; and *it becomes incumbent upon the revolution to deal first with the internal contradiction (with reaction) in order to be able to resume its struggle with the main contradiction* (the Zionist imperialist enemy) on safe and solid grounds. The absence of revolutionary theory, revolutionary consciousness and the prevalence of rightist ideology in wide sectors of the Resistance lost the revolution the ability to react and confront reactionary designs and attacks placing it in a defensive position between the anvil of Israel and the hammer of reaction.

4. **Relations with Arab Regimes.** Throughout the last three years, most of the Resistance groups did not base their relations with Arab regimes on the attitude that these regimes took towards the Palestine liberation movement and the "struggle against imperialism and colonialism", but there is an active and daily connection between "the struggle against Israel, imperialism and the reactionary Arab classes tied up with imperialism." These relations existed because bourgeois ideology prevailed in most of the Resistance groups (particularly in the political cadres), and the relations between these groups and the Arab regimes were governed by

the slogan of "non-interference in the internal Arab affairs" for the sake of obtaining temporary material gains — weapons, money, communications. This resulted in the absence of a revolutionary programic alternative to the programs which caused the defeats of 1967 and 1948, a fact which led these groups to practise a demagogic and misleading relation with the Palestinian and Arab masses and to give deeds of absolutism to the reactionary regimes in return for their handful of subsidies. It also led these groups to cover up for the programs of the nationalist regimes, regimes which have been unable to attain the objectives of national democratic liberation.

These facts have inevitably caused the relation with the Arab masses to be emotional and unorganized, thus having prevented the development of close and well organized organic alliance with the forces of the Arab liberation movement, an alliance which would have enabled the Resistance to give the struggle against the unholy trinity (Zionism and imperialism and Arab reaction) its full potential. That relation replaced the (needed) "theory of self-reliance and dependence upon the masses" and helped to chain the development of a revolutionary popular movement, organized on the local and pan-Arab levels. It left the Resistance movement dependent, for its material and political requirements, upon the Arab regimes, victimized by the contradictions that govern these regimes and their designs for the Middle East area and the Palestinian problems, while the role of the Arab masses was confined to emotional attachment and limited material (financial and human) support. *To sum up*, the situation of the Resistance, described above, led in the September campaign to the loss of initiative and forced the Resistance forces into defensive positions of a nature closer to regular than to peoples warfare (street warfare, ambushes, raids, etc), a protracted war capable of carrying the Resistance from defensive positions to equilibrium and then to the offensive. The war of positions alone could not have been in the interest of the Resistance due to the quantitative and technical superiority on the side of a regular army. Furthermore, the non-revolutionary internal structure, (military and political) of certain cadres motivated them to impede the participation of most of the revolutionary capabilities in the class conflict with reaction despite the decisions already taken to set up a popular government in the North and to advance upon Amman. This episode prompts us to wonder whether it was the absence of revolutionary ideology alone that brought about that situation. In the light of the political consequences of the campaign and in view of this type of relation with the Arab regimes, the Resistance has fallen in the trap of those regimes and their designs for the area, namely the Cairo Agreement which rescued the Hashimite throne and conferred upon it new privileges, especially the return of control over the towns and the repressive machines that slaughtered the people and the Resistance.<sup>1</sup> This was made possible under cover of the "return of the state machinery, under civil administration", to the regime. *Thus, the Cairo Agreement protected the throne and gave it a new lease of life allowing it to continue its offensive against the revolution and the masses, and making an American landing unnecessary.* It was in the interest of the Arab regimes that met in the Cairo conference to take this position; otherwise why did they not take a different position when the massacre was exposed to the Cairo Conference delegation when it arrived in the Jordanian Capital? By

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
Arab concurrence, also, the Resistance was disarmed and placed under the tutelage of Arab regimes so that the battle of the Resistance after it has retreated two steps may end in favor of the Jordan-Palestinian reaction which continues its attacks under the eyes of the Cairo Agreement and the signatory governments. The Agreement is meant to perpetuate the rift between Jordanian and Palestinian in favor of the final settlement of the Palestinian problem, namely, the "Palestinian State".<sup>2</sup>

#### Resistance in the Cities and Villages of the East Bank:

a. The sectional policy followed by certain groups of the Resistance in the past three years (i.e. the Palestinization of the Palestine cause politically, nationally, professionally and on the level of the trade-unions in the Palestine-Jordanian arena and the application of the slogan of "non interference in the internal affairs of the Arab world") has resulted in widening the gap of division between members of the Palenstino-Jordanian people. The ruling reaction has exploited these errors to the advantage of its aims in opposition to all patriotic and revolutionary classes of the country and for the service of the reactionary and imperialist plans aiming at liquidating the Resistance movement and inciting the people into civil war, under the false and reactionary pretext of "safeguarding the political entity of Jordan."

Still more important than the reactionary exploitation of the Palestinian sectionalist practices is the fact that some large sectors of the east-Jordanian patriotic forces remained *isolated* from the Resistance movement, because their ties with the Resistance were mainly *confined* to simple patriotic sentimentalism. All this was due to the lack of a class program in the daily practices of the Resistance, in spite of the fact that Jordanian masses eagerly waited for such a program, which might have facilitated the solution of the problems of the national democratic Palestine-Jordanian liberation in the Eastern Bank.

As for the program set up by the leftist radical wing of the Resistance it was not able to take *deep roots* among Jordanian masses for several reasons: the short period of practice, the theoretical and practical insistence of the other Resistance groups on continuing their sectionalist policy, the alertness of the reactionaries, the quickness of their military campaigns to prevent the spread of the revolutionary practice in its daily dialectical relations to the problems of the Palestine-Jordanian revolution. The revolutionary attempts included the support of the struggle and the strikes of workers and trade-unions, the attempt of arousing revolutionary class consciousness in the ranks of peasants in the rural areas, the unification of the people in its struggle against the Imperialist-Zionist-Reactionary trinity, the agrarian struggle against large land-owners and semifeudal capitalists, the resolutions of the 7th National Palestinian Assembly, the problems of the national Palestine-Jordanian front, the elected popular councils, the establishment of national authority, the struggle aiming at the overthrow of the lackey Government and the purge of the State machinery of the reactionaries and the agents of Imperialism.



Wall Mural in the DPFLP offices at Baq'aa camp

This prevailing trend in the policy of the Resistance movement led to the isolation of the Jordanian masses from the Revolution in practice. This explains the scarcity of East-Jordanian elements in the ranks of the Resistance on the one hand, and the success of the ruling reactionary elements in mobilizing large sectors of soldiers and officers against the Resistance movement, on the other.

b. The September experience has proven that the *central field* of the Resistance movement lies in the cities and refugee camps which constitute the dense human forests for the Resistance to melt in, as well as the main bases of "asylum and supplies" in the material and political sense. This owing to factors such as the density of the population, the spread of nationalist political consciousness, and the historical fact that cities and camps have always been the cradle of working class and petty-bourgeois movements. Cities and camps have, therefore, constituted protecting human forests for the Resistance movement. At the same time, the birth of the Resistance movement along with the awakening of the nationalist and working class movements opposed to Imperialism, Zionism and local exploiting Capitalism. This combined with the decay of reaction, led the dispossessed and working masses as well as certain sectors of the petit-bourgeois to sympathize with the Resistance movement.

c. The same experience proved that there is a great difference between the situation of the villages and that of the cities as far as the role they play in the life of the nationalist movement and resistance, due to historical and economic factors, as well as other factors related to the strategy of the Resistance movement.

Historically: the nationalist movement did not extend its cultural, political and democratic currents to the villages. It was rather confined to the cities and camps owing to its *general* character of the nationalist program directed against imperialism, Zionism and Arab reaction, and *the absence of any democratic program for the rural areas* (dealing with the land question, the struggle against feudalism, big land-owners and rural capitalism, the

struggle against the close relations between feudalism and capitalism in rural productions, demands for the mechanization of agriculture and of education in the rural areas etc. . . .). During the past twenty years, the program of the nationalist movement remained confined to taking general nationalist positions in support of the struggle of the working masses for certain demands, including a lot of "socialist" slogans. Thus, the rural areas remained excluded from an organic adhesion to the nationalist movement in Jordan.

Economically: within the general sphere of under-development in the rural areas (prevalence of primitive means of production) and the scarcity of agricultural production (primitive means of production, dependence on the rainy season, and the consequence of the fact that the East Bank experienced practically three years of drought for every rainy year), in addition to the class exploitation in the country side, it is no surprise that the economic life of villages depended largely on the state machinery and the reactionary ruling class. Fifty per cent of the villages income was from salaries received by State employees (*especially in the Army, which is considered the main source of income and the basic employment for villagers and bedouins*). At the same time, bad crops put the villages at the mercy of the regime, which intentionally follows a policy of "alms" distribution and non-productive expenditures, in ways of services and "aid," for drought-stricken villages, without promoting any agricultural development or soil improvement projects etc. It should be noted here that the dependence of the Jordanian villages on "the Army and the alms of the regime" increases steadily as one moves from northern to southern areas (where it reaches 60-90%) *with the result being that less than a third of the rural income is drawn from agriculture*. Resistance Strategy: in its dealing with the villages, the Resistance movement confined its activities to extending some medical and social services and to certain simple economic deals such as buying supplies for the neighboring bases, without undertaking any democratic program within the frame of the Resistance activities in the rural areas.

Consequently, Jordanian villages remained isolated from taking class interest in the struggle and in such vital issues as the agrarian problems and the economic difficulties encountered by peasants. At the same time, being relatively far from Zionist occupation, Jordanian villages had no immediate incentive to protect the national revolutionary movement or to take an effective part in defending the homeland and their lands.

These facts were reflected in the relation of the village with the reactionary regime, with the result being that it continued to see its economic interest linked with the existing regime and did not find any class interest in taking the side of the Resistance due to the absence of a democratic program to be implemented by the Resistance in the country side. Its relation with the Resistance remained emotional. The conspicuously sectional policy of the Resistance and the exploitation of this tendency on the part of the regime, pushed the village into the lap of its national and class enemy (reaction and imperialism) and made it fight on their side, or — at best — remained neutral when the regime launched the barbarous campaign of September to annihilate the Resistance.

Because of these combined factors, we observe at the present a wide reaction in the country against the revolution — a reaction which grows as we move from the north to the south.

The value of the role of the country-side in war against the Zionist enemy, or the attacks of reaction aiming at imposing capitulatory solutions upon the people and the dark reactionary dictatorship of the State, does not lie in the density of the population in comparison with the towns. Rather it lies in the nature and scope of its role, whether in backing or fighting against the Resistance. It lies in the role of rural soldiers in the army whether in supporting the Resistance, or in executing repressive operations against the revolution and the people. Here lies the real danger, especially if we take into consideration the quantitative weight that the rural soldiers have in the army.

## THE STATE AND THE REVOLUTION

All Marxists know that "the state is an instrument of class oppression in the hands of one class (or class alliance) against another class or class alliance." This thesis applies to the situation in the under-developed countries as well as to the situation in the developed countries. But it does not mean, under the present conditions that certain sectors of the state institution (the army, the security forces, the police, the administration), under a regime opposed to the national democratic revolution or to the socialist revolution cannot be partly won over to the revolution, especially in the low and middle sectors. This is a well-known phenomenon in history but depends, in the first place, upon the size and influence of the national or socialist revolution in the society, and in the second place, upon the nature of the class composition in the institutions of the state.

In Jordan, reaction (the Palace, feudalism, the comprador class) and imperialism used the state institutions before 1948 for its class reactionary and imperialist repression, which made Jordan a farm "for a handful of the members of the ruling family imposed by British Imperialism upon the country, and for a handful of big feudalists, landlords and capitalists." It became a center of conspiracies against the Jordanian and Arab national liberation movement, *as well as a historical safety valve for the Zionist movement and the British Mandate plans of "Judaizing Palestine."* After 1948, when the two Banks were united, Jordan-Palestinian reaction, tied up with imperialism, continued its policy of employing state institutions — particularly the army and the security forces — as an instrument of class oppression in favor of the counter-revolution. But the national and popular movement grew in the country and compelled the imperialist-reactionist-monarchic trinity to give a series of concessions to the national movement in 1956, and led to the growth of nationalist consciousness among the lower and middle sectors (soldiers, junior officers). This fact helped the national movement to impose concessions which were in the view of the counter-revolution a mere temporary tactical retreat. The Jordanian army was purged of its British commanders and the British-Jordanian treaty was annulled after a series of repressive operations against the national movement and the masses and after the failure to affiliate Jordan with the Baghdad Pact (1955 demonstrations against Templer, emissary of Baghdad Pact and British imperialism). This retreat, however, affected no change in the structure of the reactionary regime or its state institutions. Shortly afterwards, therefore, the Palace, in co-operation with the American CIA, planned and carried out, the famous reactionary coup of April 1957. The objectives of the coup were: the defeat of the nationalist movement, purging the army of nationalists and strengthening the position of extreme reactionaries and their clients at the head of the Supreme Army Command. This in order that the Palace, reaction and imperialism would be able to impose their autocratic dictatorship upon the country and to make it once more a fortress of counter-revolution. Until 1970, the State institutions remained subject to consecutive purges so that they might remain fit to play their full part in the repressive and terrorist operations and launch successive campaigns of "siege and annihilation" against the Resistance movement and the nationalist forces in the Jordan-Palestinian arena. Thus being capable of striking at the masses with blind artillery and

tank-guns, terrorizing the people and making them bow in the face of the counter-revolutionary army attacks.

The September Campaign attested to the cohesiveness of the State institutions as an effective instrument in the hands of imperialism and monarchic reaction. Despite the bombardment of Amman and az-Zarqaa' with every weapon for ten days, defections to the revolutionary side were limited and individual and went beyond the worst expectations of the Resistance movement(4).

The dominant feature in the ranks of the security forces was neutrality between the Resistance and the army, an attitude contrary to that taken by the higher cadres tied with the regime. However, in areas that were occupied by the armed forces, the security forces carried out their tasks dutifully (searching, detention, torture . . . etc.) so that a terrorist atmosphere was imposed upon those areas.

As for the administrative machine, it was not possible to test the basic attitude of its rank and file because the war impeded its daily routine(5), while its top officials (ministers, senior officials, ambassadors) who were rightist and reactionary from the start, remained loyal to the reactionary monarchy in keeping with their ideological and class reality(6).

The September campaign inexorably painted a detailed picture of the structure of the army and the reactionary rightist ideology prevalent among its members:

1. The Jordanian army is a professional institution, and the internal (ideological and material) relations that govern it are those that govern the employer and the employed. Royal reaction did its best — in every possible way — to isolate the army from nationalist and progressive ideological and political currents. Nationalist ideas are taboo, political affiliations are banned, and the nationalist elements inside the army are continually chased and purged. In contrast, the permissible and prevalent culture is the reactionary one which places the King in the position of the employer, and not an ordinary employer at that, but one around whom there is a halo of deification in accordance with the "Divine Right of Kings." This culture is presented in a religious framework connecting the royal family with the Prophet of Islam, backed with appropriate slogans such as "God, King, and Country." And the homeland which the King blesses is one where reactionism, imperialism and counter-revolution are safe and prosperous. To keep the army isolated from the movement of the masses and under the control of the reactionary ideology in its daily life, the regime refused to introduce conscription and volunteering in the army despite the existence of the State of Israel on a part of Palestine and the false pretences of the regime of wanting to liberate Palestine. For conscription will expose the army to the nationalist currents, multiply nationalist cadres within its ranks and train the people in the use of arms. In 1969, the regime briefly introduced conscription as a means of intercepting young men who might desire to join the Resistance forces, but it soon repealed the law when it found that it was a two-edged weapon (it absorbed young men in camps very much like the camps of detainment to keep them away from the Resistance, but at the same time it taught them the use of arms and allowed them to fraternize with other members of the army).

Despite all these precautions, the "professional institution" was all the time subjected to unremitting purges aimed at isolating the army from all elements of any nationalist conviction.

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2. The basic corps of the army depended for their soldiers and commanders on bedouin elements; especially in the armored divisions and the security brigades — i.e., the forces of direct repression. The army did not confine itself to the Jordanian and Palestinian bedouins; it went further to enlist Iraqi, Syrian and Saudi bedouins(7). Those bedouins — presumably — felt strong attachment to the ruler who wrested them from poverty and misery to place them in the lap of a regime that secures them permanent material and moral support. In fact the regime takes over their education from childhood. Non-Jordanian bedouin (Iraqi, Syrians, Saudis) form about 30 per cent of the army, the same rate as that of the Jordanian bedouin. In the case of Jordanians the regime selects the majority from the poor villages, particularly in the south where the region is very much under-developed and the inhabitants depend on the regime for their economic life; whereas soldiers taken from the big towns, where there is education and nationalist consciousness, form little more than 10 per cent, and many of them are employed in military administrative affairs and technical works. Even this small rate is subjected to unremitting purges that seek to oust nationalist elements among the bedouin officers who, through their training missions and courses in the United States, Britain and Pakistan, have acquired an overall [modern] education and some knowledge of the outside world).

3. The soldiers from the West Bank form about 30 per cent of the army. The dominant characteristic among the soldiers, non-commissioned officers and a sector of the junior commissioned officers is a broad nationalist attitude without clear-cut commitments; whereas, in the ranks of the senior officers there are many stubborn reactionaries and stooges of the throne.

Such a commitment which lacks a clear-cut program among the soldiers and the low ranks has paralyzed the capabilities of this section inside the army. Another paralyzing factor is the witch hunt maintained over them by their comrades-in-arms who are imbued with the monarchic reactionary ideology and tied to the regime by economic and other interests.

This is a picture of the ideological and social structure of the army from which we deduce the following results:

A. The core of the conflict inside the army is not between Jordanians and Palestinians; it is rather due to the economic, social and ideological structure of the army. Note that rural element and townsmen in the West Bank do not depend on the army in their economic life because of the nature of the economic structure of the Palestinian villages. Non-existence of feudalism (only big landlords), fertility of the land, seasons of rain, relatively developed means of production, binary and tripartite agricultural cycle, briskness of the town market, purchasing power of the countryside, spread of vocational and scientific education, existence of health care, engineers, tourism, emigration to Arab countries and the United States . . . etc).

B. The dominance of the bedouin element makes the army a blind repressive instrument in the service of royal reaction.

C. The September campaign proved the impossibility of rebellion in the army. This does not mean that there are no nationalist and progressive trends in the army; on the contrary, such trends are existent, and this very fact makes it incumbent upon the national movement and the Resistance to devote special efforts to free the army from the imperialist and reactionary grip and to develop the army into a nationalist institution (by purging it, introducing conscription, dismissing mercenaries and agents, injecting its ranks on an extensive scale with educated and knowledgeable elements and cadres . . . etc). This also specifies the role of the nationalist sectors in the army, that they should form an organic part of the national movement and the Resistance throughout the process of popular struggle.

D. It is incumbent that the Resistance and nationalist forces treat rural problems in such a manner as to make the population of the Jordanian countryside feel that they have a class and a national interest in the revolution and in rallying around it. [A progressive program on the land question] is also necessary to rally patriotic soldiers in the army against imperialism, Zionism and monarchic reaction.

As for the bedouins there can be no speedy solution. The policy here should be a long-range one aiming at promulgating patriotic consciousness in the army and liberating it from the control of the monarchical reactionary culture. The promulgation of a national program and fighting for its realization all over the Jordan-Palestinian arena will make the Transjordanians identify with their national and class interests in the revolution and will prompt them to participate in the solution of the problem in the interest of the national democratic revolution in the country.

The lessons of September came to emphasize with tangible evidence under the onslaught of bombshells, tanks, and machine guns, the reality and the nature of the structure of the state institutions and their role as instruments of repression in the hands of the counter-revolutionary trinity. Will the Resistance movement learn this lesson? Will certain Resistance groups have the ability to realize what is going on around them? And where the reactionary ideology, with which they are flirting, lead them?

#### PART III: THE SITUATION IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THE CAIRO AGREEMENT

The Cairo agreement represented a model for viewing the positions of the Arab regimes towards the Resistance movement and the reactionary monarchy in Jordan at the same time.

The Resistance movement has paid a heavy price for the sort of relationship that it has maintained with the Arab regimes over the last 3 years. The class, ideological and political structure of these regimes has brought about a definite policy of containment under which the movement would not hinder the strategy of the governments concerned. In return, the Arab regimes gave assistance to certain groups of the movement in order to use them as trump cards in the Arab political peace offensive which aims at liquidating the Palestinian cause.

These tactics have succeeded in winning over certain groups of the movement under such demagogic slogans as "non-interference in the internal affairs of the Arab States" and "let us benefit from the money and weapons of the regimes." In this way, these groups have steadily forfeited their "self-independence and the support of the masses" and have isolated themselves from the masses. As a result, they have become, necessarily victims of both the moral and financial assistance rendered by these ruling regimes.

More important, these relationships with the Arab regimes prevented the Resistance movement from absorbing a revolutionary program of liberation which would point out an alternative to the road of defeats of 1948 and 1967. The movement was becoming a mere extension of the contradictions existing in the Arab states. The Left contingents of the Resistance — still unable to lead the strategy of the movement — were subjected to a vicious campaign of encirclement by the Arab regimes, including the 'progressive' ones.

The September campaign has strikingly brought out the true nature of those regimes which — with the exception of the Syrian [intervention] — concurred in keeping the Resistance under their tutelage and in preserving the reactionary monarchy in Amman. Yet despite these attempts at containment and the June onslaught of 1970 we still find some groups within the movement refusing to learn the objective lessons of those experiences and contenting themselves by paying lip-service to having drawn the right conclusions. This is an evasion of their responsibility, towards their cadres and the masses, which requires the adoption of a revolutionary policy to govern their relations with the Arab regimes.

The reactionary and rightist regimes have, by welcoming the Cairo Agreement, followed a policy consistent with their class structures and imperialist ties in order to preserve the reactionary monarchy which represents one of the basic links of counter-revolution in the area.

Similarly, the nationalist regimes which have supported the Cairo Agreement were self-consistent.

They aim at keeping the movement within manageable proportions to use it as a means of pressure to wring concessions out of imperialism and Zionism. But they certainly do not want the

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movement to become a revolutionary force to be reckoned with in any future political settlement. On the other hand, their interest lies in preserving the status quo in Jordan so as not to be confronted with a new set of commitments towards the movement if the reactionary monarchy were to be overthrown.

Thus, the Cairo Agreement is the legitimate result of the triangular campaign of imperialism, the reactionary Jordanian regime and Palestine-Jordanian reaction. It has not only saved the regime but gave it a new lease to resolve the question of dual power to its advantage by the return of police repression to the cities, as if the experience of the previous four campaigns and the lessons of the fifth have no place or historical significance in the life of the movement, the soldiers, the masses and the Arab nation as a whole.

#### The Aftermath of the Campaign:

The lessons to be drawn from the September campaign constitute a prelude to the consequences which followed:

1. The internal structure of the movement caused a series of theoretical, political, military, and trade unionist practices which made the movement take two steps backward after the September campaign. The movement stopped short of continuing the struggle to bring about a progressive government and has yielded to the abolition of dual power in the cities in accordance with the Cairo Agreement, (in the interest of the reactionary monarchy).

The causes of such a retreat are:

a. Certain groups of the movement were neither serious nor decisive in solving the contradiction with the reactionary regime. This was clear from their positions in the northern and central areas. clear political objective would have necessitated certain political and military tactics which would have led to continued struggle to liberate the country from the reactionary forces (as long as the reactionary forces consider the secondary contradiction with the movement of more urgency and importance than the basic contradiction with the Zionist-imperialist enemy) in order to prepare the ground for a total revolutionary struggle against the Zionist enemy and the liquidationist solutions.

b. The relationships of certain groups of the movement with the Arab regimes have forced those groups to be under the protective custody of those regimes and thus they were unable to rally support from the masses and reject the compromising position of those regimes took towards the reactionary monarchy.

c. The very political and military structure of the movement has forced it into a *defensive* posture despite continuous talk about waging a people's war.

d. This defensive position resulted in the paralysis of fighting capabilities of large sectors of the movement in the northern and central regimes, which had the task of pushing forward to widen the struggle across the country so that a guerilla warfare would be combined with street fighting and ambushing. *The Movement had neither the capability nor the objective preparedness to fight such a protracted war.* In addition, there was a lack of understanding among many contingents as to what was to be done to face the crisis and its development.

The experience of the September campaign necessitates an overall critical reassessment of the political, military, financial and theoretical programs of the Resistance so that the Movement can face up to the coming challenges.

*The initiative lies with the left.* It is incumbent on the revolutionary wing of the Resistance to advance these lessons to the masses and save them from the demagogary of the right. The Movement has paid a heavy price for its incorrect policies and it is time that it fully understands the laws of the revolution and its dialectical unity. This involves a national-democratic program in the Jordan-Palestinian arena which would mobilize and win over the masses of the Western and Eastern Banks in a manner capable of resolving the problems of the Resistance in its relationship with the peasants and the army. This is the historical role which the left of the Movement should undertake in the Jordanian and Arab fronts.

2. The proposal for setting up a Palestinian state has become part of the package deal of selling the Palestinians the idea of a "political solution."

Previously, the issue of Palestinian state was restricted to reactionary Palestinian monarchial circles (eg. al-Farouki, Shihada, Kana'an, al-Ja'bari) in response to Israeli and imperialist schemes.

The issue gained wider publicity after the September campaign when similar proposals were made through American and British channels. The proposal was even put forward, though for different reasons, by the Soviet Union.

Certain Arab countries (Tunisia and Morocco) also advanced the idea. Even Haikel had his say on the proposal on the eve of his resignation as Minister of National Guidance in U.A.R. after the September campaign and the proclamation of the Cairo agreement.

The Israeli leaders made similar declarations before and after the campaign.

The significance of the September campaign lies in the fact that it has prepared the ground for the first time, since 1948, for large sectors of our people to accept the idea of a Palestinian state as a way out of the barbarity of the monarchial rule. Indeed it is in providing the right climate for the birth of such a state and the Palestinian acquiescence in it, that the various schemes of imperialism, Israel and the reactionary forces meet harmoniously.

In Israel, there is an attempt to create a "third force" to be filled in by Palestinians who would be involved in the overall settlement and who would recognise the existence of Israel in return for certain concessions regarding repatriation of Palestinian lands. This "third force" would be an alternative to the old faces and traditional reactionary circles which served the Hashemite throne and the occupation after 1967. It would also pose itself as a substitute for

the Movement under the slogan of "no return to the rule of monarchy and reaction in Amman and the right of self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza". This slogan has found response from various people in the occupied territories among whom can be found the nationalist petty-bourgeoisie (doctors, lawyers, engineers, teachers, etc.).

In the East Bank, the reactionary regime has failed in its dependence on Palestinian reactionary classes to effect a settlement because of the people's rejection of those classes due to their historical and national record of treason and the support that the Movement enjoys among the people. The forces of reaction have also failed in attempts at liquidating and containing the Movement in its September campaign.

*At present, the strategy of the Jordanian regime is to create this "third force" from within the Movement as an alternative to those reactionary Palestinian circles rejected by the people, and also as a substitute for the Movement as a whole.*

This has become publicly apparent after the September campaign when large sectors of the people in the East Bank were willing to accept anything but the return to the reactionary rule of the monarchy, especially after the failure of the Movement to defeat the forces of reaction.

*The regime is attempting to achieve politically what it militarily failed to do, to divide the Movement and liquidate its left. As a prelude to this, it put forward the slogan of cooperation with Fateh and the Liberation Army instead of the Movement as a whole.*

Thus, its policy is to hit two birds with one stone. On the one hand, it would attempt at liquidating the revolution by pseudo concessions, and on the other hand, prepared the ground for suppressing other groups of the Movement if the regime and imperialism failed to get the various organisations to accept the "Palestinian State". The counter-revolutionary forces would, after the Cairo agreement, be dealing with the Movement in this framework and at the same time continue to isolate the Movement from the masses in the cities through a policy of repression and police terror.

All this is taking place within the framework of widening the gap between Jordanians and Palestinians to destroy the unity of the people with the purpose of setting up a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza. It is also aimed at maintaining the status quo in East Jordan and advancing the proposal for a union between the Jordanian State and the would-be Palestinian State.

This would place the Palestinians in a position surrounded by the anvil of Israel and the hammer of the reactionary monarchy and imperialism.

#### What Is To Be Done In The Light Of The Current Situation?

The liquidation of the 'Palestine Problem' and with it the Resistance movement and all patriotic forces is now manifesting itself through the following measures:

1. An unremitting campaign of terror aimed at isolating the movement from the masses in the main cities, thus forcing it to retreat into the countryside (which is currently witnessing a counter-revolutionary backlash). In this way and through a series of quick attacks the movement would be completely eliminated, or else **absorbed**

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into any of the various imperialist schemes now being planned.

This campaign would also enable the 'Palestinian State' issue to find wider acceptance among the masses who would find in it a way out of the terror and massacres committed by the regime. The monarchy is now adopting a policy of dividing the movement through a dual policy of extending political and material concessions to one section of the Resistance (e.g. freedom of movement, etc.), and by creating an oppressive climate, thus driving other sections to develop into a 'third force' within the movement. This 'third force' would then face the choice of either accepting a political settlement (which is quite feasible given the pragmatic mentality that governs some organizations in the movement), or else being liquidated.

2. The regime was quick to utilize the lessons of September by consolidating its grip on all state agencies (purge of all patriotic and moderate rightist elements), and widening the schism between Jordanians and Palestinians. The monarchy was in part reacting against the attempt [by the U.S.] to transform the East Bank into a wider plan for the "Palestinian State." In addition the regime conducted a campaign of arming whole villages and tribes in the service of counter-revolution, and against the popular movement.

3. Israel similarly was able to exploit such a situation in favor of creating a "third force" which would demand "self autonomy" and pose itself as an alternative to both the traditional leadership of reaction and the Armed Resistance Movement.

It is important to note that the class composition of this "third force" would be from bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie elements who do not have a collaborationist record.

4. There is a growing contention within imperialist circles that the Palestinians should participate in any future political settlement. Hence the proposal of a Palestinian State.

5. All these developments are not taking place in a vacuum, as far as the situation in the Arab world is concerned. We can see that the reactionary regimes are in the final analysis on the side of the King and at best support certain organisations which do not constitute a direct threat to them. Those regimes are consistently trying to implement the imperialist schemes and solutions. Similarly, we find that the "progressive" regimes themselves not far from being parties to a political settlement (after their acceptance of the Rogers Plan) of which the "Palestinian State" would be an offshoot. The internal situation in these countries which have accepted the Rogers Plan and the zest with which they accepted the U.N. resolution explain a great

deal of their relationship with the movement, the monarchy and reaction (Resolution of Tripoli Conference, Arab League Meeting, Conference of Arab Head of States & Kings in September 1970, and the various committees and agreements which resulted from them).

The developments in the Arab world which accompanied the September campaign and the current situation (the death of President Nasser, the demagogic nationalist, pseudo-revolutionary campaign of the Iraqi Government) have been to the advantage of the counter revolution (i.e. Imperialism + Zionism, Arab Reactionism). The forces of counter revolution would not hesitate to exploit this situation to their benefit.

What have the various organisations of the movement done in the face of the Counter-revolution?

Instead of undertaking a critical self-evaluation certain groups of the movement have stood still, while the progressive forces within the movement are trying to conduct an objective appraisal of the lessons in order to draw the right conclusion for a successful revolutionary struggle.

These lessons involve reassessment of the day-to-day tactics and the overall strategy of resistance at every level: on the *political* level this involves, new national alignments, unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian people, understanding the dialectical laws of the revolution and understanding the nature of contradictions viz-a-viz the reactionary forces of both the monarchy and the Arab world. On the *organizational* level this involves the purging of defeatist and vacillating elements (including rightist elements in the movement) and working towards a more democratic centralist relationship between the leadership, the cadres, and towards a **revolutionary democracy with the masses**. On the *military* level, this involves, provisions of arms, proper training and education, etc.

#### Final Notes

The movement is undergoing a major crisis at the political, organizational and military levels and unless a serious attempt is made to understand the major tasks for the movement in this crucial stage, the whole future of the Resistance will be in jeopardy.

The main features of the movement in its present stage can be stated as follows:

Evasion of the existing crisis within the movement by most organizations, at both political and organizational levels, thus avoiding any critical appraisal of the political and military mistakes that were made in both the North and the Central areas where the balance of military and political power shifted in favor of the class enemy. This means the continuation of the leadership which was itself responsible for the strategic and tactical mistakes.

The Central Committee has not up till now undertaken any critical review of its overall strategy over the last 5 years. Such a review would entail of necessity certain political, organizational and military measures and conclusions which would form the outline for any program of action in the present situation. Despite our repeated demands for such a review, certain groups have ignored those realities in order to "save their day-to-day problems which cannot be dealt with without a radical alternative.

On the other hand, some groups have been active in promoting the forms of administrative unity which were superimposed on the movement as a result of its retreat after the September campaign. These groups also advance

the idea of unity of the armed forces *without a program* to confront the various schemes of imperialism and reaction. *This is merely a demagogic attempt to substitute military unity for a real united front.* In addition the unity of the armed units without the existence of objective conditions (political, military, organizational, financial, educational and propaganda) would merely be wishful thinking. It would at the same time deceive the masses into taking sides in a false battle between those in favor of unity and those who are not.

*Above all, the proposed unity of the armed forces and organizational units – isolated from its necessary preconditions – is objectively a call for disarming the revolution of its most advanced elements, organizationally and ideologically.* It is an attempt to crush the solid hard-core of the resistance movement to enable certain elements to command the movement from a bankrupt perspective, a perspective unable to lead the resistance out of its present historical crises. *National unity cannot be achieved without a political program defining the crucial tasks confronting the movement.* Otherwise it would be like the proposed Tripoli Conference of "unity" – which is nothing but an attempt to contain the movement and place it under the tutelage of the Arab regimes.

The crucial question is the structural or internal crisis of the movement (ideological, political, organizational and military). *This would necessitate a formulation of a program of action for a united national front.* This program for national democratic liberation would have to be formulated in the light of the experiences of the last 3 years and the September experience in particular, with all that it entailed in terms of lessons and conclusions, in order to confront and challenge all the schemes and dangers that face the Palestinian revolution in particular and the Arab world in general.\*

Central Committee of the Democratic  
Popular Front for the Liberation of  
Palestine – Amman, November 1970.

\* The *Bulletin* will publish in a future issue the proposed draft program for an Anti-Imperialist United National Front presented by the DPFLPs and will discuss other such draft proposals.

**FOOTNOTES**

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## WOMEN IN DHOFAR...



...IN THE NEXT ISSUE

## FOOTNOTES

1. For background information about the Cairo Agreement, see *P.R. Bulletin* No. 4-5 (November – December, 1970).

2. See "Against the Palestinian State," *PRB* No. 4-5.

3. It is no coincidence that Habis al-Majali held the position of General Military Governor during the coup of 1957 to destroy the nationalist movement and purge the army of patriotic officers; and with the same zeal stepped forward in July 1970 to hold the same position, ignoring the different subjective and objective circumstances in the country and the area. But a reactionary always remains loyal to his reactionary and imperialist masters.

4. Fateh did not expect that the army would storm Amman with tanks and with such violence. It rather expected that considerable splits would occur and that the Palestinian soldiers would, in the great majority, quit the army.

The Democratic Popular Front ruled out from the beginning possibilities of a military coup; moreover, it refused in principle to endorse such a coup except as part of a national popular uprising. But it also did not expect the events that did take place. Splits in the army were highly expected if the Resistance held out in its battle with the regime for several days (a week for instance).

As-Sa'iq'a's estimates of nationalist capabilities in the army and in the ranks of the people of both Banks were great.

The Popular Front (Arab Nationalist Movement) was certain that early splits would take place in the army. During the September campaign its estimates were that the army would split if struggle with regime continued between 48 and 72 hours.

The Arab Liberation Front was sure that schisms would happen in the ranks of the army and that it had the capability to paralyze many sectors of the army in favor of the revolution.

5. During the insurrection of 1955 against the Baghdad Pact, the administrative machine responded to the call of the nationalist movement by declaring civil sedition and going out to the streets in demonstrations with the masses to frustrate the reactionary efforts to join Jordan to the Pact.

6. One single exception took place when Antoun Attallah, foreign minister in the government of al-Rifa'i, declared his refusal to deal with the sanguinary military government. Attallah was in New York at the time and was dismissed from his post.

7. From the very beginning the British policy decided to build the army from bedouin elements for well-known ideological and political considerations: — absence of national consciousness among bedouins, their strong attachment materially and morally to the ruler (the employer) who provides their material needs and exploits religion to make of himself a holy symbol around which they would rally.

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