




PALESTINE RESISTANCE BULLETIN

In Solidarity with the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

VOLUME 11 - FEBRUARY 1971

SEPTEMBER COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN JORDAN ! a critical analysis



NAYEF HAWATEMAH

EDITORIAL:

TOWARDS VICTORY IN THE 70's

This month marks the second anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. The formation of the Front in February, 1969, as a principled and armed Marxist-Leninist detachment of the Palestine Resistance movement marked a significant *qualitative* transformation in the revolutionary struggle of the Arab peoples against the forces of Zionism and imperialism.

Recent developments in the Middle East dictate, nevertheless, that the present celebration of the Front's anniversary, unlike last year's, occur under conditions of *revolutionary retreat* for the Palestinian movement. It can now be said

with certainty that the harvest of the September (1970) counter-revolution in Jordan resulted in resolving the dual power situation in East Jordan (between the resistance & the monarchy) *in favor of the reactionary regime*. Events have underlined the warning comrade Nayef Hawatmeh made two years ago: that Arab reaction is preparing the year 1970-1971 to be the year of liquidation for the Palestinian resistance.

Today, instead of greeting the Front's anniversary with slogans of revolutionary optimism, our task is to critically evaluate the circumstances that led to the present retreat. Only thus can we serve the cause of the Palestinian people and the Arab revolution.

The *Bulletin* presents to the North American reader in this issue a very valuable document containing the report of the Central Committee of the DPFLP on the September counter-revolution, it analyzes the origins, the aims, and the consequences of the royalist campaign, and outlines the present tasks of the Palestinian revolutionary movement.

The significance of the report lies in that it contains the first self-evaluation and criticism of the theory and practice of the resistance movement (including that of the DPFLP) during the past two years. It is by no means a thorough or exhaustive study — nor does it claim to be. The editors of *PRB* urge the socialist movement and press in North America to widely discuss and disseminate this document as a contribution to a deeper and more objective understanding of the nature of the present stage of the Palestinian revolution.

The two major *organizational* tasks facing the left of the Palestinian resistance today are: One, the building of a *united national front* of all organizations and classes capable of fighting imperialism and Zionism, as well as the compradour regime in Amman; and, secondly, *the building of a Marxist-Leninist party* which can assure the hegemony of proletarian leadership for the Palestinian revolution. Obviously this task is not (nor should be) the monopoly of the Democratic Front. As the DPFLP prepares for its third year of revolutionary combat we should heed well the words of comrade Ho Chi Minh on this subject. "The proletarian party," he said, "cannot demand that the [United] Front acknowledge its leadership. Instead it must be the party that provides the greatest sacrifices in the struggle and proves by its actions to be the most determined member of the Front. The masses discover *in daily struggle alone* the correct policies of the party and its capability for leadership. Only then

can it become the vanguard of the struggle".

Note: Due to space considerations the editors were forced to postpone the publication of the second and third portions of the report, "September Counter-Revolution in Jordan" until *P.R. Bulletin* Number 7, which will appear in early March.

SEPTEMBER COUNTER-REVOLUTION IN JORDAN A Critical Analysis

Introduction

The all-out political and military campaign against the Palestinian resistance organized by Jordanian-Palestinian reaction and by American imperialism in September was not the first of such attempts and will not be the last — although it differs from previous ones in its scope and consequences. Moreover, it was not directed against the left of the resistance, as Arab reaction claims, nor was it "provoked" by the left, as right-wing elements in the resistance movement itself have stated.

The September onslaught should be viewed as a link in a chain of counter-revolutionary attacks against the *whole* of the resistance and the popular movement, resulting from *objective* conditions. These conditions are rooted in the perpetual contradiction between the semi-feudalist, bourgeois compradour regime tied to imperialist investments on the one hand, and the Palestinian-Jordanian liberation movement on the other. All attempts to push this contradiction to the background have failed because of the insistence of the reactionary forces to override the secondary (class) contradiction over the primary (national) contradiction with the Imperialist-Zionist enemy — before and after June 1967. It should come as a surprise to no one that Jordanian reaction served as a safety valve for the Zionist movement (before 1948), the state of Israel, and Arab reaction in the region. Local reaction had been continuously attempting to crush and liquidate feda'i activity even before 1967, as the experience of Fateh (65-67) shows very well. After the war of June 1967 — *before the formation of the left*, and before the masses were armed in the cities — the reactionary forces conducted their first campaign (encirclement of feda'i activity in Al-Aghwar during February, 1968) and their second campaign in Amman and

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other cities, still prior to the emergence of the left. This resulted from two factors: One, the class nature of the reactionary regime in Amman and its hostility to the popular movement and the armed revolution. Secondly: the ties of the regime with imperialism and its responsiveness to imperialist plans for striking against movements of national liberation.

Only those ignorant of the modern history of Arab and Palestinian-Jordanian reaction, and of the nature of imperialism in this region, and the rightist elements inside the resistance movement, can believe the distortions of reactionary forces claiming that the campaign was aimed at the left of the resistance, and that the left "provoked" the onslaught. It is time for the resistance to clean its ranks of such elements.

PART I: POLITICAL AND MILITARY DEVELOPMENT BEFORE THE SEPTEMBER ONSLAUGHT.

With the advent of 1970 it became clear that imperialist and Arab reactionary forces were preparing for the year 1970-71 to be the year of liquidation for the 'Palestine Problem' and the resistance movement. Witness the key events of that period: Direct American pressures on Cairo, Sisco's [Nixon's envoy] visit to the Middle East, Israel's in-depth attacks on Arab position (especially the UAR), failure of the Arab summit meeting in Casablanca, intensification of attempts at liquidating the resistance in Beirut and Amman, the anti-Palestinian campaign of October 1969, and the attacks of February and June (1970) in Jordan.

The Arab governments, in collaboration with Soviet policy were also aiming at turning 1970-71 into the year of "solving" "the Middle-East crises" — although from different political positions and according to the Soviet-Egyptian interpretation of the U.N. Resolution (of 1967).

Together those factors gave birth to the U.S. sponsored Rogers proposals (May 1970) which were accepted in Cairo and Amman (end of July 1970), thus preparing the Security Council (UN) Resolution for implementation. The primary consequence of this new arrangement was the transformation of the struggle with the main enemy (Zionism-Imperialism) into a struggle within 'the Arab Front' — between Arab reaction and the resistance movement. The leaflets of the (Democratic) Front had made it very clear at that time that "the Rogers Proposals were the first steps towards the 'Vietnamization' of the Middle-Eastern war." (Communiques of July and August, 1970).

Military Preparations

Jordanian reaction, having learned its lessons from the June 1970 onslaughts, undertook preparations for a new major attack on the resistance forces. A bloodless coup d'état occurred within the ranks of the army, security and all intelligence agencies which resulted in giving the upper hand to extreme right elements in the regime. Those forces consolidated their control over the repressive agencies of the state and conducted a campaign of political and psychological mobilization in preparation for the onslaught of September. A new "Trojan Horse" government was established including certain patriotic bourgeois elements to deceive the resistance and the people. The palace reorganized its forces around Amman to ensure the complete

encirclement of the capital by loyal elements, while the King's new government openly insisted that the siege around Amman was being withdrawn.

The final arrangement for the campaign occurred when the King went to Cairo (August 20-23, 1970) to demand that the liquidation of guerrilla activity be given top priority in the ensuing negotiations. Rifa'i's right-wing "moderate" government provided a suitable cover for those activities especially when joined by the ("Supervising") Arab Committee sent by the Arab League to "coordinate" relations between the resistance and the reactionary regime. The palace, meanwhile, did not forget to test the reliability of its troops (in siege of Amman) by executing orders against the people. Such a rehearsal occurred in the bombardment of the city during August 31-September 1, 1970. Throughout this period (from the beginning of June until September 16th) a continuous air supply of ammunition and equipment for the barbaric onslaught kept pouring into Amman from imperialist sources (Washington, London, and through West Germany). All those events were known to the resistance movement, and the campaign did not come as a surprise to any organization or to the Central Committee of the Resistance.

Position of the Arab Regimes

The Jordanian monarchy made full use of Cairo's acceptance of the Rogers Plan, and of the opposition which ensued between the Egyptian government and the resistance movement, in order to complete its "bloodless coup d'état" in the ranks of the army and State Security forces. It also took full advantage of the Nasserite consciousness among the masses in general, and of the historical affinity of the national bourgeoisie towards Cairo. The monarchy also made use of the political conflict which developed within the popular movements as a result of Cairo's acceptance (of the Rogers Plan), and of the conflict between the resistance and the popular Arab regimes (which supported the Security Council resolution).

The Jordanian regime appeared to have been confident of Iraq's (non-interference), despite the show of muscles practiced by the Iraqi regime in favor of the resistance movement (i.e. the famous warning that Iraqi troops stationed in Jordan would join the revolutionary forces in case of an attack by the Jordanian forces). This confidence was born by subsequent events before September (especially after the failure of the June, 1970 campaign, and during the end of August when royal forces bombarded Amman with heavy artillery and the fifth campaign!

The Democratic Front carried those warnings to the masses and the resistance. In the document presented to the seventh Palestinian National Congress (May 27-31, 1970) the Front pointed to the coming campaign of liquidation of the "Palestine Problem", and stressed that the current efforts were aimed at defeating the resistance movement in Jordan and Lebanon. In fact the Congress meeting was hardly over when the fourth military assault began in Amman and Zarqa (June 7th), even before the Palestinian leadership arrived in Amman.

The Front furthermore aimed at resolving essential matters connected with the *security of the revolution and the correctness of its national line in the Jordanian-Palestinian area* during the seventh Congress. Certain elements in Fateh and the right-wing of the Congress had obscured those matters in the sixth Congress (September 1969). Chief among those questions were:

1. Assertion of the unity of the Jordanian-Palestinian arena, in response to a tendency within Fateh to "Palestinianize" the Palestine problem without paying sufficient attention to what was happening in Jordan. This meant in practice the necessity of stressing the daily connection between the continuation of the armed struggle against Zionism and the protection of the revolution in the East Bank, and the necessity of securing a solid national base in Jordan which can paralyze local counter-revolution.

2. Assertion of the unity of the Jordanian-Palestinian people through their common labor-unions and professional organizations, in view of Fateh's incorrect regional line toward trade-unions and professional organizations. This incorrect policy had negative consequences not only in endangering the unity of the people, but also in exposing the safety of the revolution, by *objectively isolating the East-Jordanian masses, and subjectively preventing them from identifying their common class and national interests with the Palestinian revolution.*

3. Strengthening national alliances by bringing all contingents of the resistance into a common frame work (the P.L.O. and the formation of the Central Committee by order of the National Congress).

Although these steps were agreed upon by the National Congress, they came about far too late, and the revolutionary mass movement was to suffer the consequences of those incorrect policies in September 1970!

The acceptance of the Rogers imperialist "peace plan" by Cairo and Amman following the failure of the June (1970) attack against the resistance, brought to a head the confrontation between the resistance forces and the ruling class in Jordan. It now became essential for the new resistance forces to defeat the U.S. plan. *To do so necessarily required the establishment of a popular regime in Amman opposed to imperialism, Zionism, and the liquidationist schemes.* This was the key link in defeating the Rogers Plan.


The Democratic Front put this question to the masses, to the Central Committee (of the Resistance) and to all the resistance contingents, (communiques in *al-Sharara* — organ of the DPFLP Central Committee). The Central Committee of the Palestine National Congress called for an emergency session (August 27, 1970) in which the Front participated in formulating the decisions of the Congress. The positions of the different resistance organizations were moving in the direction of obstructing the liquidationist schemes. Unfortunately, the Congress arrived at a consensus as to the roots of the present conflict, but failed to make the proper conclusion (i.e. the struggle for the establishment of a popular regime in Amman). Thus the Congress stressed the following issues:

1. The need for unity of struggle in the Jordanian-Palestinian arena.

2. The prevention of any negotiations with the enemy, and illegitimacy of any Jordanian authority that does so.

3. The transformation of the Jordanian-Palestinian arena into a stronghold for the Palestinian revolution, in which the popular armed forces will coordinate their struggle with regular soldiers.

The Congress failed, however, to specify the nature of the "authority that will represent the people's armed forces united with soldiers to build the strategy of coming struggle" etc... and the means of arriving at this



authority. Despite these weaknesses the meaning of the decisions was clear.

For the protection of the revolution the Front crystallized the main task around the slogan of "All Power to the Resistance, the Soldiers and the Armed Masses" and posed it as an alternative to the authority of imperialism and reaction in order to mobilize the masses as well as the resistance and the soldiers against the liquidationist schemes, (*al-Sharara*, popular rallies, "Invitation to the Soldiers and Officers to Form Revolutionary Soldiers' Committees", etc.). Meanwhile *Fateh* [daily organ of the Central Committee of the Resistance] editorialized that "the defeat of the Rogers Plan will lead to a clash which will definitely be the final confrontation with the compradour regime."

The resistance movement did not resolve this question until after the events of August 31-September 1 (1970) when royalist forces began to strafe Amman (to test the responses of the resistance) under direct orders from (Hussein's) Himmam Palace and behind the back of the Supreme Command of the Army under General Mashhur Haditha [a "moderate" general] and Prime Minister's Rifa'i's government.

From then on the trend became very clear. The King's "coup" was prepared for an inevitable final confrontation. Only then did all the resistance organizations (and especially *Fateh*) become aware that the battle could not be avoided, given the imperialist pressures on the palace. The Central Committee (of the Resistance) came out with its famous proclamation calling for a "struggle for the establishment of a popular authority and for the overthrow of the compradour regime — without eliminating the King."

What now after the slogan of a "Popular Authority" has become the adopted slogan of all resistance organizations? What about the strategy for facing the accelerating events leading to the confrontation between the resistance and counter-revolution?

The resistance movement remained vacillating in defensive positions. Its strategy was characterized by the predominance of planning *defensive political and military tactics without attempting for once to take the initiative from the forces of counter-revolution and organize a campaign of offense.* The plan of the resistance can be summarized here:

1. Politically, it raised the slogan of "struggle for the establishment of a popular (national) authority" with specific tasks (i.e. rejection of liquidationist plans, purging the state apparatus from extreme elements, and the dismantling of reactionary political and military agencies within the state — without eliminating the King).

2. Militarily, it coordinated a common defensive plan for the resistance in case of attack. All contingents were to be at the disposal of the newly created Joint Military Committee.

3. The governments of the UAR, Syria, and Iraq were contacted by the Central Committee of the Resistance (immediately after the June attack) to specify their positions from the coming developments. The Central Committee, however, did not make clear its demands on those regimes and the methods of implementing them. Their relations remained unresolved.

The negative aspects of these developments are directly related to the internal composition of the resistance and to the nature of relations it had with the Arab regimes. The Front had repeatedly invited the Central Committee of the Resistance and the resistance contingents to *act on the historical necessity of taking the initiative from the palace.* The Front put the question directly to the masses after the June (70) campaign. It sought to ripen the revolutionary crisis not only in the country, but also within the ranks of the resistance organizations under the banner of "All Power to the Resistance, Soldiers, and the Armed Masses."

The September Campaign: Its Aims and Results.

Only one hour after the signing of the joint agreement with the resistance (supervised by the Arab League Committee) the Jordanian government began its military campaign against the resistance. Until that moment, the resistance movement was diligently working to avoid the shadows of civil war within the country. The monarchy and its imperialist masters decided otherwise. Their counter-revolutionary aims can be outlined briefly here:

One, the total elimination of the resistance movement by isolating it from the historical "protective umbrella" of the revolution: the masses that supplied its resources and protected its back.

Two, terrorization of the Jordanian and Palestinian masses as a prelude for the restoration of the pro-imperialist class dictatorship, in order

to facilitate the implementation of the "settlement" plans.

Three, attempting to destroy the historical unity of the Jordanian and Palestinian people through false regional claims. (The blind tanks and artillery of reaction, however, failed to make such 'national' distinctions. Nor did they distinguish resistance partisans from uninvolved civilians).

Four, to prepare the country for the acceptance of defeatist "peaceful" solutions and the final liquidation of the "Palestine Problem." It was hoped that in the face of the barbaric treatment of the royalist forces, the Palestinian people will be forced to accept *any solution that will relieve them from the reactionary dictatorship of the monarchy.*

These were the common goals of the palace, Arab reaction, and imperialism. The Jordanian regime, however, had its own special goals concerning "the fate of the throne and the monarchy in Jordan as part of an overall settlement of the Palestine Problem." As it stands now there seems to be a common agreement within the imperialist camp on the need for the establishment of a Palestinian mini-state in the West Bank and the Gaza strip as the first step towards a final settlement. The Palestinian people — according to this plan — will be forced to participate in this settlement when faced with the *fait accompli* (Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in return for recognition of Israeli sovereignty). Nevertheless, there are tendencies in imperialist circles (especially in the U.S.) which consider the proposed mini-state as inadequate — for economic and demographic reasons — to solve the problem of absorbing the total Palestinian population currently living in East Jordan (about 900,000) and over half a million Palestinians living in other Arab states (140,000 in Syria, 300,000 in Lebanon, and the rest in neighbouring states). Thus, American imperialism is prepared to "sacrifice" the monarchy in Jordan to consolidate the proposed Palestinian state. On the other hand, the British imperialists — concerned about protecting their oil monopolies under more limited considerations — favor the establishment of the Palestinian state within the boundaries of the West Bank and Gaza, and continue to support the 'independence' of the Kingdom of East (Trans) Jordan.

King Hussein was aware of this bargaining on the future of his throne between his two imperialist masters. When he conducted his fifth campaign of liquidation in September he was deliberately asserting to the U.S. and Britain that while he was capable of maintaining his 'law and order' in Jordan, he would not succumb easily to a situation where his throne will be the price for settling the 'Palestine Problem.' This he stressed in more than one public announcement in which he declared his acceptance of the Palestinian state project in the West Bank and Gaza, by frequently stressing the "connections of unity" this state will have with his kingdom.

The Attack and the Response

The palace announced the formation of the fascist Military Government on the morning of September 16, one hour after signing the joint agreement with the resistance in the presence of the Arab Committee. The scope of the impending battle became clear from the first moment, when the fascist government demanded that the people hand in their arms.

The central committee of the Resistance met immediately and undertook the following political and military preparations:

SUPPORT THE DPFLP!

The Palestine Resistance is in great need of assistance, we here in North America can greatly aid in two ways; financial and propaganda. We ask those who can to donate directly to the Democratic Front (DPFLP) by sending an international bank check via air mail payable to:

Sulaiman Hadi or/
Sami Mashshaq
P.O. Box 857
Beirut, Lebanon

We also ask that you aid us in the distribution of DPFLP propaganda by helping with subscriptions to this bulletin.

1. A proclamation to the masses to fight until the military government is overthrown and a progressive regime is established. The people were urged to join in a general strike, and to declare themselves in civil disobedience until the government falls.

2. All fighting forces were united under one command. The Military Central Committee of the Resistance was put in charge of executing a plan of defense.

3. In the event of civil war the northern territories (from Baq'aa to Al-Ramtha) were to be proclaimed liberated zones. A new national regime was to be established to protect the revolution. All revolutionary elements were to be mobilized, armed and sent to Amman.

4. The Arab governments were demanded to stop the massacre, and to support the revolutionary forces against the campaign of encirclement and liquidation.

The day of September 16 was completely quiet — the lull before the storm. With the twilight hours of the next morning the all out assault on Amman began, spearheaded with the tanks and the blind strafing of the city — with special concentration on working-class districts. We make here the following observations:

1. Two battalions and one armoured brigade were surrounding Amman and entered the initial battles.

2. The royalist forces were under unified political and military leadership throughout the country.

3. The royalist forces maintained their cohesiveness during the whole campaign. Defections from their ranks to the revolutionary forces were few and isolated.

4. The initiative remained in the hands of the royalist forces. The regime *imposed a war of positions on the revolutionary forces* in Amman and Zarqa — which made the fighting closer to a conventional war rather than to guerrilla warfare.

5. The Royal High Command through most of its forces in the city of Amman. The plan was to liquidate the resistance in the capital within three hours at the minimum and three days at most — then proceed to clean the rest of the country.

The resistance forces defended the people and the revolution using position warfare in Amman and Zarqa, and forms of guerrilla warfare (mostly raids and ambushes) in Ajlun and as-Salt. On the revolutionary side the following observations can be made:

1. The resistance forces fought the battle under fragmented political and military leaderships. Almost every city had its own

separate command. This situation allowed the reactionary regime to deal with each leadership in isolation from the Supreme Command despite the unified political resolution issued by the Central Committee and the repeated calls to the North (Irbid, Ramtha) and the middle sector (Jarash, Ajlun, As-Salt) for aid.

2. The city of Amman was the center of the fighting. The High Command of the revolutionary forces was formed in practice from three organizations: Fateh, the Democratic Popular Front, and as-Saiqa.

3. The Central Committee of the Resistance (which, for the first six days of the fighting, was composed from the above named organizations, to be joined later by the rest) maintained a correct political line and a solid military front until the cease-fire.

4. In the northern and middle sectors the resistance was paralyzed, both politically (inability to transform their administrative control over their areas into a political coordinated plan with the rest of the country), and militarily (their forces locked inside the cities). Most of these forces belonged to Fateh (in Jarash, Ramtha and Irbid), the D.P.F.L.P. Liberation Army (in Irbid and Ramtha), the Democratic Front (in Irbid and Ajlun) and to as-Saiqa (in Irbid, Ajlun and Ramtha). Most of these forces remained inactive despite the repeated call from Amman. They did not even make use of the Syrian support which succeeded in linking the northern region to the middle sector and broke the Jordanian army encirclements around Ramtha, Naima, and the Jarash-Irbid road. When the Syrian support withdrew the resistance forces did not sufficiently protect the deserted areas thus allowing the remaining contingents of the 40th royalist brigade (most of it wiped out during the fighting) and the 99th brigade (coming from Zarqa) to recapture the above positions and prevented the middle sector from communicating with the North.

The Amman command of the resistance under conditions of total encirclement and faced with the depletion of its ammunition (especially anti-tank equipment) and unable to receive reinforcements from the northern and middle commands — was forced to negotiate a cease-fire, after ten days of the bloody fighting in its history!*

Brother Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar) was sent by the Central Committee with the single purpose of signing a cease-fire. The purpose was to gain time to allow for reinforcements to arrive from the north. The conclusion of the Cairo agreement the next day came as a surprise to the Central Committee in Amman. It decided to disregard the agreement for three days in anticipation of new developments from other regions, but the total silence in the north if effect put the agreement into execution, especially when the Arab ('Supervision') Committee arrived in Amman.

PART II: THE CONSEQUENCES AND LESSONS OF THE FIFTH WAR OF LIQUIDATION IN SEPTEMBER'.

(Next issue). (This section includes the following: 1. The internal structure of the resistance movement. 2. The activities of the resistance in the cities and the rural areas. 3. The class nature of the Jordanian regime). The third and final section of this document deals with the composition of the Jordanian army and the practices of the mass movement in East Jordan, and finally analyzes critically the relations of the resistance movement with the Arab regimes and the present tasks of the revolutionary movement.

NOTES

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'MID-EAST IN REVOLUTION'

J. C. DONAHUE

A NEW BOOKLET

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NEWS --- FROM THE HOME FRONT ...



AL-AHRAM FANTASIES

A news dispatch reported in *Al-Ahram* (Cairo, Jan. 20, 1971) and claiming support by the Central Committee of the Resistance for Cairo's acceptance of the Rogers Proposals, received wide publicity in the western press (*Christian Science Monitor*, *N.Y. Times*, etc.). The tone of this publicity indicated that the leaders of the movement were "finally coming to their senses." The substance of *Al-Ahram's* story is contained in the following paragraph appearing in the front page of the same issue:

"The Central Committee of the Palestine Resistance Movement decided to support any political move by the Arab states aimed at eliminating the consequences of Israeli aggression of June 5, 1967. *This decision — which is considered as a new line taken by the movement — has the backing of all resistance organizations.* It was taken recently by the resistance movement after revising its political strategy in the light of recent developments(!!!). *Al-Ahram* added that the resolution was adopted on the basis of "suggestion presented by the Democratic Popular Front — a member of the Central Committee"(!) It quoted Ibrahim Bakr, official spokesman of the Central Committee (of the Resistance) as saying that "past experience has proven the incorrectness of the intransigent position the resistance movement took towards Cairo's acceptance of the Rogers Proposals. The resistance decided to return(?) to the position declared by the immortal leader Gamal Abdul Nasser, namely, that there is no contradiction between Cairo's acceptance of the Security Council Resolution and the American initiatives, and between the legitimate right of the resistance to pursue armed struggle."

Al-Ahram similarly quoted Yasir Arafat from Fateh, and George Habash from the Popular Front, to the same effect.

The *Ahram* dispatch was denounced and termed "a manufactured document by four major resistance organizations as well as the Central Committee.

The *Bulletin* received a communique from the Democratic Popular Front exposing the document, it contains the following points:

1. The positions of the Democratic Front are announced through its own bureaus and not through outside sources.

2. The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine which has always followed a political and military line of struggle against liquidationist schemes declares its adherence to that policy today more than ever. It resolutely denounces the cheap attempts of slander (of *Al-Ahram*).

3. *The Democratic Front resolutely denies having presented the suggestion reported in al-Ahram* of Cairo. Our Palestinian and Arab masses will surely expose the real aims behind such lies and slanders.

Fateh, the Popular Front, and the DPFLP (Central Command) issued separate strong statements denouncing the document.

Two days after the appearance of the dispatch in *al-Ahram*, the Beirut pro-Egyptian daily, *al-Anwar* published a long article (January 22, 1971) by Talal Salman (who had accompanied *al-Ahram's* news team to Amman) explaining that the original dispatch in Cairo was "the result of an unfortunate misunderstanding"(???) but insisted that the resistance movement still "considers Cairo to be her best friend"!!!

Meanwhile in Cairo Muhammad Hasanein Heikal (*al-Ahram* editor) informed a *New York Times* correspondent (Jan. 16, 1971) that "Peace must come from the heart and not from the barrel of the gun"!

ISRAELI CRIMES IN GAZA

Yasir Arafat made an appeal to movements of national liberation and world public opinion to protest the terrorist campaign of Israel against the Palestinian people in Gaza, "at a time when the Palestinian resistance and Arab and world public opinion are preoccupied with the events in Jordan." "The scope of the terrorist campaign," Abu Ammar stated, "surpasses what the Zionists ever did in 1956 or even in 1967." He referred to the following acts by the Israeli authorities:

1. Twelve thousand citizens were arrested and sent to the Sinai desert, were they were packed into concentration camps under the most severe weather conditions.

2. Al-Shati' refugee camp in al-Rimal area (Gaza) has been under seige by the Israeli army for 32 days. No person is allowed to leave or enter the camp, and only smuggled food arrives to the besieged population.

3. Omar al-Mukhtar street (the main street in Gaza) has been subject to a curfew for the same period (32 days). Israeli soldiers fire indiscriminately at whoever appears in the street, and at people looking from nearby buildings.

4. The curfew is also being imposed on the orange groves. Since this is the picking season, the curfew will destroy the main source of income for the population of Gaza.

5. Private houses are subject to daily searches, and 'suspected' dwellings are constantly being blown up. Searches are accompanied by the evacuation, beating and humiliation of inhabitants. Most sections of the city are still separated by barbed wires.

—Issued in Amman,
January 30, 1971

Split in the Jordanian Communist Party

The Politbureau of the Jordanian Communist Party made public a declaration condemning "factions that are splitting the communist movement." It referred to a section in the party that calls itself "The Ad-Hoc Central Committee."

It was clarified later that the new faction — also calling itself "The Leninist Cadres" @ was led by Fahmi al-Selfiti and Rushdi Shaheen was in dispute with the Central Committee over the question of armed struggle. Presumably they accused the Central Committee (led by Fuad Nassar) of prematurely forming al-Ansar partisans (communist partisans established by four Arab C.P.'s to fight with the resistance in 1970)!

The split occurred after the Central Committee issued a resolution defining the aim of al-Ansar to be "the liberation of Palestine." So far the size and exact nature of the split is not known. It was reported, however, that the Zarqa branch of the party refused to contact both factions until a thorough examination of all party activity has been done.

—Beirut, Feb.1, 1971

JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT TO PREVENT RESISTANCE ACTIVITY

The Prime Minister of Jordan, Wasfi al-Tal announced in an interview with the BBC television that his government "will not permit guerrillas to engage in any activity against Israel in the future — except for those conducted from the inside of occupied territories." He added that Jordan will probably not submit to any plan making any part of its West Bank a part of a separate Palestinian State. He added that Palestinians have every right to regain their lands occupied by Israel provided "they continue fighting against Israel from the inside of occupied territories."

BBC—Jan. 27, 1971.

LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF THE IRANIAN AND ARAB PEOPLES!!!

Joint Resolution of the Revolutionary Popular Movement of Oman and The Arab Gulf

&

The Iranian Communist Party (Tudah)

A delegation of the Iranian Communist Party (Tudah) met with representatives of the Revolutionary Popular Movement of Oman (RPMOAG) in which the international and local struggles were discussed.

The two delegations defined the present period as a struggle fought by the forces of the socialist camp and the working-class in the capitalist countries in alliance with movements of national liberation in colonized and semi-colonial nations against the forces of imperialism and its allies. They stressed their solidarity with the struggles of movements of national liberation, especially those of Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and

the struggle of the Arab peoples.

The two delegations condemned the imperialist plans being executed in the region at the hands of the local reactionary feudal classes and the despotic governments of the Shah and the Gulf Princes — agents of Anglo-American imperialism. The Iranian and Arab peoples will definitely destroy these schemes.

The fighting unity of both peoples cannot be broken by imperialism and its agents. The Communist Party of Iran supports the struggle of the PRM and the armed struggle led by the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf and the National Democratic Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Gulf. Similarly the PRMOAG supports the just struggle of the Iranian people led by the Communist Party (Tudeh) against imperialism and the reactionary regime of the Shah.

The two delegations helped their meeting to be the beginning of closer revolutionary cooperation in the near future.

Long Live the Common Struggle of Peoples for Liberation and Peace!

Victory to the Movements of National Liberation & the Working Class Against Imperialism and its Agents!!!

The Revolutionary Popular Movement
of Oman & the Arab Gulf

The Communist Party
of Iran (Tudeh)

(January 10, 1971)

The Americanization of the Libyan Revolution (?)

The Libyan government attacked the Sudanese Communist Party for "polluting the atmosphere of Khartoum [the capital of Sudan] with red air"(!). The semi-official Tripoli daily, al-Thawra, accused the Sudanese communists of attempting to destroy the proposed unity of the UAR, Syria, Libya, and the Sudan. The paper was responding to the position of the Sudanese communist party maintaining that the proposed unity was premature.

Tripoli
January 21, 1971

IMPORTANT !

Palestine Conference in Buffalo

The Palestine Solidarity Committee, in conjunction with the Arab Culture Club and the International Club of SUNY at Buffalo, is sponsoring a Palestine conference at the University.

The central theme of the conference is "Palestine — A Popular State vs. A Puppet State." The events will include three spokesmen from the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a Palestinian woman speaker, a Palestinian woman artist's exhibit, and films on the guerrilla struggle.

The main dates are March 2 and 3 at 8:00 p.m. in the SUNY at Buffalo Fillmore Room. All are invited and accommodations can be made if you are willing to bring some blankets.

LETTERS

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

In *The Class Character of Israeli Society* (P.R.B. No. 4/5) the majority tendency of the Israeli Socialist Organization (Matzpen) created a glaring and unnecessary dichotomy between two separate but closely related considerations:

- 1) The internal contradictions of the Zionist state itself
- 2) The contradictions between Zionism and the Arab world

These "internal/external" considerations cannot be severed from one another, particularly in respect to Israeli society, the framework of Matzpen's struggle.

Although the average Israeli worker may not be directly aware of Israel's internal class contradictions, because day-to-day propaganda tells him that there are no differences within his own society, he still knows that he is being exploited. "By whom?" and "Why?" are questions that must be answered convincingly, if one seeks to raise the level of mass consciousness. It is a serious oversight not to realize that workers in Israel are oppressed more and more each year by a growing capitalist class which has direct financial links to the Western World. The wealthy American "Zionists" sometimes mistakenly called philanthropists, have a definite financial motive as their first and foremost consideration in donating to Israel or in investing.

Class oppression in Israel can be understood by studying the wide disparity between rich and poor and by recognizing the contradictions between "promise" and, later, denial. The standard of living of the lower strata of Israeli society, comprised mainly of Oriental and Sephardic Jews (65 percent of the population), has been subject to great instability. For example, consumption per capita among European and American immigrants rose 4.9 percent between 1960 and 1964, whereas, among immigrants from Asia and Africa, it *declined* 4.2 percent. This transformation meant that, by 1964, consumption per capita among European and American immigrants was nearly 60 percent higher than among immigrants from Asia and Africa — in contrast to a 45 percent consumption differential in 1960.

Between 1962 and 1968, wages per day (average) rose nearly 80 percent whereas industrial production during the same period rose by nearly 80 percent. Zionist apologists would be quick to praise this "miracle of a planned economy" — but what about the calamitous "mitun" or depression which lasted from 1965 until the June, 1967 war? What about the fact that 13.5 percent of the work force was unemployed in 1967 and that, by 1968, the figure still stood at 5.7 percent? In other words, production increases and "wage improvements" were concurrent with mass firings. Is it merely a coincidence that, in 1967 alone, there were 20,000 requests for emigration to the United States from Israel?

If conditions in Israel were truly better than those in North Africa, why did only 20,000 out of 130,000 Algerian Jews leaving Algeria choose to migrate to Israel instead of France?

Although the "Oriental" immigrant has

usually voiced his indignation by protesting ethnic discrimination, his protests implicitly contain the awareness that he is being exploited in his daily work for the benefit of others. He knows that he does not share in the "benefits of Zionism." In 1963, during a period of "full employment" a nationwide movement of Oriental groups originated in the port city of Ashdod and the desert town of Beersheva, two towns with majority Oriental populations. This movement raised various demands, ranging from larger direct economic benefits to more independent political participation. The movement only seized upon ethnic recriminations when it was frustrated in its efforts.

In 1959, a violent demonstration took place in Wadi Salib, a slum area of Haifa, against the system of public emergency work and against the system of immigrant absorption, which discriminated against North African Jews in particular. Participants were encouraged to reject all established political parties and their lackeys among the North African population. They sought to create the "Likkud," under the leadership of Ben Haroush, who claimed to represent all victims of discrimination in Israel, not solely North Africans. As a result of this pressure, minor economic and educational gains were made.

Instances such as these, presented in *Israeli Society* by the well-known bourgeois sociologist S.N. Eisenstadt, illustrate a level of class antagonism in Israel which the majority tendency of Matzpen appears to overlook.

Today, in Israel, the class struggle is sharpening, as prices rise and real wages decline. We can point to such recent instances as the postal workers' strike which occurred in December, 1970 and to reports of growing tension between dockworkers and their employers. It is clear that objective economic conditions force workers to place their own class interests above the "national security" of Dayan, Degin, and Company.

It is particularly hard to comprehend the claim that the Histadrut is a bureaucracy which is at odds with the Israeli bourgeoisie, with respect to control of foreign capital inputs. Histadrut leaders' ties with private capital are so strong that there are many so-called "labor leaders" who also sit on the boards of directors of private companies. In many cases, the major shareholders of Israeli firms are American capitalists, rather than local capitalists or "labor leaders" or the government. It is difficult to see a dichotomy between American and Israeli capitalists, on one hand, and Israel's nominally "socialist" labor bureaucracy. Although the Histadrut supposedly owns half of the public sector of the economy, the nature of this ownership must be subjected to serious Marxist analysis. Reliance upon bourgeois sources, such as Israel's Falk Economic Institute, is not enough.

It is difficult indeed to see how the labor bureaucracy defends the interests of the working class. Rather, it fights all efforts at independent organizing of the laboring masses. It supports anti-strike legislation and agrees with the bosses to freeze wages. Strikes are usually spontaneous. In 1964, there were 800 "unapproved" strikes in contrast to only 46 strikes which were

"approved" by the Histadrut.

We admit to our Matzpen comrades that the Israeli working class, because of consistent propaganda, is still at this time anti-Arab.

We know that some of the "Oriental" Israeli youth are the most bitter haters of Arabs living in Israel and in the occupied territories. But, if class contradictions in Israel are intensified, isn't it possible that the "Oriental" population will undergo tremendous changes of attitude? Strikes occurring day after day in Israel show us that many workers are considering their class interests first — job and wage discrimination, and not the conflict with the Arab world, are the major threat to workers' livelihoods.

Members of Matzpen who carried out agitation among the Ashdod dock workers in 1969 expressed to us the firm opinion that the dockers were very willing to listen to a Marxist explanation of why the Israeli worker draws few material benefits from Zionist society. He knows that the "ugly American" who comes to dedicate a forest or a hotel or a hospital is gaining from his "philanthropy." *How?* and *Why?* as we have said, are the questions which must be answered in political agitation.

Because of Western imperialism's military and economic strategy of developing Israel as a vital link between Europe and Asia and Africa, we cannot neglect the possible importance of the Israeli masses in fighting against this strategy. There can be no socialist Palestine, free from outside attacks, without a raising of class consciousness in present-day Israel and throughout the Middle East. Just as we believe in the ultimate victory of the *fedayin* against reactionary regimes in Jordan and Lebanon, we must also believe in and work for the day when the Israeli masses will pick up the gun and fight against capitalist exploitation and imperialism.

Ellen Lockwood
Waltham, Mass.

II. What Is "National-Arab Marxism": Reply to Tarabulsi.

To the editor:

It was surprising to find in the September issue of the Palestine Resistance Bulletin an article so ambiguous and nationalist as "Note on the Palestinian Class Structure" by F. Tarabulsi — without a clear class-based critique of its ideas presented beside it. This letter is an attempt to present the basic points which such a critique must include.

In an attempt to smother the class aspirations of the exploited Arab masses, Arab bourgeois and petty-bourgeois ideologues like those of the Baath Party and Nasserism have long put forward the "Arab side" of the Palestinian question in the terms of Palestinian and Arab nationalist aspirations. In the context of these prevailing bourgeois-nationalist ideas, a Marxist ideologue must clearly differentiate his analysis as a class analysis based on concrete experience and as a fundamental challenge to the nationalist framework. He must find the evidence of class struggle, and draw conclusions that help to sharpen class contradictions in the eyes of the masses. Tarabulsi's article claims to be such a class analysis, but fails to do any of these things. Through a combination of nationalist-sounding phrases and an ambiguous examination of "various social forces," Tarabulsi robs his audience of the essential lesson of a genuine class analysis of the Palestinian situation — that national liberation for the Palestinian and Arab masses means in essence a fight against bourgeois-nationalism and a fight for socialism. At best, Tarabulsi's analysis is superficial and vague. His ambiguousness and uncritical use of

nationalist phrases fail to challenge the old Arab nationalist ideas, and are therefore open to being interpreted within the nationalist framework. At worst, his article is a deliberate attempt to undermine the growing class consciousness among the masses by superimposing revolutionary Marxist terminology on a fundamentally bourgeois-nationalist line.

In the beginning of his article, Tarabulsi states: "the dispersion of the Palestinian people and the domination of the national question over its life was bound to lead to a relative confiscation of the class struggle...the Palestinian people's principal goal is the *reintegration* of its country. The positions of its various social groups are determined by, and refracted through, the national question itself."

While it is true that between 1948 and 1967 overt class struggle among the Palestinians was inhibited, the class struggle was by no means eliminated nor was the principal goal of the various classes the same. Just as during the time of 1936-1939, when the Palestinian feudal and religious aristocracy subverted the six-month-long strike and ensuing armed rebellion of the Palestinian masses against Zionism and British imperialism; after 1948, the developing bourgeois were quick to reconstitute their privileged and exploiting position vis-a-vis the masses through integration into other Arab economies, to leave the displaced Palestinian workers and peasants to intense oppression in refugee camps, and even worse to foster and encourage the treacherous lie that the Arab governments would retake Palestine with their armies if the Palestinian masses would only give them the chance. This was in fact the "relative confiscation" of the class struggle after the dispersion of the Palestinians — a confiscation perpetrated with the support of the Palestinian bourgeoisie. The plan was two-fold: 1) to strip the masses of class consciousness by encouraging isolation from production in refugee camps and replacing class consciousness with an emotional nationalism which would not threaten bourgeois interests; and 2) to build complete dependence among the Palestinian masses on the Arab bourgeois and petty-bourgeois regimes for everything from bread to political ideology to national liberation. The June 1967 War exposed this plan as bankrupt and contrary to the interests of the masses, and the class struggle which smoldered beneath a smokescreen for some twenty years re-emerged and gained strength in the form of the Palestinian Resistance Movement. Once again today, the Palestinian bourgeoisie are ready to sell out the resistance movement for the implementation of the U.N. resolution, for the Rogers "Peace" Plan, or for the formation of a Palestinian "State" including the West Bank of the Jordan and the Gaza Strip — all of which solutions the Resistance Movement rejects. Not only are the bourgeoisie willing to sell out, they have already collaborated in the latest attempt to liquidate the mass movement in Jordan. It is proof enough to recall that King Hussein's Prime Minister during the time of the latest massacres was a Palestinian.

Thus, it is clear that the Palestinian people as a whole do not and cannot have *one* principal goal — "the *reintegration* of its country." Every goal is a class goal and must be seen in terms of class interest. The principal goal of the Palestinian bourgeoisie is at least to maintain their present role as exploiters of the masses, if not to extend that role to economic and political control over a new capitalist Palestinian state. Therefore they support *reintegration* insofar as it serves their class interests and they oppose with growing fervor the mass movement which challenges their power. Even within the Resistance Movement itself, there are differing class interests underlying the alliance of the

different participating groups. These different interests are best capsulized in each group's program for the new Palestinian state to come. They range from petty-bourgeois nationalist interests as exemplified in the call by Fateh for a "democratic non-sectarian" Palestine all the way to proletarian internationalist interests as exemplified in the call by the Democratic Popular Front for a "socialist Palestine within a larger socialist Arab union." Tarabulsi's formula — which concludes that the positions of the Palestinian people's "various social groups" are "determined by, and refracted through, the national question itself" — is then false, and can only be understood as a reversion to bourgeois-nationalist distortions. In fact, the position of each "social group" is determined by its class interest. Each group's conception of the national question is only a vehicle through which to identify its class interest in this stage of the struggle.

The remainder of Tarabulsi's article reinforces the nationalist aspects of his opening argument, through even plainer references to the old nationalist ideas and a continuing ambiguous presentation. The analysis which emerges can be roughly summarized as follows: The workers, peasants and refugees have only "tents, the competition of local labor and exploitation," to lose and they have "a whole country to gain." Therefore they have the most consistent interest in the fight of the Palestinian people for "reintegration of its country," and for de-Zionization. In order to win, the workers, peasants and refugees must destroy "Israeli 'collective' capitalism" and replace it with a new "national-Arab Marxism."

Certainly, the workers, peasants and refugees stand to lose very little in the fight — their oppression is already tremendous. But whether or not they have a consistent interest in fighting for that "whole country to gain" depends entirely on what that country will be like, what class will rule, and what class will control the economy. If that "whole country" is to be capitalist, owned and ruled by the Palestinian bourgeoisie, the workers, peasants and refugees will have gained nothing except to substitute one exploiter for another. In fact, the Palestinian bourgeoisie, not the workers, peasants and refugees, would have the most consistent interest in gaining such a country. On the other hand, if the new Palestine is to be a socialist state in which the exploited classes collectively own and control the means of production, in which the exploited classes collectively own and control the means of production, in which proletarian dictatorship is exercised over the bourgeoisie, and in which private property is finally abolished; then the workers, peasants and refugees do have the most consistent interest in fighting. For only a socialist state is capable of eliminating the economic framework which perpetuates their national and class oppression. It can eliminate exploitation by revolutionizing the relations of production. It can defeat chauvinism and racism by tearing down the economic barriers which pit the exploited Palestinian against the exploited Israeli. And it can crush the power of the bourgeoisie by cementing a militant proletarian unity and rule to fight the forces of counterrevolution. However we cannot deduce such a socialist Palestine from Tarabulsi's analysis, because his Palestine requires the implementation of two concepts irreconcilable with socialism: the destruction of "Israeli 'collective' capitalism" and producing a new "national-Arab Marxism."

Since the creation of the State of Israel, Arab nationalist leaders have painted the Israelis as a monolithic and totally homogeneous people, all of whom inherently, by their very Jewishness, are the enemies of all Arabs. This is in spite of

the fact that Jews and Arabs lived together peacefully in pre-WWI Palestine and in spite of the fact that Jews from the Communist Party of Palestine took up arms and joined in the rebellion of 1936-1939. The Arab bourgeoisie used this anti-Jewish chauvinism to contain the internal class struggle and divert its militance toward an outside foreign enemy. To whip up emotions, the bourgeoisie put forward vicious, purely racist and chauvinist slogans like "throwing the Jews into the sea." Today's so-called "progressive" nationalists have rejected such genocidal solutions, realizing that objective conditions and world opinion cannot permit them. Nevertheless, the power of these "progressives" still depends on preventing the rise of a real revolutionary mass movement. Therefore, maintaining the nationalist framework, they continue to put forward the Palestinian struggle in terms of Arab versus Jew. And they continue to put forward solutions which call for some form or another of subjugating the Israelis as a whole. Tarabulsi's call for the destruction of "Israeli 'collective' capitalism" is just one example of the lies these "progressives" propagate in order to justify their national-chauvinist programs. He replaces the old unconvincing arguments about "Jewishness" being irreconcilably opposed to "Arabness" with what looks on the surface to be a hard, material argument neatly phrased in the terms of Marxist economics. With the concept of "Israeli 'collective' capitalism", Tarabulsi is saying that the Israelis as a nondifferentiable group are collectively perpetrating capitalist exploitation on the Palestinians. Here, once again, we must conclude that the enemy of the Palestinians is all Israelis. And in order to abolish this collective exploitation, the Palestinians must destroy this collective unit. Once again, we must conclude that the solution lies in somehow subjugating the Israelis as a whole. Thus, while the arguments have changed, the conclusions remain the same as those of the Arab bourgeoisie.

A Marxist, on the other hand, recognizes that the true liberation of the exploited Palestinians requires that the masses understand and reject the treacherous implications of an Arab-versus-Jew struggle. It is precisely such a struggle which would allow the Palestinian bourgeoisie to reconstitute their own capitalist exploitation of the masses in the new Palestine, and to maintain Arab-Jewish antagonism for the time when unleashing it would serve their interests against a competing Israeli bourgeoisie. A Marxist must emphasize the fact that there are within Israel exploited classes which have an objective interest in fighting Zionism and imperialism. He must constantly fight against anti-Jewish chauvinism by building class

consciousness and a militant class solidarity between exploited Israelis and Palestinians struggling for an end to exploitation. For just as the Arab and Israeli ruling classes are already allies against the Palestinian-Jordanian mass movement, the Resistance Movement has a potential strong ally in the exploited Israelis.

Moving to Tarabulsi's call for a new "national-Arab Marxism," again we find a reversion to the old Arab nationalist ideas. The idea of this or that form of "national Marxism" is nothing new in the history of class struggle against capitalism. Every time the bourgeoisie are faced with a revolutionary situation, they have tried to abort it by offering the masses a false substitute, often disguised under the name of such a "national Marxism." We find the Swedes calling their petty welfare programs "the Swedish form of socialism," the Nazis called their fascist system "National Socialism," Sukarno was going to bridge the gap between Islam and communism by his Indonesian brand of socialism, and Nyrere is still claiming that his "African socialism" is the only way to reconcile Africa's communal character with Marxism. Similarly, the Arab petty-bourgeoisie have long had their own recipe which they called "Arab socialism." As early as 1948, the Baath Party had gone far in developing theories to reconcile the "Arab character" with "a basically European concept," namely Marxism. Since then, it has become increasingly clear that this "Arab socialism" is nothing more than the latest swindle perpetrated on the Arab workers and peasants. Today in the bastions of "Arab socialism" — Egypt, Syria, and Iraq — the jails are bursting with workers, peasants and students whose crime was to demand an end to the exploitation perpetrated by the proponents of "Arab socialism," that is by the Arab petty-bourgeoisie. The fact that Tarabulsi did not use precisely the term "Arab socialism" hardly means that he had something radically different in mind. Throughout the last twenty years, a very sharp distinction had developed in the Arab countries between those who put forward the call for Marxism-Leninism and those who have coined other names for their ideologies. The convention has been that any new-sounding "socialist" name is really meant to be an alternative to the "old-fashioned" or "foreign-imported" Marxism-Leninism. Thus, when Tarabulsi, who is quite familiar with ideological developments in the Middle East, chooses to use the name "national-Arab Marxism" without any qualification, we can only assume that he offers it as a substitute to Marxism-Leninism. This conclusion seems especially plausible considering the nationalist framework of the article as a whole, which has already been discussed.

However, the history of class struggle against capitalism has amply shown that Marxism-Leninism is the only scientific ideology for the workers, and peasants to follow. The concrete experience of revolution in countries as different as China and Albania has shown that the content of imperialist exploitation and class struggle is one the world over. And it has shown that one ideology — Marxism-Leninism — provides the tools for abolishing that exploitation and for resolving that struggle.

In summary, Tarabulsi's article was nothing but a regurgitation of the old run-of-the-mill Arab petty-bourgeois nationalist positions on the Palestinian question. First, Tarabulsi swept class struggle under the rug, saying that the Palestinian struggle is in essence a nationalist struggle with one nationalist goal. Second, he rejuvenated anti-Jewish chauvinism presenting a new economic justification for identifying the enemy as all Israelis. Third, he put the final and permanent nationalist seal on the Palestinian question, identifying the solution as a new "Marxism." Though he managed to sneak in a few terms like exploitation and other Marxist-sounding words, the content of his article could easily be found in the writings of Michel Aflaq or Nagi 'Alush.

The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine has presented the Marxist alternative to Tarabulsi's line. In its theory and practice, the DPFLP has shown itself to be far advanced in applying the method of dialectical materialism to the class struggle in the Palestinian-Jordanian situation. On the basis of a clear class analysis, the DPFLP was the first organization to raise the slogan that "the road to Tel Aviv is through Amman." This slogan was presented as an alternative of "non-interference in the internal affairs of Arab governments," and it recognized that the Resistance Movement must fight against the Arab and Palestinian bourgeoisie in order to survive. The last three attacks of the Jordanian government against the Resistance Movement have shown this slogan to be correct. Where Tarabulsi has said that the class question is in essence a national question, the DPFLP has shown that the national question is in essence a class question. And instead of calling for the "Palestinian people" to smash "Israeli 'collective' capitalism" under the banner of a new "national-Arab Marxism," the DPFLP has called for the formation of a Marxist-Leninist party to lead the Palestinian-Jordanian workers, peasants and refugees to fight for socialism in Palestine — to fight for a Palestine in which Palestinian and Israeli exploited masses can jointly exercise their dictatorship over the bourgeoisie and jointly fight against imperialism.

Marta Rojas

PALESTINE RESISTANCE BULLETIN
BOX 63 - NORTON UNION
SUNYAB - MAIN STREET
BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14214

M. Saba
 5644 E. Pina
 Tucson, Ariz. 85712

