

Free Palestine

Vol. 2 No. 12 April 1971

PROGRAM FOR

PALESTINIAN POLITICAL ACTION



The Palestine National Congress, at its eighth session held in Cairo between February 28 and March 5, adopted a new program for political action. The program was submitted by Yasir Arafat, chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and leader of Fatah liberation movement.

The new program rejects proposals for a Palestine state on the part of the Israeli-occupied homeland, stresses that the Revolution's objective is the total liberation of Zionist-held Palestine and that the Palestine Revolution is a national liberation movement.

The 115 man Congress also agreed to extend its term of office for three additional months—not exceeding June 30—when it will meet to elect a new political command. The term of the Central Committee and the Executive Committee were likewise prolonged.

At the forthcoming meeting, when a new Congress will be named, a report on Palestinian national unity will be presented. A Committee of the Congress is at present preparing the draft.

Following is a partial text—the translation is unofficial—of the program for political action:

The Palestinian Revolution is passing through a very critical and dangerous stage. It is confronting a ferocious operation of liquidation under which the September massacre in Jordan is in line with the annihilation and torture operations currently waged in the occupied homeland. This ferocious plot not only aims at liquidating the Palestine Revolution but at actually liquidating the Palestinian people.

Moreover, the explosive situation in Indochina, the steady progress of the revolution in Laos and Cambodia, and the increasing victories of the Vietnamese revolution have prompted U.S. circles to search for ways to calm the situation in our area so as to strengthen the military victory our enemy scored in 1967.

In view of these new and dangerous conditions, the Palestinian Revolution has agreed to announce its phased political program under the following principles which it hopes will clearly answer all questions, and to adopt this program as a guide in escalating the Revolution, increasing its forces and attracting the widest sectors of the Palestinian and Arab masses through its victorious revolution.

In the Palestinian Sphere:

1. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) is the only representative of the Palestinian Arab masses and their various combat and political organizations, institutions, unions, and societies, regardless of their inclinations and ideologies, provided they fully abide by the principles of the

Palestinian National Charter, the PLO legislative and executive departments' decisions, their political and military programs and internal regulations, and abide by the struggle to liberate the Palestinian homeland and return the Palestinian people to their homeland.

It is absolutely impermissible to exclude any person or group from PLO membership except under circumstances that affect the Revolution's security that constitute a departure from the principles of the National Charter. Such exclusion can only be by a decision from the PLO Central Committee or the National Congress if the latter is in session.

2. The main and focal point of the Palestinian Revolution is the total liberation of the occupied Palestinian homeland through the revolutionary, political, and military mobilization of the masses and their participation in the battle of liberation; escalation of the armed struggle against the enemy; and the unification of the Palestinian forces inside and outside the occupied homeland.

The Nature of the Palestinian Revolution:

1. The Palestinian Revolution is a national liberation movement.

2. The Palestinian Revolution represents the progressive movement in the Palestinian Arab society.

The Forms of Struggle:

The armed struggle, guerrilla warfare progressing toward a comprehensive popular war of liberation, which the Palestinian people's

revolution vanguards detonated at the beginning of 1965 is the main form of struggle for the liberation of Palestine. The cohesion of the regular forces on the side of the peoples forces in the struggle is the most effective method of realizing the victorious peoples revolution. All other forms of struggle must run in parallel with the armed struggle line.

The Only Solution to the Palestinian Question:

The only solution to the Palestinian question is the total liberation of the Palestinian Homeland through armed struggle. Therefore, the liquidationist solution or other solutions that might affect the natural and historical rights of the Palestinian people in their homeland are absolutely rejected. The Palestinian Revolution declares its severely principled adherence to the following:

1. Relentless struggle against all plots, efforts, attempts, and forces seeking to stop or obstruct the march of the Revolution or deflect it from its objectives. Relentless struggle against all liquidationist schemes in any form. This necessitates the development of the Palestinian Revolution and increasing its effectiveness in all fields.

2. Firm opposition to the establishment of a Palestinian state on any part of the Palestinian Homeland on the basis that any attempt to establish such a state falls within the plans to liquidate the Palestinian question.

3. Adoption of all necessary measures to protect the march of the Palestine Revolution and the right of the Palestinian national entity in joint cooperation with the Jordanian liberation movement.

The Palestinian Democratic State:

The armed Palestinian struggle is not a racial or religious struggle against the Jews. Therefore, the future state in a Palestine liberated from Zionist colonialism will be a democratic state where all will enjoy the same rights and have the same duties within the framework of the Arab nation's aspirations for national liberation and full unity with emphasis on the unity of the people on both banks of the Jordan.

(Continued on page 2)

campaign of TERROR IN AMMAN

Abdeen Jabara

(Note: So many inaccurate reports have appeared in the Western and Arabic press concerning what happened to FREE PALESTINE Editor when he sustained gunshot wounds during a recent visit to Amman that it was felt a report to FREE PALESTINE readers was in order. Mr. Jabara had been invited to attend the Second International Conference on Palestine held in Kuwait on February 13-17, and was on his way to the Conference when the incident in which four persons were killed in cold blood and he was wounded, occurred.)

My original itinerary on my trip to the Middle East in February included stops in Beirut, Lebanon and Amman, Jordan prior to flying on to the Conference in Kuwait. I arrived in Beirut on February 6, 1971 and was scheduled to fly from Beirut to Amman on the 10th. Missing my Beirut-Amman flight, I attempted to secure a flight at a later date from either Beirut to Amman or Beirut to Kuwait. All flights were filled at the time because of a Moslem religious holiday in which many people had come to Beirut and were returning home to various parts of the Arab world. I decided I would take a Service car from Beirut to Damascus and from Damascus to Amman so that I would catch the reservation which I had from Amman to Kuwait on February 12.

The Service System is one where offices in the various cities have cars which take five passengers between the various cities. I had made the Beirut-Amman trip in 1969 and I knew that it would take me approximately 7 hours to arrive in Amman. My flight to Kuwait was scheduled to leave the following afternoon, which would not give me much time to spend in Amman but I did want to catch some short glimpse of the conditions in the city after the September massacre by the Jordanian monarchy.

I left Beirut approximately 12:30 in the afternoon of the 11th and arrived in Damascus in the late afternoon. I immediately went to the garage where the cars left for Amman and found a car waiting that would go as far as Zerka, a town which is situated in northern Jordan, some 20 minutes by car from Amman. After a half-hour wait in Damascus, we left toward the Jordanian border crossing point of Ramtha. En route to the Jordanian border we heard a radio announcement that there had been some clashes between the Palestinian militia and the Jordanian army during the day, which were the first since the previous month, but no specific details were given, other than a commando charge that some civilians had been killed.

By the time that we arrived at the border crossing point it was dark and a long queue of automobiles waited to be processed through Jordanian customs and border police. Needing a visa for entry into Jordan, I went into a well-lit room where an officer queried me about the purpose and length of my visit and I told him that I would be traveling on to Kuwait the following day. Having gotten my visa and returned to the car, I found that the driver had been able to expedite matters so that we proceeded past the queue of automobiles into Jordan.

I gathered from the conversation in the car that all of the riders except myself were Palestinians although no political discussion took place because of the sensitivity of the situation since the events of September.

We arrived in Zerka approximately 7:30 and it appeared that four of us in the car were desirous of going on into Amman that evening. We asked at the service garage in Zerka whether it was all right to follow into Amman that evening and they indicated that it would be all right if the driver took a particular route. We found a taxi to take us into Amman and arrived on a major street leading into the city of Amman at approximately 8:00. The street was Station Road which is four lanes and very brightly lit by neon lamps. It was completely deserted by traffic and people, and a Palestinian refugee area is situated on the right-hand side with a steep rise on the left, which rises into darkness above the lighting in the street. One lone Mercedes taxi was parked on the side of the road with its hood up and the driver motioned for us that he needed help. We stopped our car and got out. Our driver examined the generator under the hood and made some adjustment but the car still would not start. We then proceeded to push it

whereupon it started and went approximately 50 yards before stalling. We drove up to the car and got out again and began to push it. I was situated in the right rear corner of the car.

We pushed it not more than 6 feet when the area was swept with machine gun fire from the heights on our left-hand side. In this initial burst of fire, I was struck in my left arm and I fell to the pavement behind the right-rear wheel to protect myself. The firing came out of the darkness from the rise on the left and I looked to my right and the driver of our automobile had been hit in the face and blood was gushing out. Not ten seconds had passed but when the area was swept by machine gun fire again and I was struck in my right shoulder. I knew that if I remained there any longer that I would be dead.

I glanced to the rear and saw an alleyway about 25 feet away that led into the refugee camp, and I made a split-second decision to run for the alley.

Having reached the alley I saw the shadows of several of the other passengers in the car who had dashed into the alley, turned to the left and a door was opening at a house. The crack of light helped guide my way to the door. Once inside the house there was a great deal of confusion and the people saw that my raincoat was red with blood. They took off my upper garments and I layed on a couch and they immediately began to apply olive oil to the wounds to stop the bleeding. They brought me lemonade and aspirin and I laid there wondering how badly I had been hurt. They covered me with blankets as I started to get chills and, luckily, the owner of the house was the mayor of the area and had a telephone. He immediately began to call the police, the American Embassy, and the Follow-Up Committee of the Arab Governments which had been organized to oversee the execution of the commando-government agreement reached after the events of September in Cairo. No one came.

Several times I talked to some American attached with the Embassy and he indicated to me that the American Consul had left some time ago and would be coming to take me to the hospital. We waited and still no one came. After four hours of waiting, we concluded that no one would come that night, probably because of the continuous firing which we heard taking place outside. The owner of the house, a person to whom I will always be grateful for his kindness and effort on my behalf, told me that the area from where the firing came was occupied by the Jordanian army. At about 12:30, it was decided that these people

(Continued on page 6)

(Continued from page 1)

Action in the Jordanian Sphere:

A national relation and regional unity cemented by history, culture, and language links Jordan with Palestine. The creation of a political entity in Transjordan and another in Palestine falls within the divisive operation through which imperialism shattered the unity of our Arab nation and Arab Homeland after World War I. This division, however, did not prevent the masses in the West or East Bank of the river from feeling that they are one people and from remaining united against imperialist and Zionist plots.

The Liberation battle confirms our belief in:

1. The unity of Palestine and Transjordan is a regional unity. We must defend and strengthen this unity and fight all attempts aimed at weakening and fragmenting it.
2. The regional unity must be represented by a unity of struggle in the form of a Jordanian National Front the main tasks of which include

the establishment of a national regime in Jordan contributing with all its resources to the liberation of Palestine and supporting the struggling Palestinian forces. This, in itself, will constitute a part of the Arab nation's struggle for liberation and unity.

In the Arab Nation's Sphere:

Palestine is an indivisible part of the Arab homeland and the Palestinian people are an indivisible part of the Arab nation. The Palestine Revolution is part of the Arab revolutionary movement and is its revolutionary vanguard at this historic stage. Therefore, the participation of the masses in fighting and in protecting the Revolution is one of the revolutionary Arab movement's basic tasks. It is an honor and a national duty for the Arab masses to work at making the Palestine Revolution a tangible daily reality by:

1. Foiling all liquidationist and capitulationist schemes.
2. Protecting the Palestine Revolution from the plots of hostile forces and foiling their efforts to

confine and provoke the Revolution.

3. Providing material, moral, and political support.

4. Participating in the Palestine Revolution.

5. Building a strong Arab front to support the Revolution and the common Arab struggle against imperialism, Zionism, and the anti-revolutionary forces in the Arab Homeland.

In the International Sphere:

World imperialism, Zionism, and colonialism are the true enemies of our people. Since they extend like an octopus into several parts of the world and exploit various forces against us, we must expand our alliances and action to every part of the world. This necessitates the establishment of firm ties with all forces struggling against imperialism, colonialism, suppression, racism, and exploitation and the mobilization of all international forces of justice, liberation, and peace for our interests.



PROTRACTED REVOLUTIONARY WARFARE

SOME BROAD
CHARACTERISTICS AND
SPECIFIC EXPERIENCES

[Ed. Note: This is the second of a three-part article.]

In what follows, we will investigate some of the broad characteristics of successfully conducted protracted revolutionary warfare; and offer specific experiences that may carry pertinence in some respects to protracted revolutionary warfare in the Middle East conflict. It must, however, be borne in mind that there are many pitfalls in trying to detect common grounds and drawing parallels between situations widely separated in space, time, and circumstance. Nevertheless, if care is exercised, some general patterns may be observed and conclusions drawn. Indeed there is much to be gained by studying revolutionary experiences elsewhere, the successful and the unsuccessful, but in the final analysis it is the movement's own experiences and particular circumstances (often very difficult to ascertain from a distance) that should dictate the path to be taken. Thus, while a suitable adaptation of successful tactical and strategic decisions tested elsewhere can reduce the hardships and losses of the movement, a hasty application that fails to evaluate correctly or to take full account of the various factors that were involved can carry serious consequences.

A key feature of protracted revolutionary warfare is precisely its protracted nature, imposed by necessity. Time is a crucial factor for the insurgents, especially in the early phases of insurgency which are characterized by weakness on the part of the revolutionaries and strength on the part of the opposing forces. The insurgent's objective becomes the correction of this imbalance and, subsequently, the defeat of counterrevolutionary forces. The path towards achieving the equilibrium is a particularly tortuous one, and the protracted approach is its mainstay. Because of their limited resources, the insurgents have to utilize these resources efficiently. The main precept of revolutionary warfare, therefore, becomes: to preserve oneself and to destroy the enemy, in that order. On the military level, this implies that the guerrilla forces should avoid battle except when assured of victory. While this aspect of revolutionary warfare may be evident, what may be overlooked is that protraction in revolutionary warfare must be all-encompassing, and not limited to the military sphere alone. It must extend to all levels of confrontation with the enemy, if necessary—political, social, economic, as well as military. What this amounts to is that the insurgents should be prepared not to expect too much too soon or, alternatively stated, to do more only when they are able to do.

In the early phases of insurgency, the revolutionaries operate in a clandestine manner seeking, on the one hand, to consolidate their own forces and gradually to win over large segments of the populace; and on the other hand, to split, fragment and isolate the enemy's forces. Direct confrontation is to be avoided. Vigilance and adaptability, flexibility and dynamism, constitute basic characteristics of successful revolutionary movements. While ideological precepts provide the motivation for the struggle, ideological dogmatism in its *conduct* can become the cause for retarding, or even aborting the revolution. Strategic and tactical considerations must assume highest priority. To paraphrase Regis Debray, no movement can claim a revolutionary line unless it is able to provide a concrete answer to the question: how to destroy the power of the counterrevolutionary forces. Strategy and tactics constitute the cornerstone of successful revolutionary warfare. While this is self-evident, since strategy and tactics are important in all situations of conflict, the implications for protracted revolutionary warfare are more subtle. This is a result of the fact that the lines between friend and foe are not as clear cut as in classical warfare. A measure of the success of the revolutionary movement is its ability to capitalize on this situation by seeking to deepen the contradictions in enemy ranks: by isolating the diehards, neutralizing the moderates, and winning over the mildly committed. (What the revolutionary vanguard must also simultaneously reckon with is that a clever opponent will continually seek to frustrate these efforts using appropriate countermeasures or may even use similar tactics in seeking to break up the revolutionary ranks. This adds a new dimension to the requirement for vigilance, a sound organizational structure, and an efficient intelligence network on the part of the revolutionary forces). It is a gross error and oversimplification to consider that people fall into one of two well-defined camps—that of the revolutionary and that of the counterrevolutionary—and that they are irrevocably and continuously pitted against each other. Any movement that begins with such a premise cannot be truly revolutionary, and certainly does not have enough wind for a protracted war where the lines are not that well defined, where alliances are not necessarily permanent, and where there has to be continuous assessment and reassessment of strategic and tactical decisions, in keeping with the demands of circumstance. This has been the path of successful protracted revolutions, as exemplified by the Chinese and Vietnamese experiences.

Of particular note is the United Front program that Mao Tse-tung entered into with his arch-enemy Chiang Kai-shek for the express

purpose of fighting off the Japanese invasion. To fully comprehend the significance of that move to struggle against Japan, and subsequently, to struggle against Chiang's Kuomintang forces, requires a more detailed evaluation than we are offering here. Nevertheless, a few pertinent remarks and conclusions can serve to illustrate the point.

The common program of the front was based on Dr. Sun Yat-sen's three broad principles, enunciated earlier in the century.

These were, as observed and interpreted by Mao: Nationalism — by firmly resisting Japanese imperialism; Democracy — by establishing the revolutionary democratic political power of the anti-Japanese National United Front; and People's Livelihood — by abolishing exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies, reducing land rent and interest, enforcing the eight-hour working day, developing agriculture, industry and commerce.¹ All these points, Mao further observed, were in the Kuomintang's published program, but it had failed to carry out any of them except resistance against Japan. "It is a simple enough program," Mao pointed out, "yet many communists fail to use it as a weapon for mobilizing the masses and isolating the diehards."² The united front approach was a turning point for the success of the Chinese Communist movement which until then had suffered heavily at the hand of Kuomintang forces and was not making much headway in winning over large portions of the peasantry. Mao's abandonment of Marxist dogma in the *conduct* of the struggle, and his recognition of the role of national appeal as a focal point for rallying the masses put him at odds with those party leaders who were inextricably wedded to the dream of effecting a workers' uprising on the Russian model. Judged in retrospect, Mao's action proved instrumental in forging the success of the revolutionary cause. It can in no way be interpreted as a refutation of Marxism. Rather, it was dictated by political expediency. Mao, as a political realist, was aware that the time was at hand for strategy and tactics to take precedence over ideological dogmatism. Whether or not to enter into an alliance with the Kuomintang because of its reactionary character was not the looming question in Mao's mind. What was important was whether circumstances were such that the revolutionary cause could benefit from an alliance, even with reactionaries, in the form of a united national front. It is, furthermore, significant to note that the united front policy was far more than a tactical ploy by the revolutionary forces, intended to buy them valuable time to regroup their forces by neutralizing the Kuomintang onslaught. It was in fact a far-reaching *strategic* decision whereby Mao essentially sought to beat the Kuomintang at their own game. Rather than continue to indulge in indoctrination efforts to convince the people that they, and not the Kuomintang, were fit to lead the

(Continued on page 6--top)

THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION AND ITS PROBLEMS

Editor's note: Abu Lutuf is one of the founders of the Palestine resistance movement. He has lived with the revolution ever since its resurgence, and he is knowledgeable about its problems. DIRASAT ARABIYAH has asked Abu Lutuf to discuss the current problems being raised about it at this stage. Here, FREE PALESTINE translates that interview from DIRASAT ARABIYAH, Vol. VII, No. 4, February 1971.

Q. Brother Abu Lutuf, what are your observations concerning the events in Amman last September?

A. There are various observations, and they touch on more than one aspect. There are those with regard to the revolution, its policy, strategy and aims at this stage; and those regarding counterrevolutionary forces and their aims of liquidating the revolution within the framework of Arab and international realities.

As for the revolution itself, it is evident that it was not ready to enter into an all-out battle with the counterrevolutionaries. This emanates from the fact that the revolution considered its main aim that of unifying all the nationalist forces, political and military, and directing them towards liberation of the occupied land. This strategy was based on the premise that the conflict with the Jordanian regime, at that stage, was still secondary relative to the primary conflict with the Zionist enemy.

The Palestine revolution, aware of the gravity of this stage and the necessity to concentrate on the primary battlefield, has tried, by every means, to avoid a confrontation with the regime. It is with this background that the revolution raised the motto of "guns, all guns against the enemy." But the acceptance of the Rogers Plan had a far reaching effect in aggravating the situation in Jordan. There, the regime exploited the situation to execute its plot to liquidate the revolution, the force refusing political solutions in the Arab world.

It is also necessary to point out that the counterrevolutionary forces took advantage of local, Arab, and international circumstances which helped them to time the execution of the plot.

Should we talk about the local circumstances, we must mention certain occurrences within the revolutionary ranks.

First: The raising of childish slogans which presented the revolution as a politically divided force and gave the non-aligned nationalist forces the wrong impression that the revolution had begun to move towards overturning the situation in Jordan. This had a negative effect on the revolution. The Jordanian regime was able to use these slogans as excuses for its actions and has presented them as evidence that the revolution intends to overthrow the regime.

Q. To whom did the Jordanian regime present the slogans as excuses?

A. To Arab regimes and segments of the local public.

These slogans created ideological confusion among the revolutionary forces, particularly since

these forces from various organizations had previously laid down a program for political action. They determined the slogans of this stage in the struggle on the basis of three principles: (a) to protect the revolution; (b) to defend the people, and (c) to establish a nationalist authority that would avoid clashing with the revolution.

Second: Wrong practices exercised by some resistance organizations. Among such practices were hijackings which reflected negatively on the Palestine revolution and created resentful world public opinion of these acts. Such actions gave the impression that the revolution was frivolous and supplied the regime with opportunity to present its conspiratorial actions as disciplinary punishment applied to reckless adventurers. The Security Council convened to discuss the matter, and the U.S. exploited the matter as a possible excuse for landing troops in Jordan. We were forced to ask the U.A.R. to seek Russian intervention. We undertook to do so on the premise that the matter be solved locally, within the framework of the Arab league.

After exhaustive attempts to solve the problem peacefully and to prevent any local or international complications, the Central Committee of the P.L.O. was forced to suspend P.F.L.P.'s membership in the Committee.

Among other wrong practices and manifestations which helped expedite the execution of the plot were the conceit and exhibitionism of many commandos in their relations with the masses. Also, obvious and widespread offices and bureaucracy helped many opportunities to infiltrate into the ranks of the revolution, particularly in cities.

Third: The "national unity" that existed at the time was one of general harmony which gave room for independence of action. Thus, in its daily practices, the revolution did not have a unified direction or policy serving the program of political action which the organizations had laid down and on whose foundation the Central Committee was formed.

Q. Wasn't all this clear to the revolution? Wasn't it clear that a plot was being contrived for its liquidation?

A. Everything was clear. Particularly after the regime's acceptance of the Rogers Plan, it became amply obvious that the regime was preparing the plot to liquidate commando efforts. But the situation prevalent on the local, Arab, and international scenes did not give the revolution an opportunity large enough to prepare itself for a confrontation of this magnitude. It was known to us also that the regime was preparing for a separate peace, after having struck the main force in the revolution and after having struck at the masses with such violence as might subjugate them sufficiently that they would not oppose any liquidation the regime might undertake to put an end to the Palestine problem.

Q. How do you believe the revolution will be able to face similar plots in the new stage?

A. The details of the plot, its location and aims as well as its executors are all exposed now. The

opposing forces in Jordan have been delineated clearly. This conspicuous division in Jordan makes it possible to lay down a plan for defending the revolution and foiling a similar plot more soundly. The positive phenomenon which became salient during the massacre and after, and which was expressed in the masses' taking the initiative and undertaking action in defense of the revolution and of themselves, has put the revolution in a stronger position than ever.

The masses began to take the initiative and rose in response to and to deter the forces of the regime whenever these forces moved to strike at the revolution and at the masses and whenever authorities have tried to arrest persons or to infringe upon their rights.

The unification of all the military forces of the revolution is a basic factor in its ability to face future plots. There is no doubt that the creation of unified political institutions that could lay down and execute the unified political line of the revolution is a vital necessity.

In addition to this, Arab revolutionary forces are under obligation to defend the Palestine revolution, for its defeat or liquidation is the liquidation of the most important Arab cause in our time. It is in defense of that cause that the Palestine struggle is being waged. The Arab states were officially committed to the "Cairo Agreement," and they are continuously called upon to stand by the Palestine revolution and to undertake punitive actions against the Jordanian regime whenever it breaks that agreement—at least, if only by imposing economic restrictions on Jordan, as Libya did, or by exercising political pressure.

Q. But, do you believe the Arab states will do that?

A. There is no doubt that we demand it. And we announce these demands to the Arab masses, in order to make the Arab states face up to their historical responsibilities and to make Arab masses shoulder, through sincere nationalist forces, a burden of responsibility in defending the Palestine revolution and to protect it.

We, at this stage, after having evaluated our mistakes and drawn some lessons from them, have no alternative but to reorganize ourselves on all levels, political and military, and lay down a sound plan to face the vicissitudes of the future.

Q. What do you mean by reorganization? and on what bases?

A. We are called upon to follow a more decisive and frontal policy towards the plotting forces. This necessitates reorganizing our cadres, our political and military institutions, in a way that permits secrecy of action. It requires us to mobilize the masses on a wider scale. We ought to solidify national unity among all the organizations of the revolution within the framework of a detailed program of political action. We must lay down a plan of confrontation on the basis of a military and political evaluation of the counterrevolution.

We are also called upon to give more attention to and attempt greater cohesion with the political forces in Jordan. We ought to create a national front, supportive of the Palestine revolution, so that these nationalist political forces will be able to move and practice revolutionary action in a way that guarantees the soundness of the situation in Jordan, in accordance with the requirements of the present stage in the revolution.

Q. Since you mentioned "national unity," what does it mean, in your opinion? What are the difficulties standing in its way?

A. In our understanding, national unity is a strategy and not a tactic serving the temporal aims of this stage. It is difficult for any revolution to

establish its strategy on sound footing if it does not take into account its human, material, political, and military capabilities. In addition, it has to compare its capabilities with those of the counterrevolution—on all levels, local and international—in order to be able to evaluate its strategic position versus that of its enemies in the struggle. National unity in the Palestinian field of action took into consideration the nature of the conflict and that of the liberation struggle, which necessitates the alliance of all forces hostile to Israel, Zionism, and American imperialism. The national unity which for years we have working to realize takes into consideration such necessities.

It seems, however, that there are difficulties facing the realization of true national unity, despite the fact that all resistance organizations are agreed upon a program of political action. Notwithstanding that agreement, the daily practice on political and military levels differed from one organization to another. These differences emanated from a variety of ideological viewpoints between resistance organizations which reflected themselves (although they should not have had to in this stage of national liberation) in the organizational practices of these organizations.

In addition, the organic and organizational ties of some resistance organizations with Arab realities and regimes that differ in their political concepts reflected themselves many a time in disputes among these organizations. This resulted in states taking positions swinging between support and opposition to this or that organization. Had all the organizations been able to unite within a single framework and conduct their activities in accordance with a single political program, this would have reflected itself in a more positive way on the popular and official Arab realities.

Undoubtedly, the factors of danger and *fear* (emphasis by Abu Lutuf)—and having to confront constant plotting, which it has become clear has to be done—will have far reaching effects on expediting true unity for the purpose of creating one revolutionary military entity under one command. Also, the unification of the political institution as the Central Committee is an

important factor in the realization of national unity. It makes it possible to establish plans and execute them systematically by political and military institutions in a manner that can insure unity of action, a unified political stand, and which protects the now disunited popular base.

Q. On what basis?

A. On the basis of a detailed program of political action, which organizes all the social, political, military, intellectual, and educational questions into the framework of the national liberation stage.

Q. Are there elements of leadership in all the organizations which do not accept this line?

A. We are facing a revolutionary choice, Either national unity based on detailed principles which will take into consideration all problems and duties, or conflict between these organizations, which will definitely lead to national disaster. Therefore, it is imperative to take all measures and follow all methods to produce conviction in and commitment to the line of the revolution—even if these would appeal to only a majority. Splinter groups could remain isolated.

Q. There is some talk circulating these days concerning a Palestinian state and there are many rumors about the subject. There are those who say that some Arab states support the project. How do you see the project?

A. The freak state: I confidently believe that this idea was not suggested officially in concrete form by any side to Palestinians or to Arab groups, nor have Palestinian revolutionaries or nationalist forces ever requested its establishment. American imperialists, however, after the massacre of September in Jordan, began to wage a psychological war against the Palestinian revolution to strike and paralyze its will to act, and to spread ideological confusion within revolutionary ranks, among the leadership and fighting forces.

The story began during the massacre when peoples' feelings were inflamed and there was animosity towards the Jordanian regime, particularly in the occupied territories. There began to appear some who called for taking

counter-measures in reaction to the criminal acts which the regime had committed against the Palestinian people and revolution. Some of the traditional leaders called for the necessity of establishing a Palestinian state. The call met with limited acceptance among some people. Since the idea was prompted by fear and a concern for self-preservation as well as to secure the safety of a Palestinian society, American imperialism and Zionists exploited this psychological situation among Palestinians and spread rumors regarding the establishment of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. They were smart to spread these rumors because they knew that the illusionary project would be tempting and seem a dream come true, at such a critical stage, to many.

American imperialists and Zionists had the following in mind: (1) to deepen regional tendencies among Palestinians and Jordanians and to create a rift among the people, to sharpen the opinion-split among them concerning the illusionary state. They would be divided among themselves between supporters and opposers, the people's interests could be turned to defending their positions *vis a vis* this matter; they might become wholly preoccupied with the imaginary project; some people might well dedicate themselves wholly to the idea while turning away from the primary effort of resisting plots to liquidate the movement and overcoming the Zionist occupation. (2) To distort the meaning of the banner the revolution raised at its resurgence. They sought to convince Arabs and the world that the Palestine revolution had abandoned its original aim to establish a progressive democratic state in Palestine, on the entirety of Palestine, after the dismantlement by armed struggle of the state of Israel. (3) To create the delusion among the masses that the Palestine revolution was launched to "eliminate the traces of aggression" only and to create an emaciated Palestinian entity on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; and that the revolution will not continue in its struggle to dismantle the Israeli structure, liberate the Palestinian land, and build a democratic Palestine on the broken promises of the Zionist state.

□



[Actual quotation of Mrs. Golda Meir in her interview with Arnaud De Borchgrave (NEWSWEEK, March 8, 1971, page 66).]

(Continued from page 3)

people to victory against the Japanese and the securing of democratic gains—the revolutionary forces sought to demonstrate their capacity for leadership through their actions. It was Mao who sought, with skill, determination and foresight, to carry out and perfect the united front policy in all its facets; this, in contrast to the negative attitude of the Kuomintang, whose inept and corrupt leadership was thereby exposed as incapable of leading the nation to victory. From then on, the tide continually turned in favor of the revolutionary forces. The defeat of Japan was followed not long thereafter by the defeat of the Kuomintang forces and the establishment of the Chinese People's Republic. Describing his basic approach is so many words, Mao later reflected: "Our tactics are guided by the same principle: to make use of contradictions, win over the many, oppose the few, and crush our enemies one by one."³

A similar perspective governed the Vietminh and their successors, the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. In describing the Vietnamese concept of the clandestine organization, the basic building block of revolutionary movements, Pike had this to say:⁴

"The organization, clandestine and otherwise, is the arena in which the struggle for power takes place . . . The world of organizational infighting is fluid and dynamic, in constant flux . . . Daily activity involves negotiation and bargaining, sincere or otherwise, partially or completely in secret, and usually through third parties. The world should never know precisely where one stands; not only should the organization be clandestine but so should its membership. Constantly there are realignments, or revelations as to one's true colors. No position is ever irretrievable, no commitment ever final. It is a system of centrifugal force always tending to fly apart, only to form again. The rule is: Be flexible, be changeable, adapt. No organization is ever completely undisguised. All consist of at least two parts, the overt face and the secret apparatus; but

the best, in addition to the covert leadership that "clever" Vietnamese eventually penetrate, has a third layer, which is reality. Nonetheless, because it is a system of mutation, the reality, even if you discover it, does not last long; soon new alliances outdate your discovery. Sometimes an organization is within an organization, with one organization evincing great hostility for a second, when actually both are controlled by a third . . . Sagacity in the follower consists in knowing whom to join and when, for timing is all-important . . ."

Pike was no doubt carried away by his own presentation and overstates the point he was trying to make to the extent that clandestine work emerges as a mass of confusion bound by no principle. The real point to be made—and Pike finds no way of avoiding it, despite his own prejudices and biases—is that only a well-disciplined, principled leadership can provide effective guidance for the multifaceted and sometimes seemingly contradictory action that may be required. Furthermore, what is required for the execution of such action is a massive organizational infra-structure that permeates every aspect of Vietnamese life, and through which the NLF, employing sound strategy and flexible tactics, can simultaneously expand their base and whittle down the enemy ranks. It was this organizational structure that constituted the main subject matter of Pike's book. Despite his thorough study, however, Pike fell far short of assessing the capacity and tenacity of the Vietnamese revolutionary forces. The completion of his book coincided with the massive U.S. military expedition in 1965-1966, which he explained away as being a result of a grave strategic miscalculation on the part of the NLF and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in deciding to escalate the military struggle against the South Vietnamese government. Pike states, in unabashed confidence bordering on arrogance, that "the end of 1964 was the end of an era in Vietnam, and there would be no going back to the old revolutionary guerrilla warfare that had

marked the previous five years. The Vietnam experience for the first time could be viewed in its totality. Clearly there emerged a beginning, a middle and an end. The American escalation, the massive influx of American troops into South Vietnam, the air strikes against North Vietnam were all of a new order. An old war had ended and a new war begun, one with new rules and new participants, with new tactics and new strategies, and with new definitions of victory and defeat, whose outcome could more easily be surmised."⁵

Today, six years later, it is evident that Pike could not have been more wrong. Whether because of an error in judgment or because of his own political orientation and psychological blocks, Pike had clearly learned little from his extensive research. His assessment in fact reflects a recurring pattern in imperialist thinking, namely *refusal* to comprehend the full dimensions and potential of protracted revolutionary warfare. The motive behind such a refusal is obvious, for to truly comprehend protracted revolutionary warfare is tantamount to recognizing that no amount of military might and fire power can quell the power and potential of the mobilized revolutionary masses. Imperialism, by its very nature and *raison d'être*, can never reconcile itself to such a thought, and is in constant search for "evidence" and "indicators" that the masses have been "defeated". □

1. Girling, J.L.S., *People's War: Conditions and Consequences in China and Southeast Asia*, Praeger, New York, 1969, pp. 90-93.
2. Mao Tse-tung, "Current Problems of Tactics in the Anti-Japanese United Front", in *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965, p. 429.
3. Mao Tse-tung, "On Policy", in *Selected Works*, Vol. II, Foreign Languages Press, Peking, 1965, p. 444.
4. Pike, Douglas, *Vietcong: the Organization and Techniques of the NLF of South Vietnam*, MIT Press, 1966, pp. 9,10.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

(Continued from page 2)

would retire for the night. Perhaps in the morning, the authorities could be prevailed upon to take me to the hospital.

The lights had just been turned out when a knock came at the door. The owner answered it and it was a group of commandos from Fatah who had been sent by the Armed Struggle Command. They had heard that an American was wounded and were sent by their leader, Abu Iyed, to take me to the hospital. I was bundled in blankets and placed in a car and waited until they checked the street so they could be certain they would not come under fire when they drove into the street.

They took me to the emergency hospital in Amman, after picking up the bodies of the four people who had been killed on the street along side me. At the hospital, the doctor awakened from sleep, examined my wounds and bandaged them. I was then placed in a hospital room and immediately three high officials from the Jordanian police appeared in their white uniforms together with two Americans from the Embassy, the Consul, and a Security Agent attached to the AID program for training the Jordanian police.

The Jordanians wanted to take a statement from me and as I began to tell them what had happened the ranking officer said "You know it was the commando who shot you." I told them "I don't know that at all." "I was told that the area from where the firing came was under the control of the army." He replied "Then you don't know who shot you?" He then turned to the American Security Agent and said "If you Americans would

give us better bullets we could finish with these commandos." After they had taken my statement, they asked me to sign it and I refused. The doctor then took me into the x-ray room to see whether or not any bullets were lodged in my back. The x-rays revealed that two bullet fragments were situated in my back, one of which was near the skin. He told the assembled officers and American Embassy personnel what the x-rays revealed and the Consul told me he would return to me at 8:30 in the morning to take a statement for the State Department. I was given sedatives for sleep and intravenous feeding and at 8:30 the Consul appeared with a stenographer to take my statement.


After taking my statement it was decided that I would be taken to the private Muasher hospital to be examined and recuperate. At Muasher hospital additional x-rays were taken and it was decided that the bullet fragments under the skin would be removed. They were removed that afternoon and after spending three days in the hospital, I decided I would travel on to Kuwait to attend the Palestine Symposium.

A member of the Arab Follow-Up Committee and someone from Fatah brought my luggage from the car the following day to the hospital together with my passport and travelers checks and the posters which I had been carrying in the car and which were now smeared with the blood of the driver who was killed. When the bullet fragment was taken out of my back, I asked the doctor what kind of bullet it was and he told me it was the type used by the Jordanian army. At this point I

knew that it was the Jordanian army that had been firing wantonly upon civilians on the street without any discrimination whatsoever. The firing upon us was completely without any cause whatsoever except as an effort to terrorize the civilians in the city.

After arranging for a flight to Kuwait, the Consul drove me to the airport and I departed thinking how lucky I had been to escape the fate of those four other people who will never go home to their families again.

While in the hospital I was interviewed by NBC and CBS and was contacted by the major international wire services. I described in detail, just as I have in this short report, what had happened to me; how I had experienced the reign of terror in Amman which is being waged by the Jordanian military. I was careful to check afterwards the news reports as they appeared in the press and the radio. None of them were accurate. We had not been caught in a clash. We were not caught in a burst of fire that was accidental. And I was not going to Amman on business. Neither the CBS nor the NBC interviews appeared in the American television. No reports of the four men who were killed in this intentional wanton attack upon us were ever mentioned. In fact, for three days after the incident the head of the house which took me in after the shooting wanted to visit me in the hospital and for three days he was unable to because the Army continued firing upon all civilians who moved out of the camp. □



OFFICIAL DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ARABS IN THE STATE OF ISRAEL

THE SECURITY SERVICES THREATEN THE LIVES OF HELPLESS CITIZENS

ACADEMIC FREEDOM IN ISRAEL IS BEING DESTROYED

A NATIONALIST UNIVERSITY RECTOR IS SPREADING VERBAL AND WRITTEN PROPAGANDA AGAINST FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND HAS INTRODUCED A REGIME OF DISCRIMINATION (THAT DESPITE ALL LOOKS RACIST) IN THE UNIVERSITY OF HAIFA

MCCARTHY-LIKE WITCH-HUNT IN HAIFA

I. WHAT ARE THESE AFFAIRS AND WHAT DO THEY MEAN?

All the above are headlines for a series of typical incidents that have occurred recently in Israel. These unsavory incidents have been discovered in university campuses. If we assume that the university is a kind of microcosmos of democracy, it may be inferred that the discriminatory pressures and terror on the campus are far less acute than those found in public institutions or in any other spheres of life. If such scandalous behavior is to be found within the university, it is quite likely that in other frameworks the situation is far worse. Furthermore, the incidents reported here have been discovered only accidentally and despite every effort made to hide it from the public (such as the attempts made by the Rector of the University of Haifa who I know from my own experience, went as far as employing threats to cover up one of the incidents). And it may safely be assumed that for every case uncovered in the university, there are dozens that are as yet unknown to us and for every dozen incidents in the academic sphere, there are hundreds or thousands in the other areas of life.

II. Academic Institutions Cooperate with the "Secret Police" in Exerting Pressure and Practising Discrimination.

The shocking facts reported below in brief have already appeared in one form or other in the Israeli press. However every published report or article that has taken a stand against the discriminatory practices has immediately evoked nationalistic responses shamelessly justifying the bids against Arabs in our institutions of higher learning. A public opinion survey carried out by the student's newspaper at the University of Tel Aviv confirms the fact that the overwhelming majority of the public is ready to accept as natural the repression and the undemocratic exercise of pressure on Arabs and expresses admiration for the Israel security services as if they are a body that may not be criticized . . .

III. Discriminatory Incidents and Pressure ("Ha'olam Hazeh" and the Student Press).

I take upon myself the responsibility for requesting the weekly magazine *Ha'olam Hazeh* to publish incidents that have occurred to Arab students in Israeli universities. It was also suggested that this would serve as the first in the series of publications on the situation of the Arabs (particularly students, teachers, and other sections of the Arab intelligentsia) under Israeli rule. *Ha'olam Hazeh* has, meanwhile, only published incidents that have been discovered.

1) A young Arab who was about to be appointed to an assistantship at the University of Haifa was visited by a Security Service man. This person threatened both the young man and his father that if he will not agree to become an informer and do internal espionage work for the Security Service, the Service was capable of preventing his appointment to the position offered him.

2) A young Arab sociologist with whom it was agreed that he would teach at the University of Haifa was suddenly fired from his job on grounds of "security" (These, by the way, are absolutely imaginary). Officially his dismissal is claimed to be due to budgetary or academic reasons. (It appears that the authorities had failed even to coordinate their fabrications.) This same student was subsequently accepted without any difficulty by the Jerusalem University.

3) An Arab teacher who was proposed for an assistantship in the University of Haifa was openly disqualified on grounds of security. The real reason: he was a relative of someone who was being politically persecuted for belonging to a perfectly legal party though in opposition to the government. The representative of the Security Services explained to the lecturer that there is in fact no formal grounds for his dismissal (as if it is the Security Services that must ask for a formal reason) but "what will they say in the young Arab's village." The teacher was hereafter accepted at the University of Tel Aviv.


4) Pressure is exerted on the Arab students at the University of Haifa where real control over their affairs is in the hands of the Security Services. The setting of an Arab Students Committee is prevented. This step is denounced by the Jerusalem University's Arab Students' Committee, the only one of its kind in existence. The head of the University telephones the Security Services (in my presence) to consult on an academic matter involving an Arab student and in order to spread the lies he hears in that same telephone conversation.

IV. Certain Echoes of the Incidents (Appear in "Ha'aretz" and "Davar").

The article that appeared in the "*Ha'olam Hazeh*" magazine aroused certain responses in the press. Especially strong were the echoes in the widely distributed daily "*Ha'aretz*" and somewhat less so in "*Davar*", "*Al Hamishmar*" to some extent in the evening papers and in the student's press. However, the debate is waged around the extreme nationalistic views of Prof. Aktzin (the Rector of the University of Haifa and the perils that these views pose for Democracy and around his views of the necessity of imposing discriminatory security limitations on Arabs in the academic sphere. (A number of articles and reports in praise of the Professor were also published so as to balance the adverse impressions created by articles unfavorable to him. None of this has deterred the Professor who till now is openly expressing his views both orally and in print. Thus far none of these reports or articles have drawn any conclusions with respect to the regime itself and to the oppressive control of the Arabs exercised by the Security Services.

It should be noted that the acceptance by the Jerusalem & Tel Aviv University of the Arabs rejected by the Haifa University (where the Security Services have assumed total control) does

(Continued on page 8)



(Continued from page 7)

not mean that former institution are free of influence and terror of the Security Services. The differences are that Haifa University has most willingly and with great pleasure permitted the Security Services to enter its sphere and wield its control over *academic appointments as well*.

V. Incidents That Have Not Yet Been Publicized.

The following are two incidents of campus life that have not yet been published by any of Israel's newspapers.

1) The less serious of these incidents involved Urie Milo, a student who is employed as a policeman (or more accurately as a police employee also engaged in studies) and who admitted to the truth of the general facts. A University lecturer approached me with the request that I help him locate an Arab student (he thought perhaps that this Arab student was participating in my courses) in order to have sign a "regulation" form, meaning those administrative orders by means of which any person may be compelled, without benefit of trial, to be put into house arrest or even, for a prolonged period of time, into prison. (By the way this regulation is employed only against Arabs). Among my students this year is an Arab student who had "gained the privilege" of being so imprisoned and

has been released only this year. I had, of course, to explain to him why I refused to help him find his victim. Incidentally, I did not know him and he had never participated in any of my courses. It turned out that this student was Ibrahim Daud Hour.

2) The second incident was more serious: Eli Kasis, a young Arab who had already been studying for several years at the Hebrew University was also an active member of that institution's Arab Students Committee. One day, he received an official letter from the secretary of the Faculty in which he was studying asking him to come to his office. Waiting in this office for Eli were some Security Services men who immediately began to threaten him and to demand of him that he serve them as informer and internal spy or at least that he cease his activities in the Committee (to which he had been elected by the votes of his Arab co-students), failing which his mother would be fired from her teaching job. They warned him to keep the whole episode to himself but in this case (in contrast to who knows how many numerous other cases where similar such warnings succeeded in their purpose), the student did not fear to relate the incident to others. As a result, the University denied that the meeting took place on its premises (however, the official who served the Security Services was not fired) and a representative of the Student's Federation (or more precisely of the student's tabloid) met with the undercover representatives of the Secret Services who promised that such incidents would not recur. (Ever since many cases have been known where such methods were employed) in this manner, the affair was forgotten and not published.

VI. Healthy and Unhealthy Reactions.

Though it is true that a majority of Senate of the Hebrew University voted in favor of a declaration of its Rector to the effect that thus far, the Security Services had not interfered, at least, in the matter of appointments. Yet, the declaration went on to say—and this too was voted for and ratified by the Senate—that if anyone from the Security Services would make a request, he would lend him sympathetic ear. Thus without a trace of shame according to the evening newspapers.

Though it is true that the Rector and the Senate of the Tel Aviv University expressed their reservations and disagreement with the stand taken by Prof. Aktzin (according to "Ma'ariv"), we may note that the Tel Aviv Rector in listing the conditions in which appointments to academic posts are made tried to include the words "and not on security grounds". The Senate, influenced

by the student's representative Michael Kleiner, an extreme rightist, refused to give its approval to this formula.

These declarations were made to counter the published views of Prof. Aktzin to the effect that the "means" he employed are also accepted practice in the other universities. (As reported in the daily papers), whereas now, after the other universities (which incidentally receive substantial contributions from abroad) have expressed their reservations, this nationalistic professor argues, as reported by "Davar", that these reservations are only for public consumption and not what really happens in their institutions.

VII. Photocopy Material.

The writer of these lines, who is publizing these incidents without any support is ready to send out a photo-copy of some 15 folio pages of newspaper clippings of articles denouncing the system of intimidation and discrimination against the Arab intelligentsia that have been uncovered by the revelation of these incidents. Interested persons or institutions are asked to send 4½ Israeli pounds (or \$1.30) together with mailing costs (ordinary mail will take a month; air mail from 3 to 5 days). Photocopy paper, it should be noted, is quite heavy. All but one of the clippings are in Hebrew; the exception is in Arabic.

An equal number of reports and articles in favor of the above "method" is available. These may be had we hope by applying to the Spokesman of the University of Haifa. The same set of articles may be had from the clippings of the Spokesman of the Jerusalem University.

VIII. Bibliography.

It should be pointed out that this issue concerning the Arab intelligentsia is very persuasive. No employment opportunities are open to them, the prospects of getting ahead are not worth a career, to mention only one or two of numerous examples. For greater detail, see the series of articles by Abu Wasil in the daily "Ha'aretz" that hints in a very subtle way at the acuteness of the problems and the article by Amnon Kapeliuk in "Le Monde Diplomatique" of Paris in this month's issue.

The "method" employed to control the general Arab population in the country is described in the book by Sabri Jiryas and Eli Lobel: "Les Arabes en Israel", published by Maspero, Paris 1969.

Yours respectfully,

Dr. J. Sadan,
3 Bialik Street
Jerusalem

Free Palestine is a monthly paper published by the Friends of Free Palestine. Editor: Abdeen Jabara. "Free Palestine" welcomes its readers submitting comments, letters and articles.

FREE PALESTINE
P. O. Box 21096
Kalorama Station
Washington, D.C. 20009

Address Correction Requested

(Send to above address)

Please enter a years' subscription for the enclosed \$5.00;

Name _____

Street _____

City & State _____

Zip Code _____

