

PALESTINE RESISTANCE BULLETIN

November No. II Volume II

SOLIDARITY WITH THE DEMOCRATIC POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

IN THIS ISSUE :

- DPFLP on the 1936 revolution
- Nayef Hawatmeh speech in Iraq
- DPFLP on the Saudi mediation
- West Bank's economy & Israel

Jordanian National Liberation Movement

Jordanian National Liberation Movement Communique A Political Communique Four Military Communiques

The Jordanian National Liberation Movement has issued the following communique.

Our Courageous Jordanian People:

The regime has brought upon us disaster under the guise of liquidating the fedayeen and to achieve that illegal aim the regime has torn apart our national unity and has proceeded down the path of submission to the enemy who still occupies our land. The regime, in the name of law and order, has robbed us of our national freedom and dignity and has imposed a period of bloody terror which has strengthened division, national prejudice and tribal loyalty.

The existing regime is attempting, in this manner, to divide our people and force them to be submissive and an easy target for the enemy. Our people will never submit. Our people's vanguard forces, *the Jordanian National Liberation Movement (JNLM)*, have risen, emphasizing the unity of the people of the two banks and the struggle for the liberation of Jordan from the terrorist ruling class.

The Jordanian National Liberation Movement calls upon the Jordanian masses to support us and to proclaim that they will never abandon the practice of confronting *reactionary violence with revolutionary violence* until all the immediate demands of our people are fulfilled.

These demands:

1. The ouster of the government of agent Wasfi al-Tall and the prosecution of all those responsible or connected to the crimes against our people.
2. The end of the bloody terror, the respect and release of the liberties of the people and the release of all political prisoners.
3. The liberation of Jordan from Anglo-American influence.
4. The respect for all agreements and treaties that commit Jordan to the support of the Palestinian resistance.
5. The end of the isolation of Jordan from the Arab world. The implementation of a policy of solidarity with all the national Arab forces.

The Jordanian National Liberation Movement, while introducing its program to the people, at the same time proclaims that its fighting forces which had waged military operations against the interests of the regime without announcement now have resumed their operations after a reorganization of its ranks that began September 11. We will not cease our campaign until all our demands have been fulfilled. Further, the JNLM claims responsibility for two operations, el-Abdaly and Abu Ahmed restaurant, and warns the authorities who are attempting to keep the silence of these operations.

LONG LIVE THE UNITY OF OUR PEOPLE ON THE TWO BANKS.
DOWN WITH THE CONSPIRACIES OF THE IMPERIALIST'S AGENTS.

Military Communiques

The Military Command of the Jordanian National Liberation Movement has issued the following four communiques.

Communique Number One

In accordance with orders of the executive committee of the JNLM, one of our units placed an explosive device near the al-Najda police station in al-Abdali. The bomb exploded at 9:00 am on 9-11-71 and injured two policemen. This caused panic among the ranks of the puppets who proceeded to surround the area and arrest hundreds of innocent civilians. Meanwhile our fighters were able to withdraw unharmed.

Communique Number Two

In accordance with orders from the executive committee of the JNLM, one of our units placed an explosive device inside the Abu Ahmed restaurant which is located on Jebal Amman (one of the seven hills of Amman). This restaurant is frequented by important members of the terrorist regime. The bomb went off at 3:00 pm on 9-12-71 while a dinner party was occurring, a party attended by several members of the phoney national assembly and also attended by other important puppets. The explosion caused a fire in part of the restaurant which resulted in unknown enemy losses. Our unit was able to withdraw unharmed.

Communique Number Three

In accordance with the broad campaign of the underground resistance, the following operations were implemented as an answer to the reactionary terror conducted by the present regime and in accordance with the orders of the executive committee of JNLM, secret cells launched.

1. 9-11-71 - One of our units threw two hand grenades into a military jeep near the Islamic cemetery in the city of Irbid. This resulted in the death and injury of several puppet troops.
2. One of our secret cells placed a mine on the al-trabi road which is located east of al-Ba'ladi Stadium and leads to the military headquarters in Irbid. The mine exploded destroying the truck and killing and injuring its occupants.
3. 9-18-71 (am) - A mine placed by one of our secret cells exploded on the road north of the village of Sama'. The road leads from the farm of Dhaif Alla Ghasib (the brother of mass-murderer Atta Alla Ghasib, commander of the second brigade).
4. 9-19-71 - A mine placed by one of our units exploded in the north Jordan town of Ya'bir. The explosion resulted in the destruction of a military truck.

Communique Number Four

1. The JNLM claimed the responsibility for the placement of an explosive device in the lounge of the Jordan Hotel on the morning of 9-14-71. The puppet radio station announced the discovery and disarmament of this bomb.
2. 9-11-71 - An explosive device which was placed by one of our units was discovered near the Amman police headquarters and disarmed before it could explode.

editorial:

1936

The resistance movement entered a new, sensitive and very dangerous stage in September of 1971 when a delegation representing the leadership of Fateh and Saiqa plus some "independents" travelled to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, for negotiations with representatives of King Hussein's regime. Ironically enough, the meetings were held on the anniversary of the September 1970 counter-revolution which King Hussein led against the resistance movement. Since those bloody and savage nine days of civil war in 1970, King Hussein has continued his attacks on the resistance movement until finally in July, the last stronghold in Jareh and Ajlun fell to the Jordanian army with 2000 guerrillas captured. During this year of civil war, over 25,000 Palestinians and Jordanians lay dead or wounded, and Israel can breathe more easily again because their ally Hussein has once again managed to suppress the Palestinian movement for national liberation.

The Jeddah negotiations — above and beyond being another step backwards in the struggle of the Palestinian national liberation movement with Hussein's forces and above and beyond being the equivalent of national treason and sell-out at a time when the masses need a leadership capable of continuing the struggle — represent a deeper and more fundamental development in the march of the Palestinian-Jordanian movement for national liberation. The negotiations are the *first concrete steps* that the Palestinian bourgeoisie have taken on the road of quitting the national liberation struggle and the *first step* on the road for an accommodation within the imperialist set-up in the Middle East.

Throughout the past four years Fateh's leadership has politically represented the line of the Palestinian national bourgeoisie within the resistance movement. This class found itself disenfranchised along with the other Palestinian classes and hence joined with them, or rather, attempted to lead the other classes in their joint struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reactionaries. Nevertheless, as the Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine's literature has constantly shown the nature of the contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the enemy is fundamentally different from the contradiction between the oppressed masses — Palestinian workers, peasants, and poor refugees — with this same enemy. The bourgeoisie were in the struggle for their own interests. This separate interest was specifically what the imperialists were aiming at when the idea of a Palestinian State in the West Bank was let out among Palestinian political circles. A puppet state in the West Bank can, within certain conditions, satisfy the aspirations of the Palestinian national bourgeoisie. However, the liberation of all of the Palestinian soil is a necessary condition for ending the plight and oppression of the toiling Palestinian masses and for ending their exile from their national homeland.

Fateh's leadership at first rejected the idea of a West Bank puppet state. But that was 1969 and the resistance movement was at the pinnacle of its strength and the Palestinian bourgeoisie had far more grandiose visions as to where this movement could carry them. However, since the September 1970 civil war in Jordan, King Hussein has managed to smash the resistance movement into one of two alternatives: either to go underground and start the long and virtuous road of building for a people's war of national liberation to be fought over the next few decades, or else to arrive at an accommodation with the enemy on the latter's terms. The Jeddah negotiations have shown that the Palestinian national bourgeoisie, represented by the *leadership* of Fateh, has abandoned the road of a people's war and has begun to direct its energies toward reviving the old idea of a "Palestinian (puppet) State" on the West Bank.

This explains the insistence of the Fateh-Saiqa delegation in Jeddah on considering the Cairo agreement as the basis for the negotiations with Hussein. Naturally the articles of the Cairo agreement that the Fateh-Saiqa leaders are interested in are not those having to do with rights of the militia to train and to bear arms, nor are they interested in the articles concerning safeguards for maintaining the bases and supply lines of the resistance movement in Jordan. The specific article they are interested in is the one stating that *the resistance movement is the sole representative of the Palestinian people*. With such a concession from King Hussein, the Palestinian bourgeoisie can then approach the U.S., hat in hand, and ask for the "Palestinian State" which State Department emissary Fischer had once offered them in 1969.

It is very important to realize that this does not mean that the Fateh-Saiqa leaders and the whole of the Palestinian national liberation movement and do not have any more roles to play. Instead, as stated above, they have taken the *first step* away from the path of national liberation and as they progress on this road they will attempt to take the whole movement with them by eliminating the left of the resistance movement. This is why it is so important to expose this class leadership and win the Palestinian masses away from it. In the final analysis, a proletarian leadership is the only one that is *willing and able* to continue the struggle for national liberation, against imperialism, Zionism, and Arab reactionaries, to its conclusion.

The following article is an excerpt from the newly translated DPFLP pamphlet "Historical Development of the Palestinian Struggle." It is part of a critical analysis of the Palestinian struggle from 1936 to 1967 that was prepared by the DPFLP in 1969.

REVOLUTION OF 1936

The 1936 revolution (with all the misconceptions which accompanied it) gives us a model to study, a model which is undoubtedly one of the best models of struggle within the history of the Palestinian cause. This is because the 1936 revolution was the climax of the Palestinian struggle against both the British mandate and the Zionist existence and came after long years of peaceful struggle which had been manifested in position papers, demonstrations, intensive strikes and many efforts to persuade Britain to stop aiding the Zionist movement.

The basic value of this revolution lay in the fact that it began as a solely popular initiative without any relationship to the Palestinian bourgeois family leaderships or religious leaderships, for those leaderships were against the idea of the revolution.

The primary organizations of the 1936 revolution grew and spread among the workers who had come from the country to the city to find work (a large number of those workers had settled around Haifa). When these organizations broadened they didn't look toward the cities, but directed themselves toward the countryside where they started to organize the peasants and convince them of the necessity of the revolution. The leaderships who took the responsibility of organizing and preparing the revolution were, however, cut off from the feudal and bourgeois family leaderships who were active in the "political" arena. There was never any relationship between the two until the former decided that the revolution was imminent, but even then the contacts between the two never prospered.

The man who played a most important role in organizing the revolution materially and politically, by agitating among the workers and in the countryside, was Izzil-Deen Alkasam,¹ a simple clergyman who was not after any personal glory and preferred to work out of the limelight. Although Alkasam was more conscious of the norm of sacrifice than being at the head and leaderizing factor in the masses fight against Britain and Zionism. Through agitating among the masses for armed struggle, Al-Kassam gave this position enough strength to enable the fighting to carry on for three years after his death. Those were the years which saw a violent revolution occur in all parts of Palestine, creating new conditions in the entire Arab area.

Shortly before Al-Kassam launched the revolution, he contacted Al Hajj Amin al-Huseini and asked him to be appointed a mobil organizer to work for the preparation of the revolution. Al Huseini apologized saying, "We are trying to solve the problem politically." In 1935, Al-Kasam sent one of his men, who was called Mahmoud Salem, to Al-Huseini to inform him that Al-Kasam had decided to proclaim the revolution in the north and to ask him to do the same in the south, but Al-Huseini answered that the time had not yet come for such an act and that the political efforts being made were enough to insure the Arabs of Palestine their rights.

But these answers did not turn Al-Kasam to desperation for he viewed the situation in terms of the secret organizations he had built among the workers and poor peasants. In addition, the quantities of arms which he had secretly purchased led him to believe that the new form of struggle would impose itself on everyone in the final analysis.

On November 14, 1935, Al-Kasam fought his first battle and the British forces, searching for him, turned all of the Jinin area into a battlefield. The British were able to surround Al-Kasam and some of his comrades in a valley where he refused to escape and continued to fight along with his comrades until they had all been killed.

It is true that the Al-Kasam movement did not accomplish any of its important goals, but it did expose the family leaderships to the masses. What was the position of those leaderships after Al-Kasam's death? They refused to attend his funeral and they limited themselves to sending consoling telegrams, and that same week met with the British High Commissioner to discuss with him the necessity of British response to the Palestinian Arab's demands for their rights.

THE SECOND STAGE OF THE REVOLUTION

The first stage of the 1936 revolution saw the workers and peasants stand on the side of the armed revolution while the family leaderships stood against it trying to peacefully persuade the British.

The second stage began five months later on the 15th of April 1936, when the secret organizations of Al-Kasam were able to regather their forces and renew their work in the countryside, attempting to continue the November 14th movement. The revolution spread from the north to the south and on the 19th of April in Jaffa began a complete popular uprising.

In reaction to this uprising, the British forces destroyed entire neighborhoods of Jaffa. This was the spark which pushed the "National Committees," organized by purely popular initiative to support the revolution, to declare a general strike (while the five family parties quarrelled with one another, far removed from the popular movement).

On April 25th the National Committees forced the following parties to dissolve themselves:

- The Islamic Board (Al-Huseini)
- The Arabic Defence Party (Rajeb Nashashibi)
- The National Front Party (Abdul Latif Salah)
- The Arab Palestinian Party (Jamal Huseini)
- The Islah (Reformist) Party (Husein el-Khalidi)

The National Committees forced upon all these dissolved parties the formation of an Arab Higher Committee to lead the popular struggle which

NEWEST DPFLP ENGLISH LANGUAGE PAMPHLET "HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN STRUGGLE"

S.35

REVOLUTION

was manifesting itself in general strikes and armed revolution. The leaders of those dissolved parties had to keep pace with the events and accept the proposed solution.

Here we must stop for some important observations:

1) The Arab Higher Committee which was formed from the five major parties, dominated by bourgeois and feudal Palestinian families, did not consider the armed revolution as one of its tasks. It stressed in its charter "to continue striking" until the British Government changed its policy by; stopping Jewish immigration, stopping the sale of land to the Jews, and establishing a parliamentary government.

The National Committees held a conference in Jerusalem on the 8th of May, under the supervision and leadership of Al Hajj Amin Huseini. The most important decision taken at the meeting was only to stop paying taxes.

2) The National Committees which were formed through solely popular initiatives had the responsibility of backing the revolution both materially and morally, in addition, these committees were running the affairs and administration of the territories where the rebels imposed their control.

3) In spite of all types of violence and terror the British could not liquidate the revolution or even prevent it from spreading. So Britain went to the Arab rulers who were loyal to her and asked them to mediate and convince the Palestinian leaders to halt the revolution and to try to peacefully persuade Britain to take regard of their demands.

4) The Arab rulers responded to Britain's request. Leading the Arab rulers was Nouri Al Said, who arrived in Jerusalem on August 26, 1936 and asked the Arab Higher Committee to use all means to break the strike and halt the present "disturbances" because the Iraqi government would try to convince Britain to give the Palestinian Arabs their legitimate rights.

5) The Palestinian people rejected the concept of mediation and carried on their strike and armed revolution until the rulers of Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Yemen intervened by sending telegrams telling the Palestinian people to "calm down."

In spite of the people's refusal, the Arab Higher Committee quickly issued a communique declaring that it had agreed to mediation and asked the people to halt the strike and all disturbances beginning October 12, 1936. With this communique the second stage of the revolution came to an end, reaffirming the manifestations of the first stage:

1) The people's rush towards the armed struggle and their rejection of the concept of negotiation with the British.

2) The hesitation of the bourgeois and feudal family leaderships and their continuous attempts to accept compromising solutions in those political negotiations.

An important element, however, appeared on the stage at this time. The Arab rulers, who stood with the leaders of Palestine on the same class grounds, attempted to intervene in order to impose a position on the Palestinian people. But the failure of the Arab mediation and Britain's refusal to stop the Jewish immigration gave the masses a new and material proof of the necessity of armed struggle as the only method to accomplish their goals. With the failure of the mediation and with the people's belief in what they were doing, the third stage of the 1936 revolution began.

THE THIRD STAGE OF THE REVOLUTION

This stage begins with an incident of important significance: the assassination of Governor Andrews of the northern district by the revolutionaries on September 27, 1937 and a communique from the Arab Higher Committee condemning the assassination.

This stage also begins with confrontations between the masses of the country and the feudal and bourgeois family leaderships. These confrontations will intensify every day until the end of the revolution.

The British occupation forces moved quickly in the face of these events and stepped up their methods of violence and terror. Even the communique condemning the assassination issued by the Arab Higher Committee could not help any of its members to escape from the British terror. Some members were arrested, others fled from the country and for those who were touring abroad in the Arab states during the assassination an order was issued preventing them from returning to Palestine.

The masses were not shocked (as was expected) for their previous experience in struggle helped them to retaliate quickly and they confronted British violence with a violence which grew from leaflets to demonstrations to strikes to armed revolution. The sphere of resistance broadened this time to include political agents, land auctioneers, spies, policemen and troops of the occupying authorities. With this total identification of the enemies, the revolution entered a stage of maturity which greatly helped in widening its scope and deepening its influence. This new position put an end to any and all shaky positions which might come from inside the ranks of the revolution. From that point on, shaky positions would come from outside the framework of the armed struggle movement.

In this stage of maturity the revolution was concentrated strongly in the areas of Nablus and Khalil and in the northern region. With the beginning of 1938 the revolutionaries had great influence in every village in those regions and the revolutionary leaders had complete control, not only militarily, but also administratively and judicially.

The main point of weakness inside the ranks of the revolution in this stage was the absence of a united leadership armed with deep political consciousness which could control the military co-ordination of operations among the different regions. This problem could not be solved by the Higher Council of Leaders which held its first meeting in the middle of 1938.

In light of this popular situation it may be asked, where were the bourgeois and feudal leaderships?

Some were under arrest or outside the country, as we mentioned before. Others were freely collaborating with the British and working hard to liquidate the revolution. Here we ought to stop in order to examine the nature of the new method which the Palestinian bourgeois and feudal leaderships followed.

In the past the method of these leaderships was striking at the people's struggle from within by accepting the concept of negotiations (to encircle the revolution politically). In the new revolutionary stage, the role of this method was terminated for these leaderships unmasked their true faces and resisted the revolution by the following methods:

1) Informing of the rebel's plans, their gathering places and their hideouts.

2) Attempting to convince the masses that the revolution was of a "party" nature.²

3) Forming what were called the "peace teams." These teams took the responsibility of following the rebels, committing crimes in the villages loyal to the revolution and making plans to assassinate the revolutionary leaders. The Defense Party and the heads of the al-Nashashibi family were behind this conspiracy.

In this stage, and after the revolution established itself and forced its authority, it became a necessity for the bourgeois and feudal Palestinian powers to fight the revolution from outside, face to face, and that was exactly what they did.

This is, however, only one side of the coin, the other side was represented by Hajj Amin al-Huseini who during the revolution was negotiating with the British and agreeing to the continuation of the mandate, while demanding an independent Palestinian government and an elected Palestinian assembly.

The armed revolution - in light of the competition between the bourgeois and feudal parties, the war launched by those parties against the revolution, these parties negotiations with the British and the absence of any co-ordination among the fronts of the revolution - began to weaken and subside. With the beginning of 1939 and World War II, the revolution came to a halt. Thus remaining in the field of the rightist reactionary political leaderships working with the same mentality and trying with this mentality to face the growing Zionist danger.

APPARENT CONCLUSIONS

The apparent conclusions that come from this quick review of the development of the 1936 revolution are:

1) The poor masses of city workers and country peasants were the material elements of the revolution and its initiators.

2) The bourgeois and feudal leaderships stood continuously against the revolution by introducing the logic of peaceful negotiations and accepting partial demands on the one hand, and by resisting the revolution with arms on the other. These leaderships, even in the stage when they pretended to be with the revolution, could not catch up with the popular initiatives of the masses nor be on the level of the masses.

3) The absence of the existence of an effective, united, revolutionary - ideological leadership at the head of the revolution is the factor which enabled the bourgeois feudal leaderships to manipulate the direction of the revolution.

We will discover later, when we complete our review of the following stages of the Palestinian struggle, that the same law will continue to dominate and is the same law which led to the abortion of all other revolutionary attempts before and after 1948. In light of this we should stop and examine the Palestinian work to see if it was able to face up to the situation according to the concrete facts existing within it.

1. The al-Kassam revolution is usually spoken of separately, but we think it was an original preparation for the 1936 revolution.

DPFLP LITERATURE LIS.

Monthly Newspaper:

Palestine Resistance Bulletin.....\$2.50
Institutional Subscriptions.....5.00

Pamphlets :

The August Program.....40
On Terrorism, Role of Party, Leninism vs. Zionism.....35
September: Counter-Revolution in Jordan.....40
Towards A Democratic Solution.....35
Historical Development of the Palestinian Struggle.....35

Buttons:

Hammer, Sickle, and Klashinokov.....35
Arabic Script.....35

Arab Headresses.....\$3.50

All of the above may be ordered by sending a check payable to "Palestine Resistance Bulletin" for the amount of material plus 15% to cover shipping. Bulk order with a discount are available, please write for information.



Nayef Hawatmeh speech in Iraq

THE TEXT OF THE SPEECH DELIVERED BY COMRADE NAYEF HAWATEMEH TO THE GENERAL UNION OF PALESTINIAN STUDENTS IN IRAQ, MARCH 1971

Comrades in Struggle,

I wished that our meeting tonight would be an open dialogue between you and I. But your Executive Committee drew strict lines for us that have defined the course of this meeting from the very start. In spite of this, I shall be as concise as possible in my comments concerning issues raised in the Committees' speech. This should leave us some time for an open dialogue later.

Another remark: the strict lines drawn for us by the Executive Committee leave us no place for emotions or simplification. Therefore, you will have to bear with me and avoid getting bored by the dryness of the material, since it is your Executive Committee which is responsible for this situation.

Our defeat in September, 1970, was not the first defeat or failure in the history of revolutions and revolutionary movements. Many revolutions have failed, even perished for various reasons. Sometimes their failure was of their own doing and hence they bore that responsibility; at other times it was due to external conditions beyond their control. It is to our misfortune that, to a certain extent, we were responsible for our own defeat in September, 1970. This defeat was despite the fact that all the local objective conditions surrounding us left us with an exceptional historical situation that would have made the exception in the Arab arena prove the rule rather than negate it, i.e. in the Arab revolution and resolving its present crisis. Yet the subjective formation of the resistance movement politically and ideologically led to a chain of political and military practices — local, Arab, and international — that led to the defeat of September, 1970. The Palestinian resistance was granted an exceptional historical situation as prone as did the Cuban revolution in the area that would have made the revolutionary exception. The situation in Cuba was that of harsh objective conditions that surrounded the revolution, it was the exception that proved the rule. This is not the case with Vietnam and Indochina, for in these areas we find a continuation of the rule. It is the subjective structure of the resistance movement that precipitated its objective failure, in the Palestinian-Jordanian arena, by encouraging all the subjective diseases within the body of the resistance movement. At the same time, the resistance movement succumbed to the objective conditions that made possible the defeat of June, 1967, rather than presenting the revolutionary alternative to the June, 1967 defeat. An alternative which is presented by the total experience of the programs put forward by the Arab national liberation movement throughout the period from 1948 to June 1967.

These subjective diseases have shaped the objective conditions of our people, approximately half of whom lead an unproductive life. They are crowded in camps prey to the idle and dull life that ultimately paralyzes their abilities and throws them into intellectual stagnation. This is a direct result of the absence of the processes of production and the contribution to production. In this sense half our people are an exception to the intellectual, political, and class realities existing in the Arabrevolutionary movement. This reality caused a volatile crisis especially since 1967. Under these harsh circumstances we find half our people not taking part in any processes of production, relying on the programs of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), thus stagnating their intellectual capacities, and consequently capitulating them to the prevailing ideolgin the region. We all know what Marx said, that the prevailing ideology in a society is that of its prevailing class. In our Palestinian-Jordanian society, which is affected by the ideology of the prevailing classes in the Arab society at large, it is the feudal bourgeois comprador ideology which prevails, a reactionary ideology that tries to achieve its purposes under religious pretenses. Due to its use of religion it succeeded in making its natural enemies support it, as in Yemen where the poor fought for the Iman Al-Dadr and for the rule of the imamites. The Yemenites have been oppressed for a long time. This oppression exhausted them and kept them living in the Middle-Ages. We even find in some parts of Yemen a slavery system with which human society was familiar before its transition to a more advanced stage — feudalism. And yet the Yemenites responded quickly to the calls of their oppressor Al-Badr and his family, and fought by their side, against their interests.

The other half of our population actually lives in a state of production, but it is small scale production in the cities and the countryside where we do not find large modern industrial and agricultural concentrations. This production is based on feudal relationships in the countryside. This mere half of the population lives under the petit-bourgeois class as the Marxist expression states or under regimes which call themselves socialist in spite of the fact that they have emptied socialism of all its democratic, political, and organizational content, as well as all that this content implies in terms of economic,

military, and agricultural programs. They make the masses see in socialism an ugly face that does not belong to it. They make them see in it oppression and repression, a Bonapartist rule (of a small group from a specific class, i.e., the petit bourgeoisie, which claims to represent all the classes in society). Let us remember that our people in Jordan are affected by the course of events in the region. As a matter of fact, the fate of Palestinians and of Palestine has always been determined in ancient, middle and modern times by the interaction taking place between what is happening on the Palestinian soil and what is happening in areas surrounding it.

It is totally incorrect to equate what is happening on the Palestinian soil now and what has happened in Algeria and Indochina, for example, and attempt to regionalize the Palestinian struggle away from the rest of the Arab region. Any such attempts to equate the Palestinian example with the Algerian are demogogic and rightist attempts which are in the final analysis suspect from a patriotic standpoint. For in Algeria, 12 million Algerians lived on its soil, in comparison with half a million French settlers. The Algerian land is twenty times as big as the Palestinian land, and the Algerian people live on their own land. Furthermore, Algeria was capable of political and military flexibility when it was faced with Tunisian and Moroccan pressures, as well as with Arab contradictions. The Palestinian situation is radically different from the Indochinese and Vietnamese ones, which are more akin to the Algerian situation, but surpass it in that they possess objective conditions that allow them to continue a deeper and more radical struggle, since their land is bound by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and by China, and they are supported to one degree or another by all the countries of the socialist camp. We, on the other hand, are facing the subjective situation of the Palestinian resistance which is by necessity sick. That is, we are the product of this sick objective condition in the ranks of our people. The outcome that these conditions will dictate and carry with it all the ideological, political and class contradictions present among our people. It will also carry all of the ideological, political and class contradictions existing in the Arab area. The maturity of the Palestinian movements and daily growth will also be governed by the contradictions our people in the Arab area are living with.

This is the state in which we find ourselves. Most of our people are either unproductive, stagnating intellectually, or representing a lumped situation — according to Marxist terminology concerning class structure. We were faced not with an industrial workers' class nor with a modern agrarian countryside that had already undergone the agrarian revolution. We were faced not with a revolutionary and patriotic youthful bourgeois class as was the case in Europe in the days of the bourgeois revolution against feudalism, on the contrary we find ourselves faced with a lumpen proletariat the majority of whom are service workers. We were faced with a countryside subject to feudal relationships of production. As well as a large bourgeoisie that does not possess a patriotic dynamism; rather by virtue of its very creation in an underdeveloped country far removed from the industrial and agrarian revolution against feudalism, it acquired the role of becoming the broker between local markets and international capitalist markets. The large bourgeois class's task became those of exporting finished raw materials to the international capitalist markets, and importing finished products to local markets. The role of the broker remains, as always, tied with the interests of those it is serving, i.e. those international capitalist markets in this case. In other words our bourgeoisie is tied with colonialism and imperialism up to its neck. This is the socio-economic reality in which we are living.

In addition to the above reality a series of attempts to build a broad petit-bourgeoisie class was witnessed in the Palestinian-Jordanian arena, started in 1957 with the American supported coup, and pursued by the throne and the consecutive governments. There were attempts to build a vast petit-bourgeoisie (army, security force, intelligence, and civil servants). The country was drawn into this huge apparatus and its huge salaries, at a time when the country, devoid of any economic resources, was semi-bankrupt. In order to continue this program of creating a class closely tied to the regime, the country had to depend on donations and foreign aid for its existence. And since the source of living of a new petit bourgeois class was closely tied to the reactionary regime and its control of the state apparatus, their position became one of support to the regime contrary to the position of the rest of the petit-bourgeoisie in the rest of the Arab world. This position was also contrary to the Palestinian-Jordanian petit-bourgeoisie's own long range historical, national and class interests.

The resistance movement grew in these conditions. In addition to the vast influence in the area of reactionary ideology and under the demogogic petit-bourgeois ideology or, in other words under petit-bourgeois socialism and its ideology. The latter claimed that it will melt away class differences and bring about rule by the toiling masses. The petit-bourgeoisie made many other claims with regards to the

liberation of Palestine, yet all ended by the defeat of June 1967. It must be noted that the progressive and revolutionary culture witnessed historically by Iraq, Egypt, Syria and other countries was not witnessed by Jordan in the Jordanian-Palestinian arena. The national movement formed in Jordan after 1948 was comprised of petit-bourgeois sectors that led the Arab national liberation movement. They were characterized by cultural, political, and class underdevelopment, which explains why they were unable to make a worthwhile contribution to the patriotic, progressive, or revolutionary theory. For even if we search hard among these sectors it is rare that we find a poet, or a writer, or even a singer, of distinction. In the ranks of this patriotic movement we rarely meet an outstanding patriotic, progressive or revolutionary theoretician. This situation continued until 1957. After that time the education of our people relied heavily on Egyptian broadcasting stations, movie-screen magazines, and at best on second rate semi-political Egyptian weeklies when the Jordanian regime allowed. This situation continued until 1967.

The petit bourgeois class which led the national liberation movement was more qualified to lead this movement than others by virtue of its historical position, for it contained most of the educated, enlightened, and professional elements. But it had a limited political horizon which was opposed to colonialism, feudalism and compradorism. Members of this class clashed daily with the feudalism of Nouri al-Said of Iraq, Farouk of Egypt, Kaykha daily with the feudalism of Nouri al-Said of Iraq, Farouk of Egypt, Kaykha Haj Amin Husseini and Nashashebi...etc. Hence it was the petit bourgeois class that led the Arab and Palestinian liberation movement towards accomplishing the tasks of democratic national liberation, with the liberation of Palestine as its top priority in its revolution. It subordinated all its powers to the program of the big bourgeoisie in order to attain a series of victories over the old colonialism, feudalism, and compradorism. But, it arrived to power in several countries only to introduce a democratic national program that goes half way and then stops, stays put or deteriorates. It took the people half way and left them facing economic, military, political and cultural programs that were incapable to finish the tasks of the revolution. It contented itself with petit bourgeois reforms that fragmented the land and scattered it at the expense of the poor peasants and workers. It supported light industry to satisfy its consumerism, and scattered agriculture. It rejected a radical position in building the national economy. It required of necessity the maintaining of a continuous internal economy. It required of necessity the maintaining of a continuous internal class detente between the international capitalist market and the international socialist market. It required reliance on conventional armies in spite of all the fire talk about the role of masses and rejected theory of armed people fighting alongside the trained conventional armies in decisive battles against the counter-revolutionary forces. For at this theory had been accepted, the masses would have fought to accomplish all their national liberation tasks and bring about the total defeat of the external counter-revolutionary forces; colonialism, imperialism and Zionism in our countries; as well as the defeat of the internal counter-revolutionary forces of feudalism, compradorism and the right wing sector of the petit bourgeoisie. Again, the petit bourgeois class refused to take a politically and culturally radical position in educating the masses. It refused to liquidate the old cultural, and feudal administrative relationships in the countryside, and the bourgeois relationships in the cities, so that they could be replaced by radical democratic cultural, administrative and patriotic relationships. Such new relationships would have armed the masses with a radical culture with which to fight Zionism and reaction. Instead this class told the people that it is futile to defy the United States. It said all that so that it could make a compromise; for by taking radical economic, military, political and cultural stances, the petit bourgeoisie would have had to tighten its belt. But it was not ready to tighten its belt because of its class interests. It was not willing to go down to the factories in overalls. It was willing only to wear starched white collars, and look elegant, imitating the bourgeois class it removed from power. Actually, its ambition and admiration of bourgeois life was endless.

On June 5th, 1967 we found ourselves faced with all these conditions; and June 5th of 1967 was the result of their sum total. It was at this time that the resistance had its historic exceptional opportunity to change the situation. For the resistance movement came after the defeat of the economic, military, cultural, and political programs of the Arab regimes, including those of the decadent reactionary regime of Jordan. The fact that the resistance movement came about after such a defeat, a defeat that gave it the opportunity to prove the exception that would prove the rule, for the objective conditions had not provided the basis for completing the tasks of the revolution on the short, medium, or long run. Before the resistance could successfully set about its tasks, the revolutionary wing of the Palestinian and Arab liberation movement had to undergo a transformation, coupled with a transformation to bring about new economic, social, cultural, and political conditions. This was necessary for the success of revolutionary struggle. Yet the nature of the exceptional conditions which we were living in that were opposing to the objective conditions, put us in the face of conditions of defeat and conditions that were immature and those that were worn-out. All these conditions gave us the exceptional opportunity to actually make the revolution in the Palestinian-Jordanian arena, as the vanguard of the Arab radical national democratic revolution. It was at this time that the resistance movement found itself with a subjective structure that contained all the class and ideological contradictions present among our people. It was a movement with forces having patriotic, petit and middle bourgeois programs. And forces whose programs and practices were influenced by petit bourgeois adventurism, even though they espoused Marxist, socialist and progressive slogans. And forces proposing progressive programs.

The Palestinian-Jordanian and Arab masses expected us to propose a revolutionary program that would provide the alternative to the defeated programs, and to the worn-out reactionary flabby rule in Amman. But what happened? The Palestinian resistance turned its back on this revolutionary program. It proceeded to identify itself as just one more force in the area, objectively and practically, in addition to the existing forces. Though we rejected, in words, all attempts by Arab

regimes to bring us under their class it removed from power. Actually, its ambition and admiration of similar to the Palestinian "No"'s of pre 1948, and Arab "No"'s of pre 1967; "No to Isreal", "Tel Aviv is our domain", "we want to liberate all Palestine", and "We are not ready to discuss this issue at all". It was also similar to the Arab regimes' post 1967 "No"'s; "No recognition, no negotiations, and no reconciliation". The same way as they played their musical instruments, we played ours with "No tullege and no containment" (Ed. reference to relations with Arab states), and "No co-ordination but complete independence." Yet the sum of this musical was self-satisfaction. It could neither achieve much, nor enchant the masses. It can only enchant conditions had not provided the basis for completing the tasks of the revolution proposing a revolutionary program that is based on an assimilation of all the lessons of June 1967 and the experience of the Palestinians and the rest of the people in the area (like those of 1936 and 1948), the resistance movement based its program on two basic principals. The first said "We are Palestinians, and you Palestinians must carry your guns and follow us. He who shall carry his gun and follow us shall be saved." This put our people in a mood conducive to the belief that we shall liberate Palestine in a year or two, three at the most. The second was that we turned our back to all the developments in Amman, the Arab region and the whole world. k Palestinian-Jordanian arena, as the vanguard of the Arab radical national as we pleased, planned as we pleased, did as we pleased, as if we were the only beings in the universe. It was on these two basic principals that the program was based.

Naturally the program asserted that as Palestinians we should carry arms. But the ordinary gun was the important thing not the "politicized gun". We all know that a revolutionary non-politicized gun will lead us in the final analysis to the experience of 1936 at best. The experiences of 1936, 1948, and 1957, underlined for us the lessons and experiences of other nations in their struggle. But we seemed to praise the Vietnamese, Indochinese, Chinese and Cuban struggles without benefitting from their experiences. Many happened? The Palestinian resistance turned its back on this revolutionary "foreign experiences". There was a reflection for what was called "imported experiences" and "imported ideologies", for "we are Arabs and should not import ideologies". And any time we asked for a program within the movement, at least as a foundation for daily practices, we were attacked for introducing politics and ideology into the struggle, by those saying, "we have had our fill from politics and ideology". As if history can be so simply changed by merely carrying a gun. The resistance ignored all conclusions based on modern experiences of struggle—ours included—which pointed to the fact that "there is no revolution without a revolutionary theory". Instead they relied on trial and error, "one step forward, one step backward", "two steps forward and one step backward", and "we will see how Allah will help us out". A revolutionary ideology that assimilates all our local, Arab and international conditions, and supplies the basis for our daily practices and programs, was rejected from the very outset, together with the concept of the "politicized gun". Yet their is really no gun without an ideology. In the absence of any revolutionary ideology the prevailing ideology of the society moves in and gains the upper hand. At best such an ideology is petit bourgeois and demagogic.

Furthermore the resistance tried to use the Algerian experience as a model to explain how we do not want to intervene in Arab affairs, wanting only from the Arab states financial aid, weapons, and transportation; forgetting that the total subjective and objective features in the conditions of our people and the Algerian people are diametrically opposed. We are facing Israel, Zionism, and imperialism. These forces can muster more power than we can. They outnumber us on our own occupied land since most of us are now outside it. They have established on this land a superior technology and scientific power which is capable of high mobility. Actually, Israel with Zionism and imperialism's backing is in a position superior to that of the whole of the whole Arab region at present. In spite of this fact, the resistance wanted to liberate our country on its own, and decided that all it needed from the Arabs was money, arms, and transportation. It adopted the position of not "interfering" in the internal affairs of the Arab countries. This position plus that of the "unpoliticized gun," resulted in serious mistakes. Forgetting that an "unpoliticized gun" will turn against us, all this became obvious in the September clashes. Also ignored was the fact that our battle with Israel is also a battle with imperialism, that the more defeats we deal to imperialism in the area the closer we are to victory. Those people ignored the fact that what has governed our country historically has been the total conditions present in the area interlocked with the subjective conditions of our people; and hence, that their attempts to separate the Palestinian question from its context put us at a disadvantage in our struggle. Moreover, the resistance movement forgot that like any other revolution it must have a primary base. It can not remain suspended in the air to be attacked, surrounded and squashed whenever it tries to land. All these factor contributed to the crisis of the resistance which was born carrying the subjective crisis within it. In essence this crisis was the product of the general crisis being undergone by the Arab national liberation movement.

But the conditions resulting from the June 1967 defeat of the reactionary and progressive regimes gave the resistance movement an exceptional opportunity. The Arab conditions and programs that led the national liberation movement for twenty years were defeated in the eyes of the people throughout the region. Had a revolutionary leftist group challenged these conditions from the very start it would have been possible to develop the situation quite differently. It would have made it possible to bypass the subjective crisis, though we would have had to face the same objective crisis we are now facing. The resistance movement program of the "unpoliticized gun", and of fighting only Israel under the slogan of "no interference with the internal affairs of the Arab states" led to its turning its back to the developments in the region and to the masses of the East Bank and the Arab region. Its slogan of making the primary contradiction with Israel and imperialism take precedence over the secondary contradiction with the reactionary regime in Amman, would have been correct had the reactionary regime agreed to abide by the necessities of this contradiction and accept it in

order to build a united front against imperialism, Zionism, colonialism, and the state of Israel. But the forces of reaction refused, before and after June, even before the existence of leftist resistance groups, and before the existence of the many different organizations and their expansion into cities and villages; before the appearance of breaches here and there; reaction worked before all that on surrounding and annihilating the resistance when it was still limited to the "Agwar" and represented by one single organization and one single experience, namely Fatah. It was far from expanding into cities when the first attempt to surround and destroy it took place in February 2nd, 1968. Reaction could not and would not tolerate opposition to imperialism, and Zionism. It could not and would not tolerate a national liberation movement. Reaction itself is tied flesh and blood to imperialism. It had used continuously the existence of Israel to blackmail and scare the national movement, before 1967, from doing anything in the Palestinian-Jordanian arena. It used to say "Don't do anything or we will lose the West Bank, Israel will occupy the West Bank". After 1967, it said "If we change the conditions on the East Bank we will lose it". This kind of blackmail has continued up to this year even though reaction itself has been acting as a safety-valve for Zionism since before 1948. If you read Churchill's diary this fact will become clear. Read about the time when Weizmann protested against the separation of the East Bank from Palestine and the formation of the principality of East Jordan. He said that this move infringed on the right of the Jews, guaranteed by the Balfour Declaration; namely that of establishing a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The East Bank was historically considered a part of Palestine, and Weizmann was insisting on including it in the deal. But Churchill asked Weizmann what he is going to do with the Palestinians. The Arab states would not accept nor absorb them in these huge numbers. The only solution lay in this desert strip of land, the East Bank. Accepting this solution made practical and objective fulfillment of the Balfour promise possible and was fulfilled. Naturally, after 1948, reaction in Amman continued to play the role of a safety-valve for Israel. We all remember the strike against, and the repression of, the "Sumou" uprising, we remember the tens and hundreds of comandos who were in Jordanian prisons the morning of June 5th, 1967. We remember that the first martyr of the Palestinian resistance was killed at the hands of repressive forces not in Israel but in the Central Prison in Amman. We remember that the attempts to strike against and squash the resistance started right after June of 1967. Reaction has historically refused to co-exist with the resistance and it gave the secondary contradiction the precedence over the primary contradiction. It insisted on solving the secondary contradiction first. That is, it attempted the liquidation of the resistance and the national movement first without thinking for a minute of fighting Israel and colonialism. Given these facts, both the resistance and reaction had to resolve this secondary contradiction first even though the resistance wanted the primary contradiction to take precedence over the secondary one. At this time the resistance was moving under rightist influence, and "rightist theoretician", towards a further localization and isolation of the Palestinian question. The left had nothing to do with this move or program. Purely Palestinian programs appeared. The rightist element in the resistance wondered "what have we got to do with what is going on in Amman? in the Arab region? in the world?". On the East Bank the resistance was armed with politics running along these same lines militarily, politically, culturally, professionally, and in its policies towards women. (Given a school with three teachers, two Palestinians and one East Jordanian, the two Palestinians got accepted in the Palestinian Teachers Union while the third stayed out; the same was true of students and workers.) It turned its back to the problems of the masses in the East Bank. These masses were suffering from Israeli strikes and Palestinian-Jordanian reactionary oppression. It is ironic that while reaction was uniting its unpatriotic Jordanian-Palestinian front as represented by the regime, the patriotic and progressive forces were refusing to unite their front and build it in opposition to the unpatriotic front. Many Palestinians born in Palestine from Palestinian parents played an outstanding role in the reactionary front (Mohammed al-Daoud, and Ahmad Toukan slaughtered us in September). Hence the question is not one of geographic identity, it is one of national and class interests. Therefore we were, and still are, expected to build our own united front from the bottom up comprising all the patriotic, and revolutionary forces in the arena. But the resistance under rightist influence, turned its back to this question and insisted on keeping away from it. Thus the East Bank masses frankly, felt that they had no interest in the struggle. Their unoccupied land suffered from reprisal strikes and they had no democratic, social or class interests in the revolution because this revolution did not deal with their problems against the reactionary regime and the ruling forces of imperialism. Nor did it deal with democratic and social issues to solve the problems of the countryside or the urban areas. The resistance turned its back completely to the masses and the masses had to look for some other refuge for fear that this situation might continue or worsen. Unfortunately, they ended up rallying around the lackeys ruling Amman, and for the first time in the history of Jordan, the Hashemite throne came to have a popular base, thanks to our "Palestinization" policies, those of turning our back to the problems of the East Bank masses and refusing to build a united patriotic front opposing the unpatriotic front represented by the government, Parliament, and all the state apparatus of repression. This is not all, but to summarize the main reasons for the failure of the resistance movement, they are: (1) unpoliticized gun, (2) falling victim to the belief that it is possible to let the primary contradiction take precedence over the secondary contradiction and hence the possibility of building a front with reaction, (3) turning the resistance's back to the East Bank masses and to the unity of the people as embodied in a patriotic united front.

Now let us assume for a minute that the masses of the East Bank and we are not one people and have no national, cultural, historical, and traditional ties, no intermarriages, and no other ties. Suppose that the East Bank was to us as Cambodia is to Vietnam. Even then, when Cambodia fell to rightist rule that endangered the rear lines of the Vietnamese revolution, Vietnam was quick to use military intervention and politics in order to deal blows to that government and its American imperialist support. Suppose the conditions in the East Bank were similar to this, then we are again faced with responsibilities for

solving this contradiction with the regime. Instead, the resistance went on to finish its program of building better relations with Arab governments beginning with Abu Dabi principality passing through whatever regime you please, patriotic progressive or unpatriotic and unprogressive, ending with Hassan II of Morocco. The basis of these relations was the slogan "we want from Arabs only money and arms". This obscured to a great extent the practical and theoretical results of the June defeat, which should have been laid bare before the Arab masses and which should have raised the questions of "Why? What can the people do?" It tied our political and intellectual position to the actions of these regimes. It made us remain silent about positions and steps taken by these governments that are unacceptable to us and fall in line with our other programs that had resulted earlier in the June defeat. The resistance went even further and started to "sell absolution" to these regimes in return for some modest contributions. This position taken by the resistance was a reactionary position that ought to be changed. But commandos that disagree with it still continue to carry arms and engage in bitter fighting against the army. Just like in Yemen where the workers, peasants and poor people fought for the Republicans under feudal leadership against other poor people fighting for the counter-revolution as represented by Imam al-Badr and his agrarian feudal Zaidi leadership. And we know how many of them died. So, in this struggle despite all our unfavorable conditions we too carry on our struggle.

al Thawri, 1971
issue 5

West Bank's economy & Israel

By Amil Tomah
September 10, 1971
al-Ittihad

What Is Behind the "Defenders" of the Occupied West Bank Products

Ed. Note: On August 27th, 1971, the DPFLP issued an important communique warning against the new counter-revolutionary developments in the attempts to liquidate the Palestinian cause. The statement pointed out that "the forces of familial feudalism and the big bourgeoisie in the West Bank are publicly calling for the end of the unity of the Palestinian cause and the unity of our people. These forces are taking practical steps to form a 'Parliament' for the West Bank and to proclaim self-rule. This call comes in line with the statements made by the Israeli Minister of Defence on 8-2-71, to form a 'permanent government' for the areas occupied since June 1967." The DPFLP statement went on to denounce the attempts to establish a mini-Palestinian state under Israeli hegemony, as well as to unmask the relationship between the forces calling for such a mini-state with the Jordanian regime previously and Israeli at present.

PRB finds it important to discuss fully the meanings of the activities of the forces that are calling for such a mini-state, as well as the politico-economic realities in the West Bank that precipitates such moves. In this issue we are publishing an article by Amel Tomah published in *al-Ittihad* (newspaper of Rakah) on September 10th, 1971. This article discusses the present economic relations of the West Bank to Israel, gains of the Israeli economy from occupying it, and finally the role of Palestinian bourgeoisie and large landowners in such a changing situation. In the next issue the discussion will be continued by publishing an extensive report on the economy of the West Bank. The following article does not necessarily represent the views of the DPFLP.

During these days (early September 1971), two delegations are visiting Amman and Cairo from the occupied West Bank; one is representing the West Bank's Chambers of Commerce. The other comes from the Conference of Mayors and heads of local councils of the West Bank which held a meeting on August 18th, 1971. The delegation's duty is: to convince Arab officials especially Arab League officials, about the necessities of maintaining "commercial bridges" between the occupied territories and the Arab States.

The Arab League had on their agenda, the prohibition of the products of the occupied territories entering the Arab States, through Jordan, considering that Israel is using the occupied territories as a path to push their products in the Arab world.

Chambers of Commerce Notice

The claims of those who object to the prohibition of the occupied territories production from entering the Arab States, (as was explained by the Chambers of Commerce Notice) is based on the following:

During the long period of occupation, the West Bank citizens had spent their savings... and sold all their goods...

"The Arab governments have neither thought of any workable way to aid the one million Arabs nor thought of a collective project to maintain their existence (!) and assist them in resisting for their dignity and honor..."

The Arab governments, "are trying from time to time to apply pressure on them and pass a more restrictive law to limit contacts with their Arab world..."

The prohibition advocates are either not aware of the situation in the occupied territories, or they have selfish personal interests. The aim of their interests is the protection of their products by pushing away the products of the West Bank from the Arab States.

It is impossible for the farmer of the West Bank to export Israeli agricultural products, because it is more expensive and it has local and external markets with prices that exceed those of the producers of the West Bank.

The industrial products in the West Bank are traditional and known (vegetable oil, plastic, and sulfur productions). It imports most of its raw material through the East Bank.

Economical Facts

It is quite apparent that the Chambers of Commerce are not only neglecting in their notices the political framework and its consequences, but also the economic facts, and that is why they bring a distorted picture to the situation.

What then are these economic facts?

The Israeli authorities since the early days of occupation have been tying the economy of the occupied territories with the Israeli economy. This is causing the occupied West Bank to lose its economical identity and independence completely. The purpose of this move being to attach the West Bank to the Israeli agricultural-industrial structures and consequently serve Israeli expansionism.

So the idea of keeping the bridges open to the Arab world (which is the line advocated by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan) is just a myth carrying in its folds political aims and at the same time concealing Israeli economic conquest of the occupied territories' markets. As such, Israel became the main exporter to the West Bank economy, and the West Bank imports from Israel increased from 178 million Lira in 1968 to 252.2 million Lira in 1970. At the same time the imports by the West Bank from Jordan decreased from 24.9 million Lira in 1969 to 12.9 million in 1970. Also, the decrease of imports from other Arab countries is continuing. So it was 39.1 million Liras worth of exports to the occupied land in 1968, it went down to 36.5 million in 1969, and it continued to decrease in 1970 to 28.5 million.

It is true that Israeli industrial products constitute the biggest amount of imports of the occupied territories, which adds up to a decisive 198.6 million Lira; but the agricultural products is a quantity that cannot be overlooked. In 1970 it reached 53.6 million Lira. This shows an increase which exceeds 30% in comparison to 1969 when imports valued 38.9 million Lira.

However, the occupied territories' exports differed in a certain way because Jordan has a similar position as Israel. The distribution of West Bank exports in 1970 was the following:

Israel's share is 60.9 million Lira.

Jordan's share is 60.2 million Lira.

Other Arab countries' share is 24.9 million Lira.

So if we consider as an example the occupied territories as an independent economical entity with its own balance of trade we find that its deficit trading with Israel is more than 300% (60.9 million Lira exports against 252.2 million Lira imports). While the deficit of the East Bank (or Jordan) in its trading with the West Bank reaches the 400% (60.2 million Lira exports to Jordan against 12.9 million Lira imports from Jordan).

According to the above evidence, it appears that the danger facing the occupied territories' economy is not coming from the possibilities of closing the "commercial bridges" across the West Bank, rather it comes from the Israeli occupation which by its economical conquests penetrated these markets and subdued them under the Israeli economy and gained great benefits.

The Benefits of Occupation Are only for the Occupiers

The Israeli ruling circles started to acknowledge this fact. They claimed, at the beginning and still claim for propaganda reasons, the occupied territories constitute a burden to the Israeli economy. *The Jewish Chronicle* wrote on August 20, 1971:

"Israel is maintaining several economic advantages in holding the areas which she occupied during the six day's war in 1967... according to a study prepared by the Ministry of Finance..."

After the *Chronical* had mentioned that this evaluation contradicts a previous study which holds the occupied territory as an economic burden, the paper, using the Ministry's study as a reference, pointed out that the Israeli income from the Sinai Peninsula's oil reaches \$35 million (14.5 million sterling pounds) annually.

The newspaper added, "the Israeli economy gained important advantages from employing 40 thousand Arab workers." It also pointed out that the share of the defense budget, from these economical benefits, for the holding of these areas which give Israel strategic contingencies has not been spelled out yet, but the share is believed to be large.

According to all this, did the occupied territories benefit in the economic field? On July 24, 1971, *The Economist* pictured the position in the occupied territories and wrote that after the massacres in Jordan the people of the occupied territories cannot but return to calmness until the storm passes. The paper added:

The West Bank economy previous to the 1967 war depended on four resources:

Remittance sent to their families by those West Bankers who are working abroad (especially in the Arab oil states).

Tourism

Agriculture

Primitive industry, because the Jordanian government directed industrialization to the East Bank.

The *Economist* questions, What are the conditions today? It answers that the remittances from abroad are still coming although they are now meager. "Tourism is all but gone; busloads of tourists come over from Israel but they stop in West Bank towns only to buy the occasional cold drink."

Agriculture faces two problems: the problem of distribution in the Arab world (it is too cheap to be marketed in Israel), and also the problem of shortage of laborers.

Therefore the economical situation is not favorable especially when agriculture in the occupied West Bank is deteriorating. This is what the Israeli economic magazine *The Israeli Economist* (August 1971) stated, "there was a shortage in agricultural production, including cattle raising, in Judea and Samaria (the occupied West Bank, A.T.)" It added, to minimize the importance of this fact, the shortage was faced with an increase in the industrial activities (!), construction and services which caused an increase in the G.N.P. and per capita income. It also added that one third of this increase was through the income of workers employed in Israel. The magazine, however, did not point to the fact that its statistics were distorting the value of the currency whose measurement and exchange value has decreased and still is decreasing.

Also, it ignored the *Economist*. (7/24/71) remark which noticed that the workers employment in the occupied territories in Israel is not a permanent phenomena.

The True Nature of the Claims of the Two Delegations

When the activities of the two delegations started in the West Bank, the Israeli press emphasized its economic nature, without giving it any political content. But the claims of the "defendents" of the occupied territories' products are political in essence and economical in few aspects.

The principal aspect of this political move is to put all the blame on the Arab States and not pay any attention to Israeli occupation. According to those "defendents" it is the Arab States who did not think of a collective project to aid the million Arabs to maintain their existence... and not the occupation who put more restrictive measures and passed laws to limit their contact with the Arab world!!

Those "defendents" do not worry about distorting the facts when they negate the possibility of the penetration of Israeli products into the Arab world through "products of the occupied territories," especially when they know that a great number of the factories of the West Bank and Gaza strip had become appendages to Israeli industry. Furthermore, is it not silly to say it is impossible for the West Bank farmer to export Israeli agricultural products because it is more expensive and it has its own markets? The truth is that the reduction of the agricultural production in the occupied territories, because of a shortage of workers (as was pointed out by the *Israeli Economist*), did make these areas markets for the Israeli agricultural production, where the value of the agricultural export from Israel to the occupied territories rose to about 30%. The increase was from 38.9 million Lira in 1969 to 53.6 million Lira in 1970.

It is possible that the percentage of the Israeli products that penetrate to the Arab states with the occupied territories' products is not very big now; but the Israeli ruling circles do not deny their ambition to invade the Arab markets.

We cannot minimize the significance of the timing of these activities, which take propagandistic form of intensive attacks on the Arab states as if they are the big enemy. In the same time, the Israeli authorities started another concentrated attack on the refugees in the Gaza strip for the purpose of pushing them out. The intensity of this attack was so high to the point that two members of the Labor Party in the British Parliament, wrote in the *Guardian* (8/21/71) that the refugees are saying that what is happening in their strip is the last stage of harassment for the reason of pushing them out of their strip as a preparatory stage to annexation... The two members added that in light of this Israeli colonial settlement, it is impossible to exclude the fears of the refugees of Gaza.

The two delegations also started their activities at a time when the Israeli officials had issued several statements showing the interests of the ruling circles to take over the occupied territories. The Minister of Defence, Dayan, stated, "we have to see our role in 'the administered territories' as a permanent government. We have to plan and do what we have to do without leaving any space to choose for the peace day which will be very far." (*Jerusalem Post* 8/20/71). And the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who always tries to appear very moderate, informed a German newspaper that We have to look for a solution to the Palestinian problem within (greater) Israel. The leader of the religious, Rafael, is calling for a boycott of the security council discussion over the problem of the occupied Arab section of Jerusalem because such discussion is an intervention in internal Israeli affairs. The newspapers increased their articles on the subject of colonial settlement planning in the occupied territories. This planning includes the settlement of 15,000 people on the Golan Heights alone...

In the light of all the above does it not appear clearly that those "defendents" of the occupied territories' products make it easier for the occupation by accepting it, and ignoring to advocate the liquidation of the occupation? They re-emphasize their desires to collaborate with the occupation authorities when they started preparing for the formation of a transitional Parliament which has the Minister of Defence, Dayan's approval. The next step is creation of a "permanent government" which accepts the authority of the occupation.

In days where hundreds of houses have been blown up in the refugee's camps in Gaza and Rafah, and thousands of citizens have been pushed out of their houses none of those "defendents" held a meeting to protest these actions, but one of their leaders, Mohammed Ali Al-Jabbari, held a meeting in Hebron, 8/31/71, and passed a resolution to thank the Israeli authorities for their unification of many families. (They allowed very few out of tens of thousands, who were forced to leave their country before, to come back.) Al-Jabbari re-emphasized the demand that the Arab League should exclude the idea of the prohibition of the West Bank's products, and also, he asked all the banks to re-open in "the administered territories"!!

Who Are the Defendents?

The "defendents" spoke a great deal about the one million Arabs in the occupied territories, as if they were seriously interested in protecting their interests. In reality, however, they were defending their own narrow class interests without any consideration for the interests of the people or their national rights. Even the *Jerusalem Post* (8/19/71) had noted on its front page under the title "No Answers at Mayor's Session" that those mayors who met in Beit Sahur, "represented local interests, and in many cases also those of the class of large landowners, to which the majority of them belong, and who will be hardest hit if the boycott becomes effective. It is more often the produce of large estates and not of the small plots worked by the fallaheen that is exported to Syria, Jordan and beyond." This analysis is true. More precisely, because the "defendents" represent the big landowners and big farms, in who the Israeli authorities have much hope. For that reason, in its opening article, the *Jerusalem Post* had asked for the presentation of practical political programs. The paper stated that, "In any case it is unlikely that genuine political leadership can develop until ideas are produced that can help to solve the political conundrums of the present situation." It blamed the Israeli ruling circles because they didn't present such practical political programs, capable of "assuring Israel of its security,"! and giving local political autonomy for the people of Hebron and Nablus!!

The Israeli rulers believe that their militaristic superiority and the complicated contradiction of the Arab world and its "disunification," plus the help of U.S. imperialism, would guarantee the maintaining of occupation for them. From this belief the "activists" of the occupied West Bank acquire strength. Days will clarify that the Israeli strategic build-up is based on a mirage and those who are collaborating with them from the occupied territories are relying on a mirage also.

DPFLP COMMUNIQUE'S

DEMOCRATIC POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF
PALESTINE

On the Proposed Saudi Arabian Mediation

The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine issued a communique on August 15, 1971, expressing its surprise about news which stated that brother Yasir Arafat (Abu Ammar) had agreed to the Egyptian-Saudi Arabian work paper. This work paper meant the opening of the doors to the Jordanian regime for negotiations and a new settlement which means a submission to the conditions of the reactionary regimes. The DPFLP ascertained that this position violently contradicts the decisions which the Executive Committee of the PLO reached in their meeting in Damascus between July 19 and 24, 1971. Decisions which assured the continuation of the struggle, against the treacherous regime of Amman, in order to regain the national, democratic rights of the Palestinian people, rights which include the right of political and military freedom of movement in the east bank for the revolution. The DPFLP communique also proclaimed rejection of reactionary Saudi Arabia and its mediation, mediation which would only lead to the transformation of the resistance into a mere "special force" attached to the royalist forces.

The DPFLP proclaimed its rejection of the use of secret diplomatic methods when matters concern the destiny of the revolution. The DPFLP will broadcast all the truth to the masses and will expose all the current conspiracies aimed at liquidating the revolution. This revolutionary stand by the DPFLP has created a violent reaction among some of the rightist leaders who care more for the Arab regimes than they care for the unity of the resistance and its relationship with the Palestinian and Arab masses. These rightist elements have waged a campaign to isolate the DPFLP and to subject it to trial, all this while the real demand is to try those rightist tendencies and the domination of individualism over collective leadership.

These rightist elements have used the absence of comrade Saleh Raafat, the DPFLP representative to the Executive Committee of the PLO who is now held captive in King Hussein's prison, as an excuse to prevent DPFLP representation in the discussions of the Executive Committee and to deny the DPFLP's right to express its opinion in the decision on the meeting in Jeddah with the representatives of the agent regime. These rightist elements have insisted upon isolating the DPFLP knowing full well the negative consequences of this act on the unity of the resistance in the face of its enemies.

The DPFLP will not fall quietly into the trap of liquidation and these rightist elements know this full well. The DPFLP will not, in the name of PLO organizational discipline, share any responsibility for any submissive resolution, which in principal it totally rejects, taken in its absence.

Our People:

The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, despite all these attempts, struggled resolutely against this conspiracy which will lead to a submission to the reactionary regime. The acceptance of negotiations with the regime constitutes the absolution of the regime of all its crimes against our people and constitutes a submission to the regime's demands. Demands which mean in the final analysis, the quiet liquidation of the revolution with the concurrence of some of the revolution's sectors, as happened in 1938.

The falling rightist elements are attempting to justify their negotiations as a tactical step to infamize the regime. However, the negotiations will not isolate or infamize the regime, especially after official Arab and popular condemnation of the regime's action, nothing will further infamize the regime.

These "tactics" will leave negative effects, primarily:

1. The confusion of the masses and their break with the movement which sat at the same table with the masses oppressors, thus confusing the masses

on the true nature of the regime.

2. The relieving of the Arab governments from implementing necessary measures against the regime, as was written in the Cairo agreement, and especially the relieving of the Arab governments who met in Tripoli from implementing their secretly agreed upon sanctions against the regime.

3. The negotiations will lead to the breakdown of the resistance and will lead to a harsher stand by the regime.

Our Masses:

The rightist elements in the resistance have temporarily retreated from going to Jeddah due to the increased pressure of the conscious and progressive elements.

The DPFLP salutes all the nationalist forces, especially those progressive forces within Fateh, who stopped the rightist elements in Fateh. The majority decision of the Fateh Central Committee which rejected the Saudi-Hashamite conspiracy and rejected the rightist elements constitutes a great victory for the progressive forces within the resistance.

The rightist elements within the resistance have temporarily bowed to the progressive forces and await another opportunity to move. The battle against the reactionary conspiracy has not yet ended.

The DPFLP calls upon all progressive forces in the resistance, all Palestinian trade unions and all popular organizations to consolidate their ranks and unify themselves in order to crush the conspiracy aimed at liquidating the resistance movement.

The blood of the martyrs of Amman, Irbid, and Jarash calls out to us not to extend our hands to the bloody hands of the reactionaries.

OUR MASSES,

ALL PROGRESSIVE ELEMENTS IN THE RESISTANCE,

ALL TRADE UNIONS,

SOLIDARITY IN ORDER TO FOIL THE CONSPIRACY

ALERTNESS IN ORDER TO FOIL THE CONSPIRACY

NO NEGOTIATIONS

NO SETTLEMENT WITH HUSSEIN'S REGIME

A RESOLUTE STRUGGLE FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
NATIONAL, DEMOCRATIC REGIME TO SUPPORT OUR PEOPLE'S
REVOLUTION FOR LIBERATION.

On the Murder of a PLA Activist

A spokesman for the DPFLP central committee of information gave the following statement:

The Palestinian masses and all the patriotic and progressive forces were surprised and shocked by the heinous crime at the hands of a fascist rightwing gang inside the PLA, which took the life of activist Abdu al-Rahman al-Baadi. This event again emphasizes the determined rejection by the forces of the Arab and Palestinian rightwing of solving all of the political and ideological disputes and struggles in a democratic manner and through an objective relation with the masses. Thus, the rightwing resorts to the method of physical liquidation when the truth of their positions and policies is exposed to the masses.

This criminal act, by the rightwing, of ending the life of activist Abdu al-Rahman al-Baadi is indicative of the rightwing campaign against the ideological and political position of the Palestinian left and its strong opposition in the face of the Zionist, imperialist and reactionary conspiracies.

The Democratic Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine denounces this despicable act and all the fascist rightwing's methods of distortion, pressure, terror and physical liquidation. The DPFLP again emphasizes its strong and affirmative stand on the side of all the progressive Palestinian and Arab forces in their struggle against the reactionary rightwing and its methods of ideological, political and physical repression.

• • • • •

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS IN JORDAN AND SUDAN

P. R. B.
BOX 63 - NORTON UNION
SUNYAB - MAIN STREET
BUFFALO, NEW YORK 14214

Non-Profit Organization
U.S. Postage
PAID
BUFFALO, N.Y.
PERMIT NO. 311

M. Saba
5644 E. Pine
Tucson, Ariz. 85712