


Hungary - People's Republic.

**THE COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY  
CONSPIRACY OF  
IMRE NAGY AND HIS ACCOMPLICES**



PUBLISHED BY THE INFORMATION BUREAU  
OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS  
OF THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC



## Preface

The trial of Imre Nagy and his associates has cast light on the internal driving forces of the imperialist counter-revolutionary attack launched against the constitutional order of the Hungarian People's Republic, on the treasonable acts of the domestic group which prepared, organized and led the preparations for the counter-revolution.

The present publication, Volume 5 of the *White Book* published by the Information Office of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, contains primarily the new documents found during the criminal proceedings, which covered the anti-state activity of Imre Nagy and his group. This publication within the given scope, contains only a part of the evidence and documentary material.

The material published here proves beyond all doubt that long before the outbreak of the counter-revolution a secret underground organization was set up under the leadership of Imre Nagy, for the purpose of overthrowing the existing order. Imre Nagy and his confederates formed an underground, anti-state group. In his writings, distributed through underground channels, Imre Nagy elaborated the political platform aimed at overthrowing the Hungarian People's Republic. His platform bore the earmarks of the guiding principles put forward by outstanding propagandists of Western imperialist circles (Walter Lippman, Sulzberger, etc.) concerning the tactics of overthrowing the people's democratic order. Imre Nagy and his confederates set up their organization on the basis of this political platform and built their ties with their foreign backers on this foundation. They thoroughly prepared, using their underground organizational activity, for the overthrow of the Hungarian People's Republic, an alliance with the forces of the underworld and resurgent fascism, and took up arms to destroy constitutional order in Hungary.

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It is evident from the material that various actions directed against the people's democracy—which the public believed, and disdained to even disguise his desire to disrupt to be an expression of the spontaneously formed views held by certain groups of intellectuals—were in reality organized by Imre Nagy's group of conspirators which also determined the course of these actions.

The documentary material presented in this book illustrates the understanding, collaboration and cohesion which developed between the treasonable group of Imre Nagy, the Hungarian emigres abroad and Western imperialist circles. They testify to the support which Imre Nagy and his group received from their imperialist allies.

Many people believed that Imre Nagy merely championed views which were divergent from the opinion of the leadership of the constitutional government; that he too stood on the basis of the people's democratic order and the laws of the Hungarian People's Republic; that he wanted to ensure constitutional order after October 24, 1956, when Imre Nagy assumed the office of prime minister through deceit and treason and by his real intentions and plans, it became clear what he really wanted, what the "special path" advocated by him consisted of.

Imre Nagy and his group began, between October 23 and November 4, 1956, to implement the secret plans which he had previously elaborated and to realize the aims of the imperialists: The overthrow of the state order of the Hungarian People's Republic. The supreme body of state power, the National Assembly, as well as the Presidential Council, which assures the continuous exercise of state power, actually set aside through measures which he introduced. He also swept aside the supreme body of state administration, the Council of Ministers, and arbitrarily acted in the vital problems of the country. He set aside the local organs of state power, the councils elected by the people, and recognized in their place the "revolutionary committees" controlled mainly by riff-raff and fascist elements.

Imre Nagy actually suspended the constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic, adopted August 1949, by the National Assembly elected throughout Hungary, in 1956, lived through a sanguinary counter-revolution for the second time.

forward as a major protector of anti-communist, terrorist gangs and supported the organization of all the reactionary forces within Hungary attacked the legal order, the free and popular

state of Hungary, with the armed assistance of the western imperialists. Horthy succeeded, in 1919, in defeating the revolution of the Hungarian people and drowning it in blood with the aid of foreign weapons.

The 1956 counter-revolution also embarked on the path of the horrors of the 1919 White Terror, the path of service to the imperialists and restoration of capitalist oppression. The tactics of disguise were similar to those used in 1919. At that time, the "trade union government" of Peidl undertook the role of handing over government power to fascism, under the cloak of democracy. In 1956, Imre Nagy and his confederates assumed the role of ground-breakers for fascism. In 1919 the Peidl government attempted to mislead the people with the catchword of "socialism without dictatorship," while throwing the gates open to the fascist, White Terrorist dictatorship. Imre Nagy and his group followed their dishonourable predecessors practically word for word, by disguising the reactionary character of the attack against the people's democratic order with slogans like "socialism without Stalinism" and "democratic socialism", thereby promoting the gathering and rapid advance of openly fascist forces.

The documentary material also proves that the imperialists delegated the role of battering ram to Imre Nagy, but their plans were worked out and their men were picked for an undisguised, bloody fascist rule.

It was not Imre Nagy's fault that he was unable to follow in Peidl's footsteps and complete the role of the ground-breaker for the undisguised counter-revolutionary forces and for fascism. The relation of forces today, in the second half of the 20th century, differs entirely from that of 1919. It favours the freedom-loving peoples and not their oppressors. The Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government restored the state and social order in our country, shaken by the counter-revolutionary forces, in reliance on the international forces of socialism and peace, and enforced the Constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic. It is conducting its activity on the basis of the Constitution. Constitutional order was re-established in the Hungarian People's Republic, as the result of the defeat of the counter-revolution; our people, under the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government, are fighting on the side of the progressive forces for a happier future for mankind.

The major lesson of the debacle suffered by the 1956 counter-revolution in Hungary and by the reactionary attacks launched against our country in connection with it, is that the forces of freedom, independence, peace and socialism are much stronger in our epoch than those of imperialist tyranny; that the manoeuvres of the imperialists aimed at enslaving other peoples will meet one fiasco after the other.

# I

## Anti-State Organization, Treason and Insurrection

After the successful defeat of the counter-revolutionary armed insurgents and the restoration of constitutional order in the country by the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government, the competent criminal and judicial organs began to probe the antecedents and the causes of the counter-revolution, and the activities of people who had had a part in it.

A number of data, documents and interlinking facts were disclosed, during the proceedings, which required that the investigation be extended to the role and activity of Imre Nagy and his group.

Following the thorough and circumspect investigation of the criminal and judicial organs of the Hungarian People's Republic, the Public Prosecutor's office, on January 28, 1958, preferred charges against Imre Nagy and several of his accomplices in accordance with legal prescriptions.

The Public Prosecutor's Office preferred charges against Imre Nagy and his confederates not on the basis of new laws promulgated after the counter-revolution, and the People's Tribunal of the Supreme Court sentenced them not on the basis of a new law, but under Act VII, passed by the National Assembly in 1946, which governs penal protection of the internal security of the state. The judicial organs of the Hungarian People's Republic would have violated the laws of the People's Republic if, in the knowledge of the disclosed criminal offences, they would have failed to institute penal proceedings. The laws of Hungary make it obligatory to place on trial people who commit counter-revolutionary criminal acts.

The Hungarian judicial organs could have abstained from conducting legal criminal procedure only if the Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic would have exercised the right of clemency and decided to quash the proceedings. The Presidential Council of the Hungarian People's Republic did not exercise this right.

EXTRACT FROM THE INDICTMENT

The Chief Public Prosecutor accuses :

*Imre Nagy*, principal defendant, of the crime of initiating and leading a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order, of the crime of treason as included in Paragraph (1), Article 35 of BHÖ,\*

*Ferenc Donáth*, second defendant, of the crime of initiating and leading a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order (Paragraph (1), Article 1 of BHÖ),

*Miklós Gimes*, third defendant, of the crime of initiating and leading a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order (Paragraph (1), Article 1 of BHÖ)

*Zoltán Tildy*, fourth defendant, of the crime of promoting a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order (Paragraph (2), Article 1 of BHÖ),

*Pál Maléter*, fifth defendant, of the crime of leading a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order (Paragraph (1), Article 1 of BHÖ); of the crime of violating Paragraph 29 of KTBTK (Military Penal Code) qualified according to Paragraph (2), § 30 of KTBTK as mutiny; of the crime referred to in Sub-point b), Paragraph (1), Article 37 of BHÖ and qualified according to provision three, Paragraph (1), Article 38 of BHÖ as disloyalty,

*Sándor Kopácsi*, sixth defendant, of the crime of leading a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order (Paragraph (1), Article 1 of BHÖ); of the crime of violating § 29 of KTBTK, qualified according to Paragraph (2) § 30 of KTBTK as mutiny,

*József Szilágyi*, seventh defendant, of the crime of initiating and leading a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order (Paragraph (1) Article 1 of BHÖ),

*Ferenc Jánosi*, eighth defendant, of the crime of active participation in a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order (Paragraph (2) Article 1 of BHÖ)

\* Paragraph (1) Article 1 of BHÖ: Official Compilation of Penal Rules and Regulations in Force. Article 1 refers to the first article of Act VII of 1946. This Act deals with the penal protection of internal security of the state.

*Miklós Vásárhelyi*, ninth defendant, of the crime of active participation in a conspiracy aimed at overthrowing the people's democratic state order (Paragraph (2) Article 1 of BHÖ),

b e c a u s e

the principal, second, third, and seventh defendants, in the period preceding October 23, 1956, brought into existence a hostile group, and, through the disruptive activities they carried on in various social organizations, led an attack against the people's democratic state order; then after the outbreak of the counter-revolution and placing themselves at its head, they bent their efforts directly towards disrupting the alliance of socialist states, towards overthrowing the people's democratic state order;

the fourth defendant, as minister of state of the Imre Nagy Government, between October 28, and November 4, 1956 deliberately assisted the shift of the Government to the right, the forming of an anti-national foreign policy in the interest of establishing the bourgeois restoration, with the aim of overthrowing the people's democratic state order;

the fifth and sixth defendants, as the military leaders appointed by Imre Nagy, disorganized the armed forces loyal to the people's power, organized and carried out the arming of the counter-revolutionary forces to prevent the armed crushing of the counter-revolution, for the purpose of overthrowing the people's democratic state order;

the eighth and ninth defendants, in the period preceding October 23, 1956, carried on organizing activities in the interest of bringing into existence a hostile group; then they played an active part in the attack against the people's democratic state order, in the realization of the anti-state objectives of the group which led the counter-revolution;

a p a r t f r o m t h i s

the principal defendant, for the purpose of preventing the crushing of the counter-revolution, urged the intervention and interference of foreign powers opposed to the Hungarian People's Republic; then with his radio appeal of November 4 he incited to hostile acts against the Hungarian state,

the third defendant, after November 4, 1956, participated in leading the illegal organization called the Hungarian Democratic Independence Movement, by the fact that under his editorship there was established and circulated an illegal paper

entitled "Október Huszonharmadika" (October Twenty-third), which defined in a programme the tasks of the illegal organization for the purpose of overthrowing the people's democratic state order,

the fifth defendant, as a professional army colonel, between October 25 and 28, in opposition to the instructions of the Minister of Defence, together with the military unit under his command, deserted to the side of the counter-revolution, furnished secret military data to Cowley, the British military attaché, and permitted him to study military arms and tanks,

the sixth defendant, as head of the Budapest Police Headquarters, went over to the side of the counter-revolution in the course of the October events of 1956.

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On the basis of the Public Prosecutor's indictment the criminal case came to trial for the first time on February 6, 1958. A concluding session of the Supreme Court took place, in the light of fresh evidence, between June 9 and 15, 1958. The verdict was pronounced on June 15, and a communiqué on the subject was issued by the Ministry of Justice of the Hungarian People's Republic.

#### SENTENCE IN CRIMINAL CASE OF IMRE NAGY AND HIS ASSOCIATES

##### *Communique of the Ministry of Justice*

The judicial authorities have concluded the proceedings in the case of the leading group of individuals who, with the active cooperation of the imperialists, precipitated an armed counter-revolutionary uprising on October 23, 1956, designed to overthrow the legal order of the Hungarian People's Republic.

The indictment of the Chief Public Prosecutor of the Hungarian People's Republic charged Imre Nagy and his accomplices Ferenc Donáth, Miklós Gimes, Zoltán Tildy, Pál Maléter, Sándor Kopácsi, József Szilágyi, Ferenc Jánosi and Miklós Vársárhelyi, with the crime of organizing to overthrow the Hungarian people's democratic state; Imre Nagy was also charged with treason; moreover, Sándor Kopácsi and Pál Maléter were

charged with mutiny. The Public Prosecutor's Office quashed criminal proceedings against defendant Géza Losonczy since he had died in the meantime on account of illness.

On the basis of the confessions of the accused, the questioning of 29 witnesses, the pleas of the prosecution and defence and the examination of the copious material presented in evidence, the People's Tribunal of the Supreme Court established the following in the criminal case of Imre Nagy and his accomplices.

Imre Nagy and his closest confederates Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth, Miklós Gimes and József Szilágyi established, in December 1955, a secret, anti-state organization with the aim of seizing power by force and overthrowing the Hungarian People's Republic. It was proved during the trial that Imre Nagy and his accomplices played a leading role in preparing and launching the counter-revolutionary uprising in October 1956. Zoltán Tildy and Pál Maléter learned about the hostile objectives of Imre Nagy and his associates in October 1956, concurred in them and actively joined the counter-revolutionary uprising. The members of the group of conspirators, heading the reactionary forces within the country and in alliance with foreign imperialists, carried out an attempted putsch to overthrow the Hungarian People's Republic.

The court established that Imre Nagy organized a select underground group composed of his closest supporters, as early as the end of 1955, in the interest of seizing power by force. The underground group conducted its hostile activity by unlawful means and exploiting legal possibilities. They mobilized and enlisted in their activity enemies of the people's democratic state system in all walks of life, for the purpose of carrying out their objective of overthrowing popular power. At the same time, they temporarily misled well-intentioned people too, exploiting them for their anti-state aims, by disguising their real aims and proclaiming "socialist" catchwords in a demagogic and mendacious manner.

The group of conspirators, and Imre Nagy, the group's leader in particular, elaborated in detail the political platform, immediate tasks, methods and long-range objectives of the movement aimed against the People's Democracy. The prosecutor presented these secret documents to the court, most of which were in the personal handwriting of Imre Nagy.

Imre Nagy, in a document elaborated in December 1955 and entitled "Morals and Ethics," termed the state system of the People's Democracy a "degenerate Bonapartist power" and

called for its overthrow by force. In another document, entitled "Some Topical Questions," which he wrote in January 1956, he set the task of forming an alliance with the forces opposed to the People's Democracy, and called for restoration of the multiparty system, thus renouncing working-class power. In another paper, entitled "The Five Principles of International Relations," also dated January 1956, he set the adventurist group the task, under the pretext of "ending the policy of blocs," of renouncing the country's defence alliance, the Warsaw Treaty, and of playing the country into the hands of the imperialists. On the basis of the evidence and confessions, the court ascertained that Imre Nagy had had these documents mimeographed and secretly distributed among his close confederates and elements considered by them as reliable.

It was proved during the trial that the underground organization established by Imre Nagy and his accomplices had carried on machinations to undermine the workers' and peasants' power, destroy the legal order of the People's Democracy and subsequently to seize power by force. They enlisted Gábor Táncczos and Balázs Nagy—who later fled to the West—in their illegal activity and, with their help, turned the Petöfi Club into a rallying point for hostile elements and a platform for attacks on the Party and the state. They personally organized the Petöfi Club meetings against the People's Democracy, under the pretext of arranging debates. They drafted a number of hostile speeches in advance, among others, Tibor Déry's contribution to the so-called debate on the press, in which they urged the youth to counter-revolutionary action. These were prepared jointly by Géza Losonczy, Sándor Haraszti and Déry. They also used the method of publishing inciting articles in the press, through the services of Tibor Déry, Gyula Háty, Tamás Aczél and similar elements opposed to the People's Democracy. They magnified in these articles some of the errors committed in socialist construction all out of proportion and exceeded all bounds in slandering the system. Their aim in doing so was to undermine the régime, discredit the state's authority, rally into action elements hostile to the People's Democracy and to seize power by force on the basis of these steps. Géza Losonczy in September 1956 publicly told Elon Amos, the journalist from Israel in Budapest, that "we shall oppose the government by force if it comes to that." József Szilágyi announced at an underground meeting organized by him on October 20, 1956: "Imre Nagy and his associates are ready to seize power."

Imre Nagy and his group initiated the well-known demonstration held on October 23, by exploiting their contacts, entrenched in the Petöfi Club and at the universities. For instance, József Szilágyi spoke under the instructions of Imre Nagy at the meeting held at the Technical University, on the night of October 22, where he called upon the audience to demonstrate. The Imre Nagy group directed the October 23 demonstration through Gábor Táncczos and his associates.

The group of conspirators met clandestinely in this period practically every day, and often more than once a day. Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth and Miklós Gimes, at the initiative of Imre Nagy, enlisted other members of the organization and commenced, on October 19, 20 and 22, 1956, drafting the programme of the government to be set up. Secret talks were held in the forenoon of October 23, 1956 in the flat of Géza Losonczy, which were attended by Miklós Gimes, Miklós Vásárhelyi, Ferenc Jánosi, and Sándor Haraszti, under the leadership of Imre Nagy. Here they compiled a list of the government which they intended to invest with power by the forcible overthrow of the legal Hungarian government. On this secret government list Imre Nagy designated himself as prime minister, while the ministerial posts were distributed among the members of the group of conspirators.

The members of the organization set up a number of special underground centres to direct the armed uprising which was precipitated concurrently with the demonstration, using it as a legal screen. One of these centres was established at the Budapest Police Headquarters, with Sándor Kopácsi, József Szilágyi, Miklós Gimes, György Fazekas and Tamás Aczél as its members. Sándor Kopácsi executed the tasks worked out by the underground centre, thereby violating his oath of office, abusing his post as commissioner of police and deluding his subordinates. With a view to arming the insurgent forces opposed to the People's Democracy and disorganizing the armed forces loyal to socialism, he ordered the district police headquarters not to resist the insurgents, but to turn over their weapons and the police buildings to them. Kopácsi was thus responsible for the distribution of over 20,000 guns to the insurgents from the police stores. Another sub-headquarters, set up on October 24, 1956, with Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth and Ferenc Jánosi as members, collaborated closely with this group. Among other things, this group directed the subversive activity carried on in the army ranks, while systematically



handing over to the insurgents the military plans of the armed forces defending the People's Republic.

Imre Nagy and his accomplices established secret contacts and conducted talks with representatives of bourgeois restoration long before the October uprising and formed an alliance with them in the interest of seizing power by force. During the talks, Géza Losonczy and Sándor Haraszti, for instance, came to an agreement with Anna Kéthly too on her participation in a future Imre Nagy government, making personal contacts with her as early as July 1956 and, later, using István Erdős as go-between. Imre Nagy had resolved in December 1955 to re-establish the former "coalition" parties and to form a government in cooperation with them. However, he went much further than that after he had obtained the post of Prime Minister by force and deceit and with the support of the counter-revolutionary forces. He permitted and made possible, contrary to the constitution, the unrestrained formation of 70 parties and organizations during the few days of the counter-revolution. These organizations included bourgeois-fascist parties banned by the Peace Treaty, such as the Party of Hungarian Liberty, the Christian Democratic Party, the Christian Hungarian Party, the Hungarian People's Party, the National Rally, the Christian Front, the Catholic People's Party, the Christian People's Party and the fascist Arrow-Cross Party in Győr.

The conspiratorial group of Imre Nagy concluded an alliance with other groups of reactionary extremists too, so as to guarantee their power. This group "rehabilitated" József Mindszenty, former prince primate, who had been sentenced lawfully and with good cause, and pushed him forward against the People's Republic. Mindszenty, after they had reached an agreement with him through Zoltán Tildy, came out with a programme of capitalist restoration, in a radio broadcast on November 3. The Imre Nagy group likewise came to an agreement with the bourgeois-fascist Hungarian emigres in the person of the imperialists. The statement made on October 28, 1956, by Béla Varga, chairman of the so-called "National Committee" substantiates this fact. He declared "The members of the committee are in constant touch with the leaders of the Hungarian uprising." Subsequently, Zoltán Tildy agreed by telephone with Ferenc Nagy, who had arrived in Vienna to support the counter-revolution, that the émigrés would back Imre Nagy's government.

During the period in which Imre Nagy held the post

of Prime Minister, he violated his oath of office by eliminating from the leadership the country's constitutional leading organs, that is the National Assembly, the Presidential Council and the Government as a body, and unlawfully established a "cabinet" as his personal organ of government. This cabinet was constituted at the time so as to ensure a majority to the reactionary forces, although individuals who were loyal to socialism were also included for the purpose of deceiving people. However, he reorganized even this cabinet on November 2, drawing into it inveterate and extreme representatives of bourgeois restoration as well as leaders of the counter-revolutionary uprising. At that time, the cabinet included, in addition to Imre Nagy, Géza Losonczy and Zoltán Tildy, among others, Anna Kéthly, István B. Szabó, István Bibó, Pál Maléter, commander of the armed counterrevolutionary insurgents, as Minister of Defence.

Imre Nagy and his group of conspirators began to destroy the local organs of state power after disrupting or waiving the central organs of the People's Republic. They abolished the councils, the legal administrative bodies, the economic administrative agencies, replacing them by "revolutionary committees," composed in the main of bourgeois and fascist elements, and established "workers' councils" to delude the working class.

The armed forces defending the People's Republic were paralysed by the traitorous and subversive activity of Imre Nagy and his confederates and finally by the cease-fire order which they extorted by force. At the same time, they organized, armed and finally legalized the insurgent counter-revolutionary forces. They rallied into the "national guard" war criminals, persons guilty of crimes against the people, convicts and all enemies of the People's Democracy. And then the White Terror was unleashed in Budapest and throughout the nation. According to available data, the terroristic detachments murdered 234 unarmed citizens during the few days in which Imre Nagy and his associates held power. During the same period of time, 3,000 progressives, loyal to the People's Democracy, were imprisoned, and their execution was set for the immediate future. In addition, they compiled up to November 4 a death list of over 10,000 individuals and made ready to massacre them.

Imre Nagy and his confederates established extensive contact and cooperation with diverse groups, agencies and representatives of the imperialists, while at the same time, rallying

the reactionary, counter-revolutionary forces within the country. László Kardos, a member of the group of conspirators had contact with Cope, a former employee of the British Legation in Budapest, who helped to smuggle Imre Nagy's anti-statist political writings to the West. They had contact, through Pál Maléter, with British military attaché Cowley, who took a direct part in the military direction of the uprising. They established contact and cooperation with Prince Löwenstein, the representative in our country of the West German imperialists through Géza Losonczy. On the basis of their talks, Prince Löwenstein in a broadcast over Kossuth Radio, assured the counter-revolutionary insurgents of support by West German big capital.

Certain imperialist groups, led by the American imperialists, had for many years set their entire propaganda machine and intelligence agencies in motion for the support of the Imre Nagy group, as the Hungarian representatives of the counter-revolutionary trend termed by them "national communism." The programme for the counter-revolutionary uprising was elaborated as early as September 1956 by the American intelligence agency known as the "Strassburg University," which also distributed it within the country through underground channels. A considerable quantity of small arms was smuggled into the country during the counter-revolution in Red Cross gift packages. Simultaneously, the imperialist press and radio launched a campaign to popularize Imre Nagy. They declared that it would be more beneficial to the western powers if "a group termed communist" would sever Hungary from the socialist camp. The infamous Radio Free Europe waged a propaganda campaign for the counter-revolutionary uprising through its Hungarian language broadcasts and its well-known balloon action, extending assistance and direction through military instructions after it had broken out. The group of conspirators executed these instructions.

Imre Nagy and his group of traitors attempted unilaterally and unlawfully to abrogate the Warsaw Treaty, the defensive alliance of the country, in the interest of attaining their goal and clearing the way for imperialist intervention. This action was crowned by Imre Nagy on November 4, 1956, when he appealed over the radio for open, armed intervention by the imperialists against the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government and the Soviet troops which the government had called upon for assistance.

After the defeat of the armed counter-revolutionary uprising, some groups of the Imre Nagy brand of conspirators sought refuge with those who had supported them earlier. Béla Király, Anna Kéthly, József Kővágó and other participants in the attempted putsch fled to the West to escape responsibility. So far as the Hungarian authorities know, József Mindazenty went into hiding in the US Legation. István B. Szabó attempted to find refuge in the British Legation in Budapest. Imre Nagy's group, which earlier had come out under the pirate flag of "national communism," fled to the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest to escape responsibility for their deeds.

It is typical of the infamy of the conspirators that they continued their counter-revolutionary activity even after the Hungarian people, guided by the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government, had begun to restore legal order, ensuring the peaceful life of the country and repairing the grave damages caused by the counter-revolutionaries. Instructions to continue armed resistance, to call strikes, to paralyze normal life and to re-organize underground subversive activity were issued by Anna Kéthly, Béla Király, József Kővágó and their associates from the West, and by Imre Nagy, Géza Losonczy and others from the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest. Through Miklós Gimes and other confederates, Nagy and Losonczy thus established contact from the Yugoslav Embassy with the "Central Workers' Council of Budapest" and Radio Free Europe; they also had a new underground newspaper published — the "October 23rd." All these facts were substantiated beyond all doubt during subsequent investigations and the present trial.

The evidence submitted during the legal proceedings demonstrated and proved that Imre Nagy and his associates had by virtue of their earlier revisionist, bourgeois-nationalist political attitude, inevitably arrived at an alliance with the most reactionary forces of the imperialist bourgeoisie and had betrayed the workers' power, the people's democratic order, the Hungarian working people and the socialist fatherland.

Ferenc Donáth, Miklós Gimes, Zoltán Tildy, Sándor Kopács, Ferenc Jánosi and Miklós Vásárhelyi showed repentance at the trial and fully confessed their guilt. Imre Nagy, József Losonczy and Pál Maléter denied their guilt. They were, however, exposed during the course of the proceedings by the incriminating evidence of their confederates and of witnesses, as well

as the material proof, and they made partial confessions concerning the facts of their crimes.

Weighing the serious nature of the crime, the aggravating and extenuating circumstances, the People's Tribunal of the Supreme Court found the defendants guilty on the basis of the trial proceedings.

The court therefore sentenced Imre Nagy to death ; Ferenc Donáth to 12 years in prison ; Miklós Gimes to death ; Zoltán Tildy to 6 years in prison ; Pál Maléter to death ; Sándor Kádár to life imprisonment ; József Szilágyi to death ; László Jánosi to 8 years in prison ; and Miklós Vásárhelyi to 10 years in prison.

The sentences are not subject to appeal. The death sentences have been carried out.

## II

### Conspiracy to Seize Power by Force

#### Imre Nagy Lays Down his Anti-state Schemes in Writing and Organizes an Underground Group

Imre Nagy wrote, in 1955 and early in 1956, the following

essays:

- "Morals and Ethics"

- "Five Basic Principles of International Relations"

- "Some Topical Questions"

The Hungarian investigating authorities seized, during the proceedings, the original copies of these essays, written in Imre Nagy's own handwriting.

He set forth, in these essays, his anti-state schemes, and they formed the political programme of the underground organization led by him, against the People's Democracy.

In his essay written in December, 1955, and entitled "Morals and Ethics," Imre Nagy set as his aim the overthrow of the people's democratic state order—its "smashing"—as he expressed it. In his essay "Some Topical Questions" of January 1956 he included in his programme an alliance with forces opposing the people's democracy, and stated that—relinquishing the power of the working class—the multi-party system must be restored and also the coalition government system with it. In his essay "The Five Basic Principles of International Relations" he took the position that Hungary would have to withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty.

He concealed these essays from the leading bodies of the country and the people of the country. But he passed them on to the members of his group which was organizing clandestinely. They turned them over, with his knowledge and on the basis of his instructions, to foreign powers from whom they expected backing.

Imre Nagy proceeded to organize, his political group long before the October 1956 counter-revolution, to implement his plans for overthrowing the people's democratic order.

He carefully selected persons whom he knew professed

political views identical or similar to his, or who had suffered personal offence during previous years and who he felt could be set up in opposition to the People's Democracy, won't carry out the secret plans contained in his essays, and even drawn into an underground, conspiratorial group.

Ferenc Jánosi admitted the following :

"The group was set up around Imre Nagy. He had the greatest political weight of any member of the group. The leaders were Imre Nagy and Géza Losonczy. Imre Nagy was an initiator and leader of the group."

During the trial held on February 6, 1958, the President asked these questions of Ferenc Jánosi :

"*President*: Who were the writers, journalists, public figures with whom you maintained contact, late in 1956 but mainly in 1956 prior to the October events, as people whom you knew to be supporters of Imre Nagy's political line?"

"*Ferenc Jánosi*: Sándor Haraszti, Géza Losonczy, Miklós Vásárhelyi, Miklós Gimes, and György Fazekas were among them.

"*President*: And who were the writers?"

"*Ferenc Jánosi*: Tamás Aczél, Zoltán Zelk and Gyula Háty."

Ferenc Donáth testified :

"Imre Nagy personally directed the activities of the group and of the individuals belonging to it. What characterized the persons grouped round Imre Nagy first of all was that they opposed the Party's policy, in whole or in part. In the course of his conversations with these persons he approved of their views, therefore in Imre Nagy they saw the person who would realize their political ideas and conceptions."

In his testimony Sándor Haraszti, journalist, member of the anti-state conspiracy—who was heard as a witness in this case—related that the Imre Nagy group began to develop into a definite form in autumn 1955. Among the members of the group at this time Géza Losonczy, Miklós Vásárhelyi, Ferenc Donáth, Miklós Gimes, Szilárd Ujhelyi and Sándor Haraszti could be listed.

The question arose, in what manner should they organize? From Szilárd Ujhelyi's testimony it is evident that a plan for organizing an illegal centre arose:

"Sándor Haraszti told me, Miklós Gimes proposed to Imre Nagy that they should bring into existence a semi-legal, or illegal organization, the purpose of which would be to unite and direct those who all over the country came out openly against the Government and Party leadership."

Imre Nagy gave the following answer to questions put by the President at the trial in February :

"Gimes made a proposal, in mid-1956 or thereabouts, that it would be a good idea to organize a small committee of persons close to my political views. This issue arose twice. Once Gimes, Fazekas and Lócsei raised this problem directly with me."

At the trial on February 6, Miklós Vásárhelyi replied to the questions put by the President, with reference to dissemination of the anti-state essays of Imre Nagy :

"*President*: Did Imre Nagy give you political essays written by him, the essays written by Imre Nagy in 1955 or 1956?"

"*Miklós Vásárhelyi*: Yes, I received them. I received the one entitled 'Five Principles', and others as well. I received the one on 'Morals and Ethics', another on economic questions, and then 'Some Topical Questions'. In other words, I received several essays."

Sándor Kopácsi gave the following evidence on the same day of the trial :

"György Fazekas gave me, in September 1956, Imre Nagy's essay 'Morals and Ethics'."

To the question what Imre Nagy's purpose was in giving him and other persons his hostile writings, Sándor Haraszti replied as follows :

"In order that we should become familiar with his standpoint, and afterwards disseminate it in intellectual circles wherever we made our appearance. I spread Imre Nagy's theses primarily among journalists in the course of conversations..."

Gábor Tánzos, secretary of the Petöfi Circle and member of the anti-state conspiracy, testified as follows:

"Late in the summer of 1956 Balázs Nagy gave me an essay of 50 to 60 typewritten pages to read. He told me that this study was written by Imre Nagy."

János Mikó, traffic supervisor, said the following in his testimony:

"Balázs Nagy and I went to visit Imre Nagy. Generally, during the greater part of the conversation, Imre Nagy stated his personal grievances. Then Imre Nagy handed us his essays to read. He reminded us not only to read his studies but also to pass them on for reading to a few other people who sympathized with him. He hinted that it would not be a good thing for the Party to get word of this activity of his."

Imre Nagy asserted at the trial, in the face of the concordant depositions, that he had not disseminated the writings in question, had no intention of utilizing them against the People's Democracy, and, according to his recollection, had given them to Miklós Vásárhelyi and Miklós Gimes only for their own information. He tried to place the responsibility for the underground dissemination of the essays on Vásárhelyi and Gimes. Imre Nagy was confronted, at the trial on June 10 with Sándor Haraszti, who appeared as a witness.

Sándor Haraszti stated:

"The members of the group were familiar with the essays of Imre Nagy. I also mentioned my disapproval to Imre Nagy because he was disseminating his views in this way."

Imre Nagy repeatedly denied this fact.

"I deny that my essays were circulated publicly. Some of my essays reached a smaller circle. I reject the statement made by Haraszti that he told me he disapproved of my essays being given to other people."

It is evident from the documents and testimony printed in Chapters V and VII of this book that the essays were sent abroad on the direct instructions of Imre Nagy.

### Intrigues Against the People's Democratic Order Behind a Legal Screen

The members of the Imre Nagy group attempted, while pursuing their underground organization, to exploit fully all legal possibilities for their attack against the people's democratic order. Their aim was to establish various groupings, to push them into the open and set them up in opposition to the state leadership and, thereby, to set the reactionary forces within the country "into motion." This is why they placed their reliance, first of all, in bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements, attempting as part of this scheme to establish an ideological and organizational base among some groups of the intellectuals to carry out their hostile plans.

The first such action of this underground group was to organize the so-called writers' memorandum. This memorandum was drafted in October 1955 and was signed by several writers, journalists and artists. The few cultural problems touched upon in the memorandum provided the group with a good pretext for their anti-government political stand.

Neither the public nor most of the people who signed the memorandum were aware that the Imre Nagy group had decided on this resolution, drafted it and organized the campaign for signatures to it.

It developed, from the testimony of witnesses, that the political significance of the so-called memorandum action was that through the unresolved problems of cultural life at that time they would launch a political attack against the Party and state leadership. There was talk about the memorandum action several times, among others, at Imre Nagy's flat too.

Miklós Vásárhelyi testified the following:

"The collecting of signatures was done largely by us—concretely by Sándor Haraszti, Géza Losonezy, Tibor Déry, Zoltán Zelk and myself, as well as one or two persons not belonging to the group. As far as I know Imre Nagy knew about this and agreed with our action. Later, when we gathered the signatures, he urged that the memorandum be handed in. In consequence of this, lack of confidence in the Party and the Government policy increased, especially among intellectual circles. To the masses this action was known as the action of the Hungarian intel-

ligentsia, the truth was that essentially the planners and executors of the whole action were the Imre Nagy group.

The Party's action convinced a considerable part of the signatories that this memorandum was of a factional, anti-Party character with a hostile purpose, therefore they retracted their signatures. The members of the Imre Nagy group took a stand against them and on their part accepted a resolution not to retract their signatures. Vásárhelyi stated the following regarding this in his confession :

"After the December 6, 1955 writers' rally several of us met at Géza Losonczy's flat—Sándor Haraszti, Géza Losonczy, Tibor Déry, Szilárd Ujhelyi, Tamás Aczél and a few others—and there we decided that we would not retract our signatures from the memorandum, despite the Party resolution. I also informed Imre Nagy of our resolution, and he concurred in it."

*The Petőfi Circle, Public Forum of Hostile Incitement,  
Led by Imre Nagy Group*

The Imre Nagy group used the Petőfi Circle as a legal front organization; from behind the scenes they organized and conducted a number of its debates, particularly the notorious debate on the press. They discussed the speeches of several journalists, they planned the degeneration of the debate into a demonstration of a hostile character.

Gábor Tánczos testified as follows at the trial held on June 11 :

"Imre Nagy and his policy were popularized in the Petőfi Club. The members of the Imre Nagy-Losonczy group chaired the meetings of the Petőfi Club more than once. The economic debate was conducted by Donáth, another was chaired by Szilárd Ujhelyi; the press debate was led by Géza Losonczy and Donáth also conducted the debate on Fruit-growing Hungary."

The author István Márkus, who took part in the counter-revolutionary organization, testified the following :

"... from the middle, or the end of May Tánczos (and other associates behind and beside him directing

the Petőfi Circle) endeavoured consciously to develop the Petőfi Circle as the propaganda centre of the Imre Nagy trend, he endeavoured to give it an organized basis, to expand it.

"At the end of May, and the beginning of June other plans occurred. The idea was raised that the Petőfi Circle should be expanded into a firmer organization: the idea was to have membership fees, periodical membership meetings, a 'constituent membership meeting' for the election of officials, the establishment of specialized departments, etc. They planned the publication of a periodical, if possible a printed weekly, but until this was accomplished, a lithographic 'organizational gazette'. This publication—according to the plan—would have carried the more important parts of the debate, and naturally would have served the purpose of consolidating the basis of the Circle, extended its sphere of activity and increased its political strength. A plan was even suggested for the establishment in the countryside of 'small Petőfi Circles' chiefly, of course, in the larger provincial towns, and university centres. It was suggested that the university students should organize their own separate debating clubs—perhaps according to faculties—on the pattern of the Petőfi Circle. In fact the thought was raised that even the working class youth ought to establish their own Petőfi Circles."

Sándor Haraszti testified as follows :

"The Imre Nagy group considered the Petőfi Circle as a suitable medium for the dissemination of their political platform. So they exploited it for this purpose. Géza Losonczy and Ferenc Donáth undertook to conduct discussions about different subjects at the meetings of the Petőfi Circle, where they stated their views too. After the resolution of the Central Committee condemning the discussions of the Petőfi Circle the political activity of the Imre Nagy group stopped short. I must state that Imre Nagy did not agree with the temporary retreat in the group's political struggle. His opinion was that we should continue the political struggle with undiminished force."

Ferenc Donáth admitted that their attacks had been organized in advance:

"From spring, 1956, the discussion evenings of the group were important scenes of the group's political activities. Certain debate evenings of the Petöfi Circle, including the press debate, were scheduled by the leaders of the Petöfi Circle after previous consultation with Géza Losonczy. Thus they carried on organized group activity which, in essence, was aimed against the leadership of the Party and the state."

Tibor Déry, writer, who also belonged to the counter-revolutionary group, testified:

"One or two days before the debate on the press, I read at the Journalists' Club part of my draft speech—the first part of it—to Géza Losonczy, Sándor Haraszti, Zoltán Zelk who belonged to the Imre Nagy group. They were very pleased with that part of my speech, which strengthened my conviction that what I had to say was good. Ferenc Donáth knew the contents of my speech before it was made public. I assume that Donáth learned about it from a member of the Imre Nagy group. I do not preclude the possibility that he may have been informed by Imre Nagy."

The people's democratic order was more and more viciously attacked at meetings of the Petöfi Circle, which were thoroughly prepared and arranged. Certain speakers at the debate on the press—Tibor Déry and Tibor Tardos in particular—took a hostile stand and called for "action," that is an attack on the system.

In his remarks, Tibor Déry warned the critics not to attack only the "surface appearances and symptoms," hence the mistakes, because the brunt of the attack should be aimed at the "essence, the cause of the disease," that is, at the system. He suggested that not only individuals should be the target of attack, but the "ideas which they represented as well."

Tibor Déry said:

"As long as our criticism is almost exclusively aimed against individuals and fails to examine whether or not there are certain errors in the system of our ideas, we are unavoidably bound to attain the meagre result of exchanging one evil for a lesser evil.

"We are confronted with mistakes in the structure," he continued, adding that action is called for.

"From 1,500 to 2,000 people, by and large always the same people, go from one debate to another . . . we are shouting words and rejoicing like kids with a trumpet, failing to realize that our words remain but words, our hopes are sterile and there is little or no change in the facts of the matter. But, what else can a person expect from all this? Merely that we are selling the birthright of action for a pottage of good speech."

Tibor Tardos drew a fallacious historical analogy in his remarks which were typical of the demagogic incitement contained in the speeches and articles of the Imre Nagy group. He actually urged that the printing shops, the property of the people's state, should be taken over if they wanted to attain "the freedom of the press." Who was Tardos speaking to and inciting to this deed? For whom was he demanding the freedom of the press? The resolution adopted by the executive committee of the Petöfi Circle, dated July 9, 1956, stated:

"Former university students, who organized the Pfeiffer and Sulyok parties at the time, leaders and spokesmen of former reactionary youth organizations and of the *Actio Catholica*, were present at the debate on the press, held in the Petöfi Circle."

Tibor Tardos testified as follows about his own speech:

"At the press debate of the Petöfi Circle, I said: 'our ever growing army' means the Party. By this, even if not stated in so many words, I meant the members of the Petöfi Circle, the writers and all those who supported the political leadership of Imre Nagy."

The activities of the Imre Nagy group, and particularly the openly seditious tone of the Petöfi Circle encouraged the other enemies of the people's democracy to conspire.

This became clear in the evidence given by István H. Szabó (a member of the right-wing of the Independent Smallholders Party, a wealthy peasant who later became Minister of State in the Imre Nagy government and a cabinet member. Editor). He said that the former right-wing reactionary leaders had conferred more than once:

"The events which were taking place in the country engaged our keen attention. We carefully followed the

debates at the Petőfi Circle, and the articles which appeared in the press, we assessed them and drew our conclusions. It was our opinion that Imre Nagy would shortly come to power and this would be to our advantage. We were confident that if Imre Nagy would control the country then the revival of the ISP would become possible. We approved of his actions in 1953, and we thought that he would extend these now on a coalition basis."

Imre Nagy and his associates, in order to achieve their aims, turned particular attention to influencing the writers and journalists so as through them to direct a centralized attack in the press against the Party and the state. The fact that Losonczy and his associates had the Petőfi Circle place the press debate on its agenda and devoted enormous care to its preparation and staging, shows that the Imre Nagy group wanted by all means to make use of the press, which plays a great role in forming public opinion, and enlist it in the service of their conspiracy. Through their positions in the various editorial boards, the members of the Imre Nagy group popularized their different actions and views and endeavoured to undermine confidence in the people's democratic regime and socialism.

The newspapers under their influence devoted disproportionately great space to reporting on the debates of the Petőfi Circle. Gábor Tanczos, in his testimony also referred to this

"The newspaper *Magyar Nemzet*, where Losonczy, an associate editor, had great influence, regularly dealt at length with the activity of the Petőfi Circle, it carried articles glorifying the debates of the Petőfi Circle. In the course of our conversation with Losonczy, we noted the fact with great pleasure."

Sándor Haraszti testified as follows regarding the influencing of writers and journalists :

"I directed my propaganda activity mainly toward the journalists and writers. Miklós Vásárhelyi, Géza Losonczy, Miklós Gimes and György Fazekas carried on similar political activity in this same circle."

Miklós Vásárhelyi said the following in his confession :

"There was a vigorous increase in the press activity of individual members of the group and of writers and journalists close to them of a kind which raised delicate

problems in the press and often presented them in an extremely exaggerated manner. I know that Sándor Haraszti and Géza Losonczy at this time were in constant contact with the writers, and they, as well as Tibor Déry, Zoltán Zelk, László Benjámín, played an active role in the political preparation of the writers' publications . . ."

Although the Imre Nagy group had formed a considerable group of followers in the Writers' Association and the Association of Journalists, at the beginning of 1956, they still considered their political influence very inadequate. They felt that among the most important section of the population, first of all among the working class, they had no notable influence. Sándor Haraszti said the following about this in his testimony :

"According to my recollections on one occasion I left Imre Nagy together with Gimes. We were talking. Gimes made statements to the effect that our struggle did not extend beyond the ranks of the intelligentsia. He saw the reason for this in the lack of organisation of our struggle. In response to my inquiry he stated the opinion that we could advance our struggle more effectively if we could spread it towards other, non-intellectual masses. As the condition for this he suggested the formation of some kind of organization."

Imre Nagy was also dissatisfied at times with the activeness of the members of the group. Sándor Haraszti testified the following regarding this :

"There were times when Imre Nagy himself initiated and urged certain actions, at other times he did not find satisfactory the political work of the members of the group. Imre Nagy proposed that political action be launched to annul his removal and expulsion from the Party. Imre Nagy on more than one occasion reproached the members of the group, saying that although the camp of followers among the journalists was quite large, still the opposition was not reflected in the press. He spoke about this first of all to Géza Losonczy and Miklós Gimes."

From Miklós Vásárhelyi's testimony it is evident also that Imre Nagy demanded a more openly hostile attitude on the part of the members of the group. Vásárhelyi confessed the following :



"Imre Nagy also agreed with each of our actions, certain of our actions were at his urging, and there were times when he was dissatisfied at certain inadequacies in some of them.

"Imre Nagy did not approve of the fact that after the July Resolution we accepted our rehabilitation without his affair being settled. He resented the fact that we accepted various functions while he was still not back in the Party."

In these testimonies a theme recurring like a refrain is Imre Nagy's return to the Party and systematic undermining activities aimed at disrupting the strength of the Party. They were well aware that the more they disrupted the unity of the Party, the greater were the prospects of success, the more easily they could seize the initiative and prevent the Central Committee from consistently realizing the decisions of its July session, the correction of mistakes committed in the past—and to keep these decisions from bearing fruit. For, as the foregoing verify, and as a whole series of documents later prove, the aim was not the correction of the mistakes, but the seizure of power for the overthrow of the people's democratic regime.

#### *Attempts to Incite the Working Class*

The more directly Imre Nagy and his group dealt with the idea of overthrowing the people's democratic system, the more determinedly did they attempt to extend their influence on the working class, or at least a part of the working class. They deemed it necessary for those forums, too, which were of an expressly cultural character, but in which their influence was the greatest, to concern themselves primarily with economic and political questions. They were thinking above all of the Writers' Association and their organ the *Irodalmi Újság* (Literary Gazette), *Béke és Szabadság* (Peace and Freedom), the *Művelődés Népe* (Cultured Nation) and other similar organizations and periodicals. Sándor Haraszti testified at the June 10 court session as follows:

"Imre Nagy urged that in the sphere of culture, in the Writers' Association and the Association of Journalists, we should not only object to the Party's cultural policy but speak also about national political questions. Imre Nagy objected that the members of the group did not raise national economic issues. Imre Nagy suggested to the members

of the group that they should seek contacts with factory Party organizations too."

This tactic of the Imre Nagy group was carried out at the September 1956 general meeting of the Writers' Association, which—as has been shown already by Vásárhelyi's confession—was the Imre Nagy group prepared. This general meeting, on a proposal from Sándor Lukácsy (writer, active during the days of the counter-revolution, particularly in the "Revolutionary Committee of the Intellectuals," one of the authors of the appeal containing the counter-revolutionary demands of this committee.—Editor.), adopted the following resolution:

"After our general meeting, a few of the writers, or groups of writers, shall go to visit 10 or 15 or more large factories and familiarize the workers with the work of our general meeting and generally with the position of present-day literature."

The meeting dealt in general with political questions, the question of Imre Nagy's "rehabilitation" and other questions proposed by the Imre Nagy group. The foregoing resolution meant that they wanted to give publicity to these questions among the workers.

Meanwhile they initiated further actions to extend their influence. The group organized the celebration of Imre Nagy's birthday, which was also a political demonstration of a hostile character. Ferenc Jánosi confessed as follows about this:

"... the question of the birthday was raised at the end of May 1956 at Imre Nagy's flat. Imre Nagy declared he did not think it proper at all if they observed an anniversary of this character in a public place, in his view it would be proper if the birthday were held at his flat and they should play host to the visitors. Subsequently, I and Haraszti considered that this event was also an occasion for the expression of political sympathy. Later at Imre Nagy's flat Losonczy, Haraszti, Schurecz, Ujhelyi and I talked about the question and unanimously reached this opinion."

Ferenc Donáth in his confession said the following:

"A momentous stage in the activities of the Imre Nagy group was Imre Nagy's birthday in the summer of 1956,

which provided an opportunity for a demonstration on Nagy's part. He invited those persons who for this or that reason were opposed to the leadership."

### *Mouthpieces of Counter-revolutionary Propaganda*

In the second half of 1956, and particularly in the weeks preceding the October counter-revolution, under the influence of the Nagy group in these papers, the *Irodalmi Újság* and other papers incited more and more openly to struggle against the people's democratic system, to "revolution." The papers under the group's influence became more and more the organs of counter-revolutionary propaganda.

Thus Miklós Vásárhelyi, for example, wrote in the *Hétfői Hírlap* libellously about the Hungarian People's Democracy in which, according to him, "there had never been democracy or freedom because the finest ideals of mankind were trampled underfoot."

Sándor Novobáczky in the *Irodalmi Újság* slandered the communist functionaries: "They felt themselves destined to rule and generally conducted themselves in the manner of a Roman proconsul. The forbearing and respectful Greeks bowed when they met them, but when they passed by they were regarded with hatred."

Gyula Háy wrote that soon the "great elimination would begin," Lajos Tamási also incited to rebellion, "Open up, from our blood, open up at last, revolution..."

Tamás Aczél, turning towards the West, wrote in his ode

"Europe... we too are about to embark on the road that we may lift up the gate... extend us your hand, let us make peace and go on from there, let us do together what can be, and what cannot..."

Gyula Fekete expressed the strivings of the Imre Nagy group in these words:

"We would liberate unbelievable forces if we storm the last remaining hedgehog strongholds of the restoration"

What they meant was that every important post was to be occupied by adherents of Imre Nagy.

This conduct of the Imre Nagy group was in complete harmony with imperialist propaganda. While Gyula Fekete wrote about storming the "hedgehog strongholds," while the September general meeting of the Writers' Association demanded the complete rehabilitation of Imre Nagy, and while Losonczy, Gyula Háy, Novobáczky and others demanded the mass removal of state and Party functionaries, Radio Free Europe said this about the same demand in its August 7, 1956 Hungarian broadcast:

"There is need for a change of personalities. Such persons are needed, whom the people believe to have learned from the past and who are willing to make serious changes."

In its September 12, 1956 broadcast, Radio Free Europe spoke as follows to the writers:

"We must be aware that we are witnessing events which we may safely call a revolution. We must also be aware that there are people who would like to confine this revolution behind bars. For this reason we writers must array ourselves behind the barricades in order to defend this revolution."

Rome Radio on August 28, 1956, as if it wished to proclaim the Western version of Tamás Aczél's above-quoted ode, said:

"As once when the West extended its helping hand and proclaimed a joining of forces against the common enemy, thus now too, the hour of liberation again approaches with the support of the West."

And in its September 19, 1956 broadcast, Radio Free Europe made out imperialism's certificate of recognition for the members of the Imre Nagy group in the Writers' Association.

"The Writers' Association has courageously embarked on the road of democratization and has taken the first step towards the solution. We know that this is not yet freedom that the Writers' Association has achieved. But the general meeting of the Writers' Association is an important stage, an important act and a good hope that our writers and people will achieve this freedom, complete freedom."

Géza Losonczy's standpoint was similar to that of Radio Free Europe. In the summer of 1956 in an interview given to the Israeli journalist Elon Ámos he declared, "We shall oppose the government by force if it comes to that."

*Extension of the Group's Anti-state Agitation to the countryside*

The members of the Imre Nagy group extended their organizing work to the countryside too and endeavoured with their actions to sway sentiment against the people's democracy, to create suitable soil for the realization of their plans. Among others Losonczy, Donáth, and József Szilágyi acted in this spirit in the countryside.

In the middle of October, 1956, they arranged a "meeting of intellectuals" at Hajdúböszörmény; the speaker was Géza Losonczy. From the testimony of a number of witnesses it can be determined what happened at the meeting. Imre Gelény, resident of Hajdúböszörmény, individually farming peasants, described it in this way:

"Intellectuals, but overwhelmingly kulaks, former gendarmes and other persons with past grievances participated in the meeting.

"Géza Losonczy gave a short talk in which he spoke about the danger of Stalinism and Rákosiism. After that a number of persons spoke, among them kulaks, and chiefly persons with grievances. One of the speakers read a programme containing several points. He demanded the independence of the country, the multi-party system and the holding of free elections. Apart from this there were more comments and they demanded changes in the government. In tones of considerable violence they demanded the recall of the local council chairman. The speeches grew heated that they almost led to open fighting."

Imre Gelény also related that after the meeting there was a conference at the home of Imre Bagosi, a kulak, which Géza Losonczy also attended. It was attended by several kulaks and Ernő Kis Pál, former chief constable. He further testified:

"Losonczy talked about the fact that the existing mistakes had been committed by Rákosiism and Stalinism and that changes were necessary in the government."

The testimony of Imre Csikós, pensioner, resident of Hajdúböszörmény, shows what kind of changes he had in mind:

"The first speaker in the discussion was the kulak Béla Fazekas, who cast abuse on the government. Solyósi, a former *gendarme*, remarked that the leaders were illiterate and did not know their jobs. He demanded that the old, competent persons be returned to the leading posts."

One can imagine what kind of "old, competent" leaders the former *gendarme* was thinking of.

In his testimony Dr. Ernő Kis Pál said the following about the role of Géza Losonczy at that meeting:

"The meeting of intellectuals in question was held in the Hajdúböszörmény Cultural Centre about 4 or 5 days before October 23. They announced in advance that Géza Losonczy would conduct the meeting, but intellectuals made up only a small part of those present, the majority of them consisted of peasants and kulaks. The atmosphere of the meeting took on a more and more counter-revolutionary character. They did not let Sándor Lévai, the second secretary of the Party Committee, take the floor. They attacked the council chairman, and there were even demands for a rope round his neck. Géza Losonczy did not even attempt to stem the counter-revolutionary atmosphere. He spoke about Stalinism, about Imre Nagy who would be fit to fill a leading post . . ."

József Szilágyi played a similar role about this time in Kesztemét. In his testimony Imre Szelepcsényi, chairman of the Cegléd Town Council, said the following concerning this:

"I arrived on October 20 before 5 o'clock at the county council building. I heard talking in Ferenc Dallos's room. My attention was attracted by loud shouts which reached me distinctly. 'A revolutionary does not ponder, he acts.' The voice of the person was strange to me. When I stepped into the room they introduced me to this man who gave his name as József Szilágyi. Szilágyi concluded his talk by saying that it was not enough for the students and the workers to demand changes, it was also necessary for the peasantry to act."

In his testimony as a witness Károly Mohácsi, director of a state farm who then worked at the county council, said the following:

"József Szilágyi stated that we must not become frightened by rejuvenation, even if there are negative flames in it because a revolutionary change can also bring slag with itself. Then Ferenc Dallos asked him what he understood by revolutionary change? Szilágyi replied that power would have to be taken over by new, positive forces. Then Comrade Dallos admonished him to consider what kind of assumption of power he was speaking about, because in his opinion the question of power was another question that was in the hands of the working class, here there could be talk about nothing other than the removal of certain persons in whom the people had no confidence. Szilágyi replied: what kind of revolutionary is it who becomes frightened of the revolutionary events?"

#### Secret Meetings and Talks

The Imre Nagy group held several secret meetings and talks when they considered that the time had come to place the seizure of power on the order of the day.

Imre Nagy included in his programme the establishment of the multi-party system and a coalition government. This plan was tantamount to an attempt at disrupting the unity of the working class and its party. Sándor Haraszti and Géza Losonczy, on the instructions of Imre Nagy, opened negotiations with Anna Kéthly concerning the re-organization of the Social-Democratic Party.

Sándor Haraszti stated in his testimony that the aim of the meeting and talks with Anna Kéthly was to become acquainted with her viewpoint regarding her re-assuming a part in political affairs, and to find out whether or not she would be willing to enter the future government of Imre Nagy.

Similar negotiations were conducted with others as well. István Erdei, former Social Democratic MP, who for a time was Secretary of State for Agriculture and who later retired to his kulak estate, related in his testimony that in September, 1956, Imre Nagy conferred with him. Erdei testified as follows about this:

"Concerning my views about agriculture, he asked me whether they represented the conception of the Social Democratic Party. I replied: Anna Kéthly read it and approved it, there was no objection to it on the part of

József Takács either. I said that the Social Democratic Party will have to come into existence legally.

"...I warned Imre Nagy against taking half measures.

"He understood my standpoint well. He immediately informed me: He was not taking half measures.

"Finally Imre Nagy asked me in what area of work I would like to employ my abilities? I replied: Should my party appoint me I would gladly fill the post of under-secretary of state in the Ministry of Agriculture..."

István Erdei's attitude left no doubt as to the conditions which would make possible co-operation between the Imre Nagy group and the Kéthly group. Imre Nagy willingly accepted these conditions—the relinquishing of the Party's leading role, the breaking of working-class unity, the creation of and giving power to other parties, thereby liquidating the people's regime. These conditions dovetailed with his own plans. That was why he understood István Erdei's standpoint so well, and immediately declared also that "he would not take half measures." There is no doubt what Imre Nagy and István Erdei meant by a "whole solution." Not the correction of the mistakes and reforms, but a change of regime. The overthrow of the lawful order of the Hungarian People's Republic, of working-peasant rule.

There were talks for the purpose of enlisting the Union of Working Youth, too, in the service of the group. István Márkus testified as follows concerning this:

"On the morning of October 22, 1956, László Kardos called me by telephone at my flat and asked me to visit him at 7 o'clock in the evening for a meeting. I was the last to arrive. László Kardos, Gábor Tanczos and Balázs Nagy were there. Later Géza Losonczy arrived. Tanczos explained that next day there would be a meeting of the Central Committee of the UWY, they wanted to have a good part of the persons present co-opted on the central committee. A controversy arose among us and the united standpoint was arrived at that though we could not know in advance how far the next day's Central Committee meeting would go in changing the programme and the leadership, we had, on our part, to bend our efforts to come out with a united stand and already now achieve the maximum in the sphere of changes in personalities.

"We also spoke about how we could achieve a numer-

ical majority in the Executive Committee of the UWY. Kardos proposed that we should nominate such a person for First Secretary through whom this post should be in our hands. The Presidency of Losonczy also came up, and it was our idea that, although up to now there had been no presidential function, we would propose that Losonczy should be the President of the UWY, he would then be able to assist the First Secretary. Losonczy did not protest against this. It was the definite aim of all of us to assist the Imre Nagy political line throughout the work of the UWY."

When the enemies of the People's Democracy swung into action in the wake of the subversive activity of the group they believed the time had come to make immediate preparations for the seizure of power, and thus for elaborating, first and foremost, a government programme of the Imre Nagy brand.

In Géza Losonczy's diary, found in his possession and seized when he was taken into custody, he had written that several members of the group had met on the evening of October 22 in the premises of the SZÖVOSZ (National Association of Co-operatives). Losonczy's diary contained this entry:

"The theme of the meeting: the preparation of Imre Nagy's programme speech. We agreed that on Friday evening we would meet at my flat. Donáth and Haraszti would also be there. Until then everybody would draft his thesis and there we would discuss them jointly."

Miklós Gimes confirmed this in his confession:

"We agreed that I would write about the question of Hungarian foreign policy, Géza Losonczy was to prepare material on the questions of the People's Patriotic Front."

Ferenc Donáth also visited the SZÖVOSZ, and concerning this he made the following confession:

"On October 22, 1956, about 6 o'clock in the evening I arrived at the SZÖVOSZ. They informed me that they were working on the preparation of the economic section of a new government programme, because more than likely Imre Nagy would be the Prime Minister. They even asked me to state my ideas in connection with the agricultural section."

On October 23, the next day that is, the Imre Nagy group held an illegal meeting and agreed on changes in personnel in the leadership.

In his previously mentioned diary Géza Losonczy wrote:

"On the morning of October 23 I called up Sándor Haraszti, Ferenc Donáth, Szilárd Ujhelyi, Imre Nagy and Ferenc Jánosi by telephone and asked them to come over to my flat to talk over the situation.

"About 10:30 they were all there.

"We were unanimous in the opinion that in our country, too, the situation was ripe for the execution of the planned changes. The government would have to be radically changed.

"I stressed that we must be rid of *not only* the Stalinist communists but also those 'non-party people' who had grown close to the Stalinists. On the basis of our talk we must place in the Political Bureau Imre Nagy, Sándor Haraszti, Ferenc Donáth, Zoltán Szántó, Géza Losonczy. We planned to include in the Central Committee (apart from those mentioned) József Szilágyi, József Schurecz, Miklós Vásárhelyi, László Kardos, Gábor Tánczos, Jenő Széll, György Lukács, Sándor Novobáczky, Sándor Fekete, Miklós Gimes, Lajos Kónya, Gyula Háy, Sándor Erdei, Ferenc Jánosi and Mrs. László Rajk.

"We decided also that we would have to remove without delay the most compromised district and county Secretaries and Council Chairmen.

"There was a short controversy on whether Imre Nagy should be Prime Minister or the First Secretary of the Party? It was Nagy's opinion that he must not be First Secretary, but Prime Minister. This was how the people remembered him and they wanted him to be Prime Minister again. Then the others also agreed with this.

"We settled it then that we should regard *this agreement as binding on all of us*. We would act only in conformity with this agreement. Because of the situation we would meet daily."

At the trial proceedings on February 6, Ferenc Jánosi, replying to a question of the President, admitted the following concerning the clandestine meeting which took place on the morning of October 23:

"Imre Nagy said that Losonczy had invited him as well as me to his flat . . . I agreed with what was said at the talks, including the youth demonstration. In addition, I proposed that Sándor Haraszti and Szilárd Ujhelyi be co-opted into the Central Committee. And when Géza Losonczy told me to take down the proposals made there, I did it."

Although the concordant depositions at the investigation proved that Imre Nagy wanted to become prime minister and set this as his goal, and members of his group, on Nagy's initiative, carried on activity and organized demonstrations for this purpose—he attempted to deny this fact before the court. Imre Nagy stated at the court session, held in February 1958:

"Losonczy, or possibly someone else, said that it would be a good idea for me to become the first secretary of the party. I said that I had never headed the party committee as a first secretary, and was known to the masses as a prime minister from 1953 to 1955. The statement that I wanted to become prime minister is untrue."

Contradicting Imre Nagy, Miklós Vásárhelyi admitted before the court:

"The conversation began around the kind of changes to be made in personnel. Recommendations were made concerning who should be members of the Political Bureau and the Central Committee . . . Nearly everybody took part in the discussion; I spoke up myself, mentioning names and making proposals. My name was also among those proposed as a future member of the Central Committee . . ."

"We also talked about the post Imre Nagy should assume. Imre Nagy said, to this, that he was most willing to become prime minister because that was how he was known to the country."

The Imre Nagy group drew up the government programme and government list at a time when the legal, constitutional government of the Hungarian People's Republic was still in existence. Its purpose in doing so was to overthrow the legal government and take its place.

As may be seen from the documents, the aim of these talks was not to achieve some sort of deviation in the UWP and the Party leadership, but to snatch the key positions there,

to organize the possibility of playing a guiding role in the leadership and thus to bring about a fundamental change in the character of these organizations. Thereafter they intended to make them serve the realization of their plans.

### Organizing the Demonstration of October 23

Through its connections before October 23 the Imre Nagy group organized meetings of a hostile character at numerous universities. The demonstration of October 23 grew out of these; this was the prelude to the counter-revolutionary rising.

The followers of Imre Nagy went from one university to the next; they organized, and voiced provocative, nationalist slogans. A decisive role was played by the meeting on October 22 at the Technical University. This was where they decided on the demonstration, under the influence of József Szilágyi's intervention.

The counsel for the defence asked József Szilágyi:

"Did you stress in your speech at the Technical University on October 22 that you were acting as a confidant of Imre Nagy?"

"*Szilágyi*: I think it is not correct in this way.

"I spoke up twice. I said, in my first remarks, that Imre Nagy should become prime minister; we had the blueprint as to what should be done: To power with Imre Nagy.

"There was also a discussion as to whether or not there should be a demonstration. Rector Cholnoky took a stand against it. This prompted me to take the floor again. I spoke for one or two minutes, saying that there should be. A lot was also said about the students going to Imre Nagy with their demands. In my second remarks I said this made no sense since Imre Nagy was not in power. Therefore, they shouldn't go to Imre Nagy with their demands, but should demonstrate the next day." Incidentally I am well acquainted with Imre Nagy—these were my approximate words."

Pál Szerbin, assistant professor at the Technical University, said the following in his testimony concerning Szilágyi's remarks:

József Szilágyi's speech was a turning point in the course of the meeting. He welcomed the students' spirit of initiative and identified himself with it. In recent days he had been listening to London, Paris, Belgrade: they usually gave very authentic and factual material, their broadcasts were more in conformity with the facts than the radio of the people's democratic countries. In a demagogic tone he spoke about a few other things, actually shouting, almost beside himself; his speech grew violently anti-Soviet."

An excerpt from Géza Losonczy's diary:

"Meeting between the revolutionary youth and the Imre Nagy group on Tuesday morning. It was also the standpoint of the Nagy group that there should be a demonstration."

The witness Mrs. Péter Józsa, the former administrator of the Petöfi Circle, testified as follows:

"I went to my place of work about 9 o'clock in the morning on October 23, 1956, and that was where I first heard of the demonstration. Prior to this, on the evening of the 22nd, the leadership of the Petöfi Circle held an emergency meeting, we called in the members of the leadership by telegramme. I was not familiar with the theme of the meeting, but later, in the Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals, I heard that the Circle had adopted a resolution to participate in the demonstration next day."

"Returning to October 23, when I went in, the members of the Petöfi Circle's leadership were again in session, and by that time there were delegates of different universities present. Among the writers I saw Péter Kuczka and Zoltán Zelk. After a long conference, about 11 o'clock the Petöfi Circle began actively to organize and direct the demonstration. After that began the mimeographing of the slogans of the Petöfi Circle, and according to Tanczos's instructions everybody was to be given copies who asked for them. At this time there was regular contact between the leadership of the Petöfi Circle and the delegates of the universities, we even set up a telephone watch. By this time it was clear that the leadership of the Petöfi Circle had taken the organization and the direction of the demonstration

into their own hands. The building was a general staff headquarters, the delegations constantly came and went..."

Szilárd Ujhelyi, in his testimony regarding the conference of the Imre Nagy group on October 23, said:

"During the conference Gábor Tanczos telephoned there several times to Losonczy, in connection with the demonstration. They agreed that Tanczos should try to control the demonstration with the slogans of the Petöfi Circle."

Aron Tóbiás, who on October 23, 1956 wanted to make a radio report on the preparations for the demonstrations, testified as follows:

"One after another the delegates of the different universities and colleges came to take over the slogans issued by the Petöfi Circle for the demonstration. I heard them as they talked over which college or university would meet when and where. From several persons I heard there would be a sound truck at the demonstration. From others I heard that during the demonstration someone would stand by at the universities in the office of the dean (telephone watch).

A counter-revolutionary set of demands, consisting of 14 or 16 points, was pushed through at the Technical University. Violent and mendacious references were contained in the demands about "citizens kidnapped and taken to the Soviet Union" and the like. The demands aimed at changing the system, severing relations with the Soviet Union and subverting constitutional order in Hungary. The real implications of these demands became clear during the counter-revolution, through the release of fascists, war criminals and common-law criminals, the sanguinary white terror, organization of reactionary parties and the publication of gutter-sheets by the counter-revolutionaries.

The provoked and misled university students were incited to demand that these counter-revolutionary claims should be read over the Radio. The organizers of the demonstration knew very well that the government of the People's Democracy would not permit the reading of these demands over its Radio. The entire action was aimed at mobilizing masses of people in front of the Radio building and using this as a cover for

armed counter-revolutionary groups to occupy the premises according to a pre-conceived plan.

Losonczy made a typical entry in his diary :

“Imre Nagy’s standpoint was that Benke\* should not prevent the broadcast of the 14 points.”

This was how Imre Nagy’s group prepared, organized and directed the counter-revolutionary demonstration of October 23, 1956, which finally turned into an open counter-revolutionary rising. With this rising those plans which Imre Nagy and his group had secretly prepared for such a long time reached the stage of realization.

\* President of the Radio at the time

### III

## Liquidation of the Foundations of the People’s Democracy

At the time Imre Nagy became Prime Minister, the pertinent leading state organs also decided on the major immediate tasks of the government in the given situation. According to the decision, the primary duty of the government was to arm the workers, to crush the counter-revolution, and enlist the aid of the Soviet troops stationed in the country under the Warsaw Treaty, and to declare martial law.

Imre Nagy agreed to these decisions without objection, and, on the basis of them, he accepted the appointment as Prime Minister. He misled and duped the Presidential Council of the People’s Republic as well as his own government; he tricked and fooled the Hungarian people as a whole, because he pretended to be a communist, an unconditional supporter of the people’s democratic order, although—as everyone now knows—he had elaborated a programme in opposition to the People’s Democracy and headed a secret, conspiratorial group organized for implementing this programme. As prime minister, Imre Nagy did not execute the decisions binding upon him. He failed to do so because his political ideas—the smashing of the People’s Democracy—sharply conflicted with these decisions. However, on the night of October 23 he did not believe that the time had come as yet to disclose his aims and plans, either to the leaders or the public. He had to wait till he had created the prerequisites for them. These prerequisites, as became evident later through the planned and conscious activities of Imre Nagy and his group, were as follows :

1. To eliminate the communists and the forces loyal to the cause of socialism from leading posts and, consequently, to eliminate them from key positions throughout the country;
2. To demoralize the armed forces—the police and the army;
3. To disorganize the state machinery.



### Ousting the Forces Loyal to Socialism from the Leadership

The communist majority in the Council of Ministers meant at the time a great obstacle to the Imre Nagy group in carrying out their plans.

In the course of his activity as Prime Minister, he violated his oath by setting aside the country's constitutional leading organs, the National Assembly, the Presidential Council and the government, as a body, and illegally instituted the so-called "cabinet" as his own organ. Subsequently they aimed at removing the communists even from this cabinet and putting bourgeois politicians in their place.

The testimonies of István Márkus and István B. Szabó shed light upon this activity and methods of the Imre Nagy group. István Márkus, in the course of interrogation, stated:

"On October 24—around noon as I recall—Losonczy called on the telephone. I think Zelk spoke with him. Losonczy called upon us (writers) to assist them by compiling a list of persons who we thought were suitable for the Central Committee and for the government then being reorganized. I spoke with him too. When I asked what kind of government it would be, he stated that he had in mind a government of broad national unity, headed by Imre Nagy.

"As far as the ideas on the government were concerned, we realized that they considered the time ripe for submitting and granting extensive political demands—that is, for implementing their political views or speeding up the realization of them."

This testimonies not only prove that the Imre Nagy group called up the writers to suggest persons whom the group would incorporate into the leading body of the Party and into the government, but also throws light on the fact that the Imre Nagy group had already at the time—at noon on October 24!—started to reorganize the government and to realize their plans for establishing a coalition government. They could realize them, however, only when they had created the necessary conditions for this.

Excerpt from the testimony of István B. Szabó:

"On November 1, 1956, Zoltán Tildy called us, together with several members of the Provisional Executive Com-

mittee of the Independent Smallholders' Party, into the Parliament. He informed us that the Imre Nagy government would be reshuffled on a coalition basis, and that it would include representatives of the Independent Smallholders' Party, the Peasant Party, the Social-Democratic Party, and the Communist Party. In line with the new situation, he deemed it necessary that the Independent Smallholders' Party should appoint another person, in addition to the two ministers already nominated, Zoltán Tildy and Béla Kovács. He emphasized that he had left the nomination up to the leadership of the Independent Smallholders' Party. Tildy added that, for his part, he would prefer my being nominated (István B. Szabó). I asked Tildy why he insisted on me. His answer was: 'I want to have a peasant in the government.' The members of the Executive Committee—including me—accepted the standpoint taken by Zoltán Tildy. That is how I became a member of the national government of Imre Nagy.

Neither I nor the new ministers simultaneously appointed by the other parties took an oath of office before the Presidential Council. I wish to add that our ministerial appointments were not confirmed, either orally or in writing, by the Presidential Council.

"I went with Zoltán Tildy into Imre Nagy's office on the morning of November 2, and was presented to him as the new minister appointed by the Independent Smallholders' Party. Géza Losonczy, and Ferenc Farkas from the Peasant Party, were already there, Ferenc Erdei and Gyula Kelemen came later. Imre Nagy spoke of the necessity of supporting each other within the coalition. We met again in the afternoon. Ferenc Farkas submitted, on behalf of the Peasant Party, a proposal to constitute a supreme 'National Council' in place of the Presidential Council.

"I do not recall whether the competence of the ministers was brought up at this meeting, or at the meeting held on November 3. Imre Nagy explained his views regarding this matter. He said that administrative secretaries of state, who would not be shifted as the political situation changed, should head the ministries instead of the ministers. The ministers of state would supervise these agencies."

The court had at its disposition the original text of the minutes of the November 2 cabinet meeting. They contain in part, the following :

“Since the question of the reorganization of the government is becoming a more urgent matter, the cabinet has decided not to appoint new ministers. Instead the cabinet shall, on the one hand, be enlarged by new forces primarily from among the insurgents ; on the other hand the cabinet will not appoint ministers, for the time being to head the ministries, but the ministries shall be directed by competent secretaries of state acting on ministerial mandate. This appointment shall be essentially in the nature of a political secretary of state. As an exception an additional administrative secretary of state shall be appointed, when personnel questions cannot be solved otherwise.”

The Imre Nagy group realized an essential point of their programme on November 3 : Under the pretext of enlarging and strengthening the national government, Anna Kéthly, Gyula Kelemen, József Fischer, István B. Szabó, István Bibó and Ferenc Farkas became Ministers of State, and Pál Maléter was appointed Minister of Defence. Simultaneously they removed from office : Minister of Foreign Affairs Imre Horváth, Minister of the Interior Dr. Ferenc Münnich ; Minister of Defence Károly Janza ; Minister of Finance István Kossuth ; Minister of Justice Erik Molnár ; Minister of Metallurgy and Machine Industry János Csergő ; Minister of Mining and Power Sándor Czottner ; Minister of the Chemical Industry Gergely Szabó ; Minister of Light Industry Mrs. József Nagy ; Minister of Town Development Ferenc Nezvál ; Minister of State Farms Miklós Ribíánszky ; Minister of Foreign Trade József Bognár ; Minister of Home Trade János Tausz ; Minister of Food Rezső Nyers ; Minister of Produce Deliveries Antal Gyenes ; Minister of Building Antal Apró ; Minister of Health Antal Babits ; Minister of Culture György Lukács ; as well as Antal Apró, József Bognár and Ferenc Erdei as deputy prime ministers. Responsible ministerial posts were not filled with the exception of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence.

The cabinet was composed of the following members : Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs ; Zoltán Tildy, Minister of State ; Béla

Kovács, Minister of State ; István B. Szabó, Minister of State ; Anna Kéthly, Minister of State ; Gyula Kelemen, Minister of State ; József Fischer, Minister of State ; István Bibó, Minister of State ; Ferenc Farkas, Minister of State ; Géza Losonczy, Minister of State ; and Pál Maléter, Minister of Defence.

Additional proof of the systematic activity pursued by Imre Nagy and Losonczy to misguide and mislead the masses is the fact that they included János Kádár's name in the list of cabinet members as a Minister of State, and publicized this list over the Radio and in the Press although they were at that time already searching for János Kádár and several of his associates who had severed all connection with Imre Nagy and his government.

Mrs. József Balogh, who worked as secretary to Imre Nagy during the counter-revolution, stated the following in her testimony :

“On November 2, József Szilágyi conducted an investigation, presumably on the instructions of Imre Nagy, into the case of the disappearance of János Kádár and Ferenc Münnich. They questioned the chauffeur and others, and Szilágyi ended the minutes of the investigation with the statement, ‘they presumably went over to the Soviets.’ This was reported to Imre Nagy in the presence of Szilágyi, Losonczy, Donáth and others.”

#### **Disorganization of the Armed Forces and Arming of the Counter-revolutionaries**

##### *Members of the Imre Nagy Group Operate at Budapest Police Headquarters*

With the co-operation of Sándor Kopácsi, the members of the Imre Nagy group, on October 23, 1956, set up a counter-revolutionary centre in the Budapest headquarters of the police commissioner. This group was the spiritual mentor of the activity which disrupted a considerable section of the police force, disorganized it and later armed the counter-revolutionaries, by agreement between Sándor Kopácsi and representatives of the insurgents and on the instructions of Imre Nagy.

Detailed records concerning October 23, 1956, exist in the diary kept by Géza Losonczy. An entry from the diary reads :

"Szilágyi around ten at the police commissioner's headquarters. Kopácsi gave instructions not to fire at the crowd anywhere."

József Balogh, police officer said the following in his testimony as an eyewitness:

"Several of us were in Kopácsi's office on the morning of October 23, 1956, and talked about the demonstration planned for the afternoon. In the meantime, Kopácsi carried on a telephone conversation. It was possible to make out from the conversation that József Szilágyi was on the phone and was inquiring where the demonstrators were starting from. After the conversation, Kopácsi said there would be no trouble, because he had direct contact with the demonstrators.

During the time of the demonstration—around 4 o'clock—a group of writers called on Kopácsi at the Budapest police commissioner's headquarters. Among them were a group of writers, including Tamás Aczél, Miklós Gimes, György Fazekas, and some others whom I did not know by name. Kopácsi conducted this group into the office of the chief of the secretariat and from then on he regularly went in and carried on negotiations with the members of the group.

"This group was joined after the 23rd by other individuals, for example by József Szilágyi, Tibor Méray and others. The group maintained contact, from the headquarters of the Budapest commissioner of police, with Imre Nagy, with the Writers' Association and other groups which took an active part in the counter-revolution. They turned out memoranda. For example, they compiled a list for a rival government, right after the Imre Nagy government was set up, from which they omitted the communist members still acting in the Imre Nagy government. I saw this list myself.

"The members of the group showed all the memoranda and drafts to Kopácsi, who approved them."

Vilmos Oláh, a counter-revolutionary, took part in the siege on the Radio and in other armed conflicts. He made the following confession under interrogation:

"The crowd marched on Deák Square in front of the headquarters of the commissioner of police. They demanded the release of the prisoners. During the afternoon

a bigger mob gathered there, and sent a delegation demanding the release of the prisoners and the removal of the red stars. I heard that Sándor Kopácsi issued an order, on the suggestion of the writers present—György Fazekas, Tamás Aczél—to release the arrested persons held in the building, to remove the red star from the building. The demonstrators, led by Angyal, János Szabó and myself started to cheer Kopácsi and demanded that Kopácsi become Minister of the Interior."

Excerpt from Sándor Kopácsi's confession before the court:

"*President*: Were there any individuals not in police status, like writers and journalists, at the Central Police Headquarters after October 23?

"*Kopácsi*: Yes, there were I remember among them György Fazekas, József Szilágyi, Tamás Aczél. I remember that Miklós Gimes was there once. In addition, Tibor Méray, Pál Lőcsei and, I believe, Péter Erdős and others, were also there."

Sándor Kopácsi issued orders disorganizing the Budapest district police headquarters, in accordance with the understanding reached with the members of the Imre Nagy group and under their influence. This paved the way for the advance of the counter-revolutionaries. He said, during the trial:

"The writers and journalists there, who kept in constant touch with Imre Nagy, discussed what was going on, that it was a revolution, a democratic movement... The outcome of this evaluation was that I wavered and issued orders that the district police headquarters should avoid clashes and rather try to reach an understanding with the attackers."

"*President*: Did reports come in from the district police headquarters that the insurgents were threatening the police?

"*Kopácsi*: Yes I received such reports.

"*Question put by a member of the People's Tribunal*: To how many district police headquarters did you issue orders that they should not fire on the demonstrators, but should reach an understanding with them and hand over their weapons to them?

"*Kopácsi*: I remember issuing instructions to lay down arms to Districts 12, 14, and 11, while I issued

orders to Districts 5, 6 and 7 to march in with their arms to central headquarters. That's all I recall.

"I consider myself guilty because I had orders from the top leadership, I had taken my oath of office, but I violated the instructions received under the political influence of writers and journalists who were at Police Headquarters."

"*Question*: It is stated in the record of events at the secretariat of the Central Police Headquarters that on October 26, 1956 you made a report to Imre Nagy on the basis of reports received and proposed that an agreement be reached with the insurgents. András Hegedüs, former Prime Minister (the Deputy Prime Minister at that time—Editor), disapproved of this and issued instructions for armed resistance. It is also stated in the record of events that László Piros, the then Minister of the Interior, called you to account as to why you had not taken action against the insurgents and why you were turning your arms over to them? Why did you not execute the instructions of the higher authorities?"

"*Kopácsi*: When I received these instructions I was already informed of the appraisal of the Imre Nagy group and Fazekas, that they had declared the events a 'pure democratic revolution.' I concluded that I should act in conformity with the policy of Imre Nagy, that was why I did not carry out the instructions of the higher authorities."

Imre Nagy asked Sándor Kopácsi, a fellow accused, the following question:

"How do you know that the journalists and writers who were there at that time had contact with me?"

And Sándor Kopácsi answered:

"I personally heard György Fazekas speaking to you twice over the telephone. Miklós Gimes also spoke on October 27 over the telephone, either with you or your secretariat—I don't know exactly with whom. Writers and journalists, Tamás Aczél and others came to me several times saying that they had been in the Parliament and had talked with you. They were in constant contact with you."

The court, on June 13, heard the testimony of police Lieutenant-Colonel Tivadar Végh. He said in his testimony:

"I was the head of the District 8 police headquarters in October 1956. I reported, on the 23rd, that leaflets were being distributed and asked for instructions in this respect. I was told that the police could not touch the matter.

"It must have been on October 25 when counter-revolutionaries drove up in front of the headquarters. In view of the dangerous situation, I asked for orders from Central Headquarters. I was told by Kopácsi that we should not shoot at the mob, but should negotiate with them. The hooligans demanded arms of us. We were ordered, after the negotiations, to hand over the weapons and move over to Central Headquarters."

Members of the Imre Nagy group—including Sándor Kopácsi—acting in the headquarters of the commissioner of police, opened direct negotiations with the counter-revolutionaries and reached an agreement with them.

Sándor Kopácsi confessed in this connection:

"I reached an agreement with the leaders of the insurgents on October 25 or 26, 1956, when we negotiated an armistice at the Budapest police headquarters. Major General István Kovács, György Fazekas journalist, as well as the leaders of the insurgent groups—I recall by name József Dudás, Pongrácz and Antalóczy—attended the negotiations. We reached agreement in thirty minutes. From this time on the insurgent leaders regularly visited the Budapest police headquarters. Around the end of October, they were elected to the Committee of the Special Police. They had a decisive influence in directing the Committee of the Special Police although fewer in numbers than the representatives of the army and police."

Béla Berecz, Major General of Police, related the following:

"I was escorted to the headquarters of the Commissioner of Police in Budapest. There I found Kopácsi negotiating with Dudás, Béla Király and others. They were discussing who should be given the Szabad Nép printing shop. Then the bandit Dudás declared: 'The printing shop belongs to me!' They went for him: 'I'll kick your teeth out! I'll decide to whom the printing shop belongs.' I was arrested and escorted into another room. Kopácsi

took note of my being there. He must have felt my presence to be embarrassing, because they moved into another room."

*Imre Nagy Appoints a Horthyite Staff Officer as Head of the Special Police*

Imre Nagy, on becoming Prime Minister, took cognizance of the decision reached at the meeting, including the point with respect to arming the workers.

"But instead of arming the workers, he issued instructions to arm the bandits and to enlist the leaders of the counter-revolutionary gangs in the Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police, and he appointed a former fascist officer of the Horthy army to head the committee. He set up a national guard consisting in the main of hooligans, criminals and counter-revolutionaries, to take the place of the police force.

From Sándor Kopácsi's confession :

"Imre Nagy telephoned me from the House of Parliament, on October 29, and instructed me to organize the new special police, enlisting the insurgents in its ranks, also, and to establish the top body of the National Guard, the Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police. He instructed me to look for an experienced, well-trained military man, possibly among the persons recently rehabilitated, to head the Committee of the Special Police. I took cognizance of it. On this basis, we informed the leaders of the insurgent groups to take part in the preparatory meeting of the Committee of the Special Police."

The "experienced," well-trained military man, "possibly a rehabilitated person," was Béla Király!

Béla Király, former staff officer of Horthy, who in 1949 worked in a confidential capacity with the Arrow-cross Minister of Defence, Beregffy, was condemned to death by court action for espionage in 1951. The death sentence was later commuted to life-long imprisonment. Béla Király never was rehabilitated by the competent organs of the People's Democracy. He received his unlawful rehabilitation on October 31, 1956, with the consent of Imre Nagy.

We are publishing in this pamphlet a photo of a handwritten letter which begins with the salutation: "My dear friend Feri!" This letter was written and sent on October 26, 1956, by Béla Király to his "dear friend Feri," that is to Ferenc János, son-in-law of Imre Nagy. The following excerpts have been taken from this letter of Béla Király's:

"I was expecting your visit, but it was made impossible by the fateful historical events. We were anxious to talk at this meeting, which did not take place, about the topic we had a few words on after the funeral.

"I am overwhelmed with joy and enthusiasm, after hearing the programme of Imre Nagy (i. e., Imre Nagy's speech broadcast that day over the Radio.—Editor.), the decision of the government and of the party. This is, my dear friend Feri, what we believed even then when we worked at the same place, and it is for this that I wish to throw all my strength, enthusiasm and modest training onto the scales.

"When I think that precisely now I must stay out of this work so close to my heart, I am overcome with grief.

"Feri my friend, I ask you to think it over and consider whether my past, my enthusiasm for work — which you are familiar with—my five years' imprisonment . . . am I not fit to take part in this work of reconstruction? I am offering my work, my enthusiasm and my sympathy to Imre Nagy and his government through you.

"... I think my place should be in the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence.

"It is true that, at the moment, I have not yet been formally rehabilitated . . . revolutionary times require revolutionary measures: therefore, wouldn't a brief order be enough to restore me to my former rank and assign me my duties?"

There was no time lost in "assigning duties" to Béla Király and making use of his "work, enthusiasm and sympathy." He did not have to keep out of "the work so close to his heart."

Imre Nagy attempted to place the responsibility for the appointment of Béla Király on Zoltán Tildy, another accused.

"I didn't know Béla Király, had never heard of him, either directly or indirectly. I didn't know about his activity either . . . Tildy recommended him very warmly.

Tildy said that we wouldn't find a more suitable man for the post; that he was an excellent organizer."

Sándor Kopácsi confessed as follows concerning the appointment of Béla Király:

"Imre Nagy agreed concerning Béla Király and asked us to call on him in the afternoon and to bring along Béla Király and our proposals on organizing the National Guard. We did this and then Imre Nagy, as Prime Minister, officially appointed Béla Király as the leader of the Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police, naming me as his deputy. Imre Nagy gave us a written commission. Besides he gave us a written proclamation with his personal signature."

The declaration signed by Imre Nagy was at the disposal of the court. In this Imre Nagy had acknowledged the formation of the preparatory committee of the "Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police" and took steps that this committee should organize the new special police first and foremost from the units which had taken part in the revolutionary battles.

Sándor Kopácsi continued his confessions:

"Since the formation of the Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police took several days, the workers could not be armed, because after the establishment of the Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police the weapons were primarily distributed to the insurgents, inasmuch as the insurgents, too, had to be inducted into the National Guard."

Sándor Kopácsi answered the question put by his attorney by stating that they began, during the first few days, to arm two workers' detachments.

*Attorney:* What made you stop that?

*Kopácsi:* The instructions which I received from Imre Nagy".

The UN "Special Committee on Hungary" deemed it necessary to hear the report of Béla Király concerning his activity in Hungary. This report was published by the February 18, 1957, issue of the American magazine "Life." It is obvious from the report that Béla Király and his reactionary co-officers

were naturally anxious to oust from the armed forces the officers of working-class and peasant descent, intending to place the armed forces of Hungary entirely under reactionary leadership. The following are pertinent quotations from the report of Béla Király:

"We worked out our programme in a night and a day. The Ministry of Defence—which directed the army—and the Ministry of the Interior—which controlled the police and the frontier guards—were honey-combed with followers of Rákosi, that is, with unreliable persons; consequently we had to establish revolutionary committees to direct both organs... a committee would ensure discipline in both organizations and, thus, the National Guard would be ready to resist a Russian attack..."

Király took the proposals immediately to Imre Nagy:

"I showed him our proposals in writing in the anteroom; then Imre Nagy sat down in an armchair next to Minister of State Zoltán Tildy. Placing the paper on the arm of the chair, he wrote and suggested that a few words be changed and then, having agreed with the proposals, signed it. We were proud as we left the anteroom, empowered with an official commission to control the two ministries to set up the National Guard and ensure public order..."

Béla Király went to see the then Minister of Defence and told him that he could accept his appointment as commander-in-chief of Budapest only under the condition of reinstating in their former posts, forty Horthyite generals and other high-ranking officers.

After taking cognizance of the establishment of the "Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police" and the appointment of Béla Király as commander of the "Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police"—which enabled him to pursue his counter-revolutionary activity unimpeded in an important and high position, counter-revolutionaries were "legally" equipped with weapons from the military depots of the army and the Ministry of the Interior. In their fight against the socialist, revolutionary forces Imre Nagy and the members of his group were able to rely on the counter-revolutionary armed forces set up by them.

### *Freeing and Arming the Criminals*

One of the main aims of the counter-revolutionary attack was to release from prison the political prisoners as well as "common" criminals, in order to incorporate them into the counter-revolutionary gangs. The documents prove that Imre Nagy was not unaware of this, and knew the "standpoints" governing the liberation of the prisoners.

On the morning of October 31, the so-called "Revolutionary Committee" from the Chief Public Prosecutor's Office—which included actor Iván Darvas—appeared in the Concentration Prison, and began releasing the convicts one by one. The report of the warden compiled in 1957 reads:

"One hundred and eight political prisoners were released on October 31. About 15 or 16 criminal records were set aside with the explanation that the crimes were committed during World War II and, consequently, the prisoners in question could not be released. Among them were János Árbócz, a lieutenant-colonel of the gendarmerie, who was condemned as a war criminal, and Lajos Dövényi Nagy, a fascist journalist. Next day, on November 1, an individual called Emeréczí came along with the Committee. He checked up on the records of those who had not been released and declared that 'these are our people; they must be released at once.' He protested that the release of the prisoners was advancing very slowly, then appointed a new committee, so that on the same day all the political prisoners were liberated. Therefore, 812 political prisoners were released on October 31 and November 1. On November 2 and partly on November 3, 113 common-law criminals were released. There were among the political prisoners released convicts whose major crime was looting or murder."

Who was the person called Emeréczí, mentioned in the report? To quote from the October 30, 1956, broadcast of "Free Kossuth Radio:":

"Recently we made a little investigation in the ante-chamber of our Minister of State Zoltán Tildy. We met there some people who are now seated here in the studio. First of all let me ask you to introduce yourself!"

"Dr. Kálmán Emeréczí."

"What matter brought you here?"

"I have been disturbed for a long time because no arrangements have been made on behalf of the political prisoners who were innocent. Today I received information that the political prisoners sentenced by the former regime were transferred from the Concentration Prison to Vác."

"Do you perhaps have contact with them?"

"Yes, my brother-in-law and several friends of mine are among them. They were in prison for years. Unfortunately, I have heard very little about them since then. I was notified now by my sister that her husband, Imre Czigány, and other friends of mine, Jenő Csóka, Gyula Hidvégi and several friends, the names of whom I do not want to enumerate now, were transported from the Concentration Prison to Vác. That was the reason I visited Zoltán Tildy and asked him to take urgent measures in this matter, so that these honest Hungarian patriots should be released at once. Zoltán Tildy promised me, in this connection, that a general decree applying to all the political prisoners will be issued for their release tomorrow morning . . ."

We must mention, even if briefly, who the "honest patriots" were that Emeréczí spoke about. They were the leaders of the so-called "Botond Division," a royalist counter-revolutionary organization, liquidated in 1953. It is worthwhile adding, if only for the sake of curiosity, that this group of conspirators included in their plans the capture of the Radio and the public buildings, the attack on the arsenals and the freight-car depots, etc.—precisely as it all began on the evening of October 23, 1956!

In any event, they reassured the other "patriots" of their own brand over the Radio. And to avoid any "mistake", "Free Kossuth Radio" reported, on its 10:40 a. m. programme, on Wednesday, October 31, 1956, that a delegation from Szolnok had demanded—allegedly "in the name of the workers of Szolnok"—the immediate release of all the political prisoners."

Imre Nagy replied to this:

"The Government has taken measures in respect to

this and it is not the government's fault if in certain places its instructions are possibly not implemented."

The paper *Magyar Függetlenség* reported on the events in the Concentration Prison and, at the end of the account, wrote:

"... A delegation of five, led by Dr. Gáspár Török, called on Prince Primate Mindszenty yesterday and requested him to accept the patronage of the organization of former political prisoners. The Prince Primate granted the request."

In the final analysis around 17,000 political and common-law criminals were released from the prisons. A great part of them organized in armed gangs, or joined the gangs already in existence, supplying the base for the counter-revolution. Béla Király, as head of the "Revolutionary Committee of the Special Police," Pál Maléter and Sándor Kopácsi issued instructions and service orders by the hundreds to enable the counter-revolutionaries to secure a large supply of weapons.

*Fascist Terrorists, Arrow-Cross Men, War Criminals,  
Robbers and Murderers Let Loose on the Country*

A few names have been selected almost at random from the long lists of released prisoners, the majority of whom took part in the counter-revolutionary events.

Béla Alföldi, former wholesale merchant, who in 1944 accepted money to hide 12 persecuted individuals and then handed them over to the Horthy police at Svábhegy.

Arisztid Atkány, son of the representative in Hungary of the German war factory I. G. Farbenindustrie, who served 15 years in prison for espionage. After his release, he commanded an armed group in Budapest.

József Bakos, a member of the terror detachment of Héjjas, formed after 1919, and one of the perpetrators of the massacre at Orgovány.

Mihály Balogh, ex-gendarme, a member of the notorious investigating squad of Juhász, who shadowed and arrested persons belonging to left-wing movements during the days of Horthy, among others István Dobi and Péter Veres.

Károly Baricz, an officer of the Horthy gendarmerie, who

commander, ordered the police to fire at Atkár in 1935; eight people were killed.

József Beél and Gyula Bokor, former detectives, who took part in the torture of several leaders of the labour movement, including Ferenc Rózsa and Zoltán Schönherz.

Albert Begre, imprisoned 13 years for robbery.

Dezső Bartóthy, who sent hundreds of prisoners from the concentration camp in County Szolnok to German death camps.

Emil Cszázkóczy, the son of a Horthy colonel, sentenced in 1955 because of anti-state organizational activity.

Dr. Ákos Csíkvári, a captain of the Horthy police and a confirmed murderer.

Attila Darvas, who was sentenced for espionage.

Lajos Dövényi Nagy, editor of the fascist weekly *Magyar Futár*.

Lajos Duhony, sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for the murder of Julia Nagy.

Béla Enyedi, notorious examining judge of the anti-communist trials during the Horthy days.

Count Pál Eszterházy, one of the richest landowners of Hungary, proprietor of several factories and mills, who took part in a counter-revolutionary conspiracy.

Dénes Gáldi, an agent of the American secret service.

Gábor Király, a member of the Héjjas detachment, who was in prison for the savage murder of 11 people.

György Lakhegyi and Barnabás Rimaszécsi, who were sentenced to prison for organizing an underground counter-revolutionary movement called the "White Partisan."

Colonel Zoltán Litomericzky, attorney of the special courts of Horthy.

Zoltán Meskó, notorious fascist Arrow-Cross leader.

Lajos Mészáros, who ordered the execution of 80 persons, suspected of being partisans, in Buchin; he murdered 10 of them himself.

János Nagy, a leading figure of the massacre which took place at Újvidék in 1942.

Prince Péter Odeschalchi, an agent of the American intelligence service, the CIC, arrested in 1956.

Emil Szakvári, a cabinet member of the Hungarian fascist Arrow-Cross government.

Richard Szentoléry (Schiwny), former lieutenant-colonel of the gendarmerie.

Rezső Varga, embezzler. After his release, he took part



in the murder of Attorney István Sarkadi and Pál Fodor, committed by the detachment commanded by Dudás, with headquarters in the office building of the newspaper *Szabad Nép*.

And here are some data regarding the "National Guards": Gyula Thullner. Sentenced four times, once 5 years for theft.

László Vértessy, bookkeeper, former Horthy officer. Military commander of the Hatvan Sugar Factory, in 1942, and MP candidate of the Arrow-Cross Party.

Jenő Kalmár, former undercover man in war factories for the Horthy counter-intelligence headquarters.

Mihály Janko. Sentenced several times for different crimes.

Of 13 members of the Bonyhád squad of the "National Guards" in County Tolna there were: one kulak; former officers of the Horthy army; 1 colonel, 1 major, 1 captain, 2 first lieutenants, 1 lieutenant, 1 gendarme sub-officer, 1 gendarme. László Szabó, holder of the Cross of National Defence, a member of the Vitézi Szék (a fascist military organization of ex-servicemen during the Horthy regime); and István Taukli, ex-SS man, sentenced for war crimes.

The members of the group at Tamási included: 2 Horthy captains, one of them sentenced to prison in 1948; 1 first lieutenant; 1 former gendarme sergeant and an ex-convict.

The commander of the "National Guard" of District 8 in Budapest was József Ujvári, an ex-convict with a long police record. He established his headquarters at the central police station in Vig Street. He issued orders for the arrest of communists, officers of the State Security Authority and similar progressive men and women. His secretary Mrs. József Argyélus testified:

"During his activity as commander, Ujvári took part in several robberies and thefts. I know definitely that Ujvári led the gang which broke into and robbed the wine shop on the corner of Bérkocsis Street and József Boulevard, the grocery on Rákóczi Road, the Wine Shop on Teleki Square and the corner of Kun Street, and the Rákóczi Square market.

The deputy commanders of Ujvári's gang were: Lajos Major, leader of the "operative" squad assigned to capture men of the State Security Authority. He had served several prison sentences since 1952 for forgery and other crimes. János Lipták, who was sentenced to two months imprisonment in

1948 for receiving stolen goods, to two years in 1951 for theft of public property, and to 5 years in 1952 for jail breaking and illegal border crossing.

The "National Guard" in district 8 consisted of 160 men. Eighty of them were ex-convicts, like István Csányi, who from 1932 onwards was hauled before the Court 11 times for theft and being a public menace as a vagrant, Sándor Kallós was sentenced 9 times for various crimes, that is forgery, committing serious physical injuries, embezzlement and theft.

Antal Mayer (electrician) confessed the following concerning his past:

"In May 1944 posters appeared calling for volunteers in the German army for SS service. I volunteered partly out of conviction and partly out of material interest. On October 28, 1956, I volunteered for the National Guard. I became deputy commander of platoon 3."

The clerical worker László Rózsa, of Budapest, confessed regarding the activities of Mayer in October 1956:

"The National Guards on duty there insulted the captured man. One national guardsman, an elderly man wearing spectacles, by the name of Mayer, and a younger man were the worst of them. Mayer demanded 'turn him over and the people will give him what's coming to him,' 'Turn him over,' he demanded, because they 'want to save him, to hide him.' Mayer gathered together the national guards, who had similar ideas to his, and told them: 'Don't let the Lieutenant help the security officer to escape.' But after this Mayer started to push the captain of the State Security Authority around and yelled to the gatekeeper: 'Open the door and we will hand him out!' and Mayer kicked the ÁVH police captain into the street. The other national guardsman, a young man, acted the same way. Mayer told me that he had served for 8 months as a sub-officer with the SS and for 6 years as a sub-officer in the Horthy army."

The captain of the State Security Authority spoken of in the testimony was Ferenc Tóth, who was hanged on a tree, at the corner of Aradi Street and Lenin Boulevard, by Mayer and his accomplices.

Árpád Gyöngyösi, former captain in the Horthy army, was commissioned to organize a counter-revolutionary battalion

in Miskolc. Andor Battha of Vatta and of Szentmártonkál, "royal Hungarian lieutenant-colonel," organized an officers' detachment in Eger. Dr. László Ághy, who, as a major headed the VIII/1 gendarmerie political section in Ungvár, started the organization in Gyula. He gave mimeographed instructions to his organized subordinates — including József Kincses, former gendarme — concerning their duties. These tasks were listed:

1. To search for and arrest the former state security police residing in Gyula.

2. To keep the flats of the communist leaders under observation, to find out whether they are organizing, have weapons, or are preparing for a counter-action.

3. To obtain the cadre files from all shops and larger factories.

4. Jews shall be handled according to point 2."

Béla Király's aim was primarily to place "reliable" Horthy officers, if possible with a prison record at the head of the "National Guard," while unifying the counter-revolutionary groups. His secretary, Mrs. László Balla, related in this connection:

"Béla Király was visited by many former political prisoners. A good part of them still wore the prison uniform, but a few had changed to civilian clothing. They had no overcoats, but only short sack-cloth jackets. Béla Király told them to try to get different clothes as soon as possible and ordered that police uniforms should be issued to some of them. The clothes were distributed by a man by the name of 'major' Földvári—who was wearing a police uniform and signed everything as Béla Király's assistant. The former prisoners received weapons and clothes. Béla Király disapproved of the fact that former political prisoners were wandering about in droves in the chief police headquarters and, if I remember rightly, premises were seized at his suggestion in the building at 28 Benczur Street, where the fraternal 'Association of Former Political Prisoners' was set up. I was a witness several times when Béla Király greeted the 'members' with joy and they kissed each other. Once a former officer of the Horthy army came to see Béla Király, for example, from Gyöngyös and complained that the organization of the National Guard in Gyöngyös had been taken over by communists,

which was intolerable. Béla Király was not there and instead 'major' Földvári, acting in his name, issued a paper certifying that the organization of the National Guard in Gyöngyös was the affair exclusively of this former Horthy officer. The person in question also asked for—and received—weapons. Weapons were distributed, by the way in unlimited quantities up to noon on November 3."

Excerpts from the testimony of József Balogh:

"The Organizing Committee handed out weapons, without any control or selection, ammunition and other equipment to anybody who showed up, just as Király and Kopácsi had done. For example, the Izabella Street murderer reported for weapons as a leader of an insurgent group. Incidentally it was a common saying in the Budapest Police Headquarters—in fact, everywhere in Budapest—"If you want weapons, see Kopácsi." I could not tell exactly how many weapons and how much ammunition was distributed from the Budapest Police Headquarters by Kopácsi and his followers; in general I would estimate it at several thousands."

Sándor Kopácsi replied in answer to the question put by the President of the People's Tribunal with reference to the distribution of arms:

"A requisition order had to be handed in for arms. There was no way to check up because, for instance, a few persons or a group of insurgents came in the name of a factory and requisitioned 50 weapons. There were instances when we recognized criminals among these people, including the murderer of Izabella Street, but this was not typical. The section of the indictment which states that essentially hooligans and criminals were issued weapons without any control, is true."

The President shows him the allocations for weapons.

"Kopácsi: Yes, they are signed by me.

"President: Therefore, you knew that these formations which appear on the allocations, actually existed?

"Kopácsi: Yes, they were insurgent formations. We supplied them with arms and ammunition. We handed out, according to my estimates, approximately 15,000 weapons—but it might have been 20,000. The allocations

were signed either by Béla Király or myself, but others signed them as well."

The signed acknowledgements of receipt testify that, on orders of Béla Király, the counter-revolutionary units were issued the following weapons, during a brief period of time, from the Timót Street depot alone: 2,206 carbines and rifles; 3 light machine guns; 2 heavy machine guns; 20 pistols; 100 hand grenades; 1,339 submachine-guns and an unlimited amount of ammunition.

One of the armed centres of the counter-revolutionaries was set up in Corvin Alley in Budapest. The backbone of the gang in Corvin Alley, just as that of the Szabó group in Széna Square, was formed of convicts released during the counter-revolution and of other criminals. János Meszy was one of the deputy commanders of the counter-revolutionaries in Corvin Alley. Known to the underworld as "Peg-leg Jankó," a criminal, he had been sentenced 16 times for theft, assaulting officers of the law, vagrancy, robbery, etc. His gang was made up exclusively of ex-convicts. The other "hero" of the counter-revolutionaries in Corvin Alley was Gábor Dilinkó, known to the underworld as "Bijou." He had been sentenced 7 times for theft, embezzlement, vagrancy, etc.

The counter-revolutionary György Kerekes who fought in the Corvin Alley confessed:

"The crisis in the Corvin Alley grew worse from day to day, and by November 2 the unit was almost completely demoralized. The first commanders were relieved of their posts in succession. They refused to obey each other. People become vociferous even against the top command. On November 1 and 2, the unit practically fell apart. At this time, the major part of the group was replaced by criminals released from prison, who knew about the units in Corvin Alley in particular and who came in great numbers and demanded more and more aggressively that they be given the command.

"For example, even László Iván Kovács was replaced as commander on November 1. A man completely unknown to us took his place. The strength of the unit rose greatly, —we put it at over 1,500. Most of them were habitual criminals sought throughout the country. They arrested many people..."

### *The Forsworn Maléter Enters the Imre Nagy Cabinet*

Imre Nagy appointed Béla Király Commander of the National Guard. He also chose the right man for the supreme command of his army—Pál Maléter. Maléter—a nobleman by descent and a graduate of the Ludovika Officers' Training Academy—had seen service as an officer in Admiral Horthy's army, and joined the democratic army after liberation. In the early days of the counter-revolution, he went over to the insurgents.

The traitorous group of Imre Nagy dispatched Pál Maléter, late at night on November 3, to "negotiate" with a commander of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the terms of the Warsaw Treaty. The Soviet military command which, with its troops, was empowered to act, and actually acted, on Hungarian territory only at the request and on the responsibility of the lawful Hungarian government, did not negotiate with Maléter.

Contrary to hostile rumours, Pál Maléter was arrested by the Hungarian authorities and not by Soviet military units. The Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government did not order his arrest because he attempted to negotiate with the Commander of the Soviet military units, but because he violated his oath of office, turned traitor and led an armed attack against the people's democratic order.

This is substantiated by the fact that no court procedure was instituted against Ferenc Erdei, although he accompanied Pál Maléter at that time to see the Soviet military command. Erdei occupies today an important post in public affairs: He is the general secretary of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Court procedure was not instituted against Colonel Miklós Ágocska either, who also accompanied Maléter.

János Meeséri, ex-colonel, described in his testimony the circumstances under which Maléter committed his treachery:

"...Maléter, with five tanks of my unit under his command and acting on the minister's orders, drove to Kilián Barracks, on October 25, to capture the barracks, which were already in the hands of the insurgents. I learned, later on, in talks with several officers that Maléter had come to terms with the insurgents at Kilián Barracks, and stayed on with them, and had assumed command of the insurgents..."

Here is an excerpt from the recorded evidence given by captain Vladimir Madarász :

“In the morning of October 25, as far as I know, Maléter, acting on orders received from Minister of Defence István Bata, went to Kilián Barracks, in order to get the army unit stationed there into shape, that is to say, to restore order there. Maléter put several calls through to the Ministry of Defence, reporting that as he was engaged in battle against the insurgents, he couldn't report in person. It turned out later on, however, that Maléter was fighting, not against the insurgents, but on their side.”

A statement was taken from János Tari, army officer, in whose tank Pál Maléter drove to Kilián Barracks. He gave the following evidence :

“I met Pál Maléter in the morning of October 25, 1956, on Jászai Mari Square, Budapest. He came up to us and ordered regimental commander Major Ferenc Pallós to get five tanks ready for him. He said he had been instructed by the Minister of Defence to take several tanks to Corvin Alley, mop up the groups of armed men there and occupy Corvin Alley. Major Pallós gave orders to me to move up with five tanks, of which I was to take charge, and to go with Maléter.

“In the afternoon of October 25, we fired several rounds at the counter-revolutionaries in Corvin Alley. Maléter was aware of this. He ordered a cease-fire—forbade us to fire—commanded us to climb out the tanks and turn the cannons in the opposite direction. About the same time he gave orders to hoist, on the barracks, the national flag, from which he had had the arms of the People's Republic cut out. Several hundred armed men flocked into the barracks and surrounded us, shouting fascist slogans.”

“*Question* : What was the nature of the contact between Maléter and the groups of counter-revolutionaries?”

“*Answer* : Maléter's contact with the counter-revolutionaries became so close, that from October 27 onwards he had several lorries run bringing food supplies to Kilián Barracks. I know of one instance when a group of armed men came to see Maléter. They brought a list of 16 demands, which Maléter approved of, that is, he agreed with them and even enlarged on some of them. I cannot remember

those demands exactly ; I only recall that they included some concerning the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops, introduction of the multi-party system, and several demands concerning the army.”

On October 29, the armed counter-revolutionaries in Corvin Alley appointed a bodyguard of six for Maléter. Counter-revolutionaries from Corvin Alley who had taken part in the armed raid on the Party HQ on Republic Square, on October 30, and in the brutal murders which followed, reported to Maléter, who expressed his approval and praised the terrorist killers : “Very well, thank you. You are brave lads.”

Maléter was found fit to be placed in higher and higher posts. What Radio Free Europe was blaring forth for days, actually happened. Pál Maléter was promoted to major-general on November 2, and, on November 3—as has been mentioned already—he became a member of the restricted cabinet as Minister of Defence. The following proposal, signed by Pál Maléter as Minister of Defence and instantly initialled by Imre Nagy at the bottom left corner, by way of approval, is dated November 3.

### PROPOSAL

to the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic

I propose adoption of the following Resolution in connection with the transference of the Frontier Guards from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior to that of the Minister of Defence :

### DRAFT RESOLUTION

“Resolution No. . . . of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic :

“The Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic places the Frontier Guards of the Hungarian People's Republic under the authority of the Minister of Defence, beginning November 3, 1956.

“The Minister of Defence will review the organization of the Frontier Guards and will put through changes he may deem necessary within his competence.”

The Council of Ministers as such was non-existent at the

time. Neither is there any indication of the proposal ever having been discussed and passed even at a session of the cabinet. It was read and signed by Imre Nagy, who gave full powers to Pál Maléter, appointed Minister of Defence as leader of the insurgents, to "put through changes he may deem necessary."

It was deliberately and purposefully made possible in the Ministry of Defence and in the army, in general, for ex-Horthy army officers to come out in the open and occupy important posts.

A "Rehabilitation Commission" was set up on November 1 by order of Béla Király, which included Király himself as well as ex-Horthy army officers Kerekes and Zsilinszki. Within a few days, the number of applicants exceeded 500; of these some 300 handed in their applications in writing.

Suffice it to mention but a few of the many applicants. Captain (r.) Dezső Nagy, a graduate of Ludovika Officers' Training Academy, who had served an eight-year prison term as a war criminal and was released in 1956; László Vida had been interned for his part in a conspiracy; ex-major-general Sándor Bálli put in a claim for full rehabilitation as a representative of the provisional governing board of the Independent Smallholders' Party. His claim was honoured, and he was reinstated on the staff of the Ministry of Defence.

Ex-lieutenant-general Pál Almássy of Nemeszsadány and Törökszentmiklós also came forward with a claim for reinstatement—he was designated for the post of chief of army organization and mobilization. Ex-lieutenant-general László Kuthy, whose 15-year prison term as a war criminal had been interrupted by the counter-revolution, also offered his services.

A "Revolutionary Army Council" was set up within the Ministry of Defence, with the active participation of Béla Király, Pál Maléter, and several of their associates. The "Revolutionary Army Council" was the body organizing and directing the removal of "unreliable" officers from the army general staff; it disorganized the army and undermined the discipline of the troops, so as to prevent an organized force from resisting the counter-revolutionaries. In response to a demand put forward by the Council, under the guise of "socialist democracy," measures were taken to ensure the immediate election of "Revolutionary Soldiers' Councils" in every army body and institution, within the staffs of higher units, as well as in the units (regiments and independent battalions).

On October 31, 1956, delegates of the "Revolutionary Sol-

diery Councils" of the armed forces, the "Revolutionary Committees" of the police, and of the armed insurgents elected the supreme governing body of the armed forces—the "Revolutionary Defence Committee of the Hungarian Republic." This body, which—even in its very name—openly repudiated People's Democracy, the People's Republic, promulgated an appeal in which it announced its formation and put forward its demands. This appeal was sent to every army unit, as well as to the Radio and the Press. One of the points of this appeal concerned termination of the Warsaw Treaty.

Thus, ex-Horthy army officers and fascists were either reinstated in their former positions or were promoted and appointed to posts; these persons and the leaders of the counter-revolutionaries were enlisted in the newly set-up "Revolutionary Committees" of the police and the army; and these "Revolutionary Committees" demanded, through the Radio and the Press, the realization of the other major design of Imre Nagy's group—withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty Organization!

The defence counsel of Pál Maléter asked Miklós Gimes several questions pertaining to details of the meeting held at the Kilián Barracks on October 31. Gimes answered as follows:

"I was present at the meeting, held on October 31, at the Kilián Barracks, but did not take an active part in it. Remarks were indeed made against Pál Maléter. The meeting was opened by Maléter, who was followed by Béla Király. Others took the floor afterwards, including an unkempt man wearing a leather jacket, whose name I don't know, and whose voice was extremely hoarse. He attacked Maléter because the latter had slapped a member of the Corvin Alley group, and taken away his submachine gun or, as the man said, his guitar. Maléter said that he found lady's ear-rings in the chap's pocket, and he slapped him. And, he said, he should be glad that's all he got. Then Maléter asked if this explanation was sufficient. Then they shook hands."

"Public Prosecutor: In other words, there were no political differences between them?"

"Gimes: No, there were not."

Pál Maléter said under questioning by his counsel:

"I did not approve from the beginning of organizing special police units from the insurgents."

In contrast with this statement, the court had at its disposal the document containing the multi-point draft drawn up by Pál Maléter. Maléter enumerated in this draft the tasks to be executed, including "strengthening" the army with "honourable officers" (insurgents). The following quotations have been taken from Maléter's draft plan :

"4. . . . There shall be no party organizations within the armed forces . . .

"7. The General Staff shall draw up plans for the following emergencies :

"Soviet troops refusing to withdraw from the country's territory . . .

"10. The Army Personnel Department shall make proposals for reinforcing the army with honest officers (insurgents, individuals who have been reinstated, etc.)"

A number of other measures were taken for the purpose of placing the army completely at the disposal of the counter-revolution. The institution of army political instructors was abolished and replaced by a so-called Educational Department which was headed by Imre Nagy's son-in-law, Ferenc János.

#### **Destruction of the Legal Local Organs Of State Power and Establishing Counter-Revolutionary Bodies**

The legal administrative bodies of the Hungarian People's Democracy and the local organs of state power, the councils, stood in the way of the counter-revolution. The councils, elected by the population in a constitutional and democratic manner, consisted of hundreds of workers, working peasants and intellectuals, who loyally served and represented the people. Consequently, Imre Nagy and his group of conspirators began, in concert with the reactionary, semi-fascist and fascist forces, to destroy the local organs of state power. They dissolved the legal administrative bodies, the councils, the agencies of economic management, and set up in their place "revolutionary committees" made up largely of bourgeois, fascist elements, and "workers' councils" designed to mislead the workers. This action played a decisive role in disrupting and sweeping aside the central bodies of power.

These "revolutionary committees" and "workers' councils" were controlled by fascists, Horthyite elements, former gendarmes, capitalists, big landowners and criminals. They launched the attack against popular power—and Imre Nagy relied on them.

Imre Nagy and his group of conspirators defrauded the masses, terming these various counter-revolutionary committees "democratic bodies," "agencies spontaneously set up by the people," and "spokesmen of the people's will."

Actually, these committees were never elected by democratic methods. Some of the committees were merely self-designated bodies ; others were set up from mobs of counter-revolutionaries and riff-raff.

The type of elements who made up these committees and took over local power is even more characteristic.

Members of the "national committee" in Paks (Tolna County) described themselves as "I was a gendarme for 20 years . . ." "I served 8 years." Ödön Novák, ex-officer in the Horthy army, was elected chairman of the "revolutionary council" in Dalmad. In Pálfa, József Barkóczi, ex-manorial bailiff, became a member of the committee. In Decs, János Heródek, ex-officer of the Horthy army, László Balogh, former county recorder, and Jenő Szalontai, former big landowner were members of the committee.

Andor Lehóczy and József Zoltai, ex-county recorders, Lajos Vindisch, ex-Lieutenant in the Horthy army, and Miklós Csaszor, who had been sentenced for organizing armed subversion, were members of the "revolutionary council" in Battonya (Békés County).

The "leading" counter-revolutionaries in Elek were István Ázucs, Horthyite officer, Ádám Barabás, ex-officer in the Horthy army, István Kiss, kulak, János Sajtos, ex-Horthyite officer, and Márton Hász, fascist Arrow-Cross leader. The committee at Körösladány included Lajos Szatmári, former Hunyadi tank man and Kálmán Tóth, ex-sergeant of the gendarmerie. Major Mihály Molnár, a former officer in the Horthy army and big landowner, became chairman of the committee in Gyulavári.

Among the active members of the Revolutionary Committees in Hajdú-Bihar County were : 112 kulaks, 67 ex-gendarmes, 41 ex-Horthy army officers, 39 priests, 27 ex-convicts, 13 ex-Horthy army non-commissioned officers, 13 former town-clerks,

3 former landowners, 1 "vitéz" (title under Horthy), and 1 ex-member of the former bodyguard.

These were some of the members of the Nyíregyháza National Committee: László Debreczeni, ex-1st-lieutenant of the Horthy army; Dr. István Sziklai, lawyer and ex-captain of the Horthy army; György Lupkovics, former landowner; Smallholders' Party M. P. and ex-Counsellor of the Ministry of Justice under the Horthy regime.

László Szente, former country recorder of Fejér County, became chairman of the "national committee" in Monor district. Szente had been sentenced because of his part in the anti-state conspiracy of Ferenc Nagy. The vice-chairman and secretary was Ferenc Baranyi, former town clerk in Monor during the days of Horthy. Other members of the committee were: Sándor Lengyel, former manorial manager, brother of a Horthyite general; Ferenc Lillik, organizer of the fascist Arrow-Cross Party; Imre Füzi, kulak; and Antal Karbach, Arrow-Cross attorney. János Maroty, a former captain of a Hussar regiment, was appointed commander of the "national guard," and Ferenc Mátyás, former company sergeant-major of the gendarmerie, became head of the political and criminal sub-department of the "national guard." Four former gendarme officers were members of Mátyás's staff.

The chairman of the "county revolutionary committee" was Dr. István Dénes, ex-factory director.

"Vitéz" Elemér Árvai, who received his title from Horthy, became vice-chairman of the "district workers' council" in Boldogkőváralja (Borsod County). He introduced himself as follows when he was "elected": "I am an officer of the Horthy army, a graduate of the Ludovika Military Academy. I was convicted several times for inciting against the People's Democracy. I hid my arms, several rifles and a Tommy-gun — twelve years ago. Now, I took them out of hiding."

The chairman of the district committee at Mezőkövesd (Borsod County) was Lajos Mizsei, a lawyer, the son of a landowner possessing 220 acres. The chairman of the committee at Mezőcsát was Gyula Dutka, a landowner with 100 acres; at Zemplénagárd, it was Béla Barati, a landowner with 140 acres; and at Kisrosvány, ex-gendarme Sándor Végh. The committee chairman at Mezőkeresztes was Kálmán Gomba, a wealthy peasant with 180 acres of land.

We could list endlessly the counties, districts and villages. Former exploiters, bloodsuckers and fascist terrorists called the

time in the various "revolutionary committees" even if the committees were not exclusively composed of these.

What relation did Imre Nagy have to these reactionary and fascist elements? Imre Nagy said in his speech of October 28:

"The government supports the new democratic forms of self-government arising from popular initiative and will strive to make them a part of the state administration."

Two days later, Imre Nagy put it even more clearly:

"... The national government recognizes the democratic local organs of self-government brought about by the revolution, relies upon them and requests their support."

It is a well-known fact that Imre Nagy attempted to come forward as a representative and friend of the Hungarian peasants. His group popularized him in this manner in the villages. During the counter-revolution, it became evident in the first week of Imre Nagy's tenure as prime minister, that he was not a friend of the working peasantry, but of the landowners, kulaks and exploiters of the peasants, who aimed at regaining their lost power.

#### *Counter-revolutionary Plans Regarding the Workers' Councils*

Workers' councils were set up, in 1956, in several factories. The counter-revolutionaries intervened immediately and got busy ousting the sincere workers from the workers' councils, so that reactionary, anti-working class elements, who were working under-cover in the factories, could assume leadership. The counter-revolution aimed at creating the impression, with the help of these workers' councils, that the working class, or a segment of it, was on the side of the counter-revolution. Later on, it attempted to turn over full political power and the management of the state to workers' councils made up of counter-revolutionaries, by setting up a system of workers' councils, the so-called Budapest Central Workers' Council.

Space does not permit the presentation of examples demonstrating the kind of "workers" who streamed into these workers' councils. The chief organizer, and later president, of the workers' council in the Flour Mill Machine Factory was Károly Gámöri, former financial chief counsellor. Attila Fogarassy, the son of a colonel in the Horthy army, and Ferenc Duka, the son of a former Horthyite sheriff, became the leaders in

the workers' council at the Drilling Equipment Factory. Mrs. Levente Magyar, wife of an ex-mining magnate and Horthyite officer, headed the council in the Orion Radio Plant. Other leading members of the "workers' councils" were: Gyula Kazi Dégi, ex-landowner, in the Auto Transport Company, No. 14; László Vörös, former capitalist factory director, in the Stationery Factory; and Baron Bódog Orbán, in the Electric Machine and Cable Factory. Besides the barons, landowners and capitalists, a host of hooligans and fascists became members of the workers' councils, many of them in leading posts. István Babay, deputy military commander in the National Worsted Mill during the Horthy-Szálasi period, was, for instance, the secretary of the Central Workers' Council. József Nemeskürty, an armed counter-revolutionary, convicted for theft, was another well-known member of the Central Workers' Council.

The minutes of the workers' council meeting held on October 31, 1956, in the United Incandescent Lamp Company, underscores the circumstances and "principles" leading up to the establishment of the workers' councils:

"Gerényi, delegate of the Revolutionary Committee of District 4 said: the composition of the workers' council in the Incandescent is not adequate... He proposed that a temporary workers' council of six members be elected.

"He himself took part in the underground movement for three years, their organization carried out 144 acts of sabotage in factories and 14 acts of arson."

Who were the members which made up the "revolutionary committee" in Újpest, which included such people as Gerényi who boasted of the exploits mentioned above?

This is the background of some of the members:

László Gábor, vagrant, who carried false papers;

Sándor Lichtenstein, sentenced in 1950 for embezzling state funds;

Károly Csehi, former Arrow-Cross fascist, sentenced, in 1946, to life imprisonment for counter-revolutionary activity, and freed in 1956.

The committee organized armed gangs in Újpest with over 1,500 members, under the command of ex-officers of the Horthy army. Sándor S. Nagy, former lieutenant-colonel in

the Horthy army, was appointed commander of all the gangs. Over 1,800 criminals, sentenced for counter-revolutionary activities and common-law offences, were released from the Kőbánya penitentiary at the orders of the chairman of the committee. Very many of the released criminals were drawn into the armed gangs.

This explains why the "revolutionary council of Újpest" organized "workers' councils" with a composition of such a nature. Let us quote from a resolution adopted by the council:

"On the basis of the resolution passed by the Revolutionary National Council, I call upon all members of the Provisional Revolutionary Workers' Council to consider the following points of view in electing permanent Workers' Councils:

"... Persons who held office under the Rákosi regime, e.g., company managers, Party branch secretaries, works committee chairmen, heads of personnel departments, members of the forces of public order or partisan units, as well as those who gave active support to the regime or declared themselves for it, shall forfeit their right to vote and to be elected. In case persons belonging to any one of the afore-mentioned categories should have been elected to the present Provisional Revolutionary Workers' Council, they shall be removed forthwith."

The resolution can be interpreted in only one way: not a single person who is loyal to the People's Democracy can be a member of the "workers' council." This decision was no exception. For instance, both Party members and cooperative farm members were refused membership in the "revolutionary council" at Marokföld (Zala County), with the statement that "only reliable people can become members of the council." And so Géza Tóth, former fascist Arrow-Cross leader of the village, became a member of the council!

Thus Imre Nagy supported these "democratic local organs of self-government brought into being by the revolution" and intended to incorporate them into the state administration, and he did this, although as shown by the resolution previously referred to—and many others in a similar vein—no progressives were permitted according to the plans of the counter-revolutionaries, to join these councils, while the doors were thrown open to Arrow-cross fascists, reactionaries, capitalists and landlords.

The "Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals" played a major part in disorganizing the state apparatus, in the formation of a host of "revolutionary councils," "committees,"



“commissions,” and raising unbridled counter-revolutionary demands. Members of the Imre Nagy group of conspirators were leaders of this Committee, including Sándor Haraszti, Miklós Vásárhelyi, Gábor Tánczos, Balázs Nagy, László Kardos and György Ádám. The Committee maintained systematic and direct contact with Géza Losonczy.

The “Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals,” at its meeting held on October 28, adopted a manifesto containing undisguised counter-revolutionary demands. The manifesto was propagated through leaflets, in the Press and over the Radio.

It is a fact that many of these “revolutionary committees” endorsed the manifesto, and backed the counter-revolutionary demands, as is obvious from their composition described previously.

István Márkus said in his evidence that the purpose of setting up the “Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals” was to rally the intellectuals belonging to the Petöfi Club, and to serve as a basis for the Imre Nagy government.

Gábor Tánczos, Secretary of the Petöfi Club, said in his evidence :

“We set up the Committee in order to assist the Imre Nagy government and to ensure a mass base for it among the intellectuals. Our views were embodied in the manifesto adopted by the October 28 session of the Committee. I see clearly now that the manifesto, in both tone and content, gave aid and comfort to the counter-revolutionary forces.”

### Imre Nagy Organizes “Pressure From Below”

Many people believe that Imre Nagy was “swept along” by the events and “was compelled to yield to pressure from below,” especially because Imre Nagy and several members of his group helped to spread this idea.

And now there is a host of evidence proving that Imre Nagy organized this “pressure from below” himself and deceitfully said, while implementing his pre-arranged and consciously devised schemes, that he had simply yielded to “public opinion” and granted “the demands of the people.”

People who listened to broadcasts and read the newspapers will remember the news items that Imre Nagy approved every demand put forward by every delegation. When these

negotiations were publicized over the radio, the predictable effect was the appearance of more delegations with demands that topped all previous demands.

Under the title *A magyar forradalom és szabadságharc a hazai rádióadások tükrében (The Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence as Reflected by Broadcasts in Hungary)*, Radio Free Europe published, in Hungarian the text of programmes broadcast by the radio stations in Hungary between October 23 and November 9, 1956 (Free Europe Press, Division of Free Europe Committee, 2 Park Avenue, New York 16, N. Y., Vol. VIII, Nos. 10—11.). On pages 61 and 62 this book states that on Friday, October 26, 1956 p. m., Radio Kossuth broadcast a news item, headlined “Important Manifesto by Borsod Workers—Comrade Imre Nagy Accepts Borsod Workers’ Demands,” which related that a delegation of the workers of Borsod County, headed by Rudolf Földvári, had called on Prime Minister Imre Nagy. The delegation submitted a list of twenty-one points, which included demands that an investigation be instituted into Hungary’s foreign trade agreements and that the agreements be made public (a demand which Radio Free Europe had begun to press as early as October 13), that the grave errors that had been made in the field of economic planning be corrected and the people responsible for them be removed from their posts, and many other things. They demanded that the Soviet troops be withdrawn from the territory of Hungary not later than January 1. The broadcast went on :

“In his reply to the working people of Borsod County and Miskolc, Comrade Imre Nagy said that he approved of each point of their demands, and that he was ready to put them into effect. A new government—a government of the People’s Patriotic Front—would be formed tonight or tomorrow morning. He said he would give far-reaching consideration to the wishes, demands and suggestions voiced by public opinion in selecting the members of the government. The demands would be embodied in his new government programme . . . Comrade Imre Nagy explained that it would be possible even to overfulfil some of the points of the programme within a short time . . .”

Now all this took place on October 26, at noon ! A perusal of the text of the broadcast will make it clear that it was meant to impress on “public opinion”—no longer in carefully dis-

guised words, but quite openly—that it should put forward wishes, demands and suggestions concerning the composition of the government, since these demands would be given far-reaching consideration by Imre Nagy. Demands were solicited since they would be considered by Imre Nagy in drawing up his new government programme. Imre Nagy had explained that it would be possible even to overfulfil some of the points of the programme!

On November 2, another delegation from Borsod County went to Parliament. Here is a news bulletin, broadcast at 10 a. m., November 2, by Free Radio Kossuth, quoted from page 295 of the book published by Radio Free Europe, concerning the demands of the delegation:

“The government should take steps to ensure that a Supreme Revolutionary National Committee be formed on the basis of the Workers’ Councils of the counties and of Budapest, and composed of their democratically elected delegations. The former Parliament shall be considered dissolved by this step . . .”

The counter-revolutionary leaders who had come to the fore in Borsod County had fully understood the meaning of the message of the first meeting: it was possible to overfulfil the programme!

An announcement broadcast by “Free Radio Kossuth” at 11:40 p. m., on October 31, furnishes evidence of an attempt to whip up public opinion and to solicit further demands. It said:

“You will now hear the text of an appeal issued by the Revolutionary Committee of University Students. We regard the present political leadership as merely provisional. We will give our support to Imre Nagy to the extent that his government grants our demands . . .”

The appeal of the Students’ Committee went on to demand the dismissal from the Radio staff of all those people who had in the early days reviled the “glorious war of independence,” and that, in carrying out the dismissals, the Revolutionary Council of the Radio should enlist the co-operation of the Revolutionary Committee of University Students, the organization of the youth who had sparked the war of independence, and so forth.

The Radio commented on the appeal of the Revolutionary Committee of University Students:

“We fully support the view that the fight must be carried on against all retrogressive tendencies and influences which are as yet undoubtedly present in the government. One should be aware of the personal implications of this fact. An eloquent case in point is the appointment of Colonel Maléter, the commander of the freedom fighters and the heroic defender of Kilián Barracks, as First Deputy of the Minister of Defence, and the dismissal of the chief of staff. We will join all patriotic people in an effort to bring about further successes in this struggle.”

Even the infamous UN Special Committee on Hungary was compelled to admit that the slogans and demands of the counter-revolution were not put forward by the masses of the people, but by Imre Nagy and his group. Imre Nagy and his group disseminated them to have a pretext to refer to “the will of the people.”

Point 339 of the report of the UN Special Committee on Hungary reads as follows:

“The announcement of neutrality apparently did not come as a complete surprise to those Hungarians who had been in contact with Mr. Nagy prior to the October events. It has been reported to the Committee that during his retirement from active political life in 1955, Mr. Nagy had in his writings referred to the possibility of Hungary adopting a neutral status on the Austrian pattern and that he had informed the Hungarian Workers’ Party and the Soviet leaders of his views in this respect. (We know that this latter statement is untrue. Imre Nagy concealed his plans from the Hungarian government, the Hungarian Working People’s Party and, obviously, from the Soviet leaders.—Editor.) As from 27 October he seems to have discussed this problem with his assistants and some of his visitors. As soon as the rumour of these intentions spread in Budapest and in the country, strong support manifested itself on 29, 30 and 31 October from various Workers’ Councils and other revolutionary organs as well as from political, military and religious leaders.”

This is the bill of particulars prepared by the chief supporters of Imre Nagy, concerning his hypocrisy, dishonesty and tactics aimed at deceiving the people.

*Miklós Gimes, Pál Lócsei, Tamás Aczél—Angyalföld Workers*

Imre Nagy granted an audience to a "workers' delegation from Angyalföld," on October 27, 1956. The delegation, with which the prime minister met for three hours, was a strange group. Most of the members of the delegation were well-known figures in Imre Nagy's counter-revolutionary group, typical petty-bourgeois and bourgeois individuals: Tamás Aczél, Miklós Gimes, Pál Lócsei, József Szilágyi and several of their associates. The delegation of from nine to ten members did include two young workers from Angyalföld. This "Angyalföld workers' delegation" was very similar in composition and function to the diverse "revolutionary committees" and "workers' councils".

The two young men happened to be in the city by chance; no one had delegated them and they had no intention of taking part in a delegation. One of the young men had brought food to his sister, who lives in District 6, and the other had gone with him. Péter Józsa lived in the same house. He met them and immediately telephoned Kopácsi, at the Budapest Police Headquarters. Kopácsi sent a car for the two young men, and this is how they went to see Imre Nagy.

Imre Nagy, the country's prime minister, devoted three hours to negotiating with these young people, who came to him in the company of several members of his group. This pre-arranged meeting was considered necessary in order that Imre Nagy might arrange for one of the darkest provocations before this "workers'" delegation.

What actually happened at this meeting?

Excerpts from József Szilágyi's confession:

"... we were received by Imre Nagy. Besides me there were the members of the delegation, whose names I do not recall, as well as Tamás Aczél, Miklós Gimes, Pál Lócsei—about ten of us in all. I asked Imre Nagy if he had any knowledge at all as to what was going on in the town and if he was aware that his name had been put to the decree on summary proceedings, and that the

Russians had been called in in his name. I reminded him that we had agreed on a different policy. Imre Nagy replied by saying that it was not he who had called in the Russians—but an attempt had been made to make him sign the resolution afterwards. As for the decree on summary proceedings, he had not signed it—as a matter of fact, others had put his signature to it. We told him that we had brought the delegation to him, so that they too might inform him about what was going on in the town. After that, all those present began talking, and I do not recall who said what. The delegation had brought no written demands—they only presented them orally. Finally Imre Nagy told them to have patience. He said that some important decisions were being hammered out and that next day (October 28.—Ed.) a statement would be made public 'which will satisfy you'. 'In that statement we will make it clear', he said, 'that the revolution is a national democratic revolution and not a counter-revolution; the withdrawal of the Russians from Budapest will be announced, and other announcements of major importance will be made.' At the end of about three hours we left Imre Nagy's office reassured. We went back to the Budapest Police Headquarters. Kopácsi sent the members of the delegation home by car."

A whole string of frauds, misrepresentations and falsifications was committed by Imre Nagy between October 23 and November 4, but the most outstanding among them was his action in trying to make not only the workers' delegation but the public opinion of the country, too, believe that he knew nothing of the decision of the Council of Ministers calling upon the Soviet troops for aid and of the promulgation of martial law. In its afternoon programme of October 30, beginning at 6.30 p. m., the radio broadcast the following:

"You will now hear an important announcement: Hungarians! The cause of our grief and shame lies in two decrees, which have whipped up passions and caused the death of hundreds of people. One was the resolution which brought Russian troops into Budapest; the other was the disgraceful imposition of martial law against the freedom fighters. Conscious of the judgement of History and with a full sense of responsibility, we hereby declare that Imre Nagy, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, was un-

aware of those two decisions! The Council of Ministers' resolution calling for Soviet military assistance and the decree imposing martial law do not bear Imre Nagy's initials. It is András Hegedüs and Ernő Gerő who will have those two decisions on their conscience! It is they who will have to answer for them before the nation and History."

Was Imre Nagy unaware of the fact that martial law had been imposed?

The following is a passage quoted from Imre Nagy's radio address broadcast at 12:10 at noon, on October 24, 1956:

"This is Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic, speaking to the people of Budapest, informing you that all those who, to avoid further bloodshed will stop fighting and lay down arms not later than 2 o'clock this afternoon shall be exempt from martial law... We intend to pursue a policy of appeasement, and not of revenge! Therefore, the Government has resolved not to institute summary proceedings against people who will voluntarily and immediately stop fighting and lay down their arms..."

On the same day, at 12:19 the radio announced:

"A party of five truce negotiators sent by the armed insurgents in Baross Square called on Comrade Imre Nagy and told him of their readiness to lay down arms in case a general pardon would be granted them. Their terms have been accepted!" (From the RFE's Radio book, page 22.)

At 3:18 p. m., October 25, 1956, the Radio broadcast Imre Nagy's address:

"... The withdrawal of Soviet troops whose intervention in the fighting has been necessitated by the vital interests of our socialist system will take place as soon as peace and order have been restored.

"The government will take a magnanimous and conciliatory attitude towards all those persons whose motive in taking up arms was not to overthrow our people's democratic system, and who will cease fighting forthwith and hand over their arms. Summary proceedings shall not be instituted against such persons! At the same time, in the interests of our working people, who wish for peace

and order, and in defence of our popular, democratic state order, we shall apply the full rigour of the law against all those who continue to engage in armed attacks, instigate, and loot."

If we compare this statement with the radio broadcast of October 30 which has been quoted above, Imre Nagy's double-dealing attitude becomes obvious. On October 25, he talked about "socialism," about "People's Democracy," and said that he thought Soviet armed intervention in the fighting was vitally important. He did all this in order to mislead people loyal to the People's Democracy, to the cause of socialism, and prevent them from going into action. But when he thought the time was ripe to come out into the open, he resorted to subterfuges to gain the sympathies of the counter-revolutionaries and to try to attain his ulterior designs by openly placing himself at their head.

The notice announcing martial law, dated October 24, 1956, and signed by the president of the Metropolitan Court, has been found among Imre Nagy's papers in the House of Parliament. On the back of the same sheet of paper there are some notes jotted down in Imre Nagy's own handwriting. The photostatic copy of the announcement as well as Imre Nagy's notes on the back are reproduced in the supplement to this book.

Another photostatic copy is included of the document, dated October 24, which contains, above Imre Nagy's signature, the following text:

"To the people of Budapest,

"This is to inform you that summary proceedings shall not be instituted against those persons who cease fighting and lay down arms not later than 1 o'clock to-day, in order to prevent further bloodshed."

The time-limit fixed here is 1 o'clock, whereas the radio address of October 24—the relative passage of which has been quoted above—said 2 o'clock. The reason was that the radio address was made after 12 o'clock. Anyway, it is notorious that it was announced time and again in those days that the deadline for the surrender of arms had been prolonged.

The representative of the prosecution asked Imre Nagy several questions at the trial concerning the proclamation of martial law:

*“Public Prosecutor:* You allege that you did not issue the declaration of martial law?

*“Imre Nagy:* I did not say that. There are the radio announcements in which I refer to martial law and enforcing it.

*“Public Prosecutor:* Did you see to the enforcement of martial law?

*“Imre Nagy:* That did not come within my powers. I did what my duties required. I considered that the martial law applied only to common-law criminals.

*“Public Prosecutor:* You had no intention of applying martial law to those persons who secured arms by unlawful means and used these weapons to fight against the Hungarian People’s Republic?

*“Imre Nagy:* No, I did not intend to apply martial law against those persons.”

Finally, under the effect of the testimonies, the confessions made by the other accused, as well as the documentary evidence shown him at this trial, Imre Nagy made the following statement concerning the decision to impose martial law:

“On October 24, Hegedüs and Gerő suggested that it was necessary to declare martial law. Influenced by the arguments, I signed it. I consulted the Minister of Justice and the Chief Prosecutor about the ways and means of declaring martial law. I urged the Minister of Justice to be careful about enforcing it so as to avoid excesses, but enjoined him to enforce it mercilessly whenever necessary. I discussed the imposition of martial law with the Minister of Justice and the Chief Prosecutor during the day, on October 24, and signed the decree about noon.”

Therefore:

Imre Nagy talked about martial law, saying that people who laid down their arms would be exempt from its force.

Imre Nagy said that he had no knowledge about the martial law;

Imre Nagy said that he did not sign the decree declaring martial law;

Imre Nagy said that he interpreted martial law as applying only to common-law criminals;

Imre Nagy confessed to have signed the decree declaring martial law and ordered that it be applied ruthlessly.

Imre Nagy denied, quibbled and admitted—at all times according to what he thought it best to do from his personal point of view under the given circumstances...

### **Imre Nagy Does Not Permit His Plans to Be Upset—Thwarts Measures Taken to Liquidate the Counter-revolution**

Imre Nagy, abusing his powers as Chairman of the Council of Ministers, sabotaged, in several instances and respects, the resolutions adopted for crushing the counter-revolutionary uprising. He arbitrarily lifted the curfew, thereby enabling the armed counter-revolutionaries, who had already been scattered, to reorganize, and preventing the forces, who were organized in the early days, from overpowering the groups of counter-revolutionaries. He prevented the enforcement of martial law against the armed insurgents, which he had signed himself. He prevented the loyal forces from annihilating the counter-revolutionaries entrenched in Corvin Alley or forcing them to surrender. Though fully aware of the acts of terror that were being perpetrated in the streets, he ordered a cease-fire on October 28, thereby paralyzing the loyal armed forces who were fighting for the People’s Democracy and Socialism.

Ágnes Ságvári, collaborator of the HSWP apparatus, testified as follows on this subject:

“... The curfew order was originally signed by Imre Nagy, who approved of it as an effective measure against the counter-revolution. In the morning of October 25, Jánosi urged Imre Nagy in my presence that the curfew should be lifted immediately. Imre Nagy immediately lifted the curfew. In the afternoon and evening of October 25 and on the 26th, several comrades sharply criticized Imre Nagy for the arbitrary lifting of the curfew.”

In his testimony, Lajos Tóth, former chief of army general staff, said:

“Upon recommendation of the military council, Imre Nagy ordered a curfew and martial law. These measures were designed to clear the streets of all people but those who sought to overthrow the People’s Democracy by force of arms. Shortly afterwards the radio announced that the curfew and the ban on meetings were lifted. Imre

Nagy ordered this without the agreement of the military council. Things worked out in much the same way regarding the enforcement of martial law—the order was given by Imre Nagy upon recommendation of the military council, but was altered subsequently by him. About that time reports were pouring in to the military council about the arrest of many persons with weapons. The question was asked what to do with the captives. These persons had to be released, subsequently, according to the instructions the military council had received from Imre Nagy."

From Károly Janza's testimony :

"The military council discussed a suggestion to mop up the armed counter-revolutionaries fighting in and around Corvin Alley, for they were inflicting tremendous casualties and material damages; that was the strongest centre of resistance in the capital, and to annihilate it would make it easier to crush the other seats of resistance. The military council accepted the suggestion, and commissioned Major-general István Kovács of the operational staff of the General Staff and colonels Miklós Szücs and Zólmány to draw up an operational plan . . .

"Imre Nagy rang me up and told me that to carry out that plan was out of the question."

A photostatic copy of the note made by ex-Major-General István Kovács, who was Chief of Staff under Imre Nagy, appears in the picture-supplement to this book. The note reads "Do not shell the block of flats. Would make things very awkward politically. Imre Nagy urged us specially not to carry out that operation."

And this is the corresponding passage from Lajos Tóth's testimony :

"It was again Imre Nagy who foiled the military operation scheduled for October 28, 1956, which had been designed to mop up the counter-revolutionary fighters in and around Corvin Alley. As soon as the plan had been drafted, Imre Nagy protested that the operation must not be carried out. He threatened to resign his post as prime minister, should the plan be carried through. Since this operation was not carried out, Corvin Alley and vicinity grew into an even larger counter-revolutionary base."

### Imre Nagy Orders a Cease-Fire, the White Terror Flares Up

At 1:20 p. m., October 28, Radio Kossuth went on the air, announcing :

"Attention! Attention! We have an important announcement to make.

"Desirous of preventing further bloodshed and ensuring a peaceful settlement, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic orders a general cease-fire to take force immediately. The armed forces are instructed to fire only if attacked. Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers."

The armed forces received orders from the Chairman of the Council of Ministers not to start actions against the armed counter-revolutionaries to force them to surrender.

The cease-fire and Imre Nagy's radio address that afternoon gave the green light to the fascist counter-revolutionaries, encouraging more acts of terror, murders, and lynchings.

In October and November 1958, the news of the atrocities of the white terror in Hungary spread throughout the world. Many of the bourgeois journalists who covered Hungary reported with horror about the fascist murders which took place in the streets of the country. Jean Roman, correspondent of the Paris *Le Monde*, reported that a manhunt was going on in Budapest, and scenes reminiscent of the return to power of the Whites in Hungary, in 1919, were being enacted. The *Westdeutsches Tagblatt* wrote about these events :

"Unimaginable horrors—this was the consequence of the events. The victims were criminals and innocent people as well. Lynch law unloosing a river of blood became master of the country."

The *Deutsche Volkszeitung* of Düsseldorf wrote :

"... from the time that Soviet armoured troops left Budapest, a horrible massacre, a real St. Bartolomew's Eve has been going on."

The White Books published previously dealt in detail with the white terror in Hungary. We give here a few examples illustrating the hundreds of terrible murders committed.

On October 26, 1956, József Kalamár, Chairman of the

Csepel Council and a worker well known in the community was murdered at Kamaraerdő. The murderers stuffed his mouth with sand and tortured him.

On October 26, 1956, András Bordás, turner and Kossuth Prize winner, was shot to death when he went out to purchase bread for his children.

György Gyenes, a lieutenant in the border guards, was tortured to death at Mosonmagyaróvár by the counter-revolutionaries who used a flag pole.

József Vági, a captain of the border guards, was tortured at Mosonmagyaróvár by counter-revolutionaries, who crossed the border from Austria and threw him out of a window. The gravely wounded officer was trampled to death.

The counter-revolutionaries on Széna Square captured during a battle Károly Nagy, sub-lieutenant of the police force. He was brutally tortured and crucified.

János Strelec, a police lieutenant, was attacked on the street by the counter-revolutionaries in Miskolc and beaten to death with a rifle butt.

On October 30, 1956, Colonel Lajos Szabó was hanged by the feet with wire and tortured to death following the attack on the Party Headquarters on Republic Square. Colonel János Asztalos was stabbed through the heart by Piroska Jankó, daughter of a kulak, while counter-revolutionaries shouted "tear out his heart." Colonel József Papp and Imre Mészáros, member of the Central Committee of the HWPP, were shot to death when they went out under a flag of truce to negotiate. The gravely wounded colonel was stabbed and then hanged near the Erkel Theatre. Young defenders of the Party Headquarters on Republic Square, who remained loyal to their oath, were assassinated here.

The counter-revolutionaries prepared, however, for far more gruesome massacres on a much larger scale. „Death lists” were compiled everywhere, supporters of the Peoples Democracy were arrested by the thousands and many of them were sentenced to death, and the date of execution was set.

“Revolutionary committees” in the Sümeg district of Veszprém County prepared blacklists and death lists containing the names of communists and other progressives living in the villages. There were some villages in which the lists contained from 100 to 150 names.

The chairman of the “National Council” in Neszmély (Komárom County) compiled the list of people scheduled for

execution. The “revolutionary council” in Tiszaszentimre (Tolna County) put the names of 38 communists and other supporters of the People’s Democracy on the blacklist and made arrangements for their execution.

Eighty communists were listed in Dobos (Békés County) and the place for their execution was designated.

Four counter-revolutionaries, armed with machine guns, set up a “court of retribution” in Szakály (Tolna County) to sentence and execute the communists.

Géza Téglási, ex-major in the Horthy army, organized an execution squad of five in Nagydorog (Tolna County). Each member of the squad, composed of Arrow-Cross fascists and gendarmes were assigned to execute six communists each.

The names of communists to be executed were read at an open meeting in front of Council Hall in Bakonyszentlászló (Veszprém County).

November 7 and 8 was set as the date of execution of communists in Szentgotthárd (Vas County), close to the Austrian border, where agents of Radio Free Europe came and went without hindrance.

An execution squad was organized alongside the “national committee” in District 16 in Budapest, which intended to execute about 130 communists on November 4.

A few members of the “national committee” in district 17 in Budapest compiled a list of about 150 communists and progressives, intending to execute them.

The examples cited above constitute merely a fragment of what really took place in the country during the last days of the counter-revolution. “Courts of retribution,” known from the Arrow-Cross days, were organized by the dozens, and hundreds of death lists were compiled. The date set for the execution of communists and other progressives in Budapest, held prisoners by the counter-revolutionary gangs, was November 6. According to the plans, the spectacular mass funeral scheduled to be held at Vérmező (a park in Buda), was to be addressed by József Mindszenty, the high priest of hatred. The funeral and the funeral oration were to be the signal for a general mass slaughter.

Ferenc Keckés, a commercial department head, was arrested by the counter-revolutionaries with several of his associates and held in Prater Street. He testified that the men guarding them had said several times that their time would come soon; that the funeral of the fallen “freedom fighters” had been set

for November 5 or 6 at Vérmező, and afterwards, the "revolutionary tribunal" would meet there to condemn the arrested communists and progressive people to death.

According to other documents, the counter-revolutionaries had planned to send armed gangs at night to make the rounds of houses and flats marked with red paint or other colours and to arrange "a night of the long knives," executing the 3,000 arrested progressives, loyal to the People's Democracy, and massacring over 10,000 persons whose names were included in the death lists.

These facts demonstrate that the counter-revolutionary white terror which ran amok up to November 4 in Budapest and other parts of the country was merely the preliminary and despite all its ghastly horrors. The counter-revolution was ready to perpetrate horrors of far greater dimensions, and the fascist terror would have drenched the entire country in blood if the socialist forces in Hungary had not taken a stand and destroyed the counter-revolution.

Imre Nagy, the "communist," was prime minister in Hungary during those sombre days when a fascist manhunt went on in the streets of Budapest and Miskolc. Imre Nagy was fond of presenting himself as the defender of law and order during the years prior to the counter-revolution, and he won many supporters in this manner. The members of his group of conspirators and other advocates of his spread this news about Imre Nagy. The UN Special Committee on Hungary also termed him "the champion of legality."

During the bloody days of the counter-revolutionary terror it was indeed the duty of the prime minister of the country to defend law and order, the lives of tens of thousands of honest and decent people. However, Imre Nagy did not take a single measure or say a solitary word against the anti-communist carnage and the raging white terror. On the contrary! He became the major patron within the country of the horrible white terror in 1956 through his collaboration and underhanded dealings with the counter-revolutionary gangs. His attitude during his criminal trial was typical.

Imre Nagy made the following statement before the court in February :

"I am sorry to say that I do not know about the attack on the Party Headquarters on Republic Square on October 30."

The President asked :

"Were you aware that acts of terror had been committed, in Budapest and in the provinces, and that communists and democratic people were being hanged?"

And Imre Nagy replied :

"I did not receive any reports of that kind. They didn't notify me about what was going on in the country . . . And it was not my duty as prime minister to handle this sphere as well."

Mrs. József Balogh, former secretary to Imre Nagy, testified at the trial on June 13 :

"I was very tired in general, and I quarrelled with several comrades. I came to loggerheads with Imre Nagy, too. He ordered us several times not to create a panic. On Wednesday, I saw that they had hanged uniformed men. Then Imre Nagy said not to create a panic. When the Party Headquarters on Republic Square was attacked, I told Imre Nagy personally that the Party Headquarters was being attacked. Then he said we should not create a panic."

The witness said under questioning by the public prosecutor:

"An information bulletin was sent by the Party one day (to the Parliament.—Editor). The bulletin carried news about terrible atrocities. I took the information in to Imre Nagy and asked him to read it. After asking him twice, he glanced through the material and then threw it aside, saying 'they exaggerate'. Then he told me to leave him alone and not to bother him with such things. After that, I read the reports and then filed them away."

Imre Nagy made the following remarks with reference to Mrs. Balogh's evidence :

"I have no knowledge concerning the attack on the Party Headquarters."

The Public Prosecutor announced, at the trial on June 13, that the Chief Public Prosecutor had secured possession of the film shot by western correspondents and film reporters during the Hungarian counter-revolution in October and November, 1956, and the photographs concerning the acts of



terror which had been printed by the western press during and after the counter-revolution. The President, at the proposal of the public prosecutor, ordered that the film be shown. Several of the accused persons commented on the film showing:

Zoltán Tildy said:

"The film has had a staggering effect. I am sorry that my name is linked with these things."

Ferenc Donáth remarked:

"The news of the white terror reached Parliament. It is possible to explain the fact that we still upheld the standpoint of the government, but it cannot be exaggerated... I believe it to be a duty of conscience to apologize to the memory of the communists, the Hungarians and Soviet soldiers who lost their lives during the counter-revolution."

Sándor Kopácsi said:

"I am guilty and ashamed that my name has been completely and rightfully dishonoured in the eyes of my friends. I saw now this documentary, showing how people were murdered. I feel that I am indirectly responsible for this, too. I saw Soviet soldiers who were taken out of the tank dead; and their commanders wept, saying that they would have been demobilized the next day and now they were dead... I am sorry for what I did and now I have qualms of conscience."

Imre Nagy had no remarks to make.

### The Gory Handshake of Imre Nagy and Donáth with Dudás

October 30 was not only the unforgettably tragic day of the terrible bloodshed on Republic Square. Characteristically enough, another event of the counter-revolution is linked with this date.

This was the day on which Imre Nagy, Géza Losonczy and Ferenc Donáth—the general staff of the conspiracy—and a few other members of the group sat down to talk with József Dudás, one of the most infamous figures of the counter-revolution.

József Dudás, a self-styled leader of the "armed insurgent freedom-fighters," President of the National Revolutionary Committee, which he had set up himself, was a counter-revolutionary leader, the chief of a gang of killers. The counter-revolutionary leader, who had set up his head-quarters in the *Szabadság Nép* building, organized a so-called operational section, which was nicknamed "The head-hunters." This group of terrorists was headed by Ferenc Pálházi, an ex-lieutenant of theorthy army. Its members were, among others, Rezső Varga and Zoltán Preiss. Prior to the counter-revolution, Rezső Varga had been taken into custody for larceny, fraud, and vagrancy. He had regained his freedom as a result of the counter-revolutionary uprising. Zoltán Preiss had served an eight-year prison term, and was set free after October 23. The "head-hunters" murdered communists and other progressive people, and engaged in lootings and robbery. Dudás recruited his men from among criminals and convicts who had been set at large.

Losonczy and Donáth met Dudás in the "Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals" and Imre Nagy met him and talked with him in the House of Parliament.

István Márkus related in his evidence:

"On October 30, as far as I remember, József Dudás, in response to someone's invitation, called on the Committee, in order to negotiate. The talks were attended—for the Committee—by György Ádám, Tamás Nagy, Iván Kádár, Gábor Tánzos, Balázs Nagy, László Kardos and others.

"Also attending were: Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth, and myself. The meeting was formally presided over by György Ádám, but Géza Losonczy's opinion prevailed. Dudás acquainted us with his demands, which boiled down to this: Call in U. N. armed forces; fix the time of general elections within two weeks, on the basis of the multi-party system; and convoke forthwith a Constituent National Assembly to be composed of delegates of the armed fighters.

"Dudás also said that they would stop fighting only if a constituent national assembly of representatives of the insurgents was summoned and there would be an election by secret ballot under the control of UN troops." Gábor Tánzos testified:

"György Ádám presided over the talks which were conducted between several members of the Committee and Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth, and József Dudás. On October 30, Ferenc Donáth and Géza Losonczy called at the offices of the Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals, where they met József Dudás and had a talk with him. I do not know whether or not Donáth and Losonczy had been aware that the Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals was negotiating with Dudás and his associates. At any rate, both of them attended the talks.

György Ádám, László Kardos, and myself, attended the talks for the Committee. Then there was József Dudás and two of his followers, as well as Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth, and the author István Márkus. Most of the time it was Géza Losonczy who did the talking: he stood highest in the eyes of the other participants. Dudás told us that he had founded a National Committee and that he had a number of armed men. He said he intended to convene a Congress of Heroic Insurgents! He would demand the holding of new elections. One of his demands concerned the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and disbandment of the ÁVH. These were essentially the points Dudás told us about."

And Imre Nagy, too—true to the role he had deliberately undertaken—impatiently waited for the meeting with the leader of the "head-hunters."

Mrs. József Balogh, Imre Nagy's secretary, said the following in this connection:

"József Dudás, and later Dudás's wife, pressed for the meeting more than once. Finally they decided on the afternoon of the next day. Imre Nagy told me to call up Dudás and tell him about the time.

"At the time of the meeting Imre Nagy waited for Dudás and several times urged his coming. About an hour later Dudás phoned that he had some other business and would come later. Imre Nagy took cognizance of the message and waited for Dudás. I do not know about the details of the talk, it took place in the conference room."

Imre Nagy had talks with other leaders of the armed counter-revolutionary groups, too.

*Magyar Függetlenség*, which was Dudás's newspaper, ran the following headline, in large type, in its next issue:

"Talks between Members of National Revolutionary Committee and Council of Ministers' Chairman."

And this was the piece of news:

"At six o'clock in the afternoon, on October 30, 1956, negotiations were opened between Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and representatives of the armed forces of the insurgent freedom-fighters, members of the National Revolutionary Committee, as well as representatives of the revolutionary intellectuals and students.

"The negotiations are proceeding in an auspicious atmosphere on the basis of the proposals made by József Dudás, President of the National Revolutionary Committee, representing the armed insurgent freedom-fighters. The proposals put forward by the insurgents will be submitted to the government by Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers."

And "Free Radio Kossuth," under Losonczy's directorship, made an announcement at 7:50 p. m., October 30, 1956, which began like this: "You will now hear an important announcement." It went on to give a word-for-word account of the statement published in Dudás's newspaper and which has been quoted above.

In the morning of the same day—October 30, 1956—the counter-revolutionaries—including Dudás's men besieged the Party Headquarters on Republic Square, where they engaged in brutal murders. Yet the Radio attached such great importance to the talks which took place on that day between Imre Nagy and Dudás, that it repeated the first announcement at 7:58 p. m., that is to say, eight minutes afterwards.

Since Imre Nagy was unable to deny the fact attested to by several witnesses—namely that he had held talks with Dudás—he attempted to whitewash himself by denying knowledge or approval of the appearance of the above bulletin in Dudás's paper and over the Radio. But his denial was in vain...

The following is an excerpt from the testimony given by Mrs. Ferenc Molnár, an office worker:

"During the October events I was one of Imre Nagy's secretaries. Dudás called on Imre Nagy and talked with him. Dudás dictated a text to me that was read

over the Radio. Imre Nagy looked through the text and said it was all right. I do not know whether or not he signed it."

And Imre Nagy commented on the testimony :

"No bulletin appeared with my approval on the talks with Dudás."

To a question of the President, the witness replied :

"Imre Nagy called me in to take down what the Dudás group would dictate. Dudás showed Imre Nagy the text he had dictated."

## IV

### The Appearance and Aims of the Bourgeois, Reactionary and Fascist Parties

In the course of the counter-revolution, a great variety of parties sprang up like mushrooms. Approximately 70 different parties—ranging from the Smallholders to avowed fascist parties—were established during the heyday of the counter-revolution.

It is worth while enumerating a few of these parties and political groupings: Independent Smallholders' Party, Social-Democratic Party, Petöfi Party (the former National Peasant Party), Hungarian Independence Party (successor to the fascist Pfeiffer Party), Party of Hungarian Life (MÉP), Hungarian Freedom Party, Party of Hungarian Revolutionaries, Christian Democratic Party (on the model of Adenauer's CDU and the Italian clerical government party), Christian Hungarian Party, Bourgeois Democratic Party, Hungarian Democratic Union, Hungarian Revolutionary Youth Party, the fascist Arrow-Cross Party (Győr), Hungarian People's Party, National Rally, Christian Front, Democratic Popular Party (successor of the party of the traitor Barankovics), Catholic People's Party, Christian People's Party, National Federation of Former Political Victims, Hungarian National Committee (Dudás's party). And this list does not include the "revolutionary committees" and "workers councils" which came forward as political parties in their activities if not in name. The list itself speaks voluminously about the "democracy" sanctified by Imre Nagy.

Imre Nagy was not pushed in this direction by the trend of events. He had laid his plans long in advance.

This is substantiated by the fact that members of his group conducted negotiations already when the counter-revolution was being prepared, with Anna Kéthly, traitor to the working class and to her country, and István Erdei, regarding the reorganization of the Social-Democratic Party, that is the liquidation of working-class unity.

The Independent Smallholders' Party (FKP) also waited the counter-revolution fully prepared. The evidence given by Zoltán Tildy indicates this fact:

"A large number of former FKP members gathered on October 24, the day after the outbreak of the counter-revolution, in the Zárda Street headquarters of the Smallholders' Party. A heated dispute took place here concerning the activity of certain individuals. János Csorba conducted the debate as chairman by seniority... The issue considered at this meeting was the expulsion of individuals from the party, who had held posts in the People's Democracy after 1949—that is, István Dobi, József Bognár, Gyula Ortutay, and László Pesta."

What were the aims of the party re-organized by the right-wing leaders of the Independent Smallholders' Party? The world was told about them, over the radio, by István B. Szabó, a kulak from Békés, vice-chairman of the party, and ex-minister of state in the Imre Nagy government. It appeared from this that essentially they backed the Békés programme (the programme of István Nagyatádi Szabó) of 1930.

This meant—among other things—that they would take the land away from the peasants who had at long last received it and would restore the former Horthyite municipal boards and representative bodies, encompassing the exploiters and tormentors of the peasants.

Zoltán Tildy Confessed before the Court about the aims of the extreme right-wing leadership of his Party.

"The Smallholders' Party was formed earlier. Among its better-known members I will mention: József Kővágyó, István B. Szabó, Sándor Kiss—who was also the director of the Peasant Federation—and Tivadar Pártay. I knew them from the Smallholders' Party of the period following 1945. They belonged definitely to the right, in fact, the extreme right-wing.

"They reported to me in the House of Parliament on two occasions. I immediately made contact with them in connection with the coalition. Their demands included abolishing the Presidential Council.

"Their major demand was that all the cabinet posts should be distributed on the basis of the 1945 coalition, in the same proportions."

For the purpose of realizing this programme point, Imre Nagy remitted to the Smallholders' Party 300,000 forints on two occasions—a total of 600,000 forints—and took cognizance of the fact that the Smallholders' Party had seized the Kemmelweis Street headquarters of the Hungarian-Soviet Friendship Society together with all the movables. Imre Nagy also granted 300,000 forints to the former National Peasant Party, which re-organized under the name of Petőfi Party.

The programme of the Hungarian Independence Party provides for the inviolability of private property and the implementation of "unblemished, eternal and Hungarian bourgeois democracy."

In general the disguised or open demand for the restoration of private property appeared in the programmes of almost all the parties. The Bloc of Non-party People went as far on this issue as to declare that only properties above 1,420 acres should be "controlled by the state." As far as industry was concerned, point 15 of their programme demanded:

"The conversion of nationalized enterprises and plants (with the exception of key enterprises like the mines, etc.) into joint stock companies."

It is only natural that the party which championed this point included in its programme demands like placing ex-partisans under police surveillance, the "liquidation" of the State Security Authority, padlocking the party and trade union offices in the factories, etc. The National Rally formulated its programme in veritable Szálasi-style mumbo-jumbo, with point 6 of the programme reading:

"Hungarian socialism is founded on the idea of the ancient Hungarian community, a compact sealed with blood, as well as on restricted private property."

And we could enumerate, one by one, the programmes of the parties, blocs, unions, rallies, fronts and committees which—under the nose of Imre Nagy, and with his knowledge and approval—outdid even so-called bourgeois democracy and gave a distinct picture of undisguised fascist demands.

Together with the profusion of parties there was a mushrooming of counter-revolutionary newspapers.

### Mindszenty Illegally Rehabilitated by Imre Nagy

Mindszenty, this infamous representative of blackest reaction, was returned to political life by Imre Nagy and his associates.

A "workers' council" was the first to take a stand on behalf of Mindszenty over the radio. This sounds bizarre, but it will not come as a surprise to people who are familiar with how the counter-revolutionary workers' councils were established and know about their composition. The Szombathely radio, on October 30, announced the demands of the "Workers' Council of Vas County" which included the following:

"... In addition, it should be made possible, without delay, to rehabilitate fully Prince Primate Cardinal József Mindszenty and other ecclesiastical dignitaries who have suffered disadvantages, and to restore these individuals as soon as possible to their posts in the Church."

Zoltán Hátori, the secretary of Zoltán Tildy, wrote in his notes that Major Antal Pálkás, a descendant of Marquis Pallavicini, telephoned Tildy from the provinces on October 31 and informed him that they had set Mindszenty free. Tildy instructed him to bring Mindszenty to Budapest and to take him to his residence on Castle Hill. Hátori made the following entry afterwards in his notes:

"... Tildy visited Mindszenty on Castle Hill... Accompanied by Maléter and János Keresztes. Tildy's visit was in the nature of a formal call..."

Mindszenty was arbitrarily rehabilitated by Imre Nagy, who thereby grossly violated the constitution of the Hungarian People's Republic.

The rehabilitation document reads as follows:

"The Hungarian National Government declares that the procedure initiated against Prince Primate Cardinal József Mindszenty in 1948 is devoid of legal foundation and that the accusations made against him by the former system were unfounded. On the basis of the above, the Hungarian National Government announces that the measures in deprivation of Prince Primate Mindszenty's rights are annulled and that the Prince Primate may consequently enjoy every civil and ecclesiastical right without limitation.

Imre Nagy, Prime Minister,"

It is impossible to ignore, indeed, it is necessary to emphasize, that this text, which bears Imre Nagy's signature in his own hand, speaks of "accusations made against him by the former system." What system? Obviously that of 1948! By taking this unequivocal stand, Imre Nagy thus draws a line between himself and the "old system," the people's democratic system, and that because he wanted another system!

And in this he considered József Mindszenty a political partner and comrade-in-arms—Mindszenty, regarding whom the Hungarian Telegraph Agency, on October 31, 1956, announced on the occasion of his release:

"The population of the community of Rétság were the first to greet the Prince Primate, who had been released from captivity. Replying to the greetings, he said: 'My sons, I shall continue where I had to leave off eight years ago!'"

Mindszenty obtained an opportunity to talk twice over the Radio which was directly controlled by Géza Losonczy. Mindszenty made a brief radio speech on November 1, in which he declared:

"... I am finding my bearings now, and in two days I shall address a personal message to the nation about ways towards a solution."

And he did find his bearings...

It is commonly known that Mindszenty had long-standing contacts with the West and had at one time visited Cardinal Spellman in New York and Otto of Hapsburg. Countess Beatrix Széchenyi, a staff member of the émigré newspaper *Új Hungária*, who was in Hungary during the counter-revolution, quoted Mindszenty's secretary as follows:

"Although there are scarcely any telephone connections in the city and none at all in the provinces, we spoke to Washington twice this morning, and the connection was just as good as though we were speaking next door..."

What business did Mindszenty, who had only then been released, have to telephone to Washington twice? The West German *Deutsche Woche* reported on Mindszenty's press conference, held on November 2, when the Cardinal in the presence of the press representatives, openly appealed to the West for political support and aid, and went on to say:

"Prior to the interview, he spoke over the telephone with Father Jaszovszky, in San Francisco, a former co-worker of his. Mindszenty sent a personal message through him to the President of the United States, requesting support for the freedom fight of the Hungarian people, and the opening of the Austrian border to bring in arms and material."

Radio Free Europe assigned Father Vecsey as adviser to Mindszenty, the moment he was released. Mindszenty established further close contacts with the imperialists during the interval of four days between his release and his escape to the U. S. Legation. The evidence of Dr. Egon Albert Turcsányi, Mindszenty's secretary, provides a comprehensive picture in this respect as well as on Mindszenty's political ideas :

"A three-member delegation, representing the Red Cross in West Germany and Switzerland, visited Mindszenty on November 2, 1956. Prince Löwenstein was one of them. Mindszenty said that Prince Löwenstein was an intimate friend of Adenauer's and a member of the latter's narrower circle. He was posted on world affairs on the basis of his talks with Löwenstein. In this connection, he said that the division of Germany is the cause of tremendous tension in world politics. At any time it could produce a situation culminating in the outbreak of war, and West Germany would take the risk of initiating intervention. Mindszenty said literally ; 'The Germans even have a time-table and do not have to wait long now.' Mindszenty insisted that we would have to rely on West Germany as the sole initiator and active force willing to take the risk. Mindszenty said that it was his personal opinion that joining such an action would be worth any blood-sacrifice on our part. He mentioned 1957—1958 as the time limit, when the Germans would be able to tie down the Soviet forces, and then the United States and England could bring their Air Forces into play with less danger. England had to make shift with the Germans precisely because of the superior forces of the Soviet Union, he said. They had not as yet reached a common stand with the United States on this issue, but talks were proceeding in this direction. Mindszenty, quoting Löwenstein, also said : 'The reason why the West opposes a ban on atomic weapons is because the Soviet Union can hardly be conquered without the use of atomic weapons.'"

The Swiss *Journal de Genève* wrote the following in its December 13, 1956 issue :

"Some Hungarians are apparently reproaching the Vatican for not extending sufficient assistance to their national uprising. This view is completely unfounded . . . the Vatican insisted on dispatching (to Hungary.—Editor) its confidential agents, among them Monseigneur Rodhain, the Vatican envoy, who reached the capital and consulted with Cardinal Mindszenty, just released by the Nagy government. After becoming posted on the situation and turning over to the Cardinal the funds sent by the Pope to the Hungarian Catholics, he returned to the Vatican bringing with him secret documents of great value. Monseigneur Zágón, rector of the papal Hungarian Institute, made the same trip shortly thereafter . . ."

It was following such "orientation" and negotiations that Mindszenty, on November 3, delivered his notorious and malicious "message," which clearly demonstrated that the aim of the counter-revolution was to restore the pre-1945 fascist system and not to set up some kind of a capitalist rule on the western model.

The picture is thus completely rounded out : The path travelled deliberately by Imre Nagy and his gang led in a straight line from underground negotiations conducted with the bourgeois parties to authorizing and supporting the formation of semi-fascist and fascist parties, placing the radio at their service, and to a formal visit to the spokesman of the restoration of the landed property of the Church, who based his plans for the future on an atomic war against the Soviet Union.

## V

### Imperialism—Principal Organizer of the Counter-revolution

#### Western Propaganda in the Period of Preparing the Counter-revolution

Foreign and domestic reaction very carefully prepared the counter-revolution over a long period, both on the political and the organizational level. The preparations were carried on without interruption from 1951 onwards, after the adoption, that year, of the infamous Mutual Security Act, which appropriated one hundred million United States dollars for espionage purposes. They were still further stepped up in 1956, when the 100 million dollars were increased to 125 million.

Radio Free Europe, which played a major role in the work of preparing, organizing and directing the counter-revolution in 1956, was established and supported by American funds, and the notorious balloon campaign and the various counter-revolutionary émigré organizations were organized, aided and supported by such funds.

In the months preceding October 1956, the counter-revolutionary propaganda organizations were exceptionally active, and they did not even attempt to conceal the fact that they had prepared a direct attack on the people's democratic system.

In the summer of 1956 Miklós Kállay, former Horthyite Hungarian Prime Minister, embarked on a tour of South America. Before audiences consisting largely of fascist rabble who had sought refuge there to escape being called to account for war crimes, he declared:

"Hungarian liberation may take place in the near future; it is possible that we are on the threshold of that liberation. The time is near when the Hungarians may again take their fate into their own hands, and I believe we may soon be able to go home."

A Radio Free Europe commentary on August 19, 1956, indicated the timing of the planned action even more clearly:

"The future cannot be reckoned from 1939 or 1945, but always from that year when, in the future, what a part of the Hungarian people wants will become reality... It is possible that this future may begin already in 1956."

But what kind of change were the propagandists of imperialism anticipating, promising and preparing in such harmony and on such short notice for "a part of the Hungarian people?" In the September 26, 1956 broadcast of the BBC they even mentioned by name the person they were counting on, also what they were expecting of him:

"There is no doubt that the Hungarian people also place a certain amount of confidence in Imre Nagy in the hope that he has learned from the failure of the half measures of 1953—54."

Is it not conspicuous that István Erdei, the former social democratic undersecretary of state, used almost the same words when, in his conversation with Imre Nagy, he spoke about half-measures, and that Imre Nagy replied: "I will not undertake half-measures?"

Just why was Imre Nagy the appropriate person "to start the process of unfolding?" The West German *Tagesspiegel*, in its September 6, 1956 issue, clearly states:

"A few months after the death of Stalin, Imre Nagy became Hungarian Prime Minister, and in this capacity he promised and carried out a great many reforms of a political, economic and ideological character... Imre Nagy will soon win..."

Of course, the abscondees and their domestic allies who were speculating on a counter-revolution could not have been rallied behind Imre Nagy if they had thought for a moment that the process started with Imre Nagy's help might stop even at some sort of semi-communist system.

Rome Radio, in its August 13 broadcast, revealed what kind of role and destiny it intended for Imre Nagy and his associates:

"At the worst, Titoism can be accepted only as a short transitional stage in liberating the country and making it

independent. If the Hungarian Titoists can achieve the withdrawal of Russian troops, an end to exploitation by the Russians and a relaxation of Russification, then let there be Titoism for one or two months, the time necessary for the Hungarian Titoists, the national communists, to be swept away by the common sense of the Hungarian nation and the accumulated dissatisfaction. The Hungarian Titoists must reckon with this in advance. If they truly stand on a national basis and put the well-being of the nation before everything else, then they must be prepared to make this sacrifice. Let them be Titoists, we too wish them every success in their efforts to drive the Russians and Russian influence out of the country . . .”

Radio Free Europe, in its August 28 broadcast, raised two demands. One was :

“In principle, in the Soviet Union and the people's democracies the means of production have passed into the possession of the working people, therefore political power also belongs to the working people. But this is true only in principle, or only on paper. The factories and the state enterprises are not managed by workers' councils.”

In other words : the establishment of the workers' councils, the placing of the management of factories and plants into their hands was demanded first of all by Radio Free Europe, supported by American funds and directed by tried and tested fascists ! In fact it was Radio Free Europe which was the first to demand that political power be placed in the hands of the “workers' councils,” and well before the formation of the notorious “Central Workers' Council !”

The second “mobilizing” suggestion, broadcast in another Radio Free Europe programme on the same day, was :

“What has happened since July 18? What kind of decisions and acts can be attributed to the administration of the Gerő regime? Have they torn down and melted that monstrosity of a statue erected on Dózsa György Road?”

Those who experienced the events of October 23 know that one of the first acts of the counter-revolutionaries was to carry out this instruction from Munich.

It is common knowledge that in the weeks and months preceding the counter-revolution the Free Europe Committee, in the course of its notorious balloon campaign, sent a great quantity of seditious leaflets into the territory of Hungary, especially the countryside. One of these leaflets, which listed the demands of the “National Resistance Movement” (on the whole the same demands already mentioned in the foregoing), also suggested :

“The struggle against the co-operative farms is one of the forms of the nation's freedom struggle.”

Farmer Bálint, whose full name is Bálint Czupi, former smallholder MP, the permanent “agricultural advisor” of Radio Free Europe, declared in his discourse of September 4, 1956 on agricultural machine stations :

“ . . . the people will dissolve the machine stations too on the day when the red star falls from the Hungarian sky.”

Radio Free Europe, in its October 13 transmission, that is, shortly before the outbreak of the counter-revolution, gave the counter-revolution its slogans and demands in much greater detail, practically enumerating them in so many points :

“We demand the withdrawal of the Soviet Army, the publication of Soviet-Hungarian agreements and accounts, democracy in the place of democratism, independence instead of foreign patronage.”

The mouthpieces of the West raised not only the above-mentioned political and economic demands for the benefit of the counter-revolutionaries, but regularly and systematically proclaimed the programme of the white terror. For many months, on the wave-length of Radio Free Europe, every week there appeared the “Black Voice,” a programme feature in the genuine style of cheap American thrillers, which mentioned by name those communists and non-party members, loyal to the people, who were to be executed without any legal procedure, by lynch law. If the counter-revolutionary gangs did not succeed in executing all the persons condemned by the “Black Voice,” it was not the fault of Radio Free Europe or Imre Nagy and his accomplices.



### The Role of Spies and Diversions in Preparing the Counter-revolution

Naturally the counter-revolution could not be prepared by propaganda means alone. There was need for widespread and ramified organizing activity and military preparations, and, as part of this, most thorough intelligence work, even the organization of armed units. The testimony of disillusioned émigrés, of spies and diversions captured before and after the counter-revolution, and the documents found on them also throw light on how the preparatory tasks were carried out.

The émigré organizations maintained close contact with the imperialist intelligence organs. Sándor Visnyei, a spy arrested by the Hungarian security authorities on December 9, 1956, testified :

“The Hungarian department of the U. S. controlled West German Gehlen Intelligence organization (an intelligence agency, operating in West Germany on behalf of the American imperialists.—Editor) played a considerable role in preparing the 1956 October events . . .

“Even in the period preceding the events, all the persons employed by the Hungarian department regularly visited the Hungarian refugee camps in West Germany and Austria, and the other organs operating under the guise of charitable institutions. They carried on a campaign of propaganda and agitation among the Hungarian refugees and called upon them to overthrow the Hungarian people's democratic regime. Simultaneously they recruited agents from among them, who were given a short course of training and sent to Hungary to incite the people against the Hungarian people's democratic régime. The same kind of activities could be observed on the part of the other Hungarian émigré organizations . . .”

The Hungarian émigré organizations, however, regularly trained and threw in intelligence and subversive agents recruited from among the émigrés. The so-called “Fraternal Community of Hungarian Fighters” was exceptionally active and consistent in this work. In connection with their methods and aims let us briefly cite the activities of two captured agents :

Sándor Mező defected to the West in 1951. In Graz he came into contact with Sándor Martsa and István Sütő, former

Horthyite officers, who recruited him for espionage activities. They trained him in the proper use of weapons, the gathering of intelligence information, photography, secret writing and methods of crossing the border. After his training he was sent into Hungary once a year with an espionage assignment. Mező used these occasions to establish an espionage network and counter-revolutionary organization of people suitable for his purposes. He informed the agents he recruited that the purpose of the organization was the armed support of any external attack or internal counter-revolutionary action.

Lajos Paty was helped to escape to the West by Sándor Mező in 1952, on his first espionage assignment, and was later brought into contact with Sándor Martsa. The recruitment and training of Lajos Paty took place in the same manner as Sándor Mező's. In 1954 he was sent into Hungary twice. His assignment was to reconnoitre and photograph military airfields, barracks and other military objectives and important buildings. Mező and Paty received 1,500 schillings as “pay” for their espionage activities. They crossed the frontier on each occasion armed and with suitable espionage equipment and forged documents.

Naturally these petty agents hired for small cash could not have a comprehensive picture of the functioning of the individual organizations, nor the interconnections and the role of the network, aimed at overthrowing the Hungarian People's Democracy, in preparing the counter-revolution.

Miklós Szabó, ex-deputy of the Smallholders' Party, one of the émigré leaders, became disillusioned and disgusted with the treacherous activities of the émigré movements. He recognized his error, left his former comrades-in-arms and returned home in 1957. In a public statement he declared :

“Immediately before October 23 or on that day a former Horthyite officer, who was then the Austrian agent of the Gehlen organization, declared that the time had arrived to go into Hungary to provide military control. And he actually did this; equipped with a radio transmitting and receiving set, presumably accompanied by several men, he entered Hungary. He only returned to Vienna in December 1956.

“About this time they began to prepare the intelligence bureau under the name of Hungarian Refugee Service, which until then had operated in Salzburg. By that time it had been decided that a legitimist named Taubinger, who had

for years been in the pay of the Americans, would be appointed to head it. This organization had been set up by Radio Free Europe and was also subordinated to the Hungarian National Committee."

The *Berliner Zeitung* in its November 21, 1956 issue carries very important information on the West German preparations. Here is an excerpt from the article:

"Following October 20 armed Hungarian groups appeared in Munich and at airfields around Munich from Regensburg, Stuttgart and other West German towns. In conversations with inhabitants of Munich these Horthyites openly admitted that they were preparing to return to Hungary as the 'lords of the country'."

The New York Herald Tribune on October 25, 1956, printed a remarkable statement made by Christian Ravndal, ex-minister of the U. S. in Budapest. Mr. Ravndal, speaking of the uprising said that only the timing had caused any surprise. Western observers had counted on an anti-Russian uprising, but it had been precipitated earlier than had been anticipated. They had expected something of the kind around the end of the year, he said.

The documents listed go to show that the Western imperialists did not "wait" for the counter-revolution; they actually furnished funds for it, organized it and incited to it. The real sense of the words of the one-time U. S. Minister to Budapest is, consequently, that originally the outbreak of the counter-revolution was planned for the end of 1956 but that the situation made it possible to have it explode even earlier.

### **Imperialist Direction of the Counter-Revolution**

#### *Radio Free Europe as the Foreign Military and Political HQ of the Counter-Revolution*

Blood flowed on the streets in Budapest and in other towns in Hungary while top imperialist politicians joyfully hailed the "new, free Hungary" in parliaments, in radio broadcasts and in the press. Scores of western radio stations offered the counter-revolutionaries encouragement and advice.

Radio Free Europe assumed the actual role of directing the counter-revolution, both from a military and political point of

view, October 22, the eve of the outbreak of the counter-revolution, this station practically doubled the time of its Hungarian language broadcasts—increasing it to 20 hours a day—from that point onwards, the radio broadcast political and military instructions daily, hour by hour. The armed counter-revolutionary gangs executed these military orders with precision. Following instructions, they immediately inscribed on their banner newer and newer political demands, shifting steadily to the right. In his capacity as Prime Minister, Imre Nagy granted these demands, too, without hesitation.

The counter-revolutionary action, which was alleged to be a "spontaneous popular movement," was from the outset a military operation, with a strategy worked out deliberately, expertly and precisely. This statement, substantiated by the 1,000,000 residents of Budapest who lived through the events, was also borne out by the West German *Tagesspiegel*, which wrote on October 27:

"The insurgents proceeded according to a strategic plan worked out to the last detail, a fact asserted unanimously by eye-witnesses and connoisseurs of Budapest. They attempted to seize by surprise the six nerve centres of the capital, or to be more precise:

- "1. The House of Parliament and the immediate neighbourhood, where several government buildings are situated;
- "2. the Radio studios;
- "3. the editorial building and printing shop of *Szabad Nép*, the official organ of the communist party;
- "4. the Keleti railway station, from which all trains going west depart;
- "5. the Károly Róbert barracks, Budapest's largest garrison;
- "6. the Chain Bridge, the strategically most favourably situated bridge across the Danube."

The possibility of keeping the armed counter-revolutionary gangs under arms undoubtedly is one of the functions of military leadership. The proclamation of martial law threatened, however, to scatter the less conscious or resolute elements of these bands. Radio Free Europe emphatically demanded the cessation of martial law from the first moment of its proclamation. In a broadcast on October 25, it gave what amounts

to the quintessence of the military tactics pursued in the first stage of the counter-revolutionary actions :

“Martial law must be rescinded and the Soviet troops ordered to return to their barracks. Further bloodshedding can be avoided if the order proclaiming martial law is immediately withdrawn . . .”

In other words, the order issued for the purpose of preventing bloodshedding should be rescinded, the Soviet troops holding the ferocious gangs in check should be ordered back so as to “avoid further bloodshedding.” Nobody could be taken in by such arguments except someone completely unversed in political and military operations; and only someone who wanted to clear the path for the counter-revolution could grant such a demand. And everybody knows that Imre Nagy repeatedly set a new time limit for the laying down of arms and prevented enforcement of martial law.

The leaders of the counter-revolution were confronted on several occasions with the problem of keeping the counter-revolutionary gangs under arms and maintaining their fitness for battle. Radio Free Europe issued instructions in this respect on countless occasions, broadcasting, for example, on October 20:

“The announcement which has just been issued by the Ministry of Defence in Budapest states that the centres of resistance in Budapest have begun, under agreed terms, to hand over their arms to Hungarian troops coming to relieve Soviet army units. This part of the communication is false and untruthful. It is impossible that the Budapest resistance—which, according to the latest reports, has taken 15,000 lives—would have laid down its arms before the routed Red soldiery . . . This piece of news is improbable also because although the fight for freedom has won a military victory, it is still far from having achieved its political aims . . . if it were to surrender its arms, that would be tantamount to the continuation of despotism and the maintenance of the nation’s misfortune.”

On the 28th, Imre Nagy in his radio address announced that the Soviet troops were being withdrawn to their military bases. The general HQ of the counter-revolution in Munich immediately went a step further. Radio Free Europe came out on the very same day—October 28—with a new military demand :

“The first condition is for the Soviet troops to withdraw at once from Hungary under a flag of truce . . . That is why we said that, despite all the joy of victory, we have only reached the first stage.”

And actually, within a matter of a few hours, steps were taken towards the next stage. Lieutenant Colonel Julián Borovitsky, ex-officer of the Horthy army, who is attached to Radio Free Europe as a military adviser, under the name of Colonel Bell, issued these instructions on October 31 :

“The Communist leaders of the Hungarian armed forces must go : they never had any business being there anyway. Soldiers ! Freedom-fighters ! Demand the posts of Minister of Defence, of Commander-in-Chief and Chief-of-Staff !”

Radio Free Europe became impatient and, on November 1, repeated the demand of Colonel Bell, extending it to cover another ministry :

“He who has arms has the power also ! . . . Nationally speaking, weapons mean the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence . . . Freedom fighters ! . . . Do not hang up your guns.”

Next day, on November 2, Imre Nagy appointed Pál Maléter—commander of the counter-revolutionaries in the Kilián barracks and Corvin Alley—head of the Ministry of Defence.

Radio Free Europe, in order to popularize Imre Nagy, had this to say about the proclamation of martial law :

“We still do not know under what circumstances this disgraceful order was brought about. We do not know how much Imre Nagy in whose name the measure was taken had to do with it. One thing is certain : it was an achievement of the Stalinist forces.”

In the wake of the whitewashing, this rumour spread at once—a rumour which Imre Nagy himself afterwards confirmed before the “workers’ ” delegation, organized and brought before him for this purpose ; later it was given widest publicity over the radio.

Béla Varga, the chairman of the former Hungarian National Committee, espoused all the demands of the counter-revolution

from the very moment of the counter-revolutionary outbreak that is, essentially all that which Radio Free Europe relayed proper dosages during the course of the events and placed on the order of the day. And the American Hungarian-language newspaper *Szabadság* printed them already on October 24.

“Withdrawal of all Soviet armed forces from Hungarian territory. Immediate dissolution of the political police and the elimination of all Soviet influence in the army, the immediate disbanding of the puppet parliament. Ending of the rule of the communist party and of its decisive role in the executive and administrative branch of the state. Dissolution of the mass organizations... Dispatch of a UN Committee to Hungary, with the aim of helping to create the conditions for the holding of free elections under international control. The UN to consider measures to ensure that a government elected through free elections should take control of the country's affairs.”

A perusal of these demands makes it apparent at first glance that Imre Nagy attempted to implement as many of them as he could, despite the relatively brief time at his disposal. The time was too short, of course, to carry out demands like dissolving parliament or holding “free” elections. But Imre Nagy promised these things, too, over the radio, and created the preconditions for it by giving *carte blanche* for the establishment of bourgeois, reactionary and, in fact, undisguised fascist parties and associations.

The counter-revolutionaries were not satisfied with the second government and Imre Nagy shortly swept it aside. Then he set up the “small cabinet,” in which bourgeois politicians constituted the majority. But this was not sufficient for the counter-revolutionaries either. They were anxious to move ahead quickly, and Radio Free Europe came out with new demands on November 2:

“The large and small cabinets must be dissolved. There are 25 members in the so-called big government, with 21 communists among them. This government was defeated before it was formed. Not even the Chairman of the Council of Ministers regarded this government as acceptable and was compelled to set up a more circumscribed cabinet to execute the governmental duties. But the small government is no guarantee at all. This state of affairs is so utterly stupid that it cannot be accepted even temporarily. The

paramount need, as demanded by the free radios, is to set up at once a provisional national government to carry on. And there is place in this government only for the genuine representatives of the parties and actual leaders of the freedom fight.”

On November 3, Imre Nagy carried this out too.

Finally, let us note that we are not the only ones who have this approach concerning the role of Radio Free Europe and the entire western propaganda apparatus in directing the counter-revolution. The West, too, saw and knew it in the same light, and did not hesitate to say so openly. The *U.S. Newsweek* wrote, in its November 12 issue, after the armed defeat of the counter-revolution:

“For U. S. broadcasters it was significant and heartening that the demands voiced independently by each station closely resembled the demands previously voiced by Radio Free Europe.”

#### *The Imperialists' "Moral" Support of the Counter-Revolution*

President Eisenhower, on a visit to New York, gave a statement to the Press shortly after his arrival there on October 25, 1956, in which he said in part:

“The United States considers the developments in Hungary as being a renewed expression of the intense desire for freedom long held by the Hungarian people... The heart of America goes out to the people of Hungary.”

Barely 24 hours after the bloodbath on Republic Square President Eisenhower again spoke up without concealing his satisfaction and delight over developments in Hungary. We quote the pertinent passage from the President's radio-television speech of October 31, 1956:

“... Today, it appears, a new Hungary is rising from this struggle; a Hungary which we hope, from our hearts, will know full and free nationhood.

“We have rejoiced in all these historic events.”

It should be emphasized once again that this speech was delivered after the mass slaughter which took place on Republic Square on October 30. This indicates what lies behind such

high-sounding phrases and delusive catchwords as "full and free nationhood" . . . This is how the imperialists interpret "freedom" . . .

Imre Nagy's declaration of neutrality was made on November 1; it was interpreted both abroad and at home as a diplomatic step towards the final severance of Hungary from the socialist camp and attaching her to the imperialist camp. The next day, on November 2, the Associated Press blared the following announcement throughout the world from Washington :

"President Eisenhower today offered Hungary 20 million dollars worth of food and other relief materials . . . President Eisenhower said he is authorizing an immediate allocation from his emergency funds under legislation authorizing emergency aid to 'friendly peoples'."

Imre Nagy proved that he merited President Eisenhower's dollar allocation for this purpose from the emergency fund set up by the United States to support "friendly peoples." Nothing proves more clearly that those millions of dollars were intended to support, not the Hungarian people, but the counter-revolution, than the fact that, although the sum was allocated in Washington, it never reached Budapest: the people's democratic system and the Hungarian people's were not considered "friendly" in Washington.

#### *Western Arms at the Disposal of the Counter-revolutionaries*

The imperialists were not content with waging propaganda for the counter-revolution in the preparatory stage, but helped by way of espionage, sabotage and organization. Nor did they limit their activity in the practical realization of their counter-revolutionary schemes to giving military and political directives over the Radio and in the Press.

The imperialist intelligence agencies and émigré groups smuggled large quantities of ammunition and weapons into the country from the outbreak of the counter-revolution and throughout its entire period. The cynicism of the imperialists is characterized by the fact that they often utilized Red Cross shipments to smuggle arms, in addition to other methods. It would take volumes to list all the eye-witnesses who have reported on the arrival, receipt and distribution of arms ship-

ments dispatched by devious ways. We have taken some typical eyewitness reports at random, as, for instance, the evidence given by Mrs. Pataki, née Erzsébet Kelemen :

"On October 26 and 27, 1956, I saw a Red Cross shipment come in from Austria to Hungary on a Hungarian lorry. They unloaded part of the shipment in the cultural centre, the rest remained on the lorry. I saw myself on this occasion that there were weapons and other munitions concealed under the Red Cross packages. I tried to hear the conversation of the escort, and so I learned the following : the leader of the escort warned the men to pack the weapons very well, because once the lorry had been stopped and examined on the border. He instructed them to enter into conversation en route only with such persons as would be able to show the same permit which they had . . ."

However, not all arms shipments successfully reached those for whom they were intended by the senders. Vilmos Tóth, a chauffeur from Szombathely told the story of such a concealed arms shipment as follows :

"There was at the police headquarters a lorry bearing the Red Cross sign, which was carrying ammunition and German-made rifles to Hungary from the West. There were two cases of rifles and a sack of pertinent ammunition on the lorry."

Ferenc Keckés, a resident of Budapest, testified as follows concerning a shipment of foreign weapons to the counter-revolutionary gang which had their HQ in the Prater St. school :

"On the afternoon of November 4, 1956, the armed counter-revolutionaries in the basement of the Prater St. school opened wooden boxes in front of us, with inscriptions in German and marked with the Red Cross. They said they had been brought there that day by lorry. The Red Cross boxes—which were about 50×50 cm—were lined with metal. One section was filled with lemons, oranges, chocolate and other foodstuffs, and there were handgrenades in another section."

Lajos Fülöp, a porter in the Győr Hospital, related in his testimony :

"I stayed in the hospital during the counter-revolution. A West German car drove up to the gate of this hospital,

on October 27 or 28, 1956. There were three West Germans in the car and they brought a wounded Hungarian in . . . I saw several times with my own eyes that in the cars transporting the wounded and bearing license plates of foreign, capitalist countries, as well as of the persons in them, there were different types and makes of weapons. I saw, when the West German car, mentioned above, was identified, that there were some six weapons stacked in the front and back of the car."

The Hungarian authorities did in fact seize a large number of modern, western-made weapons after mopping up the counter-revolutionary gangs, like "MP 44" West German repeater rifles, American rifles marked "US Carbine," new type British Tommy-guns and "MP 40" West German submachine guns.

Government circles in the West, who were anxious to acclaim the Hungarian counter-revolution as a "spontaneous popular movement," had no desire that the public should learn about the consignments of arms. The Hamburg newspaper *Welt am Sonntag* reported, in its November 4, 1956 issue, on an interview with a Hungarian insurgent who said the following:

"We received the first food consignment only on Saturday. Four truck-loads of tin boxes were turned over to us by a foreigner who spoke fluent Hungarian, with the warning to open them with caution. We understood what he meant only later on. Two hundred tin boxes were crammed with handgrenades."

The Swiss newspaper *Die Tat*, after reporting this item from the Hamburg paper, added the following comment:

"This appeared in the first edition of the '*Welt am Sonntag*', but only in part of it. As soon as the editorial error was discovered, further distribution and printing were stopped and a new edition was issued, in which the above text was no longer to be found."

Miklós Szabó, the émigré leader who returned home—and whose statement has been previously quoted—spoke about a few interesting details in connection with the consignment of arms:

"All-out support to the counter-revolution was considered necessary by leading emigrants, without exception. Among them, General Zákó, Major General Ferenc Kisbarnaki Farkas, Tasziló Daróczy, Count Béla Hadik, Colonel

Bell and the 'Gehlen' organization did everything in their power to get military assistance or, at least, weapons."

In addition to western weapons and other military equipment, a large number of armed gangs, trained in western camps, crossed the Hungarian border and intervened in the counter-revolutionary fighting. The formations were trained in camps in Austria and West Germany: in the Munich camp of the Fraternal Society of Hungarian Fighters, in the Linz and Innsbruck camps near Vienna, maintained by the Caritas, as well as in the camps near Salzburg und Regensburg, where the Hungarians' Legion organized its own shock troops. How were these units recruited and smuggled across the border? József Katona, who fled to the West long before the counter-revolution, testified the following, on the basis of his personal experience:

"A few days after October 23, 1956, Cukrász and Szilárd Karácsonyi, two abscondees in the camp at Zirndorf, called me in and asked me whether I wanted to go back to Hungary. About 30 or 35 of us left by bus for Hungary.

"In Salzburg, we were joined by other abscondees. János Bartha, right-wing ex-MP, told us, in the headquarters of the Caritas in Salzburg, that a colonel would travel with us."

It is of interest to note that the Salzburg Caritas had, on October 24, dispatched a group of 45 men towards Burgenland, as a "volunteer work group." This was not some inexpensive stunt of "recruiting workers," for the Caritas spent 2,587 schillings and 20 groschen on the group for transport, board and lodging and other expenses, according to the receipt which came into the possession of the Hungarian authorities. The armed groups, smuggled over the border, went into armed counter-revolutionary action on Hungary's territory. Border Guard Károly Brencsák, stationed at the Pornóapáti outpost, testified about these groups:

"An armed group of about 130 men crossed the border on October 29. They said they were Hungarians, who had fled to the West earlier, and wanted to go to Budapest to fight against the Soviet troops. They told the two sentries on border duty to turn over the weapons of the station by 10 p. m., or they would attack the outpost. The group was armed with pistols and submachine guns."

The Western Press carried extensive reports on the crossings of armed émigrés. The London *Reynolds News* wrote, for instance, that the Hungarian "revolutionaries" were, in fact, "right-wing extremists" and that "Hungarian fascists from abroad have been pouring into Hungary." It added:

"The choice lies among:

"1. A Nagy regime, in which the 'Titoites' will still hold an important place . . .

"2. A parliamentary regime of the Western type . . .

"3. An extreme Fascist regime, run by the followers of Admiral Horthy and of Szálasy . . ."

Democratic papers of the West exposed at that time many instances of the return to Hungary of fascist riff-raff who had fled west. The *Österreichische Volksstimme* wrote in its October 30, 1956 issue:

"The counter-revolution is establishing regular general staffs at some border stations. During the past few days, a large number of agents of the counter-revolution from among the Hungarian émigrés have crossed the borders to join the insurgents, as they say."

The *Neues Deutschland* reported on a remarkable symptom in this respect:

"All Hungarian émigrés serving in the American labour camp at Vogelweh, most of whom are members of the Arrow-Cross organization, were released from duty and then seemed to disappear from the earth . . . The same situation prevailed in the management of several West German firms, where Hungarian citizens were employed."

And *Der Morgen*, a newspaper published in Berlin, proved that this was no isolated instance. The paper reported about the "enthusiasm" among West German capitalists for the "Hungarian affair."

"The management of the Eschweiler mining company gave all the Hungarian émigrés and Horthyite fascists, working for the mining concern, a holiday late in October so that they could take part in the Hungarian counter-revolution."

And let us add that this Eschweiler mining company is not a minor local concern. Its shares are distributed among shareholders in West Germany, Luxemburg and Belgium.

### *The Rubbish Heap of History on the Move*

The Hungarian émigré organizations increased their activities to a great extent immediately before the counter-revolution. Their leaders undertook lecture tours to practically all parts of the world. It is worth while tracing a few of their tours:

*Ferenc Nagy*, ex-Prime Minister of Hungary: Arrived in Geneva on November 25, 1955, for the four power conference, then continued his talks in Rome, Paris and London. Reached Vienna on June 26, where he carried on talks with Austrian personalities and émigré leaders. From Vienna, Ferenc Nagy went to Munich for a few days, then returned to Vienna on July 6. From there he went to Switzerland, and returned to the United States. At the moment of the outbreak of the counter-revolution he was again in Vienna. During the counter-revolution, on November 3, he had a telephone conversation with Zoltán Tildy. As a result of that talk he intervened with Radio Free Europe—since it had begun to attack Imre Nagy—to moderate its tone.

*Béla Varga*, former chairman of the Independent Small-holders' Party, President of the emigrant "National Committee": Started from America on August 4 on a European tour. Visited Britain, France, West Germany and the Scandinavian countries.

*Károly Peyer*, the notorious traitor to the working class removed even from the Social Democratic Party because of his right-wing views, was in Vienna for two weeks in July, 1956.

*József Közi Horváth*, Roman Catholic priest: Was in France, West Germany and Spain from June 1955 till the end of the year. Made a similar tour in the summer of 1956. Was in Vienna the middle of August 1956.

*Miklós Horthy*: on October 29, addressed a telegram to the heads of the three great imperialist powers, demanding their intervention on behalf of the counter-revolution.

*Otto Hapsburg*: Went on a lecturing tour of the United States at the beginning of 1956. Following that, travelled to West Germany. During the counter-revolution he sent a telegram to President Eisenhower, requesting that the supreme

national symbol, the Crown of St. Stephen, be returned to the freely elected representatives of the Hungarian nation.

Otto Hapsburg thought the time had come for the re-establishment of the royal institutions!

Émigré circles, directing the counter-revolution from abroad, attempted to establish direct contact with the counter-revolutionaries, by utilizing persons suitable for this purpose. Radio Free Europe dispatched Lajos Somogyvári, an ex-officer of the Horthy army, to Győr, on October 30, 1956, to organize a counter-revolutionary government there and come forward as the "delegate of fighting youth."

Counts Miklós Festetics and Albert Apponyi jr. also crossed the Austrian-Hungarian border during the counter-revolution and established contact with the counter-revolutionaries in Sopron.

#### *How Imre Nagy's Essays Reached the West*

At the trial held on June 11 the People's Tribunal called László Regéczy Nagy, the former chauffeur of the British Legation in Budapest, to the witness stand. In his evidence, Regéczy Nagy told the Court how Imre Nagy's essays were sent out to the West.

"Early in February 1957 my friend Árpád Göncz requested me to ask Mr. Cope, secretary of the Legation whether he would be willing to send Imre Nagy's political papers abroad. This was necessary because the person guarding Imre Nagy's papers wanted to leave the country but did not have any contact with the émigré organizations abroad.

"I told all this to Cope, who replied that he could not send the material directly to the émigré organizations, but would be willing to transmit it to his superiors.

"I conveyed the reply to Árpád Göncz; he was willing to accept Cope's conditions.

"I met Árpád Göncz in a small street behind the Bureau of Statistics. I drove there in the car of the Legation. He handed me a paper parcel; at that time I was not able to find out what the parcel contained. I took this material, and when I opened it, found that the bundle contained about 300 typewritten pages on quadrifoliate

paper. Imre Nagy's name was typed across the bottom of the first page.

"In May Göncz told me that László Kardos, the guardian of the manuscript, had been arrested."

#### *Staff Members of the British and U. S. Legations at the Kilián Barracks*

During his examination before the Court Pál Maléter gave a detailed account of the visit Mr. Cowley, the British military attaché had paid him.

"We spoke in German. My visitor said he had heard a great deal about what had happened around the Kilián Barracks and would like to hear more about it. I told him about the events as they occurred."

Mr. Cowley gave concrete advice to Maléter. He proposed, for instance, that the various armed groups should be placed under unified leadership, "for only thus can the results achieved be maintained. He emphasized that what was required was a strong central leadership, a military dictatorship...

It became apparent from the examination of several witnesses that Colonel Cowley, the British military attaché, behaved during the counter-revolution and afterwards in such a fashion that the Foreign Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic was compelled to send a Note to the British Legation in Budapest requesting that Colonel Cowley leave the country. The Note read in part:

"Colonel James N. Cowley, Military Attaché of the British Legation in Budapest, during the events which took place in the last months of 1956, maintained active and direct contact with several leaders of the armed counter-revolutionary forces and a number of persons who participated in the counter-revolution. In the course of his activities—among others—he supported with military and military-political advice the organizers of acts aimed at overthrowing the state order of the Hungarian People's Republic, and the reactionary forces attacking the interests of the Hungarian people. (For example, the Kilián Barracks, Corvin Alley, etc.) After the armed counter-revolution was crushed, Colonel Cowley provided advice to his above-



mentioned contacts to conceal their arms and equipment . . .”

The American Legation, on its part, not only indirectly violated the principle of non-interference, but also established direct contact with the counter-revolutionaries. Quade, official of the American Legation, visited the counter-revolutionaries in the Kilián Barracks on October 30, 1956, and informed them that as an attaché of the Legation he had come to inquire about the political situation. Quade listened to the stories of the armed counter-revolutionaries and assured them that they could count on an American loan. After that he went to Republic Square where the siege of the Party Committee Building had just ended and the counter-revolutionaries were trying with tales about prisoners locked in “catacombs” further to whip up public sentiment. Quade himself joined the inciters, declaring that he too could hear the rumbling noise made by the people imprisoned in the “catacombs.”

#### *Prince Hubertus von Löwenstein Confers with Géza Losonczy*

The leaders of the Hungarian counter-revolution discovered ways and means of establishing contact also with the resurrected big capitalist imperialists in West Germany. Of course, the big capitalists were also looking for such a contact. An article published, during the counter-revolution, in the *Bayrischer Staatsanzeiger*, clearly reflects the hopes and ulterior motives which the big capitalists invested in the Hungarian counter-revolution. The article alleged that “certain quarters” were calculating that the Hungarian events will “arouse similar restlessness” in the German Democratic Republic, too, which “may facilitate re-unification of Germany by way of liberating the Soviet zone.”

It cannot be dismissed as a coincidence that many foreign newspapers, either covertly or overtly, clearly considered Prince Hubertus von Löwenstein, Knight of Malta, deputy of the Bonn parliament, who arrived in Budapest escorting a Red Cross shipment at the height of the counter-revolutionary outburst, as the representative of the West German government.

Prince Hubertus von Löwenstein is related to Hapsburg royalty, notably to the family of Archduke Joseph. In 1956,

Archduke Joseph recommended the organization of a “Hungarian Defence Council” in West Germany, constituted exclusively of ex-Horthyite generals, which was intended to play an important role in preparing the counter-revolution.

He is also related to Marten, the “metal king” of West Germany. The Martens control interests mainly in aluminium. Prior to 1945, they received the bauxite required for aluminium manufacture chiefly from Hungary. The mining was done through the Bauxit Trust A. G. in Zurich. This concern is still in existence and, of course, was stripped of its possessions in Hungary. Baron Alfonz Weiss, former head of the Csepel Works, Karl Schirner (of the Stinnes firm) and Ludger Westrick, Bonn secretary of state, are members of the firm’s board of directors. West Germany is especially interested in Hungary’s bauxite deposits.

The Thyssen group spent 200,000 marks to get Prince Löwenstein elected to the Bonn parliament. The heir to the Thyssen concern is none other than Countess Zichy, a descendant of an aristocratic Hungarian family.

There was every reason and pretext for despatching Prince Löwenstein, at that very time and to Hungary of all places, with a “Red Cross” consignment and a diplomatic passport. There follow excerpts from the radio speech of Prince Löwenstein held on November 2:

“ . . . We cannot afford to forget in Germany, in the German Federal Republic, that Hungary has fought for us.”  
“What can we still do? I think that we must extend political and moral assistance.”

The meeting between Prince Löwenstein and Mindszenty—dealt with in Chapter IV of this publication—is additional proof of the link between leading personalities at the time in Hungary—then being pushed by treason along the road leading to restoration of the capitalist and big landowners’ system—and the western imperialist groups.

In his talks, interviews and public statements, Prince Hubertus von Löwenstein encouraged—diplomatically, but unequivocally—the counter-revolutionaries and their leaders to continue fighting, holding out to them the perspective of the “active sympathy” of the “free world.” And in order to leave no doubt concerning the correct appraisal of the visit to Budapest made by the Knight of Malta, we present a few quotations from

the press interview given by him in Vienna—after November 4—on his return from Hungary. In his interview, he summarized the “lessons” drawn from the Hungarian events in the following words :

“The conviction grew within me in Budapest that we should not procrastinate for a single moment as far as rearming is concerned. If we don’t have sufficient barracks, it is the duty of Strauss (German Minister of War — Editor) to work day and night building them. The unity of Germany is attainable only through revolution carried out under the protection of western military forces.”

*Washington Asks for at Least a Little Diffidence on the Part of Imre Nagy*

Edmond Taylor, the well-posted European correspondent of the *Reporter*, a U. S. periodical, made public in the December 27, 1956 issue certain facts concerning the kind of “advice” supplied by the U. S. Legation in Budapest to Imre Nagy :

“In particular, Washington, according to Mr. Reston (*New York Times* of October 24), feared that the new Polish and Hungarian régimes were likely to remain within the Warsaw Pact and maintain ‘a suspicious, if not hostile, attitude toward the West’.

“A few days later, I learned from a reliable U. S. official source in Europe, only the worry about the new régime in Hungary moving too fast persisted... The American chargé d’affaires was instructed to call on Premier Imre Nagy and urge him in effect to please maintain at least a slightly suspicious attitude toward the West until the Soviet forces were safely out of the country.

“My informant did not say whether or not we specifically advised Nagy not to denounce the Warsaw Pact, but that appears to have been the implicit sense... the appeal to Nagy not to de-communize too fast was perfectly sound in the circumstances. The trouble was that it was made too late, without adequate authority behind it—and that it was cancelled out by other official or

unofficial American actions that tended to intensify the popular pressure in Hungary for a complete and immediate break with Communism.”

The article continues to the effect that perhaps the most dangerous among the American actions was the use of Mindzenty as a symbol of resistance against Communism.

## VI

### Preparations of Imre Nagy and His Group for Joining the Imperialist Camp

Imre Nagy and his followers—after having dissolved the state apparatus of the People's Democracy, built up the armed forces primarily from counter-revolutionary elements, permitted the bourgeois, reactionary and fascist parties to operate, termed the counter-revolution a fight for freedom, ordered a cease-fire, and tolerated the terrorist acts of the fascists—believed that the time had come to sever Hungary's relations with the countries of the socialist camp and, in addition, to declare the country's neutrality and terminate the Warsaw Treaty.

How and for what purpose did the Warsaw Treaty come into existence? What is its significance from the standpoint of the Hungarian people and peace?

#### The Warsaw Treaty Is the Guarantee of Hungary's Independence and European Peace

It follows from the fundamental principles of socialist society, from its internal social structure, that it does not want to precipitate armed conflicts, to subjugate other peoples, to seize new territories. In the socialist countries the power is in the possession of the working people, who have no interest in unleashing war.

At the same time, on account of the very existence of an imperialist environment, the socialist countries have to protect themselves against the danger from without. They have to safeguard the peace of their own countries and of the whole world from the imperialist aggressors who are preparing a new war adventure and carrying on an armaments race. For this purpose they concluded, in May 1955, the Warsaw Treaty, the defensive, military alliance of the European socialist countries.

The defensive character of the Warsaw Treaty is proved by the following:

1. It was concluded six years after the aggressive North Atlantic Treaty Organization had been set up. The NATO is openly striving to precipitate new war adventures with the aim of strengthening the rule of imperialism or of restoring it in countries which had already been liberated.

2. The establishment of the Warsaw Treaty was made directly necessary by the organization of the so-called West European Union. The Western powers legalized the rearmament of West Germany in this union. The fact that they admitted West Germany into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intensified the danger of a new war and increased the menace to the national security of the peace-loving countries.

An armed West Germany is a seat of war in Europe whose existence can have unpredictably grave consequences for mankind.

3. The peaceful, defensive character of the Warsaw Treaty is proved by the fact that the treaty is open to the accession of other, non-socialist countries, of every state which is willing to exert its efforts in the interest of safeguarding peace. Apart from this, the treaty states that the parties to the treaty are endeavouring to bring about a system of European collective security, based on the participation of all European countries. On the other hand, the war intentions and indisputable aggressiveness of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization are proved also by the fact that it rejected the request of the Soviet Union to join NATO.

4. The Member States of the Warsaw Treaty, contrary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, do not threaten the countries of NATO with military bases. But NATO has built and is building a system of bases around the socialist countries.

5. The Warsaw Treaty definitely states that whenever the military blocs threatening peace are dissolved, the Warsaw Treaty too will become invalid.

6. The peaceful intentions of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty are proved also by the fact that the Member States, individually and collectively, have proposed more than once the conclusion of a non-aggression pact with the NATO Member States, or the conclusion of such a treaty between the countries participating in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty. Up to now these proposals have been categorically rejected by NATO.

It follows from all this that the attempt to weaken the unity of the countries organized in the Warsaw Treaty is direct-

ed not only against socialism but also against peace. The realization of such a proposal would throw the peoples of Europe upon the mercy of renascent German militarism and the plans of the war adventurers.

The decision of the Imre Nagy group to withdraw from the Warsaw Treaty was a crime not only against the fundamental interests of the Hungarian people, but at the same time a threat to the peace and security of Europe. Hungary would have become a hotbed of war in the heart of Europe and a springboard to a new armed conflict.

#### Organizing "Public Opinion" and the Policy of "Fait Accompli"

The Imre Nagy group laid the ground-work for severing the Hungarian People's Democracy from the community of socialist countries by applying, as on sundry other occasions, the two-pronged tactic previously documented.

Their activity was characterized throughout by the tactic of organizing "public opinion," by voicing catchwords, demands and slogans, a fact which, by the way, even the notorious Special Committee of the UN was forced to recognize with regard to Imre Nagy in connection with the question of neutrality (as quoted in Chapter III of this book).

The Radio and the counter-revolutionary Press, with Géza Losonczy as the top man of both, sparked this organizing of public opinion.

Their second tactical method was to create a *fait accompli*.

An editorial which appeared on October 30, in the first issue of the morning newspaper *Magyar Szabadság*, established during the counter-revolution and edited by members of the Imre Nagy group (Miklós Gimes and Pál Lőcsei), made the following demand claiming to represent public opinion:

"Hungary has undertaken obligations under the Warsaw Treaty, and the Hungarian Government will have to negotiate with the Government of the Soviet Union if this situation is to be changed. These negotiations should be launched as speedily as possible and an understanding reached."

Miklós Gimes, a leader of the Nagy group, wrote this editorial. It was Gimes who had recommended, prior to October 23, that the group should form an underground organization.

The Radio, on October 31 at 8:30 p. m., broadcast the appeal of the "Revolutionary Committee of Hungarian Lawyers," which consisted of a few ex-Arrow-Cross jurists and pettifogging lawyers prohibited from practicing their profession. The appeal, written in typical phrases, ran as follows:

"The National Revolutionary Committee of Hungarian Lawyers... declares that it sees the guarantee of the country's reconstruction in the right derived from divine laws and the sacred idea of the motherland. We demand the immediate termination of the Warsaw Treaty, which was forced on us and conflicts with the interests of the Hungarian people. Let the Government proclaim that Hungary intends to be a neutral state..."

Before discussing his intentions with other competent leading persons and leading bodies Imre Nagy on October 31 addressed a group of people who had assembled on Lajos Kossuth Square, and declared that with the renunciation of the Warsaw Treaty he was requesting the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet Troops.

Favourable press opinion was organized to bolster the policy of *fait accompli*, even seeing that the article was given wide publicity over the radio. The journalist Péter Kende, a supporter of the Imre Nagy group and a close friend of Géza Losonczy, wrote an editorial in the November 1 issue of *Magyar Szabadság*, endorsing the demands and posing new ones.

"We approve of the Hungarian government's having opened negotiations concerning the withdrawal of our country from the Warsaw Treaty. Termination of the Warsaw Treaty, which was forced on us and tied us hand and foot, represents the initial step along this path. But it is merely the first step. We must move ahead on the path taken and should declare categorically that Hungary intends to pursue a policy of neutrality, just like neighbouring Austria is doing. Hungary has no desire of lining up with either of the blocs in world politics..."

"Free Radio Kossuth," on November 1, in its news review, following the 10:08 a. m. news bulletin, expounded the editorial entitled "Independent Hungary Will Be Neutral," which was published in *Magyar Szabadság*. (Radio book previously mentioned, p. 248).

Imre Nagy summoned the cabinet after these preparations had been made. Zoltán Tildy, in his confession before the court, spoke as follows about the meeting:

“This meeting had been prepared for thoroughly. This is substantiated by the fact that Imre Nagy came to the meeting with a resolution already drafted. He read it to the members of the cabinet and left immediately afterwards, saying that it would be announced over the radio as well. Then they brought in a huge poster with the new coat-of-arms, red-white-and-green stripes, with the inscription ‘Long live independent, neutral Hungary.’ This also shows the preparations made in advance.”

It is evident from the confession of Zoltán Tildy that Imre Nagy did not submit to the cabinet his proposals concerning neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty for the purpose of discussion, but simply declared it unilaterally as a *fait accompli*.

Replying to a question from the President, Zoltán Tildy declared:

“The repudiation of the Warsaw Treaty was initiated by Imre Nagy. I can say this definitely.”

Availing himself of the right of intervening, Imre Nagy said the following about Zoltán Tildy’s testimony:

“In connection with Tildy’s testimony, I am of the opinion that he is not sincere on a number of questions. I wish to be more concrete. Tildy definitely states that Imre Nagy initiated the termination of the Warsaw Treaty. Zoltán Tildy should be the first to know that I did not initiate it. He must know my views, and he must also know his own views, which, previously, were more clearly evident in Tildy’s case than among all other members of the cabinet. Zoltán Tildy was the person who had very definite and unmistakable views on both publishing the declaration of neutrality and repudiating the Warsaw Treaty.”

Imre Nagy insisted on this denial even when the President attempted to clarify an important detail in connection with the declaration of neutrality.

“*President*: The next point I wish to deal with is the declaration of neutrality. My first question is whether

on October 31 you delivered a speech to people assembled in front of the House of Parliament, the substance of which was that talks were going on about withdrawing the Soviet troops and repudiating our obligations under the Warsaw Treaty. If so, were you empowered to announce this, and were talks actually being held at that time on these topics?

“*Imre Nagy*: I made an impromptu speech on October 31, before a not very large crowd that had gathered before Parliament. I spoke then about those talks—that is, not the talks concerning the Warsaw Treaty—which we had already opened at that time. The indictment here questions the facts, but I regret to have to say that this is a matter of facts, and I know the facts: It was a question of the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary.”

He regretfully questioned the statement contained in the indictment, although this point of the indictment was confirmed by witnesses and written documents. In addition, it is worth mentioning that even the Free Europe Committee exposed the fact that Imre Nagy had attempted to deny confirmed facts.

The following text appears among the broadcasts of “Free Kossuth Radio,” on p. 217 of the Radio book mentioned previously. (The Hungarian Revolution and Freedom Struggle as Reflected in Domestic Radio Broadcasts, Free Europe Press, Division of Free Europe Committee, 2 Park Avenue, New York 16, New York, Nos. 10—11, Vol. VIII):

“This afternoon a huge crowd assembled on Lajos Kossuth Square. (The radio at the time spoke about a ‘huge crowd’. Imre Nagy at the trial spoke of ‘a not very large crowd’. — Ed.) Prime Minister Imre Nagy went from the House of Parliament to the Kossuth Memorial and spoke. In his speech he stressed that he had not requested the assistance of Soviet troops, and the step had been taken without his knowledge. He said that, *in terminating the Warsaw Treaty*, the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops was also being requested.”

Here it is the Editor who stresses the termination of the Warsaw Treaty. But Imre Nagy—in complete repudiation of his own defence—himself spoke at 8:01 p. m. that day (October 31—Editor) over the “Free Kossuth Radio”—obviously from a tape recording:

“Speech of Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, early in the afternoon on October 31, 1956, on the square in front of Parliament :

“I am speaking to you once again, Hungarian brothers, with warm and ardent affection!

“Dear Friends! *Today we began negotiating on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and the termination of our obligations under the Warsaw Treaty.* But we ask you to have a little patience, and I think that the results justify this confidence. . . .”

(The Radio Book cited above, pp. 219—220.)

And the words italicized here were italicized by the editors of the Radio Book in New York and not by the editors of the present book.

The speech was made early in the afternoon on October 31, 1956, whether before a very large crowd or a not very large crowd. And Imre Nagy submitted to the cabinet this proposal on a declaration of neutrality and the abrogation of the Warsaw Treaty only on the next day, on November 1, 1956, just as Zoltán Tildy testified in court.

And after all this he regretfully questioned the statement made in the indictment.

The testimony given by Zoltán Szántó at the June 13 session of the trial threw light on another remarkable detail of Imre Nagy's actions :

“Imre Nagy did not consult the Presidium of the Party in some very important questions. To give an example, he did not do so on the question of neutrality and abrogating the Warsaw Treaty. These questions were discussed only within the cabinet. I regard this as a serious matter because I knew that the representatives of the coalition parties, who were at that time cabinet members, said, when several questions were discussed, they wanted to talk with the other leaders of their parties before they would take a stand on the question on the agenda. Imre Nagy, as the representative of the Hungarian Working Peoples Party, failed to do this.”

#### “Notes” Despatched by Imre Nagy to the UN

The cabinet had barely concluded its meeting when once again the well-organized “public opinion” became evident.

The afternoon papers already carried the demands of the Corvin Alley insurgents, who were common criminals and fascists :

“... Considering the Suez events, it has become a matter of extreme urgency for the Hungarian UN delegation to announce that Hungary has entered the ranks of neutral countries, due to the revolution which commenced on October 23 and has culminated in victory.”

The Imre Nagy group hastened to grant this demand of the “freedom fighters,” too, especially because it was merely a question of implementing their own designs, which had been decided well in advance. Pál Félix, a former clerical worker in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, testified to the following :

“We were instructed by Imre Nagy to draft the notes pertaining to termination of the Warsaw Treaty and the neutrality declaration. These notes were handed to all foreign missions in Budapest in addition to sending them to the UN.”

The following is an excerpt from the Imre Nagy note sent to the UN Secretary General, on November 1, 1956 :

“... The Government of the Hungarian People's Republic on November 1, 1956 issued a neutrality declaration. I therefore request your Excellency to include, as a special point on the agenda of the UN General Assembly Session now opening, the question of Hungarian neutrality and the four Big Powers.”

Instructions were sent to the then UN representative for Hungary, to take a stand in support of this viewpoint. This was followed by a series of urgent notes to the UN Secretary General, the UN Member States, and to the Hungarian UN delegation. It became an urgent issue for the Imre Nagy group to push through their adventurous policy of the *fait accompli*, both within the country and internationally.

Imre Nagy, on November 3, despatched the following instructions to Hungary's UN representative :

“I instruct you officially to notify the UN Secretary General at once that telegrams, letters, and messages, both those in process and those to be sent in the future, as well as the information contained in them—including those

communications which have been sent direct to the Secretary General—express the official viewpoint of the entire Hungarian Government.”

In connection with this assertion, we wish to refer again to the testimony of Zoltán Tildy. Imre Nagy duped the country and not only sidestepped the National Assembly and the Government in debating and deciding fateful issues of this nature, but also placed the narrow cabinet, previously described and “purged” of communists, before *faits accomplis*. Indeed, from that time on, he did not inform even the cabinet of his diplomatic steps but himself gave orders as Foreign Minister for the preparation and despatch of various notes.

Once again the members of the Nagy group tricked and misled the people who had faith in them and in the possibility of neutrality. What kind of neutrality is it when the “neutral” country immediately asks for aid from the West? Hungary would not have remained neutral for a moment, and it would be a lie to assert that she could have remained so. As far as Imre Nagy and his confederates were concerned, mentioning neutrality was merely a means of severing the country from the socialist camp and taking it into the imperialist camp, of playing the country into the hands of the fascists at home and into the hands of the imperialists in the field of international relations. They played a despicable game with the slogan of neutrality!

An apt description of all this was given by the November 4, 1956 issue of *Magyar Nemzet*, which at that time fell under the control of the extreme right-wing leaders of the Smallholders’ Party. In an article entitled “What is Neutrality?” the author quotes from an article in the *New York Herald Tribune* by Walter Lippmann, the American imperialists’ ideologist in “Realpolitik,” to the effect that Eastern Europe cannot be freed by means of war; nor can it be liberated through a savage counter-revolution; the Eastern European communist states can only be freed by their entering into the community of neutrals.

There was, therefore, no doubt about the goal: to “liberate” Hungary from socialism by neutrality—and, we may add, neutrality coupled with rabid counter-revolution.

Imre Nagy’s cabinet met once more on November 2, 1956. The meeting adopted two important decisions. One of the decisions was that a government delegation would leave for

London and New York, headed by Imre Nagy. This trip was to have been the final touch severing Hungary from the socialist camp.

The second decision was to appoint a government delegation to Warsaw, with Losonczy heading the delegation. The task of the delegation would have been to terminate the Warsaw Treaty officially. According to the decision, a member of the workers’ council was to be given a place on the delegation. (Obviously, this decision was to document the stand of the “working class.”)

The fact that Zoltán Tildy was to recommend the “workers’ council member” is most revealing.

When Imre Nagy learned at dawn, on November 4, about the beginning of the revolutionary counter-attack, he summoned to his office Zoltán Tildy and Ferenc Donáth, who were in the House of Parliament. He informed them about the events which had ensued. Tildy suggested that the events should be reported, in some form, over the radio. Nagy Imre then drafted a radio appeal with the help of Ferenc Donáth and Zoltán Tildy, rushed to the studio in the House of Parliament and read the appeal into the microphone.

And after announcing over the radio to “all the world” that the government was at its post, Imre Nagy, accompanied by his close associates, and misleading and deceiving several other members of his cabinet, left for the Yugoslav Embassy.

Imre Nagy unexpectedly alleged on June 9, during the trial, that he had not written the radio address broadcast at dawn on November 4. Obviously, he could not deny the fact that he had read the text over the radio and, therefore, he tried to shift the blame for this action which figured as a point in the indictment partly or wholly on his associates in the dock—Ferenc Donáth and Zoltán Tildy.

Several confrontations took place during the trial. One of them is described below:

“*Ferenc Donáth*: I was awakened at dawn on November 4 with the news that the Soviet troops had marched into the city, and I was told to call together the members of the Executive Committee. I called up Zoltán Szántó and while I was on the phone, Zoltán Tildy came in with his wife. After this, we went over to the Secretariat.

"At this point Tildy turned to Imre Nagy and said that the Government should make a statement setting forth the facts while it was still possible to broadcast. Imre Nagy dictated the statement. I began to write in pencil, and when I came to the end, he said, as I recall, that one would not be able to read it, and that was when I began to type out the whole thing. I made some remark with reference to style, but I did not make any suggestions as to the substance of the text. In addition to Imre Nagy, Zoltán Tildy was present throughout the entire dictation. That is how the text was formulated.

"*Imre Nagy*: I did not dictate the text. Donath wrote the statement in pencil and, in the meantime, I handled about fifteen or twenty telephone calls."

In his evidence Zoltán Tildy told the Court how he—a minister of state in the Nagy cabinet—was treated on November 4 by Imre Nagy:

"The indictment blames me, with good reason, for having despatched Imre Nagy's November 4 radio statement to the Secretary General of the UN. I want to describe the situation in Parliament on November 4. I was in Imre Nagy's office twice. When I went there for the second time, my wife got dressed, in the meantime, and we went back to Imre Nagy. Imre Nagy and all the others with him had on their hats and coats and were just leaving the room carrying briefcases. I asked where they were going. Imre Nagy said that they were going down to the basement because there might be some shooting, and they might get hurt upstairs. Then I went back again into my room to fetch my coat and started to go downstairs. I lost my way and went down as far as the basement, and when I came back Imre Nagy was nowhere to be found. I began to inquire where he had gone, and where the others were who had been with him. An officer came in from the guard at the gate and said that Imre Nagy had gone to the Soviet Embassy to negotiate. The chaotic and shocking situation there struck me as tragic, and the fact that Imre Nagy had gone to the Soviet Embassy after all, made me feel a little better. I sent a message to stop broadcasting the Imre Nagy statement, for up to then the radio kept repeating this broadcast. Well, I

found out, not that day, but the next day, that Imre Nagy had gone straight from the House of Parliament to the embassy of another state and not to the Soviet Embassy. This was one of the worst shocks in my life. I was left alone in a terribly strained situation which had become strained so much by Imre Nagy himself. If Imre Nagy had just an iota of decency left in him on that morning, he would have let me know at least that they were seeking asylum somewhere, and I would not have been given the deceptive message that he had gone to the Soviet Embassy."

Imre Nagy deceived another of his ministers of state on this same early morning. István B. Szabó said in his evidence on June 11:

"On November 4 a car was sent to take me to the House of Parliament. Imre Nagy was just leaving his room with four other people and said that everybody was to go down to the shelter. In Zoltán Tildy's office we were joined by Mindszenty and we went down to the shelter, but Imre Nagy never showed up..."



## VII

### Imre Nagy and His Accomplices—Leaders of the Counter-revolutionary Rear-guard Action

After November 4, some of the groups of the Imre Nagy brand of conspirators sought and found refuge in quarters from which they had received support previously.

#### Some of Imre Nagy's Accomplices in the West

Part of the conspirators fled to the West and are continuing their activity there in the pay of the enemy.

Here are some of them:

Anna Kéthly wrote in her article in the November 1, 1956, issue of *Népszava*:

"Today the counter-revolution is saying, in undertones, that it will never begin again doing the things it committed in the past. We should watch out, and take care when rebuilding the party, that this undertone does not grow into triumphant laughter."

On November 2 she left for Vienna to attend the meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International, where she made a report. An article entitled "Anna Kéthly on the Counter-revolution" which was printed in the November 27, 1956, issue of the *Volksstimme*, reported:

"Herbert Wehner, a member of the executive committee of the Socialist Party of Germany (the Social Democratic Party in the German Federal Republic—Editor) spoke this week in Hamburg to the functionaries of the Party. It appears from the full text of his speech on hand, that Wehner attended the meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International, held on November 2, in Vienna. He report-

ed on the speech made by Anna Kéthly, the leader of the Hungarian socialists. We are printing below an excerpt from Wehner's speech:

"When Anna Kéthly spoke in Vienna, she had to admit, that the popular movement in Hungary was menaced by the influence of other forces. Kéthly said that the hatred against the ÁVH had turned into a general campaign against everyone who could be accused of being a Communist Party member and functionary. Not only were these people being persecuted and killed, but so were their wives and children—and they were not simply being killed, but slaughtered in a way defying description.

"Anna Kéthly said that these events were comparable only to the terrible times the Hungarians had lived through under Horthy in 1919, after the defeat of the Republic of Councils.

"She went on to explain that Cardinal Mindszenty who had been freed at that time, became—as Kéthly put it—the standard bearer of these white elements."

The paper commented as follows on the article reporting Wehner's speech:

"We have repeatedly called on the *Arbeiter Zeitung* (Official Organ of the Austrian Social Democratic Party.—Editor) to publish the speech made by the leader of the Hungarian Social Democrats. There has been no response so far, obviously because Kéthly's speech conflicts with the propaganda of the *Arbeiter Zeitung*, which stands or falls on the premise that there was in Hungary no danger of a victory of the counter-revolution and of a white terror."

These statements made by Anna Kéthly leave nothing to the imagination. She wrote about a "counter-revolution" in her article on November 1; at the Vienna meeting, she compared the events then taking place in Hungary to the white terror of 1919—but afterwards she only talked about a "pure freedom fight" in order to ensure her bread-and-butter with another piece of treachery and to merit support from her imperialist masters.

Today she is advertising herself in the West as the only member of the Imre Nagy government living in the "free world." She became chairman of the "Revolutionary Council,"

which was set up in Strassburg in 1957, and joined in the mud-slinging campaign of the West directed against the Hungarian People's Republic. She organized false witnesses for the UN Special Committee. In the autumn of 1957, Kéthly was elected chairman of "The Hungarian Social Democratic Party in Exile." This organization is known as the most extreme right-wing party of the Socialist International. Anna Kéthly is also editor-in-chief of the so-called free trade union newspaper, *Népszava*, which is published in London with the collaboration of BBC staff members who speak Hungarian. Kéthly viciously attacks the Hungarian People's Democracy and the Soviet Union in her articles.

Anna Kéthly receives financial support from her political friends to carry on her activity. A "Kéthly fund" was established to provide financial support for her. Even the Executive Committee of the Labour Party voted her £ 1,500.

Imre Nagy had appointed *Béla Király* a Major General on October 31, naming him military commander of Budapest. As head of the counter-revolutionary "national guard," he fled to the West with an armed group. He organized the so-called Association of Hungarian Freedom Fighters (AHFF), composed of armed terrorists who fled to the West. Under his command, this organization began building an espionage ring aimed against Hungary. For instance, Király despatched Péter Renner and his associates to Hungary on an espionage mission; he sent other agents to Italy and Spain for training in military sabotage. At his suggestion, others were taken into the auxiliary formations of the U.S. Army in West Germany. The AHFF also took part in organizing an extreme propaganda campaign against the Hungarian People's Republic. The leaders of the AHFF, in co-operation with Anna Kéthly and on Király's instruction, recruited the bribed false witnesses for the UN Special Committee on Hungary.

Király embezzled funds donated to the AHFF for the benefit of the Hungarian "refugees."

Despite this he maintains close contact with the Pentagon, enjoying unquestionable support from U.S. military quarters. He enlisted a number of one-time Hungarian army officers in the service of the U.S. armed forces. He writes regularly for the publication of the Committee for a Free Europe about the "military lessons" of the counter-revolution, and receives pay from the Committee.

As the leader of the nascent Freedom Fighter's Federation, Béla Király attempted to speak, on May 1, 1957, to an audience of 150 gathered in the canteen of the Hungarian Refugees' Home in Montreal. The members of the "Liberty Legion," likewise a counter-revolutionary group, turned the meeting into a riot. Father Fodor, a Jesuit priest who chaired the meeting, was unable to restore order, and squad cars were called in to help. Two hours later, a small group from the audience flocked over to the Polish Ex-servicemen's Headquarters where they continued the wrangle. Here, Király took Anna Kéthly under his wing, saying:

"Anna Kéthly is probably the only Hungarian émigré today who could achieve effective results with the Big Powers abroad, in the interest of Hungary. I believe it is sufficient to say that Anna Kéthly is a friend of Spaak, the Chairman of the most powerful anti-Bolshevik organization. She maintains both political and personal bonds of friendship with numerous members of the Interparliamentary Union. These people possess a decisive influence in directing foreign policy in the world." (From the New York weekly, *Az Ember*, May 11, 1957.)

Béla Király made his standpoint clear on another occasion when he declared:

"The Hungarian revolution demonstrated the method of solution, too, because it took an oath in support of the western technique and form of liberty, as well as a common political morality." (*Az Ember*, September 28, 1957.)

The Hungarian people, in October 1956, received a good lesson about how the "western technique of liberty" and the "common political morality" were applied in the methods of the Hungarian counter-revolution.

*József Kővágó* resides in the USA. He initiated a collection in the capitalist countries, alleging that, as the ex-mayor of Budapest, he intended to rebuild the capital. Then he embezzled a large part of the funds, but continued to receive the support of the "Committee for a Free Europe." He established close ties with General MacCarger of the USA, and took a leading part in setting up the "Hungarian Parliament in Exile."

He co-ordinated his activities in emigration with Anna Kéthly. On the instructions of Anna Kéthly, he visited Prince Van Vaithajakon of Thailand, in September 1957, who was entrusted with heading the "investigation of the Hungarian affair."

Not long ago he wrote a book full of animosity towards the Hungarian People's Republic. He was elected a member of the Hungarian Committee, a new "national representative body," financed by leading quarters in the USA. The Hungarian Committee was set up as the successor of the Hungarian National Commission, with Kővágó as vice-chairman of the new organization.

### **The Imre Nagy Group at the Yugoslav Embassy**

Imre Nagy and several members of his group fled to the Yugoslav Embassy, on November 4, as has been mentioned previously.

Underground relations were established even prior to October 1956 between some members of Imre Nagy's group and a part of the official representatives in Budapest of the Yugoslav Government.

Ferenc Jánosi, Miklós Gimes and Miklós Vásárhelyi maintained regular and conspiratorial ties with Milan Georgievic, First Secretary of the Yugoslav Embassy, in the period preceding the counter-revolution.

Miklós Vásárhelyi confessed the following in this respect :

"... I met Georgievic for the first time at an official Embassy reception in the spring of 1955. Georgievic telephoned me and invited me to the office of the Embassy in June 1955, when it became known that I was to be dismissed from my post and removed from Press work. Here we decided to maintain contact with each other, irrespective of my dismissal. As far as future meetings were concerned, we decided that they should be of a conspiratorial nature. Georgievic justified this by saying that it could be embarrassing for me if the Hungarian authorities were to learn about it.

"We agreed, concerning our first appointment, that he would telephone me and we would discuss concretely where and when we would meet. This took place in September 1955 when we decided to meet in the coffee shop on the corner of Nyúl Street in District 2.

"I met Georgievic, generally once a month, about nine times in all from September 1955 to August 1956.

"On the occasion of our meetings, I turned over to Georgievic some written material which Imre Nagy gave me with instructions to forward it to the Yugoslav leaders, through my contact.

"I turned over several statements, addressed by Imre Nagy to the Central Committee, as well as essays written by Imre Nagy, about 180 or 200 pages in all. Among the latter were, I recall precisely, an essay entitled 'The Five Principles of International Relations', another one on 'Some Topical Questions' as well as one on 'Morals and Ethics'."

Miklós Gimes made the following admissions :

"... I became acquainted with the Press Officer, further with the Counsellor of the Embassy Djikic, and an Embassy secretary by the name of Georgievic, at a press conference held at the Yugoslav Embassy.

"Georgievic told me, at the press conference, that he would like to meet and talk with me again. We agreed to meet two weeks after the conference.

"Every meeting was arranged by our agreeing on the time and place at our preceding meetings.

"I remember that Georgievic told me, in the autumn of 1955, that he would like to talk to Ferenc Jánosi. He asked me to find out whether Ferenc Jánosi would be willing to talk with him. I talked to Jánosi; he indicated his willingness to meet Georgievic. I informed Georgievic about Ferenc Jánosi's answer, and we discussed a meeting at the flat of Gábor Magos."

Ferenc Jánosi confessed :

"Imre Nagy forwarded through me, in March 1956, material for the Yugoslavs by way of Georgievic, a member of the Yugoslav Embassy."

### **How the Imre Nagy Group Got to the Yugoslav Embassy**

Zoltán Szántó had the following to say about this in his testimony given at the trial of June 13, 1958 :

"I was informed by the Prime Minister's office on November 4, 1956, at about 1 a. m., that Ambassador

Soldatic of Yugoslavia was anxious to speak to me and that I should telephone him at once. When I rang the Embassy, a staff member, Milovanov, told me to come immediately to the Embassy because Ambassador Soldatic wanted to speak to me personally.

"Ambassador Soldatic told me that he had informed Belgrade about the gist of the talk he had had with Losonczy and me at the Prime Minister's office on November 1, as to whether or not it would be possible for a few women and children to stay temporarily in safety at the Yugoslav Embassy. He had received an answer a few hours before. According to the Ambassador, the essence of it was the following: The situation was exceedingly grave; events were moving rapidly; the Soviet troops could be expected to start a new attack against Budapest at any moment. Therefore, the Yugoslav Government had decided to ensure the right of asylum to Imre Nagy, the members of the leadership, and to all those people recommended by the leadership."

Miklós Vásárhelyi—who for lack of time did not reach the Yugoslav Embassy—confessed the following:

"...I walked to the address I had been given, that is to the flat of Vukmirovic, the assistant military attaché. Colonel Ferenc Nádor, commander of the air forces, was already there with his family, and so was Péter Erdős. Vukmirovic told me that the Yugoslav Government had offered us the right of asylum."

Gábor Táneczos was likewise called to the Yugoslav Embassy. Táneczos testified the following:

"I received a telephone call about 8 a. m. on November 4, 1956. Milovanov informed me that he was speaking on behalf of the Yugoslav Embassy and invited me to the Embassy, to which several Hungarians had already gone. Milovanov said he emphatically recommended that in my own interest I should go to the Embassy and take my wife there, too. With that understanding, I went with my wife to the Embassy around 9 o'clock."

### Under the Protection of the "Right of Asylum"

Imre Nagy and his associates continued their activities against the People's Democracy from the Yugoslav Embassy. While the forces of the Hungarian People's Democracy fought, with the aid of the Soviet troops, to defeat the armed bands of the counter-revolution and began to restore legal order, Imre Nagy and his associates conferred about the support they might offer the counter-revolution and the stand to be taken against the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic, that is, the Revolutionary Worker's and Peasants' Government.

At the Yugoslav Embassy, Imre Nagy and his group declared themselves to be the executive committee of the Party, while the Party was being reorganized throughout the country in struggle with the counter-revolutionary forces and in opposition to the terror. This so-called executive committee conferred with Ambassador Soldatic, on November 4. Szilárd Ujhelyi testified as follows in this connection:

"The talk came about like this: Géza Losonczy came out of Soldatic's office and, one by one, asked the executive committee members who were present to come into Soldatic's office for a talk. The members were Zoltán Szántó, György Lukács, Ferenc Donáth, and Sándor Haraszti to whom Losonczy remarked that though he was not an executive committee member he was to participate in the E. C. meeting as the editor-in-chief of the Party's official organ, on the basis of an earlier decision. Imre Nagy was already in the Ambassador's office.

"I know from Losonczy that minutes were not taken of the meeting, but afterwards Losonczy recorded the proceedings of the meeting. Losonczy also said that the executive committee had drafted a plan on the possibilities of our unravelling the situation after November 4."

The recorded notes on the talks of the so-called executive committee were confiscated at Géza Losonczy's and Ferenc Donáth's.

The notes show clearly that Imre Nagy and his group in the name of the so-called executive committee had drafted a counter-revolutionary platform. They demanded in this platform the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and the abrogation of the Warsaw Treaty, and took a stand in support of the

neutrality declaration; they demanded a multi-party system and that "the central power of the Hungarian People's Republic shall first and foremost rely on the workers' councils and on the bodies which have been established, during the past few weeks, by the peasantry, intellectuals and other segments of the population."

By this they meant the diverse counter-revolutionary committees in which fascists, reactionaries, Horthyites, kulaks, capitalists and their ilk were the prominent figures, as proven by the documentary material.

During the time that Imre Nagy was Prime Minister, thousands of communists and other progressive men and women were imprisoned and hundreds were murdered without a single word of opposition from him. In fact, the newspapers demanded that the Party workers, communist militants, the defenders of the people's democratic order should be called to account and placed on trial. But when action commenced to render harmless the counter-revolutionaries and white terrorists, he demanded in his draft programme that "all persons arrested for political reasons should be released."

True to the draft programme elaborated at the Embassy and their whole treasonable behaviour, Imre Nagy and his associates established contact with reactionary politicians, instructing them to flee to the West and continue their treasonable activity.

Tivadar Pártay testified as follows:

"I received a telephone call on the morning of November 4. The caller said that Losonczy was speaking. He asked what had happened to Béla Kovács and István B. Szabó and where they were. I said that I didn't know. Then he asked us not to support the Kádár government, but to take refuge for the time being in one of the Legations and then, later, we would meet in Vienna."

István B. Szabó told the Court on June 11:

"Tivadar Pártay informed me that Losonczy had telephoned him from the Yugoslav Embassy that we should go to Austria. Afterwards, I tried to go to the British Legation, but I did not succeed."

Imre Nagy's group made contact with Radio Free Europe with the help of Yugoslav journalists, and requested that

their message be broadcast. Of course, Radio Free Europe willingly acceded to their request.

The journalist György Fazekas testified:

"The group decided to entrust me with organizing the publishing of the news. On November 8, I raised the question with the Yugoslav journalists Zelmanovic, Julius Djuka and Gavro Altman, that though everybody knew where we were no one was talking about it publicly. We requested that they should take steps to make the fact public in some form or other. Before long, one of the Western stations announced that Imre Nagy and a few members of his government were at the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest."

Zoltán Szántó had the following to say in his testimony in connection with this fact:

"I know that Imre Nagy sent a message to Radio Free Europe. This took place around November 15. Gábor Tanczos said that he had heard something interesting just then on Radio Free Europe; Imre Nagy had sent a message from the Yugoslav Embassy repudiating the news that negotiations were being conducted with János Kádár. Tanczos was happy and gleeful about the news, saying 'That's excellent; that's what I call speed'. Turning to Imre Nagy, I asked him what it was all about. Imre Nagy replied that they had sent the message to Radio Free Europe early that afternoon, and it had been broadcast very quickly. I expressed my surprise. Thereupon, someone remarked—probably Donáth—that there was nothing to be surprised at; so many secret stations were operating in Budapest that it was not difficult of relay a message of that kind."

Despite the testimonies heard Imre Nagy denied part of the facts:

"We gave information as to who was staying where and whether we were existing at all. But not to Free Europe; that does not correspond at all with the facts. Nor is it true that we gave any other information in this communication aside from the mere listing of the names. At the time we requested the Yugoslavs to publish it because the rumour was spreading that we had been killed or were at the American Legation, therefore they should

publish the fact that we were here, that they had given us asylum, that they had invited us to come, and we had not fled."

In November 1956, Imre Nagy and some of his associates sought contacts from the Yugoslav Embassy with members of the group outside, and smuggled out documents to them, through staff members of the Embassy. Zoltán Szántó said the following about these activities :

"The question arose of whether it would not be more proper to organize a movement rather than a Party. This gave rise to a heated controversy. Imre Nagy wavered, supporting the recommendation of either Donáth or Haraszti to consult the comrades on the outside. They even compiled a questionnaire containing three points, which they sent out."

Gábor Tánczos, who smuggled documents out of the Embassy under the instructions of Imre Nagy, testified :

"On about November 10, 1956 (I don't remember the exact time), they called me into the room at the Embassy where Imre Nagy, Géza Losonczy, Ferenc Donáth, György Lukács and Zoltán Szántó were. They placed before me a draft containing questions—about half a sheet in size—saying that it was necessary, for our own information, to know what the opinion was outside. I sent the questionnaire to Balázs Nagy, through Djikic, counsellor of the Embassy. The reply came through Djikic, too. According to the reply, the Hungarian Socialist Worker's Party had no prestige, and a broad mass movement was required and not a party. I turned the answer over to the people who had assigned me to send out the questions."

The members of the Imre Nagy group who remained outside the Embassy met to discuss the reply to be sent to Imre Nagy's message. This message served as the starting point for the organization launched by Miklós Gimes, György Ádám and their associates, with the aim of overthrowing the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government and popular rule. István Pozsár, former assistant professor, testified the following :

"György Ádám expressed the aims of the organization at the first meeting held by Miklós Gimes, Sándor Herpai, Róbert Bohó, Balázs Nagy and myself at the flat of Róbert

Bohó. He said that it was necessary for us to give organized direction, in intellectual groups as well, to this movement which would advance the national revolution that had developed prior to November 4 . . .

"At the same meeting, Balázs Nagy read a letter which he had received from Imre Nagy and his associates in the Yugoslav Embassy. Our reply, which had to be forwarded by Balázs Nagy, was pretty much in line with the analysis and opinion which had developed at our talk. All the members of our organization, that is of the so-called Hungarian Democratic Independence Movement, were champions of Imre Nagy's political line. The attitude of Imre Nagy and his associates on November 4 and afterwards definitely influenced us and our counter-revolutionary activity."

György Ádám, who, in the period of the counter-revolution, was president of the "Revolutionary Committee of Intellectuals," testified in a similar vein :

"I conducted the meeting. A major topic of the discussion was the message sent by the Imre Nagy group to Balázs Nagy from the Yugoslav Embassy. At this meeting we decided to issue an underground newspaper called *October 23* in which we published demands along similar lines. These demands also constituted the political platform for the Hungarian Democratic Independence Movement organized by us. This platform was, in essence, identical with Imre Nagy's viewpoint up to November 4 and, as such, represented opposition to the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government. Miklós Gimes accepted the editorship of the underground newspaper *October 23*. The message and attitude of Imre Nagy and his group naturally had a serious influence on our decision."

Róbert Bohó, former assistant professor, also confirmed the above statements :

"Prior to November 12, 1956, Balázs Nagy, ex-member of the secretariat of the Petőfi Club, informed me that he had received a message from Imre Nagy and his associates, who were at the Yugoslav Embassy.

"György Ádám, Miklós Gimes, István Pozsár, Balázs Nagy and Sándor Herpai met at my flat, on November 13, for a talk. We decided at that time to form the Hungarian Democratic Independence Movement, which we intended

at first to call the Federation of Hungarian Socialists . . . Gimes said, in the debate, that he did not agree with the November 4 'occupation' of the Soviet troops; he termed the events a revolution, declared that a way out was conceivable only together with the 'democratic' parties, and that Imre Nagy would have to be given a leading role in political affairs. Ádám and Gimes undertook to draft a platform dealing with the way out and to enlist people in establishing a leadership.

I am sure that I would not have committed any act against the People's Democracy if Imre Nagy had not issued the call and we had not received his message through Balázs Nagy."

The organization set up by Miklós Gimes, György Ádám and their associates played a very important part in the strikes which took place after November 4. The newspaper *October 23*—in which could be found the theses of the platform elaborated in the Yugoslav Embassy—incited to strikes and armed resistance. The newspaper of Gimes and his associates agitated for continuing the counter-revolution. It published for instance, the following:

"We have chosen the date of the revolution for our paper's masthead because this expresses the programme of national resistance. There was a revolution, and there is national resistance today in order to realize this programme, to bring about a democratic, independent, neutral Hungary . . ."

It is a matter of common knowledge that the slogan of the counter-revolution—a democratic, neutral, independent Hungary—meant that Hungary should not be socialist, nor a People's Democracy, that she should not be allied with the people's democratic countries, but become an appendage of the "Free West," of the imperialist camp. This catchword, which undisguised fascist elements in the counter-revolution also identified themselves with, was championed anew by the newspaper of Gimes and his followers.

The newspaper also put forward a "programme" declaring that "Imre Nagy should take over the leadership of the country again."

This group called for struggle for "democratic power" which would have placed its reliance above all on the armed

counter-revolutionaries, the armed groups recruited mainly from fascist and criminal elements.

The paper *October 23* issued instructions of this nature to the counter-revolutionary detachments:

"Initiative must be displayed in searching for forms of resistance. The struggle for wage demands is the best form in one place and, in other places, the removal of a detested manager, department head or HSWP functionary."

The newspaper issued the slogan: "A general strike in the country from 12 p. m. Tuesday onwards! Paralyze all activity! Stop the country's heartbeat!"

This anti-state group had contact with the so-called Central Workers' Council, encouraging its counter-revolutionary leaders to demand "the right to lead the country."

The counter-revolutionary group of Miklós Gimes and György Ádám was a circumscribed organization of reactionary intellectuals. It had no support or important mass base among the people. It was a menace because it operated at a time when terrorist gangs of counter-revolutionaries were on the rampage. Fascist and criminal elements, who came to the surface on the filthy wave of the counter-revolution, were the dictators in many factories as well. In such a situation the possibility existed for precipitating provocations which could have grave consequences. This organization became completely isolated as the people's democratic system was consolidated.

\* \* \*

In closing this chapter, it should be mentioned for the sake of full information that the Hungarian police and judicial organs did not institute proceedings against several of the Hungarian citizens who fled on November 4 to the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest together with Imre Nagy and his accomplices. No proceedings were instituted against György Lukács, Mrs. László Rajk, Zoltán Szántó, Szilárd Ujhelyi, Zoltán Vas and others, although there are among them people whose activities did harm to the Hungarian people. However the individuals mentioned either did not take part in the undercover plot and their harmful activities were not premeditated, or they turned in good time against Imre Nagy and his confederates after realizing the seriously harmful consequences of their attitude.

## VIII

### 1919—1956

Several references have been made in this book to the fact that the occurrences during the counter-revolution of 1956 in Hungary could be compared only to the events of the ghastly White Terror in 1919.

In 1919, after the Great October Socialist Revolution, the Hungarian people were the first to support the cause of socialism. They established the Republic of Councils, defending it, their homeland, with their lives against the aggressive imperialist powers and their Hungarian lackeys. The imperialists helped Miklós Horthy to power, in order to drown in blood and ruthlessly avenge the struggle for independence and freedom of the Hungarian people, and to restore the power of the big capitalists and landlords. Horthy's henchmen tortured and murdered the best sons and daughters of the Hungarian people with indescribable brutality. The imperialists did not raise their voice against this; at that time their humanitarian feelings were not aroused...

#### Successors of the 1919 Terrorists

If we compare the deeds and terroristic actions of the bourgeois-fascist counter-revolution which overthrew the 1919 Republic of Councils with the acts, the raging, the brutal terror of the 1956 counter-revolution, we are immediately struck by the amazing parallel.

The material documenting the 1956 and the 1919—1920 events sharply illustrates the truth of this statement. It is well worth while to recall and compare a few events and documents from the two periods.

\*

August 1919. From the letter of a witness:

"I am letting you know about the following events just in case you have not heard what happened in some places in Somogy county.

"In August 1919, Bunczi, constabulary commander, and three of his henchmen—Erdélyi, Nagy and Csaknya—hanged Imre Fehér, his wife and 24-year-old son at Balatonföldvár where they lived. Then they hanged our comrade Imre Libics at Kőröshegy. None of these people had committed any crime; they were hanged only because they were communists. In addition, Bunczi clubbed 80 people in the region. The population was terrorized to the extent that when they knew that Bunczi was in their village they fled to the fields and slept there..."

October 24, 25 and 26, 1956. A detachment was organized, in Eger, called the "Revolutionary Reconnaissance and Punitive Detachment," under the command of Ede Holczer, ex-major in the Horthy army. The leaflet issued by the detachment is the best testimony about their duties and activities:

"Hungarians! The present status of our fight for freedom has made it necessary to set up a Revolutionary Reconnaissance Detachment and a Punitive Detachment functioning jointly with it. The Revolutionary Reconnaissance Detachment has the duty of searching out those people who are supporters of the occupation power (including those people who tear down our posters). The names of the persons, their place of work and residence will be posted time and again on the walls of the village. The Revolutionary Punitive Detachment has the job of destroying the persons concerned, using every means at its disposal after ascertaining the accuracy of the reconnaissance."

A similar fascist group was established at Gödöllő, which was made up of Tibor Benkő, ex-major of the Horthy army, Horthyite lieutenant Sándor Miklós, Dániel Kasza, former attorney to the Horthyite military command in the Budapest region, and Tibor Oderwald, an intelligence officer of the Horthy army. It was this group which arrested and tortured József Dallos, an employee of a machine station.

\*

September 20, 1919. An officers' patrol, under the command of second-lieutenant Rezső Schmidt and sub-officer Nándor Schmidt, left for the community of Orgovány to search for weapons and ammunition concealed by the communists.



They searched for weapons and ammunition—and rounded up the communists on the basis of reports turned in by the local kulaks. They arrested Lajos Úvegi, János A. Szabó, András Hajnal, Mihály Csákó and János Hadi. The report of the patrol read: "... The persons named declared that they were convinced communists, even at the time of their arrest." The Lieutenant then gave the order and all five communists were immediately shot by the officers' patrol on the edge of the village.

November 4, 1956. Ex-Horthy policemen István Micsinai and Sándor Láng went to 2 Rákóczi Street in Pesterzsébet looking for the communist metalworker Kálmán Turner. Turner was in the basement of the building and they shouted down to him: "Come on out, Turner! Come on out, block warden! Come, Comrade Turner and we'll found the communist party." Kálmán Turner did not come up so they went down into the basement and shot him. The bullet lodged in his heart and he died instantaneously.

\*

October 9, 1919. The commissioner of County Zala sent an urgent report to the Minister for Education and Religious Affairs, Huszár, concerning procedure to be initiated against teachers who were supporters of the Republic of Councils:

"Members of the teaching staff of the Zalaegerszeg secondary school and commercial college have compromised themselves during the dictatorship of the proletariat. I require powers to conduct disciplinary proceedings, with the staff at my disposal, against teachers at the Zalaegerszeg secondary school and commercial college who sympathized with the communist order or implicated themselves in other ways."

November 2, 1956. Ex-Horthy army officers, kulaks, fascists, and former policemen were organized in the "revolutionary committee" in the district of Sümeg (Veszprém County). The following resolution was rammed through the "revolutionary committee" of the community by Captain Béla Kohánszky, a former captain of the Horthy army general staff, and Dr. József Mozsári, panel doctor at Káptalanfa:

"The police force must be immediately disarmed because it is unreliable, and a special police force should be set up, composed of former gendarmes. The communist

leaders should be arrested since they are completely untrustworthy. The communists must be bumped off." (A word for word quote.—Ed.)

Some communists belonged to the county "revolutionary committee," so it could not be trusted, Mozsári said. The members of the committee should be screened; as long as it included communists, any measures it might take should be disregarded.

\*

August 4-5, 1919. From the minutes concerning the brutal atrocities committed by the Prónay detachment in Marcali:

"... All the communist leaders—together with non-communists—were arrested early in August, either on the 4th, 5th, or 6th, at the written order of chief constable Vilmos Lehner. First, they locked up these people in the Jewish school—I was one of them—and, later, a reinforced police guard took us to the district court jail. The number of people arrested was about 200, including the communists rounded up from the countryside.

"Most of the prisoners, communists and others, were brutally tortured and butchered by the Prónay detachment in the prison courtyard. Some of them were scalped alive and others were burned. The others were viciously clubbed and those who remained alive recovered only after a long period of time. Some of the tortures took place in the presence of the relatives of the prisoners.

"Only three or four people managed to escape—all the prisoners taken from Marcali were tortured to death. They buried the comrades, who were clubbed to death in two groups, in the maize field opposite the brick factory owned by a count. The dog belonging to József Kovács, one of the victims, scratched away the earth, and the corpses were found a few days later. The public administrative officials refused to permit the funeral for days after the victims had been discovered; permission was given only after much pleading, but even then only one member of each family could attend, and the authorities refused to permit the erection of even a wooden head-post.

October 30, 1956. József Szobácsi, police officer, told this story about how he had been tortured at the hands of the Újpest "revolutionary committee:"

"They took me in first for interrogation. In the room into which they brought me sat Kósa behind the table, to the left of him was a tall thin man of about 30 with a long, narrow, pale face and a little goatee. They seated me on a chair. Around me were 15 men with submachine guns . . . Several of those with submachine guns struck me a number of times in the back of the neck and head . . . Then one of those present ordered me to remove my boots. I did as I was ordered, I took off my boots. They ordered me to put my bare feet on the table. I did this also. Then the man who had ordered me to remove my boots began to beat my toes with his gun-cleaning rod, endeavouring to strike my nails and tear them off my toes. The pain was terrible and I began to sob. As a result of the torture my feet went numb. I cannot think of it without shuddering. Even now I cannot keep from crying when I recall those horrors. Then they forced me to put on my boots. My swollen feet did not want to go into my boots, but they forced me to it, and enduring the pain, I carried out their order and with great difficulty got to my feet. One of the men behind me with a submachine gun ordered me to turn and face the wall so that my nose touched the wall. He struck me from behind so hard that blood began to run from my nose and mouth, and I was not permitted to wipe it off.

"Instead, they placed a plate in the middle of the floor and told me to bend over, support myself by placing my forefinger against the plate and walk round it in this manner. I tried to wipe off the blood with my left coat sleeve, but I received a powerful blow for my trouble. They forced me to walk around the plate like this until I collapsed, unconscious. Then the one with the goatee threw water on my face and I revived. They forced me to continue supporting myself against the plate and walking around it. I again lost consciousness. They threw water on me again and made me continue to walk around the plate . . .

"This terrible torture lasted from 9 in the evening till 11. They took me down into the basement of the building and informed me I would be shot . . .

"At midnight the same persons came for me. The interrogation began again and lasted until 5.30 the next morning . . . they beat me because I paid a high Party membership fee every month (I paid a monthly fee of 50 forints . . .).

"Around 5.30 in the morning, they took me down into the basement . . . Various armed men came down into the basement

and ordered me to stand on my heels and to crouch and rise again and again. They beat my head against the wall a number of times, they tied my hands to the wall and said they would shoot off each of my fingers . . .

"When they left my cell I noticed a piece of rubber hose lying on the floor. I made a noose from it, threw it over my head and tied the other end to the waterpipe. But when I wanted to hang myself the rubber hose broke . . ."

József Szobácsi was saved from the bullets of the counter-revolutionary gang by the Soviet troops.

\*

November 15, 1919. Lieutenant Iván Héjjas, military commander at Kecskemét, issued an order prohibiting the population from leaving their homes during the night from November 15 to 16. The patrol was given orders to shoot anyone without the badge of the Hungarian Revival Society. Héjjas got the men drunk and then they set off to put those communists who were on the blacklist "underground." On the evening of this Massacre of St. Bartholomew, they moved on the city jail, loaded the prisoners on a cart, gagged them, and took them to the edge of the town. There they strangled some of them; others were hanged, and still others were beaten to death with various implements. Iván Héjjas, Mihály Francia Kiss and their gang brutally murdered over 50 communists and sympathizers of the Republic of Councils on that bloody evening.

October 26, 27 and 28, 1956. A gang of counter-revolutionaries attacked co-operative farmer Mihály Bene in his flat at Nagykáta. Bene had been a member of the land distribution committee in 1945. They dragged him off and threw him into a well, where he drowned. In Kiskunmajsa, they beat up József Neményi, the trade representative of the village council; then they tortured him to death and drove a flagpole through his body. In Kakucs, the counter-revolutionaries stabbed to death József Bagló, former council chairman and secretary of the Party organization at the co-operative farm. They shot László Lengyel, the chairman of the New Life Co-operative Farm at Bugyi. These instances are but a fraction of the atrocities committed by the counter-revolutionaries in the towns and villages of Hungary during the few days in which they ran amok.

\*

The white terror of October and November 1956 used the white terror of the Horthyites in 1919 and 1920 as its model. Fascists, ex-chief administrative officers, police officers and army officers of the Horthy days joined with criminals against the freedom of the Hungarians and the lives of many worthy sons and daughters of the Hungarian people. And although in 1956 the followers of the bygone Horthy system felt that only the initial stage had been reached, they were unable to restrain themselves; so they attempted to "imitate 1919" with undisguised white terror. Unfortunately they were successful for 13 days...

## IX

### The Hungarian People's Defence of Socialism

The counter-revolutionary forces both within and outside the country did their level best to persuade public opinion that the working people of Hungary were backing them and opposing the people's democratic order. As the rabid white terror raged in the capital and other towns, the voice of the adherents of the People's Democracy was muffled, while the reactionary counter-revolutionary elements rose to the surface.

However, the weakness of the counter-revolutionary base among the working people was exposed on November 4, when the socialist forces took the offensive. The armed gangs of the counter-revolution were isolated and disintegrated practically overnight.

The domestic and foreign promoters of the counter-revolution resorted to terror and deception in order to lead the masses into renewed action against the people's democratic order, attempting to catapult the country into bankruptcy and famine through a wave of strikes. But their schemes met with fiasco, and although they did manage to cause considerable damage, they failed to prevent the resumption of life in the country. All the predictions about grave unemployment, inflation and hunger in Hungary were proven wrong. On the contrary! Even capitalist newspapers in the West were writing about the "Hungarian miracle" a few months after the counter-revolution, grudgingly admitting that conditions had become normal in an unbelievably short time and that life within the country had begun to develop soundly.

An important factor in this quick recovery was the assistance extended to Hungary by the Soviet Union and the People's Democracies. But this assistance *per se* could not have consolidated the country. The major factor in consolidating the Hungarian People's Democracy was the support of the overwhelming majority of the population, of the working people. During the armed counter-revolutionary attack the ranks of

those Hungarians who believed in socialism were confused and disorganized. And it was difficult to enlighten the people because of the hypocritical and perfidious policy pursued by Imre Nagy and his group. Many people waited for the "communist" prime minister to swing into action against the counter-revolutionaries. The campaign of unbridled nationalism helped to confuse matters, too. But despite these facts, the leadership of the Hungarian Working People's Party (MDP) and the Government received messages from practically every factory and town district, urging them to set up armed workers' detachments to put down the counter-revolution. The forces of the People's Democracy were not rallied, however, because of the disintegration of the MDP and treason from within, although these forces far outweighed those of the counter-revolution.

Then, on November 4, came the call which had been awaited from October 23 onwards by the workers and other labouring people of Hungary: the radio speech of János Kádár, Prime Minister of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government. The first units of the new special police force and the initial organizations of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party were formed from veteran trade unionists, the backbone of the Hungarian working class. The government of the People's Democracy found a stable foundation, for carrying through the great tasks of consolidation, in the class-consciousness of the working class, the staunchness of the working peasantry, and the backing of the best members of the Hungarian intelligentsia.

The Hungarian people thus gave a resounding reply to the question, posed by domestic and foreign reactionaries, as to the extent of the Government's mass influence and whether it enjoyed the country's confidence as its leader.

The constant exposure of the aims, outrages and foreign contacts of the counter-revolution was another major factor contributing to the country's quick recovery. Many people who had been temporarily duped by the mendacious and hostile propaganda campaign, realized, as the facts were explained, the danger to which the Hungarian people had been subjected in the autumn of 1956. Many people who, in the past, had been indifferent and passive, were drawn closer to the ideas of socialism by this exposure of the counter-revolution and by the correct policy of the government. The unity of Hungary's people was cemented on this foundation and, as a result, the Hungari-

an People's Republic, the people's régime, is more solid now than ever before.

Greater concern for the welfare of the people has convinced even the more backward segments of the working people that the people's democratic order belongs to the working men and women, that the government is their government.

A few months following the defeat of the counter-revolution, the government submitted a report on its activities and recommendations to the Parliament which was elected, in 1953, by 6,370,519 votes. Parliament gave the government a unanimous vote of confidence and approved its measures and plans. The mass organizations, which occupy such a prominent place in the people's state, have been imbued with new life, including especially the councils, the local institutions of state power, and the People's Patriotic Front which represents the mass movement encompassing the patriotic and democratic forces of the country.

The enemy failed on the international plane, too, in its attempt to boycott the legal government of the Hungarian People's Republic and, with it, our country itself. The Hungarian People's Republic maintains diplomatic relations with 34 nations. Eminent politicians, prominent public figures, including heads of states, prime ministers and parliamentary delegations, visited Hungary, in 1957, from all corners of the globe, from Japan to Brazil. Hungary has concluded commercial or payment agreements with 58 countries, and carries on trade with many others. Altogether, it maintains trade relations with more than a hundred countries. Hungary has been host to numerous cultural delegations, while representatives of the Hungarian People's Republic attend all major cultural, scientific and sport events held in other countries.

Tremendous mass political demonstrations have been held, testifying to the growing interest in and support for the policy of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party and the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government. Leaders of the party and the government and visiting statesmen of fraternal countries have spoken at these mass meetings. Already on April 4, 1957, large masses demonstrated throughout the country in favour of people's rule, of socialism. The parade, on May first, of 250,000 Budapest working people revealed the stupidity of the counter-revolutionary hopes that the Hungarian working people might be diverted from the people's democratic system. On August 20, mass rallies were held throughout

the country at which the participants celebrated the Constitution of the People's Republic. But the rally held in Budapest, on April 4, 1958, outshone all others: 500,000 people gathered to celebrate the anniversary of the country's liberation and to welcome N. S. Khrushchov, Chairman of the U. S. S. R. Council of Ministers, who had come to Hungary for the occasion. The Hungarian people welcomed the Party and Government delegation of the Soviet Union with heartfelt affection and as good friends everywhere, in town and village alike.

The number of participants in the mass meetings and the mood among the people are not the sole signs of political development. The population of the country takes an eager interest in the reports of the MPs and council members, and makes many recommendations concerning national and local affairs. Intensive work went on in preparation for the World Peace Congress in Stockholm, and meetings were held everywhere—from the capital down to the smallest hamlet, from scientific institutes to apartment houses.

It is the desire of the Hungarian people to work in peace, for their own prosperity and that of the Hungarian People's Republic, in their independent and free country. Our people have confidence in their friends, in peaceable peoples throughout the world; they place their trust in the government, in their own might and in their socialist future.

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PHOTOS AND DOCUMENTS

STAMPING MACHINE



Magyarországról kaptuk e másolatot az írója NAGY Imre, a címe A MAGYAR NÉP VÉDELMEBEN! című önvallomását, amelyben politikai világnézetét juttatja kifejezésre. Sokszorosítottuk ezt a figyelemreméltó munkát, hogy az othoni és a külföldön élő magyarok is elolvashassák és véleményt alkothassanak az író NAGY Imre hazafiságáról és politikai hitvallásáról.

The imperialists printed Imre Nagy's essays, which had been smuggled abroad, bound them in various fraudulent jackets and sent them to Hungary. The sender enclosed with the book the text, written in poor Hungarian, which appears at the bottom of the photo



Don't forget to mention that I warned Imre Nagy -  
a félmérésről a vallalkozásról!

Hát megpártoltam az állásponthoz.  
Főbbi kérés: félmérésről ne  
szólok okosk.

Excerpts from notes made by István Erdei concerning his talk with Imre Nagy

I warned Imre Nagy against taking half-measures.  
He understood my standpoint well. He immediately informed me: he was  
not taking half-measures.

Hétfő este állították a Petöfi - kör vezetését,  
amelynek programjára határozatot fogadtak el a római  
Lehárújságban. Ez ma is a "Szabad Ifjúság" - ban is  
még mindig meg lehet látni a megjelölést

Oktober 23-án reggel telefonon felhívtam Harasztit Sándort,  
Donáth Ferencet, Ujhelyi Lászlót, Nagy Imrét, Farkas Ferencet és  
a más kettőtől: jöjjenek el hozzá a lakásomra a helyi csoport  
beszélésére.

1/2 11 körül valamennyen ott is voltak.

Égyetértés volt a vélemény, hogy inkább is teljesen megújítás  
helyett az újonnan felkeltetett népszerűségükéért. A kormány  
gyökeresen át kell alakítani.

Excerpts from Géza Losonczy's diary

"The executive committee of the Petöfi Club met Monday evening, accepting  
a resolution in the form of a programme on all major issues. And next day it was  
printed in Szabad Ifjúság and several other papers."

"On the morning of October 23 I called up Sándor Haraszi, Ferenc Donáth,  
Szilárd Ujhelyi, Imre Nagy and Ferenc Farkas by telephone and asked them to  
come over to my flat to talk over the situation.

"About 10:30 they were all there.

"We were unanimous in the opinion that in our country, too, the situation  
was ripe for the execution of the planned changes. The government would have to  
be radically changed."

Rövid vita volt arról, hogy Nagy Imrét miniszterelnöknek  
kivétel-e legyen vagy a népi elöljárónak. Nagy azt a volt a  
véleménye, hogy elöljárónak nem lehet miniszterelnök. Így  
elöljárónak rá a nép parancsoltja, hogy miniszterelnök legyen.  
Ez az az érvelés a többiektől is elvárták.

Az új maradtunk, hogy ezt a megdöbbenést mind-  
nyájan el kell érnie. Fel kell mutatni a magunkra. Csak ez az az új.  
Fel kell mutatni a magunkra. Fel kell mutatni a helyet, kapata  
fogunk felkeltetni.

|| Kedden délután értesítés a forradalmi  
ifjúság és a Nagy-csoport körök. A Nagy-  
csoport elnöke is az volt, hogy legyen tüntetés.

Löwenstein a miniszterelnökkel akart beszélni, de a nem-  
tudta fogadni, így került hozzám.

Hírdette, hogy kengyelkorban nem hivatalos formá-  
ban irdeklődök: mi volna a magyar kormány elnöke arról.

Extracts from Géza Losonczy's diary

"There was a short controversy on whether Imre Nagy should be Prime  
Minister or the First Secretary of the Party. It was Nagy's opinion that he must  
not be First Secretary, but Prime Minister. This was how the people remembered  
him and they wanted him to be Prime Minister again. Then the others also agreed  
with this.

"We settled it then that we should regard this agreement as binding on all  
of us. We would act only in conformity with this agreement. Because of this  
situation we would meet daily."

"Meeting on Tuesday morning between the Revolutionary Youth and the  
Nagy group. The position of the Nagy group was that there should be a demon-  
stration."


"Löwenstein wished to speak to the Prime Minister, but the latter was unable  
to receive him, and so he turned to me. He began by enquiring in an emphati-  
cally "unofficial form" what the standpoint of the Hungarian government was  
regarding . . ."



The campaign against the Hungarian People's Democracy waged by Radio Free Europe and other intelligence and propaganda agencies formed part of the preparations for the counter-revolution. Balloons equipped with cameras are shown in the photo



Quotation from the leaflets dropped: "The results attained so far are insufficient..." The other leaflet designates the destruction of the cooperative farms as the "only way"



Instruments of balloons sent over Hungary

1956. X. 28.

Dear Feri Dear!

Your announcement about the situation, which is a 1000-  
yearly history of our people, is a great one. It is a great one  
and it is a great one. It is a great one. It is a great one.

Mostly, I think, that the program of the government is a  
great one. It is a great one. It is a great one. It is a great one.

I think that the government is a great one. It is a great one.  
It is a great one. It is a great one. It is a great one.

- I think that the government is a great one. It is a great one.  
It is a great one. It is a great one. It is a great one.

I think that the government is a great one. It is a great one.  
It is a great one. It is a great one. It is a great one.

Dear Feri,  
Király Béla

Excerpts from letter written by Béla Király to Ferenc Jánosi, asking for "work so close to his heart"

10/28/1956

Dear Feri,

We were anxious to talk at this meeting, which did not take place, about the  
people we had a few words on after the funeral.

I am overwhelmed with joy and enthusiasm, after hearing the programme of  
Imre Nagy, the decision of the government and of the party. This is, my dear  
Ferenc Feri, what we believed even then when we worked at the same place, and  
it is for this that I wish to throw all my strength, enthusiasm and modest training  
into the scales.

... When I think that precisely now I must stay out of this work so close to  
my heart, I am overcome with grief.

... am I not fit to take part in this work of reconstruction? I am offering  
my work, my enthusiasm and my sympathy to Imre Nagy and his government  
through you.

... I think my place should be in the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence.

With affectionate thanks,  
Your friend  
Béla Király

Előterjesztés

a Magyar Népköztársaság Minisztertanácsának

A Határőrségnek a Belügyminisztérium hatásköréből a Honvédelmi Miniszter hatáskörébe való utalásával kapcsolatosan a következő határozatot javasolom elfogadni:

Határozati javaslat

" A Magyar Népköztársaság Minisztertanácsának ..... határozata:

A Magyar Népköztársaság Minisztertanácsa a Magyar Népköztársaság Határőrségét 1956 november 3-tól a Honvédelmi Miniszternek rendeli alá.

A Honvédelmi Miniszter a Határőrség szervezetét vizsgálja felül és a szükséges változtatásokat saját hatáskörén belül hajtsa végre."

Budapest, 1956 november " " "

*Maléter*  
.....  
Honvédelmi Miniszter

Imre Nagy signed the draft proposal subordinating the Frontier Guards to Maléter and empowered him to review the Frontier Guard organization and to execute the required changes "within his competence"

PROPOSAL

to the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic

I propose adoption of the following Resolution in connection with the transference of the Frontier Guards from the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior to that of the Minister of Defence:

DRAFT RESOLUTION

"Resolution No ... of the Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic:

"The Council of Ministers of the Hungarian People's Republic places the Frontier Guards of the Hungarian People's Republic under the authority of the Minister of Defence, beginning November 3, 1956.

"The Minister of Defence will review the organization of the Frontier Guards and will put through changes he may deem necessary within his competence."

Budapest  
November " " , " 1956  
seen and approved: *Imre Nagy*

*Pál Maléter*  
Minister of Defence

Budapest Népe!

Mindenki, hogy mindazok, akik a további vérontás megszüntetése érdekében ma délig, 1 óráig beszüntetik a harcot és leteszik fegyvereiket, mentesülnek a statáriális eljárás alól.

Bpest, 1956. okt. 24.

Nagy Imre  
a magyar népköztársaság  
minisztertanácsának

Proclamation signed by Imre Nagy, announcing that those people who lay down their weapons would be exempt from martial law

"To the people of Budapest,

"This is to inform you that summary proceedings shall not be instituted against those persons who will cease fighting and lay down arms not later than 1 o'clock to-day, in order to prevent further bloodshed."

Budapest  
October 24, 1956

*Imre Nagy*  
Prime Minister of the Hungarian  
People's Republic

*Ne köpjék a kertemből  
bol. by magyar népi népdal  
teremt  
Nagy Imre miniszter elnök  
ny. az az népdal népi népdal  
a népdal*

The Council of War had set October 28 at dawn as zero hour for liquidating the counter-revolutionaries in Corvin Alley. However, Imre Nagy prevented the plan from being executed. The facsimile of the memorandum of Major-general István Kovács is printed above

Do not shell the block of flats. Would make things very awkward politically.

Imre Nagy urged us specially not to carry out that operation.

A Forradalmi Védelmi Bizottságnak  
Budapest.

Alulírottak a *Kispesti népbiz.*  
..... megbízottjai bejelentjük, hogy a ma  
..... megalkult

NEMZETŐRSÉG	
..... fő nemzetőrrel	..... fő nemzetőrrel
..... db. puskával	..... db. puskával
..... db. géppisztollyal	..... db. géppisztollyal

..... Kérjük az ezzel kapcsolatos működési igazolványok  
..... kiadását. Egyidejűleg kérjük az alábbi fegyverek és anyag  
..... kiadását.  
.....  
Címünk: *Radio*.....  
Telefonszámunk: *33-298*

Ferradalmi Védelmi Bizottságnak,  
Budapest.

Alulírottak a *Szabó*  
..... megbízottjai bejelentjük, hogy a ma

NEMZETŐRSÉG	
..... fő nemzetőrrel	..... fő nemzetőrrel
..... db. puskával	..... db. puskával
..... db. géppisztollyal	..... db. géppisztollyal

Ferradalmi Védelmi Bizottságnak,  
Budapest.

Alulírottak a *Lorincz*  
..... megbízottjai bejelentjük, hogy a ma

NEMZETŐRSÉG	
..... fő nemzetőrrel	..... fő nemzetőrrel
..... db. puskával	..... db. puskával
..... db. géppisztollyal	..... db. géppisztollyal

..... Kérjük az ezzel kapcsolatos működési igazolványok  
..... kiadását. Egyidejűleg kérjük az alábbi fegyverek és anyag  
..... kiadását.  
.....  
Címünk: *Radio*.....  
Telefonszámunk: *33-298*

Ferradalmi Védelmi Bizottságnak  
Budapest.

Alulírottak a *Füredi*  
..... megbízottjai bejelentjük, hogy a ma  
..... megalkult

NEMZETŐRSÉG	
..... fő nemzetőrrel	..... fő nemzetőrrel
..... db. puskával	..... db. puskával
..... db. géppisztollyal	..... db. géppisztollyal

..... Kérjük az ezzel kapcsolatos működési igazolványok  
..... kiadását. Egyidejűleg kérjük az alábbi fegyverek és anyag  
..... kiadását.  
.....  
Címünk: *Füredi*.....  
Telefonszámunk: *33-298*

Ferradalmi Védelmi Bizottságnak,  
Budapest.

Alulírottak a *Boros ter*  
..... megbízottjai bejelentjük, hogy a ma

NEMZETŐRSÉG	
..... fő nemzetőrrel	..... fő nemzetőrrel
..... db. puskával	..... db. puskával
..... db. géppisztollyal	..... db. géppisztollyal

Ferradalmi Védelmi Bizottságnak,  
Budapest.

Alulírottak a *Ellipton*  
..... megbízottjai bejelentjük, hogy a ma

NEMZETŐRSÉG	
..... fő nemzetőrrel	..... fő nemzetőrrel
..... db. puskával	..... db. puskával
..... db. géppisztollyal	..... db. géppisztollyal

..... Kérjük az ezzel kapcsolatos működési igazolványok  
..... kiadását. Egyidejűleg kérjük az alábbi fegyverek és anyag  
..... kiadását.  
.....  
Címünk: *Ellipton*.....  
Telefonszámunk: *33-298*



The armed underworld



Reports of the armed counter-revolutionary gangs on their strength and weapons



Corpse at foot of tree, beside armed woman

One of the horrible acts committed on Lenin Avenue by the bloodthirsty counter-revolutionaries. The victim was Ferenc Tóth



The family of the victim Ferenc Tóth



The two orphaned children of Éva Kállai, a victim of the attack against the Party Headquarters on Republic Square



Mrs. Mihály Bene with her grandchild. Mihály Bene, Sr., veteran communist of Szentmártonkáta, member of the local cooperative farm, was drowned in a well by the counter-revolutionaries





### In 1919...

Ferenc Somogyi, a leader of the district of Tab, was hanged in the main street of the village after the defeat of the 1919 Republic of Councils



### ...and in 1956

József Stefkó, a lieutenant in the border guard, was dragged by the counter-revolutionaries out of his sickbed in the hospital, beaten to death in the street and then hanged by his feet

## DÉLAMÉRIKAI MAGYAR HIRLAP GAZETA HUNGARA

The photos printed here concerning the terrible massacre committed by the counter-revolutionaries were published in the world press. But the South American Hungarian Journal — and other papers, too, as the text shows — represented the atrocities committed by the counter-revolutionaries as the deeds of Soviet soldiers

Below we present a word-for-word translation of the text published by the paper in Hungarian:

### HOW THE RUSSIANS MURDER

"To the communist government of Soviet Russia, the great crime of the men shown in the photograph was that they wanted to live in a way worthy of citizens in a free and independent Hungary. They are standing before a Russian execution squad with their hands raised.

"The first burst is fired from the sub-machine guns.

"... the men in the front rows collapse. Now the men behind them get a deadly burst of fire. A woman wearing a white scarf is in the group.

"All of them have died the death of heroes; only one man, mortally wounded, tries to raise his head.

"This is what happened in Hungary and what will happen in all the nations where governments called 'people's democracies' are in power, if they attempt to throw off the communist yoke — comments Rio de Janeiro's biggest newspaper *Correio de Manhã*. The paper released these photos to the DMH (South American Hungarian Journal). The photos were made by Pierre Jan Pedrazzini, photoreporter of the *Paris Match*, who died of wounds received there."

...inkább...  
Mindent egybevetve, indokolt az Szovjetunió határozta el

## IGY GYILKOLNAK AZ OROSZ




Szovjetorszo szorgazat kommunista kormanya számára látható férfiaknak egyetlen nagy bünük az volt, hogy a rokhoz méltóan akartak élni egy szabad és független Magyarországon. Feltartott kezekkel egy kivégező orosz osztag előtt.



A géppisztolyok első sorozata eldördült.



...az első sorokban állók összesznek. A mögöttük álló most a halálos sorozatot. A csoportban egy nő is látható a fején.




Mindnyájan hosi halottak csak egy halálban sebb halja meg felet felemelni.

Ez történt Magyarországon és 'történelem' majd minden államokban, amelyekben 'népi demokráciák' szerveztek. Uralkodnak, ha fel akarják szabadítani a kommunizmus. A jegyzet meg Rio de Janeiro legnagyobb lapja, a *Correio de Manhã* — amely lap volt szíves a képeket a DMH-nak eljuttatni — teletet Pierre Jan Pedrazzini, a *Paris Match* fotoreporter tette, aki maga is meghalt a sebből, amit kapott ott.


The murderers of Republic Square, hailed in the West as "freedom fighters"



The counter-revolutionaries freed from jail József Nagy who had been sentenced eight times for common-law crimes



Lajos Vass had been sentenced three times for common-law felonies. The tattoo on his right arm reads "revenge and retribution"



Zoltán Galgóczy, one of the Republic Square murderers. The tattoo on his hand reads: "Son of USA." The British and American flags are tattooed on his abdomen



A group of patriots taken into custody and imprisoned in Maros Street during the counter-revolution



A group of progressives arrested during the counter-revolution

# A Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság HATÁROZATA

1. A Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság megjelölte a kivonat és drága vírálló szobáit, melyek a belső és külső... az egész magyar nép előtt. Ezenkívül az egész magyar nép... az ENSZ tagjának, elöljáróinak, bizottságának, miniszterének a rendelkezésének, akik a magyar szabadság... az ENSZ tagjának, elöljáróinak, bizottságának, miniszterének a rendelkezésének, akik a magyar szabadság... az ENSZ tagjának, elöljáróinak, bizottságának, miniszterének a rendelkezésének, akik a magyar szabadság...

2. Felkérte a Bizottsági Tanácsot, hogy ismerje el a Magyar Nemzeti Bizottságot és a Szabadságharcosok Vezetőit... Kétféle fegyverrel: a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

3. Magyarországi függetlenségének megvédésére kéri a Bizottságot, a Bizottsági Tanácsot, hogy kétféle Magyarországi... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

4. A Magyar Nép és a Nemzeti Bizottság felmondja a varosi... az ENSZ tagjának, elöljáróinak, bizottságának, miniszterének a rendelkezésének, akik a magyar szabadság... az ENSZ tagjának, elöljáróinak, bizottságának, miniszterének a rendelkezésének, akik a magyar szabadság...

5. Magyarországi kinyitására semlegesítést Auszria... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

6. Tisztelettel kéri a Bizottságot, a fegyvert nem... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

7. A szabadságharcosok felhívják a kivonat szabadság... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

8. A szabadságharcosok kéri a Bizottságot, a Bizottsági... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

9. Mindenképp, aki részt vesz a szabadságharcos... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

10. Nem ismerjük el a jelenlegi kormányt.

11. A kormány alakuljon át ideiglenes jelleggel, rajzi... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

12. A Bizottság, miniszter, képviselő és bizottság... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

13. Uj szabadságharcosok megjelölése a régi... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

14. Az egészségügyi, élelmiszeri és kórházi... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

15. Teljes lelkiszerzés, vállalni a... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

## Tárgyalások a Nemzeti Forradalmi Bizottság tagjai és a Minisztertanács elnöke között

1956. október 30-án délután... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

A fegyveres felkelés... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

Nemzeti Forradalmi Bizottság... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

Minisztertanács elnöke... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

Minisztertanács elnöke... a) a szabadságharcosok... b) a szabadságharcosok... c) a szabadságharcosok...

The "Hungarian National Committee" was the political organ of József Dudás, infamous adventurer and commander of the "headhunters"

The negotiations conducted with Imre Nagy were reported in his newspaper, the Magyar Függetlenség

### TALKS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS CHAIRMAN.

"At six o'clock in the afternoon, on October 30, 1956, negotiations were opened between Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and representatives of the armed forces of the insurgent freedom-fighters, members of the National Revolutionary Committee, as well as representatives of the revolutionary intellectuals and students.

"The negotiations are proceeding in an auspicious atmosphere on the basis of the proposals made by József Dudás, President of the National Revolutionary Committee, representing the armed insurgent freedom-fighters. The proposals put forward by the insurgents will be submitted to the government by Imre Nagy, Chairman of the Council of Ministers."

Budapest 1956. VII. 10.		MAGYAR NEMZETI BANK		Tárgy:	
Tel. /m. 1257		Általános		Kiszagda párt és Petőfi párt készpénz forgalma.	
Cégcím: Jurisócok		IMB Titkárság,		760.000.-	
Előadó:		Ásványi Mihály kezelihez Sp.		83.800.-	
		Hivatalból		1876.200	
		Díjfelajánlásra		Összesen	
				Hiv. számuk: <i>kegyesleg</i>	

Készpénz felvétel: 1956. nov. 3.  
Kiszagda párt részére Ft. 600.000.-  
Petőfi párt részére Ft. 300.000.-

*Handwritten notes and stamps:*  
Kifizetve  
13. február 1957  
Kiszagda Párt.  
B.P.  
Magyar Nemzeti Bank  
Budapest, 1956. nov. 3.

The leaders of the counter-revolution received permission to withdraw hundreds of thousands of forints



A Magyar Nemzeti Kormány megállapítja, hogy Mindszenty József bíró hercegprímás ellen 1949-ben indított eljárás minden törvényes alapot nélkülözött, az akkori rendszer által ellene emelt vádak alaptalanok voltak. Mindezek alapján a Magyar Nemzeti Kormány kijelenti, hogy Mindszenty hercegprímás ellen elrendelt jogfosztó intézkedések érvénytelenek, ennek következtében a hercegprímás minden állampolgári és állami jogát korlátozás nélkül gyakorolhatja.

  
Nagy Imre  
miniszterelnök.

Imre Nagy unlawfully "rehabilitates" Mindszenty

"The Hungarian National Government declares that the procedure instituted against Cardinal József Mindszenty, prince primate, was void of all legal grounds, the accusations raised against him by the then existing regime were without foundation. On the basis of the foregoing, the Hungarian National Government declares null and void the measures depriving Prince Primate Mindszenty of his rights; consequently the Prince Primate is entitled to exercise his civil and ecclesiastical rights without restriction.

Imre Nagy, Prime Minister

#### Verbal Note

The Prime Minister of the Hungarian People's Republic wishes, as Minister of Foreign Affairs protempore, to inform Your Excellency of the following: Reliable information was received by the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic concerning the entry of fresh Soviet military formations into Hungary. The Prime Minister, as Minister of Foreign Affairs protempore, summoned Mr. Andropov, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the USSR, to appear and most energetically protested against the entry of new Soviet military formations into Hungary. He demanded that the Soviet formations be withdrawn immediately. He notified the Soviet Ambassador that the Government of Hungary was immediately renouncing the Warsaw Treaty and, at the same time, declaring the neutrality of Hungary; that the Government was appealing to the United Nations, requesting the assistance of the four Big Powers in defending the neutrality of the country.

The Soviet Ambassador took cognizance of the protest and message of the Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs protempore, and promised to request an immediate reply from his Government.

Accept, Excellency, an expression of my high consideration.

Budapest  
November 1, 1956

Seen and approved: Imre Nagy


*Verbal Note*  
Szobeli jegyzék.

A Magyar Népköztársaság Minisztertanácsának elnöke, mint megbízott külügyminiszter az alábbiakat hozza Excellenciád tudomására:

A Magyar Népköztársaság kormányához hiteles értesülések érkeztek újabb szovjet katonai alakulatoknak Magyarország-ra való bevezetéséről. A Minisztertanács elnöke, mint megbízott külügyminiszter magához kérte Andropov urat, a Szovjetunió magyarországi rendkívüli és meghatalmasított nagykövétét és a legerősebben tiltakozott az ellen, hogy újabb szovjet katonai alakulatok vonulnak be Magyarországra. Követelte ezeknek a szovjet alakulatoknak haladéktalan, azonnali visszavonását. Közölte a szovjet nagykövettel, hogy a magyar kormány a varsói szerződést/felmondja, egyidejűleg kinyilatkoztatja Magyarország semlegességét, az Egyesült Nemzetek Szervezetéhez fordul és az ország semlegességének védelmére a négy nagyhatalom segítségét kéri. A szovjet nagykövet tudomásul vette a Minisztertanács elnökének és megbízott külügyminiszterének tiltakozását és közlését, a megígérte, hogy haladéktalan választ kér kormányától.

Fogadja Excellenciád ezuttal is őszinte nagyrabecsülésem kifejezését.

Budapest, 1956. november 1.

  
The text of Imre Nagy's Verbal Note, bearing his initials. The Note was sent to all diplomatic missions in Budapest

New York, 1957. február 1.

Kedves Bajtárs!

Ezúttal csak nyugtázni tudom leveledet és egyszermindenkorra ki akarom fejezni örökömet, hogy a forradalomban felmutatott buzgalmad és önzetlenséged csorbitatlanul megvan még ma is. Az, amire törekszel, hogy tovább tanulj, rendkívül üdvös és ez az, amiben mi is segíteni szeretnénk a fiatal magyarokat, hogy tovább képezvissza hazánkba. E téren mindent megteszünk, ami tőlünk telik, úgy látom azonban, hogy hónapok fognak eltelni, míg törekvéseink reális eredményei mutatkozni kezdenek majd. Ha ez megtörténik, feltétlenül igyekszem Rajtad is segíteni. Tekintettel azonban arra, hogy ez nem gyors dolog, azt tudom javasolni, amit magam is csinállok, hogy kenyérkereseti forrás után nézek, hogy így biztosítva megélhetésemet, szabad időmben foglalkozhassak hazánk felszabadításának kérdésével. Egyelőre tehát mindenkinek önmagának kell fenntartania magát, hogy azután fokozatosan biztosíthassuk a tanulás lehetőségét azoknak, akik tovább kívánnak tanulni.

Kérlek, tartsd fenn velem továbbra is a kapcsolatot és légy szíves, írd meg nekem azoknak a személyeknek címeit, akikről tudod, hogy a forradalmi harcokban tényleg részt vettek, elsősorban olyanokat, akik harci csoportok vezetői voltak és külföldön elérhetőek. Nagyon érdekelnének olyan személyek, akik szovjet gáztettek, brutálítások, rablások, erőszakoskodások, tiltott fegyverek használata, deportálások, vagy bármi olyan tettekre vonatkozóan tudnának tanuvallomást tenni, amelyek a U.N. előtt az orosz agresszió törvénytelenységét igazolni képesé lennének.

Szeretettel köszöntelek;

*Mátyás Ágós*

A letter written by Király to his agent, Steiner, requesting names and addresses of counter-revolutionaries "... would be able to substantiate the unlawful of Russian aggression before the Special Committee on Hungary

Dear Friend:

New York  
February 1, 1957

I am only able to acknowledge receipt of your letter, and I want to express once and for all, my pleasure that the fervour and selflessness which you showed in the revolution still prevails unimpaired today. Your ambition to continue your studies is exceedingly gratifying, and we would like to help the Hungarian youth in this, so that they may go on with their training and return to our country in the future as men with essentially greater training. We will do our utmost in this respect; however, as I see it, it will take months before our efforts will begin to show results. If this should be the case, I will absolutely try to help you. Since this matter will not however be settled quickly, I can only suggest what I myself am doing to look for a source of livelihood, so that, assured of a living, I may devote myself to the problems of liberating our country. Therefore, for the time being everybody will have to support himself, so that afterwards we can gradually ensure the possibility of studying to those who wish to continue their education.

ELMUNISZTERI M  
KIRÁLY  
Bajtárs

SECRETARY TITKOS

### Fellemerési jegyzőkönyv

1957. május 10. Budapest  
Király

- Azonosító és utónev
- Éves felelős és hó nap
- Anyja neve
- Értesítési lakcím
- Állampolgársága
- Nemzetisége
- Iskolai végzettsége
- Égési és szakmai képzétsége
- Értesítési száma és a
- Értesítési állapota
- Értesítési címe
- Értesítési címe
- Értesítési címe

Molnár József  
Gyabroncz István  
Pisler  
Saproné  
Magyar  
Magyar  
Dinor  
Bán  
Régényi  
Molnár  
Szem  
p. l.  
p. l.



A fellemerési jegyzőkönyv készítéséhez használták a 2. és 3. számú képeket.  
Fellemerési jegyzőkönyv készítéséhez használták a 2. és 3. számú képeket.  
Király

Excerpt from an identification record

"I recognize in photo No. 2 the individual who spoke, on the evening of October 27, 1956, in the Hungarian Club in Vienna to the Hungarian refugees there. He urged them to go to Hungary in groups and to fight against the communists and the Soviet troops. I know that the above-mentioned individual crossed the Hungarian border to make arrangements for the crossing into Hungary of the above group."

Keep in contact with me and please send me the addresses of those individuals who you know really took part in the revolutionary battles, especially those who were commanders of fighting groups and can be reached abroad. Those persons would very much interest me who could give such testimony concerning Soviet crimes, brutality, pillage, violence, the use of forbidden weapons, deportations or any other similar deeds, as would be able to verify before the UN the illegality of Russian aggression.

I thank you with affection,  
Béla Király


Over 50,000 people took part in the mass meeting held on March 23, 1957, in front of the Party Headquarters on Republic Square

Several hundreds of thousands of Budapest working people marched in the May 1957 parade giving the Revolutionary Workers' Government their loyalty as workers






Parliament meets in May 1957 for the first time following the counter-revolution. The people's representatives unanimously approve the measures taken by the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government to put down the counter-revolution and restore order



A quarter of a million people attend the meeting arranged to commemorate the anniversary of the 1956 massacre



Hundreds of thousands of people gathered in Kisújszállás, on August 20, 1957, to celebrate Constitution Day. János Kádár talks to some of the participants after the rally



István Dobi, President of the Presidential Council, among the peasants in Nyírseg



Ferenc Münnich, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, at the Seregélyes State Farm



György Marosán, Minister of State, among merry-makers on May 1, 1958, in the People's Park



The workers' militia, organized by the factory workers during the counter-revolution