

**NATIONAL
LIBERATION
WARS**

in the

PORTUGUESE COLONIES

ARQUIVO HISTÓRICO DAS CLASSES

TRABALHADORAS N.º _____

Q. José Lourenço

**NATIONAL LIBERATION WARS
IN THE PORTUGUESE COLONIES**

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The Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization is happy to present this brief account of the glorious national liberation wars now being waged in the Portuguese colonies in Africa — Mozambique, Angola and Guinea-Bissau. We hope that at a time when the people's struggle in these colonies has indeed reached a crucial stage and registered great advances, the publication of this book will contribute in making known the shameful history of Portugal's colonial empire in Africa as well as about the massive economic and military support it receives from imperialism and international monopoly capital in order to sustain itself.

The information given here has been compiled from various publications and statements issued by spokesmen of the three liberation movements in the three countries, namely, FRELIMO, M.P.L.A. and P.A.I.G.C. The responsibility of making the compilation, however, rests with the AAPSO. The illustrations pertaining to Angola have been taken from the photo-reportage by Augusta Conchiglia in the volume *Guerra di Popolo in Angola* published by the Italian Association in Support of African Liberation Movements (ARMAL), Rome, and we are grateful for their permission to include them in this volume.

We are now in the midst of preparations for the International Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements in the Portuguese Colonies which will be held in Rome from 27 to 29 June 1970 under a very broad sponsorship. We present this volume as a contribution towards the political preparations for this conference.

Youssef El Sebai
Secretary General

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1

MOZAMBIQUE REVOLUTION

PORTUGAL IN MOZAMBIQUE

Portugal has today the longest existing Fascist dictatorship the world has ever known. It started before those in Spain and Germany, and it has far outlived that which prevailed in Italy. Each of these Fascist regimes has been associated with a notorious dictator: Mussolini in Italy, Hitler in Germany, Franco in Spain, and Salazar in Portugal. But it would be a serious mistake to believe that the system ends simply because a particular dictator is no longer on the scene. Ill health has forced Salazar to resign, and after several months his successor Marcelo Caetano, has shown that there is to be no essential change within Fascist Portugal nor in its policies towards Africa.

Fascist by Conviction

Marcelo Caetano has been described as a «Fascist by Conviction»; and in his political life he has always been a spokesman for the right-wing generals, the reactionary Church hierarchy, the big bankers, who together constitute the National Union Party (Fascist). That is

why he is today the Prime Minister of Portugal. Caetano is an old crony and adviser of Salazar, and one of the architects of Salazar's «New State». This «New State» was built on the labour of «the inferior peoples» of Africa, according to Salazar himself; and it is clear this was always supported by Caetano.

Back in 1951 when Caetano wrote on the «Colonising Traditions, Principles and Methods of the Portuguese», he did not hesitate to refer to the African colonies of Cape Verde, «Portuguese» Guinea, Angola and Mozambique, and he drew a distinction between the civilised inhabitants (who were mainly whites) and the uncivilised natives. Twenty years ago, Caetano was saying that the Portuguese went to the African «to lift him out of the darkness of paganism and save his soul». To prove that Caetano has not changed in the slightest since then, one has only to refer to his speech on Portuguese TV on the 10th February this year, when he asserted that the African Liberation Movements such as FRELIMO were fighting against those who had brought civilisation to savage lands. Against this kind of obscurantism, our struggle must be one of Independence or Death.

The Real Reason

Of course, cold hard economic facts lie behind all the myths and nonsense which Caetano and others within the Fascist Portuguese government have put forward for maintaining their colonial rule in Africa. They are determined to hold on to their colonial possessions in Africa because these are the greatest source of their wealth, and they help to maintain the Fascist domination over Portuguese workers and peasants. That is why

virtually half of Portugal's budget is devoted to the war in Africa.

Up for Auction

At the same time, other capitalist countries also have taken a keen interest in the wealth which Portugal robs from Africa. To some extent Portugal fears the competition of countries like the USA and West Germany which have entered the economy of Mozambique and Angola, but Portugal needs the help of these capitalist nations both at home and abroad. Consequently, Caetano has inherited from Salazar the policy of selling the riches of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea to the allies of NATO, with the specific intention of using them as a shield against the ever-expanding action of FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC. Franco Nogueira, Portugal's Foreign Minister, has openly stated that **«the Portuguese government is in a position to demand the co-operation of Western powers in the defence of Portuguese possessions in Southern Africa».**

However, the propaganda of the Liberation Movements and their progressive allies forced Portugal to pay lip-service to some liberal tendencies in the capitalist countries. Her NATO allies have always been willing to help Portugal deceive public opinion in the West; e.g., Britain, being a major investor in Portugal and in the Portuguese colonies, has always helped to whitewash Portuguese Fascism and protect Portugal from its critics. Since Caetano came to power, the British press have engaged in a campaign to present him as a «Liberal», claiming that he is carrying out reforms within Portugal. The deliberate lie that Caetano is a «Liberal» is intended to prepare the way for increasingly close relations between Portugal and the Western

capitalist nations, especially with regard to Portugal's colonial policies.

One of the many contradictions of colonialism is that although the colonialists wanted quick profits, they were not even competent enough to discover how rich Africa really was. This was particularly true of the Portuguese who always hoped that that in Africa they would find gold lying around on the ground to be picked up. In Mozambique this was not the case, so the Portuguese said that Mozambique was poor. In recent years, it has been becoming more and more obvious that Mozambique has tremendous mineral potential; apart from its agricultural wealth.

Western powers have looked with greedy eyes at the signs of the riches which lie under the soil of Mozambique, and by sharing out the whole of Mozambique in huge concessions to Western capitalist companies, the Portuguese government is gaining revenues to carry out its war of oppression, as well as giving other capitalist nations a direct stake in maintaining Portuguese colonialism. This is the way that Caetano is strengthening Portugal's alliances with all capitalists, racists and imperialists.

Mozambique has been appearing quite frequently in the last year or two in the financial and commercial journals of the capitalists world. They have been discussing the possibilities of coal, petroleum, natural gas, asbestos, bauxite, iron, titanium, beryl, colombo-tantalite, lepidolite, chrome, nickel, bismuth, gold, silver, uranium, diamonds, microlite, tourmaline and mica.

Ever since the discovery in 1965 of natural gas in Pande (not far from Beira) all the Western powers have been eager to prospect for oil and natural gas in Mozambique, for the geological signs are all favourable.

The Portuguese government has granted concessions to over one dozen companies, coming from the USA, West Germany, France and South Africa. Most of these companies, such as Gulf Oil and the IPC, are already notorious for their exploitation of the Middle East, Latin America and other parts of Africa. Their presence in Mozambique represents a further threat to the people of Mozambique. In fact, the policy of **encouraging these companies is part of the Portuguese war against the people of Mozambique.**

We Denounce

Many times we have denounced the support which Portugal receives from the members of NATO. NATO aircraft and napalm are used against the women and children of Mozambique; West German troops in Portugal allow the Portuguese government to release forces from oppressing the workers of Portugal and send them to Africa instead; while US, British, French and West German financial aid provides the Fascist clique with the money to continue their costly war against our people. But Portugal wants even more support than this, because the Liberation forces are gaining victory in Mozambique, Angola and Guinea. The NATO imperialists are waiting to give this added aid when they are offered Mozambique on a platter, in the form of concessions to explore for minerals.

Caetano and his advisers are basing great hope on increased aid from the USA. Nixon has always been considered as a rather special friend of Portugal. He visited Portugal both officially and privately and is a close personal friend of the Foreign Minister, Franco Nogueira. Nixon was Vice-President at the time when John Foster Dulles used to make statements strongly in favour of the

Portuguese, and it is felt that he will listen to the war, lords of the Pentagon who feel that Mozambique is «vital for Western defence» — just like Vietnam.

If in addition to the above facts, the USA can gain substantial profits from Mozambique, then it is very likely that they will increase the aid which they are already giving Portugal through NATO. The Portuguese Fascist government is also counting on obtaining more aid from the countries of Western Europe and from South Africa. They use the argument that victory for FRELIMO would be a threat to South Africa, Smith's regime and «Western civilization» (by which we must understand Western imperialism). At the same time they have to bribe these nations by offering them a greater share in the wealth of Mozambique.

Cahora Bassa — Imperialist Dream

All of these plans are well illustrated in the project to build the Cahora Bassa dam on the Zambezi River about 80 miles upstream from Tete. This dam is planned to be 520 feet high, 984 feet long and with a maximum thickness of 70 feet. The system by which it will produce electric power is technologically advanced, and the project requires an investment of 350 million dollars. Obviously, it could not be built by Portugal or by any single capitalist company, so the Cahora Bassa dam is based on the international co-operation of capitalism, which fits in well with Portugal's policy of attracting other capitalist nations to help fight the war against FRELIMO.

Under different circumstances, an underdeveloped country would welcome the Cahora Bassa dam. As a hydro-electric station, it would be one of the largest in the world; and in addition it would create a lake 165

miles long, and up to 15 miles across, capable of irrigating 3.5 million acres of land. But Cahora Bassa is not to be built for Mozambique or for Mozambicans. It will bring profits to the capitalists who actually build it, to the government of Portugal, to the white settlers in Mozambique, and to the white racists of South Africa and Rhodesia. **The Cahora Bassa dam is aimed at further oppressing the people of Mozambique and of Southern Africa as a whole.**

Most of the hydro-electric power produced by the Cahora Bassa dam is to be exported to South Africa. Mozambique already exports about 60 million kilowatt/hours per year to South Africa from Matola, but Cahora Bassa will increase this 100 times. This represents a direct boost to the Apartheid regime of South Africa by giving it a tremendous source of cheap electric power, and at the same time it is a means of strengthening the ties between Fascist Portugal and Fascist South Africa. If the project were to be successfully completed it would mean a great victory for South Africa's policy of holding back the tide of nationalism and progress in black Africa.

Smith in Rhodesia has also been quick to see the benefits. The whites in Rhodesia have offered to provide certain supplies necessary for the builders and have stressed that Salisbury is only 500 kilometers from Cahora Bassa. Undoubtedly, Rhodesia will be part of the electric grid which will get power from the Cahora Bassa. Furthermore, the final plan of the Portuguese includes making the Zambezi navigable all the way into Rhodesia. The Freedom Fighters of Zimbabwe, Angola and South Africa along with those of FRELIMO have already experienced many instances of collaboration between Smith, Vorster, Salazar and now Caetano that

they immediately understand what the Cahora Bassa dam is all about. It is another device being used by capitalism, racism and colonialism in Southern Africa.

That part of the power which is supposed to be kept in Mozambique is meant for the exploitation of the mineral wealth of the country and of the lower Zambezi in particular. Plans include the intensified production of coal, the manufacture of aluminium from bauxite, the production of copper and the setting up of iron and steel plants. As stated earlier, it is with regard to minerals that the capitalist-imperialist world is most keenly interested in Mozambique.

The Portuguese have already encouraged companies from Britain, France, Belgium, Scandinavia, West Germany, the USA, Japan and Italy; and all of these are looking on with interest at Cahora Bassa, which could provide them with cheaper power.

One Million White Settlers

Naturally when a private company or government has a major economic investment, it takes steps to protect those investments and the profits. It is over one year now since South Africa has been stationing troops in Mozambique to help protect the work of proceeding with the Cahora Bassa dam. In addition, Caetano is still holding on to Salazar's dream of settling huge numbers of whites in Mozambique to fight a racial war against the black owners of the land. On the agricultural side, the plan is that Cahora Bassa will allow over one million whites to enter Mozambique as farmers and they will serve as obstacles to the progress of the fight waged by FRELIMO.

Contradictions within Imperialism

In spite of the apparently brilliant nature of the Cahora Bassa scheme as one to unite Portuguese Fascism, Western Capitalism and South African Apartheid, there are certain serious problems which Portugal's ruling clique have to face. To begin with, Portugal is caught in the middle of capitalist interests from different imperialist countries which are competing among themselves. The contract to build the first stage of the Cahora Bassa dam was signed on 10 July 1968 with ZAMCO (Zambeze Consorcio Hydro-Electric), which is a consortium of German, Swedish, French and South African firms — under the control of the notorious South African company, Anglo-American. By awarding the contract to ZAMCO, Portugal satisfied German and South African capitalists in particular, but the British and the powerful US capitalists were left out of the picture. This raises contradictions for Portugal's foreign policy, since Caetano clearly hopes for more US and NATO aid to conduct his wars against FRELIMO, MPLA and PAIGC.

Another contradiction met within Portugal's colonial and foreign policy is that while it needs South Africa's support to maintain Mozambique and Angola, it is also afraid of a South African takeover of these regions, with the support of the whites already resident there. Further white immigration into Mozambique, (such as the million farmers whom they would like to settle on the Zambezi), will not necessarily improve Portugal's position since the plan is to attract those settlers from European countries, and they may prefer South Africa rather than Portugal as their master. Besides, the close association with South Africa embarrasses Caetano's attempts to portray himself as a «Liberal».

The ties with South Africa are being strengthened every day and in Angola there is another hydro-electric scheme (the Cunene dam) which involves South Africa. But the evidence is that some elements within Portugal's ruling circle do not like these developments.

In April this year, while visiting Mozambique (the areas still safe for Portugal) Marcelo Caetano announced that the agreement with ZAMCO was broken off. But that decision has been reversed in favour of ZAMCO once more. The changes and the uncertainty were probably due to fear of South African influence in Mozambique along with Portuguese hopes that United States investors would build the dam and bring the support of their government. It was widely rumoured that since the Spanish government was raising problems over the American bases in Spain, the Portuguese government was willing to allow the Yankees to transfer their bases from Spain to Portugal. The major step, along with the encouragement of American capital in Mozambique, would then have been rewarded by American armed intervention in Mozambique.

It would be foolish to deny the possibility of US intervention and aggression against the people of Mozambique, knowing how far they have already gone through NATO aid to Portugal, and knowing the ferocious nature of imperialism. But, at the moment, such hopes are only dreams on the part of the Portuguese. Being desperate in the face of the steady growth of FRELIMO, Caetano has decided to rely on the support which the South African Fascists are only too willing to offer. Therefore, it was announced in July that Lisbon and Pretoria had agreed on ZAMCO to build the Cahora Bassa dam.

Hostile Act

For the people of Mozambique it does not matter whether the dam is to be built by British and Swiss, by Americans and French or by West Germans, Swedes and South Africans. Furthermore, we reject equally vigorously Portuguese Fascism and colonialism and South African Apartheid and Fascism and their allies are our enemies. **The involvement of foreign capital in Cahora Bassa and any other scheme in Mozambique is a hostile act against the people of Mozambique.**

Western capitalists and governments are providing Portugal with several hundred million dollars in credit on the assurance that the resources of Mozambique will repay them. They are accepting from the Portuguese concessions of land that does not belong to Portugal, just as in the old days Portuguese citizens were given «donations» of land in Africa by the King of Portugal, thereby starting the process of colonial robbery. In order to establish a broad international front against capitalism and imperialism, we will continue to inform the workers of capitalist countries of these acts of aggression committed against Mozambique by their governments; but in the final analysis FRELIMO holds itself responsible for waging a war to the death against all enemies of our people.

FRELIMO's military activity started in Tete — the region of the Cahora Bassa dam — ever since 1964, long before the construction began. For strategic reasons, the Tete guerrillas were withdrawn and armed action resumed in Tete in March of last year. Our aim is to liberate that zone as part of the national territory of Mozambique, and we will deal with the special problem posed by the dam. As our President, Comrade Eduardo Mondlane, made clear — work on the dam will either

be directly stopped or it will be made so expensive by FRELIMO intervention that it will be abandoned.

We are Vigilant

In conclusion it should be made perfectly clear that Caetano's decision to parade as a «Liberal», his stepping-up of the war, and his involvement of more powers in the defence of Portuguese colonialism are not developments that have surprised or alarmed FRELIMO. These are things we expect from the enemy. All the plans of the oppressors will fall before the organised might of the people. Our only concern here is to demonstrate vigilance which is accompanied by active steps to frustrate the manoeuvres of the Portuguese. This is the task which FRELIMO has set itself. WE SHALL WIN.

THE STRUGGLE FOR MOZAMBIQUE

But, the liberation movement will not be able to claim success until, through it, the people achieve what the Portuguese denied them: a tolerable standard of living; education; the conditions for economic and cultural development; the opportunity to participate in their own government. Thus the question "How long will the armed struggle last?" is not as important as it seems to be. Whatever happens, whether we have to go on for ten or twenty years, fighting our way inch by inch down to Lourenço Marques, or whether the Portuguese give up and move out within the next few years, our problems will not end with independence. If the war has been long, however, these may be less acute. For the achievement of independence in itself does not change overnight the attitudes of the people, and colonial rule essentially discourages all the qualities which make for successful democracy. Among the uneducated, authoritarian rule discourages initiative, a sense of personal responsibility, and breeds instead an attitude of non-cooperation with government; among the educated few, it encourages an élitism imitated from the elaborate hierarchy of colonial government. In the liberated areas, these are the sort of influences we have had to combat at the same time as campaigning against traditional problems such as tribalism, superstition and the general low level of political and economic understanding. The urgency produced by war conditions has forced us to recognize these problems very early and shows us the enormous importance of political education. As a result, attitudes are beginning to change in the liberated areas. There are still local divisions, misunderstandings, some corruption, and a great deal of sheer inefficiency; but these are decreasing. People are beginning to realize that their future is now in their own hands. This is why we can view the long war ahead of us with reasonable calm.

EDUARDO MONDLANE

TUATION TODAY

POLITICAL :

During the past year, from the 25th September 1968, important developments took place in the Portuguese government as well as FRELIMO, which had repercussions on our armed liberation struggle. The most important event in Portugal was the political death of Salazar in September 1968. Incapacitated and unable to govern, there arose in Portugal the problem of who was to succeed him. The choice which, according to the Portuguese Constitution, lies with the President of the Republic, fell upon Marcelo Caetano.

A great deal of speculation arose when Caetano assumed the leadership of the government. Would he follow the Salazar policy? Would he bring about a revolution, fighting all the Salazarist principles? Would he try to follow a policy of gradual liberalisation? Would he be a supporter of the war in the colonies or would he recognise the right to self-determination of the peoples of Mozambique, Angola and Guinea.

The dominant opinion was that whoever would succeed Salazar could not be such a dictator, such a fascist, such a conservative as he was. But that on the other hand, there were few possibilities for the successor of Salazar to introduce radical changes, even if he wanted to, due to pressure exerted on him by reactionary groups, represented by high finance and above all, by the army. As to the possibility of a popular revolution this was generally rejected, the improbability being explained by

the great apolitical feelings of the Portuguese people, cut off from political activities by a fascist dictatorship of more than 40 years, which used as an instrument one of the most efficient police forces in the world — the notorious PIDE. Lack of political consciousness and the terror inspired by PIDE, made the idea of a popular uprising very remote. Nevertheless, the Portuguese people were conscious that something should be done to take Portugal out of the chaotic situation in which she was, characterised by an economy on the point of collapse. The Portuguese national product has grown at an average rate of about 3 per cent only during the past year, compared to 6 per cent average growth in the other countries of Southern Europe. It has one of the highest levels of illiteracy — about half the Portuguese population is illiterate, secondary education is a privilege of the rich. It has one of the highest levels of misery and infant mortality in Europe; with the grave economic crisis accentuated by the towering expenditures of the colonial wars, with one of the most fragile political superstructures in the world, the economic inequality in the distribution of riches widening even further the gap between the rich and the poor.

In view of this situation, naturally, the question arose : will Marcelo Caetano, the successor to Salazar, be able to achieve the reforms which Portugal needs so urgently — to revitalise the internal productive forces, to put an end to the loss of lives and riches in the colonial wars. The situation was favourable up to a certain point — the immense expenditure on the colonial war had forced Salazar to open the door to foreign investments, tourists and emigrants — the latter because of the money (dividends) which they send back to Portugal. New ideas were therefore entering Portugal together with money

and people, facilitating changes. But would the new Premier be a man to undertake these reforms ?

Cleverly, Marcelo Caetano himself suggested these reforms, when he declared in a speech to the National Assembly on the 27th September 1968, that «faithfulness to the doctrine brilliantly taught by Dr. Salazar should not be confused with stubborn adherence to formulas or solutions that he at some time may have adopted».

But an analysis of the political past of Caetano and the circumstances under which he rose to power shows that the answer is quite clear — nothing will be changed.

In fact, Caetano played a very important role in the structuring of the present fascist state, having been an intimate collaborator of Salazar. Here are some of the positions he has held in the course of his political life : from 1929 to 1934, he was a juridical auditor of the Finance Ministry. In 1936, he was nominated Speaker of the Portuguese Imperial Council (today the Overseas Council). From 1940 to 1944, he was National Commissar of the Portuguese Youth, a fascist youth organisation. In 1942, he was posted as Vice-President of «Camara Corporativa». From September, 1944 to February 1947, he was nominated **Minister of the Colonies**. As Minister of the Colonies he received in Mozambique the visit of General Jan C. Smuts, which he later returned with a visit to Pretoria, while still organising a Conference with the Premier and the Minister of Transport of Southern Rhodesia about «the Common Problems of Portuguese East Africa and of British Central Africa». In 1947, he left the Government to assume the presidency of the Executive Commission of the «Uniao Nacional — National Union» (the political party of Salazar — the only party permitted in Portugal). In his position as Pre-

sident of the Executive Commission of the National Union, he led the electoral campaign of 1949 for the election of the President of the Republic — «fighting an opposition movement drawn from the appeals of communism after the war» (Diario de Moçambique). In 1955 he was nominated Minister of the Presidency, thus occupying the second place, immediately after Premier Salazar. This short biography is self-evident, needing no further comments. It is said that at times Caetano did not agree with Salazar. That is possible. However, these internal quarrels must not deceive us : the differences, whenever they existed, centred around methods, not principles. Moreover, when President Tomas (himself hand-picked by Salazar) announced the nomination, he declared, «I know that the nomination of Caetano would have the total support of the Prime Minister (Salazar) if he were capable of expressing his opinion». And among Portuguese political circles, Caetano is considered «more like Salazar than Salazar».

When Marcelo Caetano was nominated, FRELIMO made its position clear : «Our Liberation War continues. Nothing can make us believe that the substitution of Salazar would imply any change in the colonial policy of Portugal. On the contrary, everything makes us believe that that policy will be intensified». Later events gave us good reason : the newspaper «Tribune de Genève» of 19th December 1968, stated : «In defiance of all attacks and condemnations, the Portuguese Colonial Policy, established by the former President of the Council, Salazar, will be followed by his successor, Caetano. In a speech pronounced in the National Assembly, Mr. Caetano declared «In spite of the tempest of violence and criticisms launched by the outside, Portugal has quietly maintained her position. Many people in the world thought

that this strong attitude was only due to a tough position on the part of Mr. Salazar. In reality, this was the only useful policy, the only one possible, for Portugal is responsible for the security and the preservation of the riches of its Overseas Provinces.»

Already on the 2nd October 1968, a few days after he took power, Marcelo Caetano sent a telegram to the Governor-General of Mozambique, saying «I ask you to assure the armed forces of our unwavering determination regarding the defence of the territory».

In an interview given recently, on the 18th June 1969 to a Brazilian review «Manchete», Caetano points out : «The Portuguese policy is one of not abandoning the territories which have been Portuguese for centuries». His lightning visit to the colonies earlier this year had as its objective to raise the morale of the Portuguese of these territories, who are concerned about the war, assuring them that the Portuguese Government thinks of them, is with them.

The change from Salazar to Caetano has therefore not meant any change in Portuguese colonial policy. None of the Liberation Movements — MPLA, PAIGC, FRELIMO — let themselves be deceived. The war continues.

Once in power, Caetano tried to end the war in the colonies quickly. He ordered the intensification of military operations on all fronts, at the same time when diplomatic actions were being pursued outside, aimed at gaining major support for his war. He was able to gain some success in this latter sphere. For example, the United Nations resolution on Portuguese colonialism has been more lenient than in the previous years. Similarly, NATO has promised him more substantial help, to the point that Portugal was able to declare after the NATO General meeting in October of 1968 in Lisbon : «The Over-

seas Provinces can count on the NATO forces». This jubilant exclamation is based on one of the resolutions of the Assembly which defined «Mutual Defence» in such a war as to cover the colonial territories, so that «in case of a major danger, Portuguese Africa can count on the assistance of the NATO countries» (Diario de Moçambique — 19 October 1968).

As regards the political and military struggle in Mozambique, their attempts were defeated due to the actions of our fighters : despite the intensified bombardment by more troops, the use of more modern equipment, the Portuguese forces continue to suffer defeats; their attempts to «recapture» the territories won by FRELIMO had no success; our forces even entered a new phase, attacking and assaulting Portuguese posts much more fortified, and capturing their soldiers and equipment.

In view of this failure, Caetano resolved to continue the tactic pursued by his predecessor, Salazar, to combine the military action with the infiltration of agents and the assassination of the leaders of FRELIMO, and at the same time to intensify the campaign for the demobilisation of the populations (the so-called psycho-social action). In keeping with this plan, in December 1968 the Portuguese authorities established contacts with the Provincial Secretary of Cabo Delgado, Dazaro Nkavandame, and offered him money — 50,000 escudos, to desert and return to them promising him a pardon and good treatment. The Portuguese had known Lazaro for a long time, when he worked with them and they knew (better than FRELIMO) that Lazaro could be bought easily.

Corrupt, with a history of and a taste for the exploitation of the people, Lazaro accepted the offer of the

Portuguese. FRELIMO captured the letters in which the agreement was established. Before running away, Lazaro organised the assassination of a FRELIMO military commander, our Comrade Paulo Kankhomba, on the 22nd December 1968. He ran away and gave himself up to the Portuguese who, however, only announced the defection several weeks later, through propaganda outcries, making it more or less coincide with the visit of Marcelo Caetano to the colonies. The Portuguese used Lazaro for an immense propaganda campaign designed to make the world believe that FRELIMO was «finished». But, in keeping with their tendency to exaggerate they ended up by discrediting themselves. No one believed them when they announced that 60,000 guerrillas had surrendered with Lazaro (in fact he went with 7 people, his companions in the exploitation). But there is no doubt that the psychological effect of this propaganda was very great in the outside world because the whole imperialist press collaborated, putting their enormous propaganda machine in the service of Portugal. But events afterwards, the continuation and the intensification of our combats, above all the expansion of the guerrilla centres in Tete, destroyed this false impression created by the Portuguese and showed that in fact FRELIMO was not «finished», on the contrary it had become even stronger.

In February this year the President of FRELIMO, Comrade Eduardo Mondlane was assassinated. It has not been possible to know exactly who was the assassin, for the method used was that of a bomb sent through the post, from an unknown source. Nevertheless, we have no doubt that the Portuguese government is behind the assassination, for whom the President of FRELIMO was «the most hunted man».

The death of the President of FRELIMO was followed by a period of confusion and demoralisation among our militants. He was the leader, loved and respected, followed by all the people and by all the fighters; he symbolised the unity and the strength of the Mozambican people. It is therefore natural that his death was felt profoundly by all and caused general demoralisation.

This situation was fought by intense action of mobilisation on the part of our political commissars, who explained to the people and to the fighters the necessity to continue the struggle, to avenge the death of our President, so that his death would not be a useless sacrifice.

The answer of our people and fighters was completely positive: transforming sadness into intense hatred and stronger determination, they continued with the war and advanced, thus frustrating the plans of the enemy to stop the struggle by the physical elimination of its leaders. In April 1969, the Central Committee met. It was a historical meeting which we consider as important in the history of our organisation, as was the Second Congress. The fundamental objective was to seek means of furthering our national liberation struggle — not, as the foreign press speculated, to look for the successor to our late President. Our people warned us against this danger: in numerous messages received from the Provincial Representatives at all levels, the same concern was expressed: «We must not preoccupy ourselves with personalities, who will be the President of FRELIMO — we must study the means of intensifying the struggle». And this is what was done. In the course of a long analysis of our situation, we discovered that the struggle was being hampered by ideological differences

in the ranks of the leadership. Through strong criticism and self-criticism, we discovered these divergent lines and their representatives.

We condemned the reactionary lines, we reaffirmed the popular and revolutionary line which was represented by President Mondlane. And we came out from the Central Committee meeting armed more strongly with just one ideology, that which is truly revolutionary, which puts the interests of the people above all others, which is decisively opposed to exploitation, corruption, racism and tribalism. To guarantee the centralisation of the leadership, the Central Committee elected a Council for the Presidency, composed of Comrades Samora Machel, Uria Simango and Marcelino dos Santos, delegating to the three members absolutely equal powers.

From April until the present time our struggle has proceeded with severe consequences for the enemy, who, unable to defeat us in the battlefield, continue with their plan of assassinating the leaders of FRELIMO : more bombs continue to be sent to us. The struggle continues.

MILITARY :

In the five years since the first shot was fired for the liberation of Mozambique, we are proud of the progress that has so far been achieved. From 200 well-trained and dedicated men, traversing the country in small groups with no fixed bases, with little or no co-ordination and experiencing great difficulties with supplies, our army has risen to 10,000 men trained and armed and another 10,000 trained, but without weapons. We have a well-organised system of large, permanent bases maintaining good communications with each other. Thus, the extent and effectiveness of our fight has been greatly intensified in gradual but quite distinctive stages.

Our early operations were of necessity extremely limited — sabotage operations against roads, bridges and railway lines; mines were laid in anticipation of convoys which might not come until days or weeks later, when our soldiers had gone elsewhere and could take no follow-up action. Later, as our numbers increased, ambushes against small groups of the enemy could be combined with the mining operations. As our numbers grew even larger, and the fighters could be organised into companies and battalions, ambushes of large convoys and attacks against encampments could be undertaken and then assaults against the military posts themselves.

Thus, over the past five years the armed struggle has grown not only geographically, until it covers one third of the country, but also in intensity and efficiency. Mining operations and ambushes are now considered routine. They no longer occur in isolation but as part of a precise plan of operation to obtain maximum effect. Towns are isolated and roads made impassable. Thus, in Tete, for example, the roads linking Chacha, Bene, Chitecula, Malevera, Demiciano and Cassuende are under constant attack. Similarly in Niassa as a result of our incessant activities on the roads linking the capital Vila Cabral to the posts, the town is virtually isolated and can hardly get supplies except by air. In Cabo Delgado our forces control all the main roads, thus isolating the enemy garrisons.

Moreover, the organisation and co-ordination between our military bases now not only means that far larger enemy can be attacked (often as large as two companies — 200 men) but also that these attacks can be constant and unremitting over a period of days. In one operation in Cabo Delgado, for example, an enemy com-

pany was ambushed on the way from Sagalto Mashudi and after their heavy casualties were sent away for treatment to Lipanhangule, the group became isolated and was attacked by our fighters. Those that reached Lipanhangule sent for transport from Sagal, which hit our mines and two lorries were destroyed.

In April 1969, a successful FRELIMO attack against the post of Demiciano forced it to be abandoned. The following day, a convoy from Malawera intent on re-occupying the post hit our mines and was forced to give up the mission. In May an enemy group travelling from Sagal to Imbuho was ambushed, then later hit mines. Then they waited in vain for two days to ambush our FRELIMO fighters who in fact had them under surveillance the whole time. When no one appeared they decided to return to Sagal only to be ambushed themselves. Thus, FRELIMO operations now invariably entail successive attacks on enemy groups, even large ones with air support, coupled with sabotage of enemy rescue operations. Mines are laid quickly when and where required and hence used to maximum effect. They are now so adept at concealing mines that groups which have already hit one minefield and are therefore more cautious, can still hit two or three others in the course of their patrol and can even be enticed into traps.

Constant bombardments and unexpected ambushes have had a telling effect on the morale of the Portuguese soldiers. They never know where or when the next attack will come. The demoralisation and ill-feeling among them had already been reported by our Portuguese prisoners and the six deserters, but this is now constantly observed and remarked upon by our fighters. When the Portuguese are attacked, they panic. On one occasion in April, for example, between Namrucia and Quita-

rajo, FRELIMO was informed by the local civilian population that the Portuguese were going to attack one of their bases. Our fighters organised an ambush, forcing the Portuguese to retreat, during which a great deal of their ammunition was captured. During their flight the Portuguese mistakenly thought they were still being followed by FRELIMO and opened fire — on each other — thus suffering even more casualties.

On another occasion in February, three vehicles were ambushed on the road between Muidumbe and Mangololo. A fourth returned to warn other soldiers who were following on foot. These fired their mortars in the direction of the fight but only succeeded in hitting their own men.

As they approached closer the latter panicked and fired back. During the confusion the FRELIMO soldiers departed. The next day soldiers from Muidumbe came to collect the survivors but were observed and the road ahead was mined. Many were killed.

Many of these developments have of course been greatly facilitated by the co-operation of the local civilian population who constantly pass on detailed information on the movement of the Portuguese — when they go out on patrol, where they go, what they are looking for, etc. At the same time, they also participate very actively in the fight through their own militias, which are primarily defensive, but can take offensive action when required. For example, in the operation between Sagal and Mashudi, mentioned previously, the first ambush was by the people's militias. On another occasion an enemy unit from Nangololo went out on an operation against the villagers in Tumbate. Drawing near, they stepped on our mines and the local people, alerted by the explosions, organised an ambush. The Portuguese


were forced to beat a hasty retreat and when they later stopped to rest were again attacked, this time by the guerrillas. There are also combined operations between guerrillas and militias, such as the one in August 1968 in the zone of Unango, where the Portuguese were prevented from plundering the people's fields and eighteen of them were killed.

The army realises that they have extensive responsibilities to protect the local people at all times. And, indeed, many of our operations are for just this purpose — to prevent Portuguese offensives against the people, to release prisoners, etc., as in May this year, when FRELIMO fighters attacked troops from Nangade and freed 9 villagers who had been arrested. And in April when the post of Chiuta was attacked in order to stop mass operations in the area of Chief Mbhande.

Perhaps the most striking illustration of our progress since those early days is in the direct assaults on fortified posts with combined artillery and infantry. These are either severely damaged and abandoned or destroyed completely. Our fighters storm the posts and help themselves to valuable equipment. In just two such assaults alone, more than 100 weapons were captured, 18 boxes of ammunition, 66 magazines, almost 200 items of clothing (shirts trousers and pairs of shoes), and many other items such as radios, grenades, blankets and rolls of cloth. Following the same pattern as for ambushes, the posts are often hit time and again. It is also pertinent to mention here last year's attack on Mueda airfield when 12 planes were destroyed.

«Psychological» Warfare

Although the Portuguese constantly deny that the freedom fighters present problems to them in Mozamb



A Frelimo detachment under training

Frelimo detach-
ment training to
use the heavy ma-
chine gun



AHS



Frelimo fighter
learn to use the
rifle



AHS


Frelimo guards accompanying peasants taking their goods to the exchange stores




Dr. Eduardo Moudlane
— Frelimo President

**Fraternal delegates at
the Second Congress
of the Frelimo**


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maal Bahaa eddin, As-
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ral-U.A.R. and Bahadur
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seated third and second
from the left respecti-
vely. Well-known British
journalist Basil Davidson
on the extreme left.**






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**President Dr. Eduardo
Mondlane at the Second
Frelimo Congress held in
liberated territory**



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Delegates at the Second Frelimo Congress — 1968



A Frelimo detachment proceeding with mines and other laying an ambush

que, the September 1968 issue of the Information Bulletin of the Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique stated that during one month alone, their forces were engaged in 9,640 actions and 145 operations against «terrorists». They have built up a network of 300 airfields to facilitate «movements». They deny that the opening of the military front in Tete is of any significance while at the same time they have to transfer troop units previously stationed in Niassa, convert the Tete Regional hospital into a military hospital and fortify Gago Coutinho as a command post covering a large area of the Capoche River Valley. And, indeed, their reaction to the people's struggle for freedom over the past five years has been swift and brutal. Massacres and tortures have become common-place — but to no effect, as they have now been forced to admit. As early as April 1967, it was stated quite openly in the Portuguese newspaper «O Seculo», «It has been confirmed that, apart from the family, ethnic, and religious factors connected with traditional alliances and rivalries of these groups, there is a tendency towards peculiar behaviour when confronted with the prospect of independence... In sum, an intricate net was thrown over the north of Mozambique, against which bullets have not been successful. Other types of operational weapons are needed : ... anthropological ones...» The Portuguese have made no secret of their intention to employ various tactics to «win over» the local population. One such tactic is to take them away from their traditional lands and herd them to «protected villages» **aldeamentos**, surrounded by barbed wire and guarded and administered by para-military, or military forces (these are very similar to the strategic hamlets used by their allies, the Americans, in Vietnam and on whose experience they are drawing more and

more). But they fail to realise that the «peculiar behaviour» that they observe is the determination to win freedom which no amount of barbed wire can contain. The people will not be herded together like animals but will be free to run their own affairs and their own country. And through FRELIMO they will do this. Several strategic hamlets have already been attacked and many of our people set free, e.g., in an attack by combined forces from several of our bases, the hamlet of Nancunela was captured and 69 people freed. Other «psycho-social» actions used by the Portuguese include financial inducements for weapons turned in, (e.g., mortars and anti-personnel mines, \$ 42 each; automatic carbines, \$ 17.50; machine guns \$ 35), extensive propaganda campaigns dropping thousands of leaflets in local languages urging the people to desert FRELIMO (in which the aircraft invariably violate the airspace of neighbouring countries) and «education». A crash course is being undertaken to teach newly recruited African soldiers to speak Portuguese. A major from the «Psychological Action Section» has been appointed director of the course, the aim of which is to help the soldiers achieve «social integration» in the army, to develop «a new Portuguese and Christian mentality», «so that in time they will identify themselves with the Portuguese community». It must be stressed here that language instruction by no means stems from a desire to improve the conditions of the people through education. One Mozambique Deputy in the National Assembly, Dr. Nazare, pointed out — as the problem was one of communication with the African populations and whereas literacy programmes could wait, the first effort should be to teach the African population to speak and to understand Portuguese.

Admiral Rogeiro de Castro e Silva, Director of the

Naval Institute of War in Lisbon has explained in the same vein : «Today the possession of territory is unimportant, it is the population that is important. Frontiers are no problem, what is of more interest is to know and exploit the internal tensions of the adversary — their opponents, their anxieties... the psychological factor becomes more effective...»

Another method of containing the local population is of course by European settlement. Since the outbreak of the war the need for further European settlement in Mozambique has been regarded as an increasingly important factor in the occupation and defence of the territories. Much publicity has been given to attempts to persuade demobilised soldiers to settle in the war districts of Niassa, Tete and Cabo Delgado, specifically on the Maconde Plateau, areas around Montepuez and Porto Amelia in Cabo Delgado, the areas of the Vila Caboral plateau, Marupa, Valadim and Amaramba, and the regions of Maravia, Macanaga and Angoma in Tete. Many Portuguese spokesmen have quite openly continued this policy. Brigadier General Kaulza de Arriaga, for example, has included the «settlement of Angola and Mozambique» as one of the long-term measures «to strengthen the national structure». The following are just a few examples of such projects :

The planned Cahora Bassa Dam development entails the removal for «resettlement» of 25,000 Africans from their traditional homelands and the introduction of 1 million Portuguese workers — many of them returned emigrants from France.

The Mozambique Cotton Institute plans to settle 3,250 families in the Zambezi. The scheme includes **some Africans.**

The Third National Development Plan envisages expenditure of 2,136.1 million escudos on agriculture — almost four-fifths of which will be spent on irrigation and settlement, especially for **European** farming.

The Portuguese Sugar Company, **Acucareira de Moçambique SARL** has successfully started a new pattern of production by offering free land to settlers on which to grow sugar, and giving financial and technical assistance. In 1968 there were already 400 settlers mainly Mozambican residents and ex-soldiers but also including some South African and Rhodesian nationals. The company plans to irrigate another 1,800 hectares for similar settlement of about 50 hectares each.

Under the Third Development Plan the Maputo River valley, scheme, one of the first areas for European settlement, is to be developed further at a cost of 1,000 million escudos.

The company **Marraceune Agricola Acucareira** has a concession of 6,000 hectares at Manhica in the Incomati valley. Its plans call for the allocation of more than half to settlers.

The Cashew Nut Company **Industria de Caju Mocita**, (financed by South Africa and Italian interests) has been reported to be considering plans to settle two thirds of its land in Gaza district with Europeans and soldier settlers.

In the field of vegetable fibres the **Companhia Textil do Pungue SARL** in Manica e

Sofala controls a land concession on which sisal is grown by 485 European settlers.

Contrary to popular belief, the Portuguese attitude to the war has not changed with the accession of Marcelo Caetano. Indeed, shortly after taking office, he initiated a major reassessment of the Portuguese war effort. The National Defence Council and the Supreme National Military Council were called into session for the first time since their creation in 1956. The former, consisting of members of the cabinet and high-ranking civil and military officials discussed Portugal's military policy and organisation, national defence, the general programme of armaments and the organisation of civil defence and «international agreements of a military nature». The Governors and Supreme Military Commanders of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau were recalled to present a report on the war situation in their respective territories. After all these meetings seven more battalions were sent to Guinea-Bissau. Kaulza da Arriaga was appointed the new military commander in Mozambique, to replace General Costa Gomes. The Minister for Defence visited all three territories to be followed by the Prime Minister himself.

Moreover, the last eighteen months have seen an ominous increase in activities of the Portuguese Gestapo — PIDE — and the Public Security Police (PSP). One indication has been the additional budgetary allocations in 1969 for PIDE, a rise of 20 per cent, 41.5 million and for PSP an increase of 24 per cent to 87 million escudos. There has also been large increase in allocations for the industrial penitentiary, the central prison in Lourenço Marques and the prison camp at Mabalane. Several new PIDE posts have been authorised including one at Nova Freixo in Niassa and Montepuez in Cabo Delgado. Both

the PSEP and PIDE personnel are increased. In December 1968 PIDE personnel were increased by 40 per cent.

While the Portuguese authorities constantly reaffirm that they have the war situation under complete control and that there is no cause for concern, reactions such as those mentioned above and the tremendous escalation in military expenditure, prove conclusively that our fight is having a telling effect.

Portuguese military finance is rather complex as «extraordinary» defence expenditure and other allocations for defence which come under «ordinary» administrative budgets of the different ministries are separated. In 1967 the total «ordinary» Government administrative budget amounted to 12,605.4 million escudos and the total defence allocations were 7,854.0 million escudos. It appears that 5,347 million of the latter were budgetary estimates for «extraordinary expenditure» on defence and security, of which 5,254.0 million were for the «extraordinary overseas forces». However, these allocations are not very meaningful as they are always increased considerably during the year and actual military expenditure in 1967 was 10,223.4 million, an increase of 91 per cent over the original extraordinary budget allocation. Since 1966, expenditure under the ordinary budget has been by 23 per cent, expenditure on development by 32 per cent and on defence by 40 per cent, i.e., **defence expenses have risen more-sharply than any other sector of the budget.** Indeed, in 1968, since military allocations represent 50 per cent of the total «ordinary» budget, for every two escudos spent on government services, one escudo was spent for military purposes. For 1968, total «extraordinary» military allocations amount to 5,607 million escudos, of which 4,000 million is for the «extra-

ordinary overseas force», 772 million for the naval expansion programme and 500 million for air base construction.

According to the summary of the 1968 budget, total military allocations for the year amounted to 8,259 million escudos although on the basis of the previous years, figures, (the estimates for 1964-65 were more than doubled, in 1966 they were exceeded by 75 per cent), they will probably have exceeded 10,000 million escudos or about \$ 350 million, i.e., \$ 1 million per day. Consequently, taxes were again raised by 13 per cent over 1967, when they were again raised by 13 per cent over 1967, when they were already 16.7 per cent higher than in 1966.

In 1969, the **initial** extraordinary budgetary allocations for defence and security amounted to 6,340.4 million escudos, an increase of 13 per cent over the initial allocations in 1968.

The situation therefore gives cause for grave concern. According to the Prime Minister, «all the military effort overseas has been and will go on being supported by resources coming from the ordinary income which, previously, was largely used to cover development expenses. Now we have to face many of these expenses with money obtained from loans.» During the period 1965-67 «defence and security» absorbed about 44 per cent of total public expenditure but each year has absorbed more than **50 per cent of actual annual ordinary REVENUE**. The distinction as to whether «internal» or «external» loans finance the war is irrelevant since the former are **in effect contributing** to the war effort by enabling domestic resources to be diverted to it. The revenue from internal loans alone (5,757.5 million) suffices to cover the anticipated expenditure under the Third National Development Plan. Thus, almost all the remaining funds in

the extraordinary budget, including foreign loans amounting to more than 1,400 million escudos, in effect serve to finance military expenditure.

As a result of the combined heavy defence expenditure and extra investments under the development plans, during the period 1961-66, Portugal's public debt has been rising at a faster rate (almost 80 per cent) than public revenue (41 per cent). At the same time, public debt servicing charges have risen from 8.1 per cent to 13.8 per cent of the annual ordinary budgetary expenditure.

The rather shaky position of Portugal's finances explains the growing concern to stimulate economic growth and attract foreign investment. For Portugal, a long-term war can only be supported by continued economic growth, especially since there appears to be little room to increase revenue through taxation. The 1968 budget shows that although ordinary revenue is expected to increase, the increases are completely out of proportion to the growing expenditure. Also significant is the fact that the 1968 estimated revenue is **no higher than the ordinary revenue actually collected in 1966.**

A similar situation can be observed in the territories themselves. During the period 1963-68 Mozambique's military budget has increased by more than 90 per cent. It is financed by local revenue and special heavy taxes, four of which have been introduced since 1963. In 1968, Mozambique's total budgetary estimate for military and related activities amounted to 1,112.5 million escudos, or over \$ 100,000 per day. For 1969, the estimated military budget at 900 million escudos shows an increase of about 7 per cent.

We have no illusions as to Portugal's determination to continue the war. Salazar himself once stated that

the territories would not be abandoned «even if we all go to pieces». In 1966, Brigadier General Kaulza da Arriaga, stating that the Portuguese nation depended on a policy of unity and the exercise of full Portuguese sovereignty over-all the territories, added that Portugal must face the fact that the war against it would continue with intensity, for an indefinite period. And Portugal is making the appropriate preparations for a prolonged war. Land and sea communications between the territories themselves and between them and Portugal are being improved, territorial military establishments and training centres are being strengthened and increased. General Arriaga outlined Portugal's military strategy as being externally on the diplomatic, psychological, economic and military fronts; internally, it must counter subversion and be prepared for traditional large-scale military actions; and finally it must obtain **wherever possible** the necessary war materials.

But the Mozambican patriots are aware of all this and prepared. We know that a prolonged war can only be in our favour. We will steadily work our further south, the people will be mobilised and every new front will mean the growth of our forces. «There are many difficulties. The battle for liberty is not easy. But that liberty we want to gain is worth all these sacrifices...»

Message of the Central Committee to the Mozambican People — 25 September 1967

NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION

In the liberated areas, the provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and part of Tete, the whole Portuguese civil administration has already been destroyed. The schools, hospitals and missions run by the Portuguese have been closed down; the Portuguese traders have been forced to abandon these areas; commercial companies have closed; the whole way of life has changed. Portuguese occupation is limited, in these regions, to a few urban centres and to occasional military outposts isolated in the bush.

Because of this new situation, the people have abandoned their villages, where they were exposed to Portuguese air raids, and have settled in new areas, in the shelter of the forests.

In the three above-mentioned provinces in which about 1,000,000 Mozambicans live, a new life is taking shape. Under the direction of FRELIMO, a new administrative system is being formed; schools have been opened, hospitals and medical posts have been created, agriculture and home industry is developing; new commercial circuits are opening, etc.

In these areas, the responsibility for administration, education, medical assistance and economic organisation has fallen on FRELIMO, which is forming appropriate machinery for dealing with them. The people in these regions have shaken off the oppressive yoke of

colonialism; they have abolished the exploitation of man by man, and are building for themselves a new society, thus writing a new page in their history.

This is the situation in our country today. Our fighters are gaining new victories and gradually new zones will be liberated and more Mozambicans will be freed.

EDUCATION

«In the colonial society education is such that it serves the colonialists. In a socialist society education is orientated in such a way that it serves the large masses of the people».

(Message of the Department of Organisation to the Conference of the Department of Education and Culture — December 1969)

In every stage of social development the type of education is determined by the existing socio-economic regime. The task given to the system of education is to convey to the new generations all the experience accumulated in the past so that they may be prepared to extend it into the future.

In Mozambique, where a progress of radical political change is under way, we are bound to have a change in the educational system corresponding to the new political objectives of the struggle for national liberation. The basic contradiction today is between the forces fighting for national independence and those defending the Portuguese domination. It is reflected in the educational field, where two opposite systems exist, the one controlled by the colonialists and the other organised by the FRELIMO.

I. The Colonial System

«The colonial system of education is discriminatory by nature : its education is the privilege of a caste and it teaches an ideology of discrimination».

(Definicao Duma Politica de Educacio Nacional)

The essence of the Portuguese system of education is that it is based on class distinctions. It is so in Portugal itself, where 35 per cent of the population is illiterate and 68 per cent of the industrial workers have started working before 14 years of age, inspite of this being forbidden by law. And it is even more so in Mozambique, where the class division coincides almost completely with the race difference. In our country, whites, Asians and **assimilados** can send their children to State primary schools and later on to high schools or technical and professional schools and finally even to the University. But African children must go to Catholic primary schools and are most of the time barred from attending secondary schools, as we shall show.

The reason for this state of things is that through an agreement stipulated between Salazar and the Vatican (Missionary Agreement of 1940, supplemented by the Missionary Statute of 1941) the whole system of education for the African people in the Portuguese territories was delegated to the Catholic Church. The Church takes charge of every part of it, including preparing the curricula, conducting the examinations and awarding certificates. The agreement is mutually satisfactory, since the State guarantees to the Catholic Church a sort of monopoly for her missions (Protestant missions are at the best merely tolerated), and the Church assures to the State the submission of the Africans.

Submission is achieved by keeping the great majority of the Africans in almost total ignorance and by granting some education to a very small caste. The whole system seems to be specially designed to put such aims into practice. African children are sent first of all to schools where the «ensino de adaptacao» is practised for 3 years. The purpose is supposed to be to lead the *indigena* gradually from a life of savagery to a «civilised life», mainly through the teaching of Catholic doctrines. Since the teaching is done in Portuguese from the beginning, many African children (speaking only their tribal language and furthermore forced to work for the missions) are unable to pass the final examination of this course until they are 12 or 14. This is the first barrier, because the maximum age for entry to primary school is set at 13. In recent years only some 6,000 out of 400,000 students were able each year to go on to the proper primary school.

The pupils who reach the second stage of education study a curriculum entirely based on Portuguese culture: Portuguese language, history and geography of Portugal, Christian morals, handicrafts and agriculture. The course lasts two years and there should be a third one to prepare the students for high schools or industrial and technical schools. But very few mission schools actually have this grade, so that African children must attend a private school in order to be prepared for the admission exams to the secondary programme. This is a definite obstacle, because of the school fees, which are too high for an average African family. Another age barrier is encountered at this stage. The maximum age for entry to secondary school is 14, and it is rare that an African child has started his schooling early enough to have com-

pleted three years of rudimentary school and three of primary school by the time he is 14.

The State schools for non-Africans are divided into five years of primary school and seven years of secondary school. The 1st two of the latter are designed for those preparing to enter the University. Mozambique has had a University for a few years, which has been of no benefit to Africans, since very few have ever managed to reach it. Indeed, the only comment on this system of education is the simple statement that 95 to 98 per cent of Africans in Mozambique are illiterate. This is the result of the «civilising mission» that Church and the colonial State pretend to have been conducting in Africa for centuries.

In fact, for their purpose it is not a failure. For the Portuguese, education had the basic function of perpetuating inequality. Ignorance for the masses and indoctrination for the few were the real meaning of the proclaimed ideal of «assimilating» the Africans through education. The contradiction was only apparent because the whole system of schooling was geared to enforcing the principle of colonialism, not only in the choice of the privileged ones who could go to school, but especially in the choice of what was to be taught. If anything was gained from that schooling, it was gained by the oppressors; idealistic and mystical concepts, like the superiority of Portuguese and Catholic culture, completely detached from the needs of the people and the principles of science, went only to glorify imperialism. In a regime of slavery, education was but one institution for forming slaves.

II — Education in the revolution

General Principles

A educacao e a base la nossa libertacao total.

A educacao e uma frente de luta tao importante como e a linha de fogo.

One of the priorities of our struggle has always been the creation of a new system of education, since we felt that the struggle against colonialism was to be led on all fronts, the military and political as well as the cultural and social. There cannot be any victory while our people are illiterate and while the old forms of thought still crawl among ourselves.

FRELIMO's purpose in establishing a new system of education is part of the general goal of building a new man, able to transform nature to the benefit of his society, able to cure the ancient man from the colonial forms of alienation, able to give an effective contribution to the total liberation of man. Education, as we understand it, is a constant present in all branches of revolutionary activity, a constant which in every moment raises the technical, political and cultural levels of the people in their march towards independence. In this form education goes beyond national boundaries and takes its place in the world process of total liberation of man.

More specifically, what are the tasks of education? According to the resolution on education passed by the Central Committee in October 1966, «education's role is to allow the Mozambican people to realise effectively the tasks of the Revolution... its purposes must be to create cadres for political, military, economic activities...

and to raise the political and cultural level of the militants».

In the course of our experience, this complex and two-fold role has been further specified in a series of principles which guide our action in this field :

- to us education must be a permanent possibility, in the sense that every militant must be able at any moment and whatever his position in the organisation, to raise his technical, political and cultural level ;
- The education of active militants is a priority : we see it like a wave that rolls over to cover gradually all the sectors of the population which become involved in the various fields of the revolutionary activity, especially production ;
- people to be educated must be chosen on the basis of their abilities and civic and political behaviour ;
- only one course of studies, identical for all, must exist up to the secondary level ;
- This education system must gradually be established throughout Mozambique.

As far as method is concerned, the basic principle of our system of education is that theory and practice must be continuously linked together. Bookish and merely theoretical teaching must be avoided. Our aim is to understand and interpret facts at the different levels of reality from the school to the region to the country to the world. One aspect of this method is the importance we give to the presence of productive work in the curriculum. If teachers are capable of correctly applying the method, the students participate more and more in the teaching and the traditional distance between them and the teachers gradually disappears.

Means of Education

**Learn from your teachers, but learn also
from the people. (Ho Chi Minh)**

A system of education geared to the requirements of a revolution comes up against the problem of what means must be used to convey information. The traditional means, textbooks, and teachers of the old systems, can no longer be accepted because of their colonialist outlook. We found out that even language must be revolutionised in order to express the new ideas. We accepted Portuguese for practical purposes, but it is clear that it will be a modified Portuguese according to the exigencies of our situation and our people.

As regards books, an effort is being made by the teachers of the Secondary School of FRELIMO, who have started writing their own books. The criticisms of the results by the students have been useful, especially in reaching a form of language understandable and meaningful. These texts, which are used at every level of teaching, do not yet constitute a complete course. Some of those which have been completed show how the emphasis has switched from Portuguese and colonial values to the new values of Mozambique and Africa. The history textbooks are a good example: not only the subject has changed, but the method has also been radically modified from the old times, since the effort is to show the socio-economic roots of events in the history of the peoples of the world. Other types of textbooks are the political documents of FRELIMO, which are used especially for the courses in politics. And finally, sometimes we do without textbooks altogether and learn from each other, from nature, from the oral tradition of the people.

Teachers are given an even bigger problem. Those who were formed in the old system must attend re-education courses. But we have also started preparing our own teachers, with courses lasting for 6 months at least for teaching in primary schools. Teachers for higher grades have so far come from abroad, since Mozambicans with higher education are usually engaged in the political tasks of the Front. Knowing the shortage of teachers and the big difficulties facing them, we do not try to force a very advanced pedagogy on them. We ask for simple methods, while constantly aiming at the betterment of our teachers..

Achievements and Programmes

«We are pupils of the Revolution who must carry on the Revolution. The Revolution belongs to the people, therefore, our studies must be done in the perspective of serving the people».

(Students of Cabo Delgado)

When the Portuguese left the areas which are now liberated, there were practically no schools (in the whole province of Niassa there were only 3 teachers!). In 1965, the first primary schools were founded and now there are in the liberated areas more than 12,000 pupils in 120 schools, with a total of 191 teachers. In a 4-grade course they learn Portuguese, history and geography of Mozambique with a general view of history and geography of Africa and the world, arithmetic, elementary science, civics, practical work and arts. In the course of civics (3rd and 4th grades) the pupils study the situation of their country, the structure of FRELIMO, the definition of the enemy. Also important is the course

of practical work, strictly linked with daily needs; students cultivate their own fields, make their own clothes and equipment, build the school building and its furniture, etc.

It is not easy to be a student in Mozambique, because the difficulties are many: sometimes students cannot go home for days, because of the war, and some of them, especially girls, also face opposition from their parents, still afflicted with old prejudices about the role of women. (Consequently, special attention is given by FRELIMO to the education of women). In spite of all this the students participate enthusiastically in the programme of education: they help overcome the lack of teachers, with more advanced pupils helping the less advanced or joining in literacy campaigns and so on.

Secondary education does not yet exist in Mozambique. A Secondary School was founded in Dar Es Salaam under the patronage of the Mozambique Institute. The general principles are the same that guide primary education and here too the idea is to prepare students both for immediate and long-term goals, so that they can either go into practical tasks or continue their studies, according to the needs of the revolution. The 4-year course reaches a level comparable to that obtained in 5 years in the colonial system. Subjects are the same as in the primary schools, of course at a more advanced level, plus English and sciences (natural science, physics, chemistry, biology).

We then have a programme of intermediate education, that should prepare medium-level technical cadres necessary for the development of the country in the fields, of production, political-military affairs, health, etc. So far we have established a course for nurses, a political and administrative course for those working in

local government, besides the course for primary school teachers mentioned above. It is important to note that in order to be admitted to these courses, people do not necessarily need a complete secondary education. For adults with some experience and a sound political background, a short introductory preparation is sufficient.

Special attention is given to adult education, which represents a big problem, considering the percentage of illiterates (95 to 98 per cent). The task being so great, all efforts of necessity have only succeeded in being partial, but more efforts will be concentrated on this enterprise in the near future. We envisage at this stage the primary education of all the people in the liberated areas of Mozambique as a crucial task, to be accomplished not just by the Department of Education alone, but also in co-operation with other Departments, and with the help of students and cadres of all levels.

For higher education FRELIMO must still rely on friendly organisations and countries. Militants are chosen for scholarships on the basis of their ability and political behaviour, and according to the present and future needs of the revolution.

Conclusion

Difficulties are faced daily in carrying out this programme and these ideals. In education as in other fields, we find the forces of the old world opposing our work, sometimes manifesting themselves in the anti-revolutionary behaviour of certain students and teachers. Whenever this happens, it is certainly a warning that we must better our work and make more complete efforts. This is essential for the advance of our struggle for national liberation. That is why we consider that the comrades who work on the programmes of education are just as

must engaged in a fight as the comrades who handle guns, bazookas and mortars. An implacable struggle is being waged by education.

HEALTH

In order to fulfil the medical needs of the civilian population, FRELIMO Central Committee decided, in November 1966 to reorganise the existing structures of the FRELIMO Health Services and to create a Directorate of Health Services.

For medical purposes the liberated areas were divided into medical districts, and these again were split into small cells which are the real units for the working of the health services.

The health centres established in the liberated areas are of various types according to the kinds of illness to be treated and the equipment and personnel available. These health centres vary from simple **first aid posts** (PPS), where dressings are done, first aid provided for all kinds of emergencies, where other minor health problems are solved and where treatment can be carried out as prescribed by other more important health centres, to **area hospitals**, where a large number of diseases are treated, in particular, those which are infectious or parasitic, where sutures are carried out, minor surgery is done and fractures can be treated. In one such hospital in Cabo Delgado, 3,485 people were treated from September 1968 to August 1969. One of our hospitals in Niasa treated 2,874 patients during the same period. Still in the process of being established, one of our health centres treated 515 people from January to June this year.

These health centres are organised so that a patient who cannot be treated in one post can be transferred

quickly to a better equipped centre. This convenient stratification of different health centres allows for a rational utilisation of all personnel, even those who have had a very hasty medical preparation. Appropriate medical regulations were drawn up which allow every member of the medical staff (which numbers about 400 in all) to make available all the assistance his or her level of knowledge enables him or her to, but prevents the abuse of restricted drugs which might lead to disasters.

For some cases, our health centres lack the facilities for treatment, so we have to go to neighbouring countries for help, in particular to Tanzania. We hope, however, as soon as possible to have our own means of solving every medical or surgical problem.

Clearly we are increasingly in need of funds to run and supply all these medical services, and often these funds are not available to us. Already our people in the liberated areas are supporting the burden of a war and it is not possible to impose taxes for the maintenance of the health services. Therefore, we depend heavily on the gifts of governments and organisations sympathetic to our struggle. We are counting on increased co-operation in the future from international organisations concerned with health problems.

Our achievements up to now give us the courage and confidence to face the future without fear. There are 1,000,000 Mozambicans who need medical care. The responsibility for providing this rests with us. But this responsibility must also be shared by the proper international organisations.

Programme for Preventive Medicine

It has been our constant concern in the field of health to accompany our programmes of curative me-

dicine with campaigns of preventive medicine. With the development of our health services we hope to be able to give increasing attention to preventive medicine. To do this, we believe, is in accordance with the most modern principles followed in all countries by the specialised organisations.

In the last 3 years about 150,000 people have been vaccinated against small pox in the liberated areas. This fact is significant in that, under Portuguese rule, such a large number of people were never vaccinated in so short a period in the same area. It should be emphasised that this was achieved during a time of war. The results in this field, however, have not nearly satisfied us, and we have recently started a general campaign of small pox vaccination which we hope within a year will immunise the whole population of the liberated areas. This objective is somewhat ambitious and has not yet been achieved in many countries already independent, but we are facing it with confidence as a practical possibility. In fact, the major difficulty encountered in most parts of Africa carrying out such vaccination campaigns is that, owing to a lack of health education, the population does not fully cooperate with the vaccination teams and they have to go out to remote areas and even to each individual houses.

The fact that makes us optimistic about our present possibility is the high level of organisation in our party. In the first place, the great extent of popular mobilisation means that a vaccination campaign will be made-known everywhere and will receive complete co-operation. Another factor which allows us to predict complete success is the confidence that the people have in our party. Finally, the regrouping of the population in new areas facilitates the tasks of mobilising and informing them.

For all these reasons we believe that the success of the campaign will only depend on being able to obtain sufficient quantities of vaccine.

Apart from the campaign against small pox, we are concerned with other endemic diseases, particularly yaws, scabies, malaria, bilharziasis, hookworm disease, leprosy, sleeping sickness, trachoma, etc.

We have carried out in some zones inoculations against typhoid, tetanus and tuberculosis, but much more must be done in this field. In particular, we are planning an intensive field programme. In particular, we are planning an intensive programme of anti-tetanus inoculations (very important in this period of war) and inoculations against typhoid.

We have developed a crash programme of health education among the civilian population. We consider this programme to be the corner-stone of the struggle against the main tropical parasitic diseases endemic in our country.

National campaigns against yaws, leprosy, scabies, malaria, etc., are in part dependent on obtaining outside help for financing them.

In spite of the existing war conditions in our country, we have recently begun collecting medical statistics. The results of these statistics will enable us to increase all our programmes of preventive medicine.

Formation of Medical and Para-Medical Cadres

For a long time we have seen the necessity of preparing our own medical cadres to run our health services. The colonial system not only denied the Mozambicans access to secondary and advanced education, but also organised their programmes for the formation of para-medi-

cal personnel within the framework of the colonial system. Up till now there have only been two white Mozambican doctors serving the cause of national liberation.

To solve this problem, it has been a major part of our programme to send students to friendly countries and now several Mozambicans are following medical courses at foreign universities. It also happens that the programmes for preparing para-medical staff run by the colonialists produced cadres which cannot always be adapted to our needs.

Because of this, and in spite of the reasonably large number of Mozambican para-medical officers who have abandoned their colonial ties and come to serve the national liberation struggle, we consider it necessary to prepare people who, in as short a space of time as possible, will be able to solve day to day medical problems. Thus, we organise courses for rural medical aids which will prepare para-medical cadres suited to dealing with immediate problems, particularly those arising from the war, and those concerned with parasitic diseases and infectious or contagious diseases. Two separate groups of rural medical aides have already completed the course. There are plans for expanding and diversifying these courses, including programmes on a higher level than those already provided, but to a large extent these depend on outside aid which will enable us to recruit more teachers.

In addition we are training a large number of first aid officers able to administer first-aid and deal with simple problems. This campaign is continuing and we will shortly be introducing modifications to improve the programme.

Achievements and Projects for the Future

These have been our activities towards medical assistance in the liberated areas of Mozambique. We have already achieved a lot, but there is still much more to do. For the realisation of the major part of our programme we are depending on the help and support of sympathetic organisations and governments. We are counting equally on the collaboration of those international organisations which are involved in problems of health.

The Mozambican people are sure of final victory against Portuguese colonialism and the international imperialism which supports it. This victory will not be only a military one, but will also be a victory of the other parts of the national activity, including social welfare.

ECONOMY

In economy, as well as in all other activities, we had to start from the very beginning. In this field the Portuguese were only concerned (as is typical of the colonial countries) with making our people produce that which would benefit the «Metropolitan» economy. Thus, for example, in some areas they compelled our people to produce only cotton, prohibiting any other form of cultivation, even that which the people required to eat. This cotton is sent to Portugal and manufactured there. It is in this way that Portugal, which does not produce cotton, can afford to base its economy on the textile industry. Traditional crops were either prohibited (as in this case) or if permitted at all, no attempts was made to improve them by the introduction of more sophisticated techniques of cultivation. Industry is practically non-existent. Portugal, herself being an underdeveloped country, had not the necessary means to develop the colonies. What little industry exists is in the hands of the colonialists. The same applies to commerce. Thus, we had to start from scratch.

The first problem which we encountered was : how to plan our economy ? Theoretically, two alternatives were open to us : (a) to specialise in the production of certain crops (as for example rice, cashew nuts or cotton — in the last case making use of the experience gained from the Portuguese), to export them and in this way get, in exchange, goods for which we have need ; or (b) to produce all that we need ourselves. The examples

of other countries already independent whose economy depends on external markets, but mainly, the circumstances under which we are operating, imposed the second solution on us. The fact that we are engaged in a war, the difficulty in communications, the threat of the destruction of harvests by aerial bombardments and the subsequent risk of their concentration in one area necessitated that we should orientate our economy to become a **subsistence economy**.

On the other hand, the fact that our war is a guerrilla war, in which the guerrillas often have to depend on the populations for their provisions, imposed on our economy the characteristic of a **war economy**: i.e., one that, after satisfying the basic necessities of the people, has to serve the war.

As soon as we had established the orientation, we had to study how to implement it. We found many difficulties. If on the one hand a state of war does not favour an exchange economy, on the other hand, the poor development of our country does not favour a subsistence economy.

As we have already said, the people were taught and forced by the Portuguese to cultivate cotton — but they do not know how to use this cotton for making textiles (clothing). There is no iron industry. The weapons which the people make have to be made with the metal from destroyed enemy lorries. Salt has to go from the coast regions to the interior. The same with soap — the people did not know how to make it. This means that we have to depend on the outside a great deal and to make exchange among the various regions. Thus, we stuck to the principle of a subsistence economy, adapting it to the objective conditions: a subsistence economy as a perspective, as a tendency tempered with

exchanges whenever necessary. And in this way, we encourage our people also to produce products for export to be exchanged with goods we still cannot produce ourselves. In this way, the agricultural products which we produce today are : for consumption — maize, wheat, cassava, peas, beans, potatoes and rice. For export — ground nuts, rye, cashew nuts, tobacco and rubber. In the industrial field, we are teaching the people to weave cotton, in order to make textiles. We make soap, and we encourage the development of traditional industries — such as craft work.

As regards commerce — the problem posed is the following : the appearance of liberated zones caused the withdrawal of all the colonialist structure. Having expelled the colonialist merchants, there arose the problem of finding ways of furnishing our people with the goods they need and used to buy from the Portuguese merchants — as for example, matches, clothes, lamp paraffins, salt, etc. This responsibility had to be assumed by FRELIMO, which has created people's shops. It is here that the people bring their products, receiving in exchange that which they need. At the time of handing over their products, each person receives a document with indications of the value of his products — and with this document, with indications of the value. They get whatever they wish from any of the FRELIMO shops.

With respect to the organisation of production, there were also two ways theoretically possible : individual or collective production. Again, it was our objective conditions which determined the choice. We realised that a collective production system permits the better use of land since, organised in communities, the farmers can more rapidly combine ways which would permit them to improve their agricultural techniques, for example,

by the purchase of more suitable instruments (like ploughs). Here experience showed us that collective production eliminates egoistic spirit which makes the individual farmers unwilling to share what they have produced with the guerrillas who defend them. Moreover, collective production is more in keeping with the principles of FRELIMO — against any form of exploitation of man by man. For these reasons we are structuring the economy in the liberated areas into a cooperative system.

Thus, there are production co-operatives (carvings, agricultural products, etc.), sales co-operatives and those of consumption. The functioning of these co-operatives is as follows : for example, in a co-operative of fishermen, the nets, hooks, ropes — all the instruments for fishing — are the property of the members of the co-operative. The workers are members of the co-operative, who divide work among themselves : some fish, others dry the fish, the others transport it. In the end, they divide the results among themselves and reserve a part for the purchase of new equipment.

Agricultural production is done basically in three ways :

- **Military Camps** — in the bases, cultivated by the guerrillas, mainly for the provision of the guerrillas. These camps began to be organised in 1966, after a decision of the Central Committee that the guerrillas ought to actively participate in all the national reconstruction tasks, side by side with the population.
- **National Camps** — which exist in each district — the local branches send elements of the population to cultivate these camps. The products go direct-

ly to FRELIMO. It is the District Committee which decides on the distribution of these products : part is for the population, part for military bases and part for sale.

- **People's Camps** — the organised population themselves produce and decide how to use the products. In 1966, we began to have camps which, abandoned by the Portuguese in their flight, passed over to FRELIMO. (They are mainly cashewnut and coconut plantations). The population are encouraged to clear, harvest and transport the products. The workers receive part of these products. The rest is sold and in exchange we acquire medicines, clothes, soap, etc. — which are normally distributed by the military bases.

What are the results of production? We are still very far from self-reliance because of the difficulties we have already mentioned. Nevertheless, with each year that passes, results are more encouraging. The main reason for our success lies in the massive participation of the people. After explaining FRELIMO's policy on production, the people understand, gain enthusiasm and intensify production. They strive to produce the maximum possible, conscious of the necessity to support the struggle.

Our problems — we have already referred to some of them, such as the risks of aerial bombardment — mean that in our choice of camps we have to consider not so much the fertility of the land, as security conditions : many of the camps are open clearings in the midst of forests. Transport is another difficulty. The products have to be carried on shoulders from the place of production to the exchange centres, across enormous distances. A bag of beans or cashew nuts needs two per-

sons to carry it over a long distance, 4 persons are needed to permit each other to rest. We thus have 4 persons engaged in carrying one bag of beans, when they should be engaged in the actual cultivation. The inconvenience of this situation and the fact that our people accept it, is a good indication of the our people's level of revolutionary comprehension. The plan of FRELIMO is to a certain extent to resolve this problem by using bicycles and donkeys.

The **lack of cadres** specialised in production also greatly prejudices the expansion of production. For example, for generations our people were not aware that on sloping lands, they should make terraces to make better use the water to avoid its flowing away. Another example : one that we have learned recently, is that in a rice field nothing else must be planted, as the rice may not grow. We know that there are regulations about soil exhaustion, diversified cultivation, etc., — but we still do not have the cadres which educate us on these difficulties. Some of our comrades are taking courses in agriculture.

This is our situation with respect to the economy in the liberated regions. We are in the middle of a gigantic task, of a fundamental task, because on our correct orientation of our economy hangs the Mozambique of to-morrow, whether it will be truly independent or a neo-colony.

PLUNDER IN MOZAMBIQUE

The Mozambican economy is typically that of a colonised country : it provides valuable raw materials for Portugal and markets for Portuguese manufactured goods. Since 1960 trade between Portugal and her «overseas territories» has increased by 75 per cent with an increasingly large trade balance in Portugal's favour which has conveniently served to offset her own trade deficit. In 1966 the territories took just under 25 per cent of Portugal's exports and provided one seventh of her imports. Nine out of Mozambique's twelve most important exports are agricultural products. She provides Portugal with cotton, lint, sisal, raw sugar, etc., and receives in return automobiles, (6.6 per cent of total imports), crude petrol (5.7 per cent), cotton textiles (5.2 per cent) — consumer goods mainly destined for use by the European population. As is to be expected, Portugal reaps great benefit from this situation. In 1966 her textile exports earned 500 million escudos in foreign exchange and under the sugar quota system, whereby sugar must be supplied to Portugal, two-thirds of the quota must consist of raw sugar for refining in Portugal. Thus, in 1966, when it extended the system until 1982, the Government of Portugal also approved a reorganisation and expansion of the sugar refining industry in Portugal, involving an increase in production capacity from 180,000 tons to 300,000 tons yearly.

The dominant sectors of Mozambique's economy are transportation and agriculture and it is here that the

Portuguese have concentrated their attention, but not, as will be seen, to the benefit of the African population.

TRANSPORT

In the Transitional Development Plan of 1965-1967, only 29.2 per cent of the actual target was spent. Of this, priority was given to transport and communications which at 831.6 million escudos accounted for more than half of the expenditure. Next came agriculture with 357.6 million. Expenditure on health and welfare was only 30.2 million escudos and education and research 170.5 million. Developments in transportation will have absolutely no effect on the majority of the people as they are merely geared to providing better facilities for Mozambique's land-locked neighbours of Southern Rhodesia, the Transvaal, Zambia, Malawi and Ngwane. Normally about one fifth of the territory's foreign exchange earnings are derived from this transit traffic. And it has become even more lucrative after U.D.I. — revenue from ports, harbours and railways rose by 15 per cent in 1967. Needless to say, Mozambique does not take part in sanctions against the Smith regime, claiming that its position is one of «strict neutrality», and that therefore it is bound by international conventions that guarantee the right of transit for the trade of landlocked countries. Although Mozambique has claimed compensation for loss of revenue through sanctions, reliable figures have estimated that traffic through Lourenco Marques increased by more than 20 per cent in 1967. One third of all investment under the Third National Development Plan will be in transport and communications. Proposed projects include two new roads to Malawi, a new railway link between Nova Freixo and Malawi and a road linking Tete and South Africa. Another measure to improve contacts with neigh-

bouring countries is the recent purchase of two Boeings to fly between Lourenco Marques, Beira, Quelimane and Mapula, and between Mozambique, South Africa and Rhodesia. In the 1969 budget, consigned receipts (i.e., from transit traffic) are expected to provide just under half of ordinary revenue.

AGRICULTURE

Portugal's policy with regard to agriculture in Mozambique has four objectives :

- (1) To increase the value of exports, principally by capital investment in the major export crops and by the establishment of processing industries ;
- (2) to supply the requirements of metropolitan Portugal by fostering certain exports such as tobacco, sugar, fruit and meat ;
- (3) To promote specific crops as a medium for increasing European settlement ;
- (4) to develop certain food crops in order to reduce or eliminate imports.

As it is the European controlled sector which fulfils these objectives it is obvious that future growth will continue to be in this sector. Of the six principal export crops : cotton, cashew nuts, sugar, copra, sisal and tea (more than 80 per cent of all exports) all except cotton and half of cashew nuts are mainly or exclusively produced on plantations or farms owned by non-Africans, including very large commercial companies. Other important «European» crops include jute and citrus fruits. Moreover, even in the case of cotton and cashew, when these are produced by Africans, they are sold to large European processing companies.

For the most part, Africans engaged in agriculture are either wage earners, subsistence farmers who sell

their surplus produce to dealers or government agencies, or small producers who sell their crops through officially organised channels at government controlled prices. Apart from cotton, other cash crops grown by Africans include oil seeds, some copra, cashew and rice. It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that whereas the sector controlled by non-African capital has grown significantly in the past decade, and crops such as cashew, rice and cotton, which were formerly regarded as «African crops», are now being increasingly grown on European holdings, **African production has, with few exceptions, remained static or actually decreased.** This can be seen from the published data on crop purchases from Africans, which show that purchases of such crops as rice, groundnuts, copra and manioc were less during the three years 1961-1964 (the last years for which information is available) than they were a decade earlier. Furthermore, the remarkable increase in cashew production, which more than doubled between 1965 and 1966, was mainly attributable to its cultivation on European holdings, since African sales of cashew increased by only 25 per cent. At the same time, exports of cotton, which is the principal African cash crop, declined from a peak of 44,406 tons in 1960 to 31,339 tons in 1965, and in the first six months of 1966 the quantity exported was only half that exported in the corresponding period in 1965. Although this latter may be in part attributable to the revision of the cotton regime in 1961 and in 1963, and certainly to the establishment of liberated areas in important cotton zones in Cabo Delgado, where the people were no longer forced to grow cotton but could concentrate on the cultivation of food crops, **the failure of other African cash crops to increase during a period when non-African production increased significantly reflects the lack of at-**

tention given by the Portuguese to the development of African farming. Under the Third National Development Plan, four fifths of the allocation of agriculture will be devoted to irrigation and settlement, mainly for European settlement. Other large allocations will be made for livestock and cotton development (European type). Moreover, it appears that both cotton and cashew are becoming increasingly European crops. With the help of the Cotton Institute, cotton is fast becoming a European cash crop, particularly in association with settlement schemes. In 1963, for example, in districts south of the Save river, more than 1,200 hectares have been irrigated as areas of European settlement for cotton growing. Similarly with cashew nuts. During the past decade the quantity of cashew nuts exported has more than doubled and its value increased four-fold. Formerly produced by Africans who collected the nuts from uncultivated trees, it has recently become a plantation crop, about half of the output now coming from non-African holdings.

SETTLEMENT and CONCESSIONS

The declared objectives of Portuguese land policy are : the settlement of Europeans from Portugal, the promotion of the economic utilisation of land resources (in other words the promotion of large-scale holdings), and to ensure that the African has enough land for his use (i.e., enough land on which to exist). It was around 1961 that legislation set out the conditions for the granting of land concessions. The territorial governments are empowered to grant to people governed by Portuguese civil law (which immediately excludes most Africans) up to a maximum of 5,000 hectares of agricultural land, and 25,000 hectares of land for livestock or forestry.

Larger concessions can be made by the Portuguese government by special contract. In the period 1960-64 in the districts of Gaza, Lourenco Marques and Zambezia, 239,312 hectares of land were alienated. Many concessions are granted to large agricultural companies who then sub-let smaller areas of land to European settlers.

The Portuguese have two different types of settlement: the COLONATO (European) and ORDENAMENTO (African). They claim that the former is a «more sophisticated farmer» and is therefore given more land to work (an average of 50 hectares compared with 10 for the African farmer) and more resources. Apparently those who join a ordenamento «were previously farmers for the most part. Possessing fewer technical and financial means, and recognising the advantage of such association, they prefer to become members of an ordenamento». Considering that the majority of the European settlers are either demobilised soldiers or illiterate workers imported from Portugal, one could seriously question the validity of the statement that they possess «more technical and financial means». What is true is that **they receive far more technical and financial assistance from the government.** The Cotton Institute prepares the land for the first planting and the settler also gets a monthly subsidy of 1,000 escudos for food and the construction of his house. Needless to say, there are large discrepancies in family income. In one colonato, MAGAGADE, for example, it is intended to increase the present 21 settlers to 100, with an eventual estimated gross return per family of 485,000 escudos. In the ordenamento in MUREMA, it is planned to establish families with an income of 18,000 escudos per family, i.e., a little more than one thirtieth, of the colonato's income.

So the African farmers are now gradually being squeezed out of what meagre share of agricultural production they had. And the European interests, particularly the larger companies, are getting bigger and bigger. The trend is now towards capital-intensive production and towards vertical integration of the growing and processing stages. Taking cotton again as an example, although the system of large concessions for individual companies who administered forced cotton cultivation has been replaced by a system whereby the right to purchase seed cotton in a particular zone is auctioned annually to the company which contracts to pay the highest price above the government minimum. This merely means that the former concessionary companies have now become the licensed dealers. These companies also operate as dealers and ginnery operators and are now also starting to become growers and industrialists. With the Portuguese government now permitting limited development of a small textile industry, they are now moving into cotton spinning too. So they have complete control over the whole process. Similarly with the cashew and sisal industries, companies that own the factories also control the plantations. Of the other principal export crops, sisal and tea are all capital-intensive and produced on company plantations.

THE «ESCUDO ZONE»

The «Overseas Provinces» are supposed to be «just as much a part of Portugal» as the provinces in the «metropolis» and reference is constantly being made to the so-called «escudo zone» and its advantages for the territories. However, despite measures taken to «free» capital movements, the currencies of the territories, though nominally the same as in Portugal, are not fully

convertible into metropolitan escudos, which under the present system is treated as a foreign currency in the territories. The present plan for the integration of the overseas territories envisages the establishment by 1972 of an area of free trade, free movement of capital and persons, and, through the expansion of the «national» market and the «national» exploitation of resources, the establishment of «favourable conditions for the rapid and balanced growth of economic activities and the progressive improvement of levels of living» in all regions. However, there is growing criticism by capitalists in the territories that the system is not working out as envisaged.

First of all there is dissatisfaction that policy decisions are taken in Portugal, giving priority to what is considered to be «national» interests, often at the expense of the territories. (Of course, this is happening all the time, but the settlers only see fit to complain when it affects them.) For example, the removal of trade barriers has mainly been to the advantage of Portugal and has not been accompanied by the freeing of currency exchange controls which restrict the territories' trade. There is also dissatisfaction with the 1965 legislation on regulating the establishment of industries in the overseas territories. This exchange system imposed by Portugal is justified as a means of helping to prevent the exodus of capital needed for investment in the territories. In practice it serves to provide Portugal with the foreign exchange earned by the territories and on the other hand to discourage domestic capital by placing it at a disadvantage compared with foreign capital which has priority in the transfer of credits.

For a long time in Mozambique the exploitation was solely in the hands of the Portuguese and a few South Africans. Salazar guarded his colonies jealously realis-

ing, quite rightly, that the encouragement of any economic interests other than Portuguese might eventually lead to encroachment on Portuguese economic, and possibly, also political, control. The early sixties, however, saw a complete reversal of this policy, and the active encouragement of as much foreign investment as possible. The advent of the liberation wars forced the Portuguese authorities to maintain large expensive armies that were far beyond their means. Portuguese exploitation and profits have always been based on cheap labour, particularly that of the peasants in agricultural production. But a man is not machine — there is a limit to his capacity and hence to the amount of money that can be made out of him. So attention began to turn from what grew out of the land, to what lay beneath it, for Mozambique has immense deposits of iron and copper ore, silver, bauxite, aluminium, coal, precious stones, etc. But tapping resources like this requires two basic essentials that an underdeveloped country does not possess: large financial resources for the initial capital investment and high level technical experts for the implementation. It was about the same time that the big international companies began to take more than a passing interest in Mozambique. Far-reaching changes were taking place in the international political scene: the rise of independent countries intent on controlling foreign commercial activities within their boundaries, military and political upheavals that made their investments insecure. The big international companies were eagerly searching for friendly docile governments. And their experience of Portugal in Europe had left them no doubt that Portugal in Africa would welcome them eagerly.

In April 1965 new regulations were introduced easing the conditions for foreign investments in the over-

seas territories. Previously the government had required some element of Portuguese participation in foreign enterprises but this was now abolished in certain sectors. The new regulations state that foreign interests may export abroad their stocks, bonds and other transferable securities, profits, dividends and the proceeds of the liquidation of investment made with imported capital or the earnings of foreign capital invested in a Portuguese territory. In both Angola and Mozambique the largest foreign interests other than Portuguese have remained concentrated in mining, land ownership, and the processing of agricultural products. In some instances it has been reported that the combined effect of the easing of foreign investments and the continued currency exchange controls in the territories has definitely resulted in the type of investment the legislation intended to avoid, or at least that it stated should be avoided, the sincerity of the wording may perhaps be doubted — e.g., investment which has «a greater tendency to serve the interests of the economy in which it originates than to provide effective help in solving the particular difficulties of the economies in which it is invested». Certainly, many of the new investment projects in the mining and oil exploration fields are purely schemes for extraction of new materials and to provide foreign exchange for Portugal. They will not even provide many employment opportunities as most of the processes are mechanised. Similarly, with agriculture, investments are heavily concentrated in capital intensive agricultural and processing industries for export. So the exploitation of our people and our land is taken to the furthest extreme possible — we are systematically being robbed of both our agricultural land and the riches beneath it, by two agents — the international companies and the Portuguese go-

vernment. The following are just a few examples of foreign interests, other than the Portuguese in Mozambique.

MINING

- It has recently been reported that a «foreign financial group» has shown great interest in the extensive mineral exploration in Manica, with investments totalling £ 2 million. There are no details of the nationality of the group.
- Among new mining concessions granted in 1968 was a licence for the Messina Transvaal Development Co. Ltd. to prospect for all minerals except diamonds, petroleum, coal and other solid fuels and radio-active materials in Manica e Sofala.
- Large-scale coal mining is carried out by the Companhia Carbonifera de Moçambique, 60 per cent of whose capital is held by Belgian interests. It operates in Tete.
- The South African Company, Edmundian Investments Ltd., has a copper concession in Tete.
- Bauxite is obtained from two mines in the vicinity of Manica near the border with Southern Rhodesia. The mines are owned and operated by the Wankie Colliery Co. Ltd. of Southern Rhodesia which uses it for its smelting furnaces in Southern Rhodesia.
- The Japanese SUMITOMO group was granted rights to exploit newly discovered iron deposits. Part of the ore will be processed in Mozambique at the new blast furnaces now being built near Beira jointly by a Portuguese company and the Sher Company of Southern Rhodesia.

- Earlier this year a group of Japanese technicians visited Porto Amelia in connection with the iron and coal mines in Namapa region.
- Requests for mining concessions have included one for all the minerals in Tete. The request was made on behalf of Johannesburg Consolidated investments, the Anglo-American Corporation, the Société Anonyme Minière, and Minerios Lda.
- In May this year it was announced that a group of Japanese technicians, accompanied by an official from the Mines and Geology Office had gone to Gondola in Mozambique to study the deposits of granite around the town. If exploitation is feasible, production will commence shortly and the granite will be exported to Japan.
- Also in May it was announced that the German firm Krupp had requested a concession to exploit extensive deposits of fluorite in the region of Chioco in Tete. The request came after a series of successful geological investigations.
- General Kaulza de Arriaga, President of the Junta of Portuguese Nuclear Energy, has stated that prospecting for uranium in Mozambique, notably in Tete, is being undertaken. «The outlook seems good; it is probable that Mozambique will contribute in a significant way to the augmentation of **Portuguese** uranium reserves.»
- High quality iron deposits discovered near Malema and Bibane in Zambezia will be studied by experts from British, West German and South African companies with a view to determining their suitability for exploitation.

CASHEW

- A factory for the preparation of cashew nuts is to be built at Antonio Enes, 600 kms north of Beira. It is to be financed by a Portuguese company and the South African Rand Selection Corporation.
- The firm, Industria de Caju Mocitas, in which the Anglo-American Corporation holds a controlling interest, has decided to diversify its production by acquiring 10,000 hectares on which it plans to plant half a million coconut palms. Subsidiary interests in the firm are held by Tiger Oats and National Milling Co. of South Africa and the Industrial Prodotti Alimentari de Bologna (Italian).
- Another cashew company is the Sociedade Industrial de Caju e Derivados (CAJUCA) which also has Italian participation.
- Yet another is Spence and Pierce Lda. which has a factory in Inhambane. The company is controlled jointly by Pierce, Leslie and Co. and by Gill and Duffus, both British firms.

SUGAR

- By far the largest sugar company in Mozambique is the Sena Sugar Estates Ltd. which is entirely British owned. In 1967 its profits before tax were £1.4 million. It is currently in the process of a large expansion programme aimed at increasing production from 94,000 tons yearly to over 200,000 tons by 1971. The programme involves the construction of a new irrigation system for one of its two sugar plantations (covering an area of 11,600 hectares) and the construction of additional factory capacity. In March this year Mr. John

Hornung of Sena Sugar Estates presented «a valuable donation» to the Portuguese President, Admiral Tomas, for the Salazar Foundation. He emphasised the inestimable services that the «overseas» enterprises own to the Portuguese government and the efforts made by them to warrant the government's confidence — the creation of new employment, settlement and uplifting living stands, «thereby contributing to the consolidation of Portuguese sovereignty».

- A relatively new company is Acucareira de Mocambique which is Portuguese-owned but which has received loans or advances from the French firms Compagnie pour l'Etude et le Développement des Echanges Commerciaux (COMPADEC), Presente Rouiller, and CERIS which are furnishing equipment and technical assistance. COMPADEC and the companies associated with it have subscribed 32.8 million escudos of the share capital. In 1967 the company awarded a 280 million escudo contract to a South African firm, James Brown and Hamer Ltd, to build a new sugar mill near Beira.
- Another new company is Marracuene Agricola Acucareira, MARAGRA, formed in 1963 with loans of 220 million escudos from the Banco Fomental Nacional and the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa. The Company has awarded a contract to the South African consortium of Grinakkers and Murray and Roberts Construction Co. to construct a system of dykes, drainages and irrigation and the expansion of a sugar mill. This is also being financed by the South African Development Corporation.

COPRA

- About half the total area of copra plantations belongs to three very old established companies, the ownership of which includes French, West German, and Norwegian interests. South African interests are reported to have participated in the establishment of three coir factories.

SISAL

- This is another old established plantation crop. One of the largest is the Companhia de Culturas de Angoche which is partly Swiss owned. Other companies include Swiss, British and West German interests.

INDUSTRY

- The TEXCOM company is to build a factory for treating cotton at Beira, and the government has authorised the establishment of a TEXCOM textile factory at Matola. TEXCOM belongs to the Textil de Lourenco Marques which is financed by the French company Compagnie Generale d'Entreprises Electriques. This company is also a partner in the ZAMCO consortium.
- A 1,000 million escudo paper pulp plant is being financed by the FASCL group which includes the French Compagnie Générale d'Entreprises, the Bank of Suez, and the Anglo-American Corporation. The FASOL group is also establishing a soap factory near Matola.
- Feasibility studies for a steel mill are being conducted in Tete. The foreign companies associated

with the study include TECHINT as consultants, the American R-N Corporation and Koppers Co., the Société des Etudes et Entreprises Sidérurgiques, Schneider-Creuzot, and Sestig.

- Two condensed milk factories have been authorised — one for Nestle South Africa (Pty.) Ltd. and the other to be owned jointly by a local company and the Co-operative Condens Friesland of the Netherlands.
- An automobile assembly plant, which began production in 1966, is assembling trucks and other heavy vehicles on behalf of a Japanese manufacturer, Isuzu, to be exported to Zambia, Malawi and Southern Rhodesia.
- A fertilizer factory has been built at Beira by a French firm, GEIXA.
- A chemical fertilizer complex is to be built near Lourenco Marques. Of the four units, the first will be built by the South African firms, Frazer and Chalmers. The others will be built by the French companies Sodeix and Socaltra.
- An automobile tyre factory has been built by Firestone Portuguesa.
- A French industrial concern intends to establish a perfume industry in Mozambique.
- The South African INOS Company, a subsidiary of the Anglo-American Corporation has extensive fishing rights and licences to establish a shrimp and lobster cannery and a refrigeration plant. It has an important factory in Porto Amelia operating along the whole coast of Mozambique. There is a growing interest in the unexploited fishery wealth in the sea around Mozambique and several

companies, notably South African and Japanese are interested in licences. It has been reported that the Mitsui financial group, in collaboration with South African interests, plans a fish processing factory in Lourenço Marques, and that INOS has invited the Portuguese fishing company ARPEM to create a new company together. INOS already has a great deal of capital invested in Mozambique, particularly in the cashew industry and mineral prospecting.

THE OIL BOOM

However, the best illustration of the sudden surge of international capitalist interest in Mozambique is the quest for oil.

Until the middle of 1967 there was only one oil company, the American Mozambique Gulf Oil Co. operating a concession in Mozambique. However, in March 1968 the journal «Marchés Tropicaux» was able to report that the following companies had started searching :

Hunt International Petroleum Co. (Dallas, Texas).

Anglo-American Co. of South Africa.

Société Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine (French).

Entreprise de Recherches et d'Activités Pétrolières
(French).

Sunray Mozambique Oil Co. (American).

Clark Mozambique Oil Co. (American).

Skelly Mozambique Oil Co. (American).

Texaco Inc. (American).

Others include :

Gelsenkirchen Bergwerks Akiengesellschaft (West German).

Agip (Italian).
Pan-American Oil.

It requires little imagination to realise that this sudden onslaught was probably caused by instability in the Middle East and the threat to supplies forcing companies to start desperate searches elsewhere.

The **Gulf Oil Co.** started in Mozambique in 1968. In August 1967 it had under contract the «**Seismographic Scientific Co. Ltd.**» which was prospecting for oil and natural gas in the large Gulf concession at Chirimoio. Also at the end of 1967 the Chairman of Gulf Oil, Mr. E. D. Brockett, went to Lisbon for a meeting with Salazar. He also met the President of Portugal, the Overseas and Finance Ministers, and other members of the Portuguese government. He stated that «good results» had been obtained in Angola and Mozambique. These personal contacts between the Gulf Oil Chairman and the key figures of the Portuguese government indicate the importance Gulf Oil attached to the resources in Mozambique and Angola. The company has made several important strikes in Mozambique. In the first 6 months of 1967 the company's net profit was \$ 3 million. In conjunction with **Pan-American Oil**, it has started oil exploration off the Mozambican coast with a 15,000 ft. 'wildcat' test borehole 80 miles south east of Beira. In May 1968 it was announced that the company had been granted a further concession in conjunction with the Pan-American Oil Co.

In January 1968, the **Hunt International Petroleum Co.** signed a contract worth \$ 1,029,000 for a three-year search for oil and natural gas to the north of Lorengo Marques. The contract gave the company exclusive rights to prospect in a certain region. It was required to invest 10,000 contos in the first year, 20,000 in the second year and 40,000 in the third. The contract was renewable, and

if the search was successful could be prolonged for 40 years. In March of the same year it was announced that the company had been granted an offshore concession covering 18,800 sq. kms around the mouth of the Zambezi river. The exploratory period was five years with a possible renewal for a further three. The company is required to spend \$ 2.5 million in the first three years. In February this year, the company signed an 'accord general' with the Portuguese authorities for prospecting in the area between Beira and Quelimane. It will invest about 12 million francs in the preliminary research. It expects to discover deposits capable of producing 30,000 barrels of crude oil a day or more and will thus put in a 'surprime' of 15 million escudos (2.5 million francs).

In December 1967, the **Société Nationale des Pétroles d'Aquitaine (S.N.P.A.)**, the **Entreprise de Recherches et d'Activités Pétrolières (ERAP)**, a French state concern, and the **Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa** were jointly granted a concession to prospect for oil and natural gas over an area of 15,000 square miles in Southern Mozambique. In April 1968, the West German Company **Gelsenkirchen Bergwerks Aktiengesellschaft**, was authorised by a decree of the Overseas Minister to take over ERAP's part of the concession. If oil is found a 40-year exploitation concession will be granted. In May 1969, the same group signed a further contract with the Portuguese Overseas Minister.

In January 1968 Portugal granted large concessions in Mozambique to the American company **Texaco Inc.** These included a large area in the far north near the Rovuma river, and south along the coast including an offshore site. One source commented, « Since parts of this area harbour 'rebel groups', observers in Lourenço Marques question how easily the work can be done ». The

Sunray Mozambique Oil Co. started a three-year project searching for oil and natural gas on the 'littoral' of Inhambane, at a cost of £ 1,470,000. It has now concluded its seismographic study and the data has been sent to the U.S.A. for examination. Sunray is also operating a joint venture with **Skelly Oil (U.S.) and Clark Oil and Refining Co.** In an oil concession granted to the **Anglo-American Co.** of South Africa one fifth of Gorongosa Park, one of the most famous wild-life reserves in Africa, has been handed over. More recently it was announced that the Italian state company, **AGIP** had completed exploratory investigation of semi-detailed surveys and exploratory surveys over an area of 21,000 sq. kms bounded by the Mozambique Canal on the east and the city of Majunga on the West.

The increasing significance of oil in Mozambique can be seen from the fact that a R 22 million expansion project is planned for the Portugal Oil Company's R 10 million Sonarep oil refinery, which produces 800,000 tons of refined petroleum products a year worth about R 15 million. Present production is to be increased by 25 per cent to 2 million annually by the end of 1970. Much of the crude oil still comes from the Middle East, but the sudden surge of prospecting in Mozambique may obviate the need for this in the near future. One can also anticipate that any surplus oil will flow over the border into Rhodesia. (Indeed, another reason for the expansion of the Sonarep refinery is undoubtedly increased supplies for Rhodesia. At the end of 1967, for example, it was reported that the French were rerouting their oil supplies to Rhodesia from the Beira-Umtali line to Lourenco Marques where Sonarep does the refining). The French Compagnie Française des Pétroles (TOTAL) has a 27 per cent holding in Sonarep. The French Government owns 37 per cent of TOTAL !

FOREIGN CAPITAL

And so the race goes on. More and more foreign investments pour into our country to steal the birthright of our people. And the signs are that this is only the beginning. Other companies which have requested authorisation to establish factories include the Sociedade Standard Electric, a private American entrepreneur who wants to establish petrochemical industries, and a foreign financial group called Rhomac who have proposed several industrial projects. Recent visitors have included a French economist on a study tour of agricultural development, who stated that through the intermediary of the Portuguese Overseas Ministry, it would be possible to establish quick and profitable contact with the members of the European Economic Community ; British economic missions to establish in Mozambique an extension of the Luso-Britannic Chamber of Commerce ; two American bankers from the Morgan Guarantee Trust Company who met the members of various industrial and commercial associations ; an American consultant Mr. Frank Smith who undertook an assignment for the « Assoc. Portuguese das Actividades Economicas to Ultramar » to investigate the investment potential of Angola and Mozambique for North American capital ; and the Director of Public Relations at New York State University together with the Director of Public Relations of an American firm in Angola. Their visits to Lourenco Marques and Beira were made under an agreement between New York University and the « Associacao Portuguesa das Empresas do Ultramar » to investigate the economic possibilities for American financiers to invest in various commercial and industrial activities.

It could possibly be argued that all these new investments will lead to an increased national income and greater prosperity for all. However, as pointed out at the very

beginning, this is a typical colonialist economy where there is no such thing as « prosperity for all », just great wealth for the few. As indicated by our late President, Eduardo Mondlane in his book, **The Struggle for Mozambique**,... « the nature of the projects has been dictated by the interests of the investors and by the Portuguese Government, not by the needs of Mozambique », and there are three reasons why the economic expansion brought about by these investments will not make any impression on the living standard of the majority of the Mozambican people :

- 1) Most of the new factories are situated in the two urban centres of Beira and Lourenco Marques, where only 4 per cent of the Africans live. The mass of the population in the rural areas will be unaffected.
- 2) What little revenue does accrue to the country itself, after the financiers and the Portuguese Government have taken their share, will not be utilised for much needed social services, but, as previously indicated, will go towards financing the colonial war.
- 3) The Portuguese government is so interested in attracting investments that it is sacrificing much of its potential revenue by allowing long tax-free working periods, and the wholesale export of projects.

This is just a small indication of the many ways in which Portugal is exploiting the resources and people of Mozambique for her own benefit. This economic oppression is just another aspect of Portuguese oppression in all fields — educational, social, political. FRELIMO is fighting to free Mozambique, to drive out the foreign invaders. And, as has been seen, this does not only mean the

Portuguese, but all their capitalist allies. We are fighting to build a country where Mozambique resources will be used for the benefit of Mozambique and where everyone will reap the benefits of his own labour.

ASEA WITHDRAWS FROM CAHORA BASSA

We have just been informed that the Swedish firm ASEA has withdrawn from the \$ 350 million share in the Cahora Bassa Consortium, ZAMCO.

Although the spokesman for the firm stated that the reason for withdrawal was because there may have been legal repercussions in view of United Nations economic sanctions against Rhodesia, there can be no doubt that in fact the real reason was the wholesale opposition to the project by the progressive forces in Sweden shown by the attacks in the press, massive popular demonstrations, and even, to a certain extent, criticism in the Swedish Parliament. The firm could not withstand the surge of attacks from all sides, from the press, students, intellectuals, M.P.s, workers, etc.

This event is of the utmost significance, for it demonstrates the influence and effectiveness of organised public opinion, that when a people come together and make their voices heard, they can force changes in their countries' policies. And this is extremely important, for Portugal, the poorest and most underdeveloped country in Europe can wage war against our country only due to the support she re-

ceives from her capitalist allies. Thus, actions, as those that have taken place in Sweden recently, demonstrations, public meetings, etc., can be as effective a contribution to our liberation struggle as material assistance.

FRELIMO and the people of Mozambique wish to express their appreciation to their Swedish friends for their successful efforts, and would urge the peoples in other countries who support our struggle to follow their example and take action to influence their governments' policies towards Portugal and Portuguese colonialism.

AHS

2

ANGOLA

THE COUNTRY

Angola is situated South of the Equator, and covers an area of 1,247,700 square kilometres between the 4th and the 18th parallels. Angola is confined between the two Congos in the north, Namibia (South-West Africa) in the South, Zambia in the East, and the Atlantic Ocean in the West.

Angola has 5.1 million inhabitants according to the latest official statistics of 1960. This total figure is composed, roughly, of 4,750,000 Africans and 350,000 Europeans including 80,000 soldiers.

Traditionally, only the population of the extreme South live on cattle raising, while the rest of the population practice agriculture; but in the center of the land, the two types of economy are intermingled.

The frontier zones are not as heavily populated for their inhabitants would rather live in the countries bordering on Angola, even though this be racist South Africa, than be subjected to Portuguese tyranny. At the present moment following the military extermination campaigns undertaken by the colonial army mainly in 1961 and 1962, the northern frontier areas have become almost entirely uninhabited.

Until 1960, the population of Angola was increasing by 1.66 per cent a year, which is a relatively slow rate compared to other under-developed countries where the rate of increase wavers between 2 and 3.5 per cent. The reason for this phenomenon lies within the fact of colonialism itself: undernourishment, lack of medical and sanitary assistance, very hard working conditions, etc. Infant mortality in Angola is among the highest in the world and salaries are among the lowest in Africa. A worker only receives 300 escudos (12 dollars) a month. The rate of profit extracted is sometimes over 800 per cent as in the case of the Diamonds Company. Until 1955, the percentage of illiteracy was one of the highest in the world : 99 per cent.

The White population has increased very rapidly : from 9,000 persons in 1900 it reached 30,000 in 1930, 78,000 in 1950, 172,000 in 1960, and 350,000 in 1967. The rate has accelerated beyond 10 per cent per year recently.

Angola is an "area of white colonisation", as was the case of Algeria under the French colonial domination. It is Salazar himself who explains : "It was thought Whites could be replaced everywhere by Blacks. Yet, this is not true. The whites alone are capable of planning, acting, and organising work. One man who understood this clearly was Tshombe. Let them call me a racist because I say that Blacks do not have the same aptitude as whites : it is a fact established by experience."

The final achievement of the Portuguese colonial system is meant to be the substitution of the blacks by "the superior race — the bearers of Christian civilisation".

The continuation and intensification of military activities in the colonies has led to very rapid increase of clandestine emigration to Europe. In 1967 out of 70,000 young men called for military service, 14,000 sought refuge in France.

Almost all of the budget of what they call the "Development Plan" is earmarked for the "colonization" either directly or through the creation of the infrastructure. It is a very costly form of colonization that does not correspond to the "measures of austerity" planned for the "expenses of war". That is why certain colonialist circles are calling for "a change of strategy in the colonization plan".

The year 1961 marked a new phase in Portuguese colonial methods. In its essence, Portuguese colonialism remains the same : brutal, racist, exploiting, and full of disdain for human dignity. The barbaric wars of domination waged by colonialism in the colonies is a proof of this fact. Yet, after the outbreak of the armed struggle in 1961, Portuguese colonialism was forced to make some concessions in a futile attempt to stop the irreversible movement for national emancipation. These concessions as a whole are given the name of "colonial reform" which is based on two methods, on the one hand, the war of extermination and on the other "colonial reform" itself. These two methods aim towards the same objective : maintaining extreme exploitation.

What has "Colonial Reform" meant concretely ? The number of schools has increased and so has the number of pupils in primary schools which from 104,000 in 1960 has reached 225,000 in 1966 according to "official statistics".

- A number of elementary "universities" have been created.
- Some Angolan clerks have been promoted and their salaries increased.
- 2 or 3 Angolans have become "deputies of Angola to the Portuguese Assembly" !

Yet, a closer look reveals the following :

- (1) Although the total number of pupils has increased greatly, one must take into consideration the in-

creasing number of Portuguese children in Angola who all go to school without exception; one must also remember the spirit of propaganda which dictates statistics concerning education. In any case education continues to bear the same characteristics: racist, paternalistic, confusing, anti-national, and of inferior quality.

- (2) The so-called university of Angola, where only the first three years are taught, includes the following faculties : medicine, agronomy, veterinary science, education and engineering. Almost all the students are Portuguese. If one remembers that the level of university education in Portugal itself is very low one can well imagine what the level would be in the colonies !
- (3) The so-called 'Angolan Deputies to the Portuguese Assembly' play no part whatsoever and only in this respect are they similar to their Portuguese 'colleagues', for fascism cannot afford such liberties. (At the same time, whatever the circumstances, these people are traitors who will one day have to face the justice of the Angolan people.)
- (4) The promotion of Angolan clerks cannot be carried out on a large scale for it would be contradictory to the interests of the colons living in Angola who do not wish to lose their 'posts'.
- (5) There are large number of unemployed Portuguese colons in Angola, with the result that the colonial economy is unable to absorb the unemployed Angolans whose number is constantly increasing because of the exodus from the countryside.

It is obvious that 'reform' in Angola is very far from being consolidated in the form of neo-colonialism and differs

from the measures undertaken by French colonialists at the time of the 'cadre-law', because while the 'cadre-law' was applied relatively in a period of colonial peace, Portuguese 'reform' is being applied in a period of war, a period in which the colonialists destroy a hundred villages while they are building one school, and consequently, are unable to dupe the Angolan people. The dynamics of colonial war — increase of military expenses, constant massacres of the people, and finally, the decrease of the exploiters' revenues — all this prevents the "Portuguese colonial reform" from acquiring a certain degree of importance.

The war has upset everything. In the zones of armed struggle, the major part of the population has joined underground resistance so as to build a new life under the leadership of the M.P.L.A. In the semi-liberated areas, all the people are organised in action committees, the organs of people's authority.

After five centuries of suffering and of resistance, the Angolan people are taking into their own hands the historical initiative of determining their own fate. They are finding in the depth of their newly awakened dignity that indestructible force which will sweep away foreign oppression for ever more.

In the areas temporarily controlled by the colonialists, important changes are taking place. The massive presence of the army "marks the face" of all activities; entire sections of the population are working for the army; one branch of the army, the "psycho-social action" is in fact trying to carry out a wholesale brain-washing of the population.

With the continuous exodus from the countryside unemployment in the cities is assuming such proportions that the colonial authorities are alarmed to the extent of considering unemployment as one of the "internal causes of terrorism".

In the countryside, the peasants are forcibly concentrated in the "strategic hamlets" built in the purest American style. Naturally, this is only increasing the hatred for the invaders and is also decreasing agricultural production.

The colons are incorporated in militias of the O.P.V.D. C.A. (Provincial Organ of Volunteers for the Defence of Angola). Voices such as that of the racist fascist Reis Ventura, are being raised openly saying : "All of us, Portuguese of Angola, must be well aware of the war in which we are taking part, we must not allow discouragement to reach us for it would be the beginning of defeat. We must realize that the enemy has not given up and is watching day and night for the opportunity of catching us unaware. We are facing a real and serious danger. The leadership of terrorism has passed from the U.P.A. (1) to the M.P.L.A. ..."

The fascist police, P.I.D.E., is taking advantage of the state of war to exercise its tyranny on all colonial life. The smallest of army units must include, officially, agents of the P.I.D.E. responsible for reporting any state of insubordination.

(1) U.P.A. : Union of the Angolan Peoples, group formed on a tribal basis from among emigrants in Congo-Kinshassa.

THE ECONOMY

Portugal is a country in which one half of the population works in agriculture. Forty per cent of them are illiterate and the per capita national income is only 360 dollars per year. They are harassed by chronic unemployment which place Portugal at the head of the countries of the world from which people emigrate and one of the most underdeveloped, it is also the most backward country in Europe.

Portugal is also exploited by international monopoly capital. A few years ago, it was estimated that 66 per cent of the capital invested in Portugal was directly or indirectly linked to international monopolistic capital.

Being itself dominated by imperialism, Portugal will never be able to prevent imperialist penetration in Angola and in the other colonies. International monopolies have penetrated into the production of coffee, sesame, sugar, cotton, as well as transport and large scale commerce, and dominates almost all of the mineral industries.

The only alternative left to the Portuguese capitalists and colons was to take over all the other branches liable to yield any profit, from agriculture to small scale commerce.

That is why Portuguese colonization is one of the most brutal forms of domination, it has penetrated into all the sectors of national life by taking over all possible sources of income.

In spite of the powerful influence of imperialism, Portuguese colonialism was still putting up a certain resistance

to the entry of international capital in other sectors of the economy because it was afraid that the imperialist forces, particularly the U.S.A., would take over entirely and set aside the Portuguese capitalists and colonists from Angola.

This contradiction between Portuguese colonialism and imperialism is also apparent in the domain of religion and becomes obvious in the struggle between the Portuguese Catholic missions and the American Protestants missions.

It is very obvious that this attitude of the Government in Lisbon was preventing the industrialization of Angola, which was then almost non-existent. This was part of a reactionary economic policy existing in Portugal itself, which being a badly equipped country, feared the competition of products manufactured in the colonies. This was the background which dictated the decree No. 33, 924 of 5th September 1944, forbidding the establishment of new textile industries in Angola. By doing that, the Lisbon authorities were also attempting to obstruct the development of a working class and of an educated stratum in the colonies.

Following the outbreak of the armed struggle in 1961 Portuguese colonialism changed its political-economic strategy : the doors of Angola were opened wide to international capital and the latter immediately saw the possibility of taking over from Portuguese colonialism "as soon as the situation would so demand".

The system created by Portuguese colonialism is rotten to the core and full of internal contradictions : it is not Portuguese colonialism but international monopolies who are taking over the major part of the colonial super-profits. Consequently, the thesis of the fascist government, according to which the increasing exploitation of Angola should pay for the war, has failed; lacking their own financial means Portugal is compelled to ask for continually increasing credits from the imperialist powers.

The greater and more intense grows the liberation struggle of the Angolan people, the greater will be the difficulties of Portuguese colonialism. In this the peoples of Europe can play a great part by putting pressure on their governments to make them stop giving aid for the organization of Portuguese colonialism.

Because the economy of the dependent countries is built after what is dictated by the needs of the exploiting countries, this economy is essentially disproportioned, indeed it is crippled from birth. The anomalies are found in the disproportions of development in its different branches and regions.

Let us examine this matter a little more deeply :

- (1) Agriculture is the most important sector in the economy of Angola because it is practiced by 88.7 per cent of the able bodied working population, and supplies 28 per cent of the gross national product and 66 per cent of the total exports, excluding the food consumed by the Angolan people, and produces the greater part of the raw material needs of the existing rudimentary manufacturing industry, the products of which are partly exported. Hence the fact that three-fourths of the exported material is either raw products or products manufactured from agriculture.
- (2) Industry (excluding transport) employs only 5.8 per cent of the population and supplies 11 per cent of the Gross National Product (G.N.P.) and 34 per cent of the total exports. Industry is therefore very weakly developed.
- (3) The "various services", "defence" and "transportations and communications" together employs 5.5 per cent of the population and constitute 61 per cent of the G.N.P.

- (4) The fact that agriculture employs 88.7 per cent of the working population but contributes only 28 per cent only of the G.N.P. is the result of its considerable backwardness and underdevelopment.
- (5) In agriculture, it is monoculture which dominates to the extent that in 1967 coffee alone provided 54 per cent of the total exports.
- (6) Even in the mining industry, one product only is mainly exploited. Thus, in 1966, diamonds constituted 17.65 per cent of the total exports out of 20 per cent for all the mining industry.
- (7) Industry or manufacture is practically limited to the transformation of the agricultural products (sugar, palm oil, extracts from peaches, etc.). Heavy industry is represented only by a small petroleum refinery and two cement factories.
- (8) Very low consumption of mechanical energy. The basis of most work is the muscular effort of millions of Angolas subjected to slavery.
- (9) Very deficient means of transportation : in some areas, modern means of transportation are totally non-existent.

THE STRUGGLE

The national liberation struggle in Angola has its deep-seated roots in the long tradition of resistance to foreign penetration. For over four centuries the population in various parts of the territory have revolted in opposition to the Portuguese occupation and military conquest.

Towards the end of the last century and the second decade of the twentieth century, a group of intellectuals, Silverie Ferreira, Assis Junior, Paixao France, Cordeirs Da Matta, among others, were setting the written contestation of the colonial fact and were drawing the outline of the modern paths of the nationalist movement.

The Angolan National Movement is one of the oldest in Africa. If the major part of the continent reached independence before Angola, this is mainly due to the difficulties inherent to the underground struggle and to the prolonged character of the present liberation war.

The Angolan political struggle in the period preceding the liberation war was waged secretly rendering it particularly difficult especially if we take into consideration the lack of experience of the Angolan people and of the nationalist movement at the time.

Even in the countries where an extra-ordinarily bitter war of liberation has been and is waged, such as in Algeria recently and in South Africa today, legal political parties were formed in an early phase of their history, and this was among the major factors that enabled them to reach the vast popular masses rapidly.

It is well-known that armed struggle often begins with a striking action which can shake the population, and strike a blow at the morale of the authorities and the established order. Just as the Bastille was a symbol of oppression to the revolutionaries of France, the prisons in Angola became the object of popular hatred capable of arousing great emotions. In Sao Paulo or elsewhere everybody had an imprisoned friend or relative.

With the arms taken previously from Portuguese policemen and soldiers, the militants of M.P.L.A. attacked the prisons of the capital Luanda in order to liberate the political prisoners, some of whom were leaders of the M.P.L.A. That was on the 4th of February 1961. Terrible things followed.

The best militants sought refuge in the forests northwest of Angola to continue the war which assumed such great proportions that in the course of 3 months all this vast area (cities excepted) was liberated from the colonialists.

The Angolan masses, struck by the example of the 4th of February, led the insurrection, yet certain groups had decided to deviate the popular struggle from its real objective of national liberation.

These groups have always served the interests of American imperialism, the objective of which is to obstruct the struggle of the M.P.L.A. and to stand in the way of their determined aim of total independence for Angola in order to establish a neo-colonial regime in the country.

However, the obstinate opposition of Portuguese Racism to *any* form of independence in its colonies did not allow these groups to follow the ordinary path towards neo-colonialism. Even when not really intending to start a revolution, arms had still to be taken up. That way alone could the struggle of the Angolan people ready for all sacrifices be reduced to a disorganized revolt. With this aim in view, these groups appealed to the negative feelings of the people,

feelings such as tribalism, racial discrimination, religious intolerance, and hatred towards all illiterates.

It was, however, inconceivable for any organisation dominated by imperialism to tread the true path of revolution.

The leadership of the M.P.L.A. — which in the meantime was carrying out the political and military formation of its militants — had introduced in the interior of Angola squadrons of guerrillas whose mission was to serve as a frame to the people's struggle. Several of them were massacred by the troops of Roberto Holden as they crossed the extreme north of Angola. Thus in 1961 a group led by Tomas Ferreira and including a man who later became a great leader — Hoji Henda — was massacred in the district of Fuesse. In 1962, another group was interrupted by the Angolan authorities near the frontier, and in 1963 another squadron was massacred near the Loge River.

For three years, on the one hand, militants of the M.P.L.A. who were underground at that time were prevented from declaring their identity and on the other M.P.L.A. guerrillas who had received training abroad and were waiting in Congo to go into Angola were prevented from crossing into the country. Thus the U.P.A. succeeded in its machinations to strike a severe blow to the heroic struggle of the Angolan people by preventing the participation of the M.P.L.A., the only force which was capable of effectively leading the war.

These obstacles faced by the M.P.L.A. and caused by the manoeuvring of American imperialism through its agent Roberto Holden and helped by the Congolese Government then headed by Cyrille Adoula provoked a feeling of malaise within the movement. Parallel to the difficulties caused to the M.P.L.A., the American advisors of Roberto Holden, convinced the latter to proceed to a political operation in two stages :

First : to bring about the fusion of his own organisation U.P.A. with a small tribal group Alliazo which had assumed the name of P.D.A. (1) for the occasion, thus creating the so-called F.N.L.A. (National Liberation Front of Angola) and later proclaiming the formation of a Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile (G.R.A.E.).

We have already stated that the U.D.A. and the Alliazo — the P.D.A. — the two organisations from which the F.N.L.A. was formed, were founded by Angolan emigrants in the Congo. Imperialists assumed the responsibility of supplying the necessary oxygen to this incredible phenomenon of Angolan nationalism.

The conciliation committee of the O.A.U. entrusted with the task of bringing together the M.P.L.A. and this particular form of Angolan nationalism, did not at first take the trouble of studying the real facts of the liberation movement in Angola. The committee accepted the 'diktat' of the Congolese Government which had just officially recognized the G.R.A.E. — Starting from the false premise, namely, the belief that the U.P.A. was the only armed party and that the M.P.L.A. has no actual influence, the O.A.U. recommended to all its member states to recognise the U.P.A. de jure as the only representative of the Angolan people.

Shortly afterwards the militants of the M.P.L.A. were thrown out of Congo-Kinshassa. The military plot aiming at the destruction of the M.P.L.A., the only truly nationalist organisation, had succeeded for the time being. But the M.P.L.A. could call upon other resources with which to overcome the crisis it was facing : eight years of clandestine work du-

(1) Angolan troops living for a long time in Congo-Kinshassa and who formed political parties on a tribal basis, e.g. U.P.A. (Union of the populations of North Angola); Alliazo (Alliance of the Bazombo tribe) which later become the P.D.A. (Democratic Party of Angola).

ring which cadres were formed according to revolutionary ideology and techniques of guerrilla warfare.

This crisis of the M.P.L.A. hardened the determination of its best militants and allowed a healthy selection of the best elements to be made. The Conference of cadres convened in January 1964 re-elected Dr. Agostino Neto to the presidency for he was a man who had led the movement well through the heavy storms which had reinforced his political and moral authority.

In the middle of 1964, the M.P.L.A. reopened the Front of Cabinda.

The war in Cabinda had a tremendous psychological impact on the whole Angolan population. It gave back confidence to all militants in the cities and in the country who had maintained their faith in the Movement.

The Cabinda 'maquis' was not only a laboratory where the M.P.L.A. applied its conceptions of guerrilla warfare and formed capable cadres, it was also the beginning of the first organized national and popular war in the history of the Angolan people.

In May 1966 a new battlefront was opened, the Eastern Front or the Third District including the districts of Moxico and of Cuando-Cubango. This Third Region comprising 391,000 square kilometres was four times the size of Portugal and is almost equal to two-thirds of France, as large as the whole of Vietnam (the two parts North and South of the seventeenth parallel put together). It spreads over 500 kilometres towards the interior and 800 kilometres in the North-South direction. The mere mention of the vastness of this area is enough to heap ridicule on the colonialist propaganda according to which "the terrorists have bases outside the country from which they infiltrate Angola, set their ambushes and run away".

Before the beginning of armed operations, the M.P.L.A. accomplished penetrating action of rendering the masses politically conscious, so much so that on the 18th of May 1966, it was a conscious population which provided material and moral aid to the guerrillas.

All the population living under the M.P.L.A. flag today are organized in action committees, organs of authority directly elected by the people. This fact is of the greatest importance : the people actually participate in authority and take part in a new form of state thus exercising their right to a democratic life; an old customary chief (the Soba) may or may not be elected and this would depend entirely on his behaviour and his capabilities; people from various ethnolinguistic groups live in a new village (the Kimbu) and this human contact greatly contributes to the destruction of old tribal barriers.

The National Liberation Struggle is the most powerful of cements in the erection of national unity.

The M.P.L.A. has established medical and sanitary clinics of the S.A.M. (Medical Assistance Service), politico-military schools for the formation of cadres and 'stores for the people'. A new life is beginning that constitutes a moral affront to the colonialist enemies.


The colonial soldiers live pent-up in their barracks, in most cases they can only receive their supplies by air.

The greatest asset which the colonialists still have is the control of the air and they take advantage of the fact to bomb the peaceful populations. Naturally their main victims are children, women, and old men for whom it is more difficult to protect themselves from aerial attacks.

During the dry season, the colonialists start "cleaning operations"; but these operations regularly end in dire defeat.


angola

zones de lutte armée en 1968



Angola — Zones of intensive armed struggle in 1968






An M.P.L.A. detachment on the
move through dense forest



M.P.L.A. fighters presenting arms



An M.P.L.A. girl fighter. A symbol of the new Angola






M.P.L.A. council of war



An M.P.L.A. detachment moves across liberated territory with banners flying







An the end of an M.P.L.A. zonal conference



An Angolan mother with her child —
the M.P.L.A. is fighting for their future

On the other hand, and besides the ambushes, the guerrillas of the M.P.L.A. launch severe attacks against the Portuguese bases, constantly harassing the enemy. One of the great tasks of the M.P.L.A. consists in helping the populations grouped in "strategic hamlets" to become free.

The colonialists control the air but the M.P.L.A. controls the land and this in itself is a decisive factor.

Our enemies themselves are forced to admit our power and that is why the racists of South Africa who are also engaged in the war in Angola declare : "recently the war in Angola has taken a dramatic turn for the West. What had at first been only a mere sting in one corner of Southern Africa has now become, in the past 11 months, a dangerous bite affecting the security of all the subcontinent. This is reflected in the increasing activity in the Caprivi district and the North and South-West African Sectors." This very same journalist also speaks of "the recent guerrilla activities in the East of Angola and the intensification of the war and the intensification of the war in the North". According to him, the situation of colonial troops in the districts of Moxico and Cuando-Cobango is the following : "the Portuguese forces are presently concentrated around Loso, east of Cuite Cuanovale, more to the South".

The Portuguese themselves cannot but admit that the guerrillas spread everywhere like oil, and calls the attention of settlers to the danger represented by the M.P.L.A.

In conclusion, this third district, considered the M.P.L.A.'s greatest success, has opened immense perspectives in all domains. It allows a rapid progression towards the generalisation of the armed struggle.

The North-Eastern front had by 1966 completely changed from its previous aspect of 1961. Very important changes were taking place.

The difficult reality imposed by the Portuguese Army induced the people to serious reflexion and led them to the realization that the slogans of the U.P.A. only led to chaos. In the first stage of the struggle, the people were made to believe that Holden would descend with the gift of freedom from heaven in a plane and many people actually went and waited in the open valley when the Portuguese planes shot several of them to death.

The "fetish" for "invulnerability" provoked the death of thousands of brave fighters; and the U.P.A. order to "attack the Portuguese en masse and openly" was the cause of considerable massacres.

The bravest amongst the population sought refuge into the forests under the influence of the M.P.L.A. militants who had remained in the maquis, and there they rediscovered the rules of guerrilla warfare. The ambushes took the place of mass attacks: a new organisation replaced the initial disorganized revolt.

It is at this precise moment that the glorious squadron Cienfuegos finally succeeded its clandestine crossing of the Congo-Kinshassa and arrived fully armed to join the maquis of the North.

For a whole week the people celebrated this historic victory with dances and speeches and meetings and feasts. It was the people's very own victory.

In March 1967, the second glorious squadron of Kamy covered the same path arriving at the traditional home of the guerrillas.

It was the most beautiful reward that the M.P.L.A. could offer to the heroic population of the North-West who, all alone, and during six years had succeeded in opposing the whole colonial army and had reached a high standard of political consciousness.

Thus, the northern front or the first district was completely changed after the arrival of these two squadrons. The M.P.L.A. proceeded to organize all the domains of the struggle.

All the conditions were now ripe for the carrying out of the great task which Dr. Agostinho Neto, president of the M.P.L.A., announced to the world in his historic speech at the beginning of 1967, namely, the expansion of the armed struggle over the whole national territory. A new phase of the Angolan people's struggle was about to begin.

In accordance with its strategic plan, the Movement opened a new front in the North-East of Angola, the Fourth district including the districts of Luanda and Madange. The first assembly of the Third district held in the month of August 1968 noted that more than one-third of the Angolan territory was controlled by the M.P.L.A., and that out of the fifteen districts into which the colonial administration had divided Angola, nine were at war, Cabinda, Zaire, Uige, Luanda, Cuanza-Norte, Lunda, Malange, Moxico and Cuan-do Cubango. The President of the M.P.L.A. announced : "other regions are being developed this year, so that we shall have no more scattered battlefronts but one and only battlefront enveloping the enemy in circles, paralysing him and rendering him inoffensive in preparation for the final blow which will culminate in the taking over of political power by our people". He added that the Headquarters of the Organization would cease to be established abroad and would hence forward function in one of the regions controlled by the Movement. This fundamental declaration illustrates an essential aspect of the strategic plan of the M.P.L.A. : the struggle must be waged within the country itself.

It is a matter of carrying on a long-term popular revolutionary war, a war that covers the whole of the national territory, surrounding the cities which are mobilized for

clandestine work, and which are to be taken over in the final stage of the war.

It is a matter of carrying on a guerrilla war which will eventually be transformed into more advanced stages without however completely abandoning its guerrilla form.

The struggle of the M.P.L.A. is a politico-military struggle with priority to the political aspect, hence the conscious care which the M.P.L.A. gives to the work of mobilizing and organising the popular masses both in the liberated areas and in the areas still under foreign control; hence also the constant concern of the M.P.L.A. in forming valuable cadres at both the political and military levels.

The liberation war of the M.P.L.A. has a profound national content, that is why it was imperative for all ethnic groups and all Angolan social strata to have taken part in the struggle. This follows naturally from the policy of the national front which does not however neglect the task of establishing a party structure within the national front itself.

Victory is certain.

**A WAR IS JUST WHEN IT IS NECESSARY AND
WEAPONS ARE SACRED WHEN THEY BECOME
THE LAST HOPE**

(Titus Livius L.IX-I)

3 GUINEA (BISSAU) AND CAPE VERT

THE WAR OF LIBERATION

The present revolt in Guinea is nothing but a natural consequence of many years of repressed frustration. If the population has lived in an apparent tranquility since the end of the First World War, it was only because they lacked leadership and were intimidated by the Portuguese repressive power. The seeds of the revolt were there and had always been there, since the first contact with the colonizers. According to Zartman, the present source of nationalism is four folds : 1) Political and national consciousness arising from external contact and education, especially from an educated elite who had frequented Portuguese schools, and the wave of independence which swept through Africa, 2) Social and national consciousness arising from unequal treatment of skilled and semi-skilled Africans in an urban context, and preferential

treatment given to Europeans, 3) Traditional animosity carried over from past opposition to Portuguese penetration and excreted by intra- and inter-tribal conflicts, and 4) Economic dissatisfaction arising out of disruption by the colonial system without accompanying benefits.

A vast field for the germination of these seeds of revolt were prepared with the foundation of the P.A.I.G.C. (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape-Vert), in Bissau in September of 1956.

Membership in the P.A.I.G.C. was very limited in the beginning, because of the Portuguese spies who where active among the population, and also because of the repressive action of the Portuguese police. Previously in 1954, attempts were made to create a Sports and Recreation Association, which was later closed down by the government because its membership was open to everyone, and because the government feared that it would become a subversive organization. One year after the formation of the P.A.I.G.C., a special Portuguese police, P.I.D.E. (International Police for Defence of the State) made its first appearance in Bissau.

A major turning point in the activities of the P.A.I.G.C. in the capital occurred on August 3, 1959, when dock workers organized a strike for better wages. The reaction of the Portuguese police was barbaric, it resulted in the killing on the spot of 50 workers who had participated in the strike. The reaction of the Portuguese police was swift because they suspected that some organized group might have been behind the strike. This event on the dock made the P.A.I.G.C. reconsider its initial plans and concentrate more in the rural areas where the Portuguese forces were weaker, instead of among urban workers, in order to avoid acts of blind repression by the police. A clandestine meeting was held in Bissau in Sep-

tember of 1959, where an eight-point programme was adopted as a guide line for the future orientation of the Party.

The essential points of this programme were : 1) to develop nationalist organizations within the cities, 2) shifting the emphasis to the countryside, 3) work to overcome social divisions within the population, 4) preparation of technical cadres for an eventual take over of the country, 5) increase revolutionary activities among the expatriated Guineans and Cape-Verdians, and collaboration with other nationalist movements in Africa. The territory was to be divided into regions and zones, and small groups were designated to organise these areas.

During the recruitment period, the Portuguese police made a tactical mistake ; they started arresting and torturing everyone suspected of having any contact with P.A.I.G.C. members or organizers, whom at the time they did not know. Many bright young men were thus forced to escape and seek asylum in the neighboring territories, and are today playing crucial roles in the independence of Guinea. If the political police had used other methods instead of sheer force, probably a great number of these cadres would have remained in Guinea and under the general influence of the government.

Upon their arrival in neighboring territories all the potential cadres and guerrillas were sent to North Africa for training, especially Algeria and Morocco. Those who had an academic inclination were sent for higher studies abroad. After the end of their training, all the guerrillas and cadres were sent back to Guinea to work in an intensive mobilization campaign. In the beginning, they had some difficulties in recruiting because the peasants were afraid of Portuguese retaliation and were not sure of the success of a war against the Portuguese. A scene of re-

cruitment among the Balantas is described by Chaliand : A recruiter arrived in a Balanta 'tabanca' (small village) and was received as a host travelling through the area. He goes to the hut of 'Humen Grade' (village elder, not to be confused with Regulo who in many instances is from the Fula tribe and a Portuguese agent, the Homen Grade usually has moral prestige and authority) and starts a conversation. At the meal time, he was offered only plain rice, and he asked the elder man : « Father how come as your host you did not give me chicken ; ever since you were born, you have worked all your life and you still cannot afford to offer chicken to a guest ? » « My son why are you asking such a question ? I had once cows and chickens, but the white man took some and I had to sell the others to pay taxes ». The recruiter than said : « So you like it ? » « No I do not but there is nothing I can do about it, they are strong and we are weak ». « Father suppose there is something that would give you a better life and make you able to afford chicken for you and your guests, would you be interested ? » « Yes I would ». « All right, there is a group of people interested in changing the situation and you can be a part of it. Do not say anything to the Regulo or to the Portuguese because they would kill you. I would like to talk to you and to all the people you trust later outside the 'tabanca' in a quiet place ».

In later meetings, party cells were created and propaganda material distributed to those who could read, to read them for the others.

Broadcasts in vernacular languages from Conakry, played also a great role during this recruitment period because they served to show the natives that there were many more people involved in the movement, who were powerful enough to use the same media as the Portu-

guese ; besides the psychological impact of listening to ones own language, dealing with problems affecting the tabanca specifically, was very important. These later meetings also played a very important role in the selection of trusted partisans and for the distribution of special functions inside the tabanca.

In August 1961, P.A.I.G.C. felt strong enough to begin scattered action of sabotage, directed mostly against communication lines, bridges, roads, etc. Two years later, after the first armed actions, the Portuguese government announced that « several well-armed groups, trained in subversive war in North Africa and communist countries, had infiltrated the territory of Guinea, in a zone equivalent to 15 per cent of the territory ».

In 1964, the Party Congress was organized inside the area held by the nationalists, and a solid fortification was set up to cope with the problems arising from the expansion of the guerrilla war. At this time the P.A.I.G.C. had basically three objectives in mind : 1) Economically, the destruction of all warehouses used for the storage of peanuts and rice, thereby paralyzing Portuguese commercial activities in the rural areas, and in those areas held by the Nationalists, to give more emphasis on an increase in rice production ; 2) On the military side, to locate the guerrilla bases deep inside the forests to avoid acts of retaliation on the population by the Portuguese troops, to create a militia force directly linked to the population for their protection, and the creation of a regular army F.A.R.P. (People's Revolutionary Armed Forces) able to fight from fixed positions if necessary ; 3) On the political side : change in the structure of the party, and the expansion of the political bureau. It now consisted of twenty members including an executive committee of seven members. The Central Committee was expanded to

sixty-five members divided in seven departments as follows :

- 1) Political Action of the Armed Forces.
- 2) External Affairs.
- 3) Political Control of the Military and of the Party.
- 4) Secretariat for the Formation of Cadres.
- 5) Security.
- 6) Finance and Economy.
- 7) Development and Coordination of Mass Organisations.

For someone to have an idea of the extension of the war, one needs only to compare the increase in troops for the last eight years. In 1961, the Portuguese had 4,000 European soldiers and 2,500 African soldiers. In 1962, the number of troops increased to 10,000 ; at the present it is over 25,000. Angola which is 30 times larger than Guinea has only three times as many troops.

In proportion to the population number, Portugal has more troops in Guinea than the United States has in Vietnam. In every war it is important to know the morale and the attitude of the two opposing sides. The attitude of the government and of the Portuguese troops can be determined by reading the orders that the military circulates among the troops ; this is a sample of some of them captured by the guerrillas :

Order No. 2 for Psychological Action
Our Cause is a Just Cause.

« In a classical war, the traditional military moral states that in a war there are two sides which pick up arms to dispute the possession of a territory, in the understanding that the civil population will remain outside

the fighting. The war thus will become first of all a struggle between the armies opposing each other.

The war that we are fighting is different, first of all it is a war to control the population, he who has it on his side has great advantages. We should remember what has happened in Guinea. Life was going on normally in the Province, and the place was peaceful, and only in peace can one work for welfare and wealth. Probably all was not yet done, and all was not perfect but we had here a good social climate.

The enemy who is hitting us today in Angola and here in Guinea, has been trying for a long time to persuade the Portuguese African people, that only after the departure of the whites can the negroes have a better life. According to them this method is the most suitable and the quickest to better the standard of living of the Africans. « Throwing the whites into the sea ». Since they started the war, there is all the evidence, that foreign powers have given them all the war material and also that it was in foreign countries where they received training.

The war was thus imposed on us by a common enemy. In Angola as well as in Guinea, and has forced us to pick up arms to defend our people, and our patrimony. All the population has not joined immediately the enemy : he has terrorized and killed the people, forcing them to escape and seek refuge in the new forest zone, where it is much easier to control

them and make them work. The enemy has palced himself, therefore, in a more favorable position to better resist our armed effort to re-establish peace and order. We all know the specific cases here as in Angola which show the terror that the enemy uses to dominate the population, this is the system that they have adopted and that they insist upon ; those who do not obey them suffer acts of reprisal or are killed. As you all know the guerrilla cannot fight an army like ours without the backing of the population : it is the population which gives them money, food, and information about us, and the shelter that they need. The guerrillas infiltrate in peaceful zones abandoning and hiding their arms to reappear in front of us as friendly persons and trying to be useful ; they know that as the military are inclined to treat as terrorists only those who are hiding and firing against us, and consequently, we do not distrust the women, the old men, the children, etc. The guerrilla utilises precisely those kinds of people for intelligence and information, and for the supply of food, medicaments and ammunitions.

This is the situation at the present. What should be do ? This being so, how could we define, and know all those fighting against us ? What should now be our goal ? What is the military moral that one should adopt confronted with this enemy ? Can we keep considering as enemies only those who shoot against us ? Should we consider as a prisoner of war the man without a uniform who is not fighting us

openly, but on the contrary is attacking us from behind? Or should we consider him as an assassin responsible for all the unhappiness? What is your opinion? We should control the population, forcing them to leave the areas which are favorable to the guerrilla, and move them to the areas where we can give them protection and security. We should give a chance to those who do not want the war to seek shelter. The guerrilla will therefore become isolated, and recognizable, and will not have the support of the population that he needs. Those who do not want, and will not do as they are told will join with the enemy who is fighting us from the forest. We should destroy those, neutralize them, and kill them. This is our mission.

Our military moral forbids us to become inefficient, amateurs, and irresponsible. If we do not destroy the enemy, if we do not consecrate all our duty and effort to this task, we will become responsible for the death of all those who will fall from enemy action. If it is true that the population plays a crucial role in this war with multiple aspects — political, economic, social, racial, military — and that it is up to the government to solve them completely, it is also true that it is up to the army to solve the military problem.

As from now, that is our task. The war is evil, but we were not the ones who started it. Once the war has begun, we will have to win it; to default is worse, even when playing football! We did not come here to spend two

years in the service, we came here to win the war. The solution of the military problem belongs to the army, and it implies killing. The commandos have a special goal in the army, to kill in order to be able to destroy the enemy, who is fighting us from the forests. Our mission is to neutralize the population and destroy the enemy, in order that all over the Portuguese world it will be possible to live in peace and work for a better future.

OUR CAUSE IS A JUST CAUSE

So, for the Portuguese government all in Guinea was peaceful and quiet until some « terrorists » with the help of foreign powers decided to impose a war on Portugal. Once the terrorists are defeated, all will return to normal again.

This kind of rationalization is oversimplified although sometimes efficient for building the morale of the troops fighting. After all, the issue cannot be made more complicated for the troops because they are coming out of a population where about half of the people are illiterate.

The starting of the guerrilla war was not very easy in the beginning, because the guerrillas were organized in small groups and only four or five among them were armed with pistols. During this time, some members of these groups would ask the director of the party for money to perform ritual ceremonies before the confrontation with the Portuguese. This is the role of the magician in the revolution. In most cases they would get the money for the rituals because they were so poorly arm-

ed that it was fair to assume that they needed a source of strength. Later when the party had acquired enough weapons and ammunition, everytime that one asked for money for rituals, the leader would hand him a machine gun saying : that is all you need now, because that is what the Portuguese have, from now on this is your god because your life will depend on it.

In the beginning the guerrilla commandos only had three weapons per group, and they were mostly resorting to the strategy of attacking small Portuguese convoys in order to capture weapons. As the groups started having more weapons, the commandos were considerably enlarged, comprising 5 sub-machine guns and 25 grenades for groups of 30 people. Many groups of 30 were formed this way, increasing, therefore, the attacks on Portuguese patrols.

The Portuguese government when it was confronted with a well organized revolt, decided also to use more effective means of counter attack. According to Chaliand, the method of counter insurgency used by the Portuguese troops is the method described in a book by Lt. Cp. T.N. Green, « Guerrilla and How to Fight It » ; the main points of this strategy are three : to defeat the guerrilla militarily, to isolate the groups from the population, to restore government authority in all the countryside, creating valid economic and social conditions.

As we have seen above, this was essentially the method stated by the military orders captured by the guerrillas. So far, the Portuguese government has failed to accomplish either of these methods. The guerrillas were not, and all indications show that they will not be defeated militarily. The isolation of the guerrilla from the population is not feasible, because the population is taking an active and increasing role in the fighting, the third

point cannot be accomplished, also because there are many areas where the Portuguese were not able to cross for two years. Portugal has lost control of more than half of the territory.

The strategy that the Portuguese follow now seems to be what General Gavin had advocated for Vietnam, before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1966. This strategy insists on holding firmly to the towns and barricading themselves behind military bases, hoping to be able to hold on indefinitely, while trying to break the resistance of the guerrillas by an intensive bombing with napalm and fragmentation bombs. Those bombings are often concentrated in small villages forcing the defenceless population to seek shelter in the jungle. Sometimes they live in the jungle during the day and return to the ruins of the « tabanca » to sleep at night. Sometimes the guerrillas are confronted with the problem of trying to persuade the population to abandon a bombed village.

As the war progresses there is always need to change the number of men in any given unit, which also varies with the importance of a given operation. The structural base of a group is 11 men, but there are also groups of five. For an ambush it is usually a group of 22 men, with a political commissar. The structure of the F.A.R.P. is basically simple ; it consists of a group commander, one political commissar and 21 men with machine guns and one heavy machine gun and one bazooka. Since the Portuguese have lately been remaining at their bases, behind heavy walls, the F.A.R.P. has been increasing the use of mortars and night attacks.

An average member of the F.A.R.P. receives two months of intensive training, and preliminary instructions in how to take care of his weapons and how to keep

them in a state of readiness. Experience is acquired later with a number of combats.

The morale of the guerrillas and members of the F.A.R.P. is very high. Many of them prefer to rest in the zone of action than to come outside to rest.

According to Chaliand, there is a fundamental difference between the methods utilized by the P.A.I.G.C. in Guinea and the methods used by most of the guerrillas in Latin America, especially in Peru, Colombia, Equador, Paraguay, and Cuba. In all these cases, the guerrillas applied the theory of focus, according to which the military aspect of a guerrilla war, is the most important. With a small number of men, a guerrilla war is started in strategically located places, and from there it slowly emerges embracing the whole country, as military victories are achieved and the allegiance of the people secured. The classical examples of this method is what the Cubans used in the mountains. The P.A.I.G.C. struggle in Guinea takes a different approach, the leaders have concentrated first in a very intensive political work before starting the military action. Here the political effort was emphasized and the military aspect of the struggle was left for the second phase of the struggle. Some people even explain the setback of the guerrilla war in Angola by a lack of sufficient politicalization in the beginning. They argue that too much emphasis was placed on the military aspect of the struggle without an effective political mobilization.

In the present struggle in Guinea, the P.A.I.G.C. is relying mostly on the animists, the traditional enemy of the Portuguese, to conduct the war. The Balanta tribe readily joined the ranks of the P.A.I.G.C. and they have been one of the most important tribes on the side of the guerrillas. On the other end, the government has been

relying on its old allies, the Fulas and the Mandingues, and has been carrying on an intensive campaign of mobilization among them, with promises of jobs and trips to Mecca and the building of new Mosques. Some times the government tries to win their allegiance by saying that if Guinea ever becomes independent, they would be forced to drink alcohol.

A Portuguese newspaper in Lisbon, referring to a speech made in Portugal by Portuguese officials to Muslim pilgrims coming from Mecca, stated that every Muslim should be happy because God Our Lord has helped Salazar, the friend of every believer to win this struggle ; he is like the Sun, that nobody can escape, he is the sword of God to fell the enemy. The blade of this sword would win wherever it shines. That the soil of Guinea is filled with Salazar's soldiers, and his power and money are very evident. This happens because God is on his side, and he will bring victory to the Portuguese side. All wise men would perfectly understand that this is the truth, the ignorants should follow those who know what they are talking about. That heroism, wealth and science are the three most powerful things Salazar is relying upon and they are all at his service. Those who doubt these words, those who are the enemy of Portugal, will only have one end, either to run away or be defeated. That was why the enemy could hide but could not escape. Running away from Salazar is like running away from sunlight ; wherever he is, he will be seen. If someone wanted to have an idea of how brave Salazar's soldiers are, it would be enough to watch them on the battle field, where they are as devastating as fire, and in peace time, they are as good as water.

In the propaganda for the animists, the government tries to convince them that in the case of independence, they would all be converted to Islam.

As the struggle gained momentum, many of the early strategies had to be revised. As we said above, during the recruitment, it was a good policy that made the recruiters work near the areas where they had affinities with the tribe. But once the area is under control, free from Portuguese presence, the P.A.I.G.C. found out that placing a man from the same tribe in command of his own tribe, frequently results in this man developing a domineering tendency and act as the boss. In general, in orders issued to all area commanders, the P.A.I.G.C. constantly reminds them that they should always remember that they are armed militants and not militars.

Another strategy that the P.A.I.G.C. had to change was the elimination of guerrilla bases, which were very useful in the beginning, providing a place for rest and supply. Later on, these bases became a burden because the guerrillas were losing their mobility because they had the tendency to remain too long in the bases, and also because the Portuguese had almost stopped coming for engagements, so guerrillas had to go out sometimes searching for them. Since the Portuguese had lost their mobility, they increased enormously the air war with intensive bombings. The bases were offering an ideal target for their planes which sometimes would catch the guerrillas inside. Their elimination has caused some disappointment to the Portuguese since the planes have lost a target.

A Portuguese correspondent for a daily paper in Lisbon visited Guinea for a brief time in 1966, and filed this report about the war : « The war in Guinea is a war without pity, which is not like the war I have seen in Angola and Mozambique... I think that the word 'painful' would be more adequate to describe the task of our troops. They know that the enemy is watching, hidden in the

thick vegetation. They know that they could be attacked at any time... They know that they will not have a minute to rest as long as their mission has not ended. At the same time, the military bases and fortified defence posts should be on the alert. The bandits are cowards. They come protected by the darkness of the night, and throw their killing objects, which the communists give them... The war in Guinea is painfully cruel. It would be a crime trying to minimize the seriousness of the situation ».

An elderly man interviewed by a correspondent of **Afrique Nouvelle** in a liberated zone, said that the struggle is hard, but if you want to prepare a field, you will have to first of all remove the bad grass.

Like any other war, this war in Guinea is also a conflict of interests and each side tries to find the best way to defend this interest. The Portuguese point of view is stated in a speech made in Portugal by the Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar to a group of deputies from the colonies, who were visiting Lisbon. He defines the conflict as the result of a subversion from outside, especially from the Soviet Union and from North Africa, that the Arabo-African world is in quest for hegemony and trying to build an empire stretching from Cairo or Algiers to the Equator and probably to the Cape. That the roots of revolt in Africa can be traced to historical hatred that the Arabs had always felt towards Europe, principally toward nations near the Mediterranean Sea, and that one should not forget the overwhelming Arab onrush which passed through the area many centuries ago on its way to the Iberian Peninsula. For Salazar, the conflict in Africa can also be traced to the 'haste' on the part of the West in carrying out the so-called 'decolonization' without taking into account all the shortcomings. From the territorial point of view, the small areas involv-

ed, the lack of natural frontiers, economic bases to support efficient administrations makes the independence of these countries rather precarious, without a collective conscience, different races whom European sovereignty had allowed to live together are now causes of political instability and wars, threatening, overcoming centuries of progress to ravage Africa, causing great bloodshed.

« ...However great the efforts made by the States responsible, there has been no opportunity or time to build up political elites, to provide sufficiently locally recruited staff for the administration and the direction of the economy, to blend races and cultures, so that national bases might be laid down on which a solid state might arise. Suddenly, apart from the mere appearances that arise from the legal constitution of organs of state, there lacks almost everywhere an efficient administrative network, coupled with the limited extent of national authority, which has wavered between an impossible concentration of power and the multiple traditional holder of authority who do not fit into the Western concept of a modern state. And the attempt had been made to impose this concept of a State on them ».

According to Salazar, States have been carved out of Africa and all of them did not have qualified personnel to make the governments function, or a national consciousness to make them a nation.

« ...South of the Congo and Rovuma rivers, which form the northern boundaries of Angola and Mozambique, there is a group of territories in which we should include Malawi

and which show common features of the greatest significance, although they present political conditions that are widely different. We can state that there lies the richest and the most developed part of Africa, with irreplaceable relations of inter-dependence, and the settlement, in some cases over successive centuries, of a considerable white population, which is in most cases responsible for directing the economy and progress of the inhabitants, and furthermore, orienting toward the West in their dominant culture and ideological alternatives. Set in this area, we find Rhodesia, awaiting an agreement with Great Britain that will recognize its independence and Zambia, whose real interest, properly understood, will link it to the group. But in any way this Southern Africa is for the time the only solid guarantee and the only ally for Western policy in Africa. The fact that Angola and Mozambique are part of the Portuguese Nation, and wholly integrated in it, and have for this reason enjoyed a longer status of independence than the rest of the nations, does not prevent but rather encourages a closer link with Europe which is maintained by some of these territories, if they continue to belong to the British Commonwealth or if they should join it. Closer relations among them all is essential to the life of each and the progress of all, and there also is the fortunate feature that all are free of the calamity of any kind of racism.

This very brief synthesis is sufficiently expressive of how heinous a crime would be,

against civilization and against the progress of the African people, to extend to Southern Africa the policy adopted in the North of the continent, as many advocate. There is already in Africa enough anarchy, misery, enough political and war-like conflicts on a grand scale to make us think twice before spreading to these areas the same causes that have produced these terrible effects elsewhere. Yet that is precisely what is being done.

...It is true that administration and government cannot be improvised, but is sought to deny them to be better prepared in the name of majorities not yet trained to carry them out. This principle, which we are not inclined to adopt, could only lead to an extension of chaos in Africa and the return to the former state of backwardness. For these reasons, I continue to admire Russia and her satellites, to feel sorry for the Africans and their passion, and not to understand the Europeans and the Americans who have not yet been able to see clearly the world's horizons, perhaps because they have been clouded by these so-called 'winds of change'...!

Our guideline is laid down for us by centuries of a history which has given the Portuguese community its Euro-African nature, and also by the lessons they have experienced, which have taught us in our contact with a wide variety of peoples. Material interests have not been the main aim of Portuguese activity in the world, for we have often sacrificed them for the progress of our inhabitants. Eu-

rope now affects to laugh at 'paternalism' toward certain still-backward races, and the 'missionary spirit', because it in fact no longer seems to believe in the superiority of its form of civilization. But we do still believe in them. As a result, we have rights and duties that impose on us a certain form of behaviour, which is unfaltering resistance to the disintegrating forces that infiltrate from foreign countries into our Overseas Provinces...»

The position of the Portuguese government is clearly stated in this speech by Salazar. Portugal, according to him, has a mission to fulfil in Africa which consists of bringing the European civilization to backward peoples of Africa. Even the rest of the world may laugh, Portugal still believes and will carry on its paternalistic position toward the Africans living in the colonies.

According to the newspaper *l'Humanité*, the position of the Portuguese government is thus inflexible. « No one in the world of good faith and reasonably well-informed, believes or even hopes that Portugal will discuss this matter with anyone ».

In order to see how far apart the Portuguese government and the nationalists are over the matter of independence, we will quote part of a speech made by Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of the P.A.I.G.C., in a zone now occupied by the nationalist forces :

« ...This day is for me a happy one. There are villagers among you that I know and others that I do not know, but everyone is dear to me. One needs courage in order to fight, but when we see so many peasants around us, this gives us courage and strength. Our job is not

only to eliminate the colonialism but to open the way in order that every child will become free, and that we will not fear everyone, neither the whites nor the blacks. Our destiny is in our own hands. We will have schools, hospitals and nobody will steal the labour of somebody else. Our job is to make our country prosper.

As I have told you, today I am very happy and I introduce to you a brother from M.P.L.A. who is fighting in Angola against the Portuguese, like we are. During the time of the Portuguese colonialists we would see Whites and today we do not see any. Now we should not fear the Whites because there are some who are our friends. There are those who came here to make a movie and there is also this one that I now introduce to you.

Long time ago, I had dreamed of being here with my people without being afraid of the Portuguese. That was twelve years ago. When I was an agronomist in Bissau, I would come to the rural areas, and I would come this way and see the people, tired by hard labour. The Portuguese were doing all they wanted ; they would take the rice, the corn, peanuts. They would take the women, not respecting the elders and they would beat the men. I dreamed that I would come one day to Djagali and would see free men and free women, and here I am, here in a liberated land and soon our land will be free.

Comrades, I have written on a little flag «With the P.A.I.G.C. we will be happy». No-

body should make any mistakes about tomorrow. We have to plant the rice, and make the peanuts grow, but we cannot sow it in the same day. Nobody will be happy without doing anything. We have to cultivate the land and take care of the rice. We cannot eat it in the same day. Some people say that even eating is tiring, the most tiring is to become free. The important thing to achieve is to have a light, and our people, men and women, created it themselves. What light ? The P.A.I.G.C. The road of our party is the road of the people. Nobody will ever again mislead our party, they are tired of being misled. Long time ago, local chiefs and the Portuguese mislead us, this is why we are fighting for independence.

Independence is not only to get rid of the Portuguese, have a national anthem and a flag... Today the people of Guinea are naked. They are still afraid of rivers, rain and the forest. We tell them that by his work, the river will be at his service, the forest will be domesticated and rain will be made use of. Our struggle is that people may have jobs, to be able to dress, to have hospitals and that the children can go to school. That is why the party exists. That is why we took up arms to get rid of the Portuguese.

The people should know that the wealth of Guinea is for them, provided that they work. We want our people to be educated, because our people should know what is happening in the world. Djagali is not the whole of Guinea, and Guinea is not the whole Earth. Our people

should know somewhere else, men work, suffer and struggle.

...All night long you have heard the sound of bazookas and mortars : it was our people attacking Portuguese bases. How many years has it been since you paid taxes to the Portuguese ? Three years, because you have become free men and free women...

How many villagers in our land have schools like we have now ? We have now 4,000 students in the north of the country ! In the time of the Portuguese, they had only 2,000 in the whole of the country. In the south we have 5,000 students. What was an illusion yesterday has become a reality today. And we have an army to defend what we have achieved... »

Cabral went on explaining the virtue of work, the equality between man and woman and that after independence, more and better schools would be brought to the area. That electricity will also be brought to this area where people do not even have candles. He added that the only power that the Portuguese have now is the use of bombs, but that the price of one single bomb is sometimes greater than the price of a whole village that is destroyed. The planes cannot stop the people from working. If planes come in the morning, we will cultivate in the afternoon, if they come in the afternoon, we will cultivate in the morning; the people would not stop even if they had to work during the night.

By comparing these two speeches, one can see that a compromise between these two positions is almost impossible. Salazar is talking about the past and Cabral is talking about the future. For the Government of Portugal, the only formula still valid for Africa is the paternalistic

way of life. The civilizing mission of Portugal has been carried on even against the opinion of the world. For him the whole independence movement is only a plot perpetrated by the communists, and the Africans are only pawns in the game.

Another interesting side of the conflict is given by a Portuguese soldier who left the Portuguese Army in Guinea and gave himself up to the nationalist forces. After his desertion, we lived in the same house for about a month and I had a chance to talk to him at length about the situation in Portugal and Guinea.

Soldier No. 338889/59 Braz da Mota Veloso, born in Vila-Verde, Braga in Portugal, was drafted and assigned for duty in Guinea. He arrived in Bissau on January 5, 1968, and on the same boat which brought him over, 50 coffins of soldiers were embarked, who had died in Guinea recently. A few days later, more coffins were sent to Portugal to the families of the soldiers to be buried there. All these casualties had occurred in January, and the number of dead he had seen, were only a part of the casualties which had occurred in the colony. In many instances, he said it was impossible to recuperate all the bodies because of the enemy fire, so they had to be left in the battle field. The war in Portuguese Guinea is a senseless war, which is costing the Portuguese a lot in man power. During 1967, Portugal had over 700 men killed in Guinea.

Later on, he broadcast a message over the Nationalist radio for the Portuguese soldiers in Guinea, and this is part of what he said :

« ...While I was in Bissau, I went often to the military hospital where I saw every kind of misery. The hospital is always crowded with war casualties. Everyday, three or four heli-

copters landed in the hospital bringing wounded soldiers. Many of our friends die in the way for lack of medical help. Even in the hospital, many of us die for lack of adequate medical facilities, and some are sent to Portugal for treatment in special planes. I have witnessed many times the departure of those wounded. The consequences of this war can be fully seen by anyone who has spent some time in the military hospital in Lisbon...

Sometime after my arrival in Bissau, I was assigned to Cufar to replace a soldier who was killed in combat. I came to Guinea as an individual replacement, after spending sometime before in the 7th infantry 1st Disciplinary Corps in Leiria. I spent four days in Cufar. It was from there that I left the ranks of the colonial army. When I left the base, I walked in the direction that I had seen planes bombing during the morning. I knew that I would find guerrillas in that area. Passing through it I saw the area bombed by the planes. The area was a populated zone and I saw all the destroyed huts although there weren't any casualties among the population. I could not understand what could be accomplished by bombing defenceless civilian population. As I have said, it was from Cufar, from the 1687th Company, that I decided to stop fighting a people who are seeking their freedom, a people who are trying to get out of slavery and not remain under a tyrannical government.

I am addressing this appeal to you, friends, to tell you that you should refuse to

fight, that the struggle of these people is a just and noble one. Every people has the right to liberty. What would we do as Portuguese if we had seen our dear people in Portugal under a foreign government, and slaves of another government? I am sure we would fight to death to become free... No friends, Africa should be for Africans, as Portugal is for Portuguese. What we are doing now in Africa is a monstrous crime that will remain for ever in our history. I am sure that someday in the future, when you look back to what you have done in Africa, you will certainly regret it... You are fighting a people who are seeking their independence, when our duty as Portuguese is to fight Salazar and his collaborators to eliminate the monopolies in Portugal. These monopolies are one of the reasons for this war... We have come to a situation in Portugal that we can no longer elect a man of our choice to the presidency. No people in their right mind will keep a man as head of the government for forty years...

The deserter Veloso was later sent, at his request, to Algeria, where he wanted to join the Portuguese democratic organisation working against the fascist Salazar regime which has its headquarters in Algiers.

HEALTH PROBLEMS IN LIBERATED AREAS

Armed struggle in Guinea has brought many hardships to the population, notably in the liberated areas concerning the economy and the welfare of the people. The least affected segment of the population is probably those of the rural population, who to some extent had been living outside the economy of the colony.

In spite of the hardship imposed by the war, the health problem in the rural area controlled by the nationalists has improved considerably. Many people in these areas are getting medical care for the first time in their lives.

The mortality rate in Guinea has always been very high, due to inadequate health facilities, and also due to a deficiency of proteins and vitamins in the diet, even though the colony is self-sufficient in food.

The first hospital built by the nationalists to cope with increasing war casualties, was situated about 90 kilometres from the border of the Republic of Guinea, in a liberated zone known as Intaum. The staff of the first hospital consisted of three doctors, eight nurses and six guerrillas with some elementary medical instructions. The staff had to carry their own material through rivers and swamps to equip their hospital.

Four days after their arrival in Intaum, the place could be considered as a fairly adequate field hospital, with facilities provided for the installation of 50 beds, divided into three major categories: surgery, orthopaedics and infectious diseases. A separate room was also provided for operations, with ceilings made out of straw and walls made with tree trunks, specially built so that during the day, illumination was mostly provided by sun-

light. Nearby, another house was built to contain a pharmacy, a storeroom, a kitchen, dining room for patients, and housing for doctors and nurses.

In the beginning, the doctors had some trouble with the ceiling in the operating room and with sterilisation, which was solved by making the ceiling out of a different material and by isolating the whole room with mosquito nets.

Three days after the arrival of the hospital staff, the first patients started arriving for treatment, coming mostly from combat zones, and some also from the local population. The first patient treated in the hospital in Intaum, was a woman from a bombed willage, who had broken bones, muscular tissues destroyed and vascular wounds. After preliminary treatment an amputation had to be made.

In most operations performed in this field hospital, massive doses of an anaesthetic (lidocaine) had to be administered by local insertion. The anaesthetic problem was a major one in the beginning, but was later solved by an efficient use of ether and penthotal, associated with chlorpromacine and morphine. For local anaesthesia, these drugs were supplements with barbiturates or morphine.

One can have a better idea of the tremendous work of improvisation required if one takes into consideration the conditions under which these doctors work. There are no facilities for cold storage of medicaments and most operations are done under torch lights.

From June to September of 1966, sixty-six surgical operations were successfully carried out. Other diseases which are common are : tuberculosis, eye diseases, protein deficiencies, vitamin deficiencies, beri-beri, intestinal parasitism, sleeping sickness, etc. As soon as the hospital started functioning smoothly, a programme was initiated

under which the doctors would pay regular visits to the tabancas.

The site of the hospital was discovered later by Portuguese planes which tried to destroy it by intensive aerial bombardment. The hospital was removed to another site in a liberated zone.

Several other hospitals were built later, having the same structure as the hospital in Intaum, and they have proved to be very effective. The problem still confronting them is the inadequate supply of medicaments like : oral and injectable anti-biotics, plasma, different types of serum, vitamins, penthotal, ether, etc.

These hospitals are now absolutely indispensable for the continuation and success of the liberation struggle. Before any major attack, a meeting usually takes place between the military commanders and the doctors of a field hospital in the area, to make plans for the evacuation and quick treatment of the casualties. Sometimes mobile units are placed near a zone of combat, capable of performing different types of surgical operations.

From the months of July through November, P.A.I.G.C. statistics show the following activities for a hospital situated near the border :

| | |
|--|-----------|
| Number of patients | |
| Civil population | 83 |
| P.A.I.G.C. troops | 153 |
| Complicated Surgical Operations | 63 |
| Minor Surgical Operations | 37 |
| Orthopaedical Operations | 14 |

Over the same period in other hospital centres, the figures show 1,629 civilians and 741 P.A.I.G.C. troops treated.

At the present, there are 30 nurses being trained in liberated areas and 50 in Europe.

WAR PRISONERS

What should be done to the war prisoners caught in the battle field ? What is the position of the P.A.I.G.C. and the position of the Portuguese Government ?

The policy of the P.A.I.G.C. is to keep them as hostages awaiting some kind of political settlement of the conflict and the development of the war in Guinea.

As a political gesture, some of them were liberated last March, to re-emphasize the position of the nationalists in relation to the war to the Portuguese people.

On the 15th of March 1968, three prisoners caught in the battlefield, were released and handed over to the International Red Cross to be sent back to Portugal.

The position of the nationalists was stated by the Secretary General of the Party during a press conference preceding the delivery of the prisoners where he stated that the liberation of the captured soldiers was a humanitarian gesture, according to the fundamental principles set up by the party. That the P.A.I.G.C. was not fighting against the Portuguese people, but rather against Portuguese colonialism. He stressed that after five years of struggle in Guinea, the Portuguese Government was still perpetrating crimes against the people of Guinea, disregarding the most elementary principle of legality and morality. That the President of the Party, Mr. Raphael Barbosa has been in jail for six years without trial with hundreds of Guineans and Cape-Verdians who are kept under inhuman conditions in political prisons and concentration camps where they are tortured by the P.I.D.E. and some of them have been cowardly assassinated. He

added that any member of the P.A.I.G.C. armed forces caught by the Portuguese are immediately executed, while others are tortured and forced to make statements that the Government utilizes for propaganda purposes.

Mr. Cabral said that the Portuguese public opinion and the intellectual community are realizing everyday the futility of this colonial war. That even inside the Portuguese Government circles, there is a realistic tendency among certain officials who are convinced that this war has already been lost. That according to information supplied by some deserters, there is an increasing number of Portuguese troops who are willing to quit the colonial war. He said also that he hopes that the liberation of those three prisoners would be an encouragement for the Portuguese people in their struggle against the Portuguese government and the colonial war which is even contrary to the interest of the people of Portugal. « Thus some people will interpret our gesture as a sign of goodwill from our side. But the same thing cannot be said regarding the Portuguese Government which is still claiming « the right and duty », along with the government of South Africa, of defending the Western and Christian civilization in Africa by using torture, terrorism, napalm and other revolting crimes against the African people. Our humanitarian gesture, which will certainly be understood by everyone who loves peace, liberty and progress, will not diminish our determination to fight until the total liquidation of Portuguese colonialism in our country. In doing so we are sure that we are serving the interest of our people and the interest of Africa.»

The position of the Portuguese Government concerning war prisoners is clearly stated in an official sheet of paper which is circulated by the government among the Portuguese troops :

« THE PRISONER »

« A soldier wearing a uniform and fighting under a flag, if he is caught by the enemy, has the right to be respected as a soldier.

« By convention he can only say his name, number, rank and unit.

« The terrorist is not a soldier because he is not wearing a uniform and therefore not facing all the risks which are inherent to the use of uniform which would identify him to the enemy as a fighter.

« He runs away, hides and mixes with the population. He is closer to an assassin than to a militar. According to rules, a fighter caught without a uniform is executed. It is also important to make prisoners. They are the only ones who can give us information and this is the reason why we don't execute them, even though we should, since they are fighting without a uniform.

« The terrorist should be interrogated with efficiency. All of them will not answer the questions that we will ask them about their organisation. However, without any exception, we should try to find out about their leaders, their comrades and where they have been acting ; this way, we will be able to find out where the headquarters of terrorism is hidden, and we will destroy it.

« If we don't get all this information from a terrorist, it is because we are inefficient and irresponsible.

« If he does not talk, we will adopt other means which are more efficient, which will immediately convince him that he should cooperate or we will execute him as prescribed by the military moral, which demands to shoot every fighter caught without uniform.

«When in combat, we are playing with our lives ; do not give the enemy a chance to kill you.

« It is not a question of torture, it is a question of efficiency.

«Make war with efficiency.

« Note : Read this to a friend of your choice and exchange opinions with him about the content of the text.»

As of this writing, eleven more Portuguese prisoners were made in the Sector North during an attack on a Portuguese base. In a press conference held in Dakar, Mr. Luis Cabral, member of the Political Bureau, told newsmen that these prisoners would be treated according to the International Convention on War Prisoners.

AHS

THE CONSTITUTION

The P.A.I.G.C. Constitution was revised, discussed and approved by the Second Congress held in Conakry from the 15th to 30th of January of 1962, on the initiative of the General Secretariat.

The Constitution can be divided into three major parts : the first deals with the structure of the Party itself and the organization of several Bureaus, the second part is a Minor Programme outlining the immediate goals of the Party, the third part, is a Major Programme which describes the goals of the Party and what the Party proposes to do once Guinea has become independent.

STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY

In order to win national independence, the P.A.I.G.C. mobilizes, organizes and directs the population in the struggle for total liquidation of colonial domination, and the seizure of power in Portuguese Guinea and Cape-Vert Islands, by the nationals of these territories.

The P.A.I.G.C. also proposes to eliminate all colonialist and imperialist relations ; to eradicate all Portuguese and foreign influence and to revive and revoke all agreements, treaties, alliances and concessions made by Portuguese colonialists with respect to Guinea and Cape-Vert. To achieve national and international sovereignty for Guinea and Cape-Vert Islands, along with political, diplomatic, military and cultural independence for the territory.

To facilitate the implementation of Party programmes, Guinea was divided into six regions and thirteen zones, and Cape-Vert in two regions and nine zones.

The basic organization of the P.A.I.G.C. is the group which is created within working circles (factories, mines, workshops, offices, docks, schools, etc.), provided that there are in these localities at least three members of the party. The group has as its task :

- To agitate and organize among the people.
- To acquire and transmit to superior organs of the party, the feelings and wishes of the people, and to recruit new members.

Next to the basic organization, is the Assembly of the Group. This assembly meets once a week, and elects people to the secretariat of the group, and chooses delegates to the sectional conference. The Secretariat of the group has a yearly mandate to direct the activities of the Group.

Next to the Assembly is a section which is formed by five groups. The Conference of the Section is the highest organ within the Section. It meets normally once a month and deliberates on issues related to the Section, elects the Sectional Committee and delegates to Regional Conferences.

The guiding group of the Section is the Sectional Committee ; which is composed of five members and having a yearly mandate, meeting twice a month. It sees to the application of resolutions adopted by the Sectional Conference, and has a Secretariat of three members. It also has a Financial Commission which is in charge of membership dues.

Sections within territorial divisions of the Party form a zone. The highest organ of a zone is a Zonal Conference

which meets twice a year at the convocation of the Zonal Committees, in order to elect delegates to the Regional Congress, to elect the Zonal Committees and to deliberate on the subjects on the agenda. The Zonal Conference may have extraordinary sessions at the convocation of superior organs of the Party, or at the request of at least two-thirds of party members within the Zone. The Zonal Committee is the guiding organ within the zone. It is elected for a year and seated at least once every two months. It is answerable to the superior organs within the party and to Zonal Congress.

The Zonal Committee is composed of 15 members, and elects within its set-up, a Secretariat of five or seven members to carry on the daily work of the Party's office, and control the fulfilment of the Party resolutions.

A Region is composed of at least two Zones and its highest organ is the Regional Congress. This Congress meets normally once every six months at the request of the Regional Committee.

The highest organ of the P.A.I.G.C. in any country is the National Congress, which meets normally once every two years at the convocation of the National Committee, having as its principal function : to study the strategy and line of action of the Party in the country and propose suitable changes to the Central Committee and to elect the National Committee. The National Committee is the executive organ of the Party in each given country. Its members are elected for a year. The National Committee is answerable to superior organs within the Party and to the National Congress. It is composed of nine members and elects a Secretariat of five members.

The supreme organ of the P.A.I.G.C. is the Congress which meets normally every three years at the convocation of the Central Committee. An extraordinary session

of the Congress may take place at the request of the Central Committee, or at the request of at least two-thirds of the party membership. Decisions arrived at by the Congress are binding and cannot be amended, replaced or revoked, except during another sitting of the Congress.

The highest instance of the P.A.I.G.C. within the interval of two sessions of the Congress is the Central Committee which is elected for three years. It is composed of 30 full members and 15 acting members, and meets ordinarily once every two months, at the convocation of its President.

The Central Committee nominates a President, a Vice-President, a Secretary and two Assistants to constitute the Standing Bureau at committee sessions. The Central Committee creates and has under its supervision, seven bureaux :

- **The Political and External Affairs Bureau.**
- **The Central Bureau.**
- **The Organization and Internal Affairs Bureau.**
- **The Economic and Financial Bureau.**
- **The Defence and Security Bureau.**
- **The Information and Propaganda Bureau.**
- **The Social and Cultural Bureau.**

Each bureau or department is composed of a secretariat of five members, with the exception of Political and External Affairs Bureau, which has fifteen members. The Secretariat of Political and External Affairs Bureau is known as the General Secretariat. It is responsible for the political doctrine of the Party, for the successful implementation of the Party's programme and directs the

activities of other bureaus and departments. The General Secretariat elects a General Secretary and a Deputy General Secretary, whose appointment is subject to confirmation by the Central Committee.

In view of the clandestine nature and circumstances in which the P.A.I.G.C. is compelled to work, membership in the Central Committee may differ from that stated in the Constitution.

In practice, the organizational structure of the Party is a little different from the Constitution, according to the needs indicated by the development of the struggle. The General Secretariat and some other organs of the Party were established outside the territory for security reasons.

From time to time, a minor revision is made in the Constitution but its major structure has remained the same.

MINOR PROGRAMME

This second part of the Constitution outlines essentially the immediate goals of the Party and its policies which the Party proposes to follow in order to achieve national independence. Thus, the Party proposes to establish an organic union with all nationalist and patriotic forces outside Guinea and Cape-Vert, as well as within, for the elimination of the Portuguese domination.

The P.A.I.G.C. will prepare the popular masses on the basis of broad mobilization and mass organization to fight Portuguese colonialism, resorting to armed struggle if that becomes the only available means of achieving national independence.

MAJOR PROGRAMME

This part of the Constitution deals with the policy of the Party once the independence is achieved. The Party foresees a national unity in Guinea and Cape-Vert and an economic, political, social and cultural link. In Guinea, the characteristics of the various ethnic groups in the social and cultural fields will be taken in account. In Cape-Vert Islands, each island or group of identical islands, along with other islands which are near each other, would enjoy a certain degree of autonomy in the administrative set-up, although such autonomy shall not be contradictory to the principle of national unity and security. The form of unity between these people, will be decided by their legitimate representatives, who will be freely elected.

After independence, the P.A.I.G.C. will struggle for all the African peoples in the continent as a whole or on regional bases.

As a form of government, the Constitution states that there will be a democratic, non-denominational, anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist government. Equality for all citizens before the law regardless of nationality, ethnic origin, sex, social achievement, religion, tendency or ideological convictions. General and free elections based upon universal suffrage by direct and secret ballot.

Economically, the Constitution calls for the liquidation of all relationships of colonialist and imperialist nature, and the achievement of economic independence for Guinea and Cape-Vert. The development and planning will be directed according to principles of democratic centralism.

Natural wealth, principal means of production, communication, social security, radio and other means of

broadcasting, information and culture, will be considered property of the State. Private exploitation can also be developed according to needs of progress and speedy economic development. Personal property especially consumer goods, family house, savings, etc., will be inviolable.

An agrarian reform will be undertaken in Cape-Vert and a limitation imposed on private rural property, in order that all the peasants may have enough land to till.

A balanced budget shall be secured and a new fiscal system created along with a national currency.

Under the title « justice and progress for all », the party will see to it that there will be full protection for the rights of workers and a guarantee of work for able-bodied persons. Forced labour will be abolished, and a stop put to the exportation of forced labourers or workers engaged under the so-called 'contracts.'

Freedom of association and encouragement of constructive participation of popular masses at all levels.

In Guinea, there will be development of the indigenous languages and of the creole dialect and an elaboration of ways and means for expressing such languages in writing, along with the development and protection of national arts.

There will be freedom of worship, freedom of adherence or non-adherence to religious sects. Churches and Mosques and other religious property will be protected. National independence shall also serve the cause of religious men.

Peaceful collaboration with all peoples of the world on the basis of mutual respect for national sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-aggression and non-interference



PAIGC People's Army men under training



An M.P.L.A. fighter on the
Eastern Front in Angola



PAIGC Secretary-General Amilcar Cabral accompanied by João Vieira (Nino) member of the War Council inspecting a unit of the People's Army



PAIGC marksmen under training



Young PAIGC pioneer girls singing radiating the people's confidence in the future



A convoy of Frelimo fighters transporting heavy weapons and other goods

Amilcar Cabral with Osvaldo Vieira, Political Bureau representative on the Eastern Front, with an unit operating in Gabu



in the internal affairs of one another's countries, due respect for equality, mutual advantage and peaceful co-existence and no adherence to military blocs.

This is the basic and theoretic structure of the Party. In reality, things are a little different due to special conditions imposed by the war in determined areas. The organization of the Party would depend sometimes on the progress of the war in a determined area, the geographical conditions of the liberated areas and sometimes upon the number of population involved.

According to the Constitution for instance, the basic organ of the Party is the group which is formed on the basis of place of work. However, a study on the spot in a liberated area will show that the group is not formed on the basis of place of work, but rather by residence. Since the region has been liberated, there is no need for clandestinity. However, in the cities where there is still a need for clandestinity, groups are formed according to the constitution.

Many other practical alterations have been introduced in the constitution. The creation of Inter-Zones which was not foreseen is a good example. In spite of all those practical alternations, the structure of the Party remains essentially the same since the Congress was held in Co-nakry in 1962.

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