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The 15th January, 1919.

The Murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht.

By Wilhelm Pieck (Berlin).

On the evening of 15th January, 1919, two of the best leaders of the revolutionary proletariat, Comrades Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, were foully murdered in Berlin in the most bestial manner by cavalry officers. It was attempted at first to represent the vile murder as a sort of lynch justice carried out by workers against the two leaders of the revolutionary movement. But the events which led up to the murder were too obvious to enable the traces of the murderers and of their confederates to be wiped out by means of this fraud.

It was Ebert, Scheidemann, Wels and their consorts who, from the very first days of the government of the social democratic Council of People's Deputies, through their press, by means of leaflets and meetings incited the soldiers and the workers against Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, and

who, according to their own admissions, received large sums of money from the bourgeoisie in order to carry on their incitement against the Communist leaders. It was these same leaders who told the troops returning from the front that there prevailed in Berlin the most savage terror, plunderings and robbery under the leadership of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and that it was the task of the soldiers to restore order in Berlin.

The social democratic Council of People's Deputies permitted screaming placards to appear in the streets of Berlin, openly calling for the murder of the two Communist leaders. It entrusted Noske, who designated himself as "bloodhound", with the organising of a band of murderers; it made the Eden Hotel in the West of Britain the headquarters of the Cavalry

Guard in order to carry out the bloody crushing of the revolutionary workers of Berlin.

The social democratic central organ, the "Vorwärts", after the crushing of the Spartacus revolt and two days before the murder of the two Communist leaders, published a poem by a Arthur Zickler, a verse of which reads:

"Many hundreds of dead lie in a row!
Proletarians!
Karl, Rosa, Radek and Company
Are not among them!
Proletarians!"

There could not be a plainer incitement to murder. Two days later the murder took place.

Both of our comrades were fully aware of the danger threatening them. But they were so much in the midst of the fight that the workers were then waging to maintain the few miserable achievements of the November upheaval, that they were not in any circumstances prepared to yield to the requests and entreaties of their nearest comrades to go into hiding for a time in order not be within the reach of every hired assassin.

When the armed onslaught of the white guardists on the Berlin proletariat set in on the 11th January, and Leo Jogisches had already been arrested, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg were compelled by the rest of the members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party to keep away from the editorial offices of the "Rote Fahne". Joint consultations and editorial work were carried out in private houses. And when, after the victory of the white guardists over the Berlin working class, murder and treachery raged through the streets of Berlin and house searches for weapons set in, it was decided to bring the two comrades to friends in the West of Berlin, as it could be assumed that domiciliary searches would not take place at once in this bourgeois quarter.

By a piece of treachery which has not yet been cleared up, the white guardists became aware on the very next day of the new place of residence of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. When the writer of this article, at about 9 o'clock in the evening of 15th January, went to visit the two comrades, the house was already occupied by the military. Karl Liebknecht was already arrested and taken away. Rosa Luxemburg was still in the dwelling and guarded by several soldiers. After a short time a number of soldiers led by two civilians came to search the house. They compelled Rosa Luxemburg, who lay in bed owing to severe headache, to get up and dress, and after a short time she and I were led out in the street, compelled to get into a motor car, which after a short journey arrived at the Eden Hotel. A number of officers and soldiers stood at the entrance who greeted our arrival with yells and abuse and acted especially towards Rosa Luxemburg in the vilest manner. She was immediately conveyed to the first floor of the hotel where a certain captain Papst submitted her to cross-examination. I was compelled to remain below in the vestibule, and heard that Karl Liebknecht was also in the hotel. The officers talked openly with each other and with the soldiers that none of us must be allowed to leave the hotel alive. After a short time I was likewise brought to the first floor and compelled to stand in a corner of the corridor with my face to the wall, and at the same time was watched over by two armed soldiers. I heard Karl Liebknecht led downstairs and how he was abused and spat upon by the bourgeois "ladies and gentlemen" assembled on the staircase in this feudal hotel. After a short time the same thing occurred on the removal of Rosa Luxemburg. From the vestibule of the hotel I heard a great tumult and a women's screams. A serving maid from the hotel rushed up to the first floor and, quite beside herself, called out to another serving maid: "No, I shall never forget the sight, how they beat the poor woman and dragged her along the ground."

Soon afterwards the soldiers compelled the hotel guests to retire to their rooms and the house became very quiet. Then the two soldiers who were guarding me were relieved by a soldier who received whispered instructions from an officer. This soldier was the hunter Runge who had already struck down Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg and who, according to his own confessions given later, had now received instructions to shoot me at once in the corridor. I had, however, turned round and observed the whole thing, and refused to obey the order to turn my face to the wall. As a result the murderer Runge became so nervous that he even let his rifle fall out of

his hand. He then received instructions from the officer to take me away from the hotel, but I immediately went resolutely to Captain Papst's chamber and demanded of him my immediate release. I declared myself to be a bourgeois journalist and succeeded in deceiving the officers so far that they ordered investigations regarding my identity and brought me away under military arrest. After a time and after being conveyed from one prison to another, I succeeded to escape. While I was still in prison I received the newspaper reports of the foul murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht by the white guardists.

In the book written by E. I. Gumbel, "Four years of political murder", the murder of our two comrades is described as follows, based on evidence adduced at court proceedings:

"Karl Liebknecht was conveyed from the hotel in a motor car. The hunter Runge struck him twice on the head from behind. Karl Liebknecht sank down in a semi-conscious condition. The officers stood round Liebknecht without preventing the blows. Instead of proceeding to the Moabit prison, the car drove along the New Lake in the direction of Charlottenburg Chaussee. At one spot where a completely unlighted footpath branched off, something was alleged to go wrong with the car. Liebknecht, who had not yet come to himself, as a result of the blows on his head, was asked whether he was able to walk. Two people supported him on the right and the left, two went before and two behind him. All were armed with loaded pistols and hand grenades. After proceeding a few steps Liebknecht was shot because, it is alleged, he made an attempt to escape. The first shot was fired by Captain von Pflugk-Hartung. The deed the motor car was able to proceed. The car was afterwards delivered as that of an "unknown" to the police station in the Zoological Garden.

When Rosa Luxemburg was brought through the main entrance of the Eden Hotel, the same Runge stood at the door. Captain Petri had given orders that care should be taken that Rosa Luxemburg should not come into prison alive. When Rosa Luxemburg came to the door, Runge struck her twice on the head so that she fell to the ground. Upper-Lieutenant Vogel who was in charge of the transport did nothing to prevent this. Rosa Luxemburg was pushed into the wagon. As the wagon drove away a man sprang from behind and struck her on the head with a hard instrument. On the way Lieutenant Vogel shot Rosa Luxemburg through the head. The wagon drove between the Landwehr Canal and the Zoological Gardens. By the Landwehr Canal there stood a group of soldiers. The motor stopped, the soldiers, on the order of Vogel, threw the corpse into the canal. The perpetrators of the murder had themselves photographed on the following day while engaged in a carouse."

Search was made for a long time for the corpse of Rosa Luxemburg, until at last, on the 31st of May, that is four and a half months after her murder, Rosa's corpse was found in the Landwehr Canal near the Zoological Garden. She was buried on the 13th of June in the cemetery in Friedrichsfelde, at the same spot where, on the 25th of January, Karl Liebknecht was buried along with 32 workers who had been shot. Every year on the 15th of January and 13th of June the Berlin proletariat demonstrate at this spot, on which a huge monument has been erected to the dead heroes of the revolution.

The enormous blood-guilt which the social democratic leaders bear for the vile murder of these two revolutionary leaders of the proletariat and of the workers, numbering more than 15,000 in all Germany, who were slaughtered, will remain unexpiated until such time as the German proletariat finds the power to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie, to set up the proletarian dictatorship and thereby put an end to the treachery which the social democratic leaders are still committing against the proletariat.

Trust capital is openly preparing to deal fresh blows to the working class. Imperialism is making its preparations in order to crush the first Workers' State in the world. The social democratic leaders are prepared to lend the bourgeoisie assistance in all its measures for exploiting, plundering and crushing the working masses. It is characteristic that at the present time, when there is an intensification of the antagonisms between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, Noske is again brought forward by the S. P. leaders and put up as a candidate for the Reichstag. Noske the "bloodhound" is the symbol of the activity of the social democratic leaders.

The hands of these leaders are stained with the blood of Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Liebknecht, Leo Jogisches, Eugen Leviné and of the 15,000 slaughtered proletarians who fell as victims of the social democratic Noske-policy. Never to forget this and to produce in the proletariat the revolutionary force, to weld it together in a powerful united front, to crush the counter-

revolution, to set up in its place the Soviet power, and thereby clear the way for the establishment of Socialism — that is the task, the fulfilment of which by the proletariat will best serve to honour the memory of its two great leaders who were so shamefully murdered and also of its fellow fighters who have been slain.

For the Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions.

By A. Lozovsky (Moscow).

More than three years have passed since the Third Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions, and therefore the Fourth Congress will be called upon to review a very important and eventful period in the development of the international labour movement.

At the close of 1927, the international trade union movement was characterised by the following features:

1. The connections between the reformist leader organisations of the trade union movement on the one hand and the capitalist States and the League of Nations on the other, were consolidated to an extraordinary degree. We may even speak of a nationalisation of the reformist unions.

2. As a result of this interweaving of the reformist trade unions with the bourgeois State, the trade unions became in the hands of the big employers' organisations an instrument for carrying out the rationalisation of production at the cost of the working class.

3. The orders received from the capitalists are executed by the reformist trade unions under the cover of democratic phrases and of much talk of economic democracy. Equal rights for capital and labour, creation of economic councils (in France and Germany), schemes for profit-sharing, transformation of society by the foundation of workers' banks and the like.

4. This united front of the employers' organisations, the bourgeois State, and the reformist trade unions, has induced broad masses both of the organised and of the unorganised workers, to seek new forms of fighting and new methods of self-protection, since they are forced to struggle not only against the employers and the State but also against their own trade unions.

5. In their search for new forms of defence against the offensive of the capitalists, the workers have come to have recourse to the tried methods of revolutionary tactics and very frequently employ them in practice without even being aware of it themselves.

6. One of the characteristics of the change that has taken place in the broad working masses is the desire for a united front both within their own countries and especially with the trade union movement in the Soviet Union.

7. This tendency in the direction of the working class of the Soviet Union is an outcome of the economic advance of that country, which has practically demonstrated that a victory of the revolution and a development of Socialism in a single country are by no means impossible.

8. Alongside of this revolutionising of the masses, which assumes the most varied forms, according to this situation, mention must also be made of the increased interest of the international proletariat in the Chinese revolution.

9. This interest may be explained by the fact that during the last few years the events in China have assumed a stormy revolutionary character, in which connection the fight of the Chinese people against the foreign imperialists is so closely and organisationally connected with the fight of the working class of the imperialist countries against their own bourgeoisie, that the workers cannot help feeling interested in the events occurring in the Far East.

10. Simultaneously with the awakening and the growing activity of the Chinese working class, the activity of the workers' movement along the entire coast of the Pacific has grown, quite particularly in the colonies and semi-colonies, in which connection this growing movement has inevitably turned to-

wards the trade union movement of the Soviet Union and towards the Red International of Labour Unions.

11. In the background of this convulsion and of the new events occurring in the entire trade union movement of the world, a particularly mean and miserable rôle is played by the Amsterdam International, whose leaders are clinging desperately together, so as to set up a common barrier against the menacing Communist danger.

12. At the same time there is a growth in the importance and the rôle of the Red International of Labour Unions, which has enrolled in its ranks the most important troops of the labour movement of Asia and those of quite a number of South American countries.

13. The increase and development of the labour movement in the new countries has found expression in the creation of a trade union secretariat for the countries of the Pacific and in the preparatory work for the foundation of a Latin-American trade union secretariat. The significance of the organisations already founded and in the process of formation lies in the fact that these two bodies comprise both the trade unions affiliated to the Red Trade Union International and such as are outside this International.

14. Finally it should be pointed out that the international Labour movement is on the eve of a strike wave, which will sweep one country after another and which is to be looked upon as a forerunner of great political and economic fights.

Such are the chief characteristics of the position of the international Labour movement at the close of 1927, and this is the starting point for establishing the next tasks of the revolutionary trade union movement.

The next question is, what is to be done and how is it to be done? How is this increasing revolutionising of the masses to be exploited in the interest of the proletariat? The peculiarity of the position lies in the fact that the revolutionising process is noticeable both inside and outside the reformist organisations. There cannot be the least doubt that the working class as a whole has made a turn to the left. Thus very big groups of Britain workers, who formerly voted for the Conservatives, Liberals, or for others, now vote for the Labour Party. At the same time, part of the Labour Party, formerly adhering to men like MacDonald and Thomas, are now disappointed in these leaders. Workers who not very long ago placed their confidence in representatives of the General Council, have now turned away from them. Much the same process can be traced in other countries.

In view of these facts the main task now consists in discovering forms of organisation for the consolidation of this radical tendency. In itself the revolutionising of the masses cannot have important political results save if the Red International of Labour Unions and its sections succeed in conducting the stormy torrent into a firm organisational channel, thus consolidating this tendency by organisation. This brings us to speak of one of the weakest points of our work, i. e. the disproportion between the political influence of the Red International of Labour Unions and its sections on the one hand and the consolidation of this influence on the other. In certain countries, quite particularly in France, this lack of proportion is especially noticeable. In the first place the organisations in France are not sufficiently stable, the workers come and go, and every year the composition of certain of the organisations changes by more than 50 per cent.

The Fourth Congress will have to deal with the complicated problem of the further struggle for the united front and for trade union unity in its entire extent. Does this question appear to be exactly the same as it was on the occasion of the Third Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions? Naturally not. These three and a half years were rich in experience in regard to the execution of united front tactics and trade union unity. This experience must now be taken into consideration, classified according to countries and according to professions. We shall have to decide how this united front is to be realised "from the bottom up", what organisatory forms it should assume, considering each country separately. Therefore it is quite especially important, that all delegations to the Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions should come provided with concrete material as to these questions and, what is of particular importance, with concrete suggestions. This question deserves the very closest attention on the part of all sections of the Red International of Labour Unions.

One of the great questions at the Congress will undoubtedly be that of the fight against imperialism and the threatening danger of war. It may be said that there is full clarity on this point in our organisations, but it would be wrong to say so. The more we know of what is happening in this connection, the more convinced we are that the Congress will have to deal with a very great amount of theoretic and practical work. And that not only because there are pacifist tendencies noticeable in the broad masses and because fairly extensive groups of workers do not believe in the possibility of war in the near future, but rather because even our trade unions have no very clear conception as to what levers must be worked for the purpose of effectively combatting the war danger in a revolutionary way.

The Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions will have to examine this question from a trade union standpoint and point out concrete tasks. In the case of warlike operations, we must prove not only theoretically but also practically that there must be no repetition of the year 1914. To be able to prove this at the most acute and critical moment, it is necessary that, in the course of long years we should prepare the entire working class and our own organisations for the coming storm.

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Like all former Congresses, the Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions will devote much attention to the Labour movement in the colonies and semi-colonial regions. Seeing that the working class and the trade unions of China have come most to the fore during the last few years, the tasks facing the Chinese trade unions during the revolution will be the subject of special consideration.

Quite apart from the Chinese trade unions, which bear upon their shoulders the great weight of the struggle against the internal and external enemies, the trade unions of India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and a whole number of other countries play a very prominent part in the fight for national and social emancipation.

In its treatment of the Labour movement in the colonies and semi-colonial territories, the prospective Congress will have to undertake a differentiation and specification of the facts submitted to it. Upon the whole, the Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions will have to reply to a great number of questions, not only as regards the colonies and semi-colonies, but also in respect of the imperialist countries. This refers quite particularly to the colonial countries, however, since there the trade union movement is yet young, so that errors committed are more easily made good than is the case in countries in which definite forms of organisation and a hard and fast organisatory system have evolved and assumed a permanent form.

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A special point on the agenda of the Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions is the question of the tactics to be observed by adherents of the Red International of Labour Unions in Great Britain. For the decision of this question, not only the experience made during the last few years in Great Britain, but also the revolutionary experiences in other countries will have to be taken into consideration. All objective circumstances speak for the fact that Great Britain is likely soon to experience an aggravation of social struggles,

and that despite the energetic attempts on the part of the General Council leaders to bring about "industrial peace". All such struggles, however, are doomed to fail, if they are carried on under the guidance of those men who deliberately abandoned their position in May 1926. For this reason the question as to the tactics of the Minority Movement in Great Britain, as to the methods of capturing the masses, and the process to be observed in instilling our revolutionary fighting methods into the masses, gains quite special importance.

At the same time I should like to raise the question of the immediate tasks facing the revolutionary wing of the Labour movement in Japan. Naturally the situation in Japan is different. In Great Britain the trade union movement can look back on a long history, while in Japan it is still quite young and comprises a far smaller proportion of the working class. In Japan, however, the situation is quite peculiar. We there see a rising wave. The labour movement is extremely split up. There is a serious revolutionary wing but it controls only a small percentage of the working class. The task of gaining hundreds of thousands of Japanese workers for the trade unions is a question of great historical importance, and therefore we shall also pay attention to this country, which plays so prominent a part on the shores of the Pacific.

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That item of the agenda which appears under the head of "problems of organisation", covers all questions of daily practice in our revolutionary trade union movement. In this respect we shall have no further general principles of organisational development to work out, since this has already been done by former Congresses. At this Congress, however we shall have to investigate the organisatory condition of our sections, and of the minorities, the reasons of the weakness noticeable in the independent organisations and minorities, the relations between the minorities and the independent unions, the activity of the existing factory councils and the creation of new councils, the reasons of their possible inactivity, the methods of work among the masses, the position of our finances, the mutual relations and the aid institutions in the unions, the question of fighting funds, and other matters. We need self-criticism, severe and pitiless self-criticism. Only thus can we derive useful lessons from our weaknesses and shortcomings.

Finally we shall have to treat the very serious question of the International Propaganda Committees. We already possess some such committees, which do far more work than the respective internationals. What next? Should they be left in this condition or should steps be taken for enlarging their functions, as some comrades suggest? All these questions demand detailed consideration. The organisation of all our revolutionary forces in a vertical direction is a question of the greatest importance. To content ourselves in this connection with some resolution or other, to repeat what was already said some years ago, would be senseless. Here, as in regard to the other questions, a very definite expression of opinion on the part of the delegations is necessary. Only our collective experiences can help us to make another step forward on the way of a better organisation of all revolutionary forces.

Of the other items of the agenda, the winning of the youth, the recruiting of the young workers for the trade union movement deserves special attention. This is a matter of paramount importance in countries like France or Czechoslovakia. Though there are resolutions to hand in regard to these questions, they will yet have to be formulated once again. The question of creating trade union sections will have to be thoroughly considered. This problem has already been discussed with the Young Communist International. The Congress will have to pass its final verdict on the matter.

Very much attention will also have to be paid to the matter of educational work. Though this point is not one of the separate items on the agenda, a special commission will yet be appointed in the section for the discussion of this problem. The discussion in regard to the creation of a trade union cadre must be set on foot. In this respect little has as yet been done. While the bourgeoisie attempts to demoralise the children of the working class by means of its schools, and while the Social Democrats and reformists co-operate with the bourgeoisie in feeding the children in their schools with reformist wisdom, we have as yet done very little. The erection of schools in each

individual country, the establishment of international schools, of finishing courses, the organisation of correspondence courses, the provision of the requisite literature, and so on, are all points that will have to be dealt with, while at the same time our **trade union press** will have to be made the subject of detailed discussion. We already possess a very extensive revolutionary trade union press, but it is in need of a thorough reform. And in this connection, as in all others, we shall have to appear at the Congress armed to the teeth.

Among the questions to be discussed by the sections and commissions, there is that of **emigration and immigration**, a question which is of quite particular importance for a whole number of countries. It is of particular significance in the case of **France**, where there are millions of imported workers. True, on this subject, too, a certain resolution is to hand, but we shall have to see how much has been done towards its realisation and if little has been done we must know the reason why.

Besides all this, the coming Congress will have to deal with the **work among the women** and to ascertain on the strength of experience how much has been done in this respect. It will also be of interest to find out how large the proportion of women is in our minorities, in the leading organs of those minorities, in our independent unions and their leading organs. I am under the impression that we are advancing far too slowly in this respect. The Congress will have to take the matter in hand most energetically if we are to abolish conservatism and put an end to routine.

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Among the numerous items on the agenda, there is also one which refers to the **fight against Fascism and the Fascist trade unions**. This question is of all the more importance, seeing that under our very eyes there is in some countries a political and in other countries an organisatory fusion of Fascism and Reformism. The Reformists are very fond of putting Bolshevism on the same level as Fascism, on the grounds that both of them are inclined to resort to force in fighting their opponents. This demagogic comparison must not discourage us. For us the main question is against whom this force is employed. Fascism employs force against the workers, Bolshevism against the bourgeoisie. Meanwhile the co-operation between the Reformists and the Fascists becomes daily more apparent. Apart from the fact that the American trade unions are in no way to be distinguished from the Fascist ones, we see this co-operation in **Italy**, where some of the most prominent Reformists simply placed themselves at the service of the Fascists. In quite a number of other countries we see the reactionary Fascist Governments making use of the Social Democrats and Reformists for the purpose of fighting the Communists and the revolutionary trade unions.

The fight against the Fascist trade unions is not only a general political fight, it is a serious, organisatory, and daily struggle. In those countries in which the Fascists have succeeded by force in embodying a small percentage of unenlightened workers in their organisations, our organisatory work must be increased, special attention being paid to the object of saving these workers from the demoralising influence of the Fascist trade unions. Very frequently backward workers who are disappointed in the Reformist and Social Democratic leaders, go over to the Fascist trade unions. Such developments are to be observed in **Germany**, and it is therefore our duty to pay serious attention to this point and to set up a practical programme of measures for the purpose of fighting against the permeation of the workers' organisations by Fascist demoralisation.

* * *

This Congress will also have to work out a serious **programme in regard to the fight for social legislation**. None of the promises was kept, which had been given immediately after the war by the Reformists and the intimidated bourgeois Governments. There is hardly a trace of all the achievements of the reformist-bourgeois bloc in regard to social legislation. The last few years have been characterised by the robbery of a series of elementary achievements of the working class. In many countries the eight-hour day has become little more than a matter of fiction. It will be necessary, moreover, to work out a detailed programme in regard to the protection of women,

the protection of the youth, night labour, unemployment, relief in the case of invalidity, sickness, old age, etc.

All these questions appear to be perfectly lucid. But the actual task before us does not consist in the recognition by the leaders of the trade union movement of the usefulness of social legislation, but rather in the fact that a system of social legislation be made the centre of the attention of the broad masses, that a decisive fight be started, the masses mobilised to fight for concrete demands, and thousands and millions of workers united for the purpose of wresting from the bourgeoisie a real improvement in their position. Social legislation is a matter that ought to attract the attention of all revolutionary workers and all adherents of the Red International of Labour Unions. We must put up a fight for the daily interests of the working class, a fight for partial demands, without of course for a moment forgetting our final aim.

The Congress will open in March 1928. So that this Congress may treat all questions exhaustively and so that all organisations affiliated to the Red International of Labour Unions may benefit by the approaching Congress, it is requisite that all organisations should discuss the **agenda** in detail at their district and provincial sessions and submit their suggestions to the Congress. We must not come to the Congress empty-handed, nor improvise our suggestions on the spot. We must approach the Congress with a collective expression of opinion; we must collect and study the experiences of the last few years and inform the others both of the good and of the bad side of our activity, of our successes and of our failures. It is only by such a serious preparatory work for the Congress that serious and useful results can be attained.

We must not follow the example of the Amsterdamities, whose congresses make such a lamentable and ridiculous impression. I need but remind you of the Paris Congress and of the squabble that resulted in the matter of the secretarial appointments. Every organisation affiliated to the Red International of Labour Unions and every revolutionary minority ought to employ the time which has still to elapse before the Congress for the purpose of a serious and considerate preparation for the Fourth Congress of the R.I.L.U., so that all problems facing the international Labour movement may be comprehensively discussed and the capture of the broad proletarian masses may be promoted.

POLITICS

From the Border States.

Government Crises and Regroupings in Latvia, Finland, and Esthonia.

By Balticus.

The recent conflict between **Poland** and **Lithuania**, which showed the whole world how near we are to a repetition of such catastrophes as convulsed mankind in the great war and how great the danger of war actually is, has again drawn general attention to the **Baltic States**.

The latest events clearly proved that these small States represent the arena in which the so-called Great Powers are wont to intrigue and that we can there trace all the endeavours of **British imperialism** to construct an anti-Soviet bloc. For this reason the practically simultaneous change of government in the three Baltic border States **Finland**, **Esthonia**, and **Latvia** cannot but interest the broad working masses of Europe.

In **Latvia** Skujeneck has retired. Skujeneck was at the head of a so-called Left Government, in which the Social Democrats played the principal part. The Government retired because it was no longer in possession of a solid majority and was constantly exposed to the uninterrupted attacks of the bourgeois parties of the Right. Why was the Government the object of such unintermittent attacks? Not on account of its home policy. As a number of Social Democrat leaders admit, the home policy of the Left Government was not calculated to give the bourgeois parties any grounds for complaint. In this respect the Social Democrat Ministers failed to differ at all from their bourgeois colleagues. The Communist Party continued to be exposed to the most brutal forms of persecution. As a sign of protest against the prison regime, the political prisoners were

forced to resort to hunger strike. The Left wing of the trade union movement likewise experienced all the rigidity of the Social Democratic regime. The trade unions were dissolved and the most active leaders of the trade union movement arrested.

Has the Left Government developed any new activity in the way of its taxation, labour, or social policy? Here again we must answer in the negative. For surely it cannot be counted to the credit of the Government that its motion in regard to a law on courts martial was carried. The reasons of discontent with the Skujeneck Government must be sought in the foreign policy of the Left Coalition of the Social Democrats, who were obliged to defend themselves against certain attempts on the part of the Right parties, aiming at the liquidation of Latvian industry and the transformation of the Republic into an agrarian State of farmers. The Skujeneck Government could not but recognise that the only way of counteracting these tendencies lay in an economic approach to the Soviet Union, without which there can be no possibility of a development of Latvian industry, and in the maintenance of friendly relations with that country.

It was for this reason that the Skujeneck Government concluded the commercial treaty with the Soviet Union and drafted a guarantee agreement. The Government entered upon these measures after considerable hesitation. So as not to expose itself to the charge of an orientation in accordance with the Soviet Union, it also concluded other agreements. Thus the Left Government signed an agreement in regard to the customs union with Esthonia and recently also a commercial treaty with Poland. The attempt to carry on an independent policy, however, could not be made with impunity by these small States, exposed to the pressure of the Great Powers. Foreign influence was frequently brought to bear against the Left Government. In all the attacks of the Opposition the British and Polish influence could be traced. The British diplomats even eschewed their usual "correct" manner of procedure. Woon, the British Ambassador, openly attacked the commercial agreement between Latvia and the Soviet Union.

The Skujeneck Cabinet has retired. It is still unknown by what kind of Government it will be succeeded. In any case its fall is a drastic illustration of the endeavours of Great Britain to form a hostile ring of dependent States around the Soviet Union, and that without regard to the vital interests of the countries in question. Almost simultaneously with the retirement of the Latvian Government, the Social Democratic Tanner Cabinet retired in Finland, being followed by a Government under Sunila, composed almost entirely of representatives of the petty-bourgeois agrarian party. The Finnish Social Democratic Government, which was in office for almost a year, could even less arouse the discontent of the bourgeois parties than the Latvian Government. The Tanner Cabinet was an obedient tool in the hands of the bourgeoisie as regards both its foreign and its internal policy.

The foreign-political significance of the Government crisis in Finland becomes apparent if we consider in what hands the conduct of foreign affairs has now been placed. Procopé, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs is a well-known opponent of the Soviet Union and adherent of the plan of forming an anti-Soviet bloc out of the Baltic border States; he is likewise known to be a great friend of Poland. It was indeed no mere matter of chance that at Warsaw, where he was formerly Minister to the Polish Republic, he was treated, at his departure, with the utmost ceremony, nor yet that the Polish press entertains the most elaborate hopes in his regard. It trusts that Procopé may succeed in doing what another Finnish Foreign Minister — Holsti — failed to do in 1921, i. e. in coercing Finland into joining the anti-Soviet bloc with Poland at its head. The Social Democrats were thus fully capable of conducting the ordinary bourgeois policy; for the realisation of an elaborate scheme Great Britain however needs somewhat more reliable executors.

Less importance attaches to the change of Cabinet in Esthonia. The Temanda Cabinet has retired, and in its place a Cabinet has been formed under the conduct of Tönisson. The British and Polish influence in Esthonia is so strong and that country has so thoroughly become a British colony, that no alterations need be expected to result either in the home or in the foreign policy. Consequently it is of no particular importance that the Labour Party should have taken the place of the Christian Democratic in the Government Coalition. Both

the police regime within the country and the pronouncedly hostile policy towards the Soviet Union will remain unchanged. That appears quite plainly from the declaration of the new Prime Minister.

In summing up we may say in regard to the Government changes in the Baltic border States, that in connection with the aggravation of the situation in Eastern Europe, which found expression in the conflict between Poland and Lithuania, the more active and more pronouncedly anti-Soviet elements have begun on all hands to accede to power, as though at a word of command.

It is not difficult to guess whose command this really is. The British and Polish diplomats are developing quite extraordinary activity in their endeavours to prepare the way for the formation of an anti-Soviet bloc and a declaration of war on the Soviet Union. The first step in this direction, the occupation of Lithuania by Poland, met with a serious obstacle in the shape of the Soviet Union. Therefore the situation must be better prepared and the Soviet Union must be isolated by a wall of hostile States. This policy threatens the workers of the Baltic border States with an aggravation of the capitalist yoke and the workers of the Soviet Union and of all Europe with new war dangers. Therefore the fight against the British imperialist intrigues in the Baltic border States must be allotted its place on the programme of the proletariat of all Europe.

The Communist "Spy Plot".

By Saint-Preux (Paris).

The plot of the so-called "Communist spies", which was made the subject of a trial in July 1927 and has just now again been brought before the criminal court of appeal in Paris, is not so much a mere measure of repression as rather a Government operation on a large scale in the realm of foreign politics and home politics alike. It is indeed necessary to inquire into the conditions under which, in April 1927, the respective machinery was put into operation by the political police at the express command of the imperialist French Government.

In April 1927, the awakening of the revolutionary Chinese people had reached its height. The Communist deputy Jacques Doriot was threatened with the forfeiture of his Parliamentary immunity for having in China, done his duty consequentially as a conscientious Communist, while all blows of the capitalist Governments of Europe were raining upon China and upon the Soviet Union, the natural protector of all nations engaged in a fight for their freedom.

Between January and April, 1927, in particular, there was an aggravation of the anti-Soviet crusade under the leadership of Great Britain. Chamberlain thought the moment opportune for opening hostilities. He is quite convinced that the Soviet Union the first proletarian State, must be overthrown, if all the openly apparent colonial and semi-colonial movements are to be finally crushed. On the other hand he is convinced that an open declaration of war on the Soviet Union is an impossibility. In the meantime, however, there is the expedient of an economic war, a war which does not break out with a roar of cannon and which does not require relatively unreliable armies but which can be undertaken with sole support of the capitalists of all the world.

Two great countries of the West have, in the opinion of Chamberlain, committed the mistake of resuming official relations with the Soviet Union. These are France and Great Britain. It is by these countries, therefore, that the signal for the offensive must be given. Let France and Great Britain break off their relations with the Soviet Union. The example is sure to be followed, and in this way the first object, that of isolation, will be attained.

For a long time the British imperialists, who feel themselves immediately assaulted by the young Chinese revolution, have been endeavouring to prove to the French imperialists that it is now their turn, so as to draw them in this way into the fight against the Chinese revolution and into the tacit fight against the Soviet Union, these two parallel operations being the main factors in the whole concerted programme.

May 12th saw the coup of the British Government against the seat of the trade delegation of the Soviet Union in London, only a few weeks after the coup arranged by Chang Tso Lin against the Legation of the Soviet Union in Peking. On May 17th, Briand and Chamberlain had a long interview on the occasion of a trip made by the French President, M. Doumergue. Finally, on May 26th, the commercial relations and the diplomatic relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were broken off.

Now it is necessary that the French Government should also follow the lead given by the British Government. The political police in France was therefore instructed to find a pretext and to dress up a "plot", which should compromise at the same time the Soviet Legation in Paris, the Communist Party of France, and the revolutionary trade unions.

The growing influence of the Communist Party of France naturally gave the Government ground for misgivings. The French Communist Party, at the head of the most enlightened majority of the workers and peasants in the country was supported by the revolutionary trade unions, which numbered more than half a million members.

At the same time when Chamberlain had got to work, the French Government sprang its own "mine" on April 9th and confronted the public opinion of France with the great action against the "espionage plot".

Was this supposed to be a purely political plot? Past experience had shown that there was nothing in that direction. The previous "plots against the security of the State" had failed to show the desired results. It was therefore necessary to enter the realm of national defense and to choose an accusation more liable to excite public opinion. Therefore "espionage" was chosen.

But who could be accused of espionage? Surely such as work in State enterprises or in the arsenals. There exists a revolutionary trade union of the employees of State enterprises. That was, therefore, the starting-point for the accusation against Dadot and Ménétrier, two leaders of the said trade union.

The next thing was to find a means of implicating the Communist Party as well and compromising some, preferably prominent, members thereof. There exists one Crémét, a municipal councillor and member of the political bureau of the French Communist Party, frequently commissioned to travel to Moscow. Surely the most suitable person to "represent" the Communist Party in this case of espionage. Thus the connection between Paris and Moscow would appear undeniable.

But this is not all. For the purpose of attaining the object the French Government had in view, the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Legation must be involved. The police knew that one of the female employees of the Soviet Legation was married and that her husband, a painter, was a Russian citizen. That was a safe proof of the collaboration of the Legation with the French spies. And the result was the impeachment of Abraham Bernstein and also of Stepan Grodnicki, a Lithuanian student, who had had the misfortune to be observed in the Gaumont-Palace cinema in the company of Ménétrier.

In going through the police records, it was discovered that there was a trade union review and that one of its collaborators, Pierre Provost, was an active member of a trade union. He had, moreover, been seen entering the secretariat of the Communist Party.

Now all the evidence was cut and dry: revolutionary trade unions, Communist Party, Soviet Legation, Moscow.

The espionage trial is a great political machination, directed, parallel with the action of the British Government, against the Soviet Union and intended to deal the Communist Party and the revolutionary trade unions a serious blow.

No fewer than seven comrades, all excellent fighters of the revolutionary French proletariat, are the victims of this struggle; they have been sent to prison for two, three, and even five years, the victims of the Government, of the police, of their paid agents provocateurs, and of one or two unconscious fools who were induced by cowardice to place themselves in the service of the political police.

Poincaré's Campaign against the the Alsatian Autonomists.

(From the "Humanité" of January 2nd, 1928.)

By Marcel Fourrier.

Poincaré has succeeded in finding his "conspiracy". True, his police agents had to go rather far afield to find it, all the way to Alsace-Lorraine. In these re-annexed provinces the most pronounced chauvinism is rampant. The average Frenchman, on whom Poincaré and Herriot dote, will readily believe it if he has told that Germany is ready to "stir up" the inhabitants of Alsace-Lorraine against their French "fatherland".

Since the occupation of Alsace-Lorraine by France, the sentiments of the population have again gradually but completely turned against imperialist France, and the movement in favour of a complete independence of Alsace-Lorraine, in relation to both Germany and France, has grown prodigiously.

It is an out-and-out calumny to speak of the autonomist movement in Alsace-Lorraine as a separatist pro-German movement. The entire movement is nothing but the natural reaction of the population against the ultra-chauvinism of France.

Since the imperialist Government of France is convinced that the autonomist movement threatens to win the majority of the population it intends to destroy the most active organisations of the autonomists by forbidding their press and by other measures tantamount to the proclamation of a state of emergency.

Thus it is that a number of arrests have taken place and that the separatist movement is being regularly persecuted.

The national press of France speaks of a fighting organisation of the autonomists and of the preparation of a sanguinary conspiracy in Alsace-Lorraine. This accusation can be proved to be fully unfounded.

What are these so-called "shock troops"? Nothing but an institution to preserve law and order.

In the course of the summer of 1926, the Alsatian autonomists at Colmar were the object of frequent attacks when they desired to demonstrate against the Fascist organisations. So as to be able to resist attacks of this kind, they determined to organise a body of men to keep order at their meetings. On the occasion of a recent raid, the police found a list of these formations which the Alsatian petty-bourgeois circles had fondly called "shock troops". A number of names were arbitrarily culled from the list, and the "conspiracy" was complete.

Among the twelve persons arrested on December 30th, there are eight that played no prominent part at all in the autonomist movement; they are all members of the Strasbourg petty-bourgeoisie, three of them being employees, and five artisans and small tradesmen. Two of the prisoners are journalists, connected with an autonomist paper now suppressed. The Abbé Fasshauer and his companion, finally, played a rather important part in the autonomist movement. Dr. Roos, who could not yet be arrested, failed to gain any sympathies among the population.

The Government has thought fit to have all the autonomists arrested at Strasbourg transported to the prison of Mulhouse. Obviously violent demonstrations were apprehended. Shamefully enough, the prisoners were treated like common criminals and not like political suspects.

Barely eight years since the enthusiastically welcomed entrance of the French troops into Strasbourg, the arbitrary rule of French imperialism is creating an atmosphere of hatred for the trial of these Alsations who desired to live independently and not as the slaves of the French imperialists.

Egypt on the Eve of a New Crisis.

By A . . . m.

The few weeks that have elapsed since the death of Zaghoul have witnessed a number of important changes in the inner-political structure of Egypt. In the first place there has been a consolidation of the position of the King of Egypt, since the Wafd leaders have entered into closer touch with him. In the same measure in which the Wafd has acquired leading political positions in the country, there has been an increasing political degeneration among its leaders. Though even during the lifetime of Zaghoul the Wafd had undoubtedly the bulk of the population behind it, it was in itself no party of the

masses in the strict sense of the word. The heads of the Wafd and its party apparatus, representing the Egyptian bourgeoisie, feel fairly comfortable in their present positions; they therefore deviate more and more from the masses, and have arrived at a "modus vivendi" with the Royal court on the one hand and the British imperialists on the other.

The negotiations which are being carried on with Great Britain are intended to provide a more stable basis for this civil peace. They are anything but favourable to the Egyptian claims to independence or to the broad masses of the Egyptian people; indeed, so far as is known, the proposals which Chamberlain submitted to the Egyptian Prime Minister Sarvat Pasha exclude all discussion of the Sudan problem, which means that the continuation of the undisputed rule of Great Britain in the Sudan is confirmed, to the greatest disadvantage of Egypt. The British troops are possibly to be evacuated from the interior of Egypt, but are to be placed in strategic positions, presumably close to the Suez Canal. A treaty of alliance is to be concluded between Egypt and Great Britain, which the latter will be able to cancel quite easily and the former not at all.

The British, however, know very well, why they can now confront the Egyptian Government with such presumptuous demands, which still fall short of the suggestions made three years ago and even, in many details, of the recently concluded agreement between Great Britain and Iraq. They are deftly manoeuvring among the various Egyptian parties, each of which would be glad to undertake the execution of the agreement. In the first place this naturally applies to the Ittehadists, the party in closest touch with the Court, but it is also true of the Liberal-Constitutionalists, represented by the present Prime Minister, Sarvat Pasha, and, last not least, of the Wafd itself. The longer the "bidding" for the agreement with the British Government lasts, the more favourable the situation will be for the British policy.

Before all, the British policy can reckon on the increasing friction within the coalition formed by the Liberals and the Wafd. The Liberal-Constitutional Party is in itself very weak and has only undertaken the lead in the Government because it acts as intermediary between the Wafd and Great Britain. If, however, the Wafd succeeds (as its leaders and in particular its new President, Mustapha Nehas, aim to do) in arriving, parallel with the official negotiations, at an understanding with the King and also with the British Resident, the Liberal-Constitutionalists can be eliminated and the Wafd will assume power alone.

To anticipate this elimination, Sarvat Pasha is endeavouring to accelerate the outbreak of differences between his own party and the Wafd. If he succeeds in this purpose, he will be safe. For then the Wafd would again be obliged to accept his conditions of coalition, by which he would take care to safeguard his own interests more than hitherto. The pressure on the part of Great Britain at the negotiations, the efforts of the Wafd to seize the authority, and the counter-manoeuvers of Sarvat Pasha, are the main reasons of the Cabinet crisis at present threatening Egypt.

Both the Liberal-Constitutionalists and the Wafd leaders, however, are hampered in the liberty of their movements by a considerable pressure from below. Thus just at the moment when the Liberals began to oppose the Wafd, Mohammed Pasha Mahmoud, a representative of the Liberal-Constitutional Party in the Sarvat Cabinet, published a declaration of solidarity with the Wafd in the press of that party, which is looked upon as a signal for the formation of a Left wing among the Liberal-Constitutionalists.

A yet more serious matter is the crisis within the Wafd. Here the more radically inclined members (apart from those who occupy good positions in the service of the party) are wholly dissatisfied with the compromising policy of their leaders, and in the students' clubs the prospects of a split are openly discussed. The radical wing is beginning to rally round the National (Vatanist) Party, which, despite of a weakness of numbers, is now alone in its opposition to an agreement, to say nothing of an alliance, with Great Britain. In this party, too, there are vacillations as regards orientation, towards the "intellectuals" or the peasants and workers but in most questions the radical tendency has the upper hand.

In general the internal changes in the grouping of the parties ensue rapidly enough, and the apparent "peace" and "harmony" of the Coalition in Egypt are likely to be of short duration.

AGAINST COLONIAL OPPRESSION

Left British Social Democrats as Defenders of Imperialism.

By M. N. Roy (Moscow).

In the December 30 issue, of "The New Leader" Mr. Brailsford makes a review of the past "Year of Perils and Escapes". Of course he could not do it without touching the Chinese question. After a very cursory and remarkably detached review of last year's events in China he gets terrified by "an Asiatic problem and a continental struggle against imperialism which may involve India". The "escape" from this "peril" he finds in "a rare degree of liberal foresight"! So, out of the capitalist ruins and danger of imperialist war the world can only be saved not by Socialism, but by liberalism. This is the remedy prescribed by the "left wing" of the political Labour movement.

How does Mr. Brailsford, who calls himself a Socialist and passes as a "left winger", arrive at such a flagrantly unsocialist, nay anti-socialist, conclusion? He is driven to this conclusion by the fear of Socialism: by the fear that the oppressed peoples of the East will be completely convinced that their only friend is the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. Mr. Brailsford invokes, with evident pessimism, a liberal policy "in China and in India alike which will assure their awakening masses that there is hope for them in quarters other than Russia, and in measures less violent than revolutionary".

The world is unavoidably heading towards Socialism and the road leads through revolution. This is the consequence of capitalism. But the "socialist" Brailsford refuses to see the inexorable logic of events and becomes a wise counsellor of imperialism in distress. The world is in revolt against capitalism. The Russian Revolution as well as the anti-imperialist movement in the colonies are the expressions of this revolt. The place where the revolt has been successful naturally becomes the standard to which the eyes of all rebels turn. Mr. Brailsford advises the imperialist rulers to adopt a liberal policy in order to break this revolutionary unity brought about by community of interests.

"The hope of the awakening masses" of India and China, indeed of all the subject countries is to be free from imperialist domination as a step towards the liberation from capitalist exploitation. Does Mr. Brailsford maintain that this hope can be realised without breaking the bonds of imperialism? Does he maintain that even the elementary conditions for the realisation of this hope can be created under the benign protection of imperialism? No policy of imperialism, however liberalised, can allow the realisation of this hope. Imperialism and the aspirations of the peoples it oppresses are irreconcilably antagonistic. Obviously Mr. Brailsford has a different notion as regards what he calls the hope of the colonial oppressed masses. He did not say what it is. But judging from the trend of his arguments one could gather that in his opinion the hope of the colonial peoples is not, rather should not, be national and social freedom. In that case they could secure the patronage of the liberal apologists of imperialism. But even this is not possible, as has been proved by the recent refusal of the British labour leaders to support even the very modest hope of the Indian nationalist bourgeoisie. This Mr. Brailsford himself admits when he deplors that: "the decision over the Indian Commission does not encourage optimism". So it has become clear that no other policy than that of revolutionary Socialism can help the oppressed peoples realise their hope. Nevertheless, Mr. Brailsford's faith in liberalism is pathetically incorrigible. If it were only Mr. Brailsford's inability to grasp the situation, he could be left alone in his faith in liberalism and pacifism. But the case, is more serious. He is worried about the perilous position of imperialism and is anxious to show it a way out. The "escape" he suggests is futile. He is himself conscious of it. Nevertheless, it is significant that he is so concerned about the future of imperialism. Imperialism would not accept the advice of its Social Democratic apologists. It refuses to follow any other policy in the colonies than that of the iron hand. In this situation Social Democratic Liberalism stands completely exposed in its native character: it supports unconditionally imperialist absolutism in the colonies. Mr. Brailsford's party has

done it shamelessly in connection with the Indian Commission; and Mr. Brailsford, together with the other "left wingers" of his brand, are no better than MacDonald, Snowden, Thomas and Co. The theory he makes in the article under review deprives him of any distinction from those who have frankly abandoned Socialism and have openly united with imperialism against the oppressed peoples.

The theory he makes is that a "muddled" policy has driven the peoples of the East, particularly of India and China, to look towards the U.S.S.R. as their only friend and to the conclusion that the way to freedom lies through revolution. The deduction from this is that an alliance of the oppressed peoples of the East with the U.S.S.R. is dangerous and that a revolution in the colonies should be prevented by all means. This is exactly what imperialism also desires. As a result of prolonged and devious intrigues imperialism has succeeded in having the nationalist bourgeoisie of China violently betray their alliance with the U.S.S.R. But they betrayed their alliance with the U.S.S.R. after they had betrayed the national revolution. The masses of China, who in the teeth of bloodiest terror, are heroically defending the revolution, remain convinced that the U.S.S.R. is their only friend in the bitter struggle against imperialism and native reaction. The remarkable failure of the Social Democrats to move a finger against the terror confirms them in this conviction. In spite of everything, for imperialism, China is a lost cause. Mr. Brailsford admits it lamentably, and he warns that India will go the same way, unless imperialism changes its "muddled" policy for a sane policy of liberalism. But it is too late. The disease is too serious to be cured by Mr. Brailsford's remedy. The future of imperialism depends upon the bloody suppression of the colonial revolt. The "muddled" policy is the result of the inner contradictions of imperialism. In the fierce clash of world conflicts Social Democratic liberalism has gone totally bankrupt. On every acute question the thin veil of radicalism drops from the face of the "left wing", exposing its true complexion.

THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION

Press Bandits.

By Boris Wolin.

The "Stalin Letters" afford a typical instance of the forms and methods employed by the leading organisations of the bourgeois-capitalist press, such as the Hearst press in the United States or the Northcliffe press in Great Britain.

The heads of these very influential newspaper trusts, who are in close touch with the most prominent capitalist magnates, act according to their behests and fulfil their desires.

In these two countries dens of press bandits have been formed, known as the "World-Wide News Service" in the United States and as the "Anglo-American Newspaper Service" in Great Britain. In addition to its other dark and criminal business, the "World-Wide News Service" specialises in the publication of articles and interviews by all the most prominent statesmen of the world. In connection with the increase last year in the bestial hatred of the bourgeois world against the Soviet Union, this agency commenced with great emphasis and truly American precision to manufacture articles, generally bearing the signature of Stalin and sometimes that of Bukharin.

All these forgeries were thereupon handed over to the Hearst newspaper trust, which published them under tortuous headings in its Sunday supplements, such as the "New York American" or the "March of Events", etc. The Hearst trust generally refrains from indicating the source from which it culls its material, preferring to publish it as its own original production. In the majority of cases the forgeries are put up in the form of articles, which are said to be specially written for the Hearst papers.

So as to give these forgeries another form with a view to allaying suspicion as to their genuine nature, the articles invented by the scoundrels of the "World-Wide News Service" are published in the form of an interview or at any rate as personal utterances. Thus an interview of this kind was published in the

Hearst press as having been given by "Joseph Stalin" to a certain Hermann Godfrey "the representative of a whole number of Austrian and German papers". It should be pointed out that there was never any "representative" of the name of Hermann Godfrey in Moscow.

On another occasion, "Joseph Stalin" was served up with the dressing of a "report of a secret session of the Moscow Presidency" under the very tasty heading: "The Understanding with the Holy Russian Church is the Greatest Diplomatic Achievement of the Soviets, says Joseph Stalin." The Hearst press copied this forgery under the following blatant title: "Joseph Stalin Says Russia will soon Command the Skies."

News Feature Section **MARCH 6** *San Francisco* SUNDAY SAN FRANCISCO

HOW LIVES OF SEA FLYE!

Russia Will Soon Command the

STALIN

SOVIETS WILL HAVE 3,000 WAR PLANES IN 8 MONTHS'

Today We Have 1,521 Battle Aircraft, 72 Air Stations, 19,548 Aviation Societies with Over 4,000,000 Paying Members. We Will Be Able to Paralyze Any Nation That Attacks Us," Says Moscow Dictator.

By JOSEPH G. STALIN.

MOSCOW, Oct. 6, 1937.—England's storm threats against the security of Soviet Russia forced us to adopt as a policy which soon will justify its adoption "Peace rules the air."

We acquired the knowledge of the air technique for a long time.

Up to now we might have seen many of our airplanes were built in German workshops. But we are now constructing airplanes in our own factories, manned by 7,000 workers, according to our own designs.

Today we possess already 1,521 battle planes, which will be increased to 3,000 in another eight months, each plane being ready for flight before the end of 1938. The large scale of this production in England is far less.

Behind this line of flying battle craft we have a reserve force of civilian airplanes, which within six months will number 1,000. In six months of a war they would immediately become an addition to our air force.

The number of Russian war planes will be sufficient to attack the air force of any nation.



Stalin is seen to have declared that he will be able to do so. He has already ordered the building of British airplanes to be "in a plan" to destroy the world.

TO EXPEND VAST FRONTIERS

Five years ago the technical experts attached to our War Department reported to Lenin that the construction of the Soviet Republic lay mainly on our speedy acquisition of "technical" means. No other technical means to defend the vast frontiers of Russia is as effective as the mastery of flying.

When a few years ago we applied ourselves to the study of aviation, we made it compulsory in schools. In every school arranged by children of both sexes above the age of ten, we have installed a small airplane model. Twice a week they are taught the principles of aerodynamics. We have set ourselves to acquire the latest, and the most powerful instruments of our children in the schools, by their own hands.

ANTICIPATED BRITISH AIRFARMS

Britain never had a military air force. She expressed an aim to her own destruction by the "peace" of the air. The newspaper has hoped of it.

England's reliance on the British Empire as a shield, with her conservative air stations scattered all over the British Empire, with her belatedness of aircraft, and her peace treaties, will see to it that she will be unable to defend her empire.

The Soviet air force will be built in a matter of months, by a means of defense.

It is a warning to guarantee our peace and security, and it is to our interest to challenge us a fair reason. We shall not be able to see peace as a mere promise that will be broken. Our peace is a peace of justice.

Forgery published in an American newspaper.

The "World-Wide News Service", however, is not content with the numerous forgeries published in a thousand different Hearst papers, but announces publicly that in the near future a whole series of articles will follow, including an alleged contribution by Stalin on "The Deprivation of the Russian Woman in Present Times" and another "professedly by Bukharin, under the heading "Soviet Russia's Gamble in Naphtha."

Our intervention in the conflict between Poland and Lithuania, which made the peaceful aims of the Soviet Union apparent to all the world, and the step undertaken by the Soviet delegation at the Geneva Disarmament Conference by the suggestion of a general disarmament have not only ensured us the

sympathies of the broad masses but also those of wide circles of the pacifically inclined petty-bourgeois intelligentsia.

The international capitalist exploiters have their own agents watching events. These give the sign, and the press bandits get to work. The peaceful policy of the Soviet Union must be misrepresented. Suspicion must be caused to poison the hearts of the workers whose class instincts impel them in the direction of the land of proletarian dictatorship. At once there appears on the scene the whole organisation of literary bushrangers of the "Anglo-American Newspaper Service", led by a Hungarian called Korda, a scoundrelly journalist and agent provocateur.

Social Democrats, and other prominent European papers were ready to believe these corrupt inventions. Our political representative in Vienna drew the attention of the "Neue Freie Presse" editors to the fact that the "Stalin articles" were forged. In its irrepressible desire to give the Soviet Union "a smack in the eye", the "serious" bourgeois paper had, however, already published the report in the most prominent place of its morning issue and followed this up with a commentary in the evening edition. Otto Bauer's "Arbeiter Zeitung" naturally would not let slip such an opportunity of launching a thundering sensation in regard to the "Red Bolshevik Imperialism" of Moscow. Its example was followed by the "Vorwärts" of Scheidemann and by a number of Balkan and Scandinavian papers.

The political significance of this campaign, initiated at a sign from Deterring and his associates, is discussed by Korda himself quite unscrupulously in the Liberal "Manchester Guardian". His agency of the "Anglo-American Newspaper Service" is explained as follows:

"Stalin's article first appeared in the 'New York American' in October. After Litvinov's speech at Geneva we thought it advisable for the article to be released for publication elsewhere, since it appears to us to be in contradiction to the declaration of Litvinow at Geneva."

Denials have no effect on these press bandits, all the less so as "respectable" bourgeois papers and telegraph agencies range themselves on their side. If the Soviet Union were to refute all the lies, calumnies, and forgeries that appear in thousands of newspapers in the form of articles by Stalin, Bukharin, and others, our refutations would simply not be published. The "Associated Press", the greatest telegraph agency of the United States, has twice refused to publish denials of "Stalin letters", with the explanation that it is not in the habit to print a refutation of material not originally published by its own mediation.

The "Neue Freie Presse", the Liberal organ of Austrian capitalism, could for some time not bring itself to publish the declaration of Comrade Stalin, denouncing and unmasking the press bandits, and it was only under the pressure of facts, which were more powerful than the sense of shame of these old hypocrites, that it was obliged eventually to publish Stalin's statements with all possible reservations and thus also to admit its own "mistake". The "Arbeiter Zeitung", the "Vorwärts", and others, limit themselves to ambiguous notices, obviously intended to cover up the scandal of their publication of patent forgeries.

It is therefore also ridiculous to imagine that the bourgeois capitalist press is likely to purge itself of this evil. Indeed, its entire nature prevents it from doing anything of the sort.

EVENTS
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Second News
 Magazine Section I
Feature Section

**'AVERT FUTURE WAR,'
 ENDORSING HEARST PLAN
 BUKHARIN SEES PEACE OF
 WORLD PRESERVED THROUGH
 ENGLISH-SPEAKING UNITY**

**Russia Should Cultivate Anglo-Saxon
 Nations to Help Develop her Material
 Progress, Says Moscow Editor**

By NIKOLAI BUKHARIN,

Editor of Pravda, official voice of the Soviet Government, and member of the Soviet National Bureau and member of the Politburo of the Russian Communist party in the Communist International, in an address at a special meeting of the Soviet Politburo.

There are only two great nations who are really free—Britain and the United States of America. It must be admitted that there is always friction and some opposition to the two countries in certain nationalistic aspects of the world.

Mr. William Hearst's Russia, the recognition of a large of American publications and their in England, the fact of a close relationship between the two nations, with all the danger of British imperialism, advancing a program of peace among the English-speaking nations. This line of policy is the right direction.

A more Anglo-American alliance, however, may be made possible by a recognition that the two great nations are essentially friendly and that the fact of the world. For a peace program among all the English-speaking people will have a great influence if expressed in the form of a treaty, addressed to the rest of the world, saying:

"Our program will be perfected that may have a real power to end to war."
 But, unfortunately, a serious friction is taking place between the two nations of the English-speaking nations.

"America is North World-Dominant."

England's economic position has caused English money and some small amount of British ruling classes to support the best interests of their country. America is by her own right the dominant power in the world. She would do well to recognize the fact that America is the world's power and to realize that America is the world's power and to realize that America is the world's power.

She should recognize the fact that America is the world's power and to realize that America is the world's power and to realize that America is the world's power.

Forged Bukharin article in an American newspaper.



But England is a certain degree of what the world thought. This is the only way to be saved. The world policy of America, from its spirit and policy, are now trying to make a peace program for England to work with her own, so to speak, by creating a program against her opponent. They could have England with every intention to make America the world's head nation in the world. They are showing a sympathetic attitude to Japan to force the Japanese government to recognize the fact.

But fortunately, today, the English government is very friendly to the English people, who, although one is naturally, somewhat a very much better person of the world, since, from the Liberal, what likely a better group in England will come to power.

"Russia Should Cultivate Friendship"

**Support of Russian White Guardists
 by the Baltic Governments.**

Exchange of Letters between Grevenitz and Giers.
 Moscow, 8th January, 1928.

The "Pravda" publishes two letters which the Russian white guardist Baron Grevenitz, who styles himself the Finnish representative of the Russian monarchists, wrote to the former Tsarist ambassador Giers now living in Paris. These letters throw new light upon the criminal activity of the white guardists and their relations to the governments of the Baltic States.

In a letter dated the 23rd November from Wiborg, Grevenitz reports that in connection with the examination of a number of Russian monarchists he had been received by Relander the President of the Finnish republic with whom he had a long conversation concerning the relations between a future Russia and the Baltic States.

"In accordance with the instructions" — says the letter of Grevenitz — "contained in the letter of Your Excellence dated the 5th August No. 559, I permitted myself to point out a certain difference between our relations to Latvia and Esthonia on the one hand and Finland on the other. I stressed the fact that with regard to these former States, no measures would be taken for their forcible re-unification with Russia, but that probably after a time Latvia and Esthonia would themselves express the wish for a reunion with Russia on account of economic reasons."

His London "agency", which is in the service of all sorts of men of the type of Deterring, is at present engaged in rendering the capitalist press of Europe the same services as that effected by the "World-Wide News Service for the American press, with the only difference that Korda puts up and despatches material that has already been published in America. This was the case in regard to the forgery about Russia commanding the skies, which he supplied to all European papers."

An old bourgeois paper like the Vienna "Neue Freie Presse", the "Arbeiter-Zeitung", the central organ of the Austrian

The Finnish President expressed doubts that a strong Russia would be prepared to put up with an independent Finland. Grenevitz attempted to allay the fears of the Finnish President and requests Giers to corroborate the statements of Grenevitz in this connection through some document or through a letter addressed to him.

In the second letter dated the 15th December from Wiborg, Grenevitz reports that his efforts to prevent the expulsion of Colonial Grigoriev and Lieutenant Schvezov have been unsuccessful, the reason for this being partly, as the Chief of Police informed him, the incautious statements of Grigoriev.

"As far as Laryonov is concerned" — writes Grenevitz — "he who threw the bomb into the Communist Club in Leningrad, the Minister of the Interior promised to release him in accordance with my request, and he is to settle down somewhere in the country. In the final settlement of this matter in the Cabinet Council, complications arose and the result was that Laryonov was expelled to Danzig to enter which no visum is necessary. At my request however, Laryonov received a visum to return to Finland which he used and stayed some time in Helsingfors."

Grenevitz adds: "The Foreign Minister informed me that such a settlement of the question was necessary solely because it was necessary for the Finnish government to report to the representatives of the Soviet Union that Laryonov had been expelled."

CHINA

Chiang Kai Shek's Return to Nanking.

By Tang Shin She.

In accordance with the decision of the so-called Preparatory Congress, held on 10th December last in the French quarter of Shanghai, for the fourth Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, Chiang Kai-Shek, on the basis of a proposal of the Left Wang Chin Wei wing, returned to Nanking in order again to take over the supreme command of the National Army and in this capacity to guarantee the personal safety of the participants in the Nanking Plenary Session. But Wang Chin Wei miscalculated. Some days after this decision a warrant for his arrest and that of his supporters was issued on the ground that he was the originator of the Canton insurrection, the President of the Canton Soviet and the general secretary of the Eastern department of the Comintern. He fled, so it is said, to America or France. The Plenary Session which had been fixed for the 1st of January had to be postponed indefinitely, owing to the fact that in such circumstances, out of the 50 members of the Executive Committee and of the Control Commission only 13 appeared. Thus the Kuomintang, which had hitherto been regarded as a political party, but had practically long since played out its role, has now become quite openly bankrupt, both politically and organisatorily; for it is not even capable of organising any ordinary session, and in addition Wang Chin Wei, who is regarded as the political leader of the Kuomintang, has run away. There is now arising a purely military situation.

The Preparatory Conference of 10th December was held because the Chiang Kai Shek (Chekiang) group wanted to proceed together with the Wang Chin Wei (Kwantung) group against the Kwangsi group of generals, under the pretext of annihilating the Right Chisan mountain group (which at that time, along with the Kwangsi group, dominated Nanking). It was hoped that there would again come about a collaboration between the political leader Wang Chin Wei and the militarist Chiang Kai-Shek in order to unite the Kuomintang. Wang Chin Wei wanted to win the upper hand under the slogan of "Party discipline". Chiang Kai-Shek intrigued among the Kwangsi and also the Kwangtung group in order to gain advantages for himself. When at this time the Kwangtung group, with the aid of General Chang Fa Kui, captured the city of Canton from the Kwangsi group, the latter broke off connections with the Chisan mountain group and approached Chiang Kai-Shek in order to proceed together with him against Wang Chin Wei. The fights among the groups were so fierce

that the preparatory Conference (according to the statutes of the Kuomintang, all meetings of the Central Committee must take place in the capital) could not be held in Nanking but had to meet in Shanghai, in fact in the French quarter under the protection of the French police.

The fierce fight between the Kwangtung and Kwangsi groups dates back to 17th November, when Chang Fa Kui drove General Li Dji Chin from Canton; on the other hand, the fights between the Chekiang (Chiang Kai-Shek) and the Kwangsi groups have been proceeding since August last, when Chiang Kai-Shek was driven out of Nanking by the Kwangsi group. Even today the Kwangsi group has a greater power in the Yangtse region than the Chekiang group. Shanghai is dominated by the Kwangsi General Peh Tsung Shi; Wuhan by the Kwangsi General Li Tsung Yin; and Nanking by Li Tsung Yin and Peh Tsung Shi together. The Kwangsi group was naturally not in favour of Chiang Kai-Shek again taking over the supreme command. But as it was the general wish of the bourgeoisie it finally had to give way. In the meantime it submitted the condition that Chiang Kai-Shek should have power in his hands only nominally and not in practice. How did Chiang Kai-Shek venture to go to Nanking under such conditions? He did so because his chief subordinate General, Ho Yin Chen, had captured Houchow from Sun Chuan Fang and Chang Tsung Chang, and not in the least because he wished to submit to the Kwangsi group. One may safely assume that a fierce struggle will break out before long between Chiang Kai-Shek and the Kwangsi group.

Chiang Kai-Shek is not in possession of such power as would enable him to fight alone against the Kwangsi group; he will therefore endeavour to form a big coalition. In the first place he will ally himself with the Hunan generals Tan Yen Kai and Tien Chen in Nanking and Wuhan, who have a great name and are very dissatisfied with the Kwangsi group. In the second place he will draw over to his side the remnants of Tang Sen Dji's troops who are in Nanking and are threatened by the Kwangsi group. Thirdly he will make an approach to Feng Yu Hsiang in order thereby to be able to manoeuvre in the other provinces. As however every one of Chiang Kai-Shek's future "friends" has his own plan and all of them have already been engaged in a struggle for power with him, the coalition will soon fall to pieces again.

Li Dji Shin has recaptured Canton; but the struggles between the Generals will still continue. The defeated generals Chang Fa Kui and Li Fu Lin will again and again launch attacks against the Kwangsi generals under the slogan of "Canton for the Cantonese". It is by no means impossible that the 2nd army corps, which Chiang Kai Shek has sent to Canton to support the Kwangsi group against the Kwangtung group, will for a change ally itself with the Kwangtung group against the Kwangsi group; for the commander in chief of this corps is himself a Cantonese.

As a result of the return of Chiang Kai-Shek to Nanking there will perhaps take place a great change in the Central and Upper Yangtse valley. The British press has already reported that General Wu Pei Fu, who is without troops, has again commenced his political machinations with General Yang Sen in Wanhsien and Ichang. It is possible that the small Hunan, Honan and Hupeh generals, who are marching under the Kuomintang flag which has now become so hated by the population and to whom the Kuomintang no longer brings any advantage, will again join General Wu Pei Fu. Then there will break out in the Central and the Upper Yangtse valley not only a fight between the Kuomintang generals, but all the generals will again engage in a all round fight with each other.

Chiang Kai-Shek, who has completely exposed himself, will not find any way out of the chaos in the disintegrated situation of China. There exists for him only one possibility, i. e. that, on the basis of the general desire of the international imperialists to make a Kemal Pasha of him, he succeeds, for a short time and of course only with the aid of the imperialists, in obtaining the rule in Southern and middle China. If he should so succeed, then he will owe thanks to his American god who rendered possible his return to Nanking.

IN THE CAMP OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

The Congress of the French Socialist Party.

By F. Chasseigne (Paris).

The task of the Party Congress of the French Socialist Party which took place in Paris a few days ago, was, above all, that of determining the attitude and programme of the party at the coming elections in France. Now that party congress has confirmed and brought into relief the fact of the socialist party's orientation towards the Right.

That orientation towards the Right was characteristic of the whole policy of the French socialist party since the collapse of the Left bloc and the formation of the Poincaré Government. As a matter of fact, it carried on a sham opposition in order to preserve the attachment of its followers among the workers, in reality however it let Poincaré do as he liked. Renaudel said, so quite plainly when he made the following statement at the Party Congress: "We vote against Poincaré's Government with the feeling that we do not do it any harm". The attitude taken by the socialist party in the financial questions, the fact that Paul Boncour remained Poincaré's representative at the League of Nations, chiefly however the attitude of the socialist party with regard to the military laws — to which it gave its consent — then the legalisation of the National Economic Council by Poincaré, which occurred on the very day on which the demand was made by the C. G. T. and by the socialist party — all these things and others suggest much more the idea of a sham fight in a side-show at a fair than that of a serious opposition on the part of a Labour Party.

The election are now imminent. The socialist party is already seized with election fever and developing fresh energies. It has kept alive for many years with only a weekly paper as its central organ. Since December 1st it has issued a large-sized daily newspaper. The district organisations have already nominated their candidates and convoked conferences. They are organising meetings, they are doing everything that is possible in order to prepare for the "great battle".

The National Congress which met in Paris, was also seized with election fever. It had been attended by a large number of persons. All the big guns were present. No trouble was spared in order to create the impression that it is a strong party.

The "culminating point" of the Party Congress was the finance resolution of Vincent Auriol which was passed amidst thunderous applause. In that point, the connection between the French S. P. and the bourgeoisie undoubtedly reveals itself most clearly. Both for the socialists and for the bourgeoisie the thing that matters most are the debts. Vincent Auriol who visited America accompanied by Messrs. Bokanovsky and Herriot, in order to negotiate with American capitalism in the name of French capitalism, accepted wholly and entirely the thesis of the nationalists concerning the war debts. "We shall pay our debts to America if Germany pays us." This is how the French socialists understand the international solidarity of the workers.

Neither do the socialists differ from the bourgeoisie in their conception of stabilisation. Vincent Auriol demands that stabilisation be achieved, and Poincaré sets to work in order to put it into effect. Maurange, a delegate to the Party Conference from the Right, declared point-blank: "We accept the results of Poincaré's experience." The stabilisation of the currency is, to a certain extent, also an attempt at stabilising the regime, and just that is the chief work of the socialists. Only in one point did they isolate themselves from the Radicals who had already summoned their congress at an earlier date. That point is the capital levy. Before the Socialist Party Conference took place, the specialists in financial affairs among the party had conducted a fierce fight against that slogan as if it meant the deluge. Auriol however finally found the elegant

formula with which to break the neck of that slogan. The capital levy is replaced by a property tax which is so elastic in its formulation that even the Radicals declared their satisfaction with it.

The foreign policy of the party is in keeping with its financial policy. Paul Boncour took the lead, saying that "it would be unwise to light the slow match of the revision of the treaties in Europe", and that "evacuation of the Rhineland could not be dealt with independently of the questions of security and of disarmament." Six months ago, a fraction of the socialist party demanded, it is true, that Paul Boncour should render an account of his activities as Poincaré's assistant in Geneva. This time, on the contrary, the Congress unanimously applauded his nationalist declarations. The behaviour of the French Socialist Party is such that it seriously interferes with the endeavours made by the German Social Democrats to bring about the Great Coalition; the latter are finally compelled to say to their French brothers: "Do what you like to help your bourgeoisie, we shall do anything to help our bourgeoisie."

With regard to the question of rationalisation, as carried out by the capitalists, the socialist party has nothing better to say than has the C. G. T., the Reformist trade union bureaucracy. In all the questions of labour, the socialist party has followed in the wake of Jouhaux and his consorts. In doing so, it only followed the example of the Radicals who accepted the programme of the C. G. T. already some time ago. With that, it has established the policy of collaboration with the bourgeoisie as its definite plan and has sacrificed all the actual demands made by the workers.

After the setting up of a programme of that kind, it was not difficult to determine the election tactics. The elections will take place in the district framework in the midst of all combinations possible, according to the mode decided upon by the socialist deputies themselves. At the second ballot, all the parties will be faced by the question as to what allies they shall choose. The Socialists have the alternative between an alliance with the Radicals and an alliance with the Communists who made them the offer of a united front. The Congress lost no time in making up its mind. It allows every liberty to the district organisations "in order to defeat reaction". After all the flirting with the Radicals, this means nothing more nor less than that they are putting new life into the Left bloc, with the hope that it will be possible to turn to account the Communist votes wherever they are needed. In this point also, it was Renaudel who took the lead by declaring that: "We must be at least 150. The object of the election is not only to gain votes and seats but to conquer the parliamentary power."

This is the aim the leaders of the socialist party are striving to reach. It leaves the interests of the workers on one side and rejects our offer of a united front. Neither does the party take any interest in the influence of the economic crisis on the situation of the workers. The Party Conference of the Socialist Party of France has no interest left for such things.

The workers in the socialist party, however, certainly hold a different view. There are signs of that. At the municipal elections, a section of the Paris suburbs, the section of Courbevoie, formed a united front with us on the eve of the Party Congress. The party leaders destroyed it. In doing so, the party leaders followed the same line of action pursued by them when they expelled all the workers who visited Russia on the occasion of the tenth anniversary. Other organisations will however undoubtedly follow the example of Courbevoie. This has already become obvious in the North, where several local organisations seceded from the socialist party in order to join us.

In view of the economic crisis and of the fermentation in the socialist organisations caused by the approaching elections, the Communist party of France should ask the socialist workers their opinion regarding the policy of their leaders, and it will try to persuade them to break away from those leaders.

UNION OF SOVIET REPUBLICS

Five Years of the U. S. S. R.

By A. Yenukidse.

Five years ago, on December 30th, 1922, the first Congress of the Soviets of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics ratified the declaration and agreement concerning the inauguration of the Soviet Union and thereby laid the foundation-stone of a new united Soviet State embracing many nations.

This day was without doubt a historic day, which completed a stage in the building up of the Soviet State and opened the way to a broad, creative Socialist activity by uniting in a military and economic front the forces of individual Soviet Republics which had previously been divided.

In the declaration concerning the founding of the U. S. S. R. the authorized delegations of the Soviet Republics declared clearly and definitely:

"The reconstruction of national economy appears to be impossible as long as the Republics remained divided."

The success of the past five years is the best proof of how very right the Soviet Republics were in trying to unite their forces. The comprehensive picture of the five-year plan of development of national economy, sketched by Comrade Rykov in his report to the 15th Party Congress, is also a proof of the gigantic, positive significance of the united labour of all the Soviet Republics and of the nations in the Soviet Union.

The class character of the Soviet Republics, the similarity of the interests of their proletariat, moved the nations to a fraternal alliance. As early as March, 1922, the general economic and political position demanded the formation of a union of the Socialist Soviet Republics. This is clearly expressed in the constitution of the Trans-Caucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, the most recent of the constitutions of the Soviet Republics:

"True to the traditions and to the strivings of the working masses towards solidarity and brotherly unity, the Trans-Caucasian workers solemnly declare to all working humanity that they are without reserve prepared to form, together with all the workers and peasants of the Soviet Republics, a united Soviet front in the common fight against world capital. Upon this ground the Trans-Caucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic regards as of paramount urgency the formation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, the model of a world-embracing power of the League of all Soviet countries."

Nevertheless, it took another ten months for all the independent Soviet republics to consider and work out the idea of creating a union of Socialist Soviet Republics and to put it into execution. On December 30th this most urgent action was successfully completed.

The day of the foundation of the U. S. S. R. is, as Comrade Stalin said in his report to the 1st Soviet Congress of the U. S. S. R.:

"the day of the triumph of the new Russia over the old, over Russia as the gendarme of Europe, over Russia as the hangman of Asia. To-day is the day of triumph of the new Russia, which is breaking the chains of national oppression, is organising the victory over capital, building up the dictatorship of the proletariat and awakening the peoples of the East . . ."

Yes, on that day the chains of national oppression were a mere shadowy memory of the terrible days of the old régime. On that day the little nations, which had been oppressed by Tsarism and only after the October Revolution had developed the first seeds of their free national culture, at last had the possibility of calling upon the extensive help of the proletariat of the whole Union in the interests of reconstruction and of the further progress of their economy and their culture.

Six months after this historic day the next step towards national construction was taken: The Nationalities Council of the Central Executive Committee of the U. S. S. R. was established to render it possible for the small nations themselves to solve the most important questions of their life, of their existence in the Union. Our Socialist development is progressing so favourably, because the population of the Soviet Union, which consists of many nations, devote to this matter their strength,

ability and means under conditions, which guarantee the free expansion of their national culture and of their national economy.

If five years ago, Comrade Stalin had the right to say at the first Soviet Congress of the U. S. S. R.: "May the five years' history of the Soviet Power serve as proof that the Communists can also build", how much more right have we now to say the same five years later, when through the united strength of the Soviet Republics, which have combined in a uniform federal State, we have reconstructed our national economy, surpassed the pre-war level, set up our industry on a new technical foundation, invested milliards in it, intensified our agriculture, enlisted hundreds of thousands and millions of workers and peasants directly in Soviet construction under the management of the Soviets and the executive committees, when further tens of thousands of workers are entering our Party and swelling the assets of the Soviet State.

On May 13th, 1924, the Third Soviet Congress of the U. S. S. R., upon the entry of the Turkmenian and the Usbekian Soviet Republics, again stated, that in accordance with the declaration concerning the foundation of the Soviet Union "entry into the Union is open to all Socialistic Republics at present existing, as also to any which may be created in the future."

Our constructive work, our tremendous achievements, the ability to surmount incredible difficulties, the peace and the brotherly spirit, which we have created among the various nationalities, are the most reliable guarantee that the entry of new Socialist Soviet Republics into the Soviet Union will come about in the not distant future.

WORKERS' DELEGATIONS IN THE SOVIET UNION

American Rank and File Trade Unionists Visit the Soviet Union.

By William Kruse (Moscow).

To the Soviet Union there has come a constant stream of delegates from other lands, chiefly of worker, naturally, since this is the homeland of the workers of all the world, but also other delegations.

One of the last countries in the list of those to send workers' delegations to visit the Soviet Union was the United States. True enough, during the bourgeois regime from Feb.-Oct. 1917 the capitalist government of America sent over a delegation of reactionary politicians and labour traitors. True also that since then there have been visits from scientists, jurists, etc. It is no accident that the official Labour movement lags behind even the bankers. Of course there was a steady stream of revolutionary workers who came to Russia from America for a shorter or longer period to do what they could to help in the upbuilding of Socialism. But the isolation of the American Labour movement from that of the Soviet Union was wellnigh complete until 1927.

This year there have been two delegations in the Soviet Union. The first was a small unofficial group of six trade union leaders of intermediate rank, headed by James Maurer, the President of the Pennsylvania State Federation of Labour. The reactionary officialdom exerted tremendous pressure to prevent its coming and did succeed by open terrorism in seriously cutting down the number of representative labour functionaries who dared to make the trip. Two have already paid for their temerity with their jobs, and another is likely to lay down his post at the next election. The report of this delegation is very favourable, and the data collected by the large array of economists who accompanied the delegation as "experts" will undoubtedly add much valuable material to that now available abroad. One of the "experts", a lawyer, is trying to raise his price with the master class by attacking the delegation and its report.

Even more interesting and significant, however, was the second, of these groups, a "Delegation of Rank and File Trade Unionists". They are 25 workers direct from the job — 5 of them machinists, 5 from among the various building trades, 3 miners, 2 textile workers, 2 labour newspaper reporters, 2 office workers and one representative each of the steel rolling mill workers, moulders, railway switchmen, teachers, health workers, and last but not least a farmer-labour lawyer.

Conditions in the American Labour movement are such that this delegation, if it is to be effective in advancing the organisation of the American workers' sentiment for the recognition and defence of the Soviet Union, should bear a pronounced non-Communist character. This means that while notorious non-Communists would be welcome, no trade unionist who by his militancy had come to be known as a member of the Communist Party would be considered altogether a most desirable member of the delegation. Thus we had here a cross-section of the Left inclined rebel element of the American Labour movement, and it displayed all the characteristics of this element, good — and not so good.

Notwithstanding its circumscribed composition the reaction of the delegation to its experiences in the Soviet Union were bound to be all that could be desired. Beginning with their participation in the Congress of the Friends of the Soviet Union, and extending through their many trips to the Don, Ukraine, Caucasia and Central Manufacturing Area, their stay in the Soviet Union was an extremely inspiring and instructive one. They have drawn up a 15,000 word report, very favourably and popularly written, and a declaration signed by every member of the delegation summarises their findings thus:

"The organised working men and women are the rulers of Russia. Through their trade unions, their co-operatives and their political party, operating through the Soviet Government, they are building a new civilisation for workers . . . Taking a country wrecked by war, civil strife, intervention and famine, the Russian workers have made tremendous strides toward a Socialist society".

Coming from America, where the power of the trade unions is so very small, it is but natural that they should most of all be impressed by the tremendous role of the trade unions here. How little the pseudo-democratic tradition of American politics blinded their eyes to the true state of affairs here is shown in the same declaration:

"We have found that the Soviet Union today stands alone in the genuine rights and privileges enjoyed by every productive and useful citizen . . . The Russian worker enjoys a freedom on the job unknown to the boss-ridden American wage earner".

At the same time, however, these mostly non-Party workers, have not failed to notice the directing role played by the Communist Party here. Putting it into the form of an explanation by the Yacheka (nuclei) secretary at the Amo automobile works, a style which is largely carried throughout this popularly written report, it is put thus:

"In a working class country . . . there must be one single authoritative force able to co-ordinate and direct all the activity involved in the running of the Government and industry. This directing and cementing force is the Communist Party. Without this force we might find each industry, factory and each union going off on its own, regardless of the needs and interests of the workers' society as a whole. The Party showed the way to the workers in winning the Revolution, and now it is the directing force in running the factories and building up Socialism".

In the conclusion of their report there is a section on "International Relations" in which the danger of war against the Soviet Union is clearly recognised, and in the statement issued on leaving the Soviet Union the delegation laid down definite plans for organising their work upon their return to America. The organisational plans for the future work of the delegation comprise the formation of a national committee for the defence and recognition of the Soviet Union, and for work towards unity between the Russian and American Labour movements. The present delegation will draw into active collaboration the members and advisers of the first delegation, and any others who may be of service in the work.

At a farewell meeting in Moscow almost every delegate testified that his visit to this workers and peasants republic, where the Communists lead and direct the work of the masses in the building up of Socialism, had opened their eyes to the necessary role of a Communist Party, and had convinced the delegates of the need of closer co-operation with the American Communists than in the past. True enough, the story of this workers' delegation does not differ very greatly from that of dozens of others that have preceded it, but coming from the extremely backward Labour movement of America the results surely surpass our fondest expectations.

DOCUMENTS

Theses of the E. C. C. I. on Japan.

Adopted in the Session of the Presidium of the E. C. C. I. on 15th July 1927.

I. JAPANESE IMPERIALISM AND WAR.

The great rise in the relative strength of the Far East in world economics and world politics after the war makes the problem of Japanese imperialism particularly important. The strengthening of Japanese imperialism during the last ten years, its growing aggressiveness, its penetration of China, India, the Near East, the Pacific Islands, U. S. S. R. territory, etc., transformed Japan into a first-class imperialist power of the vast Asiatic continent.

One of the main junctures of antagonisms inherent in world capitalism is forming itself on the Pacific. At the same time, one of the most powerful revolutionary movements of this age is developing in China, which will be of extraordinary significance for the progress of the world revolution. The destinies of Japanese capitalism are becoming ever more closely merged with the destinies of world capitalism. The Japanese imperialists play a most active role in preparing the coming war. It may be stated that they are already conducting this war insofar as Japanese intervention in China is an accomplished fact.

A neutral position on the part of Japanese capitalism in regard to the Chinese revolution is out of the question, as its most vital and essential interests are linked up with those of China. China is the main source of raw material for Japan with her limited coal and iron deposits. China is the principal market for Japanese industry and 35% of Japanese exports are carried to Chinese ports. China is also the principal field for investment of Japanese capital. The Japanese bourgeoisie has invested about 2,500,000,000 yen in Chinese, particularly Manchurian, factories, mills, mines and railways. Naturally, Japanese imperialism sees in the development of the Chinese revolution a direct menace to its own interests and will not stop at anything, at any expenditures or alliances in order to choke the labour and agrarian movements.

Being the most dangerous foe of the Chinese revolution and pursuing an extraordinarily crafty diplomatic game, Japanese imperialism managed to get possession of the most important strategic positions in China. Japanese imperialism is adopting an ever more open and active counter-revolutionary policy in China, particularly since the Chinese bourgeoisie headed by Chang Kai-Shek went over to the camp of the counter-revolution.

The hostility of Japanese imperialism to the Chinese revolution is being intensified also because its development constitutes a direct menace to Japanese colonial domination, it may affect her most important colonies particularly Korea. The struggle against the Chinese revolution drives and to a considerable extent has already driven the Japanese imperialists to form a bloc with the British imperialists for joint action against the Chinese workers and peasants at the present time and for joint preparations for war against the U. S. S. R. in the more or less immediate future.

A bloc of Japanese imperialism with America and Britain for a struggle against the Chinese revolution and the U. S. S. R. will not eliminate the profound and ever sharpening contradictions between them. The interests of Japanese and British imperialism are already sharply clashing in China. The erection of a British naval base in Singapore is not in vain regarded by the Japanese press as a hostile act openly and directly directed against Japan.

The antagonisms between Japan and the United States are still sharper. The American immigration law affected Japan most of all. At the same time there is a process of United States expansion on the Pacific conflicting with Japanese expansion and bringing about a clash between the two powers ever closer and more inevitable. Combating jointly, the Chinese revolution and jointly preparing a war against the U. S. S. R., the United States, Britain and Japan are at the same time preparing for war amongst themselves, preparing a sanguinary struggle for an imperialist partition of the Pacific basin.

II. THE INTERNAL SITUATION.

The development of Japanese imperialism which began rather late as compared with Europe — only in the '60s of the 19th Century — proceeded with unusual rapidity. The rate of development of Japanese capitalism was not only not retarded by the war and after but on the contrary Japanese capitalism made enormous progress during that period. In contradistinction to Britain, in contradistinction to the capitalist countries of Europe, Japanese capitalism is undoubtedly now on the rising curve of development, although the resources and possibilities of its development are incomparably more limited than those of the United States. The mercantile tonnage of Japan was 2.5 times greater in 1926 than in 1912; her railway network was 87% greater than in 1912; the output of textiles was 273% greater than in 1912; and the production of electric power increased more than 6 times.

The extraordinarily rapid growth of industry was connected with a rapid development of capitalist relations, with a growing political importance and relative strength of the Japanese bourgeoisie which resulted after a whole series of internal conflicts and compromises between the nobility and the bourgeoisie in the transformation of the government. The present Japanese government is in the hands of a bloc of the capitalists and landlords. The capitalist and landlord bloc being in general an extremely characteristic feature of the Japanese imperialist epoch possesses however certain specific peculiarities resulting from the peculiar conditions of development during the last 60 years.

The revolution of 1868 opened the path for capitalist development in Japan. Political power however remained in the hands of the feudal elements, in the hands of the big landowners, in the hands of the military and royal clique. The feudal traits of the Japanese State were not merely traditional relics, rudimentary survivals of the past, but also a very convenient instrument for primitive capitalist accumulation skillfully utilised by Japanese capitalism throughout the entire course of its further development.

The transformation of the old Japanese State into a bourgeois State proceeded along two different ways: on the one hand the relative strength and the political significance of the industrial, commercial and financial bourgeoisie was continually increasing and on the other hand the process of blending the feudal strata with the new bourgeoisie was very rapidly developing, stimulated by economic causes, by the fear of the labour and peasant movement and by the requirements of imperialist policy.

The Japanese State is in itself a powerful element of Japanese capitalism. Not in a single European country has there been such proximity to State capitalism as in Japan where according to some estimates 30% of all capital invested in industry and finance, not including the railroads which are almost entirely in the hands of the government, belong to the State. The Mikado is not only a big landowner, but also a very rich stockholder in many stock companies and combines. Finally, he has also his own bank with a capital of 100 million yen.

The process of capitalist concentration and merging of industrial with bank capital into finance capital, the process of trustification and concentration, has also gone very far in Japan. Thus if on the one hand the Japanese State is the greatest capitalist enterprise, on the other hand, of the two ruling parties of Japanese bourgeoisie — the Seiyukai and Kenseikai — one is maintained by, and ministers to, the interests of the Mitsui concern and the other is maintained by, and ministers to, the interests of the Mitsubishi firm. Thus there is a two-fold process of lending to the old feudal forms a bourgeois content and a parallel process of transforming the bourgeoisie into a counter-revolutionary factor which, although it does have a good many differences with the feudals, is nevertheless acting jointly with them against the labour and agrarian movements.

The struggle for the democratisation of the Japanese State, the liquidation of the monarchy, the removal of the present ruling cliques from the government, in a country which reached such a high level of trustification, will therefore inevitably transform from a struggle against feudal survivals into a struggle against capitalism itself. The bourgeois democratic revolution of Japan will very rapidly grow into a socialist revolution because precisely the contemporary Japanese State, with all its feudal attributes and relics, is the most concentrated expression of Japanese capitalism, embodying a whole series of its most

vital nerves, and a blow at which will also be a mighty blow to the capitalist system of Japan as a whole.

The prospect of a rapid transformation of the bourgeois democratic revolution into a socialist revolution does not at all, of course, eliminate the problem of the bourgeois democratic revolution as such. No matter how far the process of merging the bourgeoisie with the landlords has proceeded, large-scale land ownership still continues to be a very significant and highly independent factor in the political and economic life of the country.

Regardless of the stormy development of capitalism in the towns, the villages are still characterised by extreme backwardness, both from a technical and a socio-economic aspect. Lack of land and great poverty prevails among the peasants. Whereas 5.5 million peasant families, i. e. 80% of the peasants cultivate patches of 1.1 cho (about 3 acres), 0.1% of the peasants possess 8% of all cultivated areas. The system of usurious rent is widespread in Japan. Almost half of the crops gathered from 40% of the entire cultivated areas are paid in rent by the tenants to the landowners. These few figures illustrate the acute agrarian problem in Japan. They show that the agrarian revolution has already ripened and that the problem of the bourgeois democratic revolution is an actual problem.

There are thus in Japan both the objective pre-requisites for a bourgeois democratic revolution (the feudal survivals in the governmental State structure, an acute agrarian problem), and the objective pre-requisites for its rapid transformation into a socialist revolution (the high level of concentration and trustification of capital, the close blending of the State with the trusts, the relatively great proximity to State capitalism, the unity and bloc of the bourgeoisie with the landed nobility).

But if Japanese economics lead directly to revolution, the backward ideology — or what Lenin called "the objective revolutionary situation", in contradistinction to the "objective revolutionary situation" — is a great impediment and stumbling bloc. Neither the proletariat nor the peasants of Japan have any revolutionary traditions or any experience of struggle. The broad masses are only now awakening to political consciousness, and only an insignificant section at that. The labour and peasant organisations are very few and scattered, and so far not much active. Class sentiment, and understanding of the necessity of class struggle, is still stifled by patriotic poison or pacifist illusions among the broad masses. The political consciousness of the proletariat — let alone the peasantry — its class consciousness, its revolutionary organisation, are only hardly beginning to come out of their embryonic stage. It is precisely in this direction that the Japanese Communists must devote their most serious attention and greatly exert their energy.

At the present time the two main bourgeois parties — the Seiyukai and Kenseiyukai — replace each other by rotation in the government. Both of them are not only closely connected with big capital but represent the direct and open political agencies of the two most powerful capitalist concerns of the country — the Mitsui and Mitsubishi.

Whereas, however, the Seiyukai is more closely linked up with the nobility and the military royal cliques whose role in the government is very great, the Kenseikai acts as the representative of the quasi-liberal bourgeoisie which aims at the consolidation and support of the government machine of capitalist exploitation with the help of more "liberal" methods. Thus, in 1925, the Kenseikai extended the franchise. In contradistinction to the Seiyukai the Kenseikai occupies also a more moderate position in relation to the U. S. S. R.

There is no doubt, however, that, as in the struggle against the revolutionary movement in the Japanese colonies and in Japan itself there will be no essential difference between the two parties.

Japanese imperialism is still on its rising curve of development. However, the contradictions of its position, and the growing difficulties of further development, begin to assume a menacing character, which, by the way, takes the form of an acute capitalist crisis. There is no doubt that the Japanese bourgeoisie has already overcome the post-war crisis and to a considerable extent also the effects of the earthquake of 1923. But at the same time, the development of the revolution in China places the main sources of raw material for Japanese industry, and the colossal profits accruing from the capital invested in China in a precarious position. It also menaces the colonial possessions of Japan in Korea, Formosa, Manchuria, etc. The

struggle against Britain and the United States, the imperialist great-power policy, imposes upon the shoulders of the broad masses of the people enormous and absolutely unbearable burdens of militarism and navalism which, in their turn undoubtedly hamper the development of the productive forces.

The poverty of the peasants and the working class whose wages in 1926 were considerably reduced, thus injuring the home market makes the question of the foreign market very acute. Japanese bourgeois economists do not write in vain about super-capitalisation, about such extension of the industrial apparatus which is by no means in keeping with the possibilities of the absorption of the home market. Finally, the great surplus population intensified by the American immigration law undermines still further the social system of Japanese capitalism. All these factors represent the elements of the "objective revolutionary situation", which, at the same time, revolutionise the broad masses of workers and peasants and help to create and develop a subjective revolutionary situation".

The process of proletarianisation of the petty bourgeois strata is now rapidly developing in Japan. Despite the high level of capitalist development, the semi-colonial duration of the working day and semi-colonial low rates of wages still prevail. The so-called "labour legislation" is entirely directed against the workers. Strikes and trade unions are still illegal. The woman has absolutely no political or social rights. The Communist Party has been driven underground and mere membership of the Party is punishable by ten years imprisonment. All these factors cannot but radicalise the masses. These factors have fertilised and still continue to fertilise the ground for Communist propaganda and organisation.

III. THE DRIVING FORCES IN THE JAPANESE REVOLUTION.

Japan is now governed, as was pointed out above, by a bloc of the bourgeoisie and landlords — a bloc under the hegemony of the bourgeoisie. This being so, illusions that the bourgeoisie can in any way be utilised as a revolutionary factor, even during the first stages of the bourgeois democratic revolution, must be abandoned. Analogies with China stand no criticism. China was and is an object of imperialist policy whereas the Japanese bourgeoisie is itself a first-rate imperialist power. In China the "nationalist" bourgeoisie was fighting for power at the beginning of the revolution, whereas the Japanese bourgeoisie already holds power, is already utilising extensively the whole government machinery with all its feudal attributes and relics for the organisation and protection of capitalist exploitation. And finally, a great factor in this respect is the circumstance that the level of capitalist development in Japan is so high that the bourgeois democratic revolution will directly develop into a socialist revolution, a revolution against capitalism as such.

The driving forces in the Japanese revolution are the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petty bourgeoisie. In the first place, however, it is the proletariat and the peasantry. The Japanese proletariat must combine its struggle for a social revolution with its hegemony in the struggle of all toilers of Japan for a bourgeois democratic revolution. There are in Japan all necessary prerequisites for setting up a revolutionary alliance of the workers and peasants to counter-balance the reactionary landowner and capitalist alliance. A correct political line on the part of the working class in relation to the peasantry is one of the most vital prerequisites for a successful development of the revolution in Japan.

The peasantry can be victorious in its struggle for land, in its struggle against feudal survivals, the oppression of contemporary concentrated capitalism, exclusively under the leadership of the working class. The history of any country shows that the peasant movement is always doomed to failure unless it is led by the proletariat. On the other hand, in a country like Japan where more than half of the population is agrarian, the isolation of the proletariat from the peasantry would be fraught with the greatest dangers, and would give the most effective weapon into the hands of the bourgeoisie. An alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry is absolutely essential in the interests of both classes. But this alliance will be revolutionary and victorious only if the working class will have the hegemony. For the working class, the bourgeois democratic revolution is merely a step on the road to social revolution. By leading the bourgeois democratic revolution, the proletariat does not lose its

class perspectives. On the contrary, it is precisely the prospect of transforming it into a socialist revolution which is the decisive factor for the proletariat at all stages of the struggle.

The proletariat is the only consistent revolutionary class — a revolutionary class to the end. The hegemony of the proletariat in the workers' and peasants' alliance is necessary also, in order to overcome the half-heartedness, indecision and possible hesitation and vacillation on the part of the peasantry. The peasantry belongs to the petty bourgeoisie and the power of the petty bourgeoisie is a "power of vacillation". The working class and its Communist Party must always bear this in mind. The bourgeoisie always endeavoured and undoubtedly will also try in Japan to utilise this "power of vacillation". These vacillations can at a certain stage of development become extremely dangerous for the revolution, and especially at the stage of its transformation into a socialist revolution when the bourgeoisie will vigorously play on the instincts and prejudices of the petty proprietor inherent in the peasantry. Only the hegemony of the tempered, class conscious and consistent revolutionary proletariat, under the leadership of the Communist Party, can neutralise and overcome these vacillations which may otherwise become disastrous.

An alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry means, of course, in the first place an alliance with the rural poor. Supported by the poor peasantry and through them the proletariat establishes connections with, and leads the, main mass of the peasantry.

All objective prerequisites for a revolutionary alliance with the working class and the peasantry in Japan are undoubtedly present. However, these objective prerequisites must be realised organisationally. The Japanese peasantry suffers the greatest poverty and is pressed down by high taxes and rates of rent. The revolutionary movement is growing with extraordinary rapidity among the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians. Already about 12% of the peasantry are organised in peasant leagues. The Communists must exert all their energy for rallying all these leagues to the Workers' and Peasants' Party, under revolutionary Communist leadership. The reactionary alliance of the landlords and capitalists must be counter-balanced by a revolutionary alliance of the workers and peasants.

IV. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND ITS ROLE.

The working class can secure victory only under the leadership of its most advanced, revolutionary, conscious and organised section, the Communist Party. The experience of Germany, particularly Bavaria, Hungary and Italy has shown the absolute correctness of Lenin's idea that without a firmly consolidated, ideologically consistent Mass Communist Party, no victorious proletarian revolution is possible.

Nowhere does the working class constitute an absolutely homogenous mass. This is also the case in Japan. There is a whole series of different layers, with different standards of living, different political, cultural and other development. Everyone of these strata can, and actually does, have its own interests which, for the politically most backward and least class conscious workers may be fog, and often does be fog, the general class interests of the proletariat. Only through a prolonged mass struggle is it possible to overcome these craft differences. Even in a country like England, craft division of the proletariat is by far not as yet liquidated, both ideologically and organisationally. The bourgeoisie with the help of its Social-Democratic and trade union agents energetically cultivates and fosters in its own interests these craft differences.

With this craft division is also closely linked up, and partly resulting from it, another danger, namely "Economism". For the most politically backward section of the working class, the daily struggle and concrete demands advanced during economic conflicts, be fog the struggle against capitalism as such, the struggle for the complete and final emancipation from capitalist exploitation, which is possible only through revolution, through the acquisition of State power by the proletariat, through the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship. "Economism" being an infantile sickness of the labour movement is at the same time the soil on which grows the worst sort of opportunism, an ideology adapting the proletariat to the capitalist mode of production instead of rousing it to a revolutionary struggle against it.

The Communist Party is the revolutionary vanguard of the proletariat fighting for the fundamental historical interests of the working class as a whole. Without a Communist Party it will be impossible to overcome the class limitations and "Economicism". Without a Communist Party there can be no struggle for the proletarian dictatorship. To the same extent that it is inadmissible to lose sight of the principal task of the proletariat — the establishment of the dictatorship — in the partial demands put forward in the daily struggle, to the same extent it is also necessary to preserve the main revolutionary perspectives at every given stage of the struggle and the preference of this perspective to everything else, and to the same extent it is necessary that the Communist Party should actively participate in the daily struggle and lead it, actively working in the mass organisations and leading them but at the same time preserve its ideological and organisational independence, preserve its own identity, the identity of the revolutionary vanguard of the working class. Any other orientation practically signifies the stooping towards opportunism and, in the final analysis, results in the abandonment of the political struggle against capitalism — the struggle for the abolition of capitalism.

One of the principal errors of the Japanese Communist leadership consisted in the under-estimation and misunderstanding of the role of the Communist Party, and in the under-estimation of its specific importance in the labour movement. The idea that the Communist Party can in any respect be substituted by Left trade union fractions or a broad workers' and peasants' party is fundamentally wrong and opportunistic. Without an independent, ideologically sound, disciplined and centralised mass Communist Party there can be no victorious revolutionary movement. The struggle against every form of liquidatory tendencies, particularly those which found their expression in Comrade Hoski's policy is therefore the first task of the Japanese Communists. Just as in the struggle of all toilers, it is necessary in the interests of all that the most advanced revolutionary section, the working class, should take the leadership, it is also necessary that in the interests of the struggle of the working class, the Communist Party, its revolutionary vanguard, should take the lead.

The main task now in Japan therefore, is to attain a quantitative and qualitative improvement of the Communist Party. Working intensively in the matter of raising its ideological and political level, the Party must at the same time get more members, embrace and organise in its ranks all the progressive and revolutionary elements of the Japanese proletariat and, step by step, consolidate and conquer its leading positions in the Japanese labour movement.

V. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY.

Under the present conditions, a Communist Party can develop in no other way but through a struggle against Social Democracy. This is also absolutely so in Japan. The Social Democratic Party of Japan has 12,000 members and about 150,000 sympathising workers organised in the trade unions. The Social Democratic leaders are the bought agents of the bourgeoisie, at whose behest they try to poison the masses with opportunism, patriotism and social imperialism. A struggle for the masses, and particularly a struggle for the Social Democratic workers, is impossible without permanently and energetically exposing the Social Democratic Leaders, their treacherous policy in respect to the Chinese revolution connected with the Chang Kai-shek orientation, their spreading of parliamentary illusions, their role as henchmen and camp-followers of the pseudo-liberal bourgeoisie.

The Communists must especially expose the treacherous role of the so-called "Left" Social Democrats. This centrist group has at the present time the leadership in the Nihonro Party, which has about 6000 members, and the support of 5000 workers and peasants organised in the trade unions. The leaders of that Party, just as all "Left" Social Democrats, are distinguished from their Right brothers only by their use of Left phrases with which they hide their opportunism before the eyes of the Communist Party.

The objective position of Japanese capitalism, as well as the historical development of the Japanese labour movement, creates an extraordinarily favourable situation for a struggle against Social Democratic influence. In Japan the working class has no strong Social Democratic organisations that have been in existence for several decades and there are no deeply rooted

Social Democratic traditions. The "upper layer" of skilled workers, on which reformism is usually and primarily based, is relatively insignificant in Japan. The average wage is extremely low. The enormous and incessant influx of labour power from the impoverished rural districts, the enormous pressure of agrarian over-population, intensified by the American closed doors for immigration, makes the raising of the standard of living of the Japanese workers under capitalism highly improbable. Of course, Japanese capitalism, being imperialist capitalism, possesses certain possibilities of buying some sections of the upper strata of the working class. Nevertheless, it can already be foreseen that the reformist efforts to implant American opportunist trade unionism in Japan will meet with failure.

VI. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE TRADE UNIONS. THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE MASS LABOUR ORGANISATIONS. THE UNITED FRONT PROBLEM.

It has already been pointed out that the development of the Communist Party as an independent organisation is a decisive factor in the development of the Japanese revolutionary movement. In this connection, the necessity for a rapid and decisive liquidation of the old mistakes of the leaders of the Communist Party, particularly the deviation represented by Comrade Hoski was emphasised. Lately, however, another, a counter-deviation, has gained much influence in the Party. The leader of this tendency is Comrade Kuroki.

The Communist Party of Japan will be in a position to solve its historical tasks only as a mass party. There is no doubt that the Communist Party of Japan must work energetically in raising its ideological level. It must definitely realise that without "revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement". But it must just as definitely realise that without a revolutionary mass struggle, without actual and strong connections with the masses, theory is futile. The Communist Party of Japan must become a workers' party not only in aim but also in composition. Its proletarian kernel must first of all be greatly strengthened.

If it is erroneous and disastrous to adopt the course of dissolving the Communist Party in the Left wing of the trade union movement, it is no less erroneous to be isolated from the mass organisations of the proletariat. The "split and unity theory" advanced by Comrade Kuroki is nothing but the substantiation of such policy and differs most radically and decisively from Leninism. Instead of analysing the concrete tasks facing the Communist Party of Japan, and the methods of their solution given by history, Comrade Kuroki proceeds from artificially and arbitrarily formulated abstractions and is occupying himself with the development and application of principles of logic instead of trying to understand the actual relationship.

Mass organisations are on the one hand the reservoir from which the Communist Party gathers new forces and on the other hand a transmission belt which connects the vanguard with its class, with the whole mass of the workers. The larger the proletarian mass organisations, the greater are the possibilities of the Communist Party's reservoir, the broader is the audience which the Communists can address. The policy of splitting the mass organisations is therefore a policy of breaking up the reservoirs, limiting the radius of its activity, weakening of connection with the masses and self-isolation from the masses. It is hardly necessary to prove that such policy has nothing in common with Bolshevism.

At the same time, the policy of splitting the mass organisations practically means nothing but the abandonment of the struggle for the Social Democratic workers, the abandonment of the struggle for the conquest of the centrist workers, an abandonment of the exposition of the avowed reformism of the Rights and the tacit reformism of the "Lefts" concealed by "Left" Social Democratic phrases. Such abandonment would undoubtedly be of service to the Social Democrats, but it has nothing to do with Bolshevism.

The labour movement of Japan is still very young and poorly organised, in spite of the fact that the most advanced section of the Japanese proletariat is rapidly developing ideologically, having passed through the state of pure syndicalism and trade unionism, towards the adoption of the ideas of the political class struggle — ideas which are lately being adopted by the vanguard of the Japanese proletariat. The Japanese proletariat has no revolutionary traditions. It has no great experience in the class struggle. Out of the 4.5 million factory and

transport workers of Japan, there are only about 300,000 in the trade unions and political parties which are broken up into several competing organisations. It is the task of the Communists to fight against this situation and for the creation of mass organisations of the Japanese proletariat. The policy of the Japanese Communists by splitting such organisations as the Rodo Sodomei, Nomin Kumiai, etc., was therefore radically wrong. The presence of mass proletarian organisations is an absolutely necessary prerequisite for the normal and healthy development of the Communist Party. The struggle against the opportunist and reformist leaders must be carried on in such a way as not to estrange the Left elements of the trade unions and mass parties but to fight within these organisations by exposing the leaders and winning over the masses from them. Otherwise the Communists take the risk of becoming isolated from the mass labour movement. Communists must take active part in the everyday struggles of the working class and by doing so assume leadership in those struggles. They must prove to the workers that they are really the only staunch and consistent fighters for the interests of the proletariat. This is particularly necessary now when the bourgeoisie is waging an extensive and energetic offensive against the workers.

Broad mass organisations of the proletariat are the only possible basis for the Communist Parties. Not to understand this would be a most dangerous error for the young Communist movement of Japan.

The policy of mechanically politicising the trade unions as advocated by Comrade Kuroki must therefore be considered absolutely wrong. It has as its basis the absolute misunderstanding of the distinctions between a political party and a trade union, and the substitution of one by the other. In reality this leads to self-isolation from the mass movement, to the abandonment of the struggle against the reformists for the conquest of the mass proletarian organisations. What is necessary is not the mechanical politicisation of the trade unions but the strengthening of the Left fractions within them, the strengthening of the influence of Hiogikai in them, and the consolidation and organisational strengthening of the Hiogikai itself.

The policy of strengthening and consolidating the trade unions and of winning them from within must be also extended in relation to the broad workers' and peasants' parties. The Communist Party must especially try in due course, to merge the workers and peasants' party — the Ronoto — which is largely under Communist influence, with the Nichiroto which is now under centrist influence. The desperate opposition shown by the latter to such unity must be broken by the workers. This is one of the immediate tasks of the Japanese Communists.

Comrade Kuroki's point of view leading to the tactical isolation of the party from the masses, leads also to the actual ruin of the Communist Party as a mass Party. This "split and unity theory" is not accidentally linked up with the exceeding and un-called for emphasis merely on the purely ideological aspect and the complete ignoring of the economical, political and organisational aspects. This, in turn, leads to the inadmissible overestimation of the intellectuals, to the isolation from the working masses, to sectarianism, to the idea that the Party is a group of "Marxian minded people" — primarily, of course, intellectual people — and not a militant organisation of the working class. The Communist Party must decisively put an end to this caricature on Leninism, which Kuroki himself has already rejected.

To win the Social Democratic and centrist workers, to conquer the trade unions and mass parties from within by means of the proposed united front tactic, meet, of course, with certain difficulties. Here, particularly, big mistakes may be made by a young party which has not much experience in the class struggle. From this point of view the Japanese Communists must study especially the mistakes committed by the Communist Party of China in the Kuomintang. It stands to reason that the differences between the conditions in China and Japan must be taken into consideration. By adopting the united front tactic, the Communist Party must by no means lose its identity. By no means must it submit to the influence of those whom it is combating; it must preserve its absolute independence both ideologically and organisationally. It stands to reason that in speaking of a united front, it is necessary to have in mind not only a united front of the small illegal Communist Party with legal mass organisations such as the

Ronoto and Toitsu Domai, but also a united front of mass organisations (the Ronoto Party for instance), under the influence of the Communist Party, with the mass Social Democratic and centrist organisations.

It goes without saying that the united front shall be effected strictly upon working class issues and fought for along class lines and, furthermore, no concessions of an ideological character given.

By organising the working class for the struggle against capitalism, the Communist Party must at the same time not fold its arms, but work for the creation of a revolutionary workers' and peasants' bloc and for guaranteeing to the working class the hegemony in that bloc. The Communist Party must support and organise the struggle of the peasantry for restricting taxation and for reducing rent. It must utilise the revolutionary activity of the peasants in the struggle against the war menace. It must lead the struggle of all toilers of Japan for the democratisation of the Japanese State for the liquidation of its feudal elements without at the same time forgetting the general perspectives of the transformation of the bourgeois democratic revolution into a Socialist revolution. The Communist Party must get into close contact with the liberation movement of the Japanese colonies and lend it all possible ideological and organisational support.

The Communist Party must energetically overcome that which was hitherto the greatest misfortune and shortcoming in its leadership, namely, the sectarian spirit. The slogan "closer to the masses" is very acute today in Japan.

Particularly, in this connection, the complete absence of work among the youth must be considered as a most serious error which must be overcome as soon as possible. This work will be of extraordinary importance in connection with the imminent war danger.

Finally, the Communist Party must fulfil with all its energy, its foremost duty at the present time as an organisation of international revolutionaries, namely, it must fight against Japanese intervention in China and against the preparation of war against the U. S. S. R.

Based on this, the Communist Party of Japan must advance the following programme of action and issue the following slogans:

1. Fight against the menace of imperialist war.
2. Hands off the Chinese revolution.
3. To the defence of the U. S. S. R.
4. Absolute independence for the colonies.
5. Dissolution of parliament.
6. Abolition of the monarchy.
7. Universal suffrage for both sexes from the age of 18.
8. Right of assembly, association, coalition, etc., freedom of speech and of the press.
9. The eight hour working day.
10. Insurance of the unemployed.
11. Annulment of anti-labour laws.
12. Confiscation of the estates of the Mikado, landlords, governments and church.
13. Establishment of a progressive income tax.

These partial demands and slogans must be linked up with the slogan of the workers and peasants' government and the slogan of the proletarian dictatorship. Only with the help of systematic propaganda of these slogans will progress be made in the political education of the proletarian masses, in the organisation of the workers' and peasants' bloc, and in the preparation of a real revolutionary mass struggle.

The struggle for these demands leads to the dictatorship of the proletariat. But this struggle will be successful only if there will be a sound and ideologically consistent Leninist discipline, a centralised and mass Communist Party, fighting jointly with the world Communist Party marching shoulder to shoulder with the entire Communist International.

The admission by the Japanese delegation of its mistakes and its adoption of all directives and decisions of the Communist International, serve as a guarantee that the Communist Party of Japan will be able to overcome the deviations existing within it, will be able to take a correct political and organisational course in its work, will be able to cope with the great tasks raised before it by history.

XV. PARTY CONGRESS OF THE C. P. S. U.

Directions for Drawing up the Five Years' Plan of National Economy.

Comrade Rykov's Report.

(Full text.)

I. THE QUESTIONS OF THE ECONOMIC SITUATION.

A peculiar feature of the present economic situation is the existence of a number of negative and unsound developments in our inner goods traffic, which made their appearance during the last quarter of the past economic year, and still continue. The quantity of goods being placed on the market this year is much greater than last. But in spite of increasing supplies there is still a certain shortage of goods. The discrepancy between supply and demand has made its appearance on a higher rung of the ladder of economic development, and on a higher level of the necessities of the broad masses of the people. According to the control figures issued by the State Planning Commission, in 1927/28 the production of articles of consumption is to be increased by more than 13 per cent. This increase of supplies encounters however a still greater increase of demand, caused on the one hand by the increased income of the population, the reduced prices of industrial articles, the higher wages and income of the peasantry resultant on the realisation of agricultural products, on supplementary work, etc., and on the other hand by a certain influence exercised by extra-economic factors (crises in foreign political relations).

It is at the same time typical of our economy that the juncture at which the main mass of agricultural products has appeared on the market does not synchronise with the increase of industrial production.

The data which I have adduced show the situation in the market in the fourth quarter to be as follows, as compared with the corresponding period in 1925/26: The production of mass articles of consumption increased — the reductions of prices taken into account — by a total of one half per cent, the wage funds of the workers employed in State industry increased by 16 per cent; the income of the peasantry (from the systematic grain supply service, after deduction of taxes) rose by 31 per cent. The total buying reserves of town and country increased by over 20 per cent.

These figures throw light on that disparity between supply and demand which became apparent in the autumn, showing that at the moment when the village demand was at its highest, industrial goods were put on the market in insufficient quantities. The stagnation of industrial production during the summer (repairs, holidays, etc.) further increased this insufficiency. The increase in industrial output did not follow until later, and its effect can only be felt in the first months of the new economic year. The negative results of such a disparity between supplies and demand can only be avoided by an adequate reserve stock of goods. We had thought to be better equipped for the realisation of the crops in this respect this year, and have been accumulating reserves since last spring. But the whole of the reserves which we had thus only begun to accumulate, and which are necessary to us for the successful realisation of the crops, were used up before the agricultural campaign began, the international complications having greatly increased the demand.

Are these difficulties and interruptions in the development of goods traffic symptoms of a general economic crisis? Is the traffic in goods between town and country destroyed in

its totality? These are questions which arise when we endeavour to form a judgment of the present status of the economy of the Soviet Union. In my opinion this pessimistic estimate is unfounded. In analysing the economic relations between town and country, we operate as a rule solely with the figures of the grain supply service, although the income derived from this is scarcely more than 20 per cent. of the total income of the peasantry. The peasant has other sources of income: cattle breeding, cultivation of technical plants, and other work. If we examine the relations of town and country not only from the standpoint of the sale and purchase of grain, but take into consideration cattle breeding, technical plants, and other agricultural products, we find that during the past year the traffic in goods with the rural districts has been much greater than formerly.

The increased income of the rural population has of course the effect of lessening the need of the village to sell agricultural products in order to pay taxes and buy industrial products.

Goods traffic with the village has therefore increased on the whole as a result of the increased returns for technical plants, livestock products, etc., and there is no general crisis in the relations between town and country. There is, however, a partial crisis confined to the grain supply service.

During the first five months of this year's grain supply campaign about 25 per cent. less grain was purchased than in the corresponding months of last year. In comparison with 1925 we have bought up somewhat more grain; but when we take into account the fact that in this year private grain purchases played a much smaller part, we find that the amount of grain thrown on the markets by the peasantry scarcely exceeds that of 1925.

What are the causes of this phenomenon? The main cause is the shortage of industrial goods. When industrial goods are scarce, the peasantry endeavour to obtain as much cotton fabrics, agricultural machinery, etc. as they can, in the way which they find most advantageous for them. And for them it is more advantageous to sell cattle; for them it is more advantageous to earn by side occupations; for them it is more advantageous to sell technical plants and oil seeds (and to build up their traffic in goods with the city on these), than to put grain on the market. This fact finds clear expression in the comparative price index figures for the various agricultural goods. The price index figure for rye is 101, for wheat 113, whilst the figures for technical plants is 135, for livestock products 186, for butter 171, for eggs 215. At such prices it is naturally more advantageous for the peasant to turn his attention to other branches than the growing of corn.

Is this ratio of prices among the various agricultural products normal? I believe that it is fundamentally correct to place higher prices on technical plants and livestock products, as this is a spur to the progress of improved and intensive methods of agriculture, and is an absolute gain both to agriculture and to the industries whose raw material basis is secured and extended. We already experience less difficulty in supplying our industries with raw materials than last year. But the question of whether this year's price system is the most favourable solution of the problem is one which can only be

answered by actual experience, and we must compile the data not only for the whole country, but with due attention to the individual data of the separate republics and districts. Our starting point for the revision of the existing price system must be the adaptation of the prices of all other agricultural products to the stable bread prices. The negative aspect of the present price ratios is the retardative effect on the grain supplies.

I need not enter into the various causes unfavourably affecting our grain supplies. I may however point out the fact of the unfavourable geographical distribution of the grain crops. In a number of districts there has been a total failure of crops. This is, however, no disaster, as there are grain reserves laid by the peasants in former years, and since the goods traffic of these districts suffices to cover their requirements in grain.

The strained situation in the grain supply service can and must be removed, for in the first place the peasantry has now expended to a great extent the means earned by the sale of technical plants and other products, and in the second place we have taken measures for increasing the supply of industrial goods bought by the village, cotton and woolen fabrics, and a number of other goods. Thanks to these measures, we shall be able to alleviate the goods famine, and shall in all probability increase the offer in mass articles of consumption as compared with the plans hitherto projected, to the value of about 100 to 120 million roubles.

We must devote special attention to the grain supplies apparatus and its work, and never forget for a moment that our grain supply determines to a great extent the fate of our exports, and the possibility of accumulating reserves for bad years, and for possible international complications. A grain supply securing the daily needs of the population is not sufficient; we must attain more than this, and must secure both home reserves and a surplus for export.

One proof that there is no general crisis in our economy is the uninterrupted development of our industry.

Has our credit system been in any difficulties? A few months ago there were moments when our credit system appeared to be strained. This had two causes. Firstly, when drafting the industrial finance plan for 1926/27, we had over-rated the ability of our industry to obtain larger returns with a small amount of working capital. The factory prices were reduced without a corresponding decrease in the costs of production, and the limits of the capital investment provided by the plan were exceeded, so that industry encountered financial difficulties leading to an increased demand for industrial credit. Secondly, the supplanting of private trade in the sphere of goods circulation increased the need of financial means for our state and co-operative purchasing and trading institutions.

The strained situation in credit and money traffic may be regarded as past.

The improved credit and financial situation of the last quarter of a year may be seen from the fact that it has not been necessary to make use of even half of the bank note issue provided for this quarter, and the current accounts of our economic organisations have increased beyond all expectations. November brought a great increase in savings bank investments. We have undoubted proofs of the firmness of our credit system and the stability of our currency. Our chervoneiz does not yet completely fulfil the functions of accumulation and savings, but it is a perfectly stable circulating medium. The fact of the increase of savings investments in the credit organs (savings banks) collecting the small savings of the broad masses of the population, shows that confidence is increasing in the chervoneiz as a means of accumulation.

Apart from the immediate difficulties connected with the realisation of the crops, we must clearly recognise those other difficulties which we shall encounter for some time to come, probably for the next one or two years. To these must be counted the difficulties arising from two causes: In the first place the necessity of expending more on the industrialisation of the country, without receiving immediate results in a simultaneous corresponding increase of output; in the second place, the necessity of expending considerable means on the defence of the country.

The expenditure of the sums required for these two purposes withdraws from circulation considerable means which could otherwise be used for our national economy, and only the most

rational and exact of methods can make this outlay possible. It involves a great strain on our State finances, and demands a certain increase of taxation of the well-to-do strata of the population. I am of the opinion that the agricultural uniform tax can be raised somewhat next year, without of course withdrawing any of the privileges granted to the propertyless population of the village, or altering the enactment laid down in the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee, exempting 35 per cent. of the peasant farms completely from the agricultural uniform tax.

The State budget expenditure, amounting according to some estimates to over 5900 million roubles, will be increased by these plans, whose execution will require from the whole Soviet apparatus, from top to bottom, and from the whole Party, the utmost possible effort and the intensest work. The revenues from the realisation of loans occupy a considerable place in the budget income of the current year, amounting to about 500 million roubles. For this reason the development of State credit operations must be accorded special attention.

The experience gained in the industrialisation loan shows us what can be accomplished in this sphere. Many of us — and I myself was among the guilty ones — had certain doubts as to the possibility of placing a 200 million loan among the working population, especially the working and employee class. This loan is already more than covered. The success of this loan shows that we must keep our eyes open to our own possibilities. The positive results of the realisation of the industrialisation loan must be the pledge for new achievements in this direction, and the experience gained with this loan must be utilised in our further loan policy. We must follow up the success of the State loans in the cities, and try to place a loan to the value of 50 to 100 million roubles among the peasantry during the coming year. (A voice: "Hear, hear!") We must study how to make this loan comprehensible, suitable, and attractive to the peasantry.

What are the main conclusions to be drawn from the above characterisation of our present economic position? My general estimate of our economic conditions may be summed up in the statement that we are not suffering from any general crisis in the goods traffic between town and country, and still less from any general economic crisis. Our traffic in goods has increased; the peasantry is placing greater quantities of other agricultural products than grain on the market, whilst on the other hand there is a certain decline in the "metabolism" between town and country with respect to grain. The credit system is perfectly stable. This estimate of our economic status does not, however, release us from the obligation to extent every effort to improve it. Our grain supply service in particular demands intense and energetic effort, and no less important are the tasks of providing the country with a sufficiency of industrial goods, and covering this year's greatly increased budget.

Our chief task in the sphere of foreign trade is to secure our grain export; should we not be successful in this, then our export plans must be realised by forcing export in other goods.

We must devote the utmost attention to the cultivation of grain, especially of wheat, in the leading bread corn districts, and must take energetic measures (through the co-operatives, the people's Commissariat for Agriculture, seed corn reserves, supplies of machines, credit) for the accomplishment of radical changes, including a considerable extension of the grain sown area from this coming spring onwards.

This concludes my characterisation of our economic position, and I pass on to the questions of the Five Years' Plan.

II. THE PROBLEMS OF THE FIVE YEARS' PLAN.

We have already had several variations of the Five Years' Plan submitted to us; no fewer than five have come to my knowledge. Comrades better informed than I on the subject state that there are seven. The latest variation, distributed to the delegates of the 15th Party Congress, was drawn up immediately before the Congress, and has therefore not yet been examined.

What are the chief defects of the Five Years' Plan, common to all its variations? The first defect is the too statistical character of the plan. The figures given are not worked out economically to a sufficient extent, nor do they accord adequate consideration to the problems of the technics

of production. And yet we are living in a period of fundamental changes in the organisation of industry, and are pressing forward towards a far-reaching technical and economic reorganisation of agriculture. The Plan must give expression to the processes going on in the technics of production.

The second defect of the Five Years' Plans is their failure to deal clearly with the problem of dividing the Soviet Union into different economic areas. This makes more difficult not only the examination of this problem, but its solution.

The basic idea of the Five Years' Plan is: The industrialisation of the country as the main path to the organisation of socialist economy. We must face the fact that the execution of this Plan involves the overcoming of many difficulties and obstacles. The Plan must be so constructed that these difficulties and fluctuations in economic prosperity are reduced to a minimum. Here lies the importance of the directions submitted to the Party Congress for the drawing up of a Five Years' Plan. These deal with the main possible difficulties lying in the way of the development of national economy, and point out the means of overcoming them.

The problem of accumulation. A considerable portion of our difficulties is caused by the enormous expenditure demanded by the reconstruction of national economy on the basis of the development of industry and agriculture. The question of how much financial means we can obtain from our national income, and of the channels into which these means are best diverted, determines the general rate of our advance towards Socialism and the possibility of the transition without crises from one stage of economic development to another. Can we overcome these difficulties by increasing the means taken from private accumulation? It need scarcely be said that we cannot guarantee being able to extract from private capitalist accumulation the whole of the means required for the needs of the country. Doubtless our system of private capitalist taxation has still many faults; in some cases the taxation may be adequate, but in others it is insufficient, and in others again it is too high. But it would be a grave error to suppose that the private capitalist section of our national economy is an inexhaustible and ever growing source of taxation revenues. The policy which we have hitherto pursued has decreased the rôle played by private capital in national economy. In the course of the next five years we expect to reduce the share of private capital in our economy still further. There will be two opposing lines in economy, on the one hand the line of growing investments in industry, and on the other the comparative regression of the private capitalist section of our whole national economy. This process of rapid supplanting of private capital excludes the possibility of looking to the increase of taxation on private capitalist accumulation as any decided solution of the whole problem of capital investment.

Another assertion which is incorrect is that the industrialisation of the country will only be possible for years to come by means of an uninterrupted and increasing transference of means from agriculture and other sections of national economy into industry. Such a transference of means (of course within certain limits) is inevitable and permissible only in the present stage of development, until industry has been placed on a firm footing. After industry has secured its position, and the industrial development of the country has attained a higher level than at present, it is quite possible that the reverse process will take place: the transference of means from industry to agriculture, to the end that this latter may develop more intensively in a socialist direction.

One extremely absurd criticism of the Five Years' Plan — in all its variations — is that which takes as a starting point the assumption that it is necessary for a maximum speed of development to be maintained in all branches of national economy at the same time. We all know the proposals of the Opposition: a maximum increase in wages, maximum improvement in the economic position of the peasantry, maximum increase of capital investment in transport service, in house building, in industry, in agriculture, etc. etc. The means at the disposal of the State are always limited to a certain extent. The solution of the problem of rapid socialisation is not to satisfy everybody at once (which nobody could accomplish), but in a rational distribution of the means at our disposal, yielding the best results for the building up of the new society.

Accumulation and agriculture. The distance between the level of our agriculture and the agriculture of the advanced

capitalist countries is much greater than, let us say, the distance between the level of development of our textile industry and the textile industry of Germany, England, or the United States.

In our industries we possess all the advantages of the large scale undertaking, and of comparatively advanced technics. Thanks to the October Revolution, we can add to the advantages of the large undertaking the advantages of the socialist character of our industry, and the full possibility of conducting this systematically. In agriculture we have a large number of small and dwarf undertakings, which do not enjoy the advantages of large-scale undertakings. The kulak farms have the advantage over these with respect to the technics of production. The kulak farm, even when other conditions are equal, is more profitable and better able to organise its work on rational lines. Not only the smallest farms but even the middle farms suffer from the fact that technical improvements cost them proportionately much more than they cost the larger farms, as they cannot be utilised on the same scale. Comrade Molotov has told me that on many small farms it is not even worth while to keep a horse.

In what direction should a fundamental change be effected in agriculture? The right way to go to work is to organise large scale agricultural undertakings, with the aid of the co-operative organisation of collectivisation. We shall employ the full powers of the State and the Party to restrict the exploiting tendencies of the kulak, and to support the poor and middle peasantry. If we are to attain these ends it is imperatively necessary to lay before the whole peasantry, the village poor and the middle peasants, clearly and tangibly, the question of the development of agriculture by means of large-scale agricultural production. This is one of our main tasks in the agricultural question. In agriculture, as opposed to the State section of our economy, the accumulation is carried on in millions of scattered and insufficiently organised peasant farms. We must create an incentive stimulating a use of this private accumulation for the purpose of uniting the peasantry in the organisation of agriculture on the basis of larger units of production.

Light and heavy industry. The question of accumulation in national economy is followed closely by the question of the most suitable distribution of the available means among the separate branches of national economy, and especially of the share to be allotted to light and heavy industry. Various branches of heavy industry have not yet regained the pre-war level. And even before the war their degree of development was by no means high. A more rapid development of heavy industry is absolutely indispensable for the next few years. The development of light industry and agriculture depend on the development of heavy industry, especially of machine building. In the sphere of heavy industry we are greatly dependent upon foreign countries. We can and will solve our own heavy industrial problem with our own means, although this will prevent us for the time being from solving altogether the question of the so-called deficit goods (for which there prevails an unsatisfied demand). Up to now no country has been capable of reconstructing and developing its heavy industry without extensive help from abroad. If we want to build up our heavy industry with our own means — and we must do this — then we shall have to impose restrictions on ourselves for a time. There is no other way.

Our policy of steadily increasing the economy prosperity of the masses of workers and peasants brings about a correspondingly steady increase in the demand for mass articles of consumption. But the possible shortage of some mass articles of consumption, and the occasional increased demand for this or that article which cannot be produced with sufficient rapidity, are not in themselves dangerous. What is dangerous is a crisis affecting the whole circulation of goods, leading possibly to a currency crisis, and to a crisis affecting the whole national economy of the country. We must never permit conditions in our markets to reach this acute point. On the other hand we must not abandon our positions in heavy industry merely because we encounter occasional difficulties. We can only develop our heavy industry by maintaining at first an extremely strict regime in the circulation of goods, not excluding the occasional shortage of this or that mass article of consumption. This does not mean, of course, that light industry is to fall behind. It must be promoted in every possible way,

in order that there may be no interruption in the circulation of goods between town and country, and in order to prevent a crisis affecting the entire economy.

The transport problem. According to some of the variations of the Five Years' Plan, the transport service is to receive as much, or more, support than industry. In my opinion increased investments in the transport service are absolutely indispensable, not only because the further development of national economy supposes a more rapid development of transport service than hitherto, but because the transport service, in the hands of the working class, is a powerful means for the reorganisation of the whole national economy and a potent instrument enabling national economy to be influenced by our socialised undertakings. Up to the present we have dealt with transport questions as if we were speaking solely of cab drivers. Until quite recently we have even neglected the problem of the utilisation of the transport service as a weapon of our economic policy, as an instrument enabling the socialist economic elements to exercise influence over the non-socialist.

The problem of equilibrium in the market. One of the most important and cardinal demands which we must make upon the Five Years' Plan is that it secures for us as far as possible the development of our whole national economy from year to year, without crises. Do the different variations of the Five Years' Plan as yet submitted meet this demand? The problem is too complicated to allow of categorical reply to this question. I have here some calculations made by collaborators of the People's Commissariat for trade, dealing with the question of the extent to which the rate of development of the separate elements of our economy, as assumed by the State Planning Commission for the Five Years' period, secures the equilibrium of the market at the close of this period. The result of these calculations is as follows: If we take the 26 per cent. rise in wages provided by the Five Years' Plan (the increase of real wages, taking into account the reduction of prices, is estimated by the State Planning Commission at something over 40 per cent.), assume the reduction of retail prices for industrial goods at 24.5 per cent., the reduction of retail prices for agricultural products at 5.5 per cent., and the increase of agricultural products placed on the market at 68.8 per cent. as a basis, we find that the maintenance of equilibrium in the market requires a much greater quantity of mass articles of consumption than are provided by the State Planning Commission. The functionaries of the Trade Commissariat point out that, should the Five Years' Plan be realised, the end of the period will see us with a goods shortage considerably more acute than that of 1926/27. That is, we risk a general crisis in the circulation of goods. In order to avoid this, it is apparently necessary to increase the production of industrial mass articles not merely by 70 per cent., but by 89 per cent. This equilibrium of the market can of course be attained by other means, for instance by a slighter reduction in the prices of industrial goods, by the reduction of prices for agricultural products, by a somewhat smaller rise in wages, etc. Still other measures can be used for maintaining the balance of the market.

It is the task of the Five Years' Plan to secure this relative equilibrium of the goods circulation by a system of measures best guaranteeing the interests of the working class and the building up of the socialist state of society.

Foreign trade. The weakest point in our whole economic development is our foreign trade. The Five Years' Plan must take as a starting point the fact that during the next few years the process of industrialisation will depend greatly on foreign trade. In view of the enormous importance of foreign trade, the Party and Soviet organs must devote much greater attention to questions of export; we must force the export of other goods than grain, for instance wood, livestock produce etc.

Reserves. Our economic conditions will probably be extremely strained during the next five years, and we shall have great difficulties to overcome. The rate of general economic development and of industrialisation assumed by the plans presupposes a severe strain. It will therefore be necessary to accumulate reserves which will enable us to manoeuvre in the case of economic difficulties of any nature. But here again we must not forget the difficulties connected with the formation of reserves. I need only give one example in order to convey an idea of these difficulties. The sum of no less than 500 million roubles is for instance required to purchase a reserve of industrial mass articles sufficient for one month. If such a sum is required for

this one reserve stock, it may well be imagined what sums are required if reserves are to be accumulated of all necessary articles (grain, raw materials, securities, etc.).

The problem of unemployment. How do the capitalist States solve the problem of agrarian over-population? In the first place with the aid of mass emigration. We place no obstacles in the way of emigration to other countries, and yet there is no special emigration movement among us. On the contrary, there is an opposite tendency — towards immigration.

For us the way of solution of the problem of agrarian over-population by means of emigration is almost entirely barred. In the Soviet Union itself there are vast tracts of country excellently adapted for forming settlements for the surplus population, but the organisation of such settlements demands an outlay which we shall scarcely be able to afford during the next few years, and we cannot hope to lessen unemployment and to furnish room for the expansion of our population to any great extent by these means for some time to come. This means that at present our chief remedies against unemployment and surplus-population must be the intensification of agriculture and the development of industry. The transition to the seven-hour day taking place next year will considerably increase the number of workers employed in industry, but even this will scarcely suffice to provide a complete solution of the problem of unemployment and surplus agrarian population.

When dealing with the question of unemployment, there is one inaccuracy which creeps into practically all our calculations: We count the unemployed of all categories and in all districts together, and then apply the same prescription as a remedy against unemployment everywhere. That is incorrect. There are different kinds of unemployment. It will, for instance, scarcely be found possible to combat unemployment in White Russia and the Ukrainian border districts with the same means and measures as those suitable for the struggle against unemployment among the industrial workers of Leningrad and Moscow. There appears to be no general unemployment among the skilled workers in the Soviet Union. Individual cases of unemployment in these categories are due to the faulty organisation of the distribution and employment of the skilled labour of the Soviet Union. In many districts the irrigation and drainage of the soil can increase the arable land to an extent enabling the surplus population of these and the adjacent districts to find sufficient employment on the newly won land.

A considerable part of the unemployed of Moscow, Leningrad, and other large cities consist of brain workers, whilst in the provinces and in the village there is a tremendous dearth of brain workers.

It is scarcely possible to combat unemployment among brain workers with the same means employed against unemployment among industrial workers. The first measure to be taken for combating unemployment among mental workers is not to designate as unemployed those who prefer work in the village to unemployment in the city. (A voice: "Hear, hear!" Applause.) Further, more attention must be devoted to satisfying the cultural needs of the people, especially in the provinces; in many cases the position of the cultural workers must be improved.

In connection with unemployment among mental workers, I cannot but refer to the various interpretations of the economisation regime and the wrong methods adopted in carrying out the directions requiring a 20 per cent. reduction of administrative costs. I have observed a number of cases in which qualified laboratory specialists and technicians have been discharged, although these were employed in improving the methods of production, only for the sake of the reduction of the total number of employees. And this in face of the enormous shortage of qualified workers in every factory and every undertaking! In this way we create artificial unemployment among the engineers, technicians, etc., who are absolutely indispensable to us if we are to make any progress from the extreme technical backwardness of our industry. For some reason the idea seems to prevail among us that the specialists must sit in our offices, business managements, and People's Commissariats, occupied with filling up sheets of foolscap. In these places nobody is discharged, whilst in the factories, works, and in the whole process of production itself, cutting down of staffs is undertaken for one reason or another. We must change this state of affairs fundamentally, especially in the present period of the rationalisation and reconstruction of our industry. We shall never rationalise our industry unless we have sufficient technical forces at our

disposal, unless we train fresh cadres of engineers and technicians working in the factories themselves, actually taking part in the process of production, and unless we increase the specific weight of these skilled workers in our industry.

Closely bound up with this are the cultural questions, which I shall only touch upon in passing. In the first place it is, in my opinion, an undoubted fact that our cultural progress falls far behind the development of our national economy and the improvement of the standard of living of our workers and peasants. (A voice: "Hear, hear!") In the second place I am of the opinion that the realisation of industrialisation and the advancement of economy cannot be achieved further without a corresponding raising of the cultural level of the whole country.

In the third place I believe that the reason why expenditure for cultural purposes forms so small a part of the budget of the worker and peasant is not to be found in a lack of desire for culture, but in the fact that we have not yet learnt to satisfy the actually existing desire.

In the fourth place, and finally, I am of the opinion that when our budget and revenues increase during the coming year, we must begin at once to expend even more on our cultural advancement than we have expended on the restoration of economy. We must not divide the economic revolution from the cultural. A discrepancy here will have to be paid for dearly. (A voice: "Hear, hear!") It must be clear to all that in the given stage our development culture is just as important and necessary for successful economic construction as a supply of ammunition in war. Without a rapid cultural advancement we shall not be able to reconstruct our economy effectually.

The Defects of our Building Activities.

The most pressing practical question of today is the inefficiency of our building activities. At the present time building is the most expensive of all our economic activities. The index figure for building expenses for the current economic year is 265, whilst the general industrial index figure is 199. If we can succeed in reducing this figure, if only to the level of the industrial index figure, we shall save many hundred millions of roubles. The financial problem of our building work has ramifications involving a much more comprehensive problem. One of the variations of the Five Years' Plan suggests an outlay of over 20 milliard rouble for the erection of works and factories. Were our building costs to be reduced by 10 per cent, two milliard roubles would be saved in five years; a 15 per cent. reduction would save 3 milliard roubles in this time. We hold innumerable meetings to decide the question of where we are to find money for the expansion of industry, but we have not yet succeeded in solving this most important problem of cutting down building expenses, of rationalising our building activities, and applying the means at our disposal in the manner best adapted to our ends. Radical changes must be made here. Mistakes made in the erection of works and factories throw great obstacles in the way of further progress. I have before me data referring to various building undertakings. One of these was estimated to cost 7 million roubles and cost in reality 20 million. Another preliminary estimate was for 8 million roubles, the actual cost 10 million. A third project is especially characteristic. This is for the erection of the cotton factory at Fergana. This work has been already commenced, and under the following conditions: 4 to 5 kilometres from the railway, 17 versts from the nearest source of drinking water, and 14 versts from the spot where suitable water for factory purposes is to be found. There are no dwelling houses for workers or employees near the spot where the factory is being erected. It looks exactly as if the very worst and most unsuitable place in the whole Soviet Union had been selected. The unsuitable position of this building site is in itself sufficient to increase the costs of digging and laying the foundations from 4.50 roubles per cubic metre to 14 roubles. (A voice: "Has anyone been punished for that?" Disturbance.)

I have just got to know of this case, and of course those guilty will be punished.

It need not be said that such cases become rarer every year. We have made great strides forward in industry of late. But we must remember that we are not yet finished with the work of rationalising the expenditure for industrial development. Neither have we yet learnt to utilise to a requisite degree the possibilities of what is already completed.

I do not consider that the economists alone are to blame for this. We have all contributed to this evil. It is a state of affairs naturally resulting from the fact that we and our leading economic organs have devoted our attention exclusively to the question of calculating and raising the means required, and have paid but little attention to questions of reconstruction, rationalisation, and the suitable outlay of the means available. The realisation of the Five Years' Plan must place in the foreground the organisatory and technical problems arising in connection with the investment of 20 to 25 milliard roubles of fresh capital. This second aspect of the problem of our building activities must be placed on our agenda and accorded maximum attention.

III. THE FRESH EXPENDITURE AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE MASSES.

I have already taken the opportunity of pointing out that the system of economic organisation which has developed during the period of reconstruction and the working methods of our social economic-organisations taken over from this period must be regarded as entirely inadequate for the accomplishment of our fresh tasks — the reconstruction of the economy of the whole country on the basis of a tremendous advance in the activity of the working class and of the working masses generally. The realisation of our tasks, which are growing in number and complication, entails the fullest utilisation of the materials and labour obtainable both in town and country, which can and must be mobilised and organised by the Party. (A voice: "Hear, hear!")

Among the most important and essential constituents of our Party work we must reckon the improvement of the forms and methods of organising the growing active cadres of the working masses. The present methods of social organisation appear to me to be insufficient for the solution of the gigantic problems which we have already tackled: The problems of building up Socialism in our country. That these methods are no longer sufficient is due to the growing complication of our tasks and the necessity of greater expenditure for their fulfilment. We have a system of comprehensive and gigantic organisations, often occupying a monopolist position in their special spheres of economic and social life. These organisations are extremely jealous of any competitors. Up to the present no organisations of importance have been formed on the principle of the personal interest of any Party members, workers, peasants, or Soviet intellectuals for the accomplishment of this or that definite task. It need not be said that all, or almost all, the workers are members of the trade unions, and that they all, or almost all, take part in the elections to the Soviets. If anyone takes an interest in some special question, however, whether in the sphere of industrialisation, factory life, or cultural work, — then why should we not support special organisations formed voluntarily on the principle of personal inclination? Why should we not promote the formation of such organisations, why should we not avail ourselves the help of such organisations in the solution of the various problems of socialist construction? It seems to me that this can and must be done. I do not think that we can fulfil our tasks without building up a system of mass organisations, and without utilising voluntarily societies to aid us in the work of solving individual problems of socialist construction. Every initiative towards economic or cultural progress should receive the utmost encouragement. Such initiative is perfectly indispensable for the realisation of the socialist state of society.

It will scarcely be necessary for me to touch upon the necessity of altering the system and working methods of our organisations. We have gigantic centralised organisations, with ramifications extending all over our great country. The head organs of these organisations are so far distant from the works, factories, and villages, that there exists a grave danger of estrangement. In the course of years a process of routine and ossification is inevitable in these organisations, even when gigantic upheavals and changes are going on at their actual basis, and every day something new appears and grows. We run the danger that the organs thus alienated from their basis become powers in themselves, occupying an important position in the life of the Soviet State, and hampering and retarding by their routine and immobility all the new, living, progressive, and revolutionary that is growing up under the Soviet Power and on the basis of the Soviet economy.

On the eve of the XV. Party Congress the Opposition suffered a complete and unexampled defeat, although it employed in its struggle against the Party and in its appeals to the third power every description of promise and demagogic assurance. No one has followed it. Why? Because the millions of workers and peasants in our Soviet Union are taking immediate part in the gigantic and comprehensive work of socialist construction. The millions of our workers and peasants not only recognise the building up of Socialism to be their own affair, they take part in it actively, immediately, and daily. This process of participation on the part of the masses in the build-

ing up of the new society has just begun; the further we advance, the greater will be their participation.

The Five Years' Plan of Party work must secure the participation of these masses in living, active, mobile, and powerful organisations. The Five Years' Plan of Party work must secure the full utilisation of the possibilities of these gigantic masses of active participants in the work of socialist construction, ensuring the complete victory of the working class in the realisation of the new society. (Enthusiastic and prolonged applause.)

Directions for Drawing up the Five Years' Plan of National Economy.

Comrade Krshishanovsky's Co-report.

(Full text.)

The Results and Prospects of Economic Construction.

The question of a uniform plan of national economy was first brought forward in a comprehensive form at the IX. Party Congress in 1920.

That year brought a fundamental change in the life of our whole country. The war period of our revolution had just closed, and we were at the beginning of a peaceful "pause for breath". At the same time we were in the midst of a tremendous economic decay. At that time our country was a country of poverty and misery in the strictest sense of the terms.

We began to build up a system of economy such as the world had never before witnessed, for the consolidation of the achievements of the October Revolution enabled our economy to be built up on an entirely new foundation, unknown to the capitalist world. There are some economists among us who maintain that a sharp distinction must be made between the period of the restoration of our economy and the period of rebuilding; they assert that during the first period of our development we followed a system inherited by us from the pre-war period, thereby facilitating our progress. They speak derisively of a systematic line of development during this period, for in their opinion the market itself has helped us since the introduction of the New Economic Policy; the market has corrected and instructed us, and the Plan has been of no importance.

In accordance with the resolutions passed at the IX. Party Congress in 1920, a general plan for the entire national economy was drawn up, and became generally known under the name of the "electrification plan", the Plan of the State Electrification Commission. You know that Lenin hoped much from this programme; he was of the opinion that it was the basis of a second programme of the Party. This electrification plan provided for the erection of thirty electric works in the various provinces. It was assumed that in the course of ten to fifteen years we should have to expend about 1.2 milliard roubles for this purpose, and that it would be possible for us to raise our industry by 80 to 100 per cent. over the pre-war level during this same period. About 3 milliard roubles were to be expended for these purposes. It was assumed that 20 to 30 thousand kilometres of new railways would have to be laid down, and an expenditure of a further 8 milliard roubles was assumed for transport service. The plan assumed a total expenditure of about 17 milliard roubles for these three purposes.

It must be remembered that at that time we were already perfectly aware that the accumulation of resources in our industry itself would scarcely be able to meet the outlay required by the restoration of our decayed industries, and we intended to find the means for our vast work of restoration by exploiting the goods famine in Europe, that is, we intended to force export, and reckoned upon the aid of the post-revolutionary

revival of peasant farming. We calculated at that time that with the help of a favourable trade balance we should be able to accumulate in the course of ten to fifteen years about 11 milliard roubles. This meant a deficit of six milliard roubles in the expenditure estimated for the above three purposes. Further, we calculated that the West would in all probability find it necessary to take up certain commercial relations with us. We reckoned upon an extensive concession programme; we hoped for credits, and expected that credit operations and concessions would enable us to cover this deficit.

The blow dealt us by the famine year of 1921 showed us the error of depending on these export surpluses, especially as we had thought to attain these with the aid of our agriculture. It was not until after 1921 that we became fully aware of the frightful extent of the decline of our economy, which permitted only a very slow increase in the production of agricultural commodities and showed the dependence of this production on a number of extremely complicated connections within the general economy of the Soviet Union, on the general public of the Soviet Union to the peasantry, etc.

Upon what is our Five Years' Plan based, since it does not calculate on outside help to any considerable extent, and takes into account an export which is the weakest spot of our whole economy? Whatever errors we may have made in the Five Years' Plans still the progress of our industry will be 80 to 100 per cent. by about 1931.

You will see that, even if we take the minimum assumed by our Five Years' Plan, the general tasks laid down for our economic construction correspond exactly to the plan known during Lenin's lifetime as the "Plan of Great Works". We can only be ashamed that there are comrades among us who think these tasks too small.

But that is not all. You must remember that Comrade Lenin connected our whole economic development with the advance of an army of skilled workers, of specialists in every sphere of activity, without whose assistance all progress is impossible. How were matters in this respect at the beginning of the period of construction? Allow me to quote a document here. This dates from 1918, and was addressed to the Government by the All-Russian Union of Engineers, the Moscow science and technics organisations, the managing engineers, and the provincial department of the engineers union. It appeared after the six days of negotiations on the question of the nationalisation of industry. It is in itself a complete indictment.

This document placed on record that the power which took over the whole of our economic development in October failed in its task, that the Soviets did not follow the instructions of the higher Government authorities, that the People's Supreme Economic Council had no definite programmes, that the whole project of the nationalisation of industry was built upon a treacherous foundation, undermining the spirit of enterprise and excluding the possibility of an inflow of foreign capital, etc.

This declaration closes with the following words: The nationalisation of industry, when not founded on any real basis, and when hampering the influx of necessary capital and raw materials and hindering technical restoration, is bound to worsen the disastrous position of industry still further, and to retard the rapid restoration imperative for the future of Russia. For this reason we declare ourselves, in the given circumstances, to be decidedly opposed to the nationalisation of industry, and we "lay the responsibility for this nationalisation on the representatives of the working class and the government which they have set up".

And now another document: The appeal of the scientific and technical workers, issued on the initiative of the group of the "Society of scientific and technical workers for the promotion of socialist construction". Here we read:

"The undersigned, taking part in the practical daily work of building up Socialism; in agreement, with the principles of the Soviet power, and in fullest sympathy with its aims, have arrived at the conviction that it is necessary at the present time to unite our scientific and technical forces on a definite ideological basis. In the present period of the development of the scientific and cultural life of the Soviet Union, such a unification is a necessary prerequisite for the successful advancement of socialist construction."

You see that when we first took over economy, the most highly qualified groups of technical intelligentsia left us and were opposed to us. But this stage is now followed by another, in which this group returns to us.

We have proved sufficiently powerful not only to win over the technical intelligentsia to our side, but to bring about extremely important changes in the ideology of this group.

Nevertheless, the difficulties lying before us in our present first stage on the road to creating socialist economy, are still immense. It suffices to call attention to the three general tasks forming the decisive factors of our Five Years' Plan.

What are these three tasks?

Firstly, it is our aim to carry out our industrialisation, to reorganise our whole economy on the basis of electrification, and to conduct our whole economy according to plan, to the end that we attain a rate of economic development unknown to the capitalist world.

Secondly, we must pursue a determined course towards the socialisation of economy, proceed with this process of socialisation on lines ensuring the steady rise of the prosperity and cultural level of the working masses.

Thirdly, in view of the international situation, we must secure the military power and defence of our country and reinforce these by all the means at our disposal.

The difficulties which we have to overcome are enormous. The first necessity for overcoming them is a tremendous unity of will.

What is the Economic Plan, what is its actual essence? Its actual content is an endeavour to school us to a united economic will. Who can guarantee, in our country, the most rapid realisation of this united will? The Party alone, our decisive and organised centre, the firmest stronghold not only of our political but also of our economic fronts:

The Stages of Planned Work.

I should like to give you a more or less clear idea of the actual stages of our planned work. I should like you to understand clearly what demands you are really entitled to put on those who work out the plans, and what is the actual significance of the figures and comments with which we accompany our Five Years' Plan at the present time.

Whenever we hear of attempts at planned economics in the capitalist countries, we must remember that although there have been critical moments, during wars for instance, in which the capitalist countries have been forced to resort to a systematic conduct of economic life in order to utilize all forces for war purposes, in reality it is still money which rules in these countries, and any Socialism based on the reign of this yellow metal will be yellow Socialism, a transitory period of what might be named "yellow planned economics". These plans, as they are set up in the capitalist world, collapse as soon as they encounter a stronger capitalist group. We, how-

ever, are dependent solely on ourselves, and if unity of will is our head trump, you may well imagine what a high degree of unanimity and agreement of will is required if we are to sign this bill of exchange for five years from motives of actual conviction, and not merely because we are obliged to.

What has been the actual course of our systematic construction? As early as 1920 a rough outline of the ground plan of our economy was drawn up. Then the struggle against economic decline began. Comrade Lenin advised us — those comrades engaged on the elaboration of the plans — to set aside for the moment our general ground plan, and to tackle the most urgent questions of our economic life in this emergency. The State Planning Commission, organised in 1924, was at once engaged in a struggle against the crises in the food, fuel, and transport services. It took some time before we were gradually able to return from these questions to the actual lines being laid down for planned economy.

Let us take for instance State industry. At the first glance it would seem as if it must be possible to introduce a planned regime here with special rapidity. But in reality it was not until 1925 that we had a comprehensive plan for all industry, including the technics of production, the economic analysis, and the financial programme.

The year 1925 terminated a certain process of reorganisation in our economic structure. Building activity increased, and industry made more rapid progress. A period began in which it became necessary to embrace in one comprehensive plan not only the plans for the various branches of industry, but at the same time the whole of the plans for the most important departments of national economy. Since 1925/26 we have been working out control figures for national economy, furnishing the basis for the fulfilment of this task.

The first control figures of the State Planning Commission (1925/26) were compiled exclusively by the collaborators of the State Planning Commission itself. The Government could not make use of these figures for working out a plan of economic operations.

In the following year (1926/27) a certain uniformity of system developed. For the first time the control figures contained general paragraphs referring to industrialisation, etc.

Finally, the control figures for the economic year 1927/28 are at last the result of extensive collective compilation. These figures have not been worked out solely by the staff in the State Planning Commission and the corresponding commissions in the separate Soviet republics. They are the final result of the research of many thousand economists all over our country. A number of Congresses were called. At these congresses the general methods of dealing with the material have been laid down, and it may be now stated that, as a result of the work already accomplished, we have now material at our disposal comprising the budget, the financial plan for our industry, and our import and export plans, as constituents of a uniform and consistent plan of economy. This combination has been given a form enabling the Government to make immediate use of the control figures for 1927/28, since these already offer firm bases on which to set up all operative economic plans.

It is obvious that the Five Years' Perspective Plans must not constitute any limit beyond which we must not go. The extent of our development is so great that we cannot come to a standstill at this stage. When we remember that our re-examination of the prospects of the coming five years confronted us at once with a series of burning questions — the question of unemployment, of the possibility of improving the prosperity of the working masses, and of the comparative strength of such huge branches of our economy as industry and agriculture — we see clearly that we must pass as speedily as possible from the five years' plan to the ten and fifteen years' plan, that is, to the general plan. The imperative necessity of special activity in the interests of the transport service urges us especially in this direction.

I must accord a few words to the extension of railway transport. The freights carried already exceed the pre-war figures by about 13 per cent. You are probably not all aware of the extent to which the transport service is our heel of Achilles. Of special importance are: The extension of the Siberian lines and junctions, and the connections between the Donetz basin and our industrial centres.

If we do not greatly extend our railway network here, we hamper the development of our Siberian raw material basis,

and deal a severe blow to the economic dynamics of the whole Soviet Union.

A second important factor is the transport of the Donetz coal, our most important fuel, exercising enormous influence on the whole economic life of our industrial centres, both in the central industrial districts and in Leningrad.

Lenin was of the opinion that one of the greatest dangers threatening us was the bureaucratisation of our planned economics. But this triply articulated system of our planned work prevents its bureaucratisation. We may put the matter as follows: Our most immutable instructions are given by the control figures, but with one reservation: Taking these control figures as a basis, we must none the less take into account economic fluctuations, constantly retest the correctness of the figures, and carefully observe the tendencies in our economy. More than this. Should the heads of the leading economic organisations be convinced that the control figures for the given year are wrong and misleading, then they may break through the confines of the planned instructions at their own risk, but must of course be prepared to substantiate the considerations which have led them to set aside the enactments. The control figures must be exactly co-ordinated with the Five Years' Plan.

What figures are proposed by us for the Five Years' Plan? The congress of economists collaborating in the plan came to the conclusion that it was impossible to advance only one set of figures for the Five Years' Plan. A plan extending several years into the future is a distant aim. We must proceed like the artillery man. He examines his mark through his glass and then adjusts his aim to two possibilities. The first adjustment is a careful and cautious estimate, taking as the basis the minimum of economic possibilities, guaranteeing economy from unforeseen accidents. This is the preliminary adjustment. The second series of figures reckons with more favourable chances, which may in certain circumstances offer the possibility of reaching our goal more rapidly. If this optional estimate is not quite reached, it is no great misfortune. In spite of all difficulties; and in spite of our only breaking occasionally through the front of the elementary economic anarchy opposing us, we are advancing in the desired direction. The summing up of our economic possibilities under these two variations facilitates our economic manoeuvres.

The following must also be emphasised: If we find ourselves exposed to a serious danger of bureaucratisation in our planned work, it will be extremely useful to us to have the additional support, outside of the general outlines of the Plan, of independent economic organisations able to help us, the centre, in the solution of the most urgent economic problems. Special economic areas must be worked out, and the republics must become complexes of such economic areas.

The Experience and Lessons of the Restoration Period. Our Preliminary Line of Work.

The first and most important lesson to be drawn from the experience of the restoration period is the fact that the New Economic Policy has proved brilliantly successful. It suffices to follow the rate of our economic development, with the aid of the control figures, to see that the rate of development has not only exceeded our expectations, but at the same time the pre-war rate of development of our economy.

The second lesson to be drawn from our experience is the necessity of reinforcing our key positions. Comrade Stalin dealt with this when pointing out the facts and figures showing the extent of our achievements both in industry and in other spheres of national economy.

At the present time, as we approach the pre-war level of our economy, and in view of the social changes and transformations brought about by the October revolution, we come across many glaring discrepancies and inconsistencies in our economy.

The greatest capitalist trusts of today are able to produce as cheaply as they do by means of the methods of standardised mass production. These two methods, standardisation and mass production, form the foundation of the competitive struggle for the world's markets. And since these vast trustified combines supply a gigantic output in absolute figures, we must exert our utmost efforts to ensure that the really systematic and technically economic unification of our nationalised industry increase in extent and power from year to year.

We read in the theses that we must seek the optional adjustment between heavy and light industry. You know that it is by no means easy to decide upon the most favourable ratio to be maintained. As an illustration I give one example: Let us take one industry, the beet-sugar industry, which is included under light industry. Think of the innumerable ramifications connecting this industry with agriculture and with the whole of agricultural technics, a mighty complex which must undergo a revolutionary reorganisation in the near future. There are beet sugar works everywhere, from the Polish frontier and Bessarabia to Tambov. In other districts of our country the prospects of the beet sugar industry are equally favourable. There are already about one million peasant farms in immediate contact with the beet sugar works, and this contact already contains within it the germs of far-reaching historical changes in the relations between industry and agriculture.

The mutual relations thus brought about have already enabled us to record many most desirable advances both with regard to the technical rationalisation of the beet sugar and its participation in the co-operative system.

In all these districts the beet sugar undertakings are the carriers of culture; they distribute pure seed, introduce fertilisers, build roads, maintain 450 agronomists, and carry on widespread agronomic propaganda.

If we examine the other branches of industry, we see that the task of the accurate annual determination of the proportions of our grants to heavy industry on the one hand and light industry on the other, is being carried out by means of extremely careful calculations, due consideration being given at the same time to the actual economic conditions obtaining at any time.

The New Economic Policy has justified itself, and the main lines of our great constructive work have proved right. The nationalisation of industry and of the land, the socialisation of home trade, the strong position of the foreign trade monopoly, are being fully justified by the general success of our production, and by the systematic realisation of our plans for the future, which are advancing more and more decidedly in the same direction. There are still many relics of former anarchy in every branch of national economy. Our slogan is: Indefatigable effort for the suppression of this anarchy, unwearied organised and systematic pressure. This must not give rise to any bureaucratisation, and the necessary elbow room must be left for economic manoeuvring, especially in such organs as the republics and the economic departments.

The centres will be able to feel complete operative confidence in the subordinate organs after the common goal has become clear to all, and a common will has crystallised, agreeing in substance with the whole of our economic work. Systematic planning is the decisive weapon for overcoming anarchy in every department of economy. The Plan cannot be worked out by any individual group of economists. The Plan of which we speak must be a real living Plan, and to be this it must be thought out collectively by the whole of the workers. The slogan which we issue for the coming five years, along the whole front of our economic work, our main and most important slogan, is: "Up with the Plan!" (Applause.)

It need not be said that we shall not escape partial defeats at times, both in our work and on the battlefield, even in the midst of our general success. But as Bolsheviks we shall not succumb to panic on account of such partial defeats.

The Main Features of the Five Years' Plan.

I should like to draw your attention to the main features to be found in the Five Years' Plan.

If we select two questions, accumulation and the investment of capital, and then compare the Plan with reality, we find that the difference between our projects in the Five Years' Plan and the actual facts as stated in the reports is extremely small. Where a difference has been recorded, it has been attributable to natural caution.

We have found that we must not risk such expenditure at the cost of gigantic fresh investments from the means of the budget, but in connection with the successes gained in the rationalisation of industry.

One of the most important questions in all these Plans is that of accumulation. Can we, on the lines of the Five Years' Plan reckon on an accumulation of about 22.5 milliard roubles?

If we make a rough comparison of the resources of our present and our pre-war economy, we find the following quantities: in 1913 the profits and amortisation (this is a far from comprehensive calculation referring to big industry, railways, trade, municipal property and banks based on share capital) in Tsarist Russia amounted to no less than 2385 million pre-war roubles or 4770 chervonetz roubles. This means a total of over 23.8 milliard roubles in five years, whilst according to the Five Years' Plan of the State Planning Commission the total earnings and amortisation of the State section of our economics will amount in five years to only 15 milliard roubles, that is, a sum much below the pre-war level. This falling off is to be explained to a great extent by the contemplated reduction in prices and the increase in wages, measures not adopted in capitalist Russia.

It must, however, not be forgotten that even in the case of these modest standards of accumulation our possibilities of financing our national economy are much greater than in Tsarist Russia. In the first place, in pre-war Russia a not inconsiderable portion of the accumulation was devoted to the support of the bourgeoisie at home and to the payment of dividends and interest to foreign capital. In 1913, for instance, the actual increase of capital was only 1475 million pre-war roubles, although the sum total of profit was 2052 million. In the second place, we now possess the possibility of financing our economy not merely with the aid of the earnings of our State undertakings, but can draw upon the budget (6875 million roubles in the course of five years). Taken all together, our actual investments in national economy during this five years' period considerably exceed the pre-war standard (21 milliards as compared with about 15.6 milliard chervonetz roubles in 1913 on the territory of the present Soviet Union).

We must count among the most important points of the draft which we here lay before you, besides the statements already known and published with respect to the work and growth of our socialised undertakings and to the price index figures, at the same time the question of our cultural development. If we want to increase the production of the industries coming within our systematic planning by 92 to 108 per cent. during the next five years, and if we take into consideration the great increase in building activity and in the investments in transport service, then the realisation of our plans is only possible on one condition. This condition is the really unanimous support of the great majority of the conscious masses of the workers. If we are to arouse the consciousness of the workers and train properly qualified helpers, we must exert our greatest efforts in cultural and social work.

The Five Years' Plan provides for an expenditure of 13 milliard roubles for the work of cultural progress. This sum perhaps appears large to you. But if you examine the various items to be considered, you will be amazed at our backwardness. I need only refer to the most elementary questions of technical education: At the present time we have not quite one mechanic to each engineer in the technical middle schools, and at the close of the five years' period, after having expended about 13 milliard roubles for social and cultural needs, we shall still have to each engineer not quite three specialised mechanics. You will see that there is a glaring discrepancy here.

This subject is extremely comprehensive. I cannot deal with it in detail, but lay down one main slogan: We cannot permit such a discrepancy to exist in our country between the expen-

diture for industrial advancement on the one hand and for social and cultural needs on the other; we cannot permit that only 0.025 per cent. of the means allotted to the one are left for the other. (A voice: "Hear, hear!"). Our decisive slogan must be: "We must place our social and cultural work on the same level as our industrialisation. (A voice: "Hear, hear!")"

Lenin's Electrification Plan will be carried out.

We are very proud of the fact that whilst many of our economic plans are frequently interrupted, there is one plan which has been pursued steadily, and that is Lenin's electrification plan. It need not be said that there too everything is not perfect. There are electric-works here and there which have not succeeded in becoming such centres of attraction for industry that they have rationalised this from top to bottom as anticipated by our electrification plan. But all these defects and shortcomings fade into insignificance when we remember that since 1921, the lowest level of our economic decline, we have been pushing forwards electrification with undiminished energy. We can now safely maintain that by 1921 this plan will not only be fulfilled, but exceeded.

A few fundamental data: In December 1921 the total capacity of the electric works on a provincial scale, including the combination stations, will amount to 2,141,000 kilowatts, without combination stations 1,800,000 kilowatts. The growth in comparison with 1921 thus amounts to over 1,500,000 kilowatts. The output of these electric stations will be 6320 to 6840 millions kilowatt hours by the year of the five years' period; the total output 10 to 12 milliard kilowatt hours. Capital investments within the five years: Preliminary estimate 1400 million roubles, optional estimate 1600 million roubles.

In five years we shall supply our national economy approximately with as much electric energy as an industrially advanced country like Germany supplies.

When we observe the distribution of these electric works to be erected on the territory of the Soviet Union, we again receive the impression of well organised planning. You may see how a gigantic ring of strong current conduits gradually encloses the agricultural centres of our country. Within the next decade about 5 millions HP will be produced in this network. When we remember that about 70 million of the peasant population live within this centre, and that this gigantic electric ring will supply 5 million horse power, corresponding to an army of 100 million workers, we see that every peasant living in this agricultural centre will be able to afford 3 to 4 additional "mechanical slaves". America is proud of the fact that it gives every independent farmer 30 such "mechanical slaves". But an analysis of American economics shows that the want of systematic planning brings with it the loss of about one half of the energy of the country.

With the realisation of Lenin's plans of electrification and co-operation we shall pass even America in the race.

* * *

The difficulties confronting us at the present time will be overcome if we really follow the path pointed out by Lenin. And we are following it. This is shown by the work of our Party Congress. Lenin's prophecy will be fulfilled. The difficulties are great, but we shall overcome them. New forces are arising, mighty collective forces, and with their aid we shall sweep aside all these difficulties. (Prolonged applause.)

Report of Comrade ORDSHONIKIDSE on the Work of the Commission in Charge of Opposition Affairs.

Comrades, the Commission you elected made a thorough investigation of all documents concerning the activities of the Trotskyist Opposition and also the documents concerning people and groups who want to get into the breach opened by the Opposition and take advantage of our inner Party differences with an obviously counter-revolutionary aim.

The Commission considers it absolutely proven that the Opposition had its local committees, regional committees and its own central committee. This is confirmed both by documents

which we have at our disposal and by the speeches of Comrades Kuzovnikov, Zof, Pickle and others. The Opposition had its own machinery, its own treasury which thrived on membership dues and donations from non-Party elements sympathising with the Opposition.

The Opposition established contact both at home and abroad not only with people and groups expelled from the Party and the Comintern, but also with non-Party people who never belonged to our Party or the Comintern. We do not

accuse the Opposition of having been in contact with counter-revolutionaries, but we maintain on the basis of documents at our disposal that counter-revolutionary scoundrels clung around the Opposition, that the Opposition by its actions against the Party fed these counter-revolutionary scoundrels. The Opposition despite their pledges did not break connections with the Maslow-Ruth Fischer group and other expelled elements from the Comintern; they continued and still continue their organisational and ideological contact with them.

The Opposition openly appealed and is appealing to non-Party elements against the Party and against its C. C. Finally, the infamous action of November 7, on the streets against the Party and against the Soviet Government. By its work, the Opposition inspired counter-revolution within our country because the speeches delivered by Oppositionists directed against the Party were caught up by counter-revolutionary elements. By its work, the Opposition did not only not help in organising the working masses abroad around the Soviet Government, but on the contrary. Had its agitation been successful, the working class would regard the Soviet Government as a foreign government, a Thermidor government.

In the ideological sphere the Opposition has gone so far as to deny the possibility of victorious building up of Socialism in our country, the denial of the Socialist character of our State industry, denial of the Socialist path of development of the rural districts under the proletarian dictatorship, and the basic masses of the peasantry on the basis of Socialist construction. It hurls against the Party the disgusting accusation of degeneration.

It is not here a question of individual mistakes of one Oppositionist or another, but, as the Congress has absolutely correctly pointed out, the Opposition has deviated from Leninism both in the ideological, tactical and organisational spheres. In its decision on the report of the C. C., the Congress recognised the impossibility of the Opposition remaining within the Party, characterising their views as Menshevik Trotzkyist views.

The Commission received three documents from the Opposition. The first one is an Opposition statement of December 3, 1927. It says:

"The unity of the Communist Party is the highest principle in the epoch of proletarian dictatorship: without Party unity on Leninist fundamentals, the dictatorship cannot be maintained, the construction of Socialism and assistance to the development of the world revolution are impossible."

(From the statement of 121.)

But the Congress recognised that the views advocated by the Opposition are not Leninist but Menshevik. Therefore if the Opposition sincerely stands for unity of our Party, if it does not intend to organise a second party, it must renounce its non-Leninist views.

Further. They say:

"In the struggle for our views we have entered upon the path of factionalism which at times took extremely acute forms and in many cases we resorted to means which go against Party discipline. We have been driven on to this path only by our firm conviction in the correctness and Leninist character of our views, by our striving to bring these views to the knowledge of the masses of the Party membership, by the obstacles which we met on this path, by the accusations which are unbearable for Bolsheviks, levelled against us."

(From the same statement.)

Here the Opposition points out that it stepped beyond the Party statutes but that it was compelled to do so by the fact that the views which it advocates are really Leninist views and those which the C. C. and our Party adheres to are non-Leninist. It further accuses the Central Committee of having compelled the Opposition to resort to this impermissible action, the violation of Party discipline and the Party statutes. It again follows that we are to blame and not they. The Congress recognised the views laid down in Zinoviev's and Trotzky's platform as Menshevik views. They regard them as Leninist views. The Congress declared the Opposition views

to be Menshevik, they maintain that their views are correct and that they cannot renounce them.

This document we received before the Congress decision. After the Congress decision, we received two more documents, one signed by Kamenev, Bakaiev, Avdeyev and Yevdokimov on December 10th and the other signed by Muralov, Rakovsky and Radek on the same date. It seems that the bloc which Zinoviev said was to be "for long and for good" is cracking somewhere. If these documents are not merely hypocritical, if they are not a tactical move, then the Oppositionists should have honestly declared in them before the whole Party where they differ from the Party. I should say that we do not find any big difference between these two documents. In the first one signed by Kamenev, Bakaiev, and Avdeyev we read:

"Defending our principles in the correctness of which we are convinced before the Congress, we at the same time, emphasised in our statements to the Congress that we think it obligatory for us to submit to the Congress decisions no matter how hard they may hit us."

It is customary for us, Bolsheviks that every Party and Congress decision is binding on all Party members without any statements. (Applause.) If Kamenev, Bakaiev, Avdeyev and Yevdokimov think they make some concession to the Congress by declaring that they will submit to its decisions, they are profoundly mistaken. There has never been a decision of our Congresses which was not binding for every member of our Party. Those who will not submit to these decisions, we wish them a bon voyage. (Applause.)

In another document signed by Muralov and Rakovsky and later by Radek, we read:

"We think that our views laid down in the platform and theses can be defended by everyone of us within the limits of the Statutes before our Party. To renounce the advocacy of our views within the Party is politically tantamount to renouncing the views themselves. Such renunciation would be our duty if we would be convinced in their erroneousness, i. e., in their being out of keeping with the programme of the C. P. S. U. or in their unimportance from the point of view of the fate of the Party and the proletarian dictatorship. Otherwise, to renounce the defence of these views would actually be a renunciation of the right to fulfil the most elementary duty in relation to the Party and the working class."

This is said concerning the views which the XV. Congress unanimously declared to be Menshevik views. We are told: we cannot renounce the propagation of these views, but we will carry it on within the limits of the statutes. Well, comrades, I do not know any statutes in our Party which would permit the propagation of Menshevism within the Bolshevik Party. There is no such statute in our Party and there will never be. (Stormy applause.) It is clear that if these are Menshevik views they must be most emphatically rejected. That is what the Congress did. If the Opposition nevertheless intends to propagate these views within the Party, it stands to reason that no one will permit it. The Opposition must decide for themselves: either they adhere to their Menshevik views, then they should withdraw from the Bolshevik Party, or they abandon the Menshevik views, in which case they remain in our Leninist Party. (Applause.)

Based on the decisions of the Party Congress, the Commission found these Opposition statement absolutely unsatisfactory. (Applause.)

From the other Opposition members we received no statements whatever. The Commission considered it necessary to summon Comrade Piatakov, who was recently absent from Moscow, and ask him to explain his attitude to the Opposition action which recently took place (the printing establishment, illegal meetings, the November 7 demonstration, etc.).

On instructions of the Commission I invited him. To my questions, Comrade Piatakov answered that he does not approve of the actions of the Opposition on November 7 and the organisation of illegal printing establishments, but that he thinks that his was caused by the Party regime. He considers the Opposition platform correct. Moreover, he added that we ourselves will soon adopt this platform. (Disturbance in the hall.) That is the answer he gave us.

Comrade Kamenev told some individual delegates here that he does not get any assistance from either side to find a way out of the impasse in which the Opposition finds itself and that he applied to everyone of us but no one would come to his assistance. Comrade Kamenev said that he had applied to me and that I advised him to throw himself into the sea and swim so that he will either come across or be drowned.

It is true that Comrades Kamenev, Smirnov and Smilga came to me two or three hours before the opening of the Congress suggesting a preliminary conference with the members of the Polit-Bureau. I told them that the Congress must open within about two or three hours and that the only way out is to take the Congress platform and tell honestly and truly what they intend to do in the future. I considered any kind of negotiations behind the scenes absolutely inadmissible advised them to appeal to the supreme organ of the Party — the Congress. What they said at the Congress we all heard.

Their reply to the Congress decision we can see from the documents handed out to you. Is it the reply which the Congress asked for? No. The Congress demanded ideological and organisational disarmament. We see neither the one nor the other in their replies.

If they tell us now that they are dissolving their faction it is rather difficult for us to believe because we have documents showing that they tell their adherents that the faction must be formally dissolved that actually is it necessary for them to rally to their platform as it is the right platform. This cannot be otherwise. If you tell your adherents that your platform is a "Leninist" correct platform and all decisions of the Congress verge on Menshevism, what fool would consent to cease the struggle?

That they do not disarm ideologically is clear from their documents. What was there for us to do? Could the commission make some foul compromise and bring it before the Congress? We thought that such a compromise would not merely be useless to the Party, but that it would be of tremendous harm. We tried many a time to come to terms with the Opposition. You remember the famous statement of October 16th 1926; you know their statement and their pledge of August 8th this year. How did it end? It ended so that fierce attacks on the

Party began the very next day. We thought and think that if the Opposition honestly and sincerely wants to remain in the old Leninist Party it must come here and declare that it will fully and completely disarm both in an ideological and organisational respect, (Applause), that it fully and entirely recognises its mistakes and submits to the Party Congress. (Applause.) If, however, this does not happen, and so far it has not yet happened, then there is no use to start our dilly-dallying all over again which we have indulged in with the Opposition in the course of two years. (Applause.)

This impels us to adopt the resolution which says that the Opposition must be expelled from the Party. (Voices: hear, hear! — prolonged applause.) At the same time, our proposal points out that the Party must exert all its efforts, take every measure towards freeing the rank and file workers who still belong to the Opposition — their ranks are already disintegrating and we have seen in Leningrad alone 300 Bolshevik workers deserting the Opposition in the course of the last two weeks — from the ruinous influence of Trotzky's and Zinoviev's Menshevik ideas. (Applause.)

Submitting to you comrades this decision, we know perfectly well how tremendous its significance is. We know perfectly well how hard it is to expel a section of ex-Bolsheviks from the Party, a section of ex-Bolsheviks who brought a good deal of benefit to our Party and fought many years in our ranks but they compelled us to it, I repeat they compelled us. (Voice: the Party demands it). But there is nothing left to do. These comrades have done much work in our Party, but now when the Party is faced with difficulties, they, instead of combatting these difficulties together with us, and helping us to organise the defence of the country, attack our Party and the Soviet Government. This being so, we, no matter how hard it is for us, will vote with a clear conscience that all those who hamper the Party should be expelled from it. (Stormy applause.)

At the same time we will do our utmost that the Oppositionists should find themselves within the next few months ideologically and organisationally isolated as ex-generals without a single soldier, fully convinced that we will be victorious. (Prolonged applause.)

Declarations of the Opposition to the XV. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U.

DECLARATION OF THE 121.

To the Presidium of the XVI. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U.

Comrades!

The unity of the Communist Party is the highest principle in the epoch of the proletarian dictatorship. Without the unity of the Party on the basis of Leninism the dictatorship cannot be maintained, no advance towards the establishment of Socialism can be made, and the development of world revolution cannot be promoted.

The unity of our Party has, however, been openly endangered of late by the development of the inner Party disagreements. Were the further development of our conflict to lead to a split in the Party, and thereby to a struggle between two parties, this would mean the greatest possible danger for Lenin's cause.

We have not the slightest wish to deny our part of the responsibility for the acuteness of the inner Party situation. In the struggle to represent our views we have adopted the methods of fractional conflict, sometimes in very radical forms, and have in a number of cases resorted to means running counter to Party discipline. The impetus urging us to these methods has been our profound conviction that our views are correct and Leninist, our endeavour to bring these views to the knowledge of the masses of the Party members, the obstacles which we encountered on this path, and the accusations, intolerable to Bolsheviks, which have been made against us.

There are no programmatic differences between us and the Party.

We have pointed out the growth of the Thermidorian danger in the country and the insufficient measures being taken to guard against it, but we never were nor are we now of the opinion, that our Party or its C. C. have become Thermidorian, or that our State has ceased to be a workers' State; this we declared emphatically in our Platform. We have defended our opinion, and shall continue to defend it, that our Party has been and is the organisation of the proletarian vanguard, and the Soviet State the organisation of the proletarian dictatorship. We allow no doubt or irresolution in the question of the defence of the Soviet Union, the first proletarian State of the world, the Fatherland of all workers. We have never had, and have not now, the intention of appealing to the judgment of non-Party elements in our inner Party conflicts, although we are firmly convinced that in fundamental political questions our Party has nothing to conceal from the non-Party working masses, this class basis of the Party, and that the masses outside of the Party must be kept informed, by means of objective representations of the views held in the Party, of the condition of inner Party affairs, as was the case under Lenin.

The inner Party conflict has, however, become so acute that the unity of the Party, and consequently the fundamental interests of the proletarian dictatorship, are seriously endangered. This cannot go on. This form of struggle must cease. In face of the international bourgeoisie, which is speculating on a possible split in the Party, and preparing feverishly for war against the Soviet Union, and in face of the whole international proletariat, which rightly sees in the unity of the C. P. S. U. the most important guarantee for the success of its

revolutionary struggle, we consider it to be our duty to do everything necessary to secure the fighting unity of our Party.

We cannot renounce views which we are convinced are correct, and which we have submitted to the Party in our Platform and our Theses, but in the interests of the maintenance of Party unity, in the interests of securing the full fighting capacity of the Party as the leader of the State and of the proletarian world movement, we declare to the Party Congress that we shall cease all fractional work, disband all fractional organisations, and call upon all sharing our views in the C. P. S. U. and the Comintern to do the same. We hold it to be the undeniable duty of every member of the Party to submit to the decisions of the Party Congress, and shall fulfil this duty. We have worked for years and decades for our Party. We shall not agree to either a split or to the formation of a second party. We categorically reject the idea of a second party. We believe that any attempt in this direction would run counter to Lenin's teachings, and is condemned to failure. In the future we shall continue to work for our Party, and shall defend our views solely within the confines of the statutes and decisions of the Party. This is the right of the Bolsheviks, and this right had been established by a number of fundamental decisions passed by the Party Congresses under and after Lenin.

This declaration is the expression of our firm resolution. We are convinced that we express the views of all those sharers of our opinions who have been expelled from the Party, and that the Party will take the first step towards the restoration of normal Party life by regarding it as necessary, after this declaration, to reinstate those who have been expelled, to release those arrested for their oppositional activities, and to give us all the opportunity of proving the firmness of this our resolution by our work in the Party.

We do not doubt that similar measures in the Comintern with regard to those really sharing our views — these of course ceasing their fractional activity — will at the same time, have the effect of restoring normal conditions in the other sections of the Comintern.

Before the Party Congress, and during the Party discussion, we defended our views determinedly and energetically. Having resolved to submit to the Party Congress, we shall carry out this resolution with equal determination and energy, as faithful soldiers of the Bolshevik proletarian army.

(121 signatures follow.)

For the genuineness of the signatures:

L. Kamenev.

3rd December, 1927.

DECLARATION BY KAMENEV, BAKAYEV, AVDEYEV, AND YEVDOKIMOV.

To the Chairman of the Commission of the XV. Party Congress, Comrade Ordshonikidse.

We beg you to bring the following, our declaration, to the knowledge of the Commission and then of the Party Congress.

The resolution passed by the Party Congress on the report of the C. C. declares "membership of the Trotskyist Opposition and the propaganda of its views to be incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik Party".

The XV. Party Congress has therefore not only rejected our views, but prohibited their propaganda. When defending our fundamental views, of the correctness of which we are convinced, to the Party Congress, we stated emphatically in our declarations that we considered it our duty to submit to the decisions of the Party Congress, however difficult this might be for us.

The whole situation has caused the question of a second party to be raised. We for our part reject on principle the solution of a second party under the conditions of the proletarian dictatorship.

Therefore we submit to the decision of the Party Congress, and declare, as participants in the Party Congress: Firstly, that the oppositional fraction must cease its activities and does cease them, and secondly, that the decision of the Party Congress on the prohibition of the propaganda of the oppositional views will be adhered to by all of us.

We call upon all those sharing our views to draw the like conclusions for themselves from the decisions of the Party Congress. Each one of us must stand at the post allotted him by the

Party, must put into actual practice the decisions of the Party with all energy in our daily work, and must help the Party to stride forward to the goal set by Lenin.

The comrades expelled from the Party for their oppositional activities have already applied to the Party Congress with the request to be readmitted to the Party. We repeat and support their request, and take it to be a matter of course that the release of those comrades who have been arrested in connection with their fractional activity is absolutely necessary.

L. Kamenev. I. Bakayev. I. Avdeyev. G. Yevdokimov.

10th December, 1927.

DECLARATION BY MURALOV, RAKOVSKY AND RADEK.

To the Chairman of the Commission of the XV. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U.

The decision of the XV. Party Congress on the incompatibility of membership of the Opposition and continued membership of the Party induces us to make the following declaration.

We submit to the decision of the Party Congress, we cease all fractional work, disband all fractional organisations, and call upon those sharing our views to do the same.

We reject categorically the solution of a second Party, and regard any attempt in this direction as running directly counter to the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and as therefore condemned to failure.

It will be clearly seen from the above that we undertake, in accordance with the decisions of the Party Congress, not to carry on the propaganda of our views with the aid of fractional methods.

At the same time we are of the opinion that the views laid down by us in the Platform and Theses can be defended by every one of us within the limits of the Party statutes. The renunciation of the defence of our own views in the Party itself signifies politically the renunciation of the views themselves. This renunciation would be our duty if we were convinced of the incorrectness of our views, that is, if we were convinced that our views are inconsistent with the programme of the C. P. S. U., or are unimportant from the standpoint of the fate of the Party and of the proletarian dictatorship. But as we are not so convinced, the renunciation of our views would be in reality the renunciation of our elementary duty towards the Party and the working class.

We do not doubt that those sharing our views, including those expelled from the Party, will prove their faithfulness to Lenin's Party, and will not waver in their defence of the unity of the Party as the necessary prerequisite for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

We are convinced that the Party will find a way of readmitting the expelled into the Party again, and of releasing those who have been arrested for their fractional activity.

N. Muralov. Ch. Rakovski.

I Join Comrades Muralov and Rakovski in the above declaration.

K. B. Radek.

Received 10. 12. 27. 19.15 o'clock.

DECLARATION BY SMILGA, MURALOV, RAKOVSKI, AND RADEK.

To the XV. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U., with reference to the motion proposing to expel the Opposition from the Party.

It has been proposed to the Party Congress that we should be expelled from the ranks of the C. P. S. U. We feel it our duty to lay before the Party Congress the following declaration in this matter:

1. Expulsion from the Party will rob us of our Party rights, but cannot release us from the obligations undertaken by each one of us on entering the Communist International. Expelled from the Party, we shall remain true to the programme of our Party, to its traditions and its banner. We shall work for the strengthening of the Communist Party and its influence in the working class.

2. We have declared, and still declare, that we submit to the decisions of the XV. Party Congress, and disband our fractions. We have undertaken to defend our views within the confines of the Party statutes. We have undertaken, and further undertake, to do our utmost for the preservation of the unity of our Party, the leader of a workers' State. We categorically deny the intention which has been attributed to us of organising a second party, for such an intention is incompatible with the dictatorship of the proletariat and is contrary to Lenin's teachings. Expulsion from the Party alters neither our views nor our standpoint with regard to the unity of the C.P.S.U.

3. We deny with equal decision the assertions which have been made imputing anti-Soviet tendencies to our struggle. We are all — to a greater or lesser extent — co-workers in the building up of the Soviet State, the first Fatherland of the workers. Our goal is the secure establishment of the Soviet power on the basis of the alliance between workers and peasants. Our path is the path of inner Party reform. We shall strive for the victory of our views solely along this path.

4. Our views have been designated at the Party Congress as Menshevist. We cannot accept this designation under any conditions. Menshevism has been and is still the enemy of October, and defends that bourgeois democracy which is a form of capitalist rule.

But we are participators in the struggle for the overthrow of capitalism, for the attainment of the proletarian dictatorship. The whole import of our inner Party struggle lies in the defence of the proletarian dictatorship against those errors which might lead — through a series of political stages — to a return to bourgeois democracy.

5. We reject the designation of the Opposition as "Trotzkyist", since this designation is based on an attempt to connect the urgent questions of the present epoch, artificially and arbitrarily, with pre-revolutionary differences which have long since been settled, and with which most of us never had anything to do. Our standpoint is completely and solely that of the historical bases of Bolshevism.

6. We are expelled on account of our views, stated in our Platform and Theses. We regard these views as Bolshevik, Leninist. We cannot abandon them, for the course of events is confirming their correctness.

7. More than 1000 Oppositionist communists have already been expelled from the Party. The expulsion of the topmost layer of the Opposition will be the signal for the expulsion of fresh thousands of oppositionists. These expulsions will mean — whether the Party Congress wants it or not — a shifting of the Party policy to the Right, the strengthening of the anti-proletarian classes and groups in the country, and the reinforcement of the pressure of imperialism from outside.

It is impossible to place effectual restrictions on the kulak, to combat bureaucratism successfully, and to introduce the seven-hour day, if the Party pushes aside those whose utmost endeavours have been directed of late years to stemming the growing power of the kulak, to combating energetically the distortions of bureaucracy, and to demanding a more rapid improvement in the position of the workers. It is impossible to prepare for the defence of the achievements of October and at the same time to drive out of the Party those who regard the international bourgeoisie as their irreconcilable enemies.

8. The Party regime which has led to our expulsion must inevitably lead to further loosening of the Party structure, and to further expulsions. Inner Party democracy alone can ensure the adoption of a correct Party line, and secure the contact between the Party and the working masses.

9. The expulsion of the oppositionists, as also the other reprisals against them, aim at exterminating the oppositional ideas root and branch in the Party. But since these ideas accurately mirror the historical interests of the proletariat and the fundamental tasks of the Party, they will continue to live in the Party in spite of all reprisals, and will find fresh defenders.

The quintessence of the Party are the Bolshevik workers. When danger approaches, it is their voice which is decisive for the fate of the Party and the revolution. This voice accords with ours.

10. Expelled from the Party, we shall strive for readmittance. We are profoundly convinced that our expulsion will only be temporary, for the further course of the class struggle, and of our activities, will convince every member of the Party of the wrongness of the accusations which have led to our expulsion.

11. The struggle in the ranks of the C. P. S. U. has not been without an echo in the ranks of the Comintern. In almost all our communist brother Parties the Opposition has sympathisers and believers in its views, and these are subjected to the same reprisals as we. We do not doubt that the oppositionists expelled from the other Parties will agree with us in rejecting the idea of the formation of a second party, that is, an idea signifying a split in the Comintern. It is the duty of the Party members to correct errors and to improve the line of leadership, and this can and must be done within the confines of our unity. A patient explanation of our views, based on the actual experience and active participation in the struggle of the Communist Parties against the bourgeoisie and Social Democracy, will lead to the restoration of the unity of the Comintern, and the newly rising wave of the labour movement will place this unity safe on the unshakable foundation laid by Lenin.

True to the teachings of Marx and Lenin, indissolubly bound up with the C. P. S. U. and the Comintern, we reply to our expulsion from the C. P. S. U. with the fixed resolution to continue to fight unreservedly, under the old Bolshevik banner, for the victory of the world revolution, for the unity of the Communist Parties as the vanguard of the proletariat, for the defence of the achievements of the October Revolution, for Communism, for the C. P. S. U. and for the Comintern.

I. Smilga. N. Muralov. Ch. Rakovsky. K. Radek.

18th. December 1927.

DECLARATION OF ZINOVIEV, KAMENEV AND 21 OTHER MEMBERS OF THE OPPOSITION TO THE PRESIDUM OF THE XV. PARTY CONGRESS OF THE C. P. S. U.

To Comrade Ordshonikidse. We request that the following declaration be submitted to the Party Congress:

The resolution of the Party Congress raises the question of the further work for the proletarian revolution of all members of the former opposition fraction. Neither outside the C. P. of the U. S. S. R. nor within the ranks of a second party can we serve the work which we served under the leadership of Lenin for years and decades. In the meantime the Party Congress has expelled us from the C. P. of the U. S. S. R. No matter how hard are the demands made by the Party Congress, no matter how convinced we were in the representation of our opinions up to the Party Congress, it is now our duty to subordinate our will and our opinions to the Party, for it is the only leader of the proletarian revolution and remains the supreme judge of what is necessary and what is damaging to the victorious progress of the revolution.

Our declaration of the 10th December in which we announced our willingness to abandon the propagation of our ideas, was considered to be insufficient and unsatisfactory by the Party Congress. For this reason we accept the conditions made by the Party Congress of ideological and organisational disarmament. We undertake to defend the opinions and the decisions of the Party, its Congresses, its Conferences and its Central Committee. We consider as false and, in accordance with the resolutions of the Party Congress, we condemn the anti-leninist opinions which deny the possibility of the victorious constructive work in the Soviet Union, the socialist character of the revolution, the socialist character of our state industry, the socialist development of the village under the regime of the proletarian dictatorship, and the policy of the alliance of the proletariat with the main masses of the peasantry upon the basis of socialist constructive work, or deny the existence of the proletarian dictatorship (Thermidor).

As our chief error we regard the fact that we adopted tactics in our struggle against the C. C. of the Party which brought a real danger of the formation of a second party with them. We consider the demonstration of the 7th November, the occupation

of rooms (Moscow Technical High School) and the organisation of secret printing shops to have been mistakes.

Whoever tries to build a special party against the Communist Party places himself inevitably in opposition to the Comintern and to the Soviet Union and is inevitably forced into the camp of the enemy. This is not alone true of the C. P. of the U. S. S. R., but also of all other sections of the Comintern.

We acknowledge therefore that our relations with the Group Maslov-Fischer were wrong and we have broken off these connections. As far as Korsch, Souvarine, Rosmer, Roland Holst and Liebaers are concerned, we have not and never had anything in common with them.

Speech of Comrade KALININ on the Declaration of Smilga, Muralov Rakovsky and Radek.

Comrades, apparently the Opposition bloc split in two at the XV Congress: now at least we have heard a statement from only one part of that bloc. It should be said that in addition to the grounds we had for expelling the Opposition from the Party, they have added many more reasons in their last statement. (Voices: hear, hear. Applause.) It seems to me that this part of the Opposition we have now ended both ideologically and organisationally. At the present time, even the most moderate Party member, with his best desire to keep the Opposition in the Party, must say after this statement: this group of ex-Communists is dead and definitely broke away from the Party.

We also have another statement submitted by another section of the Opposition bloc signed by Comrade Kamenev and others. The authors of that statement say that they renounce the propagation of their views... they "renounce". They "promise" to submit to all Party decisions. But... they consider their views correct (!).

Comrades, what can be the opinion of the working class, from the moral and particularly political point of view, of people who declare before the whole world that they renounce the propagation of views, which in their opinion are correct?! How can such a statement be understood? It is either a deliberate deception of the Party members, a deliberate, ill-intentioned deception, so that under its cover they may carry on their disruptive work again and again, or these Oppositionists have become philistines who hold their views for themselves without advocating them.

They speak of solidarity. But this solidarity must find expression first of all in collective activity. The strength of the Party consists in its unity, in the unity of its action. And it seems to me that with all our good intention — and there is no doubt that many Communists have such intention — to find some form which would make it possible for us to leave these people within the Party, we cannot satisfy it. To do that would be dangerous for the Party. It would mean to retain merely apparent Party unity trying to preserve by all means a certain number of obviously superfluous Party members. But

We request the Party Congress to permit us to return into the Party and to give us the possibility of participating in the practical daily work of the Party.

Kamenev, Yevdokimov, Zinoviev, Bakayev, Kuklin, Lashevitch, Avdeyev, Solovyev, Hessen, Pekar, Orlov, Fedorov, Lilina, Salutzky, Charitonov, Babachan, Sharov, Ravitch, Lukyanov, Velkovitch, Reingold, Belyais, Furtitchev and Minitchev.

(The above Declaration was handed in to the Party Congress on the 19th December, after the Party Congress had already adopted the Resolution on the expulsion of the Opposition on the 18th December.)

such unity demoralises the Party, destroys the entity of the Bolshevik conceptions, undermines the Bolshevik organisational structure. Such unity converts the true unity of the Party where every member is obliged to submit unconditionally to the leading will of the Party into a conglomeration of various groups, in other words, into a Menshevik party.

Comrades, I think that some of us probably cherished the hope that perhaps on the last day, the last decisive day when the question of expelling this group of people from the Party will be considered, we will hear from them words of repentance. But as you see, this has not come from either of the groups of the former opposition bloc. Evidently, the culprits themselves feel that they are already a foreign body within the Communist Party.

Comrades, it is unpleasant to have to expel members from the Party. All of us understand that there are a good many highly deserving comrades among them who have been fighting together with us for tens of years. But the time has come when all personal sympathy, all personal services must be put aside, and be subordinated to the interests of the proletariat, the interests of the Communist Party. The supreme interests of the working class not only of our Union, but of other countries, the endeavour to preserve the ideological purity and organisational solidity of the Communist Party imperiously demand that we make this determined amputation of disintegrating elements in our Party. (Applause.)

We know very well that many times in the past people were cut off from our Bolshevik Party when it was underground and weak. All these operations proved mere episodes, but the groups which were amputated, in most cases became ordinary philistines. It seems to me that the same fate awaits also those who will be expelled from the Party now. There is no other way out for them. But the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, after throwing out useless elements from its midst, will march onward at the head of the working class to the successful outcome of its Socialist construction. (Applause.)

Resolution of the XV. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U. on the Opposition.

Full Text.

(Adopted Unanimously.)

"After hearing the report on behalf of the commission which has carefully examined all the material concerning the Opposition, the XV. Congress of the C. P. of the Soviet Union declares:

1. Ideologically the Opposition proceeded from differences of opinion of a tactical character to differences of opinion of a programmatic character, by revising the views of Lenin and taking up a menshevik attitude. The denial of the possibility of the victorious building up of Socialism in the Soviet Union and the consequent denial of the socialist character of our re-

volution, the denial of the socialist character of our State industry, the denial of the socialist development of the village under the conditions of the proletrarian dictatorship and the policy of an alliance between the proletariat and the fundamental section of the peasantry upon the basis of socialist constructive work, and finally the denial of the existence of the proletrarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union (Thermidor) and the defeatism resulting from it, this whole ideological attitude of the Trotzkyist Opposition has turned the Opposition into a weapon of the petty bourgeois democracy inside the Soviet

Union, and into an auxiliary troop of the international social democracy outside the Soviet Union.

2. Upon the tactical field the Opposition, by strengthening and intensifying its anti-party activity, has broken not only the party statutes, but also the Soviet legality (illegal meetings, illegal printing shops, illegal press organs, the forcible occupation of halls etc.). The crowning act to this anti-Soviet tactic was the commencement of an open struggle against the regime of the proletarian dictatorship and the organising of a street demonstration against the Party and the Soviet Government on the 7th November 1927. The anti-Soviet activity of the Opposition abroad, allied with the propaganda of slanders against the Soviet Union, places the Opposition in a line with the open enemies of the land of the proletarian dictatorship.

3. Upon the organisation field the Opposition, supporting itself upon a revision of the opinions of Lenin, proceeded from fractional activity to the formation of its own Trotskyist party. The commission discovered clearly the existence of an oppositional central committee, the existence of central oppositional organs in the various districts, gouvernements, towns and areas, as well as the existence of a technical apparatus with membership dues, press organs etc. etc.

Abroad the Trotskyist opposition established connections not only with the anti-Leninist fractional groups inside the parties of the Communist International, but also with organisations, individuals and groups which had never belonged to the Comintern, as well as those expelled from the Comintern, enemies and traitors to the communist movement (Maslov, Ruth Fischer, Korsch, Souvarine, Rosmer, Roland Holst, Liebaers etc.).

This organisational practice of the Opposition led to the connection of the Opposition with non-party bourgeois intellectuals inside the Soviet Union (Shtcherbakov & Co.) who on their part maintained connections with open counter-revolutionaries. Outside the Soviet Union the Opposition enjoys the utmost support of the bourgeoisie of all countries.

Upon the basis of these facts the XV. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U. approves completely of the action of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission in expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the party on the 14th November, 1927, and other members of the Opposition from these organs, and further the presentation of the whole question of the Opposition to the Party Congress. In its resolution upon the report of the C. C., the Party Congress declared that membership of the Trotskyist opposition and propagation of its opinions, was incompatible with membership of the Party. In this connection the Party Congress declares it necessary for the Opposition to disarm both organisatory and ideologically, to abandon its opinions as anti-leninist and menshevist and to subordinate itself completely to the opinions and the decisions

of the Party, the Party Congress, the Party Conferences and the C. C. of the Party.

In the meantime the Opposition has rejected these conditions. In the document of the 3rd December, 1927, signed by 121 active functionaries of the Opposition the Opposition does not abandon the propaganda of its Menshevist ideas, on the contrary, it insists upon conducting it as before. After the adoption by the Party Congress of the resolution on the Report of the C. C., the Commission received two new Opposition documents of the 10th December 1927. The first, signed by Rakovsky, Muralov and Radek, insists upon the necessity of retaining these menshevist opinions and of propagating them. The second document, signed by Kamenev, Bakayev, Yevdokimov and Avdeyev, insists upon the maintenance of the menshevist opinions of the Opposition, but abandons their propagation, declaring that this would mean a violation of the condition demanding complete ideological disarmament and a refusal to subordinate themselves to the decisions of the Party. The Party Congress points to the lack of unity between the two oppositional groups and declares that both declarations are unsatisfactory.

Having regard to the above and to the double breach of the solemn promise of the Opposition to abandon its fractional activity, the Party Congress decides:

1. to expel the following active leaders of the Trotskyist opposition from the Party: Avdeyev, Alexandrov, Aussem, Batachev, Baranov, Bakayev, Budsinskaya, Boguslavsky, Vaganyan, Vardin, Vratchev, Gessen, Gordon, Gertik, Guralsky, Drobnis, Dimitriev, Yevdokimov, Sorin, Salutzky, Ilyin, Kamenev, Kavtaradse, Kaspersky, Krasovskaya, Kovalevsky, Kuklin, Kasparova, Komandir, Kagalin, Kostrotzky, Konkova, Katalynov, Lashvitch, Levin, Lubin, Lelosol, Lisdin, Lobanov, Muralov, Minitchev, Nikolayev, Natanson, Piatakov, Ponomarev, Pitashko, Peterson, Paulson, Reingold, Ravitch, Radek, Rakovsky, Rotzkan, Rafail, Rumanzev, Safarov, Smilga, Sokolov, Solovyev, Tartanovsky, Smirnov, Senkov, Tuchkov, Tarchanov, Tarassov, Tartakovskaya, Ukonen, Fedorov, Fortin, Filipov, Charitonov, Tchernov, Shersheleva, Eshba and Lilina.

2. to expel the Sapronov group from the Party as an open anti-revolutionary group: Savaryan, Yemelyanov, Tire, Kalin, Mino, Minikov, Smirnov, Chortchenko, Oborin, Schreiber, Smirnov, Philipenko, Dune, Slidovker, Tichonov, Ustfimchik, Bolshakov, Kirilov, Minkin, Pronyaev, Vargusov, Stroganoff, Penko, Tchersanov and Putilin.

3. to instruct the C. C., and the C. C. C. of the Party to take all measures to influence the simple members of the Trotskyist opposition and to bring them to a conviction of the correctness of the party policy, but at the same time to purge the Party of all obviously incorrigible elements of the Trotskyist opposition."

Speech of Comrade RYKOV on the Declaration of the Opposition of 19th December 1927.

Comrades, to-day, the 19th December a collective declaration was handed in bearing the signatures of the expelled Kamenev, Yevdokimov and others and addressed to the presidium of the Congress and bearing the note: We request that the following declaration be placed before the Party Congress. (Comrade Rykov then read the declaration of the Opposition.)

I received this document to-day at about 12 o'clock from Kamenev, when I refused his request for admission to the congress hall (interruption: "Quite right, too!") in order to read the declaration personally and speak in its favour. I pointed out to him that I could not permit him to enter without a special decision of the Party Congress, as Kamenev and others had already been expelled by yesterday's decision of the Party Congress (interruption: "Quite correct!").

Before I put the proposal, I want the agreement of the Party Congress to my answer to Kamenev (The party congress then ratified the refusal to permit Kamenev to enter the hall.)

In the name of the whole presidium of the Party Congress I move the following draft resolution upon the declaration of Kamenev and others: (Rykov then read the draft which we print below, amidst cries of "Hear, hear!" and storms of applause.)

This proposal is put by the presidium of the party congress. Having regard to the clarity of the question and to the seriousness of the crime against the Party which the Opposition has committed up to the XV Party Congress, and having regard to the nature of the differences which have sprung up, the decisions of the Party Congress must be taken absolutely seriously (interruption: "Hear, hear!"), it is necessary to regard them as firm decisions (Interruption: "Hear, hear!") which express the will of the whole Party (Interruption: "Hear, hear!") and of the whole working class. Further, the XV Party Congress cannot leave all that which the Opposition has done without punishment, despite all the declarations. It is necessary that no one should ever get the idea to repeat the attempts of the Opposition. (Interruption: "Hear, hear!", storms of applause.)

Decision of the XV. Congress of the C. P. S. U. on the Declaration of Zinoviev, Kamenev and 21 other Members of the Opposition.

"1. The declaration of the expelled Kamenev, Zinoviev and others which was handed to the Party Congress on the 19th December 1927 shall not be examined by the Party Congress, as the question of the Opposition has already been settled by the resolution of the 18th December."

"2. The C. C. and the C. C. C. are instructed to consider only the application of individual active leaders of the former Opposition and to adopt decisions upon the applications not

earlier than six months after the submission of such applications, affirmative decisions may only then be taken if the attitude of the applicant is in accordance with the undertakings made by him and if the application is in full accord with the demands of the XV Party Congress (see the resolution of the XV Party Congress on the Opposition) and is based upon renunciation of the "Platform of the 83", the "Platform" of 3rd September and the "Platform of the 15"."

Decision of the XV. Party Congress of the C. P. S. U. in Various Organisational Questions.

1. As an alteration of the Statutes, the national Party Congress must be convened at least once every two years.

2. The plenary meetings of the C. C. C. take place every three months in the period between two Party congresses. For the management of the current work there is to be formed a presidium with 21 members and 9 substitute members; further, there is to be formed a Party Collegium of the C. C. C. for the examination of cases of violation of Party ethics, of the Party Statutes and of the Party Programme.

3. The Presidium of the C. C. C. delegates to the Political Bureau not three members and three substitute members, but four members and four substitute members.

4. Party members who refuse to answer truthfully the que-

stions of the Control Commission must be immediately excluded from the Party.

5. A discussion on a national scale can be regarded as necessary only in cases when:

a) this necessity is recognised by at least some local Party organisations on a governmental or provincial scale;

b) in important questions of Party policy in which there does not exist a sufficiently firm majority within the C. C.;

c) the C. C., although there exists among its members a firm majority which adopts a definite standpoint, nevertheless regards it as necessary to test the correctness of its policy by means of a Party discussion. A discussion on a national scale can be opened and carried out only after a decision to that effect by the C. C.

Resolution on the Report of the Delegation of the C. P. S. U. in the E. C. C. I.

Full text.

(Adopted unanimously.)

The XV. Party Congress, after hearing and discussing the report of Comrade Bukharin, approves the activity of the delegation of the C. P. S. U. in the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The Party Congress records that the period dealt with in the report is characterised by a sharpening of the most important contradictions both within the capitalist world system and also between the capitalist world and the Soviet Union. This sharpening of the situation is bound up with the danger of war and above all of the danger of a war against the Soviet Union; the colonial problem in general and the development of the great Chinese Revolution in particular has become still more acute; finally the period is characterised by a sharpening of the class struggle between the European working class and the bourgeoisie.

The partial stabilisation of capitalism has not only not stopped the development of contradictions between the various imperialist countries and their groupings, but on the contrary has promoted them still further. The growth of production, the restoration of commercial relations, the consolidation of the mechanism of money and credit, confronts the bourgeoisie in the sharpest manner with the problem of markets for the sale of goods, for obtaining raw materials and for capital investment. The shifting of the centre of world capitalism to the United States of America, the industrial decay and the process of parasitic corruption that Great Britain is undergoing, the contradiction between the growth of the productive forces and the burden of the Dawes Plan in Germany, the Balkanisation of Europe, the pauperisation of the masses and the shrinking of the home markets — all these together bring unceasingly nearer the attempt at a fresh distribution of the globe by the imperialist robbers as well as new armed collisions and war catastrophes.

Simultaneously with an exceedingly extensive sharpening of the international situation and of international relations, there is to be recorded a considerable growth of class antagonisms and of the class struggle. The capitalist stabilisation is being carried out at the cost of a systematic reduction of the standard of living and with the help of an increased exploitation of the working class. This process of stabilisation is accompanied by a degree of unemployment surpassing by several times the pre-war level of unemployment. After a short period of relative quiet there is now commencing a new surging up of the revolutionary Labour movement and a considerable revolutionising of the working masses. All this goes to show that the process of decline of capitalist stabilisation is increasing.

The revolutionising of the working masses is opposed by a sharp development to the Right of the heads of the 2nd International and of the Amsterdam Trade Union International. Social Democracy, which has openly renounced the class struggle, has gone wholly and entirely over to the side of the bourgeoisie, and is endeavouring to implant the idea of class harmony (the so-called "Americanisation" of the Labour movement, the ideology of "industrial peace", coalition policy, etc.) in the working masses; it is deceiving the working class with the prospect of a "peaceful" transition to Socialism by means of "economic democracy" within the confines of the capitalist countries and of a new period of alleged peaceful capitalism (by means of the democratisation of the so-called League of Nations) in the sphere of international relations.

It is the most important task of the Communist International, on the basis of the revolutionary upsurge of the Labour movement that has already begun, to intensify the fight against international reformism and at the same time against the Trotskyist Opposition, which is breaking through the policy

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