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Meeting of the Enlarged Executive of the C. I.

14th Session. Moscow, April 6th, 1925.

Chairman: Kolarov:

As the first point on the agenda, the resolution on the discussion in the RCP. was voted upon and **unanimously** adopted.

Hereupon Comrade Manuilsky spoke in support of the **resolution on the Czech Question**, adopted by the Czech Commission.

Comrade Manuilski:

On the instructions of the Czech Commission I have to report to the Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern the essential features of the debate that took place on the Commission.

The Czech question has assumed great international importance. It is not an accident that it occupied one of the principal positions in the debates of the Enlarged Plenum. In fact, it can be said that the debate on the most important question before the Plenum — the stabilisation of capitalism — mainly centred round the Czech question. The factual problems which are now disturbing the Czech question at every point come up against the general estimation of the present period.

At the present time an opportunist tendency is maturing on an international scale, and this tendency is inclined to regard the present transitional period as a period of the permanent stabilisation of capitalism. There is not the slightest doubt that in the near future we will see an attempt on the part of the Right wing elements, who have not yet outlived their social-democratic traditions, to build up a new set of tactics for the Comintern, based on these as yet, vague features of economic stabilisation, to take the place of "revolutionary romanticism". In view of the protracted character of the world revolution, such attempts will be made repeatedly. In Czechia we have already experienced the first attack of the opportunism which is raising its head and which is represented by several leaders of the Brünn organisation. In the documents which were submitted to the Commission we found sufficient material to convince us of the danger threatening the Communist International from the Right. The Right Wing elements in Brünn commenced a campaign against all those who remained loyal to the spirit of the resolution of the Fifth Congress of the Comintern,

against those who, in the present epoch of the capitalist offensive, are striving to defend the principles of Bolshevik tactics. Against these they hurl the epithet of "fantastic illusionists" who sing hallelujah to the revolutionary ultimate aims of the movement on every possible occasion". Hence, comrades, the Czech question is now assuming the symptoms of an opportunistic tendency in the whole of the international Communist movement. All the Right wing elements of the Communist International have resolved to use this question to test the firmness of the Comintern line. They staked on the Czech Party, and strove through it to influence the Enlarged Plenum in the direction of changing the whole line of policy of the Communist movement. I have particular pleasure in stating that the Czech Delegation unanimously, irrespective of group, refused to have this role imposed upon it, and associated itself with the resolution proposed by the Russian Delegation.

The comrades of the Minority on the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia imagine that their discussion is something peculiar. They believe that this is a unique page of history, that their crisis is a special crisis with specific features.

If we analyse the geography of Czech factional relations and the methods adopted in the factional fight against the Central Committee, we will find that the Czechoslovak crisis is as like as two peas to the crises that we have had in other parties. The general origin of these crises is the transition of our brother parties from Socialistic to Communist lines. These are crises of the growth of our movement, and are inevitable in the Bolshevisation of the Parties. They arise out of the conflicts between two opposite tendencies, and on every occasion they occur they jerk the Communist movement to a higher stage of development.

In the first place, what does the so-called Right Wing in Czechoslovakia represent? It is composed of two elements. In Czechia, as in other Parties, we have a group of old Social Democrats who politically, have not abandoned their Social Democratic views, survivals and traditions. These are people who are unable in new conditions to throw off the cursed legacy which they inherited from Social Democracy. Many comrades, who have not been hardened in politics, fail to understand how people who played an active part in the Russian Revolution can, in this protracted period of development, stand in opposition to their Party, or how people

like Rosmer and Monatte, who actively opposed the war, now find themselves outside of the Communist Party of France. In the German Party a Spartacist, Paul Levi, a close friend of Rosa Luxemburg, betrays the Party just at the moment when it is leading the masses into the battle. Former views of men and parties are not abandoned easily. Old habits, old lies, which prevent the mass of the Party to orientate itself rapidly, remain. If we examine the Czech Communist Party we will see that its Right wing embraces people with Social Democratic traditions on the one hand and people who have been disappointed in their expectations of the speedy coming of the revolution. In Czechia we have elements which represent the ideological Social Democratic remains within the Communist Party, a tendency headed by Bubnik. On the other hand we see that Bubnik was defended to the end by a man who at one time fought with us against the Right deviations, who at one time stood on the Left Wing of the movement, — I have in mind Kreibich. This is sad, but true. When at the meetings of the Czechoslovakian Commission we heard Kreibich argue against mechanical Bolshevisation, heard of his masked defence of Bubnik, it seemed to us that this was not the comrade who with us fought for the Bolshevisation of the Comintern in 1920—21. It seemed to us that this was a second edition of Kreibich; a Kreibich with one foot in the camp of the Social Democracy. The retarded rate of development has broken not only Kreibich, but a whole group of comrades who only a few years ago, held leading positions in the international movement. If anyone present here still has doubts concerning these "evolutions", let him read the stenographic reports of Comrade Kreibich's speeches. The political sweep of the present Right Wing in Czechia stretches from Bubnik, through the Brünn Memorandum to Kreibich.

If further, we examine the process of development of the Czechoslovak crisis, we will see that it too has nothing peculiar or original about it. How did the crisis in Czechia arise? The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, in the period of a relative stabilisation of capitalism, is operating in a country where acute conflicts are developing. In these circumstances the Communist Party commences a campaign against the high cost of living. Simultaneously in Moravia-Ostrava a great strike movement commences. In spite of the stagnation in Europe the Czech labour movement makes itself felt by means of mass demonstrations, and just at the moment when the Party is rushing into battle it receives a blow in the back. Everybody in Czechia knows who it was that struck at his Party at that moment. It was Bubnik, the Chairman of the Prague organisation. The Party properly reacted to this treachery, and expelled Bubnik, and around this a battle flared up, organised by the Right elements against the Central Committee.

Just recall how the French crisis developed. After the Fourth Congress of the Comintern the occupation of the Ruhr commenced. The French Party was confronted by a severe political test as to whether it would prove capable of putting up a resistance against the Versailles-ists in France. It was the first serious test to which the Party had to submit. The Central Committee of the Party was flung into jail on the charge of high treason. And just at the moment when the bloodhounds of the police were sniffing the pavements around the offices of "L'Humanité" in search of new conspiracies against Poincaré's government, Frossard deals the Party a blow in the back. How similar this is to the crisis in the Czech Party.

Recall the Italian crisis. The Italian Delegation had just returned from the Second Congress of the Comintern, at that very moment when the workers had seized the factories, when the government was literally rolling in the dust, and when there was a smell of powder in the air. At this critical moment Comrade Seratti committed his fatal error, which he has since admitted, and D'Aragona, Turatti and others perpetrated their crime. The moment was lost, the Italian revolution was thrown back for a number of years. Is this not an astounding lesson for our Czech workers, if they really desire to learn from the experience in other countries?

Finally, recall the crisis that occurred in the German Party. Rightly or wrongly, in March 1921, in reply to Seevering's provocation, the party took up the notorious March action. And just as the engagement opened, Paul Levi, the

Chairman of the Party, delivered a blow to the Party by publishing his notorious diatribe "Against Putschism". This then is the picture represented by this crisis. The test in action is the criterion of the political ripeness of the Party. Events sweep away the unfit, and expose the weak points. Friends and enemies get to know each other in the fire of events.

In passing, something should be said concerning Brünn. The Brünn organisation is an excellent organisation, and has old Left wing traditions and a good mass body. But this organisation at the present time is led by individuals who belong to the Right Wing of the Communist movement. At the last District Conference, when the question of the election of the Provincial Committee was being discussed, the Brünn representatives, in spite of the fact that one third of their organisation belonged to the Left wing, removed all the Left Wing adherents from the Party Committee. Turning to the Comintern, they said: "Give us your confidence on credit, and we will carry out the resolutions of the Fifth Congress". We had a similar experience with the French Party. At the Paris Congress the Right wing by a small majority elected an Executive Committee composed exclusively of Right Wingers. They too demanded our confidence in advance. But we refused this confidence, and we were not mistaken. In the case of the Brünn comrades, however, we gave them a bill on our confidence, and we were deceived. We state this publicly for the Brünn provincial Committee has not fulfilled its obligations. It proved to be politically bankrupt.

We will continue our analogy, and see how the fight around Bolshevisation is developing in European Parties. Everywhere we see the same picture. At first a small ideologically compact group which the old leaders brand as disruptors disturbing the normal course of life of the Party. The old leaders begin a campaign against this Left group as a group of upstarts, a group which has no respect for the pedigree of the Party, but which strives to undermine the old and tried authorities. That was the case in France. A similar campaign was conducted against the Left Wing Communists in the Party in Germany; and a similar campaign is being conducted here in Russia. Woe to our Party if it did not realise that the process of Bolshevisation was inevitable, if it did not bear in mind the growth of that new generation which must rejuvenate the Party. This generation is not infected with Socialist traditions. It as Comrade Thalheim asserts, in relation to traditions, represents a blank sheet. But the revolutionary events of 1918 and 1919 have burned into the memories of this generation the acute moments of the civil war of Central Europe.

If we approach the Czech crisis from the point of view of the internal structure of the factional struggle, we will also observe a situation similar to that which was observed in other parties. On the one hand Bubnik and the Right Wing upper stratum, on the other hand the Left Wing and between the two a stratum of waverers who first took up one side and then the other. That is the Centre group. This is the usual picture presented by the factional interrelations in the world factional geography in all our European Parties. The comrades of the Minority on the Central Committee talked a lot at the meetings of the Commission about the necessity for preserving the mass character of the Party in Czechia. This concern is quite legitimate and explicable. In this hall there is not a single individual who does not understand that we must not only retain the masses already won for the Czechoslovak Party, but that we must get fresh masses to join it. We are all of the opinion that the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is one of the best sections of the Communist International: this Party has a membership of 130,000 in a country with a population of 13½ millions. The intelligentsia represents only a small proportion of the membership and 98% of the members are workers from the bench. In its composition it is the best type of workers party.

How can the mass character of the Party be preserved? In this connection also we can turn over the leaves of a book rich with international experience covering the six years of the existence of the Communist International. I will ask you, comrades, on the basis of this experience, to tell us from which direction our Party was menaced with the danger of becoming "Austrianised". Was it not from the

direction where the Centre, which our comrades of the Minority of the Central Committee represent, broke with the Left Wing of the Party and went to the Right in Alliance with the worst opportunist elements? Take the experience of the split in Norway. You know the whole question in Norway was with whom will Tranmael go? — with the Left Wing, or with those who had organised around the semi-Fascist organ published by the Falk group? At the decisive moment Tranmael turned to and went with the Right Wing elements of the Norwegian movement. The result of this treachery was that the Norwegian Tranmael Party only very recently expelled 50 of the best trade union workers for being in the "opposition". And now the Tranmael Party is becoming a political sect. Höglund also spoke about the necessity of a broad mass Party, of the danger of becoming "Austrianised". But at the time of the Swedish split he carried about 500 members with him. You will agree that this is not a very great victory for the broad mass Party. Take the extremely rich Italian experience. Why are the results of a serious split at Leghorn felt in Italy to this day. Because Comrade Seratti at that time failed to understand that in order to build up a mass Party in Italy it was necessary to establish a bloc with the Left Wing; he himself veered to the right and sealed the doom of the movement for a number of years. Does not Comrade Seratti's mistake represent one of the most instructive pages in the entire history of the international Labour movement within the last few years? I repeat — the fight against "Austrianisation" means to proceed with open eyes to establish an honest political bloc with the Left Wing. For only in this way is it possible to preserve the mass character of the Party.

On you, Comrade Smeral, as the subject and not the object of history, depends whether the Czechoslovakian Party will remain a mass Party or whether the Czech Communist movement will be disintegrated. This is the question. And I have no doubts as to the choice the Czech comrades will make. I have quoted this experience knowing that there is no question of a split in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. I have quoted it merely as an illustration of the debates which took place on the Commission in connection with the problem of preserving the mass character of our Party.

There are two methods of solving the kind of crisis which the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is experiencing. The history of our Communist movement provided us with the Italian example. Our Party in Italy emerged from the split in Leghorn on too narrow a basis. This circumstance influenced the further fate of the Party. Our Italian comrades have suffered too much as the result of the Leghorn disaster to allow us to remain silent concerning it. But there is another example — the French. At Tours Comrade Cachin led his Party to Communism as Comrade Smeral did his Party without spilling a single drop or losing its main cadres in the difficult crossings. By this he rendered a great service to the Comintern. And now, when in the light of the past we strike the balance of our work during the six years of the existence of the Comintern, we must burn the example of the French Party into the consciousness of the Communists of all countries. Let the Czech workers, let the members of the Czech Delegation ponder over the French example, for it will teach them more than all our arguments. Right from the very beginning of the formation of the Communist Party in France we all said that there will never be a real Communist Party in France until it manages to merge into a single stream with the syndicalist movement. This was the dream of the best workers in the French Party for years. And what the French Socialist Party failed to do in the Second International even under the talented leadership of Jaures, our young Communist Party has succeeded in doing. At the recent Congress of the French Party out of 239 delegates 224 were workers and even among the 15 remaining 5 were elementary school teachers. This is an excellent example of Bolshevising the Party, from which we can learn a great deal. This must be remembered and related at hundreds of meetings of Czech workers.

In our Commission we also discussed the question of the causes of this crisis. The comrades of the minority of the Central Committee expressed the view that the special conditions prevailing in the transitional period are the cause

of the crisis. They argue that up to the present time there was a relatively revolutionary situation in Europe. Now, however, we are passing into a stable situation. By the power of inertia the Party in Czechia is still influenced by the events of 1919. It is progressing along as though on a beautifully made road under new conditions without observing the changes that have taken place. Contradictions arise between facts and conditions, and this gives rise to a crisis in the Party.

Apparently this theory is intended firstly to convince the Enlarged Plenum of the seriousness of the danger of Left Wing deviations in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and secondly, to minimise the effect of the recent mass demonstrations of the Party organised by the Central Committee. I do not think that people will be found in the Czech Party to disavow openly the tactics of the Central Committee in the recent mass demonstration. But we fear very much that such a theory of the origin of the crisis represents a certain danger to the Party. It may galvanise into life those tendencies in the Party which stand out so distinctly in the notorious Brünn Memorandum, which gave rise to considerable discussion on the Commission. The Czech comrades in the Minority will not be offended if in a friendly manner we express our fears concerning this, all the more so since they become more profound as a result of the hints of opposition to strikes contained in the platform presented by the Minority of the Central Committee to the Commission. It need not be said that our Parties must exercise the greatest caution in declaring strikes in order to prevent themselves being provoked by the reformists. At the same time, however, it would be a mistake to believe that the Party in the present period must call a halt in the class struggle and wait for a revolutionary revival. It is precisely in the light of this theory of crisis that the question of strikes becomes symptomatic.

I think that for all that the cause of the crisis lies in the transition of the Party to mass action. In this too we seriously differ from the explanation of the crisis which the Minority of the Central Committee tried to give in their speeches at the Commission. I think that one of the most serious causes of the crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is that it has in its ranks a large contingent of the principal cadres of Social Democracy. The Party contains 74% of old Social Democrats. What does it mean to Bolshevise the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia under the circumstance? It does not mean that we must fatalistically admit the fact and swim with the stream, and dismiss it with a wave of the hand; it means that we must fight actively against Social Democratic deviations. Certain comrades, however, reveal this fatalistic attitude towards the situation. Fatalism is a distinguishing feature of Social Democracy. Social Democracy substituted fatalism for Marxism. It declared the organisational role of the Party in the demonstrations of the working class to be "revolutionary adventurism". We have here the Brünn Memorandum which the Brünn organisation sent to the Enlarged Plenum of the Comintern for the purpose of giving correct information concerning the state of affairs in Czechoslovakia. There are some really remarkable passages in this document. Picture to yourselves for a moment a Party mobilised for mass action. Bubnik is trying to break up this action. The party expels Bubnik. A "mutiny" breaks out on the Brünn Provincial Committee, and as ideological justification of this Right Wing Dutch, the leaders of the Brünn organisation publish a document in which they write: "Several of our so-called Left Wing comrades are of the opinion that we can "make" permanent revolution. We, however, are of the opinion that the task of the Communist Party is not to rouse a revolutionary movement but to utilise rationally an existing movement. Comrades, where is the organisational role of the Party? Where in this Menshevik conception of revolution is the initiative of the proletarian vanguard. As the Brünn leaders picture it, revolution springs like Minerva from the head of Jupiter. And all that is left to the poor Brünn Provincial Committee to do is to "use" her. Such a "Marxian" explanation of the tasks of the Party in revolution would be readily signed by Kautsky. The "Khvostist" (dragging of the tail) character of this theory is perfectly clear, but what is most characteristic is the time at which these lines were written. They were written at the

very moment when 30,000 Czechoslovak proletarians came out into the streets of Prague, and when 45,000 workers were demonstrating in Kladno. At that time two Party intellectuals invented a liquidationist theory intended to discredit these demonstrations during which (to the horror of petty bourgeois) several shopwindows were broken. In the minds of the Brunn leaders this theory is closely connected with the question of mass action. If we pay heed to the Brunn authors of the Memorandum, it appears that the masses must not be called into the street "if they are armed not with rifles but only with cabbages". This prosiness is uttered by the leaders of one of the largest organisations in Czechia. Imagine what would have happened if the Russian Bolsheviks had adopted the view that the masses must not be called into the streets until the army had gone over the side of the people. We would not only have failed to bring about the October Revolution: we would have failed even to overthrow Czarism. Recall the fights of 1848 or of the 14th July, 1789. Were the masses armed when they came out in the streets? In Russia on the eve of the 1905 revolution, when it seemed that Czarism was still sitting very firmly in the saddle, we systematically organised street demonstrations in a number of towns for the purpose of agitating the masses. In all these cases mass demonstrations had an agitational significance not only for the working class but also for the soldiers who came into contact with the demonstrators. Recall the Moscow rising. In this citadel of revolution before which you all bow your heads, in this city of Moscow in 1905 the workers rose in revolt against the regular Czarist army, put up barricades and held them for several days. It is true we were beaten in this battle, but it left profound traces in the memories of the workers not only in Moscow. This battle was a lesson in revolution for the masses of the soldiers in 1917. At that time there were people among us with greater authority than Emanuel Stern, Covand and Etcher, who proclaimed the Moscow rising to be a mistake.

That is why we gave battle to this Brunn Memorandum on the Commission. We bluntly put to the Czechoslovak Delegation the question: Do you associate yourself with these views which enjoy the rights of citizenship in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia? And the Czechoslovak Delegation disassociated itself from these views.

The crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is complicated also by national antagonisms. The Czechoslovak Party is built up of various national pieces. The Czech-working class in old Austria-Hungaria were for years in a state of national oppression. Naturally, they, like the Polish proletariat, cannot rapidly abandon nationalist prejudices. Hence, the processes of Bolshevisation proceed much more slowly than among the proletariat of national minorities, which in addition to the ordinary capitalist exploitation, are subjected also to national oppression. The Party is confronted by the very real danger of falling to pieces at the national joints. For that reason the first care of the Party must be to endeavour to avoid this break up on national lines. It would be a misfortune if our Party based itself exclusively upon the proletariat of the national minorities. This would lead to its isolation from the principal mainstay of the Czechoslovak proletariat, and we warn our Slovene comrades and also our comrades from Carpathian Russia against adopting such an attitude. But it would be no less dangerous to rely mainly upon the Czech section of the working class. For this would represent the policy of supporting nationalist prejudices. We must frankly and openly admit that nationalist tendencies have not been completely abandoned in the Party in Czechia. I will quote a few figures showing the composition for example of the PolitBureau of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. Until the recent crisis, in the PolitBureau there were 5 Czechs and 4 representatives of national minorities: Magyars, Slovenes and Germans. Now, of the, 9 members of the PolitBureau 7 are Czechs and 2 Germans. The other nationalities are not represented, because the factional fight was conducted for the purpose of removing the representatives of these nationalities. This is a temporary situation. Nevertheless it reveals the unhealthy mood prevailing among certain sections of the Czech Communists. These moods the Party must combat systematically for they cannot be overcome very easily.

The comrades of the Minority on the Central Committee

reproached the Executive Committee of the Comintern with having supported the Left to the disadvantage of the Brunn and other comrades. Here it will be opportune to say a few words concerning the rôle of the Comintern. What should be the rôle of the Communist International in the political controversy which is rampant within our Party. We must reply to this question blankly in order to avoid all misunderstanding. We have supported, we support and will support in the future that section of the Czechoslovak Party which will adopt the line of policy of the Communist International and help to Bolshevise the Party. This does not mean that we will support it mechanically. On the Commission we said to the Left Wing who are present here; Do not build up the Party on the strength of the help you may receive from the Communist International. You must learn to walk without the aid of the leading strings of the Communist International. Only when our Left wing comrades are able by their own efforts to defeat Right wing deviations several times will they be able to consolidate the Party and gain authority in it. The comrades of the Minority on the Central Committee said to us: The Communist International should merely give advice, but it must not bring pressure to bear through its representatives. What do they mean by bringing pressure to bear? Has the Comintern at its disposal mechanical means for this purpose? Our advice in a way is a sort of moral pressure. I assert that the advice of the Communist International will always be accepted by the Czechoslovak workers, for we have behind us the authority of the Russian Revolution, the authority of the whole international Communist movement which is developing under the inspiration of our October. But the Czech comrades of the Minority assert that the representative of the Executive Committee of the Comintern at their Congress threw a bombshell not of dynamite but of threats, to open a discussion in the Party. In the course of the debates on the Czech Commission we pointed to the abnormality of a situation in which a Party fears political discussions. In his fight against the Communist International Frossard at one time put forward the following formulae: A Party is a close circle of friends. We do not know whether the Czech comrades of the Minority of the Central Committee agree with this formula, but it would be a great mistake for such a definition to be accepted by our Czech Comrades. This is a definition of a purely Socialist Party, when it was really a gathering of politicians, friends, tied by joint responsibility. We do not desire to have such a Party in Czechoslovakia, but a Party with intense political life, ruthlessly combating every political deviation. Such a Party was formed in the course of a quarter of a century in Russia by Comrade Lenin: such Parties are being hammered out and are rising before our eyes in Western Europe. We require a Party not of people gathering in a café over a glass of beer: we require not a Party representing a political desert in which people walk about with their political and theoretical nakedness covered by a blank-sheet of note-paper. (Zinoviev — "Blank Sheet").

As against all the political problems the comrades of the Minority on the Central Committee in Czechia put up the problem of the **moral purification of the Party**. Of course it would never enter anybody's head to deny the necessity to have both in the leading positions of the Party as well as in its ranks, men of the greatest political and moral integrity. Russian revolutionaries went through this process of selection under the most difficult conditions of underground Czarist Russia. Since we became the ruling Party and it became possible for careerists and other undesirable elements to penetrate our ranks, we have periodically tested our ranks and have cleared out all the slag that has stuck to it. But only a ruling Party can afford the luxury of periodical cleanings. A Party which is still fighting for power, which is oppressed and persecuted by capitalist governments, presents only very narrow openings for the penetration of elements socially alien to it. Here too, perhaps, as was the case in Russia at one time, but to a less degree, a process of natural selection of the best of the labour movement may take place. Here the readiness of each member to make sacrifices in the fight in his devotion and loyalty to his Party and to the interests of the workers revolution is the test of their qualities. For that reason the problem of the moral purging of the Party can be presented in the same way as it is presented in the Russian Party. Here we may only speak of individual cases which cannot compromise the Party as a whole or its political

policy. We are told that from the Left group an individual has got himself placed on the Central Committee who has had connections with the Czech police. But can this fact to any degree place any blemish upon the policy conducted by the Majority of the Central Committee, a policy with which we completely associate ourselves? Has not the Russian Bolshevik Party had a case in which an agent of the secret police was a leader of the Duma fraction of the Party? At one time the enemies of our Party endeavoured to utilise the discovery of Malinovsky as a provocateur to discredit the Bolshevik. But when this attack was made on our Party all the Bolsheviks rallied round their Party leadership in the fight against Menshevik lies and calumnies. Why do we not see this among you Czech comrades? Because you make use of such individual cases for your factional fights against your Central Committee. Your so-called moral campaign is a sort of defence against the debates being transferred to the political field on which you know you will be defeated. Perhaps this was not your intention, but your campaign has merely confused the issue, and has brought intellectual confusion into the Party. In the name of the Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee I express the wish that our Czechoslovakian brother Party will not raise any more questions which have been decided by the authoritative international bodies. This request is made first of all to Brünn. The Brünn comrades must show they are really a disciplined unit of the Czechoslovak Party. After this Enlarged Plenum they must show this by deeds and not merely by words.

On the Commission the Czech comrades of the Minority of the Central Committee declared to us that the question of Bubnik was settled and they would not bring it up again. We accepted this statement with pleasure, but we must say frankly and openly that it is not the renegade Bubnik who is the danger to the Party but the "Bubnikism" in the Party, and this must be centred by our joint efforts. The Party cannot tolerate a situation in which individuals or groups distribute the manifestos of individuals outside of the Party in the ranks of the Party. I have in mind the case of the member of the Prague organisation, Detrovičsky, and think this case is not unique. To illustrate how "Bubnikism" still corrodes our organisations in Czecho-Slovakia, I will quote from an article by Dr. Etcher, who is not unknown to you, in the Brünn "Rovnost" of February, 22nd. He writes:

"Bubnik's expulsion is illegal. It contradicts the rules of the Party, which the PolitBureau of the Central Committee has grossly violated. Comrade Bubnik was expelled for a breach of discipline, and consequently for a breach of Party rules... Logically therefore the PolitBureau should be excluded first, because it committed a breach of the rules."

This, comrades, is an example of lawyer's logic, an example of that blissful Arcadia in which there are no political discussions and the Party represents "a close circle of friends". This is how in this Arcadia men who lead one of the largest organisations speak of their Central Committee. We know that the best rank and file workers of the Party organisation are not responsible for Etcher's words. And we are convinced that after the Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee they will endeavour to remove such leaders and publicists from the Party leadership.

But these are only the blossoms. The berries are much larger, and it will not be superfluous to exhibit one of these berries to the Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Before me lie two extremely interesting documents. One is a declaration made by the Chairman of the Communist fraction on the Prague City Council, Comrade Nedved, the other is a declaration made by the Secretary of District 12, Comrade Rejlek. Both these comrades belonged to the Right Wing group of the Congress of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia in November last year. In these documents they relate how Bubnik, long before his expulsion, called meetings at which the plan for splitting the Party was drawn up. In addition to these documents is any further evidence required to prove the justification of Bubnik's expulsion by the Central Committee of the Party? Did the comrades who referred to the apocryphal character refute these documents? No. Why then did not these documents convince the Brünn Provincial Committee? Why did Ruczek, Etcher and Emmanuel Stern continue to write articles in defence of Bubnik? Because after Bubnik's expulsion Bubnikism still remained in the Party. The threads of this Bubnikism can be

traced from Brünn to the Social Democratic "Pravo Lidu", and are lost in the maze of "Sozialisticheski Vestnik", the organ of the Russian Mensheviks. Here I hold in my hand this miserable sheet which week by week throws mud on the Russian Revolution, at the Russian Communist Party and the Comintern. This Russian White Guard sheet has specialised in the task of besmirching the Soviet Union. And in this organ the whole history of the Czech crisis is outlined in detail from the Brünn point of view, accompanied with all the material which some kindly hand has placed in the possession of Messrs Dan and Abramovitch. Let the Brünn workers now judge for themselves whose interests were served by the campaign against the Central Committee conducted by the Brünn "Rovnost". This fact alone should convince the proletarian masses of Brünn that the memorandum written in their name is written not by a Bolshevik but by a Menshevik hand.

Before concluding my report, I like to say a few words on the political platform of the Party. Two documents were presented to us on the Commission. One was the political platform of the Minority on the Central Committee and the other the political platform of the Majority. After carefully studying both documents the Commission unanimously resolved to associate itself with the platform of the Majority. In this platform there may be one or two defects, but taken on the whole the political line adopted by the Majority on the Central Committee is correct. As for the document presented by the Minority, I will take the liberty to make a few friendly remarks. First of all reference must be made to the fact that the platform of the Minority covering 20 pages and dealing with the most varied tactical problems, makes not a single reference to the proletarian dictatorship, the slogan of the whole international movement. In the present stage of protracted development of revolution the Comintern must undoubtedly state the case for the partial demands of the proletariat with particular clarity to all the Parties. If this period drags on for many years we shall seriously have to study the question of our programme of action in the transitional period. But precisely because we put forward the question of partial demands with special emphasis, precisely for that reason is it necessary for us to link up the slogan of the proletarian dictatorship with the concrete everyday struggle. Perhaps this is a slip of the pen on the part of the Czech Minority comrades. But even if it is a slip of the pen it should cause some alarm. In the present stage of development we are particularly menaced by Right wing deviations and therefore every mistake tending towards inability to link up partial demands with the ultimate aims of the movement into a single common political policy, must be ruthlessly exposed.

Further on in this platform we find a number of demands which, together with the whole spirit of the platform rouses even greater doubts than the omission of the slogan of the proletarian dictatorship. Among these demands, in the sphere of international politics, is that of the Revision of the Versailles Treaty, and in the sphere of home politics, the demand for the nationalisation of the banks. We do not know as yet how relations within the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia will develop in the future. But if these differences become more profound, then in the light of the crisis and the formulae of the Right wing, such a platform may become a dangerous document for the present period.

But, comrades, we believe that the outcome of the Czechoslovak crisis will be different. The resolution which we submit to you for consideration may not be a perfect document. I know that it does not satisfy a number of the Left wing comrades. On the commission the Russian Delegation had to put up a big fight against the French, the German and the Polish comrades who demanded guarantees from the minority of the Central Committee for the execution of the resolution. We Russian comrades held the view that no written guarantees could be convincing if the Minority in the Central Committee lack the will to carry out these resolutions. The unanimous vote on this resolution on the Commission signifies politically that the Majority and the Minority in the Central Committee establish a political bloc to liquidate the crisis by conducting a common struggle against Right wing deviations. The Communist International is happy to state that the solution of the crisis in Czechoslovakia apparently is proceeding along French lines. Basing itself on its copious experience, the Comintern expresses its confidence in the Minority of the Central Committee in the hope that this will

assist it sincerely and honestly to clear the atmosphere in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The Czech comrades of the Minority have put in a political bill of exchange which they will pay in the future. Hand in hand with the Communist International, the Czech comrades of the Minority on the Central Committee will help to lead the Party out of the crisis and to strengthen its mass character and consolidate its unity.

Comrade Muna

made the following declaration:

"Although all our suggestions for alterations and supplements were not adopted in the resolution submitted, we will vote for it, nevertheless. We are doing this in the interest of the unity of our Party and in order to strengthen the relations between our Party and the Communist International, which rests on mutual confidence. We will not only vote for the resolution, however, but also earnestly work in its spirit, in order to overcome the Right dangers menacing us in this period, the seriousness of which we in Czechoslovakia do not fail to recognise."

The resolution on the Czech Question was unanimously adopted amid stormy applause.

Comrade Kuusinen

gave a report on the work in the American Commission:

The American Commission, with the American comrades, unanimously decided today to recommend that the draft resolution which we are submitting here to be adopted. The question upon which the conflict arose in the American Party was whether the Party should fight in the immediate future for a Labour Party or not. As you know, the majority of the Central Committee of the American Party opposed it, and the minority supported it. In the opinion of the Commission, the majority based its policy in this respect too much on superficial temporary phenomena. The minority is absolutely right in its confidence in the vitality of the Labour Party movement.

But the question has also another side. In speaking of the labour party, it was evident that one side has an entirely different conception of the Labour Party from the other. One side fought of the coming Labour Party in a much narrower sense than it ought. A revolutionary, or at least semi-revolutionary Labour Party will probably always remain a pious wish. A revolutionary Labour Party is so long an impossibility, as long as the workers' Party of America will become this Labour Party. But it is possible that a Labour Party will rise earlier than that.

What purpose can a Labour Party serve for us? It will become a field of activity for our revolutionary work among the masses, in order to win them over gradually to the revolutionary standpoint. But it will also be a school for the working masses themselves, where they will get the experience of the necessity of class organisation, and one other very important experience — the experience of the treacherous role of the reformists, who will in all probability take the lead in this movement. We have already had a clear symptom of this during the last few weeks. The Socialist Party under the leadership of the well-known Mr. Hillquitt, was compelled recently to oppose the LaFollette Party on the question of the Labour Party. The reformists could not formally abandon their leading role in the labour organisations. Otherwise they would be politically dead.

The Commission proposed that the former slogan "Farmer Labour Party" must be changed from now on to that of "The Labour Party" only. That must be done in conformity with the change in the objective situation in America. The agricultural crisis was temporarily overcome by capitalism in America, although it was accomplished by the expropriation of the property of a large mass of small farmers. At present there is no basis for a joint party of the workers and small farmers. That naturally does not mean that the Communists must not continue their work among the small farmers with the greatest energy.

The working class is approaching great mass struggles. On the whole, however, it must be said that at present the

situation is not yet pregnant with revolution. American capitalism seems to be standing at the height of its power. At present it has overcome the situation created by the superfluity of capital by exporting capital to impoverished Europe. The Dawes affair seems a step toward world monopoly to American finance capital. This great power is, however, deceitful. When one is standing on top and can stay there, it is a very advantageous position. But when he comes to a slant and begins to slide, then the higher he stands, the worse it is for him. The great task of the American comrades is to help finance capital to slide down.

In the resolution the commission stated that both the leading groups have made mistakes in their platform; the Party is, however, well on the road to Bolshevisation, but it is still much too weak. The Party comrades of both groups must together do everything in their power to strengthen the Party.

One other important task: the Party has a Right Wing led by a comrade named Lore, who may not be altogether unknown to you, and of whom there can be no doubt that he is an opportunist. The Commission declares in its resolution that there is no room for such an opportunist as Lore in the Central Committee of the Party. The Commission did not express an opinion on what the right place is for him, that has been left to the Congress of the Workers' Party to decide. We are convinced that all the comrades of the Central Committee of the Party, irrespective of the group to which they belong, will deal with this question without ambiguity at the Party Congress. (Applause).

Comrade Zinoviev:

Comrades, I should like to make the following statement on the American question:

In the course of the negotiations I myself moved that the composition of the future Central Committees of the American Party be already intimated here in Moscow. I proposed that the present majority retain a majority in the future Central Committee, but that the present minority be assured representation proportional to its strength, to wit, not under one-third.

During the negotiations I then withdrew my motion as inexpedient. We are of the opinion that after having formulated a unified political platform, we may leave it to the Party itself to elect its Central Committee at the next Party Convention as it sees fit. This is in no way intended to express a preference for one of the two wings of the Party.

I must emphasise that the Foster Majority did not absolutely insist upon having the composition of the Central Committee fixed here. That means that my motion was made neither at the initiative of the Majority nor of the Minority, but on my own initiative.

You know, comrades, that the Commission has put only one condition, that the opposition, that is the social-democratic group headed by Lore, be not represented in the Central Committee.

We believe that both wings, Foster's as well as Ruthenberg's, by all means belong in the Central Committee. Of course it is not easy for both wings to obtain a majority. Nevertheless, each maintains that it will gain the majority. The future will show which of the two has deceived itself. We can only wish both wings the best of good luck. Let them try to win a victory on the basis of the platform of the Communist International, however, only on the basis of the platform here formulated.

The wish was also expressed that both tendencies unite in fighting the social democratic tendency of Lore. If one wing should endeavour to defeat the other through collaboration with Lore that would be disloyalty to the Communist International. After eliminating the social democratic opposition a free-for-all struggle is permissible, of course in a comradely form within the organisation and only up to the Party Convention. After the Convention peace and tranquility must prevail so that an American Question should not again require the attention of the Comintern for a long time to come.

A Representative of the American Majority:

On behalf of the majority, I would like to state that we fully accept the resolution of the American Commission. We believe it provides a solution of all the disputed points in relation to the Labour Party question which have divided the Party for the last two years and that it lays down the correct line for the future.

From the beginning of the controversy which first arose in 1923 over the question of the formation of the Federated Farmer-Labour Party, the present majority has contended that the Labour Party must be a mass organisation with a firm basis of trade union support, and should not be merely a combination of the Workers Party and its sympathising organisations, and fought the theory that the Communists should endeavour to split off a Left Wing from the Labour Party as soon as possible to transform this split-off section into a mass Communist Party. The resolution of the Commission has clearly upheld this point of view and has declared that we are right in emphasising it.

After the Presidential election, the majority of the C. E. C. in its determined opposition to further attempts to organise a fictitious labour Party which could not fulfill the role of a mass Labour Party in the United States, went to an extreme and rejected the agitation for the formation of a Labour Party in the present situation. This was a mistake which is acknowledged and which will be corrected in accordance with the resolution.

On the basis of this decision the majority will strive to unite our Party to end the factional strife that has weakened our Party and to eradicate energetically the Right deviations present in the Workers (Communist) Party.

A Representative of the American Minority:

The minority of the American Party appealed to the Communist International on the American question, because it considered that there was at stake an issue which involved the whole question of the future of the communist movement in the United States, the question of developing the class consciousness of the American working class.

We see that in recent years a new tendency had arisen which expressed itself in the movement for the Labour Party. We believed that it was necessary for our Party to take the forefront in this struggle and so to move the backward masses in America a step forward. We believe that to cut loose from this movement would be to take from our Party the best avenue of its future development.

In the decision that has been proposed here we have the Communist International's approval of this fundamental new point that the Communist Party in America must remain at the head of and take the lead in developing this movement; and consequently we can give our full approval to the thesis.

In the inner Party question also we have a decision to which we can give our full approval. One of the big differences in our Party was the question of the struggle against the Social-Democratic Lore faction in our Party. We insisted upon an uncompromising struggle to eradicate this tendency and this has been approved in the thesis.

Thus in the inner Party situation we believe that the thesis follows the correct line for the future good of the Communist Party in the United States.

The draft resolution of the American Commission was unanimously adopted.

Comrade Dorsey :

I shall make a very short report on the work of the

Colonial Commission.

Your Commission heard extensive reports from **China, Turkey, India, Java, Egypt, the British colonies and the American colonies and semi-colonies.**

The Commission adopted resolutions on the following colonial countries: **India, Java, Egypt and the American colonies.**

We only adopted resolutions where the Commission felt it necessary to give the Communist Parties a statement of policy and practical directions. All the resolutions were adopted unanimously in the Commission, and were then endorsed by the Political Commission.

In **Java** the resolution points out that the principal task confronting the Communist Party is the strengthening of its proletarian basis by the introduction of industrial workers and revolutionary intellectuals; secondly, to define its attitude toward the revolutionary national movement, particularly the Swaraj Islam, thirdly, to work out a practical platform of main demands: independence, withdrawal of foreign troops, the establishment of the People's Assembly, universal suffrage and the eight-hour day. The Party is to work for the formation of a revolutionary national bloc and gradually to separate itself organisationally from the Swarajites in Java.

In **Egypt** we have the rising movement for independence. As you know, this has resulted in a crisis in the Egyptian Parliament, which was dissolved, and in consequence we have a general aggravation of the conflict between Egyptian nationalism and British imperialism. The following general policy was outlined for the C. P. in Egypt: organising a bloc of the revolutionary national movements against British imperialism; exposure of the pro-British Party and its traitorous leaders; an energetic campaign in the trade unions for the organisation of the Communist Party; and inaugurating an intensive campaign for the release of political prisoners in Egypt.

In **India**, the reports of the delegates show that the movement is now in a process of transition, finding new forms and tactics to correspond with the real basic revolutionary nationalist movement in India. The old Ghandi movement of non-violence and non-cooperation has collapsed and was followed by the Swarajist Party with its policy of parliamentary obstruction. This Party has come to the point of collapse and is now tending to decompose into a small centre group between the big bourgeois parties on the one side and the revolutionary mass movement on the other. The masses of India are discontented with the Swarajist programme of self-government. They are demanding separation from the British Government.

The Commission proposes the following policy for India: "The Commission is of the opinion that it is now necessary for the Communists to continue work in the National Congress and in the Left Wing of the Swaraj Party. All nationalist organisations should be formed into a mass revolutionary Party, an All-Indian anti-imperialist bloc. The slogan of the People's Party, having for the main points in its programme: separation from the Empire, a democratic republic, universal suffrage and the abolition of feudalism — slogans put forward and popularised by the Indian Communists — is correct."

In its resolution the Commission instructs the Indian Communists to direct their efforts towards securing leadership over the masses of the peasantry, to encourage the organisation and amalgamation of trade unions, and to take over the leadership of all their struggles.

Another resolution adopted deals with the **American colonial situation**. Within the past few years the United States has emerged as a great imperialist power. It has subjected various colonies such as Hawaii, Cuba, the Philippine Islands, etc. It is carrying on an active imperialist policy especially in China, and Persia, as well as in other countries and is endeavouring to subject all of North, Central and South America to its domination. In the last few months we have seen it come forward with the **Dawes Plan**, the first great effort of the American capitalist class to subjugate the entire world to its financial and political control. In this resolution the American Workers Party is requested to organise resistance to American imperialism in all the countries under the latter's sway, all the colonies in Central and South America, and to develop the Anti-Imperialist League which has just been formed by the Communist Parties of United States and Mexico. The policy of this League will be to support the growing nationalist revolutionary movement in these countries, to stimulate the trade unions and peasant organisations to determined resistance to American imperialism in all its forms.

These are in brief the essentials of the resolutions submitted by the Colonial Commission with the endorsement of the Political Commission, and we trust that they will be accepted unanimously.

Comrade Kolarov (Chairman):

We will now vote on the resolutions, which were submitted by the Colonial Commission. There are 4 resolutions: India, Java, Egypt and the American colonies.

All 4 resolutions were unanimously adopted.

Comrade Kolarov:

Comrades! The

Yugoslavian Commission

has finished only part of its work and submits the following short resolution to you:

The Commission suggests:

"That the Enlarged Executive of the ECCI approves of the political policy contained in the resolution proposed on the Yugoslavian Question. The Plenum entrusts the Presidium of the ECCI with the final formulation of the resolution. The Plenum entrusts the Presidium with the decision of all questions of an organisational and personal nature in connection with this resolution by a special resolution in the name of the Enlarged Executive."

Differences of opinion arose on the following questions.

1. **In the estimation of the political situation.** Certain comrades overestimated the significance of the partial consolidation of capitalism in Western Europe; on the other hand these comrades underestimated the peculiarities of the political situation of the Balkan countries. As comrade Zinoviev emphasised here: in the Balkans we cannot say that consolidation has taken place. Nothing of the kind exists there. Peculiar conditions reign in the Balkans which are having their effect in the decay and destruction of capitalist domination. With regard to strengthening the revolutionary factors in the Balkans, we feel most of all the powerful influence of the imperialist states, an influence which not only contributes to the development and stabilisation, but also to destruction. In the Balkans the influence of the imperialist powers tends to weaken the domination of the Balkan bourgeoisie. On the other hand, there are two extraordinary important factors of tremendous revolutionary importance there, which are absent in most of the West-European countries — these factors are: the nationalist movement and the peasant movement. If these fundamental relations in the Balkans are taken into consideration, the general estimation with reference to a comparative stabilisation of capitalism in the West European countries cannot be applied mechanically and unreservedly to the Balkan countries. The conditions of the Balkan countries must certainly be investigated, and on the basis of this investigation, an independent estimate must be made. This gives rise to differences of opinion, confusion and deviations in the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.

The second question is the **national question**. Certain comrades in the Yugoslavian Party claim that there is no national question; they claim that nationalism, the nationalist movement in Yugoslavia is really a bourgeois movement, that it has nothing to do with the labour movement, that we must combat the nationalism of the Serbian bourgeoisie. When a conflict arose, when the Serbian Fascist youth in Zagreb attacked the youth of Croatia, certain comrades of the Yugoslavian Party declared on this occasion. We are equally hostile to the Croatian and the Serbian bourgeoisie. This statement supported the nationalism of the Serbian bourgeoisie, which is the oppressing bourgeoisie in relation to the rest of the peoples. It is clear that have here to deal with an opportunist deviation. The Comintern has al-

ready expressed its disapproval of these deviations, but they must be fought in the Yugoslavian Communist Party.

Comrades, other deviations also occurred, for instance, in the following case: It was claimed that the National Question in Yugoslavia led to the question of the constitution in Yugoslavia, to the question of local autonomy of individual provinces within a united Yugoslavian Party, with the complete democratisation of the latter. It was claimed that this unification, which was brought about on the basis of the Peace Treaty of St. Germain, is a progressive historical stage, and that we naturally help to maintain this progressive stage. It is clear that the deviation here consists in a false conception of the significance of the revolutionary national movement in the Yugoslavian Party.

Comrades, in the **peasant question** we also encountered deviations. There too, we noted a certain amount of misunderstanding of the role and significance of the peasant movement in the revolutionary epoch in which we are living; it was claimed that the present peasant movement is nothing more nor less than bourgeois organisations, with which nothing could be done. When the question of the formulation of a workers' and peasants' bloc arose in connection with the recent elections, this tactics of the Party was criticised by certain oppositionally minded. It is clear that here also we have to deal with social-democratic remnants in the peasant question.

Certain comrades claimed that the slogan of the **workers' and peasants' government** was nothing but propaganda, that it lacks real political meaning, that it does not imply the political mobilisation of the masses. Since monarchist beliefs reign in certain of the peasant parties — in the Yugoslavian, the Serbian — certain oppositional comrades claimed that we can have nothing in common with such organisations. This list of examples, indicating deviations in Yugoslavia, characterise the misunderstanding of the nature and the role of the peasant movement in the epoch of the nationalist revolution.

Certain differences of opinion also arise in the **trade union question**. But beyond that, in the polemic and in the fractional struggle it happened that certain of the comrades working in the trade union movement, happened to get into the camp of the opposition, and that they used the fact (which is very dangerous and unforgivable) that the trade unions with their organs got into their hands, and that they played the trade unions to a certain extent off against the Party and the Central Committee of the Party.

Comrades, as reporter for the Commission I must say definitely that the Commission is certainly not enamoured of the trade union policy of the CC. of the Party; the Commission unanimously stated that the CC. neglected the work in the trade unions, that it did not ascribe sufficient importance to this movement, and that it undoubtedly aroused dissatisfaction on the part of the trade unionists by its procedure in individual cases. The Commission can also not avoid stating the sad fact that the oppositional comrades used the movement in the fractional fight with the Central Committee. The Communist International must fight the one as well as the other.

Comrades: although the differences of opinion in the Party are pretty big, although the fractional fight has assumed pretty sharp forms, although the crisis, thanks to the split between the Communist Party and the trade unions, seriously menaces the unity and the future Communist movement in Yugoslavia, — in spite of all this, the Commission certainly does not think the conditions in this Party by any means hopeless. Although the masses of workers, and the masses of the Party are pretty backward, because they were not kept to the current development of the political questions in the Communist International — still these masses are loyal to the Communist International and are ready to go with the Communist International at any price. And no-one is able to get these masses from the Comintern. Here an extensive field of work opens up for deciding all the burning and conflicting problems by the Party masses.

The first task is raising the ideological level of the workers and the special Party level of the working masses of Yugoslavia and in general the development and furthering of the Bolshevisation of this Party.

In this way it will be possible in the no far-distant future, to raise the level of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and give it the opportunity of establishing and extending its influence on the working masses again and of taking its place in the general Balkan front.

(Applause).

Declaration of Comrade Milosevitch :

In the name of the Delegation of the CPY., I declare the following:

The prolonged internal crisis of our Party represent the birth pangs of a real Communist Bolshevik Party.

The more the CPY. during the last year Bolshevised its political line with the aid of the CBF. (Communist Balkan Federation) and the ECCL., the more the chasm between it and the elements possessed by social democratic remnants within the Party deepened, and that finally led to the separation of part of the opposition from the Party.

Since the resolution formulated by the Yugoslavian Commission on the Yugoslavian Question correctly judged the fundamental line of policy of our Party and the shortcomings of the opposition at bottom, I declare in the name of the delegation of our Party, that we completely agree with the fundamental policy of this resolution.

We also completely agree with regard to leaving the definite formulation of the resolution to the Presidium of the ECCL., since we have complete faith in the Presidium that it will formulate the resolution in the spirit of the decisions of this plenum on Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties.

We also expect all the honest revolutionary elements of the opposition to acknowledge their mistakes and accept the decisions of the International Forum of the communist movement, to carry out the decisions and this to render assistance in the future in the Bolshevisation of the CPY.

Declaration of Comrade Popovitch :

In the name of the opposition I declare that the Yugoslavian Question could not be solved in the Commission. The resolution proposed by the Commission is not yet in its final form. The opposition approves this resolution in principle, although certain parts must still be changed. I hope that the Presidium will make the necessary changes. The opposition will naturally accept the decisions of the Presidium.

Declaration of Comrade Simitch :

Since I belong neither to the Central Committee of the Party nor to the opposition which has left the Party, I must say a few words about Comrade Kolarov's report.

We cannot accept the draft of the resolution word for word which was formulated by a smaller commission and laid before us only this morning for acceptance. In principle we accepted it as a basis for the formulation of definite slogans in the Presidium of the Communist International; this draft has various shortcomings and therefore could not be considered by the Yugoslavian Commission as the solution of the Yugoslavian question, but only as a basis for the decision which must be reached in the Presidium of the Communist International. We, Yugoslavian Communists, have always had and still have, the greatest confidence in the leadership of the Communist International. Therefore we are convinced that the decision which will be reached in the Presidium of the Communist International will be completely in the interest of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and in the interest of the Communist International. For this reason I declare, although that is taken for granted for every Communist, that every decision of the Presidium of the Communist International is binding on me, as it is on every Communist.

Comrade Humbert Droz :

Report on the Italian Commission.

The Italian Commission has placed on record that by adhering to the programme of action adopted by the Fifth Congress, the Communist Party of Italy has made considerable progress with respect to the consolidation of the Party itself and to its contact with the masses. It has endeavoured to draw most of the comrades, including those of the extreme Left, into practical work, with the result that during the last few months, a large number of officials and also of the youth have been adopting more and more the tactics of the International, abandoning their former viewpoint.

It is essential now to make the next step towards Bolshevisation. From practical clarification, it is essential now to proceed to ideological clarification, all the more so as Bordiga has taken up a decisive offensive against the International by solidifying completely with Trotzky.

We hoped that he would come here as a member of the Presidium to account for himself to the Plenum. Under the pretext of family affairs, he refused to come and this attitude of his demands a thorough ideological clarification in view of the forthcoming congress of the Italian Party.

I should like to draw your attention to the fact that Comrade Grieco, who up till now shared Bordiga's political views, declared on two occasions that after the happenings of the past few months, he deems it necessary to revise certain conceptions of the former extreme left.

The Commission has prepared a draft resolution, making it incumbent on the Party, in view of the forthcoming congress not to limit itself to the question of the political lines of the Party on which it would seem that the majority will agree with the Central Committee, but to raise at the same time the question of the ideological clarification of the ideological basis of the Party.

The Party has to struggle against a right tendency, which is perhaps less dangerous than elsewhere, in a Party established on a narrow basis, being open only to the left of the socialist movement, but this right tendency exists nevertheless. Especially the recent works of Comrade Graziadi, show a tendency towards the revision of the economic basis of Marxism, which makes him inevitably veer politically to the right.

But the main danger for the Italian Party is what one has been pleased to call, the extreme left, the tactical attitude of Bordiga. This extreme left becomes a right with respect to the question of Trotzkyism and also to other questions.

Concerning this fight against Bordiga, the resolution deals with three essential points: firstly, with Bordiga's abstentionism which manifested itself here at the Second Congress, in Bordiga's entire policy in the Italian CC. directly after the Third Congress, in the question of the capture of the masses, in the question of the role of the Party, and especially, in the Rome theses. The whole attitude of Bordiga with respect to the Italian Socialist Party was an outcome of abstentionism.

The second point which we stress and which the Party must clear up, is the question of the role of the Party. For Bordiga the Party must be a body of leaders capable of leading the masses into the revolutionary struggle. He cannot conceive it as a mass Party working among the masses. Like Trotzky, he over-estimates the role of the leaders in the revolutionary period, and under-estimates the role of the Party as an organ of the working class.

The third point to which we wish to draw the attention of the Party is Bordiga's tactics. He wants to put the tactics of the Party into the form of rigid theses, branding as opportunism all flexibility and all adaptation to economic and political circumstances.

The resolution demands that our Party should bring complete ideological clearness into all these various points.

This is the next step of the Party towards Bolshevisation.

After the conclusion of Comrade Humbert Droz's speech, Comrade Kolarov put the draft resolutions on the **Italian Question**, on the **trade union question**, and on the **questions of Agitprop** to the vote. The resolutions were unanimously adopted.

Comrade Kolarov proposes the following

Resolution of Protest :

The **Bulgarian Government** has published in Bulgarian and foreign papers an alleged decision of the **ECCL** of March 3rd, 1925 intercepted by it, ordering the **CPB** to organise an armed rising on April 15th, according to a plan elaborated by the Executive Committee.

Of course, this is the latest forgery.

By "disclosing" this decision, the Bulgarian Government has no doubt broken the record in international competition with respect to the manufacturing of Comintern documents.

But, if in spite of the risk of becoming the laughing stock of the whole world, it has nevertheless taken recourse to forgery, this was done in justification of the countless assassinations it has committed, is committing and is preparing to commit, in the process of the extermination of the best representatives of the Bulgarian proletariat.

This is one of its attempts to deceive the world and to divert from itself public attention at a time when the workers of all countries are condemning brutal acts.

But this attempt is doomed to failure.

The **ECCL** once more brands the Bulgarian Government of Generals and professors as a Government of assassins and forgers. It calls upon the proletariat of all countries to nail to the pillory the hangmen of Sofia and support the Bulgarian workers and peasants in their struggle to overthrow their oppressors.

Comrade **Semard's** proposal to the Plenum on behalf of the **French Delegation**.

Comrade Semard :

Comrades!

The **French Delegation** was detained in the commission when the vote was taken on the resolution concerning the **discussion in the Russian Party**. The French Delegation has a proposal to place before the Executive. Comrade Treint declared in his exposé that the right used the personality of Comrade Trotzky as a screen for a virulent campaign against the Communist Party and the International. Comrade Treint also stated that the right, and the right elements expelled from our Party, as well as a right fraction within our Party are publishing a review called: "La Revolution Proletarienne". This review apart from publishing articles by Trotzky makes also libellous statements against active members of the Party and of the International. A certain number of our Party members contribute to this review, and a certain number of our nuclei workers are of the opinion that there was no reason for the French Party to expel Monatte, Rosmer and Delagarde since Party members collaborate with Monatte and Rosmer and the two latter base themselves on the authority of Trotzky — a member of the Russian Communist Party.

On the other hand the right circulated before the Plenum the rumour that the expulsion of these comrades would probably be reconsidered and that they would be reinstated in our Party. The last review of the "Revolution Proletarienne" is even fiercer in its attacks on the Communist Party and the International than the two preceding reviews. The French Delegation thinks that such a situation cannot be allowed to continue and that Comrade Trotzky must be asked to say point-blank if he has or has authorised Monatte and Rosmer to use his personality for the popularisation of their anti-communist agitation. If he has not, he must disassociate himself publicly from these elements.

The French Delegation thinks that the Executive should ask the Presidium to settle this question with Comrade Trotzky, and asks that a card vote be taken on this question.

Comrade **Kolarov**, (the chairman) proposed to the Plenum to accept the proposal of the French Delegation. This proposal was adopted.

Comrade Kolarov :

As all the items on the agenda not only of today's session but of the Plenum of the Enlarged Executive have been dealt with, I call on Comrade **Zinoviev** to make concluding speech.

Concluding Speech of Comrade Zinoviev.

Comrade Zinoviev (Greeted with applause):

Comrades! First of all I wish to congratulate you because as it seems, our session may be concluded. The meetings of the Enlarged Executive have the same importance as Congresses. I think that it is clear to us all. We have discussed a number of questions which are vital questions for the whole international movement. We have dealt first of all with **various questions of the national sections**, each of which, taken individually, is of great international importance. The more our connections grow, the more we become a real international, the more we must discuss fundamental problems of individual sections at our sessions. It seems to me, comrades, this international coordination in our activity is the most important thing. The bare fact, merely that we come to know one another better personally is of great significance. The comrades who come to our session have mostly been here several times before. But new comrades have come whom we are glad to know, as for instance, several outstanding figures in the present session, who are obviously labelled "**Made in America**". They are figures who have stood the storm, men who have a great future before them in our movement but alone is of extraordinary importance for our work. In every session of a commission dealing with a national question we find that in

the debates we can depend more and more on comparisons from the history of other sections. That is a proof of the internationalisation of our movement. Unfortunately, we still learn too little from one another. Often we pay dear for our own mistakes simply because we learn too little from the history of the other parties. Still the price of our apprenticeship is getting smaller all the time. We are constantly learning, from mistakes and shortcomings, but also from the successes of the movement in various sections, to draw conclusions for ourselves. We have had to deal with **questions affecting the American, Yugoslavian and Czechoslovakian Parties**. Much antagonism existed everywhere. In a live movement that is naturally impossible to avoid. New problems arise and with them, differences also arise. The parties are becoming consolidated by fighting through these antagonisms; there is no other way to overcome them. Still the points of common ground are always stronger than the antagonisms. Hence the unanimity in coming to a decision. The unanimity does not arise simply because we are good diplomats — and by the way, we also need good diplomats here, but for the dictatorship of the proletariat — but because the point of solidarity outweighed the tendency to separate.

The most difficult situation occurred in the **Czechoslovakian Party**. The prologue of the conflict was not pleasant and might have caused fears to arise that the Executive

would not be able to deal with this problem as too hard a nut to crack. Nevertheless, we succeeded in solving this problem satisfactorily as well. We believe, comrades, that we have in fact found a solution which will be acceptable to the overwhelming majority of the Czechoslovakian Communists. There is no reason for speaking of victors and vanquished. We are a world party, a unit of parties bound together by actual brotherly ties. Certain comrades were sharply criticised, here. That will be understood if the cause of the problem and the acuteness of the subsequent fight are taken into consideration. Comrades, the decision we have made is sustained by the firm faith and warm affection of the Comintern for the CP. of Czechoslovakia as one of our best and strongest sections, as well as by the conviction that our decision will in fact serve the cause of the proletariat of Czechoslovakia.

We declared at the beginning of the session that we hoped that the danger of the split would be banished. We see now that our hopes were fulfilled. We are now convinced, aye, we are certain, that it will not come to a split. Of course, there still are elements which will play with the idea of a split. Well comrades, I believe that all the workers, whether they belong to the Left or to the Right, will cast all those aside regardless of who they are, who venture to play with a split in Czechoslovakia. (Loud applause). On the basis of personal contact with those comrades who represented the three largest organisations of Czechoslovakia, we have become firmly convinced that we are dealing with loyal and courageous comrades, who, in case of actual danger to the unity of the Party, will hold their ground, and as I have said, will thoroughly teach anyone who wantonly plays with the unity of the Party, whoever he may be, that the party is higher than any individual person or any prejudices.

Comrades! It seems to me that we have correctly solved this most important question, and everyone of us is thoroughly imbued with the conviction that everything was done to assist the Party to overcome fraternally its internal conflict and to coordinate all the really proletarian communist elements to a joint struggle against the Right deviations along the line of the Communist International.

Comrades! We also attempted to solve questions which are of great importance not only for the various sections, but also for the whole international labour movement.

Our session was a **session of Bolshevisation**. All our questions were regarded from the point of view of Bolshevisation. That is true of the **peasant question** as well as of the **trade union question**. We have dealt with these questions with the various sections in order to differentiate, that is, to take into account the concrete condition in the various countries.

Summing up, we might say that our session was conducted under the banner of the following slogans:

Against the illusions of the ultra-Lefts — for a realistic estimation of the international political and economic world situation. Such an estimation is the basis for all the serious work of an earnest revolutionary. It means that the truth must be looked straight in the face and that one must not waver even when the situation at the moment is less rosy than we might wish.

To represent things as they are, free from illusions, must be the preliminary condition of the work of the Executive session.

Our **second slogan is: no concession to the Right;** for any concession to the Right might be extremely dangerous in the present state of affairs. Our session was devoted in fighting Right sicknesses, abandonment to depression which might occur if the International is not at its post and on guard. In the present state of affairs, every deviation to the Right, that is, toward Social Democracy, which is the same thing as towards the bourgeoisie, is particularly dangerous. Lenin taught us that the fight against the Right must not be turned into a sport. We fight on account of political necessity, not for the joy of the sport.

Comrades! **Fight against the Right means fight against Social Democracy;** fight against Social Democracy, however, means fight against the bourgeoisie. We must see things

realistically; we must see them as they are. Once we have recognised the difficulties, we must understand how to hold the communist rudder firmly in hand. That is required by the present transition period during which period the movement develops in an increased degree at a slower pace.

Our **third comprehensive slogan is; Bolshevisation.** It was issued at the Fifth World Congress, it is true, but was made concrete only at the present session. But that certainly should not mean that we cannot return to this subject. Bolshevisation is a task of years, an eternal task. We have raised this question concretely for the first time and tried to differentiate this slogan and to adapt it to the requirements of each separate country and in conformity with the conditions prevailing there at present.

All these slogans, however, were dominated by our **fourth slogan: "To the masses!"** To the masses, notwithstanding all difficulties. No matter how great Social Democracy may grow, **our task, the guiding star of our whole work must continue to be to penetrate deeper and deeper in every country into the masses, not only to understand the general situation but to overcome the difficulties.** No matter whether we lead a legal, illegal, or semi-legal existence, in every case we must understand here and there to connect up organisationally with the masses, for instance, in case of illegality, then we must seek all the more to strengthen our spiritual influence over the masses, and must all the more energetically spread our political ideas among the masses. Be it less a severe class struggle or civil war, in both cases we must be able to carry our banner at the head of the masses.

A few words on the **situation in Russia.** With greater attention, it seems to me, greater than ever before, the vanguard of the proletariat of the Soviet Union in following our session. Certain Russian comrades ask: **Cannot our movement be coordinated better internationally?** Would it not be possible to coordinate the economic strikes on an international scale? Today, for instance, there is a strike in Czechoslovakia, in a fortnight something similar in Germany, three months ago the same thing in France. Would it not be possible to coordinate these strikes?

Comrades! I am the last man to believe that such questions can be discussed wantonly, least of all the question of the economic struggle. But that such a task confronts us is an actual fact. We must become more familiar with trade union questions, must act more energetically in the economic fights of the working class, and attempt to coordinate the economic class struggles of the proletariat which must sooner or later lead to civil war. This task, comrades, is not easy to solve. Still — we must concentrate on it internationally.

The conditions of the Russian proletariat are constantly improving, slowly, to be sure, but constantly. The political situation of the Soviet Union is firm. No one is justified in saying, however, that our victory is final. Lenin was not only a Russian but also an international proletarian revolutionary. The Party we have created is not only a Party of the Russian proletariat, but feels that it is a section of the international proletariat of the international army. We all know only too well that **the final victory of the Soviet Republics in the last analysis depends on the victory of the international proletariat.** Yes, we were mistaken as far as tempo is concerned. We reckoned with months where we should have reckoned with years. Yet we won more time than we believed at the beginning. The pause for breath which the Russian proletariat obtained was longer than we all assumed it would be. Historically regarded, however, it is still only a breathing space. A final victory is possible only when we have attained victory at least in some other decisive countries of Europe. Then, and then only will our victory in Russia be a final victory, which, however, will then be a final victory on an international scale. The prestige of the Russian proletariat is also growing. Today a new movement has arisen: the desire to send delegations of Social Democratic trade union workers, and also non-party workers to Russia. We regard this movement sympathetically and ask you to encourage this movement. We are ready to welcome also the Social Democratic workers and show them without any pretence what we have achieved. Our work is not yet at an end. The Russian proletariat is still in the midst of the work of building up:

after all, it has had only a few years of peaceful work. Still it has already achieved a considerable amount. It will march onwards. The economic, material situation will improve. Every honest worker, whether he be a communist or not, will instinctively, if only from a class feeling, stand by us. The Soviet Republic in the next few months and years will become an ever stronger magnet for the workers of the whole world, including the Social Democratic workers. The propagandist magnetic power of the achievements of the Russian proletariat is constantly increasing and will become more and more a factor of international significance.

Comrades! We fought here for the truth, for the right path to the victory over the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats. We hoped that we would part as brothers, as true class fighters, and remain a great family of students of Comrade Lenin, honourably striving to grasp Leninism. And if it should happen that one or the other of us does not reach this aim, then that is not his fault, but is due rather to objective difficulties. How lucky the squad of proletarian fighters of the Russian working class was, which developed under the direct leadership of such a genius as Lenin was, and had the good fortune of fighting with him shoulder to shoulder.

But the comrades who were less fortunate must thoroughly study the experiences of the Russian Revolution and above all the teachings of Leninism. The greatest pride of the Communist Party of Russia, which is also the pride of the Russian working class, is that Lenin's world of thought is beginning to be the common property of the conscious proletarians of the whole world. We are convinced that we will all do everything possible to fill our world party more and more with Lenin's spirit, and thus with Marx's spirit, to make it a communistic, an ever more resolute mass party, and an ever more solid revolutionary vanguard for the fight against the world of foes and for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie and Social Democracy. **Our Communist International is the only real revolutionary organisation of the world. It is the organisation of the world revolution. As such it was created, as such it stands, and as such it will fight on and on to the final victory.**

(Stormy applause. The delegates rise and sing the International).

Comrade Kolarov.

I declare the meeting of the Enlarged Executive closed.