

TOWARDS
UNION IN PALESTINE

ESSAYS ON ZIONISM
AND JEWISH-ARAB COOPERATION

Edited by
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DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY

of

HENRIETTA SZOLD

(1860-1945)

and

H. M. KALVARYSKI

(1868-1947)

Builders of the Jewish National Home

and

Pioneers of the Bi-National Idea

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If we do not give every member of the public the opportunity of considering the Jewish-Arab question, we will be committing, I think, an unpardonable sin. Why do I think so? For two reasons. First: it was Judaism which brought me to Zionism and I cannot but believe that Judaism, Religion as I understand it, is our moral code; and Judaism bids us find a way in common with the Arabs living in this country. Secondly: I am almost certain that at the end of the war it will not be easier than it is now to shape the development of our life in the way we desire by bearing our influence on those who determine the course of affairs. The more I return to this matter, the more do I become convinced that politically as well as morally, the Jewish-Arab problem is the decisive question. I insist that we must reach an understanding of this question, and we can succeed in this only if we are offered opportunities of meeting and discussing the matter. I think that even at this late hour we must endeavour, through IHUD, to find ways of speaking and conferring about this question with clear insight and full knowledge of its importance. And that paragraph on national discipline printed on the Shekel cannot deprive us of the right to speak and understand.

HENRIETTA SZOLD (1942)

Can we resign ourselves to this calamity of partition—even if the pill be coated with the emblem of sovereignty? We are confronted by the question, What comes first, the reunion — even if incomplete — of the remnants of the Diaspora in their Homeland, or the empty splendour of sovereignty, the fictitious glory of a dwarfish state, whose absorptive capacity will be very limited?

All the attention of our National Institutions is concentrated on the two alternatives—either partition, or the continuance of the Mandate and the 'status quo'. I hold the Mandate much in esteem, despite all its shortcomings. I know full well how good it is to be master in one's own house, even if the property be small. I know, too, how bad it is to have to depend on others. But the most important thing is peace with the Arabs. Any solution found and put into practice against the will of the Arabs endangers our future. Let us learn from the past: fifty-two peoples, including the greatest powers, have signed an obligation to establish a

National Home in Palestine for us; and now we find that the Mandate is in danger of losing its force—because the thing was done against the will of the Arabs.

We must recognize the kinship existing between the two branches of the Semitic race, and the duty of both parts to act in accordance with the principle: "that which it would not have the other branch do unto him, that it should not do unto the other". From this follow the principles of equality—parity—and of non-domination of either people by the other. Both these principles were accepted and proclaimed by various Zionist Congresses. The Arabs, on their part, must consent to the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine and abandon their objection to immigration and land sales to Jews.

Is this within the realm of possibility? In my opinion it is. We must only find a way of reconciling the two national movements, the Zionist and the Arab, which seem conflicting and mutually exclusive, but which are in reality complementary to each other, and able to live side by side in peace and harmony. I have been in search of this way for years, and from my long experience I have reached the conclusion, first, that it is not the fault of the other party only that so far the way has not yet been found; and secondly, that "if any one tell thee, I have striven and have not found, then believe him not."

H. M. KALVARYSKI (1937-38)

TO THE READER

THIS BOOKLET is issued by the IHUD (Union) Association in Palestine. The majority of articles are translated from previous numbers of BA'AYOTH, the Hebrew monthly of IHUD. Those specially written for this English edition are marked with an asterisk in the Table of Contents.

The spirit, attitude and aims of IHUD have been clearly enough set out in the articles by Dr. J. L. Magnes and Prof. M. Buber to necessitate exposition here. Moreover, every page bears witness of this spirit and of the practical consequences, both political and economic, which ensue therefrom.

The articles in this selection are political for the greater part, but they also deal with the ethical and cultural sources and consequences of our political views. Such papers as portray the economic aspects prove, however, that the latter are inseparably bound up with the political aspects of this complex problem, which is Palestine. Such articles have been chosen for the economic section of this booklet as a point to what has already been achieved and what is possible of achievement in the way of Jewish-Arab co-operation.

We do not claim to have a monopoly of right views and correct estimates. The short editorials, reproduced with their dates, indicate that our forecasts have sometimes been wrong; our hopes often frustrated. We have reprinted them here as they stand so that the reader may judge for himself to what extent our political outlook and analysis have proved right.

Wherever necessary, explanatory notes, setting out the background of events and situations, or explaining non-English terms, have been added in footnotes or at the beginnings of articles, particularly of the short editorials. Most articles, however, are self-explanatory. Readers unacquainted with the political structure of the Yishuv in Palestine are advised to begin with the article by Mrs. Luft, which will help them understand the background against which our opinions and criticisms are to be examined.

Thanks are due to the following persons, who have helped in the preparation of this booklet: Dr. B. Berger, Mrs. M. Blaukopf, Mr. H. Masaryk, Mr. G. Michaelis, Mrs. Roth, and Mr. Brian Stone, who have helped prepare the English version of articles written in Hebrew; Mr. W. Edinger, Dr. M. Spitzer, and Mr. G. Stern, who have given valuable advice; and, last not least, Mr. Immanuel Koplewitz, who has acted as secretary to the editorial board.

E. S.

Jerusalem, February 2, 1947.

CONTENTS

The Bi-National Approach to Zionism* — <i>M. Buber</i>	7
A Solution through Force?* — <i>J. L. Magnes</i>	14
Jewish Palestine To-Day* — <i>G. Luft</i>	22
Our Reply — <i>M. Buber</i>	33
Into the Abyss — <i>N. Hofshi</i>	37
Ireland — The False Analogy — <i>R. Koebner</i>	41
Letter of Resignation to Dr. Weizmann — <i>D. W. Senator</i>	51
Citrus Growers Have Learnt to Cooperate* — <i>M. Smelansky</i>	57
Jewish-Arab Cooperation in Haifa Municipality	66
Civil Rights in Palestine — <i>M. Avi-Shaul</i>	70
Jewish and Arab Workers — Divided or United?* — <i>G. Baer</i>	76
The Choice Before Jewish Youth — <i>E. Simon</i>	84
Reflections of a Guest on Violence* — <i>H. v. d. Steinen</i>	88
Past Prognoses — Right and Wrong	97
Forecasts and What They Are Worth	97
Well Meant But Dangerous	98
A New Prospect	99
Azzam Bey's Statement	100
Anti-Zionist Declarations by Jews in Arab Countries	100
Innocent Victims	103
Failure and Progress	104
Who Will Give Evidence Before the Anglo-American Com- mittee of Inquiry?	108
Why Has IHUD Given Evidence?	109
Declaration of the IHUD Council	111
A New Start	112
What Is Missing in the Recommendations	113
Federalization and Bi-Nationalism	114
Functions of the Mandatory Government	116
Lives in the Balance	118
Notes on the Authors	120

THE BI-NATIONAL APPROACH TO ZIONISM

By MARTIN BUBER

WHEN some years ago, a group of Jews from Jerusalem and elsewhere in Palestine combined their efforts in founding the IHUD (Union) Association, and later created the monthly BA'AYOTH as its organ, the main problem occupying their minds was the one usually referred to as the Arab question. This problem consists in the relationship between Jewish settlement in Palestine and Arab life, or, as it may be termed, the intra-national basis of Jewish settlement.

The *intra-national* approach is one which starts out from the concrete relationship between neighbouring and inter-dependent nations, when considering the given economic and political facts and when considering decisions within their domain; the *international* view, on the other hand, gives predominance to the necessarily more abstract relations between civilised nations as entities. It is one of the most important characteristics of our revolutionary age that intra-national considerations are gaining in significance, when compared with international ones. As long as the traditional colonial policy, the "legitimate" rule over the destinies of remote peoples, was indisputedly maintained, the intra-national point of view was denied its natural precedence. With the growth of self-confidence in the nations and with their increasing desire for self-determination, concrete geographical conditions became absolutely and relatively more important factors. Especially was this the case where historical connections existed and where new possibilities were opened up for the joint erection of a new cultural and social structure. This accounts for the fact that international politics soon became the scene of a dispute between the colonial point of view and considerations of neighbourliness. It may be assumed that this state of affairs will only suffer a radical change in the course of a future stage of global development, when the actual and all-embracing co-operation between the nations, brought about by an enormous calamity, will give concrete substance to international activity.

Jewish settlement in Palestine, which was embarked upon in order to enable the Jewish people to survive as a national entity, and which, in its social, economic and cultural aspects, constitutes an enterprise of universal significance, suffered from one basic error, which handicapped the development of its positive features. This basic error consisted in the tribute paid by political leadership to the traditional colonial policy, which was less suitable for Palestine than for any other region of the globe and certainly less fitting the Jewish people than any other nation. Hence, political leadership

was guided by international and not intra-national considerations. Instead of relating the aims of the Jewish people to the geographical reality, wherein these aims had to be realised, the political leaders saw these aims only against the background of international events and in their relation to international problems. Thus, Palestine was embedded into international entanglements and attempts towards their solution, isolating it from the organic context of the Middle East, into the awakening of which it should have been integrated in accordance with a broader spiritual and social perspective.

Whoever pointed to this state of affairs as constituting a decisive factor in the shaping of the future, had to realise that the Zionist public and their leaders were, in this respect, blind to reality. This blindness was bound to prove fatal. To a large extent, this attitude and its practical consequences are responsible for the fact that the self-confidence and desire for self-determination prevailing among the Arab population of Palestine have found a militant form of expression.

AT A TIME when colonial powers are forced into the defensive and have to give up position after position, even a nation with big-power backing could dare to settle in a country the population of which is maturing politically, only if it were sincerely bent on creating a real community of interest with that population; if it were prepared, at the price of inevitable sacrifices, to make the development of the country a joint concern; if it would enable the partner to co-operate actively in the enterprise and make him share the advantages gained. This applies in a still greater measure to a nation which cannot count on big-power support and which has to be careful not to mistake what is only the ephemeral interest of this or that big power, for genuine backing. What was needed at the outset of the settlement enterprise—in any case at the initiation of the modern one, undertaken with an international perspective—was a clearly defined programme of “do ut des” (give and take). Such a programme should have provided for the collective integration of the backward Arab population, as a whole, into Jewish economic activities and should have secured, in exchange, the indispensable demands necessary for the survival of the Jewish people as a national entity: free immigration, free acquisition of land, and the right of self-determination. What was actually put into practice, even when it seemed to answer real necessity, as was the case with the principle of ‘Jewish Labour’¹, was bound to have results almost contrary to the above programme. In these circumstances, those in the Arab camp, who wanted to shape the

¹ i.e. the principle that all hired labourers, both in industry and agriculture, should be exclusively Jews; first, because only thus can Jewish immigration be absorbed into the economy of the country, and new places be created for additional Jewish immigrants; second, because Arab labour, for the most part, is not organized in trade unions, and cheaper, and thus may undermine the principle of employing organized labour only.

awakening Arab national movement in a negative, defensive manner, instead of allowing it to develop positive and social features, which would have threatened their interests, had an easy task.

In this faulty development of the Arab movement, as well as in our own, another characteristic feature of our age becomes dreadfully apparent: the hypertrophy of political factors as compared to economic and cultural ones. This world of ours should, by dint of gigantic problems, be forced to bury phraseology and give way to matter-of-fact reality. Such a state of affairs should make politics only the facade of the economic and cultural structure. This facade has only to represent the economic and cultural structure, and not to exercise an influence impairing it. But instead of contenting itself with this rôle, the political principle claims to be the only decisive and active one. Hence, whenever real, that is, essentially economic clashes of interests between two nations occur, it is not the actual extent of the divergences, which determines the struggle, but the exaggerated and over-emphasised political aspect of these divergences. Nurtured by fictitious political ideas, this surplus factor has become more powerful in the public arena than economic realities themselves, since in any emergency, these economic factors cannot act but through their political agents, and, therefore, have to put up with and pay for the latter's encroachments. Whilst the real conflicts might be easily solved, political fictions precipitate the crisis, by adding the emotional surplus; the crisis, in turn, increases the power of professional politicians. Such is the vicious circle.

It is frequently claimed that power lies with captains of industry, but this would only be true in unaffected conditions. More often than not are conditions affected by the mass intoxication with fictions, without which, it seems, most people can no longer go on in this dreadfully complicated world. In between come the catastrophes, that is, the time when the fictions become reality, because they were allowed to reign supreme. The power of professional politicians over the intoxicated masses is almost unlimited, although in the hour of catastrophe they have to share this power with military or gang leaders, unless they manage to unite both these functions—as, for instance, by holding one post officially and fulfilling the other function de facto, only. The “Jewish-Arab Question” has indeed become a classical example for all this.

What are we to call the Cassandra of our time? Whether we choose the proud name of “spiritual elite” or the somewhat contemptuous reference to “certain intellectuals”, it comes to the same. I am referring to those, who, equally free from the megalomania of the leaders and from the giddiness of the masses, discern the approaching catastrophe. They do not merely utter their warnings, but they try to point to the path which has to be followed if catastrophe is to be averted. This path is not unalterably defined. With history slipping further down the dangerous slope, they have to change the

plan and adapt it to the remaining possibilities. They do not prattle about the goal, they want to attain it. Thus, they have to analyse reality in its changes, brought about by the suggestive interplay of political fictions, in order to arrive at a correct appreciation of facts; in order to reach their target eventually. Since they are out to realise these aims in fact and since they refuse to accept hopeless, heroic gestures as a substitute for the triumph of the national rescue work over immense obstacles, they are called defeatists. Because they remain faithful to the ideal and do not allow its replacement by the Asmodaeus of a political chimera, they are looked upon as quislings. Because, day and night, they summon up all inner forces so as not to submit to despair, and because they invoke the helpful power of reason, they are described as men whose hearts are left cold by the misery of their people.

Such are the convictions and such the fate of the group of men in whose midst IHUD and BA'AYOTH came into being.

DOES THIS Cassandra act? She, too, only speaks. She does not act because she is not authorised to do so and because at this juncture action without authorisation would be madness. But her speeches are as many deeds — because they point to the path. The history of the present and the coming generations will prove that her speech was action and the road indicated, the only one leading to Jewish revival in Palestine.

We describe our programme as that of a bi-national state — that is, we aim at a social structure based on the reality of two peoples living together. The foundations of this structure cannot be the traditional ones of majority and minority, but must be different. We do not mean just any bi-national state, but this particular one, with its particular conditions, i.e., a bi-national state which embodies in its basic principles a *Magna Charta Reservationum*, the indispensable postulate of the rescue of the Jewish people. This is what we need and not a "Jewish State"; for any national state in vast, hostile surroundings would mean pre-meditated national suicide, and an unstable international basis can never make up for the missing intra-national one. But this programme is only a temporary adaptation of our path to the concrete, historical situation — it is not necessarily the path itself. The road to be pursued is that of an agreement between the two nations — naturally also taking into account the productive participation of smaller national groups — an agreement which, in our opinion, would lead to Jewish-Arab co-operation in the revival of the Middle East, with the Jewish partner concentrated in a strong settlement in Palestine. This co-operation, though necessarily starting out from economic premises, will allow development in accordance with an all-embracing cultural perspective and on the basis of a feeling of at-oneness, tending to result in a new form of society.

Essential pre-requisites for such an agreement are the two principles, which I have described as decisive for the immediate future of mankind: the precedence of economics over politics; and that of the intra-national principle over the international one.

The cleansing of the Jewish-Arab atmosphere is much more difficult today than it was only a few years ago. Above all, this is the result of an entirely fictitious programme, which does not comprise any possibility of realisation, and which relinquishes the realistic Zionism of toil and reconstruction — the Biltmore Programme. This programme, interpreted as admitting the aim of a minority to "conquer" the country by means of international manoeuvres, has not only aroused Arab anger against official Zionism, but also made all attempts at bringing about Jewish-Arab understanding suspicious in the eyes of Arabs, who imagined that these attempts were concealing the officially admitted real intentions. Yet, even today, such a cleansing of the atmosphere — an indispensable preliminary condition for the establishment of agreement — is not impossible. This can only be done, however, on the basis of the primacy of reality. It is necessary to create conditions which will prove that the common interests, now overshadowed by political considerations, are more real, more vital than the differences hitherto so successfully emphasised by the professional politicians on either side. This is what J.L. Magnes, when giving evidence before the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry, defined as reaching agreement "through life and not through discussion". The realities of life should be given a chance to force the walls of political fictions. Magnes was right in going as far as to hope for an "agreement among the political leaders" themselves. Life, when given a chance, will prove strong enough to force a new line of action upon the politicians. The evil does not lie with politics as such, but with its hypertrophy.

Equally important for the intended agreement is the precedence of the intra-national principle over the international one. Prevailing Zionist policy hitherto adhered to the axiomatic view that international agreement had to precede, nay, determine the intra-national agreement with the Arabs. It is imperative to reverse this order: it is essential to arrive at an intra-national agreement, which is later to receive international sanction. This order will recommend itself also to the Arabs, even if today their political leaders refuse to admit it, because the Palestinian State they aim at will, in the present international situation, only come about if demanded jointly by Jews and Arabs — that is, only after Jewish-Arab agreement will have been established.

In the present state of world politics, the intra-national principle tends more and more to assume a constructive role, whilst it remains for the international principle only to sanction the results of the former. In other words: as a consequence of agreements between nations, super-national structures will of necessity come into being,

based, from without, upon common economic interests and joint economic action, and cemented inwardly by the singleness of purpose in the cultural and social domains. Within this common concern of two or more nations, economically unified and culturally diverse, the political activities will partly be the joint action of all and partly the result of the separate action of each group; but all this diversity of effort will be moulded into a whole, by a great vision, shared by all and creative. Finally, these new social structures will be fitted into a super-territorial pattern, corresponding with our present "international" principle, but more vital and more active.

In the Middle East, no such larger integration will come about without a genuine agreement between Jews and Arabs and its international sanctioning. In the same manner, the essential Jewish demands can only be realised by way of such an agreement. Only if the Jews are able to offer the world the peace of the Middle East — as far as this depends upon them — will the world concede those demands to Jewry. For, one thing is certain: not only this or that Great Power needs a peaceful Middle East, but the nations of the world at large.

SINCE we embarked upon our struggle against fictitious political thinking, the power of these fictions over the Yishuv has, it seems, been increasing continuously. First, a programme was drawn up that could not be realised by political means; when this became apparent, a desperate and foolhardy section of Jewish youth resorted to violence — which is more vain still. The whole history of national movements, in which revolutionary and violent measures play no small part, was invoked to serve as a lesson that was no lesson — for it is evident that lessons drawn from history can only be applied if the particular character of the situation has been recognised: the weight of the interested powers, assessed, and the inter-play of forces between and within these states, as they affect the particular problem, analysed. But this very investigation — an essential preliminary — was not undertaken; had it been, it would have laid bare the absurdity of a policy of violence in our situation.

It should, of course, be borne in mind that genuine despair was prevailing, brought on by an action of extermination never before experienced by any other nation, as well as by the indifference of the world in the face of this action. Yet, despair does not usually render judgment more keen; rather does it lead to an intoxication by political fictions. Professional politicians here, as elsewhere, have made all the despair, all the misery of the nation, the demand for rescue, so many factors in their calculation. It is not the calculation that matters, however, it is reality; and the politicians of the world power most interested, instead of watching reality, had their eyes pinned on to these calculations. By so doing, they heightened the feeling of despair, especially since after an action of extermination

of this kind, the poor human soul is inclined to see extermination lurking everywhere.

Nevertheless, the feeling continues to spread over the Yishuv that something is wrong with official Zionist policy; that irretrievable opportunities have been lost. The number of those, who re-examine their position, is growing. Our pains-taking efforts have not remained without result. It is now of the utmost importance to prevent this dis-illusionment from developing into destructive pessimism and to shape it into constructive resolution. More emphatically than ever has it to be shown that a solution is still possible. To bring this solution about will be more difficult and less satisfactory now, than at any earlier stage, but its realisation is still within our reach: it will bring us back to our path of constructive work.

To point to the way and to aim at the solution in the present and more difficult conditions is a task which can only be fulfilled by dint of a supreme effort. To this end, we seek allies everywhere and appeal for their support.

A SOLUTION THROUGH FORCE?

By J. L. MAGNES

This is the stenographic record of an address given by Dr. Magnes in New York, on July 17, 1946, before an important Zionist organization which had invited him to discuss the political situation. The discussion which followed has been published in the Jan.—Febr. 1947 number of BA'AYOTH, the Hebrew Monthly of IHUD.

EVERYBODY who considers the Palestine question has to ask himself two things. First, what does he really want? Second, how does he expect to get that? Those who have answered the question to themselves and have said, we really want a Jewish State or the Jewish Commonwealth, have very good reasons for that, and I don't have to go into those reasons.

The tragedy that has happened to the Jewish people, its virtual homelessness, the lack of a voice in the United Nations Organisation or anywhere else, those are negative reasons on the one hand, very powerful. There are positive reasons also for a Jewish State, namely, that the Jewish people ought to be given the opportunity, as every people is given, to set up governments, to try its hand at that very difficult exercise of power which one calls sovereignty, government. That would be a great challenge to the Jewish people. Instead of giving advice from the sidelines, it would be in the midst of the struggle itself, which every people ought to have the privilege of confronting.

A Jewish State would give all of that presumably, at least in theory, and more besides.

As I said, it is not necessary for me to tell you, who have been in favour of that, what the arguments for a Jewish State are. It is an entirely different question as to how you are going to get it. You have to try to make up your mind on that with as much clarity, insofar as it is possible, as you make up your minds on the question of the Jewish State itself.

I don't know if those who advocate a Jewish State have given sufficient thought, systematic, orderly, responsible thought, to that second problem. How are you going to get it? I should like to express the opinion, which is not my personal opinion alone, that a Jewish State can be gotten, if at all, only through war, war in the literal sense of the term, fighting with arms insofar as the arms are available; insofar as they are not available, they are to be secured.

Those who have been for a Jewish State and who have been trying to build up Jewish armed groups are not only logical but they are

also realistic, because they know that if they want a Jewish State and want it hard enough, the only way to get it — you may perhaps succeed in getting it — is through the use of arms, through warfare. If you teach the Jewish youth, as so many of us are teaching them — mistakenly it seems to me — that the only hope for the Jewish people is a Jewish State, that the Jewish people is doomed everywhere, in America as elsewhere, and that betimes a Jewish State has to be established; if you teach the Jewish youth that — that Judaism, the Jewish spirit, the Jewish religion, Jewish culture are all in danger of deterioration, if not extinction, if there be no Jewish State — then of course, with an idealistic Jewish youth such as we have in Palestine, in America and elsewhere, this idealistic Jewish youth will draw the conclusion which I have tried to draw for you, even though you yourselves don't draw it, that the way to get that is through force.

You see that the Jewish youth is ready to go out on that battleground. When British soldiers are killed in their beds within what is presumably the hospitable city of Tel Aviv, when officers are kidnapped, when bridges are blown up, when all of these things take place that have been taking place, that is the logical and the natural and the inevitable consequence of the theory which our youth is being taught, that without a Jewish State we are lost. If not to-day then to-morrow.

Those, therefore, who have advocated a Jewish state and who condemn what is being done are, I think, taking an illogical ground. The youth who go out at night with their bombs and their other weapons are ready to sacrifice their own lives there, and not just talk about it here. They are drawing the natural and inevitable conclusion, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the premise that a Jewish State is absolutely necessary.

I DO NOT regard it as my function to-day to argue with you. I am just trying to put the problem to you. I should like to put another side of the problem to you. Before I do that let me say why I am sure that a Jewish State cannot be achieved, if it can be achieved at all, except through violence and warfare.

You can talk to an Arab on everything in the world: you cannot talk to him about the Jewish State. You cannot talk to him about a Jewish State because a Jewish State means, in the definition of it, the rule by Jews of others, of others who live in that Jewish State. You may try to persuade him that Jewish rule is going to be just and generous, and we may all believe that; we certainly all hope for that. But that is prophesy, and one cannot be guided by that.

If you talk to an Englishman, and he is another factor in the situation, you will find that there are differences of view. There have been some Englishmen who have thought that a Jewish Palestine could be a bastion to the British Empire at this very sensitive centre

of communications. I know that some of the earliest Zionist reading that I had done, years and years ago, by Mr. Sidebotham and by other Englishmen, was based just upon this premise.

These Englishmen believed that it was necessary to have a loyal Jewish Palestine in order to safeguard what they then foresaw would, actually even more than they could then foresee, become a crucial centre of communications. You don't find as many Englishmen saying that to-day as you did then or as you did a year ago. The conception of a loyal Jewish Palestine has disappeared. Both Englishmen and Jews have to realize that a people is loyal or a state is loyal when it is to their interests to be loyal, and we see to-day that situations may arise which may prompt us to think, correctly or mistakenly, that our interests do not lie with England, and we are therefore endeavouring to show England that she need not count upon our loyalty.

In general, the conception of loyalty on the part of the Jews has long since disappeared out of the British vocabulary. I think you ought to know that. I am not trying to assess the blame for it.

You have, therefore, these two main factors: The Arabs, not only of Palestine, but the whole Arab world, and beyond that, the world of Islam. Then you have the British factor, which you are not going to eliminate, however hard you try, because Palestine is too important for the British scheme of things.

You would find that to get a Jewish state from either of them, or with either of them against the other, would mean the application of force, warfare. That also is something that those who are engaged upon this terror understand. They say, the only way we can get it from Britain is through force, because Britain has shown in Ireland or in India that when sufficient force is applied concessions are made. I don't want to go into what to me are fundamental differences between Palestine and the Jews on the one hand and Ireland and India on the other hand. I think they are radically different and the analogy is a basically false analogy.¹ But it is correct when they say, if you want the State, the only way you can get it is through force.

Jabotinsky knew that long years ago. He was the prophet of the Jewish State. Jabotinsky was ostracized and condemned and excommunicated, and we see now that almost the whole Zionist movement has adopted his point of view. There is not sufficient credit given to Jabotinsky and the Revisionists for their foresight and for their loyalty to this idea, which all these years was exceedingly unpopular, at least on the surface. He saw that the only way to get a State was through force.

He said in his early writings: "Has it ever been known that a people would willingly give up its soil? No more would the Palestine Arabs yield their sovereignty without force." He endeavoured to get the

¹ See the article by Professor Koebner, *Ireland — the False Analogy*, in this booklet.

British to understand that, and he found a large following among the Poles, those Poles who are now carrying on these pogroms. They wanted to get rid of the Jews in Poland and therefore accepted his plan of evacuation.

All these things were in his mind and were recorded by him more or less in a prophetic way. These things are being adopted now by those who excommunicated him and who pilloried him and who made his life a great burden. I tell you that in order to indicate that sometimes ideas have a way of marching and of accomplishing themselves long after they have been subjected to derision and opposition, and not Jabotinsky's ideas alone.

I WOULD LIKE then to put before you another side of the problem. There are those who say they want a bi-national State, and they have tried to put to themselves the question how they are going to get it. They want a bi-national State because they think that, in the first place, that is a worthy ideal, a high ideal, an ideal to which the Jewish youth can be educated to give their best mind, their best spirit. They have this in mind also because of the practical situation. We find the Arabs there, a fact which, of course, cannot be overlooked, although it has been overlooked over and over again.

I met with a group not so long ago and they asked me to say something on this problem, a group of leaders in the community here, a couple of hundred of them. At the end of that meeting one man came up to me and said, "Well, you know perfectly well that whenever we want to come to an agreement with the Arabs we can; it is the British." So I said to him, "Why don't you come to this agreement with the Arabs, if you think it is so simple?"

I have heard that said by many people on many occasions: "Of course when we choose to come to an agreement with the Arabs we can." Well, there was a time when that might have been possible. That time is long since past. The Arabs have grown in political maturity, and the Arabs are more and more afraid of us. So the initiative is out of our hands. When that man said, "We can come to an agreement with the Arabs whenever we want" — he meant that the political initiative was still in the hands of the Jews. It is not; it has passed out of the hands of the Jews.

The question therefore is — I am not trying to go into the question so much as to why we want a bi-national State; I have indicated that in a few words — the question that I want to ask and try to answer is, how do we expect to get it? We have worked out a program for that, which was presented in writing to the Anglo-American Committee; and was supplemented by oral testimony, which is also available in print. I don't expect in the brief remarks that I make to go into the same detail that you can find in these documents².

² "Palestine — A Bi-National State." Publ. by IHUD (Union) Association of Palestine, New-York, August 1946.

We want to get the bi-national state through, as far as possible, argument, persuasion, not through the use of force; certainly not through the use of Jewish force; not through warfare. And we think we can get that.

The reason we think we can get it is because we know of Arab circles in Palestine who are in favour of it. We know there are Arab circles outside of Palestine who favour it. I have had two conversations in New York with important representatives of the Arab world and they favour it.

So that the question that I ask and the question that I answer is just this: What do we want? We want a bi-national State, because we think the Jewish genius for government can be given full play through the bi-national State. How do we expect to get it? Through argument, persuasion, and finally through life itself. And this is an important point which I should like to make with you as one of the details we have tried to work out.

We were greatly disappointed that the Anglo-American Commission did not go further in the report. They adopted a great deal of what we said, sometimes in the very words of our statements. But they overlooked a primary consideration, namely, that the process of self-government be begun at once, expedited.

WHY DO WE think that that is so important? Because in that way Jews and Arabs would come together in one of the most important concerns of life, Government. We therefore contended, and we still contend, that there should have been a concurrent declaration on the part of the Anglo-American Committee, proclaiming a bi-national State on the one hand and the beginnings of self-government on the other. The Arabs want, above all things, self-government. The Jews, for the most part, want above all things, immigration. We have tried to make these balance one another. Our formula is: political parity and numerical parity for the two nationalities.

Our proposal is that immigration be permitted up to parity, equality. That would give the Jews the chance of five to six hundred thousand additional immigrants until parity was reached. It would not mean the discontinuance of immigration when parity was reached, because the Arab birth rate is higher than the Jewish, twice as high. So that the additional Jewish immigration would be at least that much, in order to make up the disparity between the birth rates.

Moreover, it is our contention that if there be some political peace, as there might be, in connection with a bi-national State, the Jews and the Arabs could work out together some further arrangement as to additional Jewish immigration, after parity was reached and after the disparity of the birth rates had been covered.

In our programme we have worked out a series of steps. We proposed three stages for this self-government; now, before the Mandate ends; to-morrow, when trusteeship takes over Palestine; and in the

third stage when Palestine becomes an independent autonomous unit within a larger federation in that part of the world.

We think that those things are practical. We certainly know that they cannot be introduced through warfare. We think we can find a common language, a language of understanding and of peace with the Arabs, as we have found with many individuals. We think if the bi-national State with self-government were made the policy of the British and of the American Governments and of other governments, and this policy were adhered to, and if both the Jews and the Arabs understood that that was the policy for Palestine which had the approval of the United Nations, we think that the Jews and the Arabs in the course of a not very long period would be finding one another increasingly, year by year. You find that to-day. You find it in the government itself. There are Jews and Arabs who participate in government, but in the lower positions. There was this government strike. The Jews and the Arabs carried it on together. The Jews were in the minority, the Arabs were in the majority. But the Jews and the Arabs stuck together because the interests of their life required it. It wasn't an abstract formula that was presented to them.³

Jews and Arabs work together in the country districts. The Kibbutzim and the Fellahin are on good terms. They are not on such good terms to-day as they were a year ago, and they probably will not be on such good terms to-morrow as they are to-day, if all of this goes on. But they have laid the basis of understanding and co-operation between them. Not on the basis of a Jewish State but on the basis of life, of what one can give to the other, of what one can receive from the other.

There are Arab workers organizations now, particularly the left-wing workers organizations, which have as a plank in their platform the co-operation between Jews and Arabs, although on other matters they are almost as chauvinistic as some of the Effendi Arabs themselves. But it is an indication that points the way.

We cannot afford to lose much time. The sands are running out. The war that is taking place now — and it is warfare — the beginnings of warfare were inevitable, they were not to be avoided as long as the Jewish State was the official policy of the Zionist movement. It has not been the official policy of the Zionist Congresses as yet; for that reason those of us who are opponents of the Jewish State still feel that we have the right to be members of the Zionist Organization, to buy the Shekel as we do. I am hoping that with the developments of the next six months, before the Zionist Congress takes place, there will be a greater measure of calm and of understanding. But if we simply keep reaffirming what the Biltmore Programme began, and simply shake our fists and say to Great Britain, You are our enemy, and say to the Arabs, You are our enemy—that is what we are

³ See the article by G. Baer, *Jewish and Arab Workers — Divided or United?*

saying to them at the present time—with this war on two fronts, which every book of strategic warfare warns against — why then, of course, the situation will go from bad to worse.

I have to add one point. The IHUD group is not the only group advocating the idea which I put forward to you to-day. The Hashomer Hatzair advocates these ideas, with certain differences, but the general tendency is the same, and they are an important group. I should like to say that in the Mapai there are also persons who are not unimportant and who at least flirt with the idea of the bi-national state. And in the Aliyah Hadasha I think there is a majority now who are for a bi-national state. I would like to say that some of the Zionist Executive, who do not say this publicly, nevertheless say it privately, "Oh, if you could get what you are after, how happy we should be."

THERE ARE some in the Zionist Executive who talk about the Jewish State and who also would be very glad if there could be partition. We oppose partition. We oppose partition not only for all the reasons that are usually given, but because partition is going to mean the intensification of chauvinism on both sides.

When you draw these borders, when you draw these frontiers and have the Jewish schools on the one side of the line and the Arab schools on the other side of the line, have you any idea what is going to be taught in them? Well, I have. There is going to be the hatred by the Jews of the Arabs and the hatred of the Jews by the Arabs. That is being taught to-day. But it is not being taught in the same way, because, after all, we meet, we see one another. If there be this partition and there be those water-tight compartments, there is going to be a hatred engendered in comparison with which this present day hatred is just a plaything. Moreover, those of you who are thinking of the Jewish State and who are ready for this warfare, which will be inevitable, which will be much more serious than it is to-day, may think that we Jews have these great caches of arms, which we have — this Yagour is only one, as you probably know. You may think that we are better armed than the Arabs, and we are, much, much better armed, and we are better trained than the Arabs. Well, all of our sons and all of our daughters go out for training, and we are going to get at least 12,000 trained men and women from the Jewish Brigade, and we are going to get among the 50,000 young men and women who are coming in among these hundred thousand refugees I don't know how many who have been or are being trained.

The day we lick the Arabs, that is the day, I think, when we shall be sowing the seed of an eternal hatred of such dimensions that Jews will not be able to live in that part of the world for centuries to come. That is something that you had better try to avoid.

I have great confidence in some of these leaders who are to be in Paris for a meeting soon, confidence even in some of the most violent

of them, that they may be ready now to make these admissions that this is not the way. *Lo zeh ha-derech*,⁴ this is not the way.

I can only repeat to you that this is the inevitable way on the basis of the Jewish State. I do hope the idea of the bi-national State is going to be taken seriously, taken up seriously in Paris; if not in Paris, it certainly will be in the coming Zionist Congress. By that time I am hoping that the movement of the 100,000 will have begun in good earnest, and that many who are engaging upon all of this simply out of understandable despair, will say, It is time to lay down our arms; and this would be the beginning, this is what we want.

We cannot maintain a Jewish State or a bi-national State or a Yishuv in Palestine if the whole surrounding world be our enemies. We may be doing this and we may be doing that, but the existence of that Yishuv or that State, or whatever one calls it, will be precarious, and that is not what we want nor what the Jewish people require.

⁴ That was the name of the first article by Ahad-Haam, the leader of spiritual Zionism, criticising some ways of the Zionist Movement. The title of that article has become a slogan of earnest criticism.—Ed.

JEWISH PALESTINE TO-DAY
THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND

By GERDA LUFT

IT HAS never been easy for the outsider to understand Palestine well enough in order to arrive at a correct idea of its diverse political and social tendencies. Despite the smallness of the country and although it was only during the war years that the Jewish Yishuv had increased its population, attaining the 600,000 figure, various forces, most complexly inter-connected, were at work in the framing of this growing social organism. Palestine Jewry, moreover, was going through an uninterrupted process of transformation, which often gave rise to swift and surprising changes and innovations.

One of the factors responsible for these phenomena, often referred to as "dynamic development", is to be found in immigration. The waves of immigrants reaching Palestine during the past decades were different from one another, both as regards their social and political ideologies and the social and cultural traditions of the countries, whence they originated. This alone would have amply sufficed to give rise to ever new tendencies of development. We have only to bear in mind the differences between an immigrant from Central Europe, to say nothing of England, on the one hand, and one from Yemen, on the other; or, again, between an American business man and an underground combattant of World War II, in order to realise that a welding of these various elements presents problems equal in propensity to those confronting much bigger countries and that the process of adapting the immigrants to the Yishuv already in the country must of necessity change, threaten and fertilise Palestine Jewry.

Yet, immigration as such was not the only factor which, from the outset, led to intense political activity and to the formation of a great many parties and factions. Responsible, too, was the passion for discussion, in general, and of ideological discussion, in particular, prevalent among many of the immigrants, especially those from Russia and Poland. This tendency, along with a keen suspicion of compromise and the spiritual attitude upon which it rested, was inherited by the succeeding generation, comprising the elements growing up in Palestine itself and those reaching its shores from other countries. Those with a leaning towards historical speculation could spend an amusing hour or two reflecting on the possible nature of development in Palestine during the past decades, had the bulk of immigrants come, not from Eastern and Central Europe, but from the Anglo-Saxon countries.

Apart from the extreme splitting up into parties and groups, Jewish public life in the past 25 years has been characterised by the predominance of the working-class. This trait has continued to the present day with far-reaching effect, both favourable and dangerous. As a country of immigrants, Palestine is free from rigid lines of caste or clearly-defined social strata. Consequently, the vested interest of groups and influences emanating therefrom were to a great extent non-existent. One of the distinguishing features of Jewish Palestine was that it did not have a working-class, in the European sense of the term, opposed to a capitalist class. On the contrary, it may be recorded that one of the main aims of Zionist colonisation has been to create a working-class in Palestine. The idea of a return to the soil and to productive work has been one of the guiding principles of Zionism since the end of the last century, and the creation of the Jewish worker, first in the field of agriculture, and later in that of industry and all other branches of economy, figured among the chief aims of Zionist settlement. There were two contributory factors to this end: colonisation and most particularly workers' colonisation attracted the finest elements of Zionist youth, whilst the developing institutions of the Zionist Organisation threw in all their efforts to promote the creation of a working-class and the safeguarding of its interests.

As a result of these tendencies, the workers in the Jewish Yishuv got the start of all other social strata, as far as social standing, organisation and political influence are concerned. The remainder only took to organising themselves very gradually. Even today, with economic groups already very sharply defined and with the existence of associations representing the interests of citrus growers, industrialists and traders, the depreciating term, *déclassé*, used in Europe when a son of an industrialist or intellectual takes to agriculture (a usual process in old-established societies), is very largely unknown among the Yishuv. The contrary may be said to be the case, for not only is this process considered perfectly natural, but a lad leaving Secondary School straight for the Kibbutz (communal settlement) is generally looked upon as joining the élite, which realises the aims and ideals of the Zionist Movement in its purest and natural form.

Until recently, this preponderance of the working element and its organisations had imprinted its peculiar stamp of social progress upon the Yishuv. To this preponderance and its recognition by the Zionist Organisation, the success of social experiments in the field of agriculture and the marked emphasis of co-operative forms of activity in the Yishuv is largely due. This survey will show, however, that nowadays, the overwhelming influence of the working-class cannot be considered as constituting an unmixed blessing.

THE WELTER of political and social forces and factions, so characteristic of the Jewish Palestine of today, had already begun to make

itself felt in the early stages of the war. The economic structure of the Yishuv had undergone a fundamental change. Several new political groups had emerged; the Jewish catastrophe in Europe made people see the Jewish question and the Zionist Movement in a new light. The vortex of totalitarian war recalled memories of WW1, and many cherished the hope that the end of this war would afford Zionism another great chance as the first had done with the promulgation of the Balfour Declaration. Added to all this, WW2 had for many years cut Palestine off from the outside world, making the countries of the Diaspora seem even more remote than ever. The result was an intensified concentration on internal affairs and problems. All these factors, in short, combined to bring about the social, political, and — most important of all — the psychological changes, characteristic of Palestine Jewry today.

Let us first consider the economic changes in the Yishuv brought about by the war. In the first case, it removed the problem of unemployment, which had made itself felt early in the forties, and laid the foundations of war prosperity, as remarkable in its effects as that previously caused by the influx of immigrants. The cutting off of Palestine from foreign trade; the stationing in the country of strong Allied forces, who were large-scale consumers, as well as the possibility of feeding them and of manufacturing in the country itself great quantities of products, which were normally imported from abroad, gave an enormous impetus to the whole economic life of Palestine. Shortage of manpower was experienced everywhere and there was an almost unlimited purchasing power in the face of a limited quantity of supplies. Ever new projects could thus be launched under the stimulus of war.

Agriculture underwent a process of consolidation (with the exception of citriculture, which was with difficulty saved from ruin by means of Government loans until the end of the war.¹) As for industry, it was provided with opportunities for expansion, unprecedented in the history of the country.

The fullest advantage was taken of all these varied opportunities, largely because of the adaptability of the Jews and also because they could dispose of specialists of a European standard. As a result of the war, industry in Palestine ranks equally with agriculture and citriculture. The war years, too, have seen the development of new branches of industry, e.g. that of diamonds.

The consequences of this rapid economic rise were two-fold. Industrialists, hitherto badly organised and to a great extent backward in their social ideas and views as to the place and the interests of industry within the social framework as a whole, now closed their ranks and built up an organisation, which corresponded more closely to their social and economic interests. The workers, for their part,

¹ See the article, *Citrus Growers Have Learnt to Cooperate*, by M. Smelansky.

took advantage of this boom in employment in order to expand their already wide-spread trade union organisations still further and to force the industrialists to bear at least part of the social expenditure which in more developed countries is shared by workers, employers and the State. This struggle for better conditions greatly contributed to the preservation of that predominance, which workers and their organisations had previously enjoyed—though, during the war, the employers made the first serious attempt to consolidate their own positions. By means of the establishment of a Jewish industry and the organisations connected therewith, the war had created new and important interest-groups, which are bound to come to the fore politically, sooner or later.

Within the working-class, too, the importance of the industrial workers has grown considerably, quite apart from the fact that the 'Histadruth' (Jewish Federation of Labour) and its subsidiary societies (such as the contracting firm of 'Solel Boneh') are by now playing a leading role as contractors. Emphasis of these points is necessary, seeing that in the present rather vague circumstances, these factors in the existing parties do not make themselves felt as strongly as their intrinsic social and economic importance might lead us to expect.

THE NEW groupings, which emerged in Palestine during the war, cannot be classed as political parties in the usual sense, that is, groups representing definite social interests, with their respective ideologies, fulfilling the functions nowadays ascribed to "pressure groups." The traditional classification, no doubt, also yields valuable results. Generally speaking, we may say that the Labour Parties, in the accepted sense, tend to the 'Left,' that the Bourgeois Parties and groups represent the interests and ideologies of the 'Right'; that the religious circles, for the greater part, are not fighting for the attainment of religious aims only, but tend to the Right rather than the Left — apart from the equally-well-organised religious workers, with agricultural settlements of their own. These concepts, however, are no longer fully adequate to-day, and apart from the Parties, there are groupings determining the trend of public life, which cannot wholly be brought within the rigid categories of parliamentary institutionalism. To these might be added the military and semi-military organisations and, in a certain sense, the Youth Movements as well.

The influence of the Jewish catastrophe in Europe on the political attitude as well as the social values of Palestine Jewry cannot be over-estimated. The work of up-building in the country acquired an unprecedented significance and importance as constituting the salvation of the scattered remnants of European Jewry. The links connecting the Jews of Palestine with the gruesome happenings in Europe during the recent decades are as powerful as they are manifold.

They could easily become associated with the often fantastic hopes, entertained in connection with changes expected to be brought about by the war and the eventual peace treaties, for the Jewish cause along with many others. These hopes had been kindled by leaders who had lost touch with reality and who refused to look reality in the face even when the facts could no longer be denied. Both catastrophe and the exaggerated hopes thus aroused resulted in a mood of excessive expectation and excitement, which made rational argumentation seem dull and lifeless by contrast, and left the door open at the same time to every type of fanaticism.

This fanaticism was further enflamed because, throughout the war years, Palestine had been cut off from the outside world, this state continuing even at present, to a large extent. What is more, there is an ever-growing number of young people in this country, unable to speak or read any other language beyond Hebrew. They are consequently thrown back upon themselves and their surroundings. They feel no urge, and in some cases, it must be added, have no possibility, of acquainting themselves with the outside world; of evaluating its interests, intentions, views and cares and of bringing these into some relationship with Palestinian and Jewish questions as a whole. This generation is intensely suspicious of all that is not Jewish—even more, of all that is not Palestinian-Jewish. In many cases, what is lacking is not only awareness and knowledge of the non-Jewish world, but any real knowledge of the Golah (Diaspora); of the interests, relationships and developments which Jewry cherishes and has undergone within the far-flung and complex Jewish community, the world over. Thus, out of this faith in, and devotion to Palestine, there has arisen not only a state of ignorance regarding non-Palestinian Jewry, but the staunch belief that Palestine alone could decide Jewry's fate. Strange as it may sound, in a community fighting for large-scale immigration, there has developed a kind of Palestinian isolationism, a convulsive concentration on the Palestinian section of the Jewish community.

It is hardly necessary to assert that this development ran parallel with the intensification of nationalism throughout the world, as also with a world-wide faith in the potency of physical force. The period of dis-illusionment before the war, and the war years themselves, had not passed without leaving their traces on this country. The indescribable experiences, through which many of the immigrants reaching Palestine during and after the war had passed, naturally exercised a very profound influence on political feeling and thought in the country.

IF WE AIM at an understanding of the political parties and factions prevalent in Jewish Palestine of our day, we must never lose sight of the very complex psychological development, occasioned by the war years, but which is in part also rooted in previous phases of world

development and in pre-war Zionist colonisation. A survey of these groups must commence with the working-class, which remains to this day the politically decisive element, determining the trend of the country, and more particularly of the Zionist Organisation. What is still more important is that it controls the political apparatus.

In recent years, quite a number of different parties have arisen within the working-class. For the Palestinian each one of these has its distinct political colouring; the outsider, however, is confronted with a confusing jumble.

The largest and most powerful of the working-class parties and at the same time the one behind the Executive of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Le'umi (representative body of Palestine Jewry), is the "MAPAI" (Miflegat Poale Eretz Yisrael). Some fifteen years ago, this body grew out of fusion of the two parties then dominating the Left, thus obtaining a majority within the Working Class Movement. Of these two parties, one was the "AHDUT HA'AVODAH," which, on the whole, corresponded to the "Right Poale Zion" of the Diaspora. It was Marxian in outlook and adhered to the Social Democratic International; the other, the "HAPOEL HATZAIR," proclaimed a kind of non-Marxian organic Socialism, inspired by the late A. D. Gordon. The Mapai, headed by Ben Gurion, which succeeded these two, is responsible in the main for the tenacious proclamation and maintenance of the Biltmore Programme, with its avowed aim—a Jewish State. The same Party is also responsible for the turn towards "activism" given to political propaganda in this country and hence for the dangerous intensification of the Anglo-Jewish conflict, resulting in the impasse in Anglo-Jewish relations, to date.

In recent years, an opposition wing has broken away from this central and most powerful body. This Opposition Movement entertains more radical and extremist views both as regards Socialism and the Zionist policy. At the outset, conflict with the majority only arose on internal Labour questions. Later, however, the Opposition took up its stand as a separate party, known as the "AHDUT HA'AVODAH" and joined forces with another minority group, the "Left Poale Zion." Finally, it adopted an attitude in questions of "activism" and foreign policy, which was keenly antagonistic to that of the Mapai. Whilst the latter party, to-day, advocates partition, the former rejects and combats it. In matters of "activism," "Ahdut Ha'avodah" advocates an even more extreme policy than the party from which it has broken away. "Ahdut Ha'avodah" is at present one of the most ardent champions and propagators of the activist course within the working-class movement.

Within the ranks of the Mapai, a not inconsiderable minority—mainly former adherents of the rightist groups of the Hapoel Hatzair—is opposed to terrorism and, at bottom, loyally follows the Weizmann course. Outwardly, however, this minority has always adhered to discipline and dumbly submitted to majority decisions. It has never

considered the moment ripe to come out into the open with its opposition to terrorism with all its repercussions on propaganda, politics and education. It excuses its attitude by a desire to maintain the unity of the Party, thus preserving the predominant position it occupies within the Labour Movement as well as within the Jewish Agency Executive, the Vaad Le'umi and the Zionist Organisation.

Beside these two groups, the "HASHOMER HATZAIR" has gained strength in recent years. Whereas formerly, it was a purely Kibbutz movement (i.e., a movement towards settlement on the land), at its last conference, it constituted itself as a Party, welcoming as members urban elements as well, whether labourers or intellectuals. The "Hashomer Hatzair" has always been opposed to partition, and nowadays more than ever. Moreover, it has been and still is loud in its proclamation of the necessity to bring about an understanding with the Arab population. Together with the IHUD group and other like-minded circles, it goes to form the 'League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Co-operation.' It is violently opposed to the tacit condonation of, to say nothing of co-operation with, the terrorist organisations, which it classes as "fascist."

At times, the "Hashomer Hatzair" actively opposed terrorism. Yet, it makes a distinction, which is fairly easy for Palestinians to grasp, but pretty difficult for the outsider, between the permissible use of violence for the direct protection of immigration on the one hand, and acts of terrorism and violence and sabotage, on the other, which it condemns. This distinction has kept the "Hashomer Hatzair" back from joining in a common front with those who reject political violence as a matter of principle. Like the "Ahdut Ha'avodah", the "Hashomer Hatzair" insists on the necessity of an understanding between Zionism and Soviet Russia. All three—Mapai, Ahdut Ha'avodah and Hashomer Hatzair—draw their strength from within the network of the agricultural settlements, which is of decisive importance for their Youth Movements.

Finally, we must mention a working-class party, at present playing a bigger role than before, and recently admitted within the ranks of the Histadrut. The Palestine Communist Party, which is now more to the fore, is "non-Zionist" rather than "anti-Zionist" in its propaganda among the Jews. It has a press of its own and organises its own meetings. At the last elections for the "Assefat Ha-Nivharim" (Parliamentary Representative Assembly of Palestine Jewry), it succeeded in returning three candidates. The Palestine Communist Party contributes one more distinct voice to the anti-English propaganda chorus. So far, however, none of its representatives occupies a leading position in any national institution, hence it can exercise no influence on the formulation of policy.

Mid-way between the working-class parties and the bourgeois groups comes the "ALIYAH HADASHA". Though founded but a few years ago, it emerged the second strongest party in the Yishuv from

the 1944 elections for the Assefat Ha-Nivharim, whilst in the Zionist Congress elections, held in October 1946, Aliyah Hadasha proved the strongest Central party. In recent years, it attracted attention and hostility, mainly because of its unequivocal repudiation of the use of force in politics. Despite the antagonism and threatened position resulting from this attitude, there was no deviation from this stand.

The political aims of the Aliyah Hadasha are: the safeguarding of sufficient immigration; the abolition of the existing land-laws and the securing of the necessary possibilities for the development of the Zionist colonisation work, in addition to a strengthening of Jewish autonomy in the country. The party has fought the Biltmore Programme as being illusory and politically harmful. Whilst proclaiming Jewish-Arab understanding as one of the most important aims of Zionist policy, it has been indefatigable in its efforts to prevent an irreparably widening breach with England, since it maintains that in the long run, Anglo-Jewish co-operation is inevitable. As far as the home policy is concerned, Aliyah Hadasha has formulated a progressive programme and has proposed a series of internal reforms in the Yishuv.

The "MIZRAHI" (the Party of the religious Zionists) has in recent years comprised the most ardent propagators of the Biltmore Programme. In politics, it identifies itself with the Mapai, to the extent of supporting the official course pursued by the Executive. It is more maximalist in attitude than the Mapai, and in matters of home policy it tends to the Right.

The Religious Labour Movement, the "HAPOEL HAMIZRAHI", is stronger than the bourgeois mother-party, from which it has not wholly separated either ideologically or organisationally. In social questions, however, as distinct from cultural ones, it is very close to the Mapai.

Mention must be made of "AGUDATH ISRAEL," the non-Zionist wing of Orthodoxy. It is difficult to assess its numerical strength since it does not take part either in the elections of the Zionist Congress or the Assefat Ha-Nivharim. Its stronghold is the old Yishuv in Jerusalem, which in recent years found an important if somewhat heterogeneous ally in new immigrants from Poland, Germany and Hungary. Besides the "Aguda" there has arisen amongst these circles a Youth and Labour Movement, similar to the Hapoel Hamizrahi in that it is more "left" than the mother-party. This year, the "Aguda" has suffered two severe losses in the death of Rabbi Moshe Blau, leader of the so-called "Old Yishuv"; and of Dr. Isaac Breuer, leader of the orthodox movement of Frankfurt on Main, Germany. Both were bitter opponents of terrorism (from which religious circles were not entirely free), and both assessed the importance of the Arab problem.

The bourgeois parties proper are not as easily recognisable for what they are as are the parties of the Left. Yet, it is easy to spot

the circles behind the bourgeois interests. They comprise groups round the Mayor of Tel-Aviv, Mr. J. Rokach; round the owners of old orange plantations and some, not all, sections of industrialists and land-lords, as well as certain influential Sephardic circles. The influence they exercise is stronger than lack of an adequate party organisation would lead us to believe. This is due to the narrow majority they enjoy in the Tel-Aviv Municipal Council and to the publication of a widely-read daily, the "Haboker". Respecting realities rather than ideologies, these circles are at bottom opposed to driving the conflict both with the English and the Arabs to extremes. At the same time, however, they are anxious on retaining their popularity. With regard to terrorism, these circles have adopted an anti-activist attitude, though tempered with characteristic caution. With the atmosphere as it is at present, they cannot prevail over the majority in this respect. They recently came to the fore with an anti-partition proclamation, thus forming a united front with the Revisionists, on the one hand, and the activist "Ahdut Ha'avodah" and the socialist and bi-nationalist "Hashomer Hatzair", on the other. This is but an illustration of how transient political attitudes may lead to the most diverse combinations in Palestine Jewish politics today.

A typical illustration of what was said above about the uninterrupted and often surprising process of transformation is inherent in the fate of the "GENERAL ZIONISTS" in Palestine, who have today ceased to play a decisive role in public life, though they figure in all elections and have their representatives in the leading national institutions. For years, there continued to exist in the country the two groups of A- and B-Zionists, hailing from the Diaspora, particularly Poland. They were led by their old functionaries, fairly recent immigrants. The A-Zionists were originally followers of Weizmann, in as far as foreign policy was concerned and in their close collaboration with the Left. Consequently, as far as Palestine was concerned, they were almost completely dependent on the Mapai. When this latter party, headed by Ben Gurion, turned its back on the traditional Weizmann policy, the local A-Zionist organisation (now under the energetic leadership of Dr. Sneh) followed suit. The influential daily "Haaretz" remained loyal to the old party line, whilst many General Zionists, particularly from Germany, found a new political home in the "Aliyah Hadasha".

This new orientation of the A-Zionists paved the way for their reunion with the B-Zionist group, recently effected. Up to the present, the main social and economic support of the B-Zionists was forthcoming from the bourgeois circles mentioned above, for whom the ideological conflicts within Zionism in the Golah were more or less alien, but who sympathised with the B-'s because of their pointedly Rightist bourgeois views. There are certain indications, now, that the fusion of A-'s and B-'s has given rise to some uneasiness in these circles, both because of the pro-Histadrut tendency of their new allies

and because of their support of "activism". It was no surprise, therefore, that in the last elections they supported the otherwise quite insignificant "Maccabee" list.

None the less significant is the fact that the clear dividing line, formerly separating the "REVISIONISTS" from the rest of the Yishuv, has today been blurred to a great extent. At the recent Zionist Congress elections, the Revisionist Party, which once more sent in its candidates, secured second place with some 14% of the total votes. What is more significant by far is that Revisionist ideology, in respect of political strategy and of political tactics, has today infiltrated the minds of many who have no connection whatsoever with the Party as such. This can be said of the maximalist and activist circles within the Labour Movement as well as of the wide circles of the Centre bloc. Strictly speaking, the radicalisation of the Yishuv, as a whole, is due to this infiltration of the Revisionist ideology.

IT HAS already been mentioned that the existing parties present no exhaustive picture of the political groupings to-day. In fact, many a fait accompli has often been brought about by groups which do not identify themselves with any of these parties. Since the terrorist groups of Stern and IZL were formed, several years ago, the fact had to be faced that the course of politics was no longer determined by parliamentary action alone, but in a decisive way by the terrorists, especially during the past year. In stating this, we do not refer to terrorist acts in the narrow sense of the term only, such as the assassination of Lord Moyne, in Cairo; the acts of sabotage against railways and coastal stations; or the blowing-up of the King David Hotel. Even more important, perhaps, than these individual acts is the general stream of propaganda which precedes their being put into effect and the very copious literature serving these ends. The Jewish Resistance Movement of the Haganah as well as IZL and Stern have their own radio transmitters for propaganda use, for the spreading of news suppressed by the local censorship and, above all, for the arousing of a war-like anti-English spirit. Moreover, houses and walls in Jewish towns and colonies are plastered with illegal pamphlets, which are being published very frequently and almost regularly, and reaching a wide public. It is not too much to say that this literature is probably more influential to-day than the legal press, which is also mainly devoted to the political struggle. Thus, there is a veritable hail of propaganda storming down over Jewish Palestine to-day. Though varied in style and violence of expression, it is aimed at inflaming national and nationalistic passions and arousing violent discussion of England's policy in Palestine. It requires a good deal of objectivity and a thorough knowledge of the situation to resist this propaganda and attain a true picture of what is actually happening and what should be done, when confronted with such a welter of truth and falsehood. Especially in view of the fact that it

is the very nature of underground movements and acts of terrorism to present the whole community with many a *fait accompli*, thus exercising a decisive influence on politics.

Naturally, those most strongly influenced by this pamphleteering are the youthful elements. Neither the home nor the school to-day decisively influences that large section of the youth which is passionately interested in politics. The well-organised youth-movements attached to the political parties take care to mould the younger generation along a line more or less in keeping with activism. Strenuous efforts are naturally also being made by the terrorist groups to win over new recruits. It is not surprising therefore that the educational problems arising are occupying many a serious mind, yet a real solution is hard to come by in the present atmosphere of unhealthy excitement, violent propaganda and narrow chauvinism.

Hitherto it was one of the characteristics of Palestine Jewry that social questions and experiments played a leading role in youth circles and dominated public life. In fact, the peculiar character of Zionism lay therein that it attempted to combine the national renaissance with a social one. This was to a large extent possible seeing that a national economy in Palestine had to be built up from the very foundations. This afforded a unique opportunity of developing new social forms. *To-day, however, the national factor completely overshadows the social.* True, the working-class is as strong as ever and the social institutions have lost none of their strength, while the collective and co-operative settlements are gaining strength and ground. Yet, in Palestine as elsewhere, there prevails the historical law, according to which national aspirations drive the social ones into the background until a minimum of the former have been satisfied. More than once, we have seen this law at work in the Middle East. More than once, we have witnessed the harnessing of social movements to the service of national and nationalist aims. Where this is the case, the usual ideas of "right" and "left" lose their customary meaning. Nowadays, it seems as if Palestine Jewry is passing through a similar process of changing political conceptions, without an awareness of the various political groups thus affected. Jingoism, today, is by no means confined to those sections of Palestine Jewry who profess allegiance to the political right; a nearer approximation to the truth is that large sections of the working class, constituting the vanguard of social reform and experiment, are at one and the same time in the forefront of the nationalist and activist movement. It is just these developments which make it so extremely difficult to come by an accurate picture of present-day Palestine. A close and constant study of these changes in their details and often surprising jolts is the prerequisite of a true understanding of the political and social situation in this country.

OUR REPLY¹

By MARTIN BUBER

OUR MONTHLY is entering upon the second year of its existence. Those who today read again its first issues will feel most strongly how much the Zionist atmosphere has changed in this short time, though it is not customary to admit the fact. Our evaluation of the true position, which was earlier condemned as cowardly defeatism, has now come to be accepted more generally, but those who now adopt it as their own view forget to mention the fact that previously they were mistaken. Our realistic views regarding immigration, which were then pilloried as being minimalistic to a criminal degree, have now, by open or tacit admission, become the basis of all proposals, however much attempts are made to adorn these proposals with the claim of political declarations (a claim that is absolutely incapable of literal fulfilment). During the last few months I have often met respected public figures who have told me in all earnest that the days of fevered haggling are now past—without realising, apparently, that they are beginning to say things that have been said by us over and over again. Only the second part of our thesis (i. e. that a constructive proposal is required that will fit into the framework of the Near Eastern policy of the Great Powers) has yet to meet with acceptance—which is not in the least surprising, seeing that this would impose a direct obligation. Generally speaking we may say that, while things are now being seen differently, the phraseology has remained unchanged.

The things we are bound to fight for are clarity, the coordination of knowledge and conviction, and political rectitude. By political rectitude I mean refusal to put up with brittle illusions after their brittleness has been recognised; and refusal to issue declarations involving claims that are known to be unrelated to the facts and incapable of realisation. The fanatical adherent may achieve a certain effect and a certain amount of influence on the political stage, so long as his faith is genuine; but the fragments of a faith once broken can have no political effect, because no inner power is attributed to them any more.

It is clear from a survey of the situation that the 'official' polemic against us has really lost its basis. The polemics of the right wing opposition continue, but they are being carried on at such a low level that there is no need for us to deal with them. However, outside the 'parliamentary' conflict, in certain youth circles who deserve atten-

¹ A detailed and, on the whole, decent article criticizing IHUD had appeared in "Herut", the illegal wall-paper of a terrorist organization.

tion in view of their personal sincerity, the kind of criticism which is truly fundamental is crystallising out just now. This calls for a further fundamental clarification on our part.

This kind of criticism begins on a definitely personal note. It is based on the supposition that the editors of this journal and its contributors 'are for the most part recruited from Mount Scopus (Har Ha-tzofim)';² which is untrue, as far as the great majority of our contributors is concerned. It then goes on to state that they are indeed 'tzofim' (observers), who take no part in life here below, but are content to lift up their 'still, pure, admonitory' voices from the height of the 'moral Olympus'.

This critic errs. He seems to imagine that only the man who cries aloud suffers. But such is not the case. Those who suffer most deeply have ceased crying. As long as we cry, we do not know how to help. Those who have been in hell, and have returned to the light of day again, have learned to speak quietly and clearly. For it is only in this way that the truth can be spoken, and there is nothing that can help us except the truth. And truth is rather unpalatable at times. Sometimes it is harder to speak the truth than to lose control, lash out and call upon others to do the same. But he who knows the truth, the truth that alone can help us, is compelled to speak out, no matter whether a whole people is listening or only a few individuals.

However, this criticism goes further and undertakes to prove that what we are saying is not the truth at all. It bases itself on the supposition that we are following the road of compromise, without reservation and as a matter of principle. But neither is this true. All we maintain is that there are situations for which compromise provides the only way out, and that everything depends on being able to recognise such situations when they eventuate. We do not believe compromise to be 'the high road of development', but we are of the opinion that we must not shrink from it if, in a given situation, compromise, and compromise alone, can lead us to the high road. Compromise as such is neither good nor evil; if or when it is fitted by its nature and content to save our cause, and if there is no other way of salvation, then it is good. By its nature and its essence it must only be adopted if it is in harmony with our cause; it must not threaten our cause's foundations or falsify its maxims while appearing as its saviour. We had to ponder this; we had to confront the nature of compromise with the nature of our cause. And when the result we reached was found to be a positive one, it was our bounden duty to say so, to affirm publicly the bitter truth that in a uniquely difficult situation there can be no easy way out. We had to say that the way of claims and declarations, the way of losing control and lashing out, cannot save us, but only the hard way that leads through com-

² The Hebrew University of Jerusalem is situated on Mt. Scopus, and is therefore often shortly called 'Har Ha-tzofim'. Some of the members of IHUD are in some way or other individually connected with the University.

promise to real service of this country. For that indeed is our goal: to be able to work in peace, with all our might. That is the high road, and there is no other way.

Now the critic would try to teach us, with the help of a long list of grandiose examples, beginning with the Prophets and Socrates and ending with the Encyclopaedists and George Washington, that in all great, fundamental matters' compromise is inadmissible. In reality these examples, if they are subjected to a careful historical examination, merely go to show that what is most important is to make a practical distinction between the absolute and the relative. In all matters touching the absolute, compromise must be ruled out. But for the sake of the absolute, it is permissible and defensible to act within the sphere of the relative as the situation demands; provided always that compromise is not in conflict with the claims of the absolute. In a catastrophic situation Jeremiah, in order to save Israel and the Torah, proposed a way out which amounted not only to a compromise, but to downright submission—a solution which I myself could never have brought myself to propose. Socrates knew no compromise when he was called upon to testify to the truth; but his disciple Plato did not betray the master when, his ideal Republic having turned out to be unrealisable, he proposed an alternative scheme. The men of the French Revolution, who were spurred to action by abstract principles and a lust for power based upon them, rather than by a combination of ideas and a correct diagnosis of the situation, defeated their own ends. Our critic is ready to quote examples 'from Prometheus to Ghandi'. Well, as to the politics of Prometheus, I am not sufficiently well informed. In any case, tradition records curious compromises he made with the Gods—though, no doubt, in this he deceived his partners. The mention of Ghandi surprises me even more; for if he is to succeed, it will only be on the basis of a compromise with the Moslems.

Naturally, everything depends on making the right compromise at the right time. But that is exactly what I am talking about. There are people among us who appear to be guided in their attitude by the lunatic motto of 'the twelfth hour being past', meaning that there is nothing to lose any more. Our critic is not one of them. He will not cease fighting, against the whole world, if need be. He has elected to follow the path of 'heroism'. This heroism prompts him, not to look in front or around him, but to rush about and lash out in all directions. This heroism is not the heroism of Prometheus, but that of Don Quixote, but a tragic Don Quixote, tragic in the fullest sense of the word.

Our reply to this youth stricken with tragic blindness has been given in every issue of our journal. We shall continue to give it in every future issue. Our reply is based on a presupposition which touches on the absolute and brooks no compromise. This premise is the faith, which no catastrophe can shake, that a great future awaits

the people of Israel. For this people, the guardian of such an inheritance and the possessor of such powers, there can be no question of simply ending its life as one of the 'small nations'. Even as we see it today, reduced to a tenth, crushed and violated as it is, a creative task is waiting for it still. Today it is up to us to recognise the beginning of this task, for it is an hour that offers labours such as few other hours in history have imposed; and in conjunction with the rise of the Near East, in whose most important centre the remnant of Israel is gathering. This task cannot be solved in isolation; in isolation, surrounded by hate and distrust, it cannot even be imagined. To win a truly great life for the people of Israel, a great peace is necessary, not a fictitious peace, the dwarfish peace that is no more than a feeble intermission, but a true peace with the neighbouring peoples, which alone can render possible a common development of this plot of land as the vanguard of the progressing Near East.

During the quarter century we have so far had at our disposal we have not laid the foundations of that peace, either economically or politically. On several occasions when peace seemed to come within our reach, we did much to prevent it. Our economic life was built up as a barrier rather than as a point of contact, and our policy, instead of producing a constructive plan working towards an equilibrium, only submitted to the Powers claims for greater rights than were compatible with the realities of the situation. No doubt there were occasions when Zionist leaders, if not in practice, at least in their formulas, drew certain conclusions from their realisation of the fact that it is impossible to live in a house of cards. But their experience that declarations, and declarations alone, were sufficient to score success after success, made them lose sight of reality. At the present moment, however, precisely because foreign policy is more to the fore than at any other time, and because we shall not be able to evade the necessity for a solution much longer, we can see on the political horizon the hour when a firm hand will put us back on the terra firma of reality and confront us with the question: what proposals have you to make for the peaceful development of the Near East?

Even those who are most favourably disposed towards us will be compelled to pose this question; and they will be forced to ask it because it is we who come to them with claims. Those who even then have nothing to say beyond the mere repetition of trite claims of the past will find they do not enjoy a sympathetic audience. Everything will depend on whether another answer, a true one, will have matured in us by that time. It is this true answer for which we are striving to prepare the ground with what we are saying in this Monthly.

September, 1945.

INTO THE ABYSS

By NATHAN HOFSHI

"For thus saith the Lord God, the Holy One of Israel; in returning and rest ye shall be saved; in quietness and confidence shall be your strength; and ye would not." (Is. XXX, 15)

The disaster has happened. Explosion and destruction, blood and fire, dead, wounded and "prisoners"—to quote the expression of the "victorious" commander at Sharon and Emek Hefer—destruction and ruin of property, life and soul—such is the picture that has been haunting us ever since that ill-starred day of 1st November. Our Yishuv has gone up in flames of hate, anger, despair and battle-cries. The sermons that have been preached for years, both orally and in writing, against the "terrorist gangs", as "Etzel" and the Stern Group were called, are forgotten, and so are the "purges" carried out against these gangs by our own forces in view of the danger they constitute to Zionism, to our people and our country. Now the doctrine of the "demonstration of Jewish power" has carried the day. The sabotaging of railways, the blowing up of guardrooms and police-stations, have suddenly become Zionist acts of redemption. Jewish history is repeating itself: for it was thus, 2000 years ago, that our heroic Zealots brought destruction upon our people and country in the blind faith that they were redeeming and liberating them, and it is thus that our blind believers in violence are to-day leading us into the terrible abyss with the song of redemption and salvation on their lips.

"There is nothing to lose any more". That is what I hear from enthusiastic youngsters whose thoughts are immature and whose minds are in the grip of hollow phrases. "There is nothing to lose any more", that is what I also hear from men whose hairs are grey with age, men hypnotised by the deceptive slogan: "We shall be victorious to-morrow or be lost for ever". And thus many have at last arrived at the belief that we can obtain "by the strong hand and the outstretched arm" what we cannot accomplish by peace and understanding. But if some level-headed man takes the risk of raising his voice and uttering a warning against this disastrous path, if he calls on them to think this matter of life and death over again, he is told to keep quiet and is accused of indifference to the sufferings of his persecuted and stricken people—and there the "discussion" ends.

HOW DID all this come about? Is there, and was there, not a way out of this fateful situation?

Fortunately this is decidedly not the case. "Zion shall be redeemed with judgment, and her converts with righteousness",—that is not an abstract vision, but a practical possibility. The Zionist renaissance movement did not base its hopes on power and violence. We had far-reaching opportunities of action in peace, in returning and rest, and in concord with our neighbours.

This is the crux of the question. And now let us answer the question whether there is a way to peace in our work of upbuilding in this country or if, as is enthusiastically being proclaimed to the masses, there is no hope of an understanding with the Arabs, but only in our power and the strength of our hands? The truth will again spread and grow and shine forth in all its splendour and all its bitterness. What was once silenced with noisy contempt when the words of truth were published by the late Yitzhak Epstein (in Ha-Shiloah 1907/8), has found its terrible vindication in the subsequent course of events. It has been vindicated with regard to two vital points of the first magnitude:

a) Without an understanding with our Arab neighbours, we are building on a volcano and our whole work is in jeopardy.

b) It is definitely possible to reach an understanding. There were various serious opportunities which the Zionist leaders let slip owing to their ostrich-like policy and the blind faith they put in our "strong hand" and in that of our British allies. (The latter, unfortunately, disappointed the faith and confidence that was again and again placed in them, and this aroused violent hatred and bitter despair in the frustrated Zionists.)

The second point is decisive. And every time I speak with one of our enthusiastic and naive youngsters, he looks at me, sometimes with pain, anger and surprise in his eyes and cries out: Indeed? You really have proof of the fact that there have been possibilities of agreement which were rejected by our leaders? Should I believe you more than them? Or do you mean an agreement which involves the sacrifice of all our aspirations?

No, my dear friend, you need not take my word for it. On the contrary, go and investigate yourself, look at the various documents, study the matter in all its aspects; then you will find where the truth lies. One thing, however, I must grant you at the outset: you will never find an Arab willing to agree to the Biltmore programme, to the claim for a Jewish State in Palestine, just as you will never find a Jew willing to agree to an Arab State in Palestine. Biltmore and Zionism are not by any means identical. The Revisionists, with Jabotinsky at their head, clamoured for a Jewish state, just as they clamoured for a Jewish army and all those other manifestations of physical power which those in the Zionist movement who were then opposed to this programme, are now endeavouring to outdo in the ardour of their warlike enthusiasm. The Revisionists have since left

the Zionist movement. They, and more particularly the terrorist gangs which sprang from them, have been looked upon as destructive elements. To-day the Revisionists declare with perfect truth that those who abandoned them have enthusiastically accepted and adapted their teachings.

Well then, was there or was there not, the possibility of an agreement on the basis of large-scale Jewish immigration into Palestine? Is it true that the refusal came from our own responsible leaders?

Let those who want to know read in Medzini's "Ten years of Politics" of the Jewish-Arab conference which was to take place in Lebanon in 1913, but was prevented by our leaders on the ground that "it is not necessary, the Government is on our side." Let them read of the energetic warning given by one of the Arab leaders in reply to our refusal. Further, let them read the details of the plan which was accepted in 1919 by King Feisal, the pan-Syrian Congress and the leaders of the Palestine Istiklal party. This plan, which was excellent in all respects, especially in respect of free Jewish immigration into Palestine, was rejected by the "Commission of Delegates" of the then Zionist leadership, who were actuated by contempt for the Arab movement and by faith in our power in Europe and America. Since then, there have been further opportunities, especially in 1928 and again in 1930. And then in 1936 — in the midst of the terrible disturbances — an agreement was proposed granting 30,000 Jewish immigrants annually for the next ten years. This proposal, too, was turned down, since our national "prestige" demanded everything or nothing. And it was thus that we paved the way for the "Patria," the "Struma" and similar tragedies... Even in recent years, there were various important proposals, as recorded by B. Rabinowitz in "Zionism and the Arabs" and the pamphlet "Banativ" (On the Path), both published in Hebrew by the League for Jewish-Arab Cooperation. The last Arab offer, as recorded by "Banativ," was submitted to the Jewish Agency in the beginning of 1943 through the League for Jewish-Arab Cooperation, the main points being as follows:—

1) Palestine to be a bi-national State.

2) Jewish immigration to be kept within such limits as to enable the Jews to reach numerical parity with the Arabs in the course of some years. (This paragraph meant *the immigration of 700,000 persons* in the very near future.) No decision to be made regarding immigration after parity has been reached.

3) Bi-national Palestine to join a federation of the neighbouring countries.

Shertok rejected the Arab offer, it being "contrary to the fixed policy of the Jewish Agency"!

And thus it was that 'Biltmore' defeated logic, Jewish interest and the peace of people and country.

DESTRUCTION and explosions, dead and wounded, despair and anger against the British who made promises and who disappointed us. And that is what has been going on ever since the Balfour Declaration: childish enthusiasm and implicit faith in the British saviours — and then, when this faith was inevitably disappointed — utter despair, charges of bad faith against the saviours of yesterday. All this has repeated itself since the Labour Party came to power. Once more we rose sky-high on the wings of messianic hopes: Labour had promised us free immigration and a Jewish State.

And to-day? The Bevin Statement — an unbridled outbreak of utter disappointment, demonstrations of armed strength by means of explosions and destruction. War. And in a war between the Jewish Yishuv of 600,000 souls and the mighty British Empire, the Yishuv, needless to say, has been defeated by the British army and continues to be defeated. Those who are going to war to-day, should not complain of dead and wounded. The responsibility for manslaughter and destruction rests with those who prevent the people from grasping the true situation. But the true situation is as follows: There is an Arab people in this country and there are Arab peoples in the Middle East all round us. The British and Americans are taking account of these peoples in making their plans here, and we Jews have to take account of them, too. I am very much afraid — and I have a right to demand that my fear be heeded — that all the diplomatic declarations of our leaders to the effect that “there is no conflict between the Arabs and ourselves,” will not save this unhappy country. Again Dr. Magnes has made a “last-minute appeal” for Jewish-Arab understanding in Palestine, and again, as usual, he has met with contempt and anger.

Battle-cries in the press, at meetings and funerals of the fallen. But the question remains: why these victims, why this heroism? Why should we not pursue the path of peace? Why should we not be able to reach by peaceful means what we are trying to reach by warlike ones, if we pursue this path with the same devotion? Why should we not bring into the country tens or hundreds of thousands of immigrants with Arab consent instead of bringing a few hundreds at the price of endless suffering and bloodshed, threatening the very foundations of our national life? Must we really sacrifice all the happiness and welfare of our people, both in Palestine and in the dispersion, to this Moloch called the State?

My people, your would-be benefactors are leading you astray. Your prophet is a lying prophet. And the warning of Jeremiah is like unto a voice crying in the wilderness!

Into the abyss!

January, 1946.

IRELAND — THE FALSE ANALOGY

By RICHARD KOEBNER

THE DRAWING of analogies is an extremely common feature when attempts are made to strengthen one's case. This proneness is particularly characteristic when Palestine forms the subject of discussion. The analogy drawn in this connection is Ireland — but, it is a wrong one.

I do not know to what extent our activist extremists argue along these lines, since I am not personally acquainted with them; but what I do know is that a great number of people condone, or at least, do not condemn acts of violence, because they think that, in the long run, they will further the Zionist cause. Ireland provides these speculative patriots with an argument. In that country, a relatively small people has, by acts of violence, forced the mighty hand of Britain, so the argument runs. Jews are by no means the first or only ones to base their arguments on this analogy. To quote the nearest example — those Arabs who have supported acts of violence in their midst, are adepts of this Irish theory. The mere fact that our real opponents make use of the self-same argument ought to give pause to those of us who advocate it, but we will not go into that at the moment.

We will not press the point that no analogy is absolutely correct and that nothing ever repeats itself completely in history. After all, why should not the causal nexus, on which our theorists insist, repeat itself? Again, we shall disregard the fact that the question of terror and armed resistance is not solely one of cause and effect, but has a moral angle to it, too. Finally, we do not wish to enter into a theoretical argument as to what extent and in what circumstances a small nation like ours is in a position to impose its will upon a great power by force or by the threat of force. We shall do our utmost to be “Real-historiker,” examining the validity of the Irish “parallel,” and to meet our “Realpolitiker” on their own ground.

The Irish National Movement has, at times, employed violent methods and it did end up by realising some of its aims. This much is common knowledge. But whereas the “post hoc” is clear, the “propter hoc” stands in need of further elucidation. What have been the gains; by what means have they been achieved; and to what extent have acts of violence really benefited the Irish nation?

THE HISTORY of the Irish National Movement is complex in the extreme. We do not wish to simplify it here as crassly as our “Realpolitiker” are wont to do (those to whom we are addressing our-

selves). Yet, a certain amount of simplification is necessary to bring out the main features, which make a checking up on the analogy possible.

The Irish National Movement has its origins in the violent repression and expropriation of the Irish people, which began under the Tudors and was continued with the utmost ruthlessness during the revolutionary epochs of the 17th century; under Cromwell, after the triumph of the Puritan rebellion; and under William III, after the Glorious Revolution. The two latter waves of repression already constituted a reaction to the liberation movement. The early history of the Irish National Movement, then, was unfortunate in the extreme and cannot serve as an argument. The same applies to the period of the French Revolution: the rebellion of the United Irishmen, 1798, which followed the attempt at reconciliation between the English and Irish — between Protestants and Catholics. The result of this rebellion, resented by all Irish patriots, was the constitutional union of Ireland and Great Britain, which existed until 1921.

Our "Realpolitiker" cannot consider these early days of Anglo-Irish conflict as constituting a precedent. The object of comparison is Ireland since the union, in January, 1801; more especially, the development of Anglo-Irish relations since the rise of the Irish National Movement under Parnell, which dates from 1878 onwards.

The problem confronting the Irish National Movement was how to get the English out of Ireland. England was ruling the country in two ways:

a) Irish lands were the property of English land-lords, whether directly or indirectly. The Irish peasant had sunk to the position of a tenant with stiff rental conditions.

b) Ireland's parliamentary representatives were condemned to a permanent minority status, which made it impossible for them to forget their past national independence.

With regard to both these forms of rule, the Irish fought against a powerfully-established system of vested interests. This system belonged only to a narrow social stratum, as far as the former point was concerned; as to the latter, it was a case of conflict between the interests of the state and a national principle, comparable to the problems of the German border provinces and those within the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

The latter analogy becomes even more apparent in view of another aspect, only very gradually discovered, of the modern Irish national problem. There were two kinds of Irishmen: Catholic Celts, and the Protestant offspring of English and Scots settlers. The Anglo-Irish, for the greater part, occupied the northern province of the Island—namely—Ulster. But there was no clear and rigid geographical division any more than there was between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia. Anglo-Irish negotiations had been disastrously affected by the exist-

ing antagonism between the Celtic Irishmen and the Orangemen (as the Scots-Irish were then called). Since the time of the union this antagonism had not made itself felt much until the end of the 19th century. In varying degrees, Catholic and Protestant peasants had the same interests. Only when Gladstone's Home Rule Bill of 1886 brought the immediate possibility of the rule of the Catholic-Celtic majority over the Ulster minority within reach—rule by Dublin over Belfast—only then did this antagonism flare up.

Home Rule was not granted, however. Gladstone had been defeated twice, in 1886 and in 1893. By degrees, however, the land law in Ireland was amended to the advantage of the Irish peasantry. The last and decisive step was taken by Lord Balfour's Conservative Government, through the Land Purchase Law of 1903, which enabled the peasants to buy their land cheaply from the landowners by means of Government subventions.

This reform was welcomed by the Irish, and its financial stipulations were loyally carried out until 1932. But there was a catch in it: It did away with the main interest shared both by Irish Nationalists and Ulstermen. When the Liberal Party, which was again in power since 1905, wanted to fulfil its promise of Home Rule and tabled the third Home Rule Bill of 1912, Ulster prepared for armed resistance, thus affording the 20th century the first example of an organised private army ready to oppose law and order. The Ulstermen were encouraged by the Conservatives and the House of Lords. Proposals to solve the problem by partition of the country were rejected by both sides. The Home Rule Bill was passed by Parliament, but it had not yet become law when England entered the war against Germany in August 1914. In view of the need for unity in face of the enemy, the Southern Irish under the leadership of John Redmond agreed to a postponement of the solution.

Meanwhile, however, the Ulster movement and the Government's attitude towards it had given rise to new developments in the Irish camp. The Irish Parliamentary party had lost ground, and the radical national party, the Sinn Fein—till then insignificant—had gained followers. They, too, had organised and armed. The decisive point in this development was that the Government apparently did not feel strong enough to suppress the Ulster movement and mobilize all efforts to put Home Rule into effect.

During the war, the radical national Celtic movement which demanded more than Home Rule gained momentum. While reform on the Gladstonian basis still envisaged a union with Britain in matters of foreign policy and trade, Sinn Fein aimed at nothing less than complete independence and the institution of a republic. The new national trend was towards complete severance of cultural relations, too, by means of a return to the old Gaelic tongue.

When the Home Rule Bill finally became law in 1920, the Southern Irish turned it down. A revolutionary Government was set up which

broke off relations with the existing bodies representing the Government. Now Ulster was prepared to accept partition, which was effected. Since then, Northern Ireland forms an annexe to the United Kingdom, with a parliament of its own, with conditions such as the Liberals had desired for the whole of Ireland. Meanwhile, however, Civil War was raging in the South, as well as war with the English police. The English police force—called the “Black and Tans”—met the terrorism of the Irish rebels with counter-terrorism no less cruel; but they were not strong enough to put an end to their opponents. This could only have been done by employing a regular army.

Under these circumstances, Lloyd George and his Coalition Cabinet decided to try a compromise, which had been advocated before the war by the Premier's ex-liberal colleague, now his opponent, Lord Asquith. Lloyd George had declined to make this attempt so far. The constitutional basis of this compromise was the concept, as yet new, of “Dominion Status”. The large overseas settlers' colonies of the British Empire, the “Dominions”, had gradually arrived at the status of independent states within the framework of the Empire during the last 70 years. The latest and most far-reaching concession that had been made to them was the recognition of their right to independent decisions in matters of foreign policy,—ratified at the Imperial Conference of 1917. Consequently, the Dominions sent their own representatives to the Peace Conference. The new solution of the Irish question was to amount to this that the new Free State, erected by revolutionary methods, was to receive the same status which the Dominions had attained gradually and by separate laws and agreements. This offer went much further than mere Home Rule; it did away with all that remained of Dublin's dependence on Westminster. But at the same time it left unsatisfied the most extreme aspirations of the Sinn Feiners. The Republic, with de Valera at its head, was not recognised and the King's suzerainty was once more acknowledged; furthermore, Northern Ireland was not incorporated in the new Free State, but was to retain its constitution of 1920.

Consequently, a strong faction within the Sinn Fein, led by de Valera, violently protested against the Treaty. On the other hand, Arthur Griffith, the founder of the Movement, as well as his collaborator Michael Collins, agreed to the compromise, and succeeded in winning over the majority to their side. So the treaty was put into effect. The resistance of the radical Republicans, however, did not subside, but now began to assume the proportions of ruthless terror against the representatives of the majority; Griffith and Collins themselves fell victims to this conflict, along with many others. But the treaty party emerged victorious, and until 1932, Anglo-Irish relations remained peaceful on the basis of the agreements reached by them.

In that year, however, de Valera came into power again and embarked on a policy of severance from England, in particular, and the

Empire, in general. This policy, however, was no longer pursued by means of physical violence. For a number of years, there was a tariff-war between Eire and Great Britain. By means of one-sided legislation, de Valera changed certain clauses of the treaty, for instance the one regarding the oath of loyalty to the King. During the appeasement period, the government of Neville Chamberlain renounced its right of garrisoning the Irish treaty ports. Finally, de Valera declared Eire neutral in the war against Hitler.

WE HAVE outlined some stages of the modern phase of the history of the Anglo-Irish conflict. The question now arises whether we, the Yishuv of Palestine and the Zionist Movement, have something to learn from it and if so, what. First, we must make up our minds which of the national parties of Ireland we are going to liken to ourselves, the “Irish” Irishmen, the Celts of the South, or the Ulstermen, the Anglo-Irish who predominate in the Northern counties. Our nationalist interpreters of history are only thinking of the former, who now have their independent state. Bernard Shaw, however, once complained that the Balfour Declaration created a new Ulster. The truth of the matter is that both these comparisons are accurate in some minor points only. With the Ulster Irish we have this much in common that we constitute an enclave in a world of different nationality, and that we are interested in British protection of our national existence. But the conditions which ensure such protection in the case of the Ulster Irish, are lacking in ours. We are not a kindred people to the English, and our country is separated from theirs, not by mere narrow straits, but by the whole Mediterranean and Continental Europe.

With the Celtic Irish we have this in common that like them we are striving to achieve an independent national life, but unlike them we do not enjoy a majority status in any geographically definable territory. True, official Zionist policy aims at such status and demands English and American assistance in order to attain it. Now the adepts of the Ireland theory consider that this assistance can be secured by force, arguing that England has been yielding to violence in the case of Eire. But, as a matter of fact, Irish violence, if it attained anything at all, arrived exactly at the opposite of what we want to get the English to do in Palestine: the English left Ireland and abandoned the Irish to themselves. Paradox is too polite a word for this particular brand of drawing analogies.

We shall now proceed to the question what methods were employed and what measure of success attended them. To begin with, let us put an end to an idea the absurdity of which should be obvious to all, but which is still playing a regrettably large part in the imagination of many Palestinian Jews, viz. that the English suffered military defeat at the hands of the Irish and were driven to capitulation by sheer physical force. The truth of the matter is that the first epoch

of the conflict, the epoch of Parnell, ended with the renunciation of methods of physical violence on the part of the Irish National movement. Instead it was now waiting for the political moment when Gladstone's slogan of Home Rule for Ireland would have a chance of realisation with his party's return to power. No doubt, during the later epochs of the conflict, since 1912, the Irish were cruelly disappointed in this hope, and physical violence, first by the Ulster Irish, then by Sinn Fein, dominated the political scene. But there was no final trial of strength. Asquith postponed it from 1912 to 1914, until the outbreak of war spared him the trouble. In 1921, Lloyd George broke off the war and tried the method of negotiation, before really decisive forces were thrown into the struggle by the English. In the words of Michael Collins: "We had not beaten the enemy out of our country by force of arms".

Irish methods of violence assumed a great variety of different forms. For the first epoch, the time of Parnell, the following methods were characteristic: acts of sabotage on country-seats, attempts on the lives of estate owners, refusal to pay rent, boycott of land-lords who had driven out their tenants. Only the last-named had Parnell's unqualified approval. The political struggle was not yet militarily organized. The acts of violence were for the most part perpetrated by oppressed peasants, inspired by hate and vindictiveness, with the support of individual fanatics. After the interval from 1887-1912, the new phenomenon of irregular armies sprang up, accompanied by acts of terrorism from ambushes.

There can be no doubt whatever that these various types of violence had a moral effect on the English. But this effect assumed two contradictory forms: on the one hand, a desire to appease the embittered Irish and to find a way out of a disastrous situation by means of compromise: on the other, a stiffening of resistance in the English camp, a determination not to yield to violence. During all phases of the struggle, both tendencies existed side by side. The former tendency found expression in the gradual concessions of Gladstone and finally in his conversion to the principle of Home Rule. But his efforts were paralysed by the fact that the terror had assumed proportions which made the majority of his fellow-countrymen unamenable to the idea of concessions. The murder of the Chief Secretary and his Under-Secretary in 1882 in Dublin (the so-called Phoenix Park murders) had a particularly disastrous effect; Parnell was no less appalled by this senseless act of cruelty than the English; his reaction was identical with that of Dr. Weizmann after the assassination of Lord Moyne in November 1944. He felt this incident to be a stab in the back. Events vindicated his attitude when in 1886, Gladstone's Home Rule Bill met with embittered resistance in England. After the rejection of the Home Rule Bill the acts of sabotage continued, but they did not intimidate the English any more. They ceased entirely when Balfour (then Chief Secretary for Ireland) in-

tervened with a strong hand. The Irish found themselves reduced to parliamentary forms of resistance.

In the fight for the third Home Rule Bill, Asquith, like the Irish leader Redmond, at first under-estimated the danger of an armed Ulster. Later the pro-Ulster attitude, adopted by the Conservative party leaders and by numerous army officers, forced upon him a realisation of the true situation. The danger confronting him was simply that of civil war, not only in Ireland, but in England too. Hence his hesitation and evasions, which could not inspire confidence in his determination to carry the Bill through. Now we cannot by any stretch of the imagination conceive of a situation in which the Palestine question could in any way lead to civil war in England; here, too, the analogy fails.

Finally, there remains Lloyd George's change of heart in 1921: instead of real war a compromise on the basis of Dominion Status. If there is anything in this that calls for explanation, it is the fact that Lloyd George turned to this solution only after the counter-terrorism of the Black and Tans had greatly increased the bitterness of the victims. The solution itself corresponded to the world situation. The war against Germany, the Austro-Hungarian anarchy and Turkey had been brought to a successful conclusion under the slogan of "the self-determination of peoples". It was impossible to threaten an autonomous organisation of the Irish with a war of annihilation after similar autonomy had been recognised in the case of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. It was equally impossible to refuse the application of the concept of Dominion Status in the case of Ireland, after having not only accepted it for the overseas settlers' colonies, but also having admitted it into the official future programme for India. So there were the strongest moral reasons for avoiding war and striving for a compromise, provided Ireland was ready to accept it.

In our present situation, we too may look forward to all sorts of compromise proposals, not only from England, but from the U.S.A. as well. But the example of Ireland cannot lead us to expect that the Western Powers will seek compromise in a direction which involves the renunciation of force where we are concerned and at the same time the use of force against the Arab countries. Moreover, Winston Churchill put the point well when he said that in 1920-21 the British Government found themselves in a situation which admitted of only two possibilities: "War with the utmost violence or peace with the utmost patience". The British Government in the end took the risk of choosing the latter alternative. But we can hardly apply this choice of alternatives to our own case. We certainly do not wish to experience "war with the utmost violence" at the hands of the British; but will "utmost patience" serve our purpose and further our aims?

To sum up: the example of Ireland cannot give rise to speculative hopes. But it can, and does, give rise to apprehensions. The constant

conflicts between Unionists and Home Rulers, between Irishmen and Ulstermen, have again and again resulted in the postponement of a solution, and this postponement, so far from improving the situation, has aggravated it. The same applies to the repeated rejections of compromise solutions on the part of the various parties.

WE MAY ASK, however, whether de Valera was not right after all in refusing to resign himself to the compromise of the 1921 treaty and in embarking upon a more radical course in restoring the independence of the Irish Free State? The question would appear to be beyond the scope of our present enquiry, seeing that de Valera's policy since 1932 has never resorted either to armed violence or to terrorism. In fact, the Irish President was himself threatened by a yet more radical group. However, the causes and consequences of de Valera's policy in the thirties may give us occasion to touch on the last aspect of the Irish question which is of direct interest to us, viz., the results of a radical national movement for the people whose future it claims to work for. The motives which brought de Valera to power in 1932 were largely economic in nature. The Irish people was feeling the effects of the world-crisis; but just as Hitler taught the Germans to seek the root causes of their troubles in political conditions, so did de Valera the Irish. The Anglo-Irish treaty of 1921 plays a similar part in his propaganda to that of the treaty of Versailles in Hitler's. He then attempted to establish a system of economic autarchy calculated to make Ireland independent of the English market, "reversing that policy which made us simply the kitchen garden for supplying the British with cheap food". This policy turned out to be a failure; geographical circumstances proved stronger than economic nationalism in Eire.

What else was achieved? The symbols of Royal power were removed; but this measure was itself of no more than symbolic value. Of deeper significance was the fact that Ireland was being wrenched out of the British defence system: first by the withdrawal of the British garrison from the Irish treaty ports, and then by de Valera's declaration of neutrality after Great Britain had declared war on Germany. In both cases it may be doubted whether a different attitude would have been possible: the vast majority of the population approved of the policy of its leader. But in each case this policy has served to promote a line of development which was diametrically opposed to the natural tendencies of Irish national consciousness: viz. the alienation of wide and important sections of men of Irish descent from the national cause of the Irish state. The gulf between Ulster and Eire has been widened. There has been a perceptible cooling off in the attitude of Americans of Irish extraction towards their ancient homeland. Nor is that all. Emigration from Eire to the United Kingdom has once more increased. For a hundred years, the population of Eire has suffered continual losses through emigration.

At first it was possible to explain the downward trend which began with the great famine of 1846 as the result of the bad living conditions of the Irish country people. But emigration and decline of population did not come to a standstill when the agricultural reforms of Gladstone and Balfour removed this cause. Not only America and other overseas countries, but also the country of the "oppressors", England, continued to attract Irish immigrants. It was only when the economic world crisis of 1929 began to counteract this attraction, that Irish emigration was temporarily reduced to a fairly low figure. After the outbreak of war, however, there has been a fresh increase. Large numbers of Irishmen left the country which enjoyed the safety of neutrality and linked their fate with that of Great Britain. They entered the British Army where, like many descendants of Irish immigrants before them, they greatly distinguished themselves; or they accepted work in the British armament industries.

Does not this fact convey a warning to us? The national agitator, acclaimed by the masses and able to inspire many individuals to sacrifices of various kinds, may easily jump to the conclusion that the strongest and most progressive attractiveness of his people is embodied in his person and his slogans. But this confidence is not solidly based. Telegrams of admirers can be counted; disaffected fellow-countrymen cannot; but they are none the less real as potential forces and potential losses for being beyond the reach of statistical enquiry. The main point, however, is this: national agitation is neither directly nor indirectly the most important means of creating sound economic and cultural conditions for the people it wants to build up. For this task of upbuilding, work of quite a different kind is required.

December, 1945.

POSTSCRIPT 1 — July, 1946.

Recent voices from England are calculated to convey the impression that I have been mistaken. On the occasion of the events at the end of June 1946,¹ various Englishmen both of the Right and the Left got up to draw the attention of their Government to the warning example of Ireland. But what is the real truth of the matter? The warning was given to Great Britain, and it must not be construed as meaning that the warners wanted to encourage our armed 'fighters for freedom'. They got up and warned the British Government against pursuing a policy which must inevitably lead to bloodshed and unspeakable bitterness. But it does not follow from this that bloodshed and acts of despair will be crowned with our victory. Neither did the warners mean to say that the British Government must accept

¹ The sudden searches of the premises of the Jewish Agency and other public institutions and of numerous agricultural settlements, the arrest of several leading Jewish Agency members as well as of several thousand citizens in the communal settlements and in the towns.

the radical claims officially put forward by us in order to prevent a repetition of the bloodshed in Ireland and of the Irish wrath incurred. In part, the warners pleaded for a political solution in accordance with the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry: neither a Jewish nor an Arab State, i.e. nothing that might be said to correspond to the Irish example. Other warners pleaded for partition and it was precisely in this sense that they quoted the Irish example. Partition on the Irish model would mean a kind of Jewish Ulster. I trust I have succeeded in showing in the course of my essay that this is the very example that does not bear transplantation. Tel-Aviv never can hope to take the place of Belfast.

POSTSCRIPT 2 — December, 1946.

The liquidation of the Mandate, still a remote issue when this article was written a year ago—though already envisaged by the Peel Report in 1937 and more seriously by the White Paper of 1939—has meanwhile, in consequence of the incessant outrages of Jewish terrorists, gained ground in English public opinion, and doubtlessly is eagerly wished for by a large proportion of the English people. Leaders of Zionist public opinion have been quick to adapt themselves to the new situation, and just as they have changed front in the question of partition, so they have professed acquiescence in the British leaving Palestine at an early date. It seems by no means impossible that impending negotiations are to lead to a solution which comes near this demand. If so, the way is prepared for the advocates of terrorism to boast of having helped the Zionist cause, and that the Irish analogy has proved right in spite of all dissimilarities. But that will be a fallacy again. When Irish nationalism went to extremes in the policy of separation, it could, consciously or unconsciously, rely on the English retaining an interest in the island in general and Ulster in particular. If the English quit Palestine—or, for that matter, Jewish Palestine—no residue of interest is to be expected. Palestinian Jews will be thought a people better to be forgotten than to be remembered. Is that outcome to be wished for?

When the Irish Home Rule movement was still in its infancy, *Punch* voiced a warning which may not have attracted much attention in its days, but is certainly worth being unearthed to-day and adapted to our situation. The warning runs (vol. 74, p. 46):

'To teach Home-Rulers that England's difficulty is not Ireland's opportunity, however Ireland's importunity may be England's difficulty'.

Say 'Eretz-Yisrael 1946' instead of 'Ireland 1877', and you have the real analogy.

LETTER OF RESIGNATION TO DR. WEIZMANN

By DAVID WERNER SENATOR

In December, 1945, Dr. Senator resigned from the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine. His reasons are set out in this letter. It was first published, in Hebrew, in the September 1946 number of BA'AYOTH. It was first printed in English in the October 1946 issue of Commentary (New York) because "it would be useful if a larger Jewish public in America knew more about the situation in December 1945." A few paragraphs have been deleted in order to avoid any personal controversy.

Dear Dr. Weizmann,

As indicated in my cable to you, I shall try in this letter to explain the reasons which prompted me to resign from the Executive of the Jewish Agency to which I have belonged for almost 16 years, namely since March 1930.

I have taken this decision not lightly, but after full consideration of the facts and recent developments in the Zionist movement.

Of course, I cannot put down black on white in detail all the reasons which have led to my decision. This is a great handicap: I shall personally suffer therefrom because I am still less able to explain these reasons in public. But I shall attempt in this letter to you to give an outline of the situation which caused my resignation.

During the almost 16 years I have been a member of the Executive, I have formally been a representative of the non-Zionists. But you, my colleagues and the people who nominated me as their representative know that I was a Zionist before the Balfour Declaration and that I had come to Palestine long before Hitler. Whatever work I did in the framework of the activities of the Jewish Agency, I have done as a Zionist, a member of the Yishuv and a Jew. I think I have always been loyal to the cause and to my colleagues, although and even when I was in disagreement with them, and also to those non-Zionist groups who have chosen me as their representative.

When, a few years ago, the Zionist movement actually changed the political programme of Zionism, substituting the Basle Programme [which called for a "publicly and legally assured home in Palestine"], by the Biltmore Programme [which called for a "Jewish Commonwealth"], I thought that a great political mistake had been made.

But I did not resign then, because I did not see sufficient reason to do so, since nothing else but a political programme, a political ideology to be realized in some more or less distant future, was involved.

The position became more difficult when the Executive seemed to embark upon a course of non-cooperation with the Government in connection with its post-war reconstruction programme. There again I thought that attitude a political mistake. I wrote you at the time offering my resignation, because in this case direct political action was contemplated. Later on, however, it transpired that the whole question did not become as acute as it appeared at the time, and I did not want to create unnecessary difficulties by resigning.

Now, however, the position is completely different.

You have been in this country a year ago and for the first time since six years you had an opportunity of seeing for yourself what is going on in the field of Jewish political education, how our party system works and what are the real determining factors in Jewish politics. This situation which you noticed with great anxiety and which you tried to improve, has deteriorated even further. The tragic fate of our people, the utter despair of each of us in Palestine who has relatives or friends in the D. P. camps in Europe and cannot bring them over here, the knowledge of people rotting in these camps and on the other hand the indifferent attitude of the world powers towards this problem, their—and particularly the British—lack of action, and lately the Bevin statement, must be regarded as strong contributing factors to the general feeling here of which the pronouncements and decisions of the Executive and acts of the Jewish youth are but an expression.

The leadership of our movement, the majority of my colleagues in the Executive here, and of course men like Dr. Silver, have either been led by the "Stimmung" of the masses instead of influencing them, or are responsible for creating or inciting the destructive political attitude of the masses instead of directing them in a statesman-like way.

I respect my colleagues in the Jewish Agency Executive, including those to whose political opinions I take the greatest exception. They know what they want. I disagree with them fundamentally, I believe that they are leading our people and our cause into a chaos, but they surely are entitled to their views as much as I am entitled to mine, and only future history will show who was right.

I regret perhaps even more the attitude of some of my best personal friends who, in order to save party unity or the so-called unity of the Movement, seem ready to sacrifice their personal beliefs, although they probably see the dangers involved as much as I do.

Recent developments have brought a further deterioration, but at the same time a clarification of the situation.

At the World Zionist Conference in London, Dr. Joseph and Dr. Sneh became members of the Executive in key-positions. Moreover, the strength of Dr. Silver, both as a member of the Executive, and as the President of the ZOA, has been added to this wing.

In Palestine, the powerful personality of Ben Gurion dominates the

scene, leading the Movement and the Yishuv by his driving power, persuasion, influence and authority.

I have elaborated a little on the psychological situation. I come now to the Bevin statement.

The Bevin statement has been carefully analyzed by Ben Gurion both at the meetings of the Executive and in his speech before the Assefat Hanivcharim. It is perhaps useful to review our political situation internally and externally in relation to this speech. Before the Bevin statement we were told that the Coalition and Conservative governments, those governments in which we had a friend like Churchill, had betrayed us. When the Labour government came to power, that government in which we believed to have a large number of good and old friends, most of us felt relief. But soon rumours started about the future policy of H.M. Government, unrest in Palestine followed, and then came the Bevin statement.

It seems to me that there should be some political logic in the attitude of political leadership. It must be prepared, in decisive hours, to draw the consequence of political success or failure.

Now, either the Labour government, which comprises close political friends of members of our Executive, has betrayed them and ourselves and consequently the Biltmore policy pursued by our radical group has collapsed—and that is the impression which is obtaining—then our Executive, or at least, those members who were the radical exponents of this policy, should have resigned. That would have meant to the Jews and to the world at large, including the British government, a significant political change, and indeed, I have made this proposal, which was however rejected. It is no answer to say that it would have been impossible to form another Executive. In almost every party, perhaps with the exception of the General Zionists 'B', one would have been able to find representatives of a different political attitude, and one could have enlarged the Executive by adding representatives of the Hashomer Hatzair and the Aliyah Hadasha. Such a re-grouped Executive could once more have been headed by you.

But a different analysis of the Bevin statement is at least possible. The Bevin statement, admittedly unfortunately worded in many respects and very disappointing with regard to the immediate future, particularly concerning immigration, could still be regarded as an attempt at abolishing the White Paper policy by bringing in the Americans, and we, I think, are interested in putting forward such interpretation.

But what actually happened was a very strong condemnation of the Bevin statement, not only by the Chairman of the Jewish Agency Executive in Jerusalem at a public meeting of the Assefat Hanivcharim, but even before that by means of rioting in Tel-Aviv, for which of course, as always in such cases, everybody declines responsibility. Moreover, even in anticipation of the Bevin statement,

when rumours were spread about the future policy of H.M. Government, acts of sabotage on a very large scale were committed in the whole of Palestine.

You in London and I, who happened to be away from Palestine, in Johannesburg, have publicly condemned these acts, but in Palestine I am informed they were condoned by the Jewish public, and not by the Jewish public alone. This is a point to which I shall have to refer again.

All of us are united in the question of immigration. A man like Magnes, whose political views certainly differ in the extreme from those of Ben Gurion, has said privately and in public that he is in favour of "illegal immigration". So did I. So did others. I am going a good deal further. If our people are prevented by force from landing in this country, I think we have no other choice than to resort to force. But in these matters extreme caution is required: the attacks on the Police Stations were in my opinion a mistake, although it is of course possible to construe a direct connection between these acts and the fight for immigration. One may argue that this is a borderline case. What one cannot argue is that if Government forces are attacked—and that was the case both in Tel-Aviv and at the Police Stations—and if subsequent loss of Jewish life ensues, that this is murder. It is contrary to all experience to believe that if thousands of people assemble on the one side—even unarmed—and thousands of soldiers on the other side, bloodshed can be avoided, particularly in an atmosphere as tense as it has become in Palestine not only since yesterday.

A political leadership must be aware of this situation and of the consequences of its actions.

Coming back to the Bevin statement, I believe that the policy announced by Mr. Bevin in fact means the imminent abolition of the White Paper and an attempt to solve the Jewish and Palestinian problem by introducing the American factor. Of course it does not mean the fulfilment of the Biltmore Programme. But even the resolutions adopted now in the American Senate and the American House of Representatives, while outspoken and favourable with regard to immigration (reverting as they do to the Churchill White Paper formula of 1922 of economic absorptive capacity) do not promise a Jewish State.

At this stage, I would like to say a few words with regard to the political contents of the Biltmore Programme, as I see it. If it is not assumed that the Great Powers are prepared to transfer the Arabs of Palestine from this country to other Arab countries, the Biltmore Programme can only mean partition. But here again, a workable partition seems to be possible only if at least a partial transfer is effected. I don't say that it is impossible, or immoral, but I doubt whether any partition could be arrived at which would be feasible from the economic, political and military points of view.

The Biltmore Programme and its possible consequences have a direct bearing on the present psychological situation in the Yishuv, and not only in the Yishuv but also in the leadership of American Zionism. A psychology has developed both in the Yishuv and the Zionist leadership here, and the Zionist leadership in America, and likely enough also in most other countries, which regards compromise as treason and political thinking as weakness.

Regrettably, the Arab front is expanding and Arab reaction and resistance are stiffening to a point when they may soon go over to attack. We have indeed succeeded for a considerable time in belittling Arab nationalism, and in the last year the Arab League, in the eyes of the Jewish and particularly Zionist public. But in the meantime Arab nationalism and the Arab League have gained considerably in strength on the world political scene.

At the same time we are being told that we have to fight the English, of course not the English people, only the English government. It is the third English government we are fighting: we have tried them all, a Coalition government, the Conservative government and now the Labour government, but still we maintain the fiction that our fight does not concern the English people.

And now, the newly elected leader of American Zionism in his first political utterances, privately and publicly, attests to the stupidity of the American President who is being duped by the shrewd Englishmen and led into the trap of the Anglo-American Committee. Let us fight with all means at our disposal this first attempt of America to become a partner in the Palestine problem, for instance by boycotting the commission! Thus Dr. Silver.

That, Dr. Weizmann, is the political background against which votes are being taken in the Executive and decisions of major importance made. It is a political and psychological background for a spirit of despair and violence which I cannot associate myself with.

I refuse to find myself again in a situation in which I was when returning to Palestine from South Africa. There, as a member of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, I have on the 2nd of November condemned emphatically the acts of violence which had been perpetrated in Palestine. Here, as such member, I have apparently to condone them and to bear a moral and in my opinion also political responsibility therefor. It may happen again that I shall read in the newspapers about acts for which morally and politically the Executive and every individual member thereof will be held responsible. I refuse to be a party to that game. That in fact is the main reason for my decision.

Obviously, I could not discuss these matters here, except with my colleagues, but to them I had given notice during the meeting and I have also informed the Actions Committee of my attitude before they decided on the unlimited powers to be given to the Executive to act in accordance with its political wisdom. After all that has

happened and in view of the personal composition of the Executive, I have no confidence in its wisdom and I am not prepared to share responsibility for what I believe an utterly dangerous and destructive course.

With kindest personal regards,

Yours very sincerely,

David Werner Senator

Jerusalem, December 24, 1945.

CITRUS GROWERS HAVE LEARNT TO COOPERATE

By MOSHE SMELANSKY

I

Citrus culture in our country is a common Jewish-Arab enterprise. The Arabs introduced it, the Jews improved and perfected it. Jews and Arabs united when, at one stage of its development, destruction threatened it, and *together* they succeeded in averting the danger.

When the first Jewish pioneers came to the country to settle, a few citrus groves already existed at Jaffa and at Acre. They yielded a variety of citrus fruits: lemons, mandarins and oranges. Of these the chief place was taken by the so-called 'Shamuti' orange, which later became known all over the world by the name of 'Jaffa Orange'. It was juicy, had a pleasant smell and tasted delicate. Being round in shape, its peel was thin and of fine texture. At that time the quantity of citrus produce was still very limited, and the fruits exported went in baskets on deck, the trade of citrus packing being still unknown in Palestine.

In those days there was no irrigation system except for the primitive practice of well-digging. Wells were sunk into the sandy ground and their insides supported by stone walls which reached down to just above the water level. The second stage of building a well consisted of making a *henzira*, a well within a well, which was tightened and fastened by iron rods and then lowered into the initially sunk well by means of chains. The water was drawn by 'antilli', little wooden boxes connected with one another on a wheel which was rotated by a camel, mule or donkey. The quantity of water varied from five to ten cubic metres per hour.

The water came from the upper level of soil, which consisted mostly of fine sand. Consequently the water would contain a fair amount of sand, too. The sand deposited from the upper layer of earth would undermine the foundation of the well, which would sink lower and lower and finally break down. The 'henzira', though intended to be a safety device to forestall and prevent a breakdown, was not always effective.

Tree culture was also still very primitive. The young, newly grafted tree-plants, for instance, would be surrounded by a heap of sand before the onset of winter, which was intended to protect them from the violent gusts of this season. This practice, however, though serving its purpose, would lead to the decay of the roots and the lower parts of the stems, a tree-disease which was known as 'Komuz'.

The soil between the trees was well tilled and properly cared for. The hoeing was thoroughly and even affectionately carried out, for

the Arab is a great lover of the soil. The summer ploughing of his lands is an agricultural work of art for the Fellaah. The Arab also loves the tree, and I myself have seen many an Arab citrus grower kiss the most beautiful tree of his grove as a token of his affection.

The Arabs learnt the art of packing their produce from Greek packers who had been brought to Palestine for this purpose. But this, too, was quite primitive in those days, and fruits of different species would be packed into one and the same box.

The Jews improved the system of irrigation. A Jewish engineer invented a filtering device which filtered the water before it was drawn from the well so that the danger of breakdowns was neutralized. Instead of 'antilli' the Jews put a pump into the well. At first all the pumps were brought from abroad, then later they were manufactured locally as well. The Jews now replaced the camel, mule or donkey by the motor which was to drive the pump. This made it unnecessary to pump the water from the upper layer only. The new pumps were strong enough to draw water from the second, or even the third, the lower layers being richer sources of water than the upper ones. In order to penetrate to these layers, special pumping pipes had to be drilled into the bottom of the well. Finally the primitive practice of sinking wells was entirely abandoned. From now on wells were drilled into the ground by modern machines, which were of course worked on the surface, so that there was no need to dig a hole into the soil. Pipes were now sunk into the earth, penetrating to great depths, sometimes hundreds of metres. The new wells achieved a record of water-pumping, supplying quantities as large as 500 cubic metres per hour. This meant that their working capacity was fiftyfold and hundredfold that of the primitive wells.

The Jews also perfected the packing of the fruits. They introduced the so-called 'American' packing system which replaced the former method of packing the fruit in baskets. From now on the fruits were packed in wooden boxes, each containing fruits of one species and size. This innovation found a favourable reception on the markets. The Jews furthermore contributed to the development and improvement of tree culture. The sand heaps formerly employed were abandoned, and instead the tender plants were protected by supporters, at first of wood and later of iron. Thus the roots were saved from decay. They could now be exposed to the fresh air and sunshine, and the hitherto prevailing diseases ceased their destructive activities. The Jews also perfected the means of warfare against the numerous insects that harm the trees and plants and spread diseases. Jews and Arabs alike began to attend lectures given by experts on agricultural subjects at the experimental stations of Rehovoth and Mikveh Israel.

The Jews learned the practice of hoeing and weeding from the Arabs. They also learnt from them how to manure the soil with cow dung. On the other hand, the Arabs learnt the application of artificial fertilisers from the Jews. The common Jewish-Arab work resulted

in a tremendous rate of progress in the sphere of citrus cultivation. Fifty years ago there were only 5,000 dunams of citrus groves in Palestine. Twenty-six years ago the number had increased to 30,000. In 1938 there were a little less than 300,000 dunams of cultivated citrus groves in this country, and in that year over 15,000,000 boxes of citrus fruit were marketed abroad.

The bulk of Palestine's exports up to the outbreak of war consisted of citrus produce, which constituted about 80% of all exports. The number of employees in the citrus industry had assumed immense proportions, for out of every five inhabitants, one was making a living in this way. About the same number of citrus groves was owned by Arabs as by Jews.

The Jews also perfected the citrus trade. This had been handled hitherto by local merchants, mostly speculators, and by brokers abroad. The Jews, for the greater part, founded cooperative societies and sent their produce to overseas markets at their own expense. They opened up new markets for the citrus produce of this country, adding Germany, Poland and the countries of Central Europe to the list of purchasers. The Jews also introduced an entirely new species of citrus produce, the grapefruit, which was a success and soon became famous all over the world.

But unfortunately Jews and Arabs did not cooperate over the commercial aspect of the citrus problem, nor did they market their produce on a common basis. The Arabs neither founded cooperatives of their own nor would they join those already established by the Jews. In regard to the agricultural side of citrus growing, Jews and Arabs were friendly and considered each other as colleagues, and their union proved to be a blessing to both. Commercially, however, Jews and Arabs went their separate ways. The cause of trouble between them was the heavy competition which ensued, bringing harm and losses to both sides. The Jews and Arabs could not find a common approach to the export of their fruits, and the Administration did nothing to mend the cleavage. Nor did it take action to protect our Palestinian produce against foreign competition. Following the famous Ottawa Empire Economic Conference (1932), at which our country was denied preference on British markets, heavy duty was imposed on citrus produce from Palestine marketed to England; and in the course of the following years, from 1933 to 1940, Palestine's citrus growers paid not less than LP. 2,854,000 in duty alone to England. A still greater loss was sustained by the growers on account of the political status of Palestine, which made it an 'open door' to any country wishing to place its goods on our markets. Palestine's export, on the other hand, was greatly curtailed and encountered manifold difficulties: import restrictions, heavy taxation and the strictest foreign exchange regulations made it impossible for the growers to receive ready money for their sold goods. We were thus left with the alternative of purchasing or bartering foreign goods,

which were often superfluous and of a kind that was also manufactured locally.

The actual citrus crisis set in on the eve of the outbreak of war. The wild competition between exporters resulted in a lowering of the standard which Palestine's citrus industry had hitherto maintained, the quality of the fruit deteriorated and the following drop in prices was only a natural consequence. The restrictions on foreign markets and the heavy duty imposed on our exports made the crisis complete.

II

The war dealt the final blow to the citrus growers of Palestine, who found themselves in a state more desperate than ever before. The war blocked the overseas markets and 15,000,000 boxes of juicy, beneficent citrus fruits, which had been tended and gathered in by honest toil, decayed and lay like manure on the fields. Only then did all, Jews, Arabs and even the local Government, realise that *union* was the only way out of this crisis and that union at times of emergency, but also when all was normal, was the only road leading to success. For it was then that Jews, Arabs and the Government united.

The results of this unification were as follows: A Citrus Control Board was established with the aid, approval and participation of the Government. The Board consisted of eleven members, four Jews, four Arabs and three Britons. Furthermore, a Citrus Marketing Board was formed. It comprised six members, two Jews, two Arabs and two Britons. In addition there were also two General Secretaries, one Jewish, from among the best established veteran citrus growers in the Yishuv, and one Arab, also a veteran citrus grower. The two boards have been active for six years in rendering assistance to citrus growers in every way and in facilitating the export of their produce. Though theirs was by no means an easy task, and in spite of the regrettable fact that they did not always enjoy the full support of the Government and of the Palestine public, it must yet be recorded with satisfaction that the common effort of Jews and Arabs was, in the long run, an undeniable success. Throughout the period of office of the two boards there was almost always perfect understanding and accord between the members of these bodies in regard to the various issues of citrus cultivation. There were also, of course, differences of opinion, but these were not caused by opposed nationalisms, but by the existence of different economic viewpoints which would gather Jews and Arabs in opposition to Jews and Arabs. When it came to voting, the constructive attitude of both parties to the citrus trade and the concern of both Jews and Arabs for its future were the only deciding influences.

What were the activities of these common Jewish-Arab committees during their years of existence?

At the outbreak of the war two blows were simultaneously struck at the citrus trade of Palestine. One came from without, where

the sea route had ceased to serve trade purposes and our country became completely isolated and severed from the markets of the world. The second blow, from within, was the repercussion created by this disruption of communications and its successive exclusion of most of the purchasing markets. The moneylenders, banks and private usurers, who had in normal times been only too eager to grant loans to the growers, knew very well that their debtors would now be driven into a position where it would be impossible for them to meet their obligations. For how, indeed, could they pay if they were unable to sell their produce? The moneylenders also knew quite well that the citrus grower had to continue the cultivation of his grove, that hoeing, manuring and irrigating had to go on if the groves were not to die. The moneylenders, however, were eager to secure the endangered position of their capital, and urged their debtors to pay in any circumstances, failing which they would be liable to forfeit their property. The destruction of the whole citrus industry meant nothing to them, so long as they could be sure of their money.

The united Jewish and Arab citrus growers tried to find a way to undo the obviously fatal activities of these moneylenders. They had to sell their produce by any and every means. In addition there was the bothering problem of how to keep their now unprofitable citrus groves going and themselves from starving. Consequently they applied to the Government, requesting it to declare a moratorium which would render it impossible for their creditors to deprive them of their possessions on account of their debts. They further asked to be granted an annual subsidy for the duration of the war in the form of a loan, which would enable them to finance the upkeep of their plantations and sustain, at least to a certain extent, the growers and their families during the period of crisis. Another request was that they should be enabled to sell at least a portion of their produce to the Army, to neighbouring countries and to local consumers, the latter mostly consisting of local fruit juice and marmalade manufacturers.

The first request was rejected by the Government. Many growers who had taken loans before the war during the period of prosperity were now at the mercy of their creditors. These insisted on immediate repayment and many citrus growers lost their hard-gained property, which was sold by public auction at extremely low prices. The equipment of most of the citrus groves and cooperative societies met with a similar fate.

The second request to Government was met halfway. Although Government refused outright to grant the modest request for a loan of LP.1 for each dunam of citrus cultivation, which was to provide for the sustenance of the growers' families, Government yet agreed to grant the growers limited loans for the upkeep of their groves. The Control Board was entrusted with the task of super-

vising the distribution of the loans among the beneficiaries so that each should receive a fair share.

At the outbreak of war the complete area of Palestine's citrus groves was 299,500 dunams. Of these many groves had only recently been planted and had not yielded any fruit at all. These groves were excluded from the Government loan. The Government furthermore excluded all citrus groves that were in a state of neglect or dilapidation. Also there were well-to-do citrus growers who did not apply to Government for any loan at all. The area benefiting from the Government loan was thus reduced to about 177,000 dunams, and this was the area which it rescued. Another 50,000 dunams were lost during the war because the Government had excluded them from the category of beneficiaries.

The following table shows the Government loans granted to the united Jewish-Arab citrus growers during and after the war:

Year	Area in Dunams	Amount
1941	167,000	LP. 436,000
1942	175,000	537,000
1943	177,000	637,000
1944	154,000	770,000
1945	148,000	740,000
1946	148,000	650,000

Altogether LP.3,770,000 was received in loans from the Palestine Government.

The Government loans served the citrus growers as a life-buoy at a time of utter despair, when the great benefit which citrus cultivation had brought to the Yishuv and the country as a whole had been entirely forgotten and when the striving growers of Palestine had been deserted by one and all.

The third activity of the united citrus growers was an attempt to *organise* as far as possible the marketing of their produce, and this was successful. In the first two years after Italy's entry into the war, all sea communications in the Mediterranean had been blocked to British sea traffic, and during the years 1940 and 1941 the produce of Palestine's citrus groves was literally turned into manure. The greater part of the fruit was picked, some fell off the branches by itself, and all this produce was buried in ditches where it decayed and was converted into dung. The limited quantities supplied to the Army, to local manufacturers and local consumers, sold at extremely low prices, at next to nothing. The charge for a ton of oranges, for instance, was between 500 Mils and LP.1. At the same price fruit was also sold to local speculators, who transported it to neighbouring countries where better prices could be had.

From 1942 onwards the Marketing Board founded alongside the Citrus Control Board became firmly established. Gradually all sales were effected through this body. All transactions with the

Army, with neighbouring countries and finally also with local consumers, were conducted through the Control Board and its sub-committee, and the price was gradually increased from next to nothing to as much as LP.4 and LP.6 per ton. But even this improved price could not cover the expenses involved, much less yield profits for the sustenance of the growers and their families. The situation had, however, by now passed the stage of chaos.

In view of the destruction of a considerable portion of Palestine's citrus groves (about 15%), the inadequate care that had been given to the existing plantations by reason of the very limited financial means at the growers' disposal, and the shortage in artificial fertilisers which caused a great reduction in the fertility of the tree, Palestine's citrus groves, instead of yielding 15,000,000 boxes as before, produced only a third of this quantity. Even this limited amount exceeded the demand of the markets, and the prices could not be increased sufficiently to make citrus cultivation a self-supporting concern.

In 1944 a tiny door of hope was at last opened to the growers for they were able to export a small quantity of Palestinian oranges, grapefruits and lemons to the British market. In 1945 prospects improved when our produce penetrated into the Scandinavian countries and was marketed to the European continent. This year we face a further considerable increase in citrus exports.

III

The advantages of union between Jewish and Arab citrus growers became more than ever apparent in 1945, when the union proved its strength in the face of severe trials. In that year important issues were at stake. Following upon the surrender of the enemies of humanity, it seemed that all markets would be throwing open their doors to Palestine citrus produce. Speculation raised its ugly head attentively and the local citrus traders and brokers came to regard the Control Board as a body hostile to their interests. They incited the citrus growers to free themselves from the 'yoke' of this control.

The citrus groves, for the greater part, were in a state of considerable dilapidation. Their owners were heavily indebted to Government and yet further investments were necessary if the orchards were to regain their former productivity.

A further obstacle in the way of marketing the produce had become evident: shortage of packing materials. Most of Palestine's considerable stocks of this had been sold by the creditors, and new materials were not yet arriving from Europe. And finally, mention must be made of the incessant political smear campaign against union, initiated by Palestinian 'political' agitators who were eager to sow the seeds of discord, for how could they witness a state of cooperation between Jews and Arabs and remain silent?

In defiance of all these deterrents the united Jewish and Arab citrus growers made a common effort to overcome all obstacles. In spite of the sinister aims of the fiend of discord, a common Jewish-Arab delegation left Palestine for London and the European continent early in September 1945. The delegation had drawn up the following programme: 1. to sell a certain quantity of Palestinian citrus produce. 2. To purchase packing materials. 3. To negotiate with the British Government concerning the debt of Palestine's citrus growers to the local administration, with a view to reaching an agreement which would enable them to use the payments due to the Palestine Government for rehabilitation purposes in the dilapidated citrus groves.

The tasks of the delegation were not easy ones. It encountered many obstacles, some unforeseen. Europe was in greater distress than could have been visualised far from the spot. In England, too, the traces of the war were obvious everywhere. But the delegation discharged its duties in a spirit of perfect cooperation between its Jewish and Arab members, by mutual agreement and goodwill, and above all, by an interior discipline.

Under the prevailing circumstances the delegation, it must be recorded, succeeded in serving its purpose.

For the first time in five years, 4,598,079 boxes of citrus produce of all sorts were sold in England and the European markets. But for the shortage in packing materials a far greater amount could have been placed. The delegation succeeded in acquiring all the vast stocks of packing materials available in Portugal and Sweden, and bought them up to the last box, but even all this was insufficient. The prices obtained in England and Europe could generally be considered satisfactory in view of conditions prevailing in all markets during this first postwar period, and taking into particular account the existing foreign exchange restrictions. Nevertheless, even these prices were not yet high enough to cover the growers' expenditure.

The Control Board also sold 1,125,000 boxes of citrus produce to the Army and the local manufacturers of juices and marmalades. Only in regard to the neighbouring countries did the Control Board fail to serve its purpose. Its failure was not, however, the result of a shortcoming or of the impracticability of the idea in general, but was mostly due to the undermining activities of the fiend of discord. The neighbouring Arab countries boycotted the produce of Jewish Palestine and extended their boycott to that of the united Jewish-Arab citrus trade. As a result of this boycott the export of citrus fruits was reduced by half a million boxes which had hitherto been placed on Arab foreign markets.

The Foreign Office in London accorded the common delegation of Jewish and Arab citrus growers a most hearty reception. It was very helpful in advising the delegation as to possible sources of packing materials, and assisted them to conclude deals with the British

market. In regard to the delegation's request concerning the repayment of the loans which the Palestine Government had granted to the growers, the Foreign Office was very sympathetic and accepted in principle the submitted suggestions. The main points of the provisional agreement reached were as follows:

The growers were to repay their debts in 30 years, with an addition of 3% annual interest. The instalments of the debts were to be paid into a special account which was to become, in the course of time, a permanent loan fund, issuing loans to growers wishing to readjust and rehabilitate their devastated citrus groves. Until the contemplated permanent loan fund was strong enough to issue such loans, i.e. until substantial amounts had accumulated from instalments paid in, the Government was to support the fund by loans which would thus cover the deficit and in time make effective working of the fund possible.

Unfortunately this laudable idea has not yet been realised, but doubtless it will be in due course.

Today the new citrus harvest of 1947 is imminent. Once more a common Jewish-Arab delegation of citrus growers has left these shores for England and the European continent for the purpose of placing our produce on the overseas markets. It is expected that the delegation will succeed in its mission now that the shortage of packing materials has become a little less acute. It is to be hoped, too, that thanks to the common effort, Palestine's citrus growers will be able this year to market nearly 8,000,000 boxes, and that Palestine's citrus trade will at last return to normal.¹

'Politics' still continue to sow their seeds of discord in our country. But the creative elements, the producers, try to find a way to restore peace and progress by means of *union*.

July, 1946.

¹ About 9 million cases of citrus fruit have been sold beforehand, for the season of 1946/47, both abroad and to the forces. The rest of the fruit will be sold at reasonable prices to customers in Palestine — to the regular local market and the juice and jam factories. Several citrus growers, distrustful of the Marketing Board and reluctant to await the outcome of its negotiations, sold their fruit to brokers at low rates. They now find that they suffered heavy losses; and the brokers have made a good deal at their expense. Those growers who do their own marketing or do it cooperatively will make good business this year, and will be able to pay off part of their war-time debts.

JEWISH-ARAB COOPERATION IN HAIFA MUNICIPALITY

That Jews and Arabs in Palestine are engaged in what seems an unending and bitter strife for supremacy is looked upon as a foregone conclusion by the outsider. Has not the press, for years on end, boosted reports of political antagonism, Arab riots and the continuance of Jewish illegal immigration, in the face of Arab opposition? In spite of all this, Arab-Jewish co-operation, in many fields of activity, has never ceased. Human predilections being what they are, bombs and bloodshed are being served up by the journalistic profession in a much more attractive form than reports of peaceful co-operation. The fact remains, however, that collaboration between the Jewish and Arab communities has developed in Haifa during the past 40 years, turning the relatively insignificant oriental township into the important modern port of Haifa we know today. At the beginning of this century, when Haifa was connected to the Hedjaz Railway, from Damascus to Medina, it numbered some 10,000 inhabitants, of whom about 2,000 were Jews. Today, it has over 130,000 souls, the Arab-Jewish proportion being about 60,000 to 70,000. This increase in the Jewish population is largely due to the steady flow of immigration, particularly since 1933.

Some 15 years ago, the Jewish community in Haifa was represented by 2 members on the local Municipality of 10. Even then, they did not feel in the minority. Now, the Municipal Council comprises 6 Arabs (Moslems and Christians) and 4 Jews. Certainly, this does not constitute an adequate representation for the Haifa Jewish Community, and it is hoped that the coming elections (the first in ten years) will establish full equality.

Leaving numerical representation aside for the moment, the following incident gives evident proof that some feeling of "belonging together" does exist. When David Hacoheh, Jewish Town Councillor for some 20 years, and leading member of the Histadrut, was recently detained in Latrun Camp, his family received the visit of some fellow Arab Councillors on the occasion of the Jewish New Year. The Arab colleagues conveyed the seasonal greetings of their families and sincere wishes for a speedy release.

The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, too, expressed its appreciation of Jewish-Arab relations in Haifa. The Government is helpful. A loan granted the Municipality some years ago made possible the erection of a fine Municipality building. Government lands have been allotted for the carrying out of an ex-soldiers housing scheme—this being executed by the Municipality for the benefit of Jews and Arabs alike.

When Jewish immigrants from Germany settled in a newly-founded suburb, in the Haifa Bay, some ten years ago, the late Arab Mayor, Hassan Shukri Bey, went out to welcome them. Today, Arabs feel no hesitation in bringing up the particular problems of their quarters for discussion and advice to the Jewish Mayor, Mr. Shabatai Levy.

The Jewish quarters of Haifa, the most important being Hadar Hacarmel, with its 40,000 inhabitants, may be considered as representing municipalities in themselves. Though they have no legal status, they are highly organised and meet the special needs of their inhabitants. Mutual understanding and co-operation are not wanting between the Municipality and the Jewish quarters, the activities of which, particularly the excellent town-planning work of the Hadar Hacarmel Committee, have met with the warm appreciation of the British City Engineer.

Lying at the bottom of this co-operation is the principle that none of the two communities seeks to dominate the other. Whatever justified political aims and aspirations Palestine Jewry cherishes have been deliberately excluded from the agenda of the Municipal Council, thus removing the possibility of it ever becoming the scene of political discussions.

The work of the Haifa Municipality rests on the fundamental pre-supposition that neither section of the population should be allowed to dominate the other. The term "pre-supposition" has been chosen expressly, for from the very outset, it has been the basis of every approach to municipal affairs. This approach may appear somewhat strange when we consider that three of the four Jewish Councillors are members of parties pledged to the Biltmore Programme. One of the staunchest upholders of this policy is reported to have said that whoever dominates Haifa, dominates the entire country: the attitude of both Jewish and Arab members of the Municipality, however, represents an unequivocal renunciation of any such domination.

It is in the nature of domination to arouse fear and natural resistance in those thus threatened. A striving for co-operation, on the other hand, results in actual co-operation. In the town of Haifa as in the Municipality, either section of the population—be it Jewish or Arab—can paralyse normal life or at least cause great difficulties, if it so desires, regardless of which constitutes the majority. It is idle, therefore, to argue about numbers, particularly when the numerical difference between the two communities is so insignificant as it is in Haifa. The Jewish members of the Municipality do not consider themselves strangers, but as sharing the work with friends, whose task it is to safeguard and further the well-being of the town as a whole.

At a conference of the Histadrut, in December, 1944, devoted to questions of municipal self-government, David Hacoheh said:

"That which, as Jews and Socialists, we do not accept abroad, we must accept and justify here in our work in a mixed municipality... It is our duty to care for the whole town, and not for the Jewish interests alone... but for the interests of the Arab workers, in the same degree, with honesty and without discrimination... It is right that taxes paid by wealthy Jews should benefit poor Arabs living in the same town."

It is not within the compass of this article to enter into a discussion of the formulation of these ideas. At the said conference, the above words gave rise to a certain amount of opposition. Yet, honesty compels us to admit that the allusion to wealthy Jewish tax-payers and poor Arabs may give rise to some mis-understanding. Doubtlessly, the speaker was not unmindful of the fact that the richest men in Haifa are Arabs, who have not yet learned to bear their share of the burden to the same extent as the wealthy Jews, as far as helping the poor is concerned—though even the Jews of means cannot be said to do as much as they should in this direction.

But this has only been mentioned in passing in order to give weight to the fundamental attitude of both Jewish and Arab members of the Haifa Municipality, who serve the interests of both sections of the community, irrespective of person or creed. Many of the tasks confronting the Municipality exclude, by their very nature, the possibility of any discrimination. Sanitation is a good example in point: epidemics affect both communities in equal measure.

The work of the Haifa Municipality and its discussions serve no other purpose than the welfare of the citizens as a whole, extending and improving the municipal services of this biggest modern town in Palestine, the town-planning area of which is twice that of Tel Aviv. The terms "majority" and "minority" simply cannot be applied in Haifa.

In considering our problem, we must not lose sight of the fact that the smaller the circle and the more intimate the negotiations, the easier it is to arrive at an understanding between men of goodwill. The Haifa Municipality meet but very infrequently; but when meetings do take place, they are not public and the press is only presented with an extract of the resolutions, with but few details of the proceedings being made public property. The absence of public criticism naturally entails the absence of radical and destructive criticism. The small group of men who administer the affairs of Haifa, and who have remained in office for several years on end, have become accustomed to quiet preparation of resolutions, which, as far as possible, replaces discussions and voting. The sense of compromise, political tact and conscious waiving of personal ambitions, have made it possible to tread the modest path of Jewish-Arab co-operation in the Haifa Municipality.

This is both gratifying and regrettable. Quarrels are noisy and full of hollow phrases; clashes of nationalism fill the air with their con-

tests and contentions. Peace and co-operation, however, are tender plants threatened by every gust of wind and therefore thrive in the shelter of unobtrusiveness. Co-operation between peoples cannot be proclaimed from the house-tops. It is not something to be displayed in public; it hardly enters consciousness, much less does it command the esteem of the larger public — Jewish or Arab.

We citizens of Haifa can look into the future with the confident hope, that Jews and Arabs *can* work together. It is our earnest task in these and coming days to broaden this common understanding.

March, 1946.

CIVIL RIGHTS IN PALESTINE

By M. AVI-SHAUL

THE HEBREW PRESS has recently dealt at length with prison conditions in connection with the treatment meted out to detainees and prisoners by the police, and more especially with the Regulations which empower the civil and military authorities to detain persons, set up special courts to pass judgment on them, and to sentence them to various terms of imprisonment or to deportation from the country. There can be little doubt that the public's objections to all kinds of ordinances and regulations which deprive a defendant of the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts, and to a police and prison procedure that leaves room for unscrupulous behaviour on the part of the authorities, are justified.

At the same time we have to acknowledge that ordinances and regulations which limit the rights of men and citizens do not exist in a vacuum. They grow out of a certain attitude towards the governed community as a whole. In a mandatory country administered on the strength of an authority given to its Government by a foreign power, without taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants, it is not surprising that the authorities attempt to consolidate their power by any means which serve the administrative purpose. In such a country only a vigilant public opinion can resist encroachments on civil rights and compel the respect of the authorities. Have those who shape public opinion in Palestine actually availed themselves of their power and influence with a view to extending the rights of man? In the opinion of the writer, who has gathered practical experience in this field during ten years of active interest, more particularly in his capacity of Secretary of the League for the Rights of Man in Palestine (which is affiliated to the National Council for Civil Liberties, London), the answer is definitely in the negative. There is no real Public Opinion in Palestine.

The second principle which lends strength to our fight for civil rights and provides it with a constructive character is the recognition of complete equality in this respect towards all sections of the population. One code of laws for all inhabitants, without any discrimination in respect of nationality, race, creed, or religion, is the elementary condition of the success of any demand for the maintenance of our status in face of lack of responsibility on the part of those who wield power.

The practical value of the fight for the rights of man extends over various fields and over many complicated features of our public life, beginning with politics in the most restricted meaning of the

term, and ending in the field of social welfare, education and the right of citizens to work and achieve satisfaction from their work.

Apart from obstructions that may be imposed by the Government, there are obstructions which arise from a particular frame of mind that refuses to notice whenever an administrative obstruction is directed against 'others'. The boycott, for instance, on goods manufactured by Jews is an obstruction to the rights of Jews. Similarly, the boycott of the Arab worker is an obstruction to the rights of the Arabs. And it is a waste of moral indignation to complain about the boycott imposed on us, as long as the same moral indignation is not also expressed against the boycott of the Arab labourer. It may seem difficult to tell a Jewish tomato from an Arab one; but those who found the means to make such a distinction should realise that other keen-eyed people may find a way to distinguish between a "Zionist" and an Arab shirt.

The connection between a tomato and a shirt on the one hand, and emergency and defence regulations on the other, is that in an atmosphere of national tension and isolation public opinion is bound to degenerate and to become incapable of a united and sustained struggle against oppression.

TO JUDGE by the reaction of the press, the Emergency Regulations would seem to be a novum in Palestine. But this is not the case. Even leaving out the Prevention of Crimes Ordinance of 1933, which in spirit and effect was based on the same principle as that expressed in the various subsequent defence regulations, there is an entire system of codification in matters of justice, arrest, deportation etc., which has produced a multitude of variations on the same juridical theme—sometimes played by civil and sometimes by military authorities.

The Defence (Emergency) Regulations, 1945, as published in the Supplement to the official 'Palestine Gazette' of 27.9.45, clarify this point. Paragraph 16 of these regulations, *inter alia*, empowers any police officer in charge of a police station to issue a warrant for the arrest of any person whom he may reasonably suspect of having committed a military court offence. The source of this is the Defence (Military Courts) Regulations, 1937; and it is interesting to note that in accordance with that same paragraph such a warrant of arrest may also empower any private person to carry the arrest into effect.

Para. 21 empowers Military Courts to decide any matter of procedure and adopt such course as appears to the Court best calculated to do justice. Again, the source is the Regulations of 1937.

Para. 33 provides for the whipping of boys under the age of 18, in addition to or without imposing other punishment; source, the Emergency Regulations, 1936. In para. 84 there is a definition of the term 'unlawful association'; among others, this term applies to any body of persons, which in any way brings into hatred or contempt, or ex-

cites disaffection against, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom or the Government of Palestine or the High Commissioner in his official capacity. Source—Emergency Regulations, 1936. All the paragraphs (for instance 110, 112) which deal with the placing of a person under police supervision, banishment of a person to a certain residence, detention and deportation from the country — have their sources in the Emergency Regulations, 1936, and the Defence Regulations, 1939. And the whole of part IX, dealing with prohibited immigrants, the definition of which term is taken from the Immigration Ordinance, 1941, is but a repetition in spirit or verbatim of previous regulations; and even though later supplements provide severe punishment for those who extend help to such immigrants, or impose collective responsibility on members of groups or associations, these are no nova in subject matter, but rather more precise formulations of an administrative power which had already existed and been used previously.

NUMEROUS memoranda to the Government of Palestine, the British Colonial Office and various British organisations; numerous reports; a few hundred letters concerning the fates of individuals — all these are piled up at the Palestine League for the Rights of Man as evidence of the implications of the various emergency regulations and administrative ordinances for the people of this country, in many instances innocent ones, as well as foreigners — Jews and non-Jews — among them many refugees from Fascism.

In order to penetrate more deeply into this jungle we shall first quote from a letter of 6.10.37 from the late Ronald Kidd, Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties, London, to the editor of the 'Manchester Guardian,' in reply to the grievances of the Secretary of the Revisionist Zionist Party in London with regard to prison conditions at Acre:—

"Mr. . . . draws attention to the fact that under the Crimes Prevention Ordinance persons against whom no evidence has been adduced are imprisoned without trial — a procedure contrary to every principle of British law and one which must be repugnant to British sentiment, even though this system exists in Northern Ireland. It appears, moreover, that a considerable number of persons are detained in prison even after their sentences have expired. The fate of deportees seems to be tragic in the extreme, for we are informed on good authority that political refugees are returned to dictatorship countries on the mere allegation of the police that they are undesirable. This procedure appears to be carried out by the police authorities without any judicial decision."

In addition to this letter, a pamphlet, "The Tasks of the League for the Rights of Man," published in Palestine in 1938 in both English and Hebrew, contains the following warning: "Hitherto the Emergency Regulations and the Prevention of Crimes Ordinance

have been invoked mainly against the Arab section and against Communists — with tacit Jewish consent. But already there are signs that they are being turned against sections of the populace which have hitherto approved of them. The imprisonment without trial of workers from Hadera and Karkur; the closing down of newspapers in the case of the slightest expression of opinion unwelcome to the Palestine administration — these signs show that the Jewish community is by no means immune from their action."

Our public opinion did not pay attention to this warning, nor did the Jewish national institutions. And we have to note that the League for the Rights of Man presents one of the few instances where Jews and Arabs worked side by side.

In the memorandum to the Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, dated 16.9.38, on the denial of asylum to political refugees in Palestine and their deportation back to the countries of their persecution, and on arrest and imprisonment in Palestine without trial, the League for the Rights of Man quoted the statement of Mr. Ormsby Gore in Parliament to the effect that "since the beginning of 1934, 26 German Jews have been deported," with the addition, however, that "in cases where the deportee wished to find asylum in other countries there was no question of deporting him or her to Germany." Yet, this memorandum included instances of deportation also to Germany. In one instance the Arab lawyer of a Jewish defendant tried to impress upon the court that his client be not deported "on the grounds that he was a German Jew." This defendant was eventually released by the Court, but re-arrested immediately by the police authorities (exactly as happened in the case of the captain of the "Enzo Sereni" ¹ in Haifa Court on 12.6.46).

In 1937 in his reply to a question put by R. Gibson, M.P., on the Emergency Regulations, the Secretary of State for the Colonies replied that "as these are cases of preventive detention, no question of trial or conviction arises." Their honours Judges Manning and Frumakin, in a verdict rejecting the request for Habeas Corpus, decided as follows: "We are of the opinion that the District Commissioner's powers under the Regulations are absolute and that he is not obliged to give any grounds when he acts under the Regulations."

To an enquiry by the Palestine League for the Rights of Man as to whether two prisoners had appeared before a judge, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in a letter dated 5.3.38 stated "that these persons are detained in Central Prison, Acre, under Sec. 15B of the Emergency Regulations."

The examples could be greatly multiplied.

¹ The captain and sailors of vessels bringing so-called illegal immigrants to the shores of Palestine are liable to trial and punishment; and their ships to confiscation. — This practice of the police of arresting persons acquitted by court immediately after the judge has left the courtroom has become quite usual. All protests have been in vain.

WHO DOES not know that at various periods, even in the past, Jewish illegal immigrants were hunted down! At that time the Jewish newspapers expressed their objection, while the Arabs rejoiced and demanded intensification of these activities. Who does not know that during a certain period collective punishment was meted out to Arab villages! Then the Arabs protested, while the Jews rejoiced and demanded intensification of such punishment. Again, who does not know that Arabs have also been deported! The Jewish press then rejoiced, while to-day this same press protests against "the deportation of Jews from their fatherland." And who does not know that there have been hunger strikes in our prisons, either on account of the intolerable prison conditions or of the unlimited prolongation of detainment on the strength of various regulations! When the strikers were Arabs, the Arabs protested; and when they were Jews, the Jews protested.

In the report of the League for the Rights of Man for the period from 1937 to 1941 some of the League's activities are discussed, in connection with such matters as strikes, prison conditions, capital punishment, terrorism.

In a memorandum to the Government of Palestine, prepared by a sub-committee composed of Jewish and Arab members (submitted through the Commissioner for Reconstruction in September, 1943) the following points were raised: Security of life and property, democratic liberties, administrative activities, deportations, police authority, prison conditions (with detailed proposals for reform), prison visits, judicial flogging, hospitals and lunatic asylums, and compulsory education.

Had reforms on the above lines been jointly demanded by the general Jewish and Arab public, and not by a small group only, we should never have witnessed the promulgation of the latest Defence (Emergency) Regulations.

BEFORE US LIES SUPPLEMENT 2 of the Palestine Gazette Extraordinary No. 1470 of 28.1.46. At the very beginning we find a "Government Notice" explaining the objects and reasons of the new Defence (Emergency) Regulations. This notice stresses that there are no changes or no very substantial changes in the law, and this is true.

The Regulations of 1946 are a consequence of the system to which Government had resorted during two decades in suppressing disturbances in the country, more especially in cases when the public failed to assist Government in discovering and handling over "rioters" to the authorities.

But only people with notoriously short memories can feel bitterness against the appointment of an officer of H.M. Forces as single judge, when according to previous regulations a person could already be held in administrative detention for several years. Such Admin-

istrative Detention could be ordered on the strength of the evidence of a policeman or some secret file, and "the defendant," that is to say, the prisoner, had to prove his innocence of a charge the full extent of which, in many cases, he did not even know. Nor is collective responsibility of a person for crimes committed by other people a novum in Palestinian usage. Paragraph 66 which reads "it is also immaterial that by reason of circumstances not known to the offender it is impossible in fact to commit the offence" — reveals perhaps more than any other example the spirit of our whole legislative and administrative system.

The rights of man can be safeguarded only by the cooperation of the entire population. These rights cannot be limited by racial, religious, national or other considerations. As long as one section of the population is content with the restriction of elementary rights in regard to another section, there is no chance of achieving such elementary rights. But this understanding presupposes an education of the public in a spirit entirely different from that at present prevailing in this country.

There can be no doubt that there are Jews and Arabs in this country who understand the necessity for cooperation against any attempt at transforming Palestine into a prison. In a review of 10 years of activities, submitted by the League for the Rights of Man, Palestine, to the National Council for Civil Liberties, London, in September, 1945, the following summary is given:

"Ten years of experience have taught us that there is no hope for the League's progress and expansion among organisations and individuals, not even for its very existence, as long as there is no solution of the Palestine problem based on Arab-Jewish understanding."

February, 1946.

JEWISH AND ARAB WORKERS — DIVIDED OR UNITED?

By GABRIEL BAER

The political conflict about Palestine may have made the impression upon the foreign spectator that the "Land of Promise" has become a scene of permanent clashes between Jews and Arabs and that deep hatred between these two peoples reigns even in everyday life. But, although political tension and national differences play an important part in dividing the inhabitants of this country and confining their cooperation to very narrow limits, neighbourly relations between Jews and Arabs in the towns and between Jewish and Arab villages in the country almost always existed. Moreover, Arab and Jewish workers have more than once cooperated in defending their right to a decent living and, from time to time, they were given opportunity to show a very great extent of solidarity. As recently as in April, 1946, a common strike of all junior Government officials and workers paralysed the communications of the country, railways, post and telegraph, broadcasting and ports, and Jews and Arabs could be seen marching together through the streets of Jerusalem carrying posters on which "Long Live Unity" was written in Arabic, Hebrew and English. Only one who is acquainted with the complicated political situation of Palestine, and who has witnessed the efforts spent to drive a wedge between Jewish and Arab workers, will appreciate the meaning of the greeting which was sent to all striking Government employees by their committee. The greeting, extending "Heartly Wishes to All," was sent to Moslems, Christians and Jews alike, for their respective feasts which occurred the same week. It should be mentioned that these feasts, Nebi Musa, Easter and Passover, which usually take place at the same time, have not seldom been the occasion for communal riots.

The common strike of the Government employees last year was not, however, the first expression of solidarity between Arab and Jewish workers in Palestine. In 1931 Arab and Jewish drivers all over the country struck against the high taxes on fuel and cut off all road communications. Workers of all communities employed by the Jerusalem Municipality have for years been conducting a common campaign for raising their standard of life. The most outstanding example of Arab-Jewish workers' solidarity was the stay-in-strike of the Railway Workshops in Haifa early in 1944, which lasted for some days and nights. At night the Jewish and Arab workers sat together around fires, telling stories and chanting; the food sent by Arab or Jewish trade-unions was distributed equally among all workers. Although organized in different and even rivalling unions,

Jewish and Arab workers were united until the end. A year later Arab and Jewish civilian workers declared a strike in one of the army camps near Tel-Aviv, organizing a common demonstration through the streets of the city, where the Jewish population cheered and applauded this sign of Arab-Jewish unity. This happened in the very days when news agencies all over the world were reporting "imminent clashes between Jews and Arabs in Palestine."

The Difficulty of Cooperation

All these examples show that cooperation between Jewish and Arab workers in Palestine is possible and has been a fact in many cases. But the necessity for pointing out these examples shows that cooperation has not been easy and, generally, has not even been the rule. Why then, is cooperation so difficult?

First of all, there are in Palestine two national economic units which are more or less secluded from each other. But for a very small number of experts, no Jewish workers are employed in Arab enterprises, and very few Arab workers are employed by Jewish undertakings, except in orange-groves. Thus the only places where Jewish and Arab workers meet are in Government and Army works and, to a certain extent, in the plants of the big companies such as the Iraq Petroleum Co., the Oil Refineries in Haifa, the Potash Co., etc. But in these companies the Jewish workers are generally employed as experts and skilled tradesmen, while the Arabs do unskilled labour. On the whole, the character of the Arab working class is that of a colonial one, whereas the Jews are nearer to European standards. The problems of the Jewish or the Arab worker are more or less alien to his comrade from the other community. Although, during the war, thousands of additional Arab and Jewish workers were employed in Government and Army works and the need for and possibility of cooperation grew, the majority of the Arab and Jewish workers at present still work and live separated.

Moreover, there exists a great difference between their standards of life. In industry the wages of the Jewish workers are, on the average, almost three times those of the Arabs, and even if Jewish and Arab labourers do the same work, the Jew earns more than his Arab colleague. The different standards of life are accompanied by different habits: a common consumers' society of Jewish and Arab Government clerks in Jerusalem had to be separated, some weeks after its establishment, into two shops, one Jewish and one Arab. Even where Arab and Jewish workers are employed by the same employer, generally no common workers' committee exists. This fact, however, has other reasons as well, and its roots lie in the separate organizations of Jewish and Arab workers.

Arab and Jewish Trade Unions

The vast majority of the Jewish workers in Palestine are organ-

ized in the 'General Federation of Jewish Labour', known as "Histadrut." The "Histadrut" is by far the biggest workers' organization in Palestine, comprising about 160,000 members. It was founded in 1920 and has since then been one of the main pillars of the up-building of the Jewish National Home. Comprising not only wage-earners but also members of the agricultural settlements, industrial cooperatives and workers' wives, the "Histadrut" is more than a pure trade union. Moreover, contracting enterprises and industrial undertakings founded by the "Histadrut" are among the most important factors of Jewish economy in Palestine. Inside the "Histadrut" there are different political trends, a slight majority belonging to the "Palestine Labour Party" ('Mapai'), which is the most influential party of the Zionist movement. The left opposition, which will be mentioned later, consists of the "Hashomer Hatzair" and the "Ah-dut Ha-Avodah-Poale-Zion" Party.

The oldest Arab trade union is the "Palestine Arab Workers' Society" founded in 1925 by Arab railway workers in Haifa, who are until to-day the core of the "Society." The development of the "Society" has not been as smooth as that of the "Histadrut"; since 1925 the membership of the "Society" has fluctuated considerably. It reached a high level of activity in 1931, when the first Arab labour congress was held, and again in 1934-36, a period of many strikes. During the disturbances of 1936-39 and until 1942, the "Society" was rather inactive, but thereafter a new period of development began, caused by the growth of the Arab working class and its concentration in Government and Army works. The majority of the members of the "Society" are wage-earners, but recently some cooperatives have been formed. The political outlook of the "Society's" leadership is nationalist, generally following the line of the "Palestine Arab Party," whose Vice-President is Jamal Eff. al-Husseini.

Against this outlook a left opposition had grown inside the "Society" since the early thirties, criticising the "reformist" and "opportunist" tendencies of the "Society" leadership. The development of world events, together with the consolidation of the Arab working class in Palestine, has led to a considerable increase of these leftist elements in the last few years, and they have gained influence in most of the important branches of the "Society." When the "Society" leadership, about a year ago, refused to grant them representation on the delegation to the Paris World-Congress of Trade Unions, these branches broke away from the "Society" and formed the "Arab Labour Congress." The membership of the "Congress" is to-day at least as great as that of the "Society" and its political outlook is leftist, influenced by the Arab communists of the "National Liberation League."

The third trade union organization comprising Arab workers is the "Palestine Labour League," founded in 1927 by the "Histadrut," whose aim was the creation of a common organization of Jewish and

Arab workers with the Histadrut as its Jewish section. This object, however, was changed afterwards and the "League" became an organization of Arab workers only, affiliated to the General Federation of Jewish Labour and managed by its department for Arab affairs. For years, political reasons curtailed the activity of the "League," but the new rise of Arab trade unionism since 1942 induced the Histadrut to revive its Arab "League." Nevertheless, up till now it remains the smallest of the trade unions among Arab workers.

The only common organisation of Jewish and Arab employees is the "Palestine Civil Service (Second Division) Association" in which all junior Government clerks are organized. The "Association" was founded during the war and has no connection whatsoever with any of the existing trade unions. Including Arab and Jewish clerks as it does, it carefully avoids getting mixed up in politics. The labourers, however, who are employed by the Government, are organized in the abovementioned Arab and Jewish trade unions.

It is very difficult to give exact numbers of the membership of the Arab trade unions. The figures submitted to the Labour Department by the Arab organisations were a membership of 15,000 in the "Society," 18,000 in the "Congress" and 4,500 in the "League." Even if these figures are taken for granted, it is necessary to consider the special character of these relatively young Arab trade unions, in which they resemble the workers' organisations in all colonial countries. The membership is always fluctuating, the members being connected with their organisation by stronger ties in periods of strikes and activity, and looser ones in calmer times. The Arab working class in Palestine, like the workers of Egypt, India and other colonial countries, has not enjoyed the long period of stabilization and industrial development which was the basis for the consolidation of the European trade unions. Therefore, Arab trade unions cannot be compared with European or American ones. Neither is it possible to compare them with the "Histadrut," which is founded on the European level of the Jewish worker.

The Trade Unions and Cooperation

The existence of two more or less exclusive economic units in Palestine and the difference between the living standards of the Jewish and Arab workers have indeed been important reasons for the development of separate trade unions. But there has been another reason too. The Jews come to Palestine to build the National Home, which, according to the present official Zionist leadership, means the establishment of a Jewish State. Organized Jewish labour plays an important part in these efforts. The Arabs on the other hand, the Arab labour movement not excluded, strive for independence from foreign rule and are fervently opposed to Zionism. The right wing of the Arab trade unions is strongly influenced by the present

leadership of the Arab national movement, which stresses its struggle against the Jews more than opposition to foreign rule.

This political antagonism has led to sharp conflicts between the Jewish and Arab trade unions. Arab labour leaders describe the Histadrut as "one of the most dangerous opponents of the Arab worker" because it "always demands the maintaining of a difference between the Arab and the Jewish worker. Therefore it is far from democracy and near to fascism...". Especially fierce are the attacks of the "Society" and the "Congress" on the "Palestine Labour League," the union of Arab workers established by the Histadrut. According to their opinion the "League" was created "with the help of Zionist money in order to divide the Arab labour movement and to serve Zionist propaganda, which tries to deceive the international labour movement." The Arab members of the "League" are considered as "traitors to the Arab workers' and nation's aspirations," and in several cases the Arab unions refused to negotiate with the Histadrut if delegates of the "League" were to take part in the negotiations.

The attitude of the Histadrut towards the Arab trade unions is also very hostile. The Arab unions are defined by the leaders of the Histadrut as having a "feudal character." On several occasions leaders of the Histadrut declared that if negotiations with the Arab unions should become necessary, they should serve as means to discredit their leadership.

At the same time it is significant that both the Histadrut and the Arab unions have more than once declared and keep on declaring on solemn occasions that cooperation between Arab and Jewish workers is necessary and desirable. In speeches at Arab labour congresses it has been possible to hear the following words: "Even if the workers are divided by religion and race, the right of work and the struggle for improving their conditions unite them... we want real fraternity with the Jewish workers." Likewise, one of the leaders of the Histadrut wrote in a recently published pamphlet that "the human necessity for fraternal relations with the Arab worker and fellah, the consciousness of the inevitability of these relations... have been present in the mind of the Jewish worker ever since he came to Palestine...". We shall see that in reality these solemn pledges have frequently not been kept. Nevertheless, to a certain degree they indicate the mood of the Arab and Jewish workers and reflect upon situations in which fraternity has been a fact.

On the other hand, one cannot deny that other voices have been heard. A delegate to a conference of agricultural workers, held by the Histadrut, announced that the raising of the Arab fellah's standard of life did not interest the Jewish worker at all and he even used very strange expressions when referring to the Arabs. Although he met with opposition from the left wing of the Histadrut ("Hashomer Hatzair"), the motion of the latter to deal with the problems of the Arab village in a later session was rejected by the

majority. On the other hand, some of the leaders of the Arab "Society" went so far as to declare that "if the Jews had human feelings, they would not have been expelled from all countries." But such racial theories are severely condemned by the Arab leftists organized in the "Congress."

How Politics Sow Discord

Unfortunately, reality has proved in many cases that the will of the Arab and Jewish trade unions' leadership to create this fraternity about which they spoke has not been too strong. The narrow-mindedness which found its expression in the abovementioned resolution of the Histadrut and in the anti-Jewish slanders of the "Society," has guided their action on more than one occasion. It is self-evident that the struggle for the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine (which, of course, cannot have any other real meaning than partition) conducted by the present majority of the Histadrut, has not greatly encouraged them to work for fraternity between Jewish and Arab workers. In the same way, cooperation between Arab and Jewish workers has been discouraged by the strong anti-Jewish tendency of the Arab leadership. If, notwithstanding this political antagonism, Jewish and Arab workers have cooperated, it only shows how strong the necessity of cooperation was.

To give an idea how the machinery of sowing discord works, it will be useful to cite some typical examples. Some years ago, it was planned to conduct a campaign to improve the conditions of the workers employed by the Army. The leadership of the "Society" refused to cooperate, claiming that the campaign was a political action of the Histadrut. Then even the Arab leftists supported this view. In a similar way, some leaders of the Histadrut declared the strike in the Railway Workshops to be a political Arab strike against Jewish immigration; the Jewish workers, however, remained steadfast.

The most outstanding example was the recent common strike of the Government employees, which had the support of the whole Arab and Jewish population. In this case too, efforts were made to sow discord on political issues. Some of the Arabic newspapers wrote that the Zionists and the Histadrut had paved the way for this strike to show the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry that Jews and Arabs in Palestine cooperated and that, therefore, the Arabs did not fear Zionism. The Emir (now King) Abdullah of Transjordan requested the Arab employees to return to work in order not to spoil the "favourable political prospects" of the Arabs. (It is worthwhile mentioning that the strike had already spread to Transjordan, where railway workers came out in support of their Palestinian comrades.) One of the Jewish newspapers, on the other hand, told its readers that the strike had been organized by the Arab League! Some foreign news agencies claimed that the strike was against Jewish im-

migration, others that it was organized in support of a refugee ship trying to reach Palestine at the time. A much read Jewish evening paper announced one day that the strike prevented the Government from dealing with Jewish immigration. A few days later, however, the journalists of this paper were not afraid to contradict themselves by stating that a high Government official had declared that this time even the Arabs had helped immigration by the common strike. The same paper published a malicious article trying to convince its readers that the strike was not in the interests of the Jews, because they would have to pay the taxes in order to feed the satiated Arab Government employees... Only a few sharp statements were published in the Palestinian press condemning this baiting campaign (e.g. in the Arabic "Al-Ittihad" of the leftist "National Liberation League," in the Hebrew "Mishmar" of the "Hashomer Hatzair" and in "Ba'ayot," organ of "Thud"). Nevertheless, the unity of the striking employees was not disturbed, and they were granted a considerable part of their demands.

Exclusivism or Cooperation?

Much of the future of Palestine, as of the whole world, will depend on which of the two ways will be chosen: the way of exclusiveness which must lead to bloodshed and suffering, or the way of cooperation and solidarity which can lead to peace. We have cited many examples of Jewish and Arab workers in Palestine trying to take the second way; but, for years, they have been driven in the other direction by strong forces which are still continuing and even increasing their efforts. Only recently the League of Arab States has declared a boycott against the Palestinian Jews, and although the left wing of the Arab labour movement did not agree with this step, and generally the Arab population was not too enthusiastic about it, the boycott has already done its share in poisoning the relations between Arab and Jewish workers. Organized Jewish labour has maintained its slogan, "Avodah Ivrit" (Jewish Work), i.e. that only Jewish workers must be employed by Jewish employers. In the years before the war pickets were organized against the employment of Arab workers in Jewish industry and orange-groves, but the shortage of labourers during the war made this impracticable. Recently, however, the danger of unemployment has begun to grow again and there are already the first signs of the old slogan's revival. Nothing has aggravated the relations between Arab and Jewish workers more than these slogans, by which cooperation with Arab workers employed by Jews was excluded and suspicion and distrust spread among the Arab workers in general. In Government works such slogans were skilfully exploited in order to divide Arab and Jewish workers by dismissing Arabs and employing Jews, dismissing Jews and employing Arabs and so on. There is no doubt that this fact has been an important reason for the low standard of life of the

Palestinian Government employees; exclusivism not only fosters the political dangers of mutual slaughter and delay of the liberation of both Arabs and Jews, but also has a bad influence on the social conditions of the workers. It seems that the Government of Palestine is aware of the political and social consequences of discord: asked at a press conference in Jerusalem, held in June, 1946, what Government was doing to encourage Arab-Jewish labour cooperation, Mr. Graves, then Director of the Department of Labour, said he did not see what Government should do about it ...

In the economic field Jewish and Arab workers have understood their need for unity on several occasions, but politically their aims are still opposed. The question whether, in the future, they will find their way to political cooperation depends not only on the changes in the situation in Palestine and the Middle East, but also upon the way the world in general will choose.

August, 1946.

THE CHOICE BEFORE JEWISH YOUTH

By ERNST SIMON

1.

In revolutionary times, youth acquires an added significance. In normal times it may be content to pick up the inheritance which has dropped from the nerveless hands of the preceding generation, and to make some minor changes; whereas in times of emergency matters are very different. For then struggling society — whether it be a state, a class or a federation of states covering half the globe — stands in urgent need of that surplus of strength which youth possesses, for good or evil, as a blessing or as a curse. This surplus is among the distinctive features of mankind. Good youth is always ready to sacrifice its life on the altar of some great cause, and it is this readiness for sacrifice which has been youth's distinctive contribution to human history since the dawn of civilisation. Without this special quality, "sacrifice of life" would not have been a living concept of ever-recurring historical reality. Naturally this spirit of sacrifice is not to be found among all young people, not even among a majority; but among that active minority who in periods of stormy transition are the makers of history: the minority who devote themselves to wars and revolutions, discoveries and inventions, adventures and persecutions, in short to all that is wild and noble.

Within Zionism, the 'Halutz' (pioneer) movement, the youth movement par excellence, has succeeded in directing the surplus energies of youth into the constructive channels of life and work. The war-like spirit which is simultaneously being aroused by these surplus energies, was turned not against other human beings, whether individuals or whole peoples, but against the resisting forces of nature: swamps and barren desolation, rocks and sand dunes, deserts and steppes. The urge to conquer inherent in this spirit was not at first directed towards the conquest of work rightfully belonging to others, but towards the reconquest of work for a people that had been torn from the soil and become alienated from manual labour. The spirit of adventure found an ample outlet in the colonisation of a soil which even the Bedouin had scorned, on the scorching shores of the Dead Sea and in the stifling heat of the Jordan Valley. So the revolutionary will was occupied not with the destruction of an antiquated society, but with the laying of the foundations of a new and better world.

All this is well known; but it is perhaps a little too well known, and that is why I must repeat it. The torrent of propaganda which was showered on the Halutz venture for financial and political reasons, gradually made us lose sight of what is great and real in this

work of upbuilding. Though its greatness is proclaimed from the housetops, though it is put in a veritable pillory of glory, yet its true greatness remains unimpaired and its foundations are sound and solid. Nor has it lost its power of attraction over the best part of our youth in the country and in the towns.

2.

It is not to be denied, however, that this power of attraction may yet find a dangerous rival. I am referring, of course, to those youths who engage in terroristic acts of various kinds. They are organised in two movements which, while they differ in tactical details, are agreed as to means and ends. The means are those of immediate violence, and the end is the immediate establishment of a Jewish State. It may be assumed that psychologically speaking these movements of destruction attract the same type of youth who in different circumstances would be found among the pioneers of constructive work. Moreover, the number of those engaged in carrying out terroristic acts is very much smaller than the number of their sympathisers, both open and secret. And it is incumbent upon even those who exhibit the Halutz spirit at its best, daily to search their hearts and ask themselves whether there is not in them some hidden spark of that disquieting sympathy for the way of destruction.

Why is it that this has come to pass?

It is because the Halutz element within the active and decisive minority of our youth, while condemning the methods and tactics employed by the terrorist elements, i.e. the immediate use of violence, are often in agreement with them as regards their object, which is the immediate establishment of a Jewish State. That is why their resistance has neither power of conviction nor power of attraction. A discussion on methods may convince adults; it can never inspire the young.

About three years ago, David Ben-Gurion gave the message of his new Zionism to a conference of the Organisation of Hebrew Teachers. It was then that I warned my colleagues against "short-winded Zionism", a warning which was as necessary as it was unsuccessful. For short-windedness must lead to despair and despair in its turn must lead to desperate acts, in spite of all efforts to prevent them, and that precisely among the potentially good and idealistic elements of our youth. For only he who has been strong in an ideal can be strong in despair. And that is why so great a responsibility rests on those leaders whose powers of vision and whose powers of speech can sway this youth — that part of youth which is historically creative — and control alike its ideals and its despair.

3.

Into what channels will the surplus energies of Jewish youth, which may well decide the character and fate of our work of upbuild-

ing, flow in the months and years ahead? Here is the choice Jewish youth is confronted with to-day. But the decision does not lie with youth any more; it lies with Zionist policy. Will this policy continue to identify itself with the aims of the terrorists, will it remain a policy of "immediate" solutions, a policy of "now or never"? If so, their honest struggle against the method of direct action will be utterly in vain. Nothing but a change of Zionist aims, or rather a return to the sources of that Zionism which was and is, in the words of Kurt Blumenfeld, a "long-winded revolution", can bring about a change of method and a victory of the forces of the halutz over those of terrorism in the sphere of youth in general and in each individual heart in particular.

In my view, the choice now confronting Palestine policy is as follows: splitting the country into two small and mutually hostile states, or development of the country as a whole in accordance with the grandiose plans of development which have recently been submitted to public criticism, mostly by American experts, but also by a Palestinian scholar, Dr. A. Bonné. All these various plans have one feature in common: they presuppose large closed areas with a population ready for honest and lasting co-operation. The integral unity of the country and a steady and long-drawn-out process of upbuilding are the distinctive elements of all these plans which provide us with an alternative to an *immediate* solution, which could only be partition.

4.

The best part of our youth will not return to a purely urban and spiritual individual life. Such a return is neither necessary nor desirable, except in the case of a few chosen individuals, those with special gifts whom we cannot by any means blame for so returning. Youth's profound experience of collective work and collective life has become one of the foundations of its existence and there is no reason why it should not remain so. On the contrary: judged by its psychical qualities, our youth is certainly among the best now on earth and among the best in the long history of Israel. This youth, in its working and fighting sections, is pure and idealistic, ready to sacrifice itself for whatever it believes to be great. It is an excellent youth, of which we have every right to be proud, but it is partly misled. We adults, parents, teachers and leaders, have led them astray and go on doing so, thus increasing our guilt day by day. Therefore a change of heart is called for in the whole Jewish camp and in each of the various camps within Jewry, in the Zionist movement and in all its youth organisations, in our central security organisation and in all the groups acting under it. We must concentrate the ample energies of our youth and its wonderful readiness for sacrifice on a constructive aim instead of on the aims leading down the slope of destruction. For, this Palestine in process of upbuilding

leaves room for all the qualities of a true man—among which we must make a point of including civic courage; there are swamps to be drained, rocks to be levelled, fallow fields to be cultivated. Such was the work of our fellows who chose the path of realisation and persisted in it till the dark hour which is now upon us, and whose hands remain at their work even yet. This is the path we have to pursue if we are ever to succeed in dispelling the dark clouds which have gathered ominously over the Land of Israel.

But there is a yet greater task confronting us, calling for even greater sacrifice than that of the soldier who risks his life on the field of battle. On this generation or the next devolves the task of restoring peace between our work of upbuilding and the Arab people, of achieving a genuine rapprochement between our two communities and weaving our Arab neighbours, with all their social and political aspirations, and their physical and spiritual gifts, into the texture of that great and growing work as an equal partner; more than this, we have to weave our work into the larger process of growth and concentration of the whole Middle East, as an active and activating factor. It is not, as slander has it, a task of renunciation, but the task of a great work of upbuilding, capable of giving meaning and purpose to the lives of our young people and of kindling an ardent flame in their breasts which is not the flame of death. This part of the world cannot remain in its present social and cultural state much longer. Our world is a world of conflict, of clashes between opposing forces, the forces of progress on the one hand and those of stagnation and retrogression on the other. Conflict in this country will strengthen the forces of reaction, whereas peace will strengthen the forces of progress. This is the new pedagogic aim that can and must be set for our good youth, and if they march towards it with firm tread, they will reach it and thereby succeed in opening the doors wide to our brethren in exile, those who are suffering and also those whose exile is comfortable and who will then be attracted by the new-old light radiating from the Holy Land, the land of peace and creative work.

October, 1944.

REFLECTIONS OF A GUEST ON VIOLENCE

By HELMUT VON DEN STEINEN

I.

AT THIS stormy moment even courageous people feel that Israel's constructive work in its old country seems to be hardly less endangered than in the period of the Nazi hordes' knocking at the gates of Alexandria only four years ago. The more courageous such Jewish self-observers are, the more they grieve to find dangers by no means arising only from one of the camps concerned, nor yet from only two... No reasonable evaluation of the political facts could give them any hope that this sombre situation will soon clear up. From the muddle of antagonistic tendencies not a single imaginative programme arises to deprive the present difficulties of their cruelty by indicating a concrete way to attractive aims. Still less are any personalities visible who could rally youthful forces round them for hard fights which would yet promise the final display of victorious human values. To expect an encouraging lead from the outside world would seem almost preposterous in a time of daily worsening international discomfiture. In this respect Palestine has the doubtful privilege of demonstrating within its nutshell, with scientific nicety, the chaotic cramps of the whole human body.

So the most important device for anyone to apply to his mental apparatus nowadays is a little telescope, installed on some lookout tower of his brain. The tower should not be built of ivory, the old-fashioned escapology material, but of atom bomb-proof soulsteel, purified in many intellectual furnaces. The lenses of the telescope should be polished according to the formulae which are determined by incessant historical observation. Then the pessimism of the present outlook on the Zionist venture will give way to sounder judgment. Not the shadows of transient party struggles, but the substance of durable communal labours, must be considered in order to produce rational prognostics. Here the record remains thoroughly edifying: though limited to a few hundred thousands of busy workers, the founding of a prosperous Jewish economy in the Ottoman desert belongs to the great achievements of our time. We do not need to illustrate this basic sentence with figures or details. We only want to stress one point for our present purpose: this economy is not merely a material improvisation, like a gold-diggers' town whose ghastly ruins remain deserted after the sweat-paying mine has been exhausted. It is a living organism with a living soul. The genuine progressive trend of its labour, the greyly shimmering glory of its boy and girl agriculturists, pioneers not only of Israel's, but of the

world's socialism; the happy remoulding of a hieratic idiom to the organ of a new life's poetry and a new poetry's life, the return (begun, of course, not ended yet) of feverishly wakeful ghetto fragments to a healthily dreaming entirety—these are the main features of an expanding achievement of a type which history (so the telescope tells us) never allows to be choked by exterior enemies.

All this has been done in two or three decades. Why, then, be overfrightened by visiting storms? Why press for a definite solution of problems which are less urgent in themselves than in the sensibility with which they are felt or exploited in the political battle? A platform cry of incomprehensible folly shouts: Now or never! If we do not once for all arrive at a legalised regulation of our future plans, our future is lost. Certainly there is no such 'once for all'. It is a paradox to hear this impatient slogan from the representatives of a nation which has a much greater independence of time than any European one, always finding, through the darkest tragedies, a new way to its own regeneration. Their main resource in never submitting to the fists of their crudest adversaries was their ceaseless self-criticism. By voluntary admission of their own weakness or, speaking in religious symbols, of their own faithlessness towards their superhuman conscience, they renewed their human conscience, and with it their courage and mastery over life. Is not this moment rather convenient for self-criticism of such a kind? The religious symbols are a matter of strictly personal concern. But for any kind of religion, Jewish, Christian or Moslem, or for any irreligious belief in the omnipotence of an asymbolic nature, the Jewish conscience is sure to be a very real and a very powerful agent. If people saw the Jews seriously criticising themselves they would be deeply impressed and the better among them, who after all do exist in many camps, would feel some shame at participating in the horrors of an anti-semitic revival, and would be ready to help Israel in fructifying the results of its self-examination through concrete actions.

A foreign wanderer in this Hebrew landscape, who owes it a good number of unforgettable impressions, is certainly not the right man publicly to discuss any mistakes which, in his opinion, have been made by its spirited settlers. He does not wish to point out single persons, deeds or plans. But perhaps he could show his gratitude by throwing some more light on a general tendency which, in this critical period, obviously acts as a factor of enormous harm to Jewish moral interests. It is nothing new, but it is not always seen in its right importance. Moreover, it is a psychological aberration whose healing lies entirely within the intimate scope of pure Zionism. If this movement aims to make of the Jewish nation a community among other communities, redeemed from the isolation of the ghetto and the fallacious assimilation of the Diaspora, no impulse in the heart of its people could be more offensive to its aim than the self-isolation evident in terroristic and kindred fanaticisms. It creates

a ghetto of the soul by assimilating itself to the disastrous power slogans of the most heathenish Gentiles: a double stroke at true national dignity. To this uncouth phenomenon of modern Jewish fanaticism a gentle onlooker, an unreserved sympathiser with the Jewish cause, would like to contribute some analytical conclusions derived in part from his experience of other varieties of national fanaticism.

II.

NO MOMENT appears more improper, and is in fact more proper for this kind of reflection than the present time of the nation's fight for its vital right. In quiet times fanaticism is but an immoral luxury, but in trouble and tension it is a deleterious poison. It provokes enemies where there were none before, and it strengthens those it attacks. The belief in its realistic usefulness is on the intellectual level of a man who, in a fit of hysterical obstinacy, throws himself from the top window of a sky-scraper and exclaims, while triumphantly enjoying the fresh air, 'Isn't this fine?'. 'Provided it lasts', added Napoleon's cautious mother during the glamorous rush of her family through similar suicidal glory. The Germans must have felt like that from the burning of the Reichstag down to their attack on Stalingrad. Fanaticism with its inmost cramp is not interested in success, it is interested in only one thing: itself. Its Latin name is 'solipsism', its chief moral feature—radical absence of responsibility.

The bomb-thrower is perhaps not personally cruel, but in his crazy satisfaction at 'being able to do something' he simply does not see that there are lives besides his own which he has not the right to endanger. The pretension of being at war most clearly reveals the illusory character of the fanatics; they have an ugly blindness for the fact that their victims are not their fighting opponents, but harmless and incidentally involved people. Instead of bombs, other supporters of fanaticism throw slogans and kill the intelligence, not in real children, but in child-like adherents of every age and sex. The commonest fanaticism is simply a readiness to be led by the fanatic, to believe in one's right to irresponsible luck and to accept around oneself with gusto a ring of hated prosecutors.

The abyss between the devoted follower of his cause and the fanatical admirer of his own zeal can be made clear in a moment. The real hero knows his limits and acknowledges the existence of other rights besides his own. In the heat of the struggle and by the slander of his enemies he might be confused with his fanatical caricature. In single instances there may be practical doubts how to judge a courageous action. But in the present situation in Palestine these individual misunderstandings are of slight relevance. What matters is a general and open display of fanatical principles and actions stubbornly pretending that they constitute a telling expression of Israel's newest awakening to collective realism. Certain anti-semites would say that they constitute an expression of Israel's con-

tinuation of its most ancient sleep-walking in collective illusion. This point must be considered with the utmost delicacy. From the beginning the religious life of the Jews certainly had an ingredient of very strong self-isolation in which the present fanaticism may possibly have a traditional root. Are the two things really the same? Is this political blindness a modern variation of ancient religious isolationism? Did some Roman proconsul previously give his tough legionaries the same advice of injured haughtiness against it as has now been given by some British general to his bashful conscripts?

The Roman disdain, and sometimes hatred, of the Jews was in its core certainly religious; it came from the uneasiness felt by the broad-minded idoliser of many superhuman powers towards the austere worshipper of the one Deity, whose moral zeal condemned to nothingness the playful splendour of his heathenish competitors. If in our times polytheism were a living system, we could not deny its adherents the right to criticise monotheism as the Hellenes criticised it. But polytheism is not living; and we most categorically deny the bookish survivalists of pagan metaphysics the right to minimise, with merely imitative aestheticism, the wonderful exploit of the Hebrew prophets. It embodied the idea of the one Man in the sacred gesture of a nation fervidly concentrated in its devotion to the one God. Self-isolation in this unique case was only an unavoidable means of self-preservation. Fanaticism, by making safe this sublime idolatry of the idolless potency, though it was never a pleasant show, did at least remain purely passive and trespassed upon no foreign rights. Also, when Christianity and Islam took to themselves the privilege of the monotheistic faith, the Jews' 'gran rifiuto' to abandon to either their primogeniture for savoury lentils was an act of flourishing vigour, not of degenerate inflexibility. The three tests of this are: the inexhaustible treasure of religious culture in holy actions, thoughts, legends, poems and so on, heaped up by the scattered Israelitic communities through so many centuries: their rare efficiency in bringing Eastern wisdom to the barbaric West during the whole period of Europe's formation: and last but not least, their present donation of surviving oriental inheritance to the dissolving mental household of the white man—who greatly needs it.

In modern times, however, this astounding creativeness, which was by its own intention strictly confined to religious values, suffered decay within the general European and Hither-Asiatic decomposition of the monotheistic spirit. Man turned to nature, to free reason and creative art. So Jewish life became sterile in its core and sombrely fanatical (though always, of course, in the passive sense) on its surface. Israel's best children craved a renaissance which was only made possible by their joining the progressive vogue of European civilisation. The legendary inaugurator of this new movement was Spinoza, and the European country where his voice was first heard by the greatest geni as a revelation was also the stage of the most

fruitful Jewish endeavour along this assimilative line. As everyone knows, the debt of intellectually working and playing Germany to its biblical adepts, men and women, from Kant's critical apostle Marcus Herz to George's mystical apostle Friedrich Gundolf, from Rahel Levin to Margarete Susmann, is enormous. Nor could any other European nation complain of lacking rich contributions from its oriental members to the highest civilised spirit of Europe.

Towards the end of the 19th century the first signs of imminent catastrophe appeared before the public eye in Central Europe. An atmosphere of fin-de-siècle agitation spread, and provoked varying excitements of 'sky-high jubilation' and 'death-deep sorrow'. Subtly organised brains observed the lack of common forces amongst all the glories of individual success. New forms of community, political and economic, nationalist and socialist, were hotly discussed. From these moods arose, characteristically in the Austrian, that is, the European-minded German capital, the Jewish movement which raised the thrilling aim of forming such a desirable community in the old Palestine. Every excitement, when compressed into slogans, is justified by nothing but the fertile impulses it attracts, condenses and leads to creative work. Thus the Zionist excitement justified itself by the creation, in less than half a century, of the living Zion which is here.

III.

IN THE MEANTIME, however, the dreaded cataclysm had descended. Germany became the centre of two global concussions by emitting ever more brownish floods of subhuman alluvium. The universal motive of the Teutonic excesses was fear, hysterical terror in face of threatening chaos, and secretly craved annihilation. The great antidote to the passive nihil was the active nihil, the negation of humanity for negation's sake, the totalitarian cramp of soulless power, whirling shapeless masses round a void gravitation centre called the 'führer'. The fundamental quality needed for the fixation of this sort of hysterical mass devotion in every single wretch's mind is, of course, fanaticism — superstitious belief in the central fetish's power, blind self-immersion in the whirling mass, venomous ignorance of the enemy. The enemy as a reality of its own does not exist, and if he existed, he would not be perceived. His substance must be pure fancy in order to excite the antagonistic instincts of the reluctantly hating mass creature. The only responsibility towards him is to misunderstand him; the only satisfaction, to be feared, or at least hated, by him. This disastrous parody of the most elementary values had attractive charms for uprooted and scared masses over many continents and, alas, its infection found an easy way into the heart of the imagined enemy himself, who had become in reality a millionfold victim of the nihilist's murderous frenzy.

At every moment and in every place where real work was possible, fanaticism was absent from the Zionists' life. What cut of desert was

changed into a garden except by common skill and positive enthusiasm? What house was built, what book was printed, even what fight against bandits was put up, except by common efficiency and courage? What would irresponsible self-isolation have meant in all these? It came in only in the sphere of unreal struggle towards unreal or unreally conceived aims. To avoid misunderstandings: the fatal situation which was the base of the sad distortion of Jewish fighting power into reckless fanaticism would be ascribed by no objective observer to the fault of the Zionists. If there had been honest energy, progressive efficiency and 'the wood from which kings are carved' — real, not only pretentious, superiority — at the disposal of the Mandatory Power, the problem of Palestine as a vicious entanglement would not exist. When we think it necessary to discuss Jewish fanaticism, it is not with regard to the past, but to the future. It is not a question either of excusing the Teutonic infection. It is excused a thousand times. Nevertheless, one's appreciation of the rich resources in the Jewish soul would lead one to expect that, in spite of its tragic bereavements, it will in the long run be superior to these weaknesses which are so sympathetically understood.

Jewish fanaticism is by no means a simple imitation of Nazidom. In one aspect it is worse — not as a murderous threat, but as a disheartening abuse of finer mental gifts. The Germans, after all, are sick. They inherit the dangerous reserves of half-barbaric crudity, never, especially in the northern and eastern parts, having fully assimilated the wisdom of Christianity. But their fanaticism is based on no intellectual energy; it is a beastly cramp, an hysterical aberration. The scared masses enjoyed obeying, the leaders in themselves were nothing, they were just hollow masks of commanders who were there to be obeyed. All their brain equipment was mere mud. The ugly mess remains, so to speak, in the sphere of bodily indecency. So a blowing up of the spook is imaginable at any time. But for the brainy Jews the brutish German emotionalism was the catalytic agent of a far more refined decomposition. The old religious motives of self-isolation reappeared in pseudo-religious arrogance. What was the faith in a power which had chosen its own people, but punished it severely for all its irresponsible lapses from its duty, now became simply the faith in one's own superior right, without the shadow of a feeling that the 'elected' might sin and be tried and punished for it. This kind of moral pretension without moral effort most naturally embitters the despised but stronger antagonist. Display of intellectual superiority always hurts. But if it is supported by moral cynicism, based upon moral exclusivity, it may provoke cold fury. Offensive manners may complete the catastrophe. We must not forget that in some parts of Palestine the former ghetto of Eastern Europe is still existing and conserves a state of paralysed monotheistic rigidity from which the happier Jews of Central and Western Europe had fled to more humane, if not yet perfect, freedom.

On the surface, the poverty and lower class frustration in those parts produced manners and gestures which were only fleeting episodes in the long epic of Jewish history, and which, in the fresh air of the Palestinian village, tend to evaporate, but still can lend, in the eyes of a malevolent antagonist, a more repulsive appearance to the repellence of aberring aims.

To conclude these pathetic reflections: the Nazi folly pendulated between the great miracle and the great nihil. Reason, always a sore point in German psychology, was suppressed. In Jewish fanaticism it is by no means suppressed, and gives method to its folly. The mad alternatives of a common burning scene, surpassing the Nibelungen despairs with sombre historical records, on the one hand, and on the other incredible luck, not arrived at by meritorious actions, but magically induced by stubborn belief in an absurdity—when will they stop provoking subtle argumentation and logical casuistry? The past offers not a single instance of the total collapse of a sound working group, and it gives many instances of what we may call a miracle: that a group in its hard fight, when inspired by a revival of its deepest moral forces, throws away the poisoned arms which were smuggled into its hands by hostile deceit, and finds in the lifting storm a way of strengthening the peaceful and prosperous community with the addition of its former adversaries. One thing is certain: the world wants, and still more, needs, peaceful collaboration, and the example of the Jews would give it immense hope which in its turn would reflect like a warming beam on its authors. The fight against the Nazi infection is still the world theme. Any Jewish advance along this steep road would bring them as allies those who find the courage to make similar progress. These results, of course, must ripen slowly. 'Now or never' cannot help. But the tenacious and sober belief in the future seems a better solace, even in the darkest hour, than the Teuton-like but sophisticated dice-casting at the banks of imaginary Rubicons.

IV.

A FULL RESTITUTION of the genuinely Jewish fighting style (which even at this moment is by no means corrupted, but only confused) would not limit its field of action to this tiny margin between desert and sea salt. Zionism was begotten in the pulsing heart of international Jewry. All its evolutions have an immediate effect on the great community which is global today. But what does dispersion on the earth's surface mean in our time of air-conditioned traffic and ether-conditioned talk? When Croydon is nearer to Jerusalem for Weizmann than Jerusalem was to Jaffa for Herzl, and when the speeches of a Zionist Congress in Switzerland are being caught sooner by every kibbutz radio listener than by the back-bencher in the meeting hall, the sharp division between Yishuv and Diaspora has vanished. The steadily closer interwoven world problems at all points

on the planet make the union of national groups unshakable, wherever their single representatives settle. Thus, on the one hand, the tension of Palestine settlement is greatly reduced. The Yishuv does not need certain iron walls of independence, which in earlier decades were deemed both decorative and protective. But on the other hand, the Yishuv's responsibility towards its Jewish brethren who are living in close contact with the other nations has become more urgent. Total assimilation is dated by the bourgeois 19th century, which seems more antiquated, as far as Israel is concerned, than the epoch of the Persian kings. So the Jews' reinforced international community finds one, if not the only, moral centre in the old country, whose inhabitants become pioneers not for thousands, but for millions. From this point of view, too, iron walls are a nuisance. In other words, the horrid fetish 'state' has lost the last vestige of its vampirish right. It is not necessary to go into this problem in further detail. Whatever ineffective innocence was shown in face of its venomous nature fifty years ago could be pardoned—but today it is the all-round symbol of everything negative in social development. Its sorcerer-devotees' only interior power, humming in empty brain spaces all around the globe, is, of course, the same fanaticism which we observe distorting the fine features of regenerating Judah.

We do not want to close this criticism without putting it in its right perspective. The participation of the two other peoples concerned in the Palestine muddle must be evaluated in a few words as far as they are co-agents or co-sufferers in the fanatical tension. We have already hinted at the British ruler's factual responsibility for the present situation. Without embarking on political excursions, the meteorologist who is interested in the moral weather changes must fall into deep sorrow, the more so as he is convinced that the last substantial reserves of European humanity have been entrusted to the English nation. When, into the bargain, he has experienced the long process of Nazification in Germany, he cannot help stating with horror some familiar symptoms of the ugly invading disease. The central point is the reckless tapping of the anti-Jewish underworld mud when it is considered useful for the daily conflict. Or in fact it is not a question of use, but of obsession. One fears that the same leaders, though inflicting cruel pain on their victims, really believe themselves to be the victims. The material symbol of this kind of prosecution mania is the barbed wire. It spreads over the whole surface of Jewish Palestine like a vicious rash on human skin. Every private British soldier trips about as if wearing a personal barbed wire crinoline, while the officers and leading officials keep the barbed wire expression between their eyes and on their lips. It seems the Second World War has been won only as far as tanks and bombs could go. We should like to think ourselves over-sensitive to these symptoms, and hope to be refuted by healthy deeds. Do people in England clearly see the very danger for England? It would not be

the first time that the decisive virus of decomposition penetrated from Imperial rotting limbs to the heart of the Mother Country.

For the Jews, anyhow, there is no choice. As long as the British Empire exists they have got to appeal to its progressive forces in order to unite in a common effort against the common Nazi enemy, who in varying masquerade skims over both partners' faces grinning wickedly.

The Jewish responsibility towards the Arabs is very simply defined. It is not only a question of politics, but it deals with permanent and vital values. Zionism decided to settle among the Arabs. As these old owners of the country had lived for many centuries under an incredibly corrupt foreign rule and as nothing had been done to preserve Palestine right and left of the Jordan from falling into full desert abjection the Zionist enterprise was justified by all humane principles. But it included, of course, from the beginning the strict duty not only not to interfere with the rights of the neglected Palestinians, but to make the new settlement a centre of progressive civilisation, contributing to the rescue of the Middle East from Ottoman dissolution. Here interfered, tragically for the sincerest Jewish endeavour, the maddening ambiguity of British Colonial Policy which did everything to separate the despised 'natives' from the intruding European 'Boers'. Nevertheless the raising of the Arab level, though quite insufficient, since the separation from Turkey, became an undoubted accessory to the Jewish settlement. So the base of future mutual understanding between the two Semitic groups is not damaged by facts. The picturesque ruins of oriental feudalism have been so far strong enough to bar an upheaval of the toiling masses who greatly need it. It will come however, and the Jews are responsible for being useful in a brotherly function to the right side. No less urgent seems the intellectual adaptation of the Arab minds to the inevitable problems of modern humanity. Certainly they bring to it noble gifts dreamingly rooted in the magic soil of our most venerable ancient culture. For a superficially modernised petty bourgeois intelligentsia the nationalist appeal is necessarily of dangerous charm, and Jewish fanaticism would only serve to encourage its fusion in primitive savagery with Nazi technique. We must be satisfied to know that in both the social and the spiritual aspect the most enlightened socialists and the most experienced intellectuals on the Jewish side clearly see the way they have to go. Hashomer Hatzair and Ihud are living testimonies to this positive fact. They are small minorities. But hopes raised on easily accepted popular slogans would be no hopes in a tempestuous period like ours. The fate of the Palestinian Jews and of the Jews in general is but quite superficially distinct from the fate of any human group on our planet. All is change and danger and hope. By their unique gift of expression the Jews are only privileged in that they may more easily set a great example.

September, 1946.

PAST PROGNOSSES — RIGHT AND WRONG

FORECASTS AND WHAT THEY ARE WORTH

October, 1944

It appears to me that the time has now come for drawing up the balance. At any rate, the time is very near at hand. He who inclines his ear and listens to what is and what is not being said, and how it is said or left unsaid, must needs perceive the first signs of disenchantment. For the present the voice of disenchantment is still stifled and suppressed, and an appearance of normality is being strenuously kept up. There is yet no frank confession of the sins committed and the mistakes made. But that is a very human and natural attitude to adopt during the first hours of disenchantment, and we cannot reasonably complain of it. The process of change is slow, halting, quiet and, as it were, a little ashamed of itself; or, to use another figure of speech, it walks on tiptoe. And those who beat a retreat are in the habit of hiding their discomfiture behind a show of noisy arrogance. However, let us refrain from jeering at such changes; for by jeering and scoffing, we should only strengthen the obstinacy of those erring souls and retard the return to reality which we desire. Although it is our duty to assist in this process of disenchantment as much as possible, truth is in any case bound to emerge sooner or later, victorious over the obstacles it meets.

What then are the signs of this hour of political disenchantment? There are four of them: a) the discountenancing of decayed slogans b) their disappearance c) a shifting of emphasis d) a gradual and stealthy return to slogans formerly despised. These four signs are all to be seen in the camp of the Zionist majority, who for five whole years has refused to listen to us. At times we are astounded at the unerring way in which our own views and opinions have stood the test of time. For our forecasts, the doubts we voiced, the warnings we gave, the political means we recognised as false, — how much of this has even now been tragically vindicated by events! And that the rest will also come true — and in precisely the manner we predicted — is by now only too obvious to all those who look reality in the face.

Can it be that we were so much wiser than the others? Nothing could be more foolish than an attempt to explain the rightness of our predictions in terms of personal superiority. Our superior wisdom is capable of one explanation, and one only: the course we followed was the course of true Zionism. Hence our path was the right path. In this case, as in others, the Lord of Hosts was not in the earthquake, but in the still, small voice.....

S. Zemah

May, 1944.

The Annual Conference of the British Labour Party, meeting in Blackpool, approved a report in favour, inter alia, of a "voluntary transfer" of the Arab population, or part of it, to other Arab countries — an idea which had never been adopted by the official Zionist policy. In his evidence before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, Dr. Weizmann told how "once or twice when I got to know about the sort of resolution which the Labour Conference... was intending to pass, I had to go down on my knees and ask them to modify and moderate it."

The comprehensive report just published by the General Council of the British Labour Party includes a proposal concerning the future of Palestine. There can really be no doubt that the intentions of the authors of this proposal are disinterested and sympathetic. Nor can one doubt their sincere desire to help the cause of the Jewish people and its revival in Zion. We ought indeed to be glad that, even in these troubled days, new friends of the unfortunate Jewish people stand up, courageous enough to voice from the platforms of world politics an emphatic demand that our people shall have justice.

However, this is the very reason why, bitter though it may appear, we are bound to say that the scheme as it stands does not advance the realisation of the aims of the Zionist cause. On the contrary, its effect may well be to delay and imperil it. The fact is that the just demand for the abolition of the arbitrary restrictions imposed by the White Paper on Jewish immigration and Jewish settlement in Palestine has been linked with a recommendation for the transfer of the Arab 'minority' from Palestine. Years ago, for the first time, a similar proposal came from the Royal Commission, and in our view it then caused, both in Palestine and in neighbouring Arab countries, more empoisoning of the atmosphere than even the proposed partition which was the main recommendation of the Commission's scheme.

The idea of 'transfer' is regarded by all of us as most strange indeed.

Just as we shall never give up our right to return to our homeland, so there is no doubt that the Arabs, too, will never give up their right to continue to live in this part of their homeland. And just as we shall never, of our own accord, leave the fields and vineyards we have cultivated and planted and the holy places that are dear to us, even if we are offered the most generous compensation, so, it may safely be assumed, would it be the case with the Arabs. 'What is loathsome to yourself, do not do unto your neighbour'. Zionism can derive no benefit whatever from such a proposal.

The Zionist movement has again and again declared with justice that its goal can be fully achieved without a single Arab being ousted from his lands. Repeatedly we have drawn attention to the fact that the Zionist enterprise, so far from having ever harmed Arab interests in any way, has bestowed economic advantages on them. The fact is that the numbers of Palestine Arabs have grown considerably during the last 28 years. Significantly enough, the authors of the 'Biltmore' programme (which we do not support) have recently shown an appreciable measure of understanding for the dangerous implications of the 'transfer' idea, realising that it would threaten both our moral and our political foundation. Shall we be able to hold our own in face of the misguided advice of friends as vigorously and with the same determination as we did when confronted with the evil schemes of our enemies?

August, 1945.

The victory of the Labour Party in Britain is a big event, revealing the moral greatness of the British and proving their political maturity. They are now really and truly out for the establishment of a new Britain. Seeing that they can no longer rely on the Conservatives, they have decided to give the historic chance to others, this time to Labour.

Doubtless an attempt will soon be made to establish British industry on new foundations, as otherwise it will hardly be possible successfully to compete with the United States and with Russia, or avoid the risk of becoming a second class power. Now the people of Britain has a free hand to carry out housing and general insurance schemes, and to develop public medical services and work towards full employment.

In European countries such as Greece, Italy, Yugoslavia and Austria, Fascist or semi-Fascist groups will be allowed to rise to power no more; instead, liberal and socialist elements will receive encouragement. By this means Russia, too, will be made aware of the birth of fresh prospects for the building of a new world based on juster social foundations than we used to know. It will be of interest to see to what extent the results of the British elections will influence American public opinion. They would probably have been a source of strength to the late Mr. Roosevelt. Now they will occupy the uncertain vacuum created by his death.

The British Empire will not pass into a state of liquidation; it will only become more liberal and less reactionary. The British policy for India will now receive a fresh impetus which may lead to success. Also the Arab world and the Middle East generally will probably secure a wider measure of political freedom and new opportunities for social and economic development.

For us in Palestine, the British elections constitute a new turning

point. The situation cannot remain as it is. The Labour Government will surely look for a way out of the present political tangle, taking full account of the rights of both peoples, Arabs and Jews alike. Particularly will they endeavour wholeheartedly to encourage Jewish immigration into Palestine. The previous declarations of the Labour Party cannot have been only lip-service.

But when yesterday's opposition leaders seek at once to put into full effect their own political declarations on Palestine, they will find that everything is not as smooth as it looks. It is to be feared that they will encounter fierce opposition if they revert to the partition scheme. Mr. Churchill's Government is said to have been inclined to accept such a solution. Let us hope that the Labour Government will make no attempt further to reduce the area of Palestine, as this would infuriate large sections of both communities.

There is also another course, which has never been embarked upon by any Government: for almost the space of a generation the policy of encouraging rapprochement and comradeship between the two peoples has been altogether ignored. Now the time has arrived for an attempt to advance in another direction, following the path of Jewish-Arab-British cooperation. Let us hope that the Labour Government will go into the matter thoroughly and come to the conclusion that this is the only possible course in line with true British tradition, and the only one beneficial to all concerned.

This course will not by any means be easy, nor will it be a short cut. It will take time and really great efforts, continuous and methodical, will have to be made. However, at its end stands success.

It is to be hoped that one of the first things decided will be the admission to Palestine of thousands

of Jewish refugees, Jews whose hearts are in Palestine. A statement from the Labour Government on the necessity for Jewish-Arab cooperation would be a first step towards the opening of the country to all the homeless fugitives who

AZZAM BEY'S STATEMENT

October, 1945.

Even now there are Arabs still holding out a hand to us and the British Government in order to help the Palestine problem to a peaceful solution in which the needs of the Jewish people would be taken into account. Azzam Bey, the Secretary of the Arab League, has recently stated that "the Arabs are prepared to make far-reaching concessions towards the gratification of the Jewish desire to see Palestine established as a spiritual or even as a material home." (Haaretz, 24.10) When he said that, he was perhaps, as some people are inclined to assume, thinking of a partition of the country; as a matter of fact some time ago he stated that the Arabs were prepared to consider a suitable scheme; "No Arab body has recanted what he then stated" (Haaretz, 24.10). But is it really certain that Azzam Bey only thought of partition? Or should we see in his words an expression of general preparedness to find a compromise solution? This is how Azzam Bey

are at present distributed in provisional shelters, and who keep knocking at the gates of Palestine.

The hour has struck. We may now start once more to breathe the air of friendly cooperation with others.

motivated his readiness to consider a partition scheme:

"If you could assure me that the handing of Palestine to the Jews would mean peace everywhere, I should give them all of it. However, such a solution would involve constant conflicts like those which developed in Ireland. But if a partition of the country is likely to effect a solution and put an end to the present disturbed situation, let us study such a possibility most carefully" (Le Progrès Egyptien, 5.10. 1945).

It would appear that it is not the manner of solution that matters most, but the ultimate goal; not just a partition scheme, but a solution which would guarantee peace in this country. If we were able to bring up for international and Arab-Jewish discussion another solution scheme, under which the country would not have to be carved up, who knows whether we should not even now find a way out of the impasse?¹

ANTI-ZIONIST DECLARATIONS BY JEWS IN ARAB COUNTRIES

October, 1945.

Our press publishes a great deal of scornful, and at the same time, pitying comment on those Jews of Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut and other places who have recently declared their loyalty to the anti-

Zionist policy of their respective Governments. Mostly, this comment stresses that the statements made by those Jews do not reflect the real views of Jewry in the Arab countries, but that in truth Iraqi,

Syrian and Lebanese Jews, who have never put up either with their surroundings or with their dispersion generally, are yearning for a chance of speedy immigration into Palestine, and of complete redemption in the homeland. It is also said in the Hebrew papers that the authors of these declarations are well-to-do Jews who are only loosely connected with their community, and that they are more concerned for their own welfare than that of their people. Furthermore it is explained that even these people have not delivered their declarations of their own accord and in conformity with their real opinions, but under duress, as they had to yield to the despotic authorities of the Arab states.

It may safely be assumed that most of the above press comment is essentially correct. The desire for immigration into Palestine is rather strong in the Arab countries, though there are certain differences and nuances in it: the desire to emigrate is, for instance, stronger in the Yemen than in Syria, and stronger in the latter country than in Egypt. It is true, of course, that "notables" are always bound to submit to the pressure of the authorities to a greater extent, and that it often becomes difficult for them to distinguish their own private interests from those of their community. But not all of them act under duress. There are some deliberate assimilators among them who, like certain Jews of similar standing in Europe or America, have never received any kind of national or Zionist education.

From this point on, however, things become rather conjectural. There are certain aspects of the problem which, as far as can be seen, have never been covered in the Hebrew press. What, in fact, are the genuine interests of the Jewish minorities in the Arab countries? They are twofold: On one hand, political and economic equality of rights, both in theory and in practice; and on the other, freedom to maintain contacts with Palestine and the

Zionist movement and to start local Zionist organisations, as well as to have a free hand in the fields of Zionist and Hebrew education and pioneer training for future agricultural work in the upbuilding of Palestine. The Jewish minorities living in Arab countries need all that no less than the rest of Jewry. They must also be intent on preserving their right to emigrate from their countries to Palestine, taking their fortunes with them.

The conditions in which Jews are living under Arab rule are far from satisfactory. They vary somewhat from country to country. In the matter of equality of rights, Jews are particularly badly served in the Yemen. This is clearly reflected in the extent of Jewish immigration into Palestine from that country. The number of Yemenite immigrants, in fact, exceeds the total from all other Arab countries. In Egypt, by contrast, the situation of Jewry is relatively good. Accordingly, the extent of emigration of Egyptian Jews into Palestine at the moment is almost negligible. In the Lebanon and in Syria, conditions up to a short time ago resembled those prevailing in Egypt. Recently, however, the feeling of security among Syrian Jews has been shaken, and there has been a turn for the worse in their legal and juridical status.

In so far as the anti-Zionist statements delivered by Jews residing in Arab countries are really the result of pressure exerted upon them by the local authorities, the arbitrary attitude of the latter should be strongly blamed. Such dealing does not harmonise with the Arab national liberation movement, which might have been expected to show an inkling of understanding for the Jewish national liberation movement; and it constitutes no proper course for countries claiming membership in the family of democratic nations. It should be stressed that in Egypt the situation is more satisfactory than in the other Arab countries, despite the fact that for several generations a large part of Egypt-

¹ In a press conference on July 8, 1946, Azzam Pasha said: "The Arabs and the Jews are not really opposed to each other. There is no reason why with patience, negotiations, time and the pacification of spirits we cannot find a way out of this thorny problem."

November 25, 1945.

ian Jewry were foreign subjects enjoying the protection of the "capitulations." After the liberation of Egypt, these privileged foreigners simply became members of an ethnical and religious minority, and are often reminded of their "blame-worthy" past.

While the establishment of a local Zionist Organisation and the pursuit of Zionist activities are legal in Egypt, things are quite different in the Yemen and Syria. There they are banned altogether. In the Lebanon, the situation in this respect is rapidly deteriorating. Immigration into Palestine from the Lebanon has now been completely prohibited.

This is the situation of Jewry in the Arab countries at present, according to the scanty reports that reach us. The Zionist policy is, therefore, confronted with the double problem: What can be done to improve the situation, both as regards general security and equality of rights for Jews in Arab countries, and as regards their freedom to maintain contacts with the Zionist Movement and with Palestine?

It is certainly easier to answer this extremely serious question negatively rather than positively and to say what the Zionist movement must not do, for fear of worsening the position of Jewry in these countries. It is quite clear that any step which might harm Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine would react adversely on these Jews in neighbouring territories. Our leaders must be fully conscious of this interconnection when adopting important political decisions or before issuing important statements. While this consideration cannot, of course, be the only decisive factor, it must never be overlooked, as it concerns the well-being of one of the largest groups of our people. (The estimated number of Jews in Eastern countries is 750,000). It must be borne in mind that Eastern Jewry constitutes one of the most important reserves for the upbuilding of our homeland.

It is far more difficult to give a positive reply to the above question.

Not every improvement in Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine will automatically produce an improvement in the conditions of Jewry in the Arab countries. It may be assumed that such a change for the better in Palestine might improve their civic status and give them an increased sense of security, but on the other hand, just this very amelioration might weaken their desire to emigrate to Palestine.

Such is the dilemma in which our brethren living in the Arab countries find themselves. Our journalists, however, whose comment on them is published in the Hebrew press, live in far less complicated conditions. We must beware of adding to the difficulties of Iraqi, Syrian and Lebanese Jews by worsening unnecessarily our relations with the Palestine Arabs. Even if we could rescue European Jewry by such a policy, at the expense of our brethren in the Arab countries, it would be an extremely grave and bitter responsibility to undertake. However, this alternative does not exist and the situation is that the same difficulties which obstruct the realization of Zionism in Palestine also encumber Jewish life in the Arab countries. By removing these difficulties in Palestine, we shall certainly not aggravate the problems in Arab countries. On the contrary, in the long run, it would make life easier for Jews under Arab rule.

I should not like to be a prophet of doom, but I regard it as my duty to say that the contrary way, leading to constant strife between the two communities in this country, would probably convert these Jews into anti-Zionists in time; anti-Zionism would then appear not only in the statements of their spokesmen, but what would be far worse, it would come from the hearts of these Jewish masses!... Let us hope that Eastern Jews will never fall victims either to the pressure of the despots of the Arab world under whose rule some of them are now living or to the political blunders of the Jewish leaders in this country.

E. Simon

When the British Labour Party assumed power, a change of policy was expected by all Jews of Palestine. When this failed to come into being, patience which had indeed been sorely tried, translated itself into over-growing tension. On the night of November 2, 1945, acts of sabotage were carried out on railway stretches throughout Palestine, apparently intending this to serve as a warning that Jews are capable of rendering Palestine useless for Imperial communications, should their demands not be met. During the ensuing curfew and searches and in the course of demonstrations against both these punitive measures as well as against the policy of deliberate procrastination, there were casualties in Tel Aviv, several children included.

"Davar" has been suspended for a week. We protest against this ruling, as we do in all cases of restriction of the freedom of speech, and of the freedom of press. We do hope that by the time these lines appear in print, the newspaper of the Jewish Labour Federation (or rather, of its majority) will again be reaching its scores of thousands of readers. Then "Davar" will be able to reply to our criticism, which we make, not because of the provisional ban imposed on the paper, but in spite of it. We are tackling an important problem here, and not even the ban imposed on "Davar" by the authorities should be allowed to silence the voice calling for a domestic clarification.

In the last number of "Davar," just before the suspension of the paper, a cartoon appeared, showing young children of 6 or 7 who were wounded in the streets of Tel Aviv during the recent events. The legend read: "Excellent snipers they are. They have not missed their targets, small though they were." The cartoon and the caption are intended to make a twofold impression: a) The children were roaming the streets of Tel Aviv "innocently" during the curfew hours, and in this adults bore no responsibility whatsoever. b) The British soldiers fired on these children intentionally. Both these assumptions are incorrect, the second of them even more so than the first.

It cannot be assumed that the children were in the streets, during

the curfew hours, simply out of curiosity. The fact is that during the last few years an ugly habit has spread among us of sending children to participate in all kinds of political demonstrations, and even in rioting. Those of our teachers and educators who wholeheartedly oppose this ugly practice have no influence whatever on their "patriotic" colleagues, and the vociferations of demagogues have succeeded in silencing the consciences of many parents. If there is any need for demonstrations, let the leaders march in the front ranks, but leave young children in peace!

The second assumption is even less true. We are now conducting a bitter struggle against England. Mr. Bevin's statement has given rise to much disappointment among Britain's friends in the Zionist movement, because it entirely disregarded the national character of our problem and the deep roots of our movement, and utterly ignored the most vital needs of our people. The opportunities offered by Mr. Bevin for the abolition of the White Paper — opportunities which require all our attention and all our sense of responsibility — cannot make up for the fact that his statement has entirely ignored our vital national needs. It has aroused the anger not only of "Davar" and of its cartoonist. But we must not allow our mental equilibrium to be disturbed by Mr. Bevin's statement. Surely, even now, we can say: The British soldier in Palestine is, gen-

erally speaking, no personal foe of the Yishuv;¹ he does not open fire on Jewish children just for his pleasure. The fact is that during the events at Athlit and in Montefiore Quarter, the British soldier in Palestine displayed quite a great deal of restraint. If in Montefiore Quarter Jewish youths boasted of their "victory" over the British Army, it was a victory that was made possible only because an order of self-restraint seems to have been issued at that time.

Now, however, it would seem that that order has been revoked. Now they open fire, if need be, and sometimes blood flows; blood of adults and children alike. It is quite terrible, and there are people responsible for that blood, both among the British and in our own camp. But the British soldier who shoots on receiving an order to do so, and who formerly restrained himself, also acting upon instructions, is to be blamed least of all. The British soldier, too, is a victim of the foolish and inhuman policy carried out by both, or even by all three, parties concerned in the political struggle. Our children, in particular,

are the victims of this policy, whether they are hit by bullets or "only" injured to the depth of their souls.

Difficile est satiram non scribere, and possibly it is also hard to avoid drawing a cartoon, a cartoon about those politics that have brought us so far, about those politics which have united against us the two other factors in this country, and which keep wasting, to no purpose at all, the constructive energies and goodwill of our youths, directing them to "wage war" against Britain, instead of rallying them round building and creative tasks in towns and villages, in the domain of immigration and settlement, and also in that kind of defence which never exceeds its predetermined duty. How sad that the spirit of the Irgun Zevai Leumi has started to reign supreme in the camp of self-defence, even at the time when Revisionist politics have got the upper hand in the political sphere. It is this terrifying consistency that is mocked by the humorist and caricatured by the cartoonist; but he who deplores it can contemplate it only with tears in his eyes.

E. Simon

FAILURE AND PROGRESS

November, 1945.

Mr. Bevin's long-awaited statement of November 13, 1945, which all Zionists had expected would open up at least some vista of attempts in the future of a satisfactory solution of the Palestine problem and would rescind at least the most cruel restrictions on Jewish immigration and land sales, imposed by the White Paper of 1939, came as a bitter blow to all. Instead of trying to find some means of satisfying the acknowledged and just national demands of both the Jewish and Arab peoples, the statement only dealt with the refugee problem, which, it alleged, could not be solved by Palestine alone. It provided for an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry to be sent out, with orders to submit its findings within 120 days. This delay meant yet another winter for homeless Jews in Europe — alas, not the last one...

The official Zionist policy has failed, and the Zionist movement has suffered a heavy blow. While we cannot assert that better results

could have been achieved by our following another political course, we were always perfectly sure that the official Biltmore policy would

¹ This is, alas, no longer absolutely true; the attitude of the "average British soldier" has changed for the worse.

fail in the end, and that that failure would entail grave results for the entire movement.

The official Zionist policy has actually failed. This was declared by some of its own supporters, as early as a few weeks ago. They themselves asked that the course should be altered. They did not call for a change of the Zionist goal, but for a change of methods. They asked that the traditional methods of the Zionist movement—propaganda, information, negotiations—should be abandoned and replaced by political methods which we had always denounced and utterly despised.

The official claim for the conversion of Palestine in its entirety into a Jewish state, has been rejected by the British Labour Government, by the same circles who, a few months before, had adopted the official Zionist policy, the Biltmore programme. The British Labour Party accepted at the time not only 100%, but 120% of "Biltmore" by deciding on two additions to that programme: The extension of the boundaries of Palestine, and the transfer of the Arab population by their own consent. And we still remember: When the Labour Government came to power in Britain, the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem and Tel Aviv went about with jubilation in their eyes in the streets of their cities, holding in their hands the list of members of the new Cabinet, and proclaiming that there was a Zionist majority in the British cabinet. And these very people have now issued a statement showing that they have not the least idea of what Zionism is, and of what the Jewish problem is. The fact is that, in the whole new document, not the slightest reference to the Jewish people will be found. They only speak of a "Jewish community". They recognize a Jewish Home, but the word "national" has been dropped! They have not a single word to say about Zionist enterprise in this country, that enterprise which had been highly praised in the White Paper, not to mention the Royal Commission Report. Twice in the new

document it is stated that the problem of the Jewish Community has arisen as a result of Nazi persecutions. We have before us not only a mixture of ignorance and lack of appreciation, but in addition we find a further echo of that official Zionist argument, which during the last few years used to guide us to base our political demands on the present plight of Jewry, and especially on the refugee problem.

Mr. Bevin's statement was welcomed by the world press and by the non-Jewish public in Britain, but hardly in the United States of America. However, in my view this document has by no means been compiled by a statesman who knows his job. It does not compare in any way with the Royal Commission Report, nor with Mr. Churchill's White Paper of 1922. There was a fine chance to make a new approach to the Palestine policy, if the authors of the document had tackled the problem with courage, and if they had let themselves be guided by the principles preached both by the Labour party and by the Labour Government, as far as general political problems are concerned. Mr. Bevin's statement does not reflect any confidence in the possibility of reshaping the political world, nor does it betray the least desire to carry out any big reform in this country, which is a Holy Land to three great religions. True, it is difficult to bridge the differences of religion and language, of cultural and social life, and of ways of thought and conduct. But woe to the leaders of the Labour Party if they recoil before such difficulties, since they will encounter no less difficult problems in other parts of the Empire as well. Such problems can only be solved by constructive ideas. In Mr. Bevin's statement no strong revolutionary inclination manifests itself, marching forward, impelled by a hearty desire to remove all obstacles in the way of reconstruction in this destroyed world of ours. From this point of view, Mr. Bevin's statement is a sinister warning to the entire world, which has been waiting for wise reforms.

Instead of the new motto for which we had been waiting, Mr. Bevin not only describes, almost with pleasure, the difficulties arising from the differences dividing the two peoples, but also maintains that "the Government has always endeavoured to find some settlement under which both Jews and Arabs would be able to live side by side in peace and co-operate for the benefit of the country as a whole, but all those endeavours have been in vain". We have heard a great deal about the continuity in British Government policy. We know that succeeding Governments fully honour the undertakings of their predecessors; therefore, no doubt, we should show some understanding for the fact that the Labour Government has not been courageous enough to cancel, in one sweep, the White Paper which is part of the heritage of the Chamberlain period. But we fail to grasp why the Labour Government have deemed it necessary to identify themselves with their predecessors' policy of inaction, and have even ventured to say that his Majesty's Government has never shrunk from any effort to bring about peaceful relations between the two peoples. To this last statement we can only say: "No, gentlemen". Both peoples, whatever differences divide them, are of the opinion that His Majesty's Government has done nothing, or very little indeed, towards the bridging of the gap between them, and that it has not made any effort to find a constructive solution which would enable both peoples to live peacefully together. We have become used to the argument that they "have made every effort" from Jewish official quarters, too. But, surely, had both the Government and the Jews really been making such efforts to create conditions in which Arab-Jewish co-operation would be possible, there would have been no need either for the new Inquiry Committee, or for the new statement delivered by the Government. It is these very general phrases, the wording and composition of the new document, which have given

rise to bitter disappointment, even in circles that were ready to understand the difficulties in which the Labour Government found themselves, and were ready to wait with confidence and patience for a new statement from the Labour Government on British policy in Palestine.

Moreover, the fierce pain we suffered in the past, because no effective action was taken to rescue the remnant of our homeless refugees, should not be overlooked. True, we know that the Labour Government acts with the utmost caution in other political fields as well, but its conduct over the question of certificates really exceeds all limits of reasonable caution, and shows a measure of timidity which does not add in any way to the honour of the Government of a great power. In all statements that preceded Mr. Bevin's, the monthly quota of 1500 certificates was mentioned as a *minimum* proportion of what was really required. Yet in spite of this, neither President Truman's intervention—though the political weight of the President of the USA can hardly be exaggerated—nor the efforts made by the Labour Party, nor the pressure of public opinion throughout the world, have succeeded in adding to that shamefully small minimum even a single certificate.

The Yishuv and the entire Jewish people expected some kind of liberal gesture in the matter of certificates. The immediate grant of say 30,000 certificates as a contribution towards easing the desperate situation of the refugees would not have driven the Arab world to revolt, and it would have considerably lessened the resentment roused by the contents of Mr. Bevin's utterly depressing statement.

But we should not be blind to the fact that this document contains positive points, too—rays of light, as it were. First of all, we must stress that in Mr. Bevin's statement no confirmation whatsoever can be found of the White Paper of 1939. Mr. Bevin adduces a great number of statements of policy issued by His Majesty's Government during

the last few years, but it is quite possible that that very accumulation of quotations was intended to reduce the importance of each statement. Moreover, the fact remains that Mr. Bevin's statement has reopened the discussion of the Palestine problem, and has made possible the revision of that White Paper which has now ceased to be the last word in Britain's policy in Palestine.

A committee consisting of British and American representatives has been set up. They are to investigate the Palestine problem all over again, and to submit their recommendations to the Governments of both Great Britain and the United States of America, both those intended to relieve the needs of the hour, and those pertaining to a permanent solution. A further point in Mr. Bevin's statement was that, while His Majesty's Government would take, on their own initiative, the decision with regard to the temporary arrangements to be made, the decision concerning a final solution would rest with the United Nations.

It is true that the investigations of such a committee must proceed at a slow pace, and also that the need to have the recommendations approved by the United Nations will slow up the actual implementing of any recommendation; and true too that delays may bring further disasters upon the remnants of Jewry in Europe. However, on the other hand, there can hardly be any doubt that the frame of the White Paper policy has been broken up. The procedure of speeding up the destruction of that frame must now be accelerated, and we should regard it as our foremost concern to see that important amendments are incorporated in the provisional arrangements that will undoubtedly be made on the basis of the interim recommendations, not only as regards the immigration quotas, but also as regards the Land Transfer Regulations. First of all, it may be hoped that the members of the Inquiry Committee will succeed in finding a construct-

ive political formula of compromise which will meet the vital needs of both peoples.

A new chapter has opened in the history of the development of the Zionist movement. We are bound to have to start our work all over again, but we can say that we are in a position to do that. A good chance has been offered us by the establishment of a joint Anglo-American Committee, and we should gain whatever advantage we can from the new situation. What is made of the new chance will depend on us, too, when we make our appearance before the Committee. Recently voices have been heard suggesting that we should boycott the Committee, and that we should influence the course of events by other lines of action.

It will be the Executive of the Jewish Agency that will determine the official political course. It will be a decision fraught with destiny. We must choose between a campaign of enlightenment and a militant struggle. There is no way of combining both courses of action, neither can we remain in a state of constant hesitation. A decision will also have to be taken on whether we are to stick to the "Biltmore" programme or to start preparing a compromise solution.

In fact it makes no great difference whether we fail to appear before the Inquiry Committee or whether we choose to do so on the basis of the "Biltmore" programme. The "Biltmore" platform has been rejected, and there is no chance that the Anglo-American Committee or the United Nations will be prepared to accept it. Eventually, our central institutions must realize that we shall have to put up with a compromise solution in Palestine. Our utmost concern is that that compromise solution should enable us to continue the development of our National Home on a large scale. The failure of the "Biltmore" policy has shown that putting up extremist demands does not by any means ensure an advantageous compromise solution. We must start preparing for such a solution.

Here I should like to repeat every single word that I wrote in my article "Imperative Need of the Hour—Preparing a Compromise Solution" (Ba'ayoth, Vol. 1, No. 3, June, 1944). We must ask ourselves what kind of solution will meet our needs best. Will it be a solution which will be arrived at without Jewish participation in its preparation, a solution to which we should only contribute by voicing extremist demands, or will it be one in whose preparation we should be able to influence the determining factors? This question is at the moment of particular urgency. Today the reply to it is even clearer than it was over six months ago.

Mr. Bevin's statement shows a considerable lack of understanding, lack of appreciation and distortion of facts. Nonetheless it reflects the Palestine reality in such a way that it is apt to rouse the anger of both Jews and Arabs. The document published shows that there is no hope whatever for considerable progress towards the realization of both Arab and Jewish national ambitions, as long as the Government are able to say that any solution acceptable to one of the parties is rejected by the other.

WHO WILL GIVE EVIDENCE BEFORE THE ANGLO-AMERICAN COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY?

The Anglo-American Inquiry Committee works at full speed. Jews who appear before it belong to two categories: They are either Zionists and pro-Zionists who support the "Biltmore" programme, or anti-Zionists of different shades. Zionists opposed to the "Biltmore" programme are almost entirely absent, Zionists who would rather submit alternative constructive solutions like those hinted at by Professor Einstein in America, and by Lord Samuel in England. Though these two men are very distinguished personalities, and certainly faithful friends of the Zionist enterprise in

Will the wiser elements among the two communities learn a lesson from Mr. Bevin's statement? Our dependence on the Arabs is represented there in a most annoying way, but the Arabs also can see from that statement that no progress towards self-government is possible for them as long as they do not make peace with the Jews.

According to Mr. Bevin's statement His Majesty's Government has promised that it will seek a permanent solution for bringing before the United Nations. This undertaking imposes both on the Government and on the joint Inquiry Committee the duty of making a serious attempt to induce both communities to accept compromises. The success of such an attempt will depend on the extent to which both Britain and the United States are prepared to contribute their share towards the solution of the problem by active assistance in a large scale development of the country, which would adapt it for the absorption of hundreds of thousands of new Jewish immigrants, at the same time bringing about a rise in the living standard of the Arabs.

S. Hirsch

February, 1946.

this country, they could only voice their individual opinions, as no Zionist body stands behind them.

As soon as the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee reaches Palestine, the present position may change, and this would be very desirable indeed. It would be a distorted representation of the true state of affairs among Jews, if no more than a single Zionist opinion were voiced. The Zionist opposition, which has never given its consent to "Biltmore" and which has persisted both in opposing it, despite officially instigated campaigns conducted against it, and in backing

an alternative scheme of its own, has a moral and political right to appear before the Committee. That Zionist opposition consists of "Hashomer Hatzair", "Aliya Hadasha", "Ihud" and the "League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement". To silence the voice of that opposition—should anybody attempt it, and should such an attempt prove successful—would greatly harm our Zionist cause. The members of the Committee at any rate know about the differences of opinion prevailing in our camp (though it may be assumed that they knew nothing about them before approaching the study of the Palestine problem). If the opposition were precluded from giving evidence to the Committee and from voicing openly the views of the minority existing in the Zionist camp, it would corroborate the opinion of those who regard us as a political factor which has lost

a main character of progress and democracy—tolerance.

And now another point: If the spokesmen of the "Biltmore" policy have no courage to admit their failure or do not perceive it, we can say that we anticipated that they would fail. We think we can suggest other solutions, better than "Biltmore," which our leaders have never seriously tried, and which have never been brought into the limelight of international discussion. If our leaders cannot say or refuse to say anything else beyond what they have kept on saying all the time,—their policy having actually failed, they should let others come to the fore and have a try. The programme of the opposition may—who knows?—turn out to be the good fortune of the whole Zionist movement and constitute a new hope for the upbuilding of this country in entirely new conditions.

WHY HAS IHUD GIVEN EVIDENCE?

April, 1946.

The appearance of IHUD representatives (Dr. J. L. Magnes, Professor M. Buber, and Mr. M. Smelansky) before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, constituted one of the high-lights of its activities. Almost for the first time during the sessions of this Body could its members listen to a counsel of peace and practicable plans of co-operation between Jews and Arabs. The official leadership of the Zionist Movement had forbidden the appearance of any private witnesses, whether individuals or organisations, unless approval had been formerly obtained. IHUD, however, did appear, thus reaching for the first time a wider audience among Jews and Arabs, as well as abroad. A special number of the Hebrew BA'AYOTH comprised the full text of all parts of the evidence. It was prefaced by the following article, which sets out the reasons for IHUD's appearance. The text of the evidence, both oral and written, has also been published in English, in a printed booklet issued in America in August 1946, called "Palestine — A Bi-National State", and is also being published in England by Gollancz.

The supreme institutions of the Zionist Organisation have decided to prohibit the appearance before the Committee of any public bodies or personalities who would voice opinions which could not be fitted into the Official Zionist scheme. This decision is likely to cause the Zionist opposition a serious internal conflict; it will be the case particularly with the men of IHUD who since

the very start of the "Biltmore" policy, have been of the opinion that that scheme will never bring us nearer to our goal.

Let there be no misunderstanding: We have never denied the exclusive right of the Executive of the Jewish Agency to speak in the name of the Zionist Organisation, and to appear as the only representation of the organised masses of the Jewish

people. We have never denied the right of the Executive of the Jewish Agency to conduct political negotiations which are binding upon the Zionist Organisation and on the entire people. And notwithstanding, we claim that minorities like ourselves have a right to appear before the Inquiry Committee, and to voice the opinion of the Zionist opposition about the political course of the Jewish people. IHUD has not only theoretically claimed that right. Its spokesmen have appeared before the Committee, despite the prohibition of the central Jewish institutions, and we feel bound to explain publicly the reasons which have induced us to adopt this course.

The main motive was that factor which today is urging forward Zionist politics generally. I mean the tragic situation of Jewry as a homeless people, in desperate need of a home, of a National Home. Now more than ever, after twelve years of persecution at the hands of the Nazis, at a time when the defeated Nazis are still the conquerors of the Jewish people, hundreds of thousands of whose sons are still roaming among the ruins of Europe, while the gates of the National Home remain locked in front of them—at such a time, there can only be one political goal for both the Executive of the Jewish Agency and the Opposition: the abolition of the White Paper and the opening of the gates of Palestine to a Jewish mass immigration. All political schemes can only be means devised to bring about these ends.

The Executive of the Jewish Agency has a programme of its own, a scheme twice approved by the competent institutions, a scheme in which the demand is voiced for the establishment of a Jewish State. The Biltmore programme has, in fact, been brought before the Committee, and I am not going to reiterate the old discussion on the foundations of the "Biltmore" platform. But whoever is courageous enough to face the facts, will admit that in the present international situation, and in the political conditions pre-

vailing in the Middle East, there are practically no prospects whatsoever for the acceptance of the official Zionist scheme. One does not have to be a prophet to predict that the Committee will never submit to their respective Governments any recommendations based on the official Zionist policy, and that they will never recommend that full power in the spheres of immigration and development of the country be handed over to the Jewish Agency.

The opposition, therefore, is confronted with a dilemma. They must ask themselves whether it is not necessary to place before the Anglo-American Committee an alternative scheme. There are people who say that we should concentrate on the main official scheme, and that it is up to the Inquiry Committee to try to find an alternative solution. But despite all the respect we feel towards the members of the Committee, and despite our fullest appreciation of their wisdom and of the wide scope of their expert judgment, which can be gathered from their questions, we must consider the intricacy of the problem and the acute danger that the members of the Committee may not be able to find a way out of the tangle without our assistance. There is a danger even that they may come to the conclusion that the problem is altogether insoluble. We have had some bitter experience in the past. If we were unable to put up with the ban imposed by our institutions, it was because we had a feeling that the Committee might reject the official scheme without finding an alternative scheme which could create another possibility for the continuance of the building of our National Home.

It would be extremely unwise not to attach the fullest importance to the Inquiry Committee and to its proposals. The political struggle before it is very likely to be a matter of decisive importance. It is now becoming increasingly clear that the Governments which have appointed the Inquiry Committee will pay attention to its recommendations, and that its verdict will

determine the fate of our people for years to come.¹ How can it be expected that at such a time the opposition will remain silent, when they are convinced that the acceptance of the official Zionist scheme by the Inquiry Committee is entirely out of the question?

And another point: There is not the least doubt that the members of the Committee know about the existence of an opposition in the Zionist camp. It will be extremely useful if they hear the views of that opposition at first hand, so as to satisfy themselves that the opposition, too, will not accept just any offer, and to learn that there are claims in which the whole Jewish people and the entire Yishuv are perfectly united, regardless of political divergences. We think that from this point of view our official institutions should be interested in the appearance of an opposition which would stress the demands in the voicing of which we are not at variance with the rest of the

Yishuv: abolition of the White Paper; large scale immigration; immediate admission of the hundred thousand; development of the country; wide range of settlement.

However, our institutions have been unwise enough to reach a decision to the contrary, and have imposed their ban. Observing discipline towards our central institutions is a very good thing indeed, especially in our case, since our national authorities have no means of compulsion at their disposal. But the demand for discipline must not go beyond a certain limit. In this case, the permissible limit has been exceeded. It sometimes happens that a man who feels a private sense of responsibility towards the future of his people, is obliged to listen to the voice of his conscience, even if it is contrary to the decisions of any central national institution. History alone will one day pass its verdict on him, either approving his conduct or condemning it.

S. Hirsch

DECLARATION

OF THE COUNCIL OF THE IHUD (Union) ASSOCIATION

May 1, 1946

The report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, published in outline on May 1, 1946, was, on the whole, a positive step forward. The following three articles set out both our satisfaction with some of the recommendations and our criticism of others. It should be remembered that Mr. Attlee's statement in the House of Commons on the very day of the report's being made public, making the implementation of the report dependent on the complete disbanding and disarming of all "private armies" in Palestine, robbed the report of most of its practical value, since past experience has shown that the Jews in Palestine cannot, in the present conditions, forego their right to retain arms for their legitimate self-defence.

The Council of the IHUD Association welcomes the proposals of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee. It hopes that the Mandatory Government will proceed to their implementation without delay. Both the Jews and the Arabs should see in this Report a chance of a new beginning in their relationship. The way is open for Jewish-Arab cooperation in a bi-national Palestine.

The Council sends its greetings to the 100,000 refugees to come here. Their coming will place a heavy burden on the Jewish community. This will require a concentration of all the forces of the Jewish people.

It is welcomed that the artificial land restrictions are to be removed. They interfered with the settlement of Jews without bene-

¹ The course of events during 1946 has proved this belief to be mistaken.

fitting the Arab peasant, and they tended to keep Jews and Arabs apart. What is now required is a large development plan for the benefit of all the inhabitants.

We ask for the reform of the Administration of the country, especially the appointment of Jews and Arabs in positions of Government authority, even during the

transition period of the Mandate.

We hope that the terms of the trusteeship agreement will be worked out without delay, and that a very full and immediate measure of self-government will be provided for in that agreement.

Now it is the time for all Jews and Arabs of good will to get together.

A NEW START

May 2, 1946.

The report of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee is likely to bring about a turn for the better in British policy in Palestine.

It can now be seen that those who were opposed to the appearance of representatives of the Zionist Organization before the Committee were wrong. Despite all their baseless apprehensions, the fact is that the Committee conducted their work loyally and with a full measure of independence; they reached conclusions which pave the way for a new start.

It has also become clear by now that those who deprived the Zionist opposition of the right to appear before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, as well as those sections of the opposition which, in compliance with that decision, actually refrained from placing their views before the Committee, were altogether wrong. It turns out that the course adopted by IHUD was in fact perfectly justified, when it chose the direct line of action, and submitted its constructive proposals in the true spirit of original Zionism, by which, there can hardly be any doubt, the members of that Committee were greatly impressed.

IHUD stressed the principle that neither of the communities should be allowed to dominate the other, the motto being: "Neither a Jewish nor an Arab State".

The Commission underlined the importance of Arab-Jewish cooperation. It recommended the immediate admission to Palestine of the

inmates of the refugee camps, and declared itself in favour of the continuance of Jewish immigration after their admission, too, so that the further development of the National Home might be ensured.

The same spirit was shown by the representatives of IHUD when they were expounding the reasons for the necessity of abolishing the Land Transfer Regulations, and when they were dwelling on comprehensive development schemes.

The details of the scheme certainly deserve a further analysis, in which the aspects omitted in it, and particularly the politically constructive aspect, will be elucidated.

But it is obvious that the practical value of all these proposals will entirely depend on whether the British Government in London and the local administration in this country decide faithfully to put them into effect. Mr. Attlee's statement is not, unfortunately, very encouraging; it rather seems to forebode ill in this respect.

Everybody knows that we are definitely opposed to all terrorism and to any use of arms except for the purpose of the barest self-defence. But not in the space of one day, or two, can the poisoned atmosphere and its wicked manifestations of violence in this country be removed. The stoppage of all that can never be stipulated as a condition for giving assistance in rescuing all those suffering innocent people who are yearning for safety and peace.

But even after the central Govern-

ment and the local administration come to a decision to discard their hesitations, as we hope they will, we shall still be confronted with big tasks. It will not be easy, for many Jews and Arabs alike, to overcome the disappointment of their excessive hopes. But all of us must understand that the destinies of both peoples are inseparably linked, and

that only by co-operation and mutual understanding can the true national interests of both Jews and Arabs be realized. Only by a joint effort shall we be able to repair the shortcomings of the new scheme, and only by a joint effort shall we be able to give the new framework a substance capable of real life.

WHAT IS MISSING IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS

The Editor of the London Times.¹

May 5, 1946.

Sir,

May I tell you how deeply thankful large numbers of the Jews of Palestine are for the recommendations of the Anglo-American Inquiry Committee?

The prospect of giving a home to 100,000 refugees has filled us with renewed hope, and is testimony to the existence of a conscience in the world. Too many of our people had lost faith in this.

Many of those whose sole concern had been a Jewish State are now confronted with this tremendous practical task, and it can safely be assumed that much of the propaganda for a Jewish State will give way to the need for uniting the forces of the whole Jewish world, in order that the 100,000 may be absorbed in the briefest possible time. This will require of the Jewish Agency the setting up of a great organization with the participation, it may be hoped, of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee and other Jewish bodies. The implementation of this great programme requires the aid also of international bodies such as UNRRA, the Inter-Governmental Committee, the Displaced Persons Committee of UNO and other bodies.

The Report stresses the urgency of carrying out this humane project during 1946, if in any way possible. It is therefore of importance that the British and American Governments adopt the Report as their

official policy promptly, and let nothing whatever stand in the way of carrying this policy out.

Nothing but good can be said of the Report on this side of its findings.

But may I point out what seems to me to be its great defect?

We accept the principle "that Palestine shall be neither an Arab nor a Jewish State," but we do not accept the principle that "setting up of self-governing institutions is dependent on the will to work together on the part of the two peoples." On the contrary, this will to work together can be furthered best by setting up self-governing institutions. It is fatuous to think that good will can be engendered through abstract formulas. Good will can come through life, through the creation of common interests vital to both peoples. Active, responsible participation in Government is perhaps the most important of these common vital interests. Both peoples want this. Why not proceed with it, beginning now during the period of the Mandate, and not waiting until the Trusteeship Agreement is worked out?

The Report says, that "British officials hold all the important positions. They exercise as much authority as in a country where the mass of the inhabitants are in a primitive stage of civilisation." Why not show a bit of faith in the two peoples and begin with appointing a few Jews

¹ This letter was printed in the New York Times on June 3rd, 1946.

and a few Arabs to positions of authority in the Central Government?

Moreover we must take exception to the proposition that, "once the will to work together appears, representatives of both sides will be of help in framing a constitution; until that happens no step can be taken". On the contrary, the will to work together will appear only if the opportunity to work together is given or created by Government. Charge representatives of the two peoples with the task of helping to frame a constitution and the will to work together will thus appear.

This is true not only of working together in government, but in all walks of life. It is the function of those in authority to seek out the vital interests common to both

peoples and to set them to work at these.

Proposing that good will first appear and that only then the two peoples can come together, is putting the cart before the horse. The dangers of this vicious circle ought to be avoided by concrete action, by listing the large numbers of practical interests common to both peoples and making them responsible for day by day work in meeting these problems. There is no time to wait until some abstract good will puts in an appearance. Let a large measure of self-government begin now.

I am, ...

J. L. MAGNES
Chairman, IHUD (Union)
Association

Jerusalem, May 5, 1946.

FEDERALIZATION AND BI-NATIONALISM

August 8, 1946.

The recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry were shelved, despite the fact that Mr. Bevin is reported to have pledged himself to see them through, if the report were unanimous. Instead, a new scheme was proposed, which had been prepared even before the said Committee had set out on its inquiry. The new scheme was vigorously opposed by both Palestinian Arabs and Jews. The fact that the British Government insisted on its being taken as a basis of discussion at the Conference which it convened in London in September, 1946, was one of the main reasons why the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Executive refused to participate.

The federalization scheme presented by Mr. Morrison to the House of Commons needs a more detailed study than it has been so far possible to devote to it. It contains various elements, it has advantages and drawbacks, and it is not clear enough in all its parts. But a few words may be said by way of analysis, though they can be no more than first impressions.

The proposal is far from what we have wanted and what we are striving for. But it is a kind of bi-national approach, or, at least, it can be implemented in this spirit; and that is why it should not be rejected out of hand.

In discussing the bi-national Palestine, there have been two general

points of view; the one that it be based on the two communities, Jews and Arabs, and that there be communal registers such as in India. To most of us this has not appealed, and the example of India has shown that this communal basis is one of the banes of India's political life.

The other approach has been territorial. We have thought that Palestine should be divided into counties or cantons, some all-Jewish, some all-Arab, and some mixed. We have tried to effect a kind of synthesis between the territorial and the communal approach. That was the basis of our constitutional proposals.

The new plan provides for at least the outline of a bi-national

Palestine. But this bi-national Palestine is altogether too restricted.

The territory which the Jewish Province is to have is much too small. Nothing is said about the possibilities of the Negev for Jewish development either through a Jordan Valley Authority or some other scheme. That part of the Negev which is cultivable and fit for settlement seems to be included in the Arab Province, and not in the "Reserve"; for the boundaries of the Negev District have been fixed as "beyond the limits of present cultivation." In the Commons it was stated that after the 100,000 refugees were brought in there would be continuing immigration thereafter. We wonder how many additional immigrants the experts think can be introduced into the 1,500 square miles called the Jewish Province. We have stood out for the possibility of numerical equality with the Arabs as well as political equality; will this small Jewish Province give us this possibility?

The political rights of the Jewish Province and of the Arab Province would seem to be the same, and one might thus say that there was an equality of political rights as between the Jews and the Arabs. But it might be possible to characterize the situation more truly as an equality of but very few political rights for Jews and Arabs. Apart from the very wide powers granted to the High Commissioner to control and to interfere with the legislative processes of both Provinces, the most glaring fault, it would seem, is that Jews and Arabs are to be excluded from really active participation in the central government. If we accept this scheme as a "basis for negotiations" (Mr. Morrison called it that) we must take a very strong stand on two points: one, that at least one Jew and one Arab be made members of the High Commissioner's Executive Council, and that some Jews and some Arabs be made heads of central government departments; and, two, that there be formed some kind of central federated council having representatives of the Jewish Province, the Arab Province, the Jerusalem Dis-

trict and the Negev District, as well as representatives of the Central Government. This Council would be kept informed of the state of affairs in the whole country; among its functions would be that of smoothing out possible differences; and it would be privileged to make proposals to the High Commissioner and his Executive for legislation, nominations, and the like.

In proposing the enormous sum of \$300,000,000 for development in the Arab world we miss any reference to one of the primary and most important items — the development of Palestine itself, for the benefit of all its inhabitants. That this should be left out seems incredible; and it is to be insisted that the omission be rectified by all means, perhaps in the spirit of the recommendations of the Committee of Inquiry.

In general, what is proposed is a kind of spoon-fed self-government, whereas what we should insist upon is a very large measure of self-government, for the appetite of both peoples for this is big and healthy.

It is a very great disappointment that after all these years the British Government has not yet been able to take its courage in both hands and to propose constitutional measures that are worthy of adults, and that are not, as the present proposals would seem to be, intended for infants. It is all right to promise that there will be more self-government in the future, but unfortunately such promises cannot be accepted at their face value. Mr. Gladstone promised, for example, in 1882 that the British would leave Egypt, but it is only today that the halting, difficult negotiations for the British evacuation from Egypt are going on seriously; even now things are not smooth and easy and it may well be that the negotiations will fail altogether. This brings us to say that, so it would appear, the Negev is probably being held as a possible military base when and if the British do leave the Canal Zone.

The great thing about the proposition is that we are to get the 100,000 refugees, and then more; everything else seems to us at the moment to take secondary place.

Some other points of the scheme, for instance the proposed Development and Planning Board consisting of representatives of the two Provinces, leave the door open for the two peoples to cooperate.

The Jewish Province and the Arab Province — is there not a chance that they might become good neighbours? Is there not the chance that together we might suc-

cessfully insist upon a much larger measure of self-government? Is there not the chance also that a plan of the sort—with all the many necessary improvements and amendments — would give some stability to our life and thereby help put an end to the present terror and anarchy, putting us back once more on the path which leads to a peaceful and constructive solution?

FUNCTIONS OF THE MANDATORY GOVERNMENT

August, 1946.

On June 29, 1946, there was a surprise search in the Jewish Agency building, Jerusalem, and in numerous agricultural settlements the country over. Several Jewish leaders and some 3,000 citizens were arrested and transported to specially constructed detention camps, where many of them are still being detained without trial or charge. In a Government White Paper, the Jewish Agency was accused of direct connection with acts of violence. In an interview with Prof. Chaim Weizmann, the High Commissioner suggested a re-casting of the Jewish Agency, and mentioned the names of two leading figures, known to be opposed to the official policy of the Zionist Institutions. A loud cry of "quislings" was immediately unleashed. Spirits soared ever higher and acts of violence increased in frequency and fury, culminating in the foul attack on the King David Hotel, Jerusalem, on July 22. The military authorities proceeded to erect "fortresses" in Jerusalem and Haifa, and continued their searches of towns and settlements; the behaviour of the soldiers during these operations was not always beyond reproach.

What are, and what are not, the duties and functions of the British Mandatory Government in Palestine?

It is not their duty to suggest to us — or, for that matter, to the Arabs — candidates for the management of our national affairs. That is our own business, and ours only, as it is the business of any self-respecting nation and community. We have no less self-respect than the English, and no less good reasons for it.

Such talk might paralyse and atrophy the life of the Zionist Movement and subject it to still worse anarchy. For it makes saints of those leaders who go astray and lead their followers astray, some of whom are now in detention or in semi-voluntary exile. Those other forces, which could and ought to direct Zionist politics on to a new, more fruitful path, are apt to be

discredited by such talk beforehand in the eyes of a public which will easily seek and find wrong historical analogies.

It is not the function of the Mandatory Government to keep in detention the chosen leaders of the organised Yishuv and the Zionist Movement. They should be set free immediately so that they may be taken to task by their electors over their policy which has led to failure. If the Government has any charge against them, they should be given a fair and full trial, so that they may defend themselves, in accordance with one of the noblest aspects of British tradition. Their continued detention is not only a piece of injustice and affront but also rallies those of their followers who had already begun to awake from their illusions and reflect upon the political course of their leaders. It thus achieves exactly the opposite

of the desirable, just in the same way as happened some years ago amongst the Arabs.

It is not the function of the Mandatory Government to provide the terrorist organizations with leaders, or to aid them to return. But this is what the London *Times* tells us: "The present leader of the Irgun Zevai Leumi (Etzel), Menahem Beigin, served as corporal in the Polish Army. In 1941, David Raziel, the leader of the Etzel, went to do espionage work for the Allies in Iraq during the rebellion there. When he died in action, the "New Zionist Organization" requested that Beigin be released from the Army to do "political work." The request was granted. Today, two thousand pounds are promised any person assisting in the capture of Menahem Beigin." (retranslated, quoted from "Yediot Aliyah Hadashah," Aug. 2, 1946).

It is not the function of the Mandatory Government to evict a whole business quarter in Jerusalem and put an end to its economic activities. It has already been remarked in the daily press that it would have been much more logical to move the few Government Departments from that neighbourhood, as was once done in similar circumstances during the Arab disturbances. This measure is not even a "collective punishment"; for it affects a number of firms chosen at random; although the whole economic life of the town will suffer from the evictions, they cause particular hardship to the evicted, who bear no special responsibility for any offence.

Moreover, this wholesale ousting of offices, shops and tenants which is bad enough as it causes immeasurable economic loss and unjustified personal affront to the evicted, also adds to the artificial distance between the Jewish and the Arab economic sections. It creates a kind of wedge between Jewish Jerusalem and Arab Jerusalem. Surely it is not the duty of the British Mandatory Government to widen the rift between the two peoples of this country, which was entrusted to it so that its people might be educated towards independence.

It is one of the duties of the Mandatory Government in this country to maintain law and order for the peace of its inhabitants. But this will only be achieved through constructive measures leading to a solution. Vast and systematic searches, such as that of Tel Aviv some time ago, will not ensure law and order. They cause inconvenience, losses and insults, but they do not yield any positive find worthy of mention. When similar searches were carried out some years ago in Jaffa and Nablus, their result was the same: practically nothing. We have been insisting in these columns that the Palestine problem cannot be solved by violence, whether Jewish or Arab. Neither can it be "solved" by British violence.

It is not the function of the Mandatory Government or its military representatives to be swept along by antisemitic moods or expressions, such as have, it would seem, caused the now notorious order of General Barker. It should be noted and remembered that during the whole two-day debate on Palestine in the House of Commons (July 31—August 1st) not a single antisemitic remark was heard, despite the justified bitterness after the mass murder in the King David Hotel. Mr. Morrison deemed it necessary to dissociate the Government from the tone of General Barker's order. He also explained that the Jews of Europe are the victims of Nazism in two ways: most of them have been murdered, and some of the survivors have contracted the spiritual poison of their murderers. It may be that there are some who have suffered that way; but the poison of racial hatred seems to have penetrated into other quarters too, which the Lord President forgot to mention, even after his dissociating remark...

But it is the duty and function of the Mandatory Government to help spread a spirit of understanding and sympathy for our tortured and suffering people. It should understand that it too is not devoid of guilt in this torture and suffering—a guilt mostly indirect, but also partly direct. We know that we too bear part of the responsibility for

what has happened, that "our hands, too, have spilt blood." It is high time that some Englishmen, be they even few, take the courage to declare the same, and to admit their part of the responsibility for what has happened. If those Jews and

Britishers who look things in the face will help each other, if they will try to influence their respective leaders in this spirit—a way out of the impasse, a common acceptable solution may still be found for this country.

LIVES IN THE BALANCE

September, 1946.

On one and the same day, two striking news items appeared in the local press. The first reported the British Labour Government's decision to suspend the death penalty for a trial period of five years. The second recorded the sentence passed by the British Military Court in Palestine on twenty-two young persons (eighteen lads being sentenced to death and four girls to life imprisonment) who had taken part in the blowing up of the Haifa Railway Workshops, on the very night that the bridges surrounding Palestine were burnt.

Well for the British people, who have lived to witness such a humane and encouraging step taken by their Government, particularly at a time when a wave of crime is sweeping over England, too, on the heels of the long and bloody war. But woe to the British people since in the country which has been entrusted into its care, terrorism not only continues but is being aggravated.

Woe, too, to our people and our country, whose sons that were destined to be its builders, have, under the influence of a senseless situation and an insane ideology, become its destroyers and frustrators. And the song of hope—the "Hatikva"—on their lips, has been converted into one of blood and fire, of dis-illusionment and death.

From the very outset, we did not conceal our opposition to the Emergency Regulations, imposed on Palestine during the period of the last Arab disturbances. These were extended with the intensification of Jewish terror in recent years.

On various occasions, we appeal-

ed for mercy both for Jews and Arabs, and the stand we adopted met with mis-understanding and scorn on the part of Jews, who did not wish to see that wantonness knows no limits and that our turn, too, would come.

And now, the Arab press gives evidence of the same amount of stubborn dumbness, in its demand for a "firm hand" against the terrorists, who are this time Jews.

Our approach to the situation is conditioned, first and foremost, by moral and legal principles; by a feeling of respect for the elementary rights of the human being and the citizen. And we are not prepared to exchange these principles for "false prophecies" along the lines of—"Right or wrong, my people".

This is also our stand with regard to similar matters within the Yishuv itself, such as "kidnapping" or "clandestine courts", terrorists or informers.

Even from a practical point of view, it is our earnest conviction that such death sentences defeat their own purpose. Certainly, both Government and the public have to take all precautionary and security measures to safeguard life and property. But, if you would allow a variation of the age-old proverb, I should say—*fiat justitia NE pereat mundus*.

We were greatly relieved when we heard that the efforts made to commute the sentence did not prove vain and that human feelings had gained the upper hand over lust for revenge. But, one must not reconcile oneself with the Damocles sword of murderous emergency laws

and we must persist in the demand that the accused should no longer be delivered over to the mercy of flesh and blood.

The Arabs of Palestine, too, are now urging the release of the remaining prisoners and exiles, sentenced in connection with the Arab disturbances of 1936/39. These have been serving long terms of imprisonment. It is our sincere hope that towards them, as towards the Jewish prisoners, detainees and deportees, an amnesty will be extended, which will not be prompted by calculations of prestige and equilibrium, so that they return to the family-fold, if not today, at least in the near future.

In the case of many of these Arab prisoners, it was just a question of mere chance that they were not sentenced to death at the time, as was the case with many of their

comrades, who were sent to their doom on the strength of the same crimes and the same rulings. As far as they are concerned, there is no commutement of their lot, neither today nor in time to come, and their families can no longer cherish the hope of seeing them again. Let this sad thought serve as a warning to law-makers and judges.

Let us admit quite frankly that the hope which brought us to this country has not died in our hearts—the hope that we shall continue to develop the country and our people; that the two peoples of this land will choose the path of peace and life together with those who are now passing through the valley of the shadow of death.

In this way alone can we achieve our freedom; only thus will crimes be obliterated from this country.

Gavriel Stern

NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

MORDECHAY AVI-SHAUL

(p. 70)

was a teacher and youth leader in Hungary, later organizer of "Palestine Offices" in Yugoslavia, and editor of an Hungarian Zionist weekly. In Palestine for 25 years. At present librarian of the Jewish Junior and Children's Farm Ben Shemen. Besides literary work, he has taken active interest in public life, being a co-founder and active member of various organizations: "Brith Shalom" (Union for Arab-Jewish Conciliation); The League for Arab-Jewish Rapprochement and Cooperation; "V-League" for Friendship with Russia; the Palestine League for the Rights of Man (affiliated to the National Council for Civil Liberties, London).

GABRIEL BAER

(p.76)

born in Berlin 1919, in Palestine since 1933. A graduate of the 'Haifa Hebrew Secondary School', he studied at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, and the American University of Beirut, specializing in modern Arabic language and literature. A teacher of Arabic, he now devotes himself to journalism, contributing to BA'AYOTH, "Haaretz" and "Mishmar." His publications deal with the economic, social and cultural problems of the Arabs in Palestine and the Middle East and espe-

cially with the Arab Workers' Movement.

MARTIN BUBER

(pp. 7, 33)

was born in Vienna in 1878. Was Professor of the Science of Religion at the University of Frankfurt - on - Main (1923-33) and in 1934 became Principal of the 'Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus' there. Since 1938 he is Professor of Social Philosophy at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. This is not the place to evaluate the entire scope of Prof. Buber's many-sided activities as historian and philosopher of Judaism, as expounder of Hassidism, and as spiritual leader of two generations of German Jewry. He has been connected with the Zionist Movement since Herzl's days as editor of 'Die Welt' (1901) and as one of the leaders, together with Chaim Weizmann and the late B. Feiwel, of the 'Democratic Faction'. He founded and edited 'Der Jude', the leading periodical of German-speaking Jews, 1916-24. As early as 1921, at the 12th Zionist Congress (the so-called 'Carlsbad Congress'), he advocated a Zionist policy of reconciliation with the Arab people. Publisher of BA'AYOTH, member of the Presidential Board of IHUD and of the Central Committee of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation.

SALLI HIRSCH

(pp. 104, 109)

now aged 61, is a lawyer taking active interest in Zionist politics. He has been a Zionist since 1904, and was a member of the governing bodies of the Zionist Organization in Germany from 1913 to 1935. He then came to Palestine and has since been an active member of the Inner Zionist Council, and a member of the Executive Committee of the Aliya Hadasha. In 1929 he became a co-founder of the „Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Realpolitik“ in Berlin, a society aiming at Jewish-Arab understanding. He is a member of the secretariat of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation and of the Council of IHUD.

NATHAN HOFSHI

(p.37)

the son of a 'hassid' and pupil of a traditional 'heder' in a small city of Poland, joined the Zionist Movement very early in his life. After coming to Palestine in 1919, he was one of the founders of the Agricultural Workers' Organization and of the Histadruth, as well as an active member of the Hapoel Hatzair party, which he left when it became too politically minded. He was one of the founders of Nahalal, the first communal village in Palestine, which celebrated its 25th anniversary this year. A pacifist and vegetarian, Mr. Hofshi is the President of the Palestine branch of the War Resisters' International. Like his comrades in this movement, he regards the policy of union and

cooperation advocated by IHUD as the only way to secure the continued upbuilding of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, and is an active member of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation.

GERDA LUFT

(p. 22)

was active in the Zionist Labour Movement, the Vaad Eretz Israel Haovedet, and the Keren Hayesod while still in Germany. She was the wife of Hayim Arlosoroff, the late head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency, who was murdered in 1933. In Palestine since 1924, she was the representative and correspondent of the "Jüdische Rundschau," up to its suspension in 1938, and is a correspondent of Jewish papers in England, France and elsewhere. She contributes to several Palestinian Hebrew newspapers, particularly to "Amudim", the weekly of the Aliya Hadasha. Up to 1930 Mrs. Luft was a member of the World Executive of WIZO. At present she is a member of Assefat Hanivharim and of the Executive of the Aliya Hadasha.

H. M. KALVARYSKI

(p. 1)

was an ardent Zionist from his teens and studied agriculture at the University of Montpellier, France. In 1895 he came to Palestine where he served as administrator of PICA settlements for over twenty years, striving for the expansion of PICA's colonization work and insisting on the farmers doing

the work themselves. He founded the colonies of Kfar Tabor, Yavneel and Menahemia, as well as the first communal settlements on PICA land, Deganiah and Kinneret, and later Kfar Gileadi, Tel-Hai and Mahanayim. He was one of the ten members of the Advisory Council in the early twenties, the only semi-parliamentarian institution ever set up under British mandatory rule. From 1923 to 1927 he served the Zionist Institutions as expert on Arab affairs; but his objection to the political line prevailing even then made it impossible for him to continue.

For Kalvaryski had very early come to understand that the realization of Zionism is impossible without peace and cooperation with the Arabs of Palestine and the neighbouring countries. As early as in 1919 he met King Feisal and the Pan-Syrian Congress and at their request prepared a draft constitution for a bi-national Palestine. Up to 1943, he repeatedly passed Arab offers of conciliation on to the Jewish Agency. But his efforts failed, among other reasons because Zionists failed to grasp the necessity of a policy of cooperation with the Arabs. He was President and the leading spirit of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation, and a member of the Presidential Board of IHUD, until his death on 19.I.1947.

RICHARD KOEBNER (p. 41) was Professor of Medieval and Modern History at the University of Breslau from 1924 to

1933, when he was dismissed; since 1934 he is Professor of Modern History at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem. His publications deal with medieval culture, the social and economic history of the Middle Ages, the development of historical and political thought and the principles of scientific historiography. He contributed the chapter on 'The Settlement and Colonization of Europe' to the "Cambridge Economic History" Vol. I, and edited the Hebrew translation of H. A. L. Fisher's 'History of Europe.'

JUDAH L. MAGNES (p. 14)

President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and Chairman of the Hadassah Council in Palestine, Chairman of the Middle East Committee of the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Chairman of the IHUD (Union) Association. b. San Francisco, 1877. Rabbinical degree, Hebrew Union College, Ph.D., Heidelberg. Rabbi at Temple Israel and at Temple Emanu-El. Secretary of the Federation of American Zionists, 1905-08. Organizer of protest movement against the Kishinev pogroms, 1903. Founder and Chairman of the New York Kehillah, 1909-1922. During the first World War he aroused a great deal of opposition and criticism because of his pacifist views. One of the prime movers in establishing the J.D.C. and head of the first mission that went to Europe to arrange for the distribution of American Jewish relief funds.

In Palestine since 1922, when he began to organize the Hebrew University. Chancellor, 1925-35, since then President. Advocated his bi-national ideas, as opposed to official Zionist policy, ever since the disturbances of 1929. Founded the IHUD Association in 1942.

DAVID WERNER SENATOR

(p. 51)

wrote his Ph.D. thesis in economics on the subject of Jewish land policy in Palestine; he worked in the „Arbeitsfürsorgeamt“ in Berlin, the central Jewish organization for the care and rehabilitation of refugees from Eastern Europe; and as Secretary General of the Joint Distribution Committee's European headquarters in Berlin. He joined the Zionist Organization in 1913 and first came to Palestine for a year in 1924. He settled in Jerusalem in 1930, when he was elected a member of the Jewish Agency Executive, which he served in various responsible posts. Since 1937 he has been the Administrator of the Hebrew University and has taken a leading part in planning its expansion. He is also President of the Board of Directors of the Junior and Children's Farm Ben-Shemen. Keenly interested for many years in Jewish-Arab cooperation, he is a member of the IHUD Council.

ERNST SIMON (pp. 84, 100, 103)

was active in the 'Freies Jüdisches Lehrhaus' in Frankfurt, founded by Franz Rosenzweig. Together with Martin Buber, he

edited the monthly, "Der Jude". He came to Palestine in 1928, and taught history in secondary schools and teachers' seminars; he is now lecturer in the Principles of Education at the Hebrew University. Besides, he has been educational adviser to the Youth Aliya, and frequently is guest lecturer at courses for teachers and youth leaders. Politically active in IHUD and Aliya Hadasha; Honorary Editor of BA'AYOTH; the author of most of the unsigned short editorials in this booklet.

MOSHE SMELANSKY (p. 57)

is one of the most honoured veteran settlers and agriculturists of Palestine. He was born in 1874 in the Ukraine and came to Palestine in 1890. He was a pioneer farmer at Rishon le-Zion and Hadera and one of the founders of Rehovoth. In 1900 he founded the Union of Colonies, and later the Farmers' Association, of which he was President for 16 years. In the first World War he volunteered to the Jewish Legion, and helped found the Hagana, which he did not leave until he was 60 years old.

Mr. Smelansky is also a journalist and writer. He has contributed to most of the important Hebrew newspapers, and for some years was the editor of the farmers' weekly, 'Bustenai.' In recent years, his political articles have appeared in 'Haaretz,' BA'AYOTH and the American 'Commentary.' His books include an autobiography, a history of Jewish settlement

in Palestine, and many stories on Arab peasant life. He is regarded as one of the foremost experts on Palestinian agriculture and more especially on the possibilities of developing the Negev. He gave evidence before the Shaw Commission (1930), the Royal Commission (1937) and the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (March, 1946), where he, together with Dr. J. L. Magnes and Prof. M. Buber, represented IHUD.

HELMUT v. d. STEINEN (p. 88)

is the son of the German ethnologist, Karl v. d. Steinen. He studied at Heidelberg and was assistant in the Institute of Cultural Morphology of Frankfurt. He left Germany in 1934, settling in Greece, where he concerned himself with problems of Classical Philosophy and Literature. In April, 1941, he left Athens, so as not to fall into the hands of the Nazis. In spite of his being a notorious anti-Nazi, he was interned first in Uganda and later in Palestine, where he was released in the summer of 1944. His chief conviction is Philhellenism.

GAVRIEL STERN (p. 118)

was born in Germany in 1913. In Palestine since 1936. He is Assistant Editor of BA'AYOTH and Joint Secretary of the League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation. He studied at the School of Oriental Studies of the Hebrew University and contributes to various journals, dealing parti-

cularly with Arab and Oriental current affairs.

HENRIETTA SZOLD (p. 1)

began her long life of service as a teacher in her home town, Baltimore. For over 20 years she worked as a writer, editor, compiler and translator for the Jewish Publication Society of America, being also very active all the time in the Zionist movement in its earliest days. She first visited Palestine in 1909, and in 1912 founded the Haddassah Women's Zionist Organization of America, which today maintains a great network of medical, social and educational services in Palestine. In 1927 she settled in Jerusalem, and was a member of the Zionist Executive up to 1931, holding the portfolios of education and health. In 1931 she became a member of the Va'ad Leumi, taking charge of and organizing the department of social welfare. When she was 73 years old, Youth Aliyah summoned her, and for the rest of her life she devoted all her energy, wisdom and initiative to the rehabilitation, education and settlement of thousands of young people from Europe, and later from the slums of Palestinian cities. Throughout her Zionist history, Miss Szold was deeply conscious of the problems and obligations involved in Arab-Jewish relations in Palestine. She was one of the founders of IHUD and a member of its Presidential Board until her death on February 13, 1945.