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The V. World Congress of the Communist International.

Concluding Speech of Comrade G. Zimoviev on the Report on the Work of the E. C. C. I.

June 26th 1924.

World Economics.

Some comrades think we made a mistake in the discussion in combining the question of the future tactics of the Executive with the report on its activities. Certainly this has involved a certain amount of inconvenience which we may be able to avoid in subsequent congresses. I personally would not object to this, but I think that it would be inexpedient from a practical standpoint, inasmuch as the tactics of the Comintern and its general line of action are always closely united with the tactical course mapped out for the immediate future. And so, if our Congresses have referred to carry on the discussion in this order, it has been merely to economise time, and from no other consideration.

It is my opinion that in addition to the very detailed resolution on the activities of the Executive we must also have a separate basis on general tactical questions.

Our present discussion, comrades, has been more comprehensive than ever before. Sixty-two speakers have taken part, and to mention the various resolutions and statements that have been presented. Many of the speeches have contained a great deal of valuable and enlightening material on the actual conditions in the various countries. I shall not, of course, have time to take up all the speeches, and must concentrate my attention on only the most essential points. In the first place I shall try to elucidate those points which I did not make sufficiently clear in my first report, long as it was. In such cases the length of the report should be attributed not to love of speech-making, but to the vastness of the theme, demanding from the speaker a more thorough elucidation of the activities of fifty or sixty parties, and the mapping out of the tactical line for the future.

To begin with I should like to supplement my analysis of the world economic situation. I have already pointed out in my first report that on the whole I am in agreement with the bro-

chure and theses of Comrade Varga. Certainly many corrections can and must be made therein, and there could be no objection to a certain amount of re-working of the theses by a special commission. But I believe, comrades, that we must give preliminary consideration here to the question of whether or not they are fundamentally correct.

In "Die Internationale" published by the German brother party, we find in an article by K. S., a statement like this:

In the activities of the Third Congress the clear perspective of world revolution was replaced by a general economic forecast, which signified a distinct step backward in some particulars, and especially in the question of methods."

The question asked is: What do we really need, a forecast or a revolution? It seems that the forecast is the most important thing to some writers. In so far as we may speak of a forecast, the Third Congress was absolutely correct. Events have already shown that the Third Congress rightly analysed the world economic situation. Events have not proceeded at a more rapid pace than was foreseen by the Third Congress. Of what use would be a forecast entirely favourable to us and unfavourable to the bourgeoisie if it were not later vindicated by facts? It would have been very simple to draw up a paper "forecast" at the Third Congress showing that in the next year or so we would witness the complete and final collapse of capitalism. But what sense would there be in that if it did not correspond with the truth?

We have learned much during this period, and we have partially come to understand that we must handle the term "collapse of capitalism" very carefully. The downfall of capitalism is absolutely inevitable; capitalism is doomed, but we must see things in their real light, and interpret the times more rationally than we have hitherto done.

You have heard Comrade Dengel's estimate of Comrade Varga's report. After hearing the statement of the German declaration on this question the fact becomes of secondary importance. But that does not prevent us discussing the essential point of disagreement with individual comrades, especially with such an esteemed comrade as Dengel. Comrade Kreibich, by the way, the exponent of an entirely different political viewpoint, held exactly the same opinion of Comrade Varga's report as Comrade Dengel.

According to Dengel it was not an accident that Radek and certain other comrades of the Right seemed to be in agreement with Comrade Varga. It seems to me that Comrade Varga has to some extent become a victim of the "military strategy" of Radek. You have probably noticed that Radek hunts everywhere for the weak spots of the Left, groping and sniffing about for some little aperture through which to crawl.

He endeavoured to do this in connection with Comrade Varga's report. I can easily understand the feelings of a revolutionist, and especially of a German revolutionist, in such a situation. Dengel would have liked to have had our theoreticians and economists mark out clearly the line of march. Capitalism will collapse sooner or later, revolution is inevitably approaching, and is likely to break out at any moment. Especially comprehensible is such a mood after the October defeat, after they have been able to shake off the yoke of the Right leadership. The real desire to fight is present—their fists are clenched—they wait only for our theoreticians to do their work well—that is, to prepare a "forecast" giving assurance that the revolution will break out to-morrow.

Our Task—to See Things As They Are.

Of course I understand this feeling on the part of revolutionists, especially on the part of our German comrades who find themselves in a unique position. But comrades, we want to conquer, and not merely to shake our fists in the air; and to do this we must see things in their true light.

Comrade Varga was commissioned to outline for us the world economic situation, and not merely the condition in Germany. Germany is a very important country for the revolution. But comrades, it is quite rightly pointed out that the Anglo-Saxon countries, and especially England, also have a certain importance for the world revolution. If my memory does not deceive me, it was Karl Marx who said: "Revolution without England would be a storm in a teacup." And so, while paying our due to the German movement, we must turn our attention to the world economic situation as well. We must remember that even in Germany, notwithstanding the many symptoms of the decline and disruption of capitalism, we have also certain symptoms of its consolidation. Every worker feels this in his own factory. There is no use in our denying this fact. There are many questions to which it is no easy matter to answer simply yes or no, and consequently many articles and speeches betray marks of indecisions—of sitting on the fence.

The situation is very complicated, and it is not Varga's fault that certain symptoms of the strengthening of capitalism exist. Unfortunately it is so and we cannot simply shut our eyes and say that no such phenomena are to be observed. Our task is to see things as they are.

The "Pacifism" of Comrade Varga.

It has been stated here that Varga has manifested "pacifist tendencies." If we are to judge by his appearance, we may well believe that he actually has certain "pacifist tendencies" (laughter). But Varga has indicated these tendencies only in one respect—had I been in his place I should not have dealt so "pacifistically" with Dengel (laughter). Nevertheless, I consider that the forecast which Comrade Varga has scientifically outlined for us, is correct. The economic research which he has carried on in the Comintern, his three months' survey, serves as excellent material. I know of nothing better in all international economic literature. In my opinion we all have something to learn from Varga in this sphere. I myself am ready to learn from him here. And there is nothing to prevent others from learning from him, particularly Comrade K. S.

An analysis of the international economic situation is extremely difficult and complex. The situation is very kaleidoscopic, and cannot be grasped on the basis of a subjective approach. To what conclusions does Comrade Varga's analysis lead us? He says: "In practically every part of the world a general agrarian

crisis is to be observed. In America a severe industrial crisis beginning. In individual European countries the crisis has been mitigated at the expense of neighbouring countries. Simultaneously a sharpening of class contradictions not only relatively, but absolutely, is taking place—an indication of the general regression in the condition of the working class."

Comrades, can this be called pacifism? Varga rightly proposes that the present economic situation is such that the decisive role may be played by the subjective factor—the extent of the organisation of the proletariat, the will to power, the readiness to fight, the strength of the Communist Parties—this certainly not pacifism. The objective situation may be as revolutionary as you please, but if the will to power is lacking, if the oppressed masses lack sufficient revolutionary experience, if there is no party—then nothing will come of it.

It is not at all a bad thing that that little interlude occurred. It is especially good that Comrade Dengel did not insist on the exaggerated conclusions at which he arrived with the best intentions in the world.

But we must be calm. What would have happened if he had declared at the Third World Congress: "The world situation is such that capitalism is at its last gasp. And then it will be turned out that the Fourth Congress was convened, and the Fifth, and capitalism was still hale and hearty in many countries. Such self-deception would hardly have enabled us to maintain our prestige among the members of our party, or to speak of the workers who sympathized with us."

Two Prospects for World Capitalism.

There are two outlooks for world capitalism. One rough speaking, is that capitalism may vegetate for a comparatively long period, neither living nor dying, the other, also quite possible eventually, is that a more rapid development of events are speeding up the collapse of capitalism in a number of the most important countries, and leading to a swifter decline in others. Certainly, historically speaking, capitalism has now only very brief span of life. In the life of a single human being five or twenty years—is a long period. But in the history of the world such a period is very short indeed. We, the Comintern, on whom depends the task of organizing the world revolution, must be able to make our tactics conform to either one of these possibilities. Our main attention must be concentrated on the less favourable one. If the better one should be realized, and the collapse of capitalism comes more quickly, then it will be easy enough to adapt ourselves to the more favourable situation. Affairs will go badly with us if we make all our plans on the basis of smooth and rapid development. This is true in relation to each country separately, and even more true in relation to the world economic situation as a whole. I know that among the leaders of the German Communist Party there are very influential members who consider that the collapse will be delayed decades yet, even in Germany. I do not think that is true. But it is useless to jump on Varga when he displays caution in his estimate of the world-wide economic situation.

I consider therefore that the theses of Comrade Varga on the whole correct. It is quite possible to meet the wishes of the German delegation and work out more completely the possible revolutionary perspectives, especially in Germany. In general I would recommend that they should be studied more closely, especially by the young comrades. It is not fair to accuse Varga of "pacifist tendencies" just because he has a pacifistic exterior, without being able to produce a single fact to figure against his analysis of the world economic situation. We must study and master the facts of the world economic situation more closely than ever before, and be more careful in our deductions and conclusions.

The International Political Situation. The Meaning of the Pacifist-Democratic Era.

I should now like to make a few supplementary remarks on the question of the international political situation. In my report I declared that Fascism and bourgeois reaction on an international scale reached their apogee at the time of the Fourth World Congress. The Congress already at that time foretold that this movement would give way to a different "era"—the pacifist-democratic era.

This forecast has now proved correct, but this new period will not be of long duration. In a number of countries the situation will again become aggravated, emergency measures

will once more be introduced, Fascism will reappear,

What was the situation during the imperialist war? It was incredibly difficult; almost everywhere martial law was introduced. At the end of the war there was a certain blossoming of democracy; in a number of countries there were bourgeois-democratic revolutions. However, Fascism very quickly replaced this period, and the most severe bourgeois reaction swept a number of countries with very important results. It was probable that the Communist Party should appear as the only party who could lead the working class to battle and seize the victory from the bourgeoisie. After this the wave of the pacifist-democratic era rose again. The Messieurs Social-Democrats considered it all a very simple matter: after martial law—democracy, and again martial law, and then again democracy as if there had been a change at all.

Crisis of the Fascist Regime in Italy.

But it is not so simple as that. Let us take Italy for instance. It might be an exaggeration to say that a new wave of revolution, beginning with a general strike, etc., was already rising there (information regarding what occurred in connection with the murder of Matteotti has not yet appeared in the press) but it is undoubted that a new situation has arisen in Italy. This is clear from the fact that the communist organ "L'Unità", for the first time in two numbers has carried on its first page, in large type, the slogan "Down with the government of murderers!" and Mussolini has not suppressed the paper. This is certainly a symptom that another new "era" is approaching. In spite of the fact that Mussolini may say he has no intention of leaving the government at the present moment, the very fact that the question has already been raised is an indication of the "spirit of the times". Here we see the first significant and profound internal crisis in the fascist regime in Italy.

If, however, bourgeois "democracy" again gets the upper hand in Italy, this "new" democracy will be nothing like the democracy of 1920. You are well aware that the Socialist Party of Italy was a large mass-party at that time.

The working class felt that it was free, and bourgeois democracy blossomed forth. But at that time the Italian workers did not understand the essence of "democracy". The Socialist Party was full of democratic illusions, and the workers were politically unsophisticated. Do you think for a minute that when Fascism came there will be simply a return to the former condition of the working class? Not a bit of it! A great change has taken place in the working class. They have lost their "democratic" illusions; they have paid dearly for the lessons. An entirely different political situation, an entirely different "democracy", will come. The working class has been enriched with entirely new political experience. We must not lose sight of this fact. As a matter of fact not only the social-democrats but even we communists have been obliged to analyze the situation too simply. We thought: first there will be democracy, now comes Fascism, and after Fascism will come the dictatorship of the proletariat. It might have been open so, but then again it might not. For instance, it is possible that the Mussolini regime in Italy might be replaced, not by democracy, but by the dictatorship of the proletariat, but by a new brand of "democracy" not at all like the democracy of 1920, and during the regime of the "new" democracy the dictatorship of the proletariat might be prepared.

The situation is not so simple. We cannot say that this will happen according to formula: first the letter D for democracy, then F for Fascism, and finally R for revolution. This is not such a simple matter as Marx's formula: commodity—money—commodity. There may be some other denouement. We may also have here a unique type of "surplus value" in the form of the political experience accumulated by the working class. If Italy falls upon an "era of democracy" the working class will be enriched for it, enriched with new political experience. The role of the party would then be different, as that would mean an essential change in the situation.

The Democratic-Pacifist "Era"—for How Long?

How long can this democratic-pacifist "era" last? It is difficult to make a definite statement on this question, but, as far as we can judge, it will be of very short duration, for instance in France—the country of political manoeuvring and bourgeois democracy. There the left bloc will break down sooner than is generally assumed. Its position is very unstable. The victory of

the left bloc was achieved by only 300,000 votes; for the right bloc, including all its tendencies, polled 3,600,000 votes, and the left bloc 3,900,000 votes. Herriot initiated his government activity by appointing six ministers of Poincaré's old Cabinet, and has retained the latter's policy in his foreign politics. The left bloc made very big promises to the working class, and sees itself unable to fulfil any of them. That is why one is justified in assuming that the democratic-pacifist "era" will soon come to an end in France. If the working class and its Communist Party show weakness, France cannot escape fascism. How long will Herriot remain at his post, and how soon will Doriot take his place? (Applause and laughter.)

It is impossible to say how many months the new "era" will last, and how long we shall have bourgeois dictatorship with us, but one thing is certain: the development of events is quick this transition will be, but it is self-evident that the process of disintegration within the left bloc is more rapid than before. The left bloc will soon come to grief. What does the whole pacifist-democratic "era" mean for capitalism? What has brought it about? Does it coincide with the consolidation of the bourgeoisie, or with the decline of capitalism? It coincides, of course, with the latter. Events are developing fairly rapidly, although we do not always notice it. Take for instance the most recent events; I suppose you all remember the former crises of the bourgeoisie in the pre-war period. For instance, the Dreyfus affair in France kept people talking for years. It was considered to be a very serious crisis within the bourgeois social order; or for instance the struggle against the three grade electoral system in Prussia. What is all this compared with the recent fights? For instance when prior to the war a strike took place in Belgium for universal suffrage, Comrade Rosa Luxemburg wrote long treatises about this event. Compare this with what is going on at present almost every day. For instance, the assassination of Matteotti, the occupation of the Ruhr, the assassination of Rathenau, the risings in Bulgaria, Hamburg, and Cracow, the left bloc in France, the Labour Government in Great Britain, the magnitude of the strike wave, the growth of the revolutionary movement in the East, etc. To-day, if half a million workers are on strike, there are about twenty lines concerning it in the press, and own attention is soon occupied with other things. This shows the enormous progress of the class-struggle, and the imminence of final victory.

The social democrats think that the golden age has come and that one can breathe freely and say: Capitalism has consolidated itself. They do not even suspect that it is the democratic-pacifist "era", as such, is a true sign and symptom of an unprecedented development of the class struggle. It is the strongest proof that capitalism can no longer maintain its power by its old methods. The objective meaning of this democratic-pacifist "era" is that it helps only to undermine capitalism which received its death blow through the world-war. Many social-democrats picture to themselves the situation as follows: At first democracy took the place of reaction, then reaction set in, and after that democracy came again. But in spite of these perturbations, the queen of hearts—democracy—remains as fresh, and young and beautiful as ever. This is how the social-democratic gentlemen picture the situation to themselves. They fail to understand that every change affects the political mood of the masses. The social-democrats are mistaken if they look upon this "era" as a new episode in the history of parliamentaryism. For the masses, this "era" is connected with their economic conditions and with their life in general. If the bourgeoisie, together with the social democracy, vacillate continually like a pendulum between the right bank of fascism and the so-called "left" bank of democracy, and back again, these vacillations disintegrate capitalism all the more and awaken the communist consciousness of the masses. This is how the proletarian revolution is prepared.

It is self-evident that the democratic-pacifist "era" is not by any means a sign that good times are coming, when all questions will be peacefully and painlessly settled by "democracy" in parliament. This "era" is correlated to the collapse of capitalism.

On the political field the symptoms make their appearance sooner and are more clearly felt than on the economic field. Of course, we know economics are the foundation and the definition of everything. But before this or that process is ripe, and when the new change is just about beginning to set in, political symptoms are sometimes much more characteristic.

I reiterate that: The democratic-pacifist era is a sign of the disintegration of capitalism, of its decline, and of the inevitable crisis within it. Mussolini and Poincaré on the one hand and MacDonald and Herriot on the other hand, further the proletarian revolution. It does not matter in the least if their methods are those of "democracy" or those of avowed fascism. They only add grist to the mill of proletarian revolution. Both these regimes cost us very dear, for both of them exact great sacrifices from the working class. Nevertheless, both of them bring proletarian revolution nearer. Therefore, we must beware of taking a too simple view of the matter. In this case it would be out of place to keep to the simple analogy of Marx' formula: "Money-commodity-money", — "fascism-democracy-fascism". In every country this is a very complicated and peculiar process.

On the whole, this is the chapter of capitalist collapse in the history of mankind. This "era" cannot be of very long duration. The social-democrats are endeavouring to save the bourgeoisie by throwing life-belts to it, but these life-belts are of no use for they are made of the poorest material. They will only drag the bourgeoisie quicker to the bottom of the sea.

Objectively, the counter-revolutionary "labour" government of Ramsey MacDonald, generally speaking, must be detrimental to the bourgeoisie. Comrade Lenin was a thousand times right when he said at the Second Congress: a "labour" government will come into power in Great Britain. This labour government must be supported by the communists, but it must be the support which the cord gives to the person on the gibbet. At the moment when the cleverest bourgeoisie of the world must appeal to British menshevism, it becomes evident that it can no longer maintain its power by its former methods. Of course, it would be wrong to speak of the menshevik party as a true labour party, for it is not a revolutionary party. But menshevism is frequently a being which looks with one eye to the left and with the other eye to the right. Menshevism can help (perhaps against its wish) to disintegrate and undermine the position of the bourgeoisie.

Therefore, we must have very clear views on this matter, and our education must undergo frequent changes because we are going through a new democratic-pacifist "era". We must explain to the workers of the world what this "era" means. We must make them understand that this "era" cannot last and that the social-democrats are again deceiving the workers. On the historical arena we are the only force which has no illusions about the "labour" government of this "democracy" and "pacifism". And because we are the only force of this kind in the whole world, we must set ourselves the task to find out and to expose all the concrete characteristics which differentiate the present bourgeois regime from the former.

Communism and the Peasantry

I should like to deal also with the question to which not enough attention was paid during the discussion. I mean the peasant question. I take it as a bad omen that the peasant question was almost entirely omitted in this very full discussion in which sixty-two orators took part. I am afraid that we might say again that we agreed with everything, that we consider everything we heard here correct, but that in fact everything will remain as before. This would constitute a great danger not only for agrarian but also for industrial countries.

A few days ago I read an article in the "Vorwärts" of June 19 called "Five Minutes to Twelve". The Landtag deputy of the Bavarian Peoples' Party, Dr. Schlittenbauer, made the following statement in the Landtag: I will quote him in full: "The crisis in Germany is by no means over. In the dim and distant future we are threatened not only with the communist peril, but also with the peasant social revolution. If the present policy of the government and the Reichstag towards the German peasantry will be kept up for another six months, the danger will become acute. Such is the inevitable logic of events, for the present situation is unbearable. It destroys peasant farming with a swiftness which is uncanny. When the pressure will become unbearable, when the economic situation will be completely undermined, we must expect an explosion — the peasant revolution, and peasant revolutions are thorough, cruel, and terrible. History teaches us that a peasant revolution means arson and gibbets. This must be prevented, the time for action has come, another five minutes and the fatal twelfth hour will strike."

Well comrades, if I did not know anything more of Germany but what this bourgeois tells us, his words alone would show me that this question is very acute in a country where there are no large masses of consciously revolutionary peasants and where our only task would be to win over to our side some sections of the peasantry and to neutralise others. Dr. Schlittenbauer is quite right when he says that peasant revolutions are thorough and cruel and accompanied by much shedding of blood and destruction. We in Russia know that this is so. In view of such a situation, it would be unpardonable to underestimate this question. It is not a secondary question but is closely connected with the question of proletarian dictatorship.

I read that German fascists have elaborated a very cleverly compiled demagogic "program of action". What is the meaning of a fascist "program of action" for the peasantry? Perhaps some of our ultra-left comrades will say: "As we believe in the dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasant question does not concern us." Or at best I might say: We shall form a peasant commission in the Central Committee, and we shall appoint people to write theses which, alas, are never read by anyone. Such things happen sometimes. Things are not better in agrarian countries. For instance, I want to draw your attention to the fact that Averescu's counter-revolutionary party in Roumania a short while ago convened a congress which was attended by 10,000 peasants. Probably, there were rich peasants at this congress. But the fact alone that ten thousand peasants attended the congress is very significant. The Polish bourgeois parties in Warsaw also convene peasant congresses, which are generally well attended. And in the Bavarian Landtag they say it is five minutes to twelve, and the peasant revolution is imminent. All this goes to show that the peasant question must be one of the most important questions for us. And not only in agrarian countries, but also in industrial countries where, as in Germany, the situation is revolutionary.

I think that in such cases we must act in a revolutionary manner. The time of theses is passed, and social democratic wiseacres who say that we have nothing to do with the peasantry, are obsolete. Yes, comrades, as long as we remain a guild party, the peasantry will not concern us. But if we really mean to establish a workers' and peasants' government and proletarian hegemony, we must carry our propaganda right into the midst of the peasantry.

I will give you a couple of examples from the history of the Russian revolution.

Communists are now achieving great successes among the workers of Germany. There we have behind us a considerable number of big factories and works. What was done in Russia must be now applied to Germany; when we saw that a factory was in sympathy with us, we convened a general meeting and said: It is of the greatest importance that we should work among the peasantry. Let us, as a first measure, select two or three men and send them to the peasants in this or that province. This requires money, and the Party has no money. Let us therefore make a collection among the workers. Let us form groups of five communists and twenty non-party workers and let us send them for one or two months to various villages. And their families will be supported by us until their return. This is how we acted. In this work the wives of the workers played a very important part. The working men wrote letters to the villages and sent leaflets and newspapers. The proletarians spent their holiday for propaganda purposes. The workers knew that the communist party looked upon propaganda in the villages as one of its most important tasks.

Let us assume that our German party, which meets with so much sympathy among the working class, and which has behind it the majority of a considerably number of enterprises, adopts the same methods. If it were to do properly organized work on this field, and if it were to draw into it not only communists but also non-party workers, and would carry out systematic work with the assistance of factory committees, it would no doubt achieve considerable results in the course of a few months. And I am sure that the wives of the workers will help us in this work. Work among the peasantry will help our work within the army. The best tactors are the wives of working men, as shown by the example of the Russian revolution. We cannot afford to be conservative. We must be ever on the lookout for new forms of agitation for we must not forget that fifty percent of the army are peasants.

If what this Bavarian member of the Landtag says is true — that it is five minutes to twelve by the clock — if the tension is so great among the peasantry, it must find an echo in the army, for although many officers are members of the nobility, the peasant elements prevail in the army. Who was it who always crushed every revolutionary movement? Who beat us in 1905, who destroyed the Bavarian Soviet Republic and crushed a number of other risings in Germany after 1918? Mainly — peasants' sons.

Comrades, all this shows you that this is one of the most important questions before the Communist International. Let us spend less time in haggling about what Comrade Radek said on the Third or Fourth Congress, but let us rather concentrate our attention on this most important question for the preparation of the revolution. Let us solve it in the new spirit, and let us concentrate on it our revolutionary will and determination. All honour to theses, but we must not only write theses, but must also rouse the working and peasant masses to action.

This applies particularly to agrarian and semi-agrarian countries. Once and for all we must put an end to a state of affairs when our Parties even in these countries do not know how to approach the peasant question. Some of these Parties did not even know the exact number of peasants in their respective countries, nor the conditions under which these peasants lived. What would you say if, before setting out on a journey and taking into consideration all kinds of circumstances, you would omit to consider a mere "trifle" — the distance and the obstacles which you would be likely to meet on the road etc.? The same happens with the Communist Party when it says: I want to achieve a victory and to establish socialism, but there is a trifling matter of which I am ignorant, namely the composition of the population, the proportion of peasants in it, and the economic position and aspirations of the peasants.

What would you say about a surgeon who omitted to examine the state of his patient's health before performing the operation? But this is an analogous case. You wish to perform a serious operation such as achieving a victory over the bourgeoisie, and forget a mere "trifle" — getting to know about the position of the rural population which forms the majority of the total population of an agrarian country.

Therefore, I think that it would be much more useful not to haggle so much about the pacifist tendencies of Comrade Radek, but to concentrate upon the main point, for if we do not do so, we cease to be a revolutionary communist party, and if we cease to be that we cannot achieve a final victory.

Questions of Tactics

Comrades, I am coming now to the question of tactics. It is said here (these were the first words uttered by Comrade Radek against us) that our Congress is occupied with the revision and the liquidation of the united-front tactics elaborated at the Fourth Congress. Other comrades followed suit, including (I am sorry to say) Comrade Zetkin from whom I expect something better. Comrades, that after the Fourth Congress we needed a Fifth, and after the Fifth, a Sixth Congress and so on, is self-evident. It is also self-evident that what was elaborated by one congress must, if necessary, be corrected or altered at the next congress. Otherwise, there would be no necessity to convene congresses.

We would meet once and decide everything once and for all. If there is a proposal to alter or supplement this or that part of some resolution or other, this does not mean that a revision and a liquidation of the foundation of former tactics is contemplated.

Comrades, you know very well the specific feature of this situation at this Fifth Congress of the Communist International, which for the first time has to work without Comrade Lenin after a series of serious crises in various sections of the International. You begin to realise the special nature of the accusations when you are told that what is proposed is a revision of the decisions of the Third and Fourth Congresses. Comrades, I think that I shall be able to show it is not we who want to revise the decisions of the Third and Fourth Congresses, but Radek and other comrades on the right. The thing is that the right must show itself now in the true light. It has become evident that these comrades on the right can not work harmoniously with the Executive

and are therefore endeavouring to shift the responsibility on to someone else.

Comrade Radek's Right Tendencies

Comrade Radek said that I admitted being "led astray" by him. He said so repeatedly. Comrade Zetkin, I am sorry to say, repeated this. The question of who was "led astray" has a certain political significance. Comrade Zetkin said: How is it that for two or five years the Executive went with Radek, and that all of a sudden he is considered to belong to the right tendency. She never doubted that the situation was somewhat different, namely, it was not the Executive which went with Radek four or five years, but it was Radek who went with the Executive. (Applause.) And comrades, this was actually the case, which was every laudable on the part of Radek. I think that this is easily understood.

If you will allow me comrades, I will place before you some facts of a political and biographical nature. This is absolutely necessary as the question of who was "led astray" and who followed who, has a great political significance. Comrades, it generally happens that differences accumulate gradually and that only towards the end quantity becomes quality, when "all of a sudden" two completely different lines are discovered. This does not happen for one night or one hour, but frequently lasts a considerable time.

I have reckoned up that there were as many as ten differences between us and Radek in the course of several years of joint work in the Comintern.

The first and rather serious and acute difference between Radek and myself happened during the Second World Congress. It was on the question of Paul Levi and also on the question of our attitude to the right and the left. This happened already at the Second Congress. Some of the comrades perhaps remember my speech in the Executive in which I said: Yes, we will fight relentlessly against the right. At the time this was meant for Crapien, Dittmann, and others who were coquetting with us and were trying to get into the Comintern. Already at that time I said that we would fight against these people as against our class enemies. As to the left syndicalists, the ultra-left, at that time they had a considerable following. But in this left there were honest revolutionary working-class elements. They had confused notions, but nevertheless I considered them to be our comrades in the common cause. They were not our class enemies. Levi thought that the Comintern could accept into its ranks only "real communists", but not revolutionary syndicalists. At that time the question of the German Communist Labour Party loomed big. I was in favour of receiving it into our ranks as a sympathising party. These tactics were correct, but Levi and the then "right" Central Committee of the German Communist Party, which was under his influence, and also Radek, were against it. This was the first serious difference, and thus already at the time of the Second Congress (the First Congress was but small) we had a difference of principle in connection with the Paul Levi question, the German Communist Labour Party, and on the question of our attitude to the "right" and to the "left" (and at that time it was not to left communists but left syndicalists).

The second difference was in connection with our attitude to the German Communist Labour Party. We had many collisions on this question.

The third difference arose in connection with the first open letter of the German Central Committee to the Social Democrats, written by Radek. Some comrades, including Bukharin and myself, were against this letter, as they were afraid that Levi and the elements under his influence would not use these tactics for revolutionary strategical purposes, but for quite other purposes, as they eventually did. That is why we were at first against the open letter.

Comrade Lenin intervened and settled the dispute. Since then we watched Levi more carefully. Subsequently it showed itself that on the Levi question we were right, and Comrade Lenin acknowledged this.

The fourth difference arose on the question of the Berlin Conference of the Three Internationals. You will probably remember that Radek's attitude was condemned in two articles — one written by Comrade Lenin and the other by myself. Radek transgressed the bounds of united-front tactics and made the same opportunist mistake as now.

Comrade Clara, I would like to ask—at that time did the Executive go with Radek, did Lenin go with Radek, or did Radek go with the Executive? At that time Radek gave in and recognised his mistake. This was all the better for him.

The fifth difference arose on the Norwegian question. When we sent Radek to Norway, he immediately made a rotten "one-sided" compromise with Tranmael. In that case we could not publicly disavow Radek for reasons which I need not explain.

The sixth difference arose in connection with Radek's attitude to the German left. Everyone knows that between Radek and myself there was a heated, if not open, contention on this question. On the whole, Radek went with Brandler, except in a few cases, and supported his organisational threats addressed to the left. I did not always support the left, for we did not know the new leaders very well and thought that Radek was probably better acquainted with the various comrades.

I did not always see the situation clearly, but there was one thing on which I was quite sure: I was convinced that we must come to an agreement with the left at all cost.

The seventh difference: whether the "workers' government" is synonymous with dictatorship or not. I will discuss this a little later.

The eighth difference was connected with the Leipzig Party Congress. The question in dispute were the theses on the "workers' government within the framework of bourgeois democracy", which Bukharin and myself criticised, while Radek defended it.

The ninth difference was in connection with the taxation programme, the confiscation of 51% and so on. We were against all this, not because we rejected partial demands in general, but because we favoured the bringing forward only of partial demands capable of arousing the interest of the masses, and not artificial demands of a bureaucratic nature.

The tenth difference was in connection with a very important question. During the September and October events of 1923 we were not unanimous on everything. I have already related in the press how Radek was opposed to the organisation of a one day's anti-fascist campaign. But this is after all not so important. Much more important was his attitude at the September (1923) conference with the German comrades in Moscow. We discussed the question as to whether the time had not come in Germany to bring forward the slogan of the organisation of Soviets of Workers' Deputies. Radek was against it. Unfortunately, the representatives of the German left agreed with him on this question. (Thälmann: Not all.)

At that time even the left said: Factory and work-shop committees are sufficient, in fact they are Soviets (we ourselves thought so), we do not as yet require Soviets, this would mean much parallel work, etc. Since the left were making concessions, we also had to follow suit.

In looking back on the trend of events, we must acknowledge that all these differences had one and the same basis. The Congress is of course not so naive to believe that the Executive followed Radek for five years, and now suddenly realised his errors. The contrary was the case. Unfortunately, the same thing happened not only with Radek, but also with Zetkin. I am very sorry, but I cannot help saying that comrade Zetkin dissociated herself from the position of the Executive. There was a time when she was with us, even on the question which is for us the most contentious question at present—the question of the banal parliamentary farce in Saxony.

Comrade Radek also objected to my calling the Saxon events a banal parliamentary farce. I have something to say on this matter. In answer to his assertions, I will acquaint you with what I wrote on the entry of communists into the government in "Problems of the German Revolution".

"The entry of German communists into the Saxon Government can be justified only if sufficient guarantees are provided that the government apparatus will be used in the interests of the working class, that the arming of tens of thousands of workers for the fight against Bavarian and German fascism will be immediately taken in hand (some of whom are former servants of the kaiser), that bourgeois officials will be actually eliminated from the government apparatus, and that economic measures of a revolutionary nature and directed against the bourgeoisie be at once applied.

If the present Saxon government will really make Saxony a red country capable (at least to some extent) of becoming

the rallying point for all the revolutionary proletarian forces of the country, the German proletariat will understand and will support the efforts of the Saxon government. But if that does not happen, German communists must use the Saxon episode only for the purpose of demonstrating to the masses that there is no backbone in the "left" social democrats and that the social democratic leaders are counter-revolutionaries. We reject the issue of evolutionary tasks."

"Problems of the German Revolution." Chapter 3, page 32. I wrote in this strain at the very beginning of the Saxon "experiment". After a few days it became clear to me that the right elements of the German Communist Party were converting our tactics into an opportunistic farce.

On the Fifth of November 1923 I proposed that a confidential letter be sent to the German Party to the effect that the Saxon experiment had become a parliamentary farce. Comrades, we need not be ashamed of this letter. It was not a bad document. I drafted the letter which was discussed by a commission consisting of Comrades Kolarov, Zetkin, Zimoviev, Kusinen, and others. Comrade Clara Zetkin took an active part in this and made many political alterations, as well as alterations of style. In the end, the letter was adopted unanimously. And what was the position at that time? Did the Executive follow Comrade Zetkin, or vice versa? The latter was fortunately the case. But what is rather unfortunate is Comrade Zetkin's unwillingness to follow the Executive now when the situation is much clearer than in November. It is, as I say very unfortunately, that she is no longer with us because of the friendship and feelings of comradely solidarity with those who have at present dissociated themselves from Comintern lines. Unfortunately she put up the same attitude at the Third Congress of the Comintern in connection with Paul Levi: "We cannot leave them in the lurch." Comrade Zetkin deserves all praise for her friendship, but dialectically, this good trait of her character becomes a political error. Her warm-heartedness and kindness, which all of us love and value so much, becomes, dialectically a political mistake.

Radek's Strong and Weak Points.

Radek spoke here very humorously. His speech sparkled with wit. I envy him; in his position it was indeed some achievement.

But, comrades, to discuss the question seriously, the work of the Communist International for the last five years—and it was a very important five years—shows that there was an internal struggle which was not brought to a head, thanks to the fact that Comrade Radek at that time submitted to the Communist International and to the Russian Central Committee and did not set up an "opposition." We all said: We know our Radek; we know his strong and weak points. His strong point is that he is a good journalist. His weak point is that he is a man who looks at political life through newspaper columns. He is a journalist whose articles are finished a long time before he has time to think them out. Some say that otherwise one cannot be a responsive journalist. I recently read an article by Maximilian Harden who writes of the nature of the journalist: the pronounced type of journalist is he who reacts promptly and immediately before the events have had time to cool off; he reacts immediately and begins to think only after he has written. This very thing constitutes both the strong and weak points of Radek. He frequently used to say to us: "How can you judge the situation in Saxony better than I, considering that I read a score of papers from Saxony?" He said the same thing more than once even to Lenin: "The old man, of course, is a genius, but now he wades through world politics without reading all the newspapers and pamphlets, I cannot understand." Of course I am not against the reading of newspapers and pamphlets, but I am against frivolously jumping at conclusions on the basis of such reading. Radek would frequently say: "How can you deny it if it is printed in the paper?" As though Radek does not know that bourgeois and social democratic papers are "made" (Laugh and cheers.)

Now, comrades, permit me to deal with our alleged revision of the resolutions of the Fourth Congress. It seemed that on the question I expressed myself somewhat inaptly, thereby giving rise to some misunderstanding. I quoted the phrase about the coalition of all the labour parties. Comrade Kreibich snatched at this; did you not yourself speak of a "coalition of all labour parties", for this is the very tactic of the united front and of

workers' government. My mistake was that I did not go on to read the following few lines, in which it is said:

"The fundamental tasks of a workers' government should be to arm the proletariat, to disarm the bourgeois counter-revolutionary organisations, to establish control over production, to shift the main burden of taxes to the possessing classes, and to break the resistance of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie."

I will now quote this resolution in greater detail. This is necessary because an attempt is being made to create a whole legend about our supposed revision and liquidation of the tactics of the united front, and of the workers' government. This will prove somewhat tedious, but it is necessary.

This is what the Fourth Congress said in its resolution:

"The application of the tactics of the united front signifies that the communist vanguard marches at the head of the everyday struggle of the large masses for their immediate and vital interests. For the sake of this struggle, the communists are prepared even to negotiate with the treacherous leaders of the social democrats and the Amsterdammers. The attempt of the Second International to interpret the united front as an organisational fusion of all the "labour parties" must, of course, be categorically repudiated. In Germany the "fusion" of the social-democrats and independents virtually amounts to nothing else but enabling the social-democratic leaders to betray some fresh sections of the workers to the bourgeoisie.

The existence of independent communist parties, and their complete liberty of action in regard to the bourgeoisie and to the counter-revolutionary social-democracy, constitute the most important historical achievement of the proletariat, which the communists will not give up under any circumstance. The communist parties alone defend the interests of the proletariat as a whole.

In the same way the tactics of the united front do not at all imply the so-called "election combinations" at the top, calculated to promote parliamentary aims of one kind or another.

The tactics of the united front are nothing else but an offer made by the Communists to wage a common struggle with all the workers belonging to other parties or other groups, or not belonging to any parties at all, in defence of the elementary vital interest of the working class against the bourgeoisie. Any action taken even for the most insignificant everyday demand is a source of revolutionary enlightenment and revolutionary education because the experience of this struggle will convince the toilers of the inevitability of revolution and of the significance of communism.

The fundamental task of the tactics of the united front is to agitate for and organize the union of the working masses. The tactics of the united front can be properly carried out only "from the bottom", directly with the masses of the working class. At the same time, however, the communists, under certain circumstances, cannot afford to refuse negotiations with the leaders of the hostile labour parties. But the masses must be constantly kept informed about the progress of such negotiations. Nevertheless, even while negotiating with the leaders, the independence of the communist party and of its agitation must not be subjected to restriction.

It goes without saying that the tactics of the united front must be applied differently in the various countries, to suit the concrete circumstances. But in those cases, when, in the principal capitalist countries, the objective circumstances have already become ripe for the socialist revolution, and when the social-democratic parties, led by the counter-revolutionary leaders, aim deliberately at splitting the working class, the tactics of the united front will be of decisive import for a whole epoch."

All this is equally true to-day.

As to the "workers' government", we read the following resolution of the Fourth Congress:

"As a general agitational slogan, the workers' government (for the workers' and peasants' government) can be applied almost everywhere. But as an actual political slogan, the workers' government is of greatest importance in those countries where the bourgeois state of society is particularly unstable, where the correlation of forces between the workers and the bourgeoisie puts on the order of the day the solution of the question of power as a practical necessity. In such countries the slogan of the workers' government arises as the necessary production from the whole tactics of the united front

The parties of the Second and the Second and Half Internationals are trying to save the situation in these countries by advocating and carrying out a coalition of the bourgeoisie with the social-democrats. The recent attempt of some parties of the Second International (for instance, in Germany) to decline open participation in such a coalition government, while at the same time carrying it out in a concealed form, was nothing else but a manoeuvre to allay the indignation of the masses—a more tricky way of hoodwinking the masses. As against the bourgeois-social-democratic coalition, open or covert, the communists oppose the united front of all the toilers and the coalition of all the labour parties in the economic and political field for the struggle against the bourgeois power and for its ultimate overthrow. As a result of the united struggle of all the workers against the bourgeoisie, the whole machinery of the State must go over into the hands of the workers' government, and by this very fact the rule and position of the working class will become consolidated.

The fundamental tasks of the workers' government must be to arm the proletariat, to disarm the bourgeois counter-revolutionary organisations, to establish control over production, to shift the main burden of taxation to the possessing classes, and to break the resistance of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie.

Such a workers' government is possible only if it comes as the result of the struggle of the masses themselves, and if it relies on the militant working class organs created by the rank and file of the enslaved masses of the toilers. But even a government that has come as a result of parliamentary grouping of forces, i. e. a government of pure parliamentary origin, may also lead to a revival of the revolutionary labour movement" (for instance, the present MacDonald government). "Of course, the creation of a genuine labour government, the further maintenance of such a government on the basis of revolutionary politics, is bound to lead to bitter strife, or even to civil war with the bourgeoisie. Already the very attempt of the proletariat to form such a workers' government will immediately meet with the strongest resistance on the part of the bourgeoisie. Hence, the slogan of the workers' government is capable of consolidating the ranks of the proletariat and letting loose the revolutionary struggle.

In certain cases the communists must declare themselves ready to form a workers' government jointly with the non-communist labour parties and the workers' organizations. But this they can do only when there are guarantees that this workers' government will wage a fight against the bourgeoisie in the aforesaid sense. Under such circumstances, the necessary preliminary conditions for communist participation in such a government are as follows:

1. Participation in the workers' government is admissible only with the consent of the Communist International.
2. The communists who participate in such a government must be under the strictest control of their party.
3. The communists who participate in such a workers' government must keep in the closest contract with the revolutionary organizations of the masses.
4. The Communist Party retains unconditionally its identity and its complete independence of agitation.

With all its advantages, the slogan of the workers' government, as indeed the whole tactics of the united front, has also its dangers, and in order to avoid these dangers the communist parties must remember the following:

Every bourgeois government is at the same time a capitalist government, but not every workers' government is a real proletarian government, i. e. a revolutionary weapon of proletarian power.

The Communist International must take into consideration the following possibilities:

1. A liberal workers' government. Such a government existed in Australia; such a government may emerge in the near future in England.
 2. A social-democratic workers' government (Germany).
 3. A workers' and peasants' government. Such a possibility exists in the Balkans, in Czecho-Slovakia, etc.
 4. A workers' government with the participation of communists.
 5. A genuine proletarian workers' government, which in its pure form may be realised only by the Communist Party.
- The first two types are in reality far from revolutionary workers' governments, but masked coalition governments of

the bourgeoisie and the anti-revolutionary labour leaders. Such "workers' governments" are tolerated by the weakened bourgeoisie at critical moments, in order to mislead the proletariat in regard to the real class-nature of the State, or even in order to drive back the revolutionary onslaught of the proletariat and to gain time with the aid of the bribed labour-leaders. In such a government the communists can not participate. On the contrary, they must ruthlessly expose the real nature of these alleged workers' governments. At this period of capital decay, when the most important task is to attract the majority of the proletariat into the ranks of the fighters for the proletarian revolution, these governments may objectively contribute to the acceleration of the decay of bourgeois rule.

The communists are ready to join hands even with those workers who have not yet recognised the need for the proletarian dictatorship, with the social-democratic, Christian-socialist, non-party, and syndicalist elements of the working class, and so on. Consequently, the communists are ready on certain conditions and under certain guarantees to support also a non-communist workers' government. But under all conditions the communists must openly declare to the workers that the proletarian dictatorship alone ensures the real emancipation of the working class. The next two types of workers' governments (3 and 4), in which the communists may take part, do not yet mean the proletarian dictatorship; they are not even the necessary historical form of transition to the dictatorship, but they may become an important starting-point towards the establishment of the dictatorship. The complete proletarian dictatorship is only a real workers' government, (type 5), composed of communists."

I now ask you: what labour party in the world, except the Communist Party, could solve this elementary task of disarming the bourgeoisie, arming the proletariat, shifting the burden of taxation to the shoulders of the rich, and breaking the counter-revolutionary resistance of the bourgeoisie? All this can be accomplished by a real revolutionary government, led only by the Communist Party. What is the meaning of these quotations? It means that we said to the social-democratic workers of Poland: "You are in favour of a coalition government, you still believe in coalition, you think that the communists are against unity. No, we are not against unity, for the sake of uniting with you we are prepared even to accept a coalition government of all the labour parties, but on one small condition, that they carry out several elementary demands, such as disarming the bourgeoisie, arming the working class and so on. In other words, we are not against coalition with the social-democrats and with such "labour" parties which are not real workers' parties, but since you fail to understand us, since you reproach us that the united front cannot be realised on account of our obduracy, we will give you a formula which will open your eyes. Yes, we are in favour of such a coalition government which would begin to carry out the program of disarming the bourgeoisie, arming the proletariat and so on."

For every communist it is clear what it means: we are against a coalition of all "labour" parties which would be unable to carry out this program.

Why have we expressed our ideas in this manner? Some comrades have criticised me for my alleged suggestion that we translated the slogan of "proletarian dictatorship" from the Latin into the Russian. As though I acted simply in the role of a translator. What I meant was a translation from the Latin into the popular, understandable revolutionary language that we should not be a sect, but a mass party.

Just read what Lenin writes in "Renegade Kautsky" about the German events of 1918:

"Now there is no need to write about it, the words proletarian dictatorship were translated from the Latin into the language of the revolution by the events themselves."

It is not a question merely of making the slogan popular, but it means rather that we, as a mass party, must insist on transforming agitation into flesh and blood, this is what the translation of the Latin word into revolutionary language means. Otherwise we shall be Marxists of 1847, Marxists of the "Communist Manifesto", but not Marxists of 1924.

We passed through a time when the social-democrats were in the majority, when we were accused of sowing discord in the labour movement, when the whole of our strategy con-

sisted of our efforts to demonstrate to the social-democratic workers the real state of affairs.

We said to the social-democratic worker: We want to unite with you, we are even prepared to form a coalition of all the labour parties together with the social-democratic leaders, let them only agree to do the thing which you, the social-democratic workers, want as much as we do, namely, disarming the bourgeoisie, arming the workers, and so on. This they refuse? Now you see that it is not our fault, but that of the social-democratic leaders. Come with us then, let us bring about unity from the bottom, in spite of the social-democratic leaders. In other words, for pedagogical purposes we did not say to the social-democratic workers: "We are against coalition with other "labour" parties because their leaders are counter-revolutionary", but we said: "We are ready for coalition if your social-democratic leaders will accept certain elementary conditions" (which we know to be unacceptable to those gentlemen).

This morning I had to do a very tedious bit of work, to revise the speech which I made at the Fourth Congress. One could hardly imagine a more tedious job. May be you will find it equally tedious to listen again to what I said then. Nevertheless, I must quote rather extensively in order to dispel the legend about the revision of our tactics.

I said at the Fourth Congress:

"The slogan of a workers' government has not yet been made sufficiently clear. The tactics of the united front are applicable in almost all the countries of the world. It would be difficult to find a country having a numerous proletariat in which the tactics of the united front would be out of place. These tactics are equally applicable in America, Bulgaria, Italy and Germany. The way circumstances have shaped themselves at the present time, these tactics are of universal importance. But this cannot be said of the slogan of the workers' government. This slogan can under no circumstances acquire such universal importance. It has only a limited importance. It may be advanced only in such countries in which the problem of power, the problem of government, takes first place both in parliament and outside of parliament. One may no doubt carry on some effective propaganda in America to-day with the aid of this slogan, by saying to the American workers: If you wish to be free, you must capture power. But from this it does not follow that under the existing correlation of existing forces in America the slogan of the workers' government could arouse such intense agitational interest as it would for instance, in Czecho-Slovakia, or in Germany, or as it happened and may occur again in Italy. The slogan of the workers' government is not such a universal slogan as the tactics of the united front. The slogan of the workers' government represents a certain concrete form of the application of the tactic of the united front under given conditions. On this basis it is easy to fall into error. It seems to me, comrades, that we must combat the attempts to represent the workers' government as an absolute necessity, in the sense that we must inevitably pass through the stage of the "workers' government" in every country. On the contrary, I think that in as far as predictions are possible in this respect, the workers' government (i. e. the "workers' government" of a transitional nature, not the revolutionary workers' government) may become a real fact only in exceptional cases, only under quite completely peculiar circumstances in one country or another. Thus the "workers' government" (of transitional nature) will be rather the exception. Furthermore, we must not entertain the idea that we are going to enjoy a period of semipeaceful development thanks to the workers' government which will make easier for us the burden of the struggle. If a workers' government will be based exclusively on parliamentary positions, which are of no real worth, it will represent but a small episode in the struggle and will be unable to prevent the civil war. This should not mean that under the existing circumstances the slogan of the workers' government is unacceptable.

Of course, the tactics of the united front contain also some dangers, which are indicated by the Executive in the December thesis. But the greatest danger is to interpret them as a form of workers' government. For in countries with parliamentary provision, as for instance in France, this question is interpreted as though we as Marxists do not speak of the proletarian dictatorship, but of something else. But we understand this slogan exclusively as the application of the proletarian dictatorship. Even if a workers' government is formed

we shall not escape the civil war. In some cases the former will even lend poignancy to the latter."

I think this ought to be quite clear, comrades. Let me now quote from my concluding speech:

"To me it is not quite clear whether we have any real differences of opinion upon this question or whether the question itself has perhaps not been sufficiently cleared up, and we are partly indulging in a mere terminological dispute. This should become cleared up as the Congress goes on with its work, and above all, in working out the resolution on tactical questions, which we will take up after the question of the Russian revolution. Personally I attach no importance to the word "pseudonym" which was quoted here. I will gladly yield any dispute about words, because it is not here a question of words but of understanding. I think the best way to clear up the question will be for me to say the following: It is clear to all that every bourgeois government is at the same time a capitalist government. It is hardly possible to imagine a bourgeois government, a government of the bourgeois classes, which would not be at the same time a capitalist government. Nevertheless, we are sorry that we cannot affirm the opposite. Not every workers' government is 'ipso facto', a proletarian government, not every workers' government is a socialist government. This position has a very profound meaning. We have before us one of the manifestations of the fact that the bourgeoisie has its outposts in the midst of our own class, but we cannot say the contrary. Without our desire we cannot establish our outposts in the bourgeois camp... I am afraid that in the race for a straight scientific definition we might lose sight of the political aspect of the case. We are not so much concerned about fine scientific definitions; but we do care lest we omit the revolutionary side of the matter. Some comrades think that if we march together with the social-democrats we have already the workers' governments, being unmindful of the fact that we must first of all overthrow the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie will not voluntarily cede its position, it will fight for its power. It is important to foresee all the possibilities of the development of the world revolution and of the civil war. We should not forget that besides the "Labour" parties there is also the bourgeoisie which has been in power for centuries and which is doing everything to retain it.

Thus in order to form a workers' government of revolutionary meaning, we must first of all overthrow the bourgeoisie. This is the most important thing. Let us not forget that here we must distinguish between two things: firstly, our method of agitation, the question of how we are best to approach the common worker, how we are best to explain to him his position. I think in this respect the slogan of workers' government is very much to the point. But there is yet another question, how the revolutionary march of events will shape itself, in what concrete form will the revolution take place? And on this question the whole bother about slogans is devoid of the slightest importance. Let us just lift a little the curtain of history.

How is the revolution going to develop? Some are inclined to think that it will be bound to pass through the state of workers' government, coalition government, and finally civil war. We can quite understand the attempts to predict the further course of the revolution. The only safe prediction to make is that the revolution will enter through quite different gates. We have already seen this in our Russian revolution. Five years ago we imagined all kinds of things, we said that we would be brought to our knees by the blockade, by the famine, and so on; we took into consideration all manner of possibilities, but not the possibility of the new economic policy and of the victory of the revolution.

The situation varies in the different countries. In all probability the revolution in Germany will take place in a different way than in England. This, however, does not mean to say that we as conscious revolutionists have no right to lift the curtain over the future. We are thinking people; we wish to march in front of the working class. We must endeavour to explain every aspect of the situation. But to make any predictions at this point it really is difficult. If we consider the slogan of the workers' government from this point of view as a concrete road to the proletarian revolution, we may still entertain some doubts as to whether the world revolution must enter through no other gate than that of a workers' government. We were told by our friend Radek yesterday that the workers' government represents the possibility of transition to the proletarian dictatorship. I would say: yes, it is one of the possi-

bilities, or rather, one of the least likely possibilities. Of course, I do not mean to say that the slogan of workers' government is incorrect. No, it is a correct slogan. Wherever the correlation of forces is favourable, this slogan will bring us big successes in our agitation. Nevertheless, if we start examining the question of the road along which the revolution will come, then I must say: this question cannot be settled here. The workers' government is probably the least possible way in those countries where the bourgeoisie is strongly developed, where we cannot seize power unless through civil war, and having eliminated the bourgeoisie by means of civil war, we shall hardly have to deal with the transition stage for any considerable time. This is possible, but it's no use quarreling about it; one can only surmise. The only thing we need is to define clearly all the possibilities of revolution.

A workers' government may be formed which is nothing but a liberal workers' government, which is possible in England, Australia, etc. This kind of workers' government may also prove objectively useful to the working class. The agitation for a workers' government is correct. By means of this slogan we may gain a good deal in our agitation. But at the same time we must not ignore the revolutionary prospects."

At the Fourth Congress I quoted from a speech by the Czech Foreign Minister Benesh who said a kind word about the communists. Benesh said:

"Communists cannot be denied the art of imagery. They know how to serve to the working class the same thing under different guises. For instance, there was a time when the communists agitated for the formation of Soviets. When this agitation failed to yield the anticipated results, they stopped it in order to renew it again six months later in the shape of an agitation for the formation of united-front committees."

I said: Bravo, Benesh! It seems that you have understood better than some of the opportunist labour leaders of Czecho-Slovakia the real substance of the case.

I may again be reproached with divulging a "political" secret. But you see that already in 1922 the substance of the case was understood by Benesh. How could comrades Kreibich and Smeral forget this "secret" which was known to Benesh already in 1922, namely that this slogan serves us only as a formula for approaching the masses. This I said quite plainly at the Fourth Congress:

"I believe that our discussion at this Congress, particularly after the work of the committee, will not lead us to a rejection of the slogan of "workers' government". The slogan remains correct, if we consider it as a means of approaching the masses. There can be no dispute about this. All we have to do is to make proper use of it. It contains the very same dangers as the tactics of the united front. When we begin talking about governments, the idea suggests itself quite naturally about parliamentary combinations, distribution of portfolios, and so on. Here we encounter greater difficulties than in the tactics of the united front. But from this it does not follow that we must give up this slogan because it is difficult of realisation, as it was surmised by our French comrades."

Can there be anything clearer than that, comrade Radek? Furthermore, comrades, in my concluding speech at the Fourth Congress I said:

Therefore I think, comrades, that we may quietly follow the slogan of "workers' government", but on condition that we distinctly understand what we are talking about. Woe betide us if we should in our agitation for one moment entertain the opinion that the realisation of a workers' government is inevitable, that it is possible in a peaceful way, that it will mean the inauguration of a period of semi-organic development, which can take the place of civil war, and so on. If such views exist among us (and there are perhaps some who maintain them), we must categorically combat them and educate the working class to the consciousness that in order to form a workers' government we must first of all overthrow and vanquish the bourgeoisie."

"This is what the slogan really means: You want a workers' government? All right! For the sake of this we are prepared to enter into negotiations even with the social-democrats. Although we say that they will betray us, we are nevertheless the adherents of a workers' government, even with their participation, providing only that this government shall show its readiness to fight hand in hand with us against the bourgeoisie. We shall enter into the fight, and if the fight will lead

to the formation of a workers' government, then it will stand on a firm foundation and it will really be the beginning of the proletarian dictatorship. I do not insist on the word "pseudo-nym", I gladly make a present of it to comrade Meyer. My only concern is that we take a definite line upon this question. The workers' government is by no means a military trick undertaken in order to outwit God and the bourgeoisie and to prevent civil war. The International must be a good strategist, but there is no strategy in nature to make it possible to avoid civil war, and to arrive at a workers' government over a polished floor. The decisive moment is the fight and victory over the bourgeoisie. And once we overcome the bourgeoisie, we shall be able to proceed to the various forms of a workers' government.

The Labour Government in England under the present circumstances may objectively act as a revolutionary factor, and in that country we will even support a limited menshevik-liberal workers' governments. We know that under certain conditions such a menshevik-liberal workers' government may turn against us with far greater ferocity than even a bourgeois government. This was splendidly demonstrated by Noske and by our own mensheviks. Consequently, such a government by no means implies the possible avoidance of civil war. Therefore I think that the slogan of workers' government is absolutely correct as an agitational slogan, if we shall only know how to make revolutionary use of it.

On this question we must shun circumlocution. We must say: comrades, a workers' government is a splendid thing, but in order to form it we must first of all overthrow the bourgeoisie, and in order to do this we must have arms, we must organize, we must win over the majority of the working class. And above all, we must clearly understand that it will come to serious fights, that there is no other way to victory. I believe, comrades, that at this I may conclude this part of my concluding speech."

This was the main substance of my speech. I said then that some people are inclined to consider the question of power as a sort of "no man's land". The fact of the matter is that in order to form a workers' government we must first of all vanquish the bourgeoisie, which now holds the power. Do you really imagine that everything will run smoothly, that the bourgeoisie will turn around and say: "Splendid! You have devised a new formula, and therefore we shall hand over power to you." No, comrades, in order to organize the workers' government we must first of all vanquish the bourgeoisie. This "little detail" should not be forgotten.

In regard to the other organizations, I said the following in my speech:

"At a distance it seemed to us that our Party (in Germany) was cringing too much before the chiefs of other organizations. In Germany we are not poor relatives, but an independent party, which will ultimately be the victor. At a moment when the social-democrats wanted to get us in at all costs, at such a moment it least of all behooved us to play the part of poor relatives."

I beg to be excused for quoting so extensively from my own speech. But I saw no better way of exposing the "invention" of Radek and of the whole right wing that we were now engaged in liquidating the tactics of the Fourth Congress.

If you will read my speech, I believe you will say even now that it was not a bad speech. In it the idea was expressed quite plainly that the slogan of "workers' government" is merely an agitational slogan. It is only a gesture towards the proletarian dictatorship, towards the winning of the masses for the idea of dictatorship. How can it be now asserted that a revision is being effected? No, comrades, this is merely used by Radek as an "agitational slogan" against the Communist International, nothing more than that.

They say: every book has its fate. Also every slogan has its fate, and many an experienced revolutionist may be taken in. This morning I did yet another job: I read over the speeches and resolutions of the Enlarged Executive of June 1923, which dealt already with the slogan of "workers' and peasants' governments". In my speech on the question of the tactics of the united front (I must again quote myself) I said then the following:

"What then is the real meaning of the tactics of the united front? Is it only a tactical manoeuvre, or does it indicate a sincere desire for a union with the social-democratic workers? To this question we in our turn reply with the following

question: I ask you, comrades, whether in the early years of the activity of the Communist International, in 1919-1920, there was anyone among us who did not strive in the sincerest manner towards a rapprochement, and even fraternisation with the social-democratic workers. I think that no such people were among us. From the very first day of the existence of the Communist International, we were all of us in favour of rapprochement with the social-democratic and even with the non-party workers."

I will now ask you: What about the tactics of the united front; did we carry them out in 1919-1920? No, we did not. Thus, if you take the first period of the existence of the Communist International, say until the Second Congress inclusive, you will find that the situation was like this: rapprochement and fraternisation with the social-democratic workers — yes, tactics of the united front — no.

What does all of this prove? It proves that this question ought to be approached on quite a different angle. It is not a question whether we sincerely strive for a rapprochement with the social-democratic workers. This has always been our aim, and so it will continue to be, for the simple reason that we must have the unity and consolidation of the whole of the working class, as the only postulate of our real victory.

Now then, what do the tactics of the united front consist of? What was the new thing that we started, say in the beginning of 1921, which we formulated in 1922, and which we did our utmost to carry out in 1923? What was the new thing that we introduced? It was the very thing that we described as a strategic manoeuvre. Here we must first of all deal with the problem of "masses and leaders".

We must, however, give ourselves clear account of the relations between the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government" and our old formula of proletarian dictatorship. Comrades are sure to be found in our midst who will ask in perplexity: If we advance the slogan of workers' and peasants' government, does it not mean that we give up our formula of proletarian dictatorship? Do we remain a party of the workers' or do we become a workers' and peasants' party?

He who has learned anything at all about the tactics of the united front, he who is beginning to understand the meaning of political class strategy of the proletariat, must understand that the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government" is the way towards the proletarian dictatorship, not the negation of the proletarian dictatorship.

Thus, in advancing the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government", we by no means renounce the proletarian dictatorship. In this we cannot yield a single step, because there is no other way than the proletarian dictatorship to liberate the human race from the yoke of capitalism, and there can be no other way. The working class is the only class which is revolutionary all the way through. But this class and its Party may act wisely or foolishly. If our class will act wisely, we shall reach our goal much sooner and with the least sacrifices. We shall then be able to partly neutralise and partly gain over to our side a considerable part of the peasantry and of the petty-bourgeoisie in general. If we shall act unwisely, if we shall interpret the great emancipatory tasks of the proletariat in a narrow sectarian sense we shall thereby cut off the moment of ultimate victory.

Therefore we think that the time has come to generalize the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government". The dangers connected with the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government" consist in the fact that some of our weaker sections, which have been little trained in the Marxist spirit, may begin to interpret it in the sense of the doctrine of the left-wing social-revolutionaries. You all remember what that Russian social-revolutionary party was like. This party claimed to represent the workers, the peasants, and the intellectuals.

The dangers arising out of the launching of the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government" consist in the fact that our weaker parties may perhaps begin to befool the class nature of our party. Preventive measures must be taken right now.

We must show the way to freedom from the yoke of capitalism to all those elements of the population who are not directly interested in the capitalist domination.

Thus, we must not close our eyes for a single moment to the dangers associated with the launching of the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government". People who are afraid of wolves should not walk into the forests. We have already managed to acquire some knack in tackling the difficulties of

manoeuvring tactics... We are now confronted with a much loftier task: we must imbue our parties with the desire for power, we must raise them into parties which shall be conscious at every step of their activity that to-morrow they will be victorious over the bourgeoisie. Our Party represents the vanguard of the working class. Once imbued with the desire for power, this vanguard will communicate the same desire to the teeming millions of the working class. And when the scores of millions of the proletariat will be imbued with the desire for power, it will not be at all so difficult to attain the victory.

Comrades, it is asserted by Radek, Zetkin, and Kreibich that the workers' government means the coalition of "all labour parties". If this be so, then would not the workers' and peasants' government mean the coalition of all workers' and peasants' parties?

To put the question in this manner is to demonstrate how false and un-Marxist it is. How can it be asserted that the workers' and peasants' government is based on a coalition with the workers' and peasants' parties, if we know that in the whole wide world there is not a single peasant party that is really revolutionary?

Comrade Radek and others, by stating the question in this manner, you show plainly that you are on the wrong track at best. Read at least the resolution on workers' and peasants' government which I drew and which I defended.

In that resolution we read:

"The slogan of 'workers' and peasants' government', as the old slogan of workers' government, by no means takes the place of, or shifts into the background, our agitation for the proletarian dictatorship, which is the corner-stone of communist tactics. On the contrary, the slogan of 'workers' and peasants' government', extending as it does the basis for carrying out the tactics of the united front in the only proper way for the present epoch, is the way to the proletarian dictatorship. Correct interpretation of the slogan of 'workers' and peasants' government' will enable the communists not only to mobilise the proletarian masses in the towns, but also to establish for themselves reliable points of support in the villages and thus pave the way for the conquest of power."

The slogan of "workers' and peasants' government" will prove of good service to the Communist Parties also on the day after the conquest of power by the proletariat. For this slogan will remind the proletariat of the necessity to check its advance by the state of feeling among the peasantry in the country, to establish proper co-ordination between the victorious proletariat and the peasantry, and to observe sweet reasonableness in carrying out the economic measures of the proletariat, as it has been achieved by the victorious proletariat of Russia in that epoch of the Russian revolution which is known as "The New Economic Policy".

Of course, the agitation under the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government" must be concretely adapted to the circumstances of every particular country. For instance, in America it must deal with the problems of the toiling farmers. The defence of the economic interests of the peasantry in the spirit of the program of the Communist International must be the starting-point of our entire agitation for the workers' and peasants' government."

I believe that this quotation should prove to you sufficiently convincing. After the conquest of power, the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government will still retain its usefulness, in the sense in which it continues to be useful in the U. S. S. R., where we have a proletarian dictatorship, but a wise dictatorship, which carries out a policy that is acceptable, to the peasants. Otherwise the whole dictatorship would have gone to the devil, and thus we must be able to point out to the peasantry. For this we need the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government". Thus this slogan will retain its propagandist value even after the conquest of power. How much more so before the conquest? But it will never become transformed into the slogan "coalition of all workers' and peasants' parties".

Permit me to claim your attention for a few more quotations from that resolution:

"The very fact that the Communist Parties will assimilate and start an international agitation for the slogan of 'workers' and peasants' government', will lay the foundation for the neutralisation of the middle classes of the peasantry, and for the winning over to our side of the small peasantry. The Executive of the Communist International observed

that the great majority of our sections have so far displayed extreme indifference to propaganda work in the villages, and this is highly detrimental to the cause. This indifference betrayed, in the first place, the persistence of the ranks from which the more important parties of the Communist International were born; secondly, it shows a wrong theoretical attitude on the question of the peasantry, which tries to argue as though from the standpoint of "orthodox Marxism" that the workers' party has nothing to do with the peasantry; thirdly, it indicates a narrow guild conception of the class-struggle of the proletariat. The task of the Communist Parties at the present moment consists in doing away once and for all with such a narrow guild standpoint. The Communist Parties should not consider themselves as merely the Parties of the extreme proletarian opposition within the bourgeois order of society, as it was done in the years when the Second International was in its prime. The Communist Parties should now be fortified with the psychology of Parties which expect in the near future to lead the working masses into the fight against the bourgeois order, to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to take its place at the helms of the State. The narrow guild psychology must be substituted by the psychology of Parties which have the desire for power and which embody the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution. The Communist Parties must be prepared to vanquish the bourgeoisie to-morrow, and therefore even to-day they must set themselves aims which embrace the whole of the people, thus endeavouring to secure the support for the proletariat from the elements of the population which, on account of their social position, may render support to the proletariat in one way or another at the decisive moment.

As a propagandist slogan, enabling us to express by arithmetical formulas what was formerly expressed only algebraically, the slogan "workers' and peasants' government" may have a universal meaning. As a slogan of the actual political struggle, the watchword "workers' and peasants' government" will have the greatest significance especially in such countries as France, Germany, Italy, the Balkans, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, etc. In any case, the victory of the proletarian revolution and its consolidation would nowhere be possible without support in some form or other from the peasants. And in this sense the slogan "workers' and peasants' government" must be a general slogan of the Communist Party. Thus, while launching with all our energy the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government", the Executive of the Comintern recommends to the Communist Parties that they do not forget the dangers involved in its incorrect application. Just as in the case of the united front policy in general, the use of the slogans "workers' government" and "workers' and peasants' government" is undoubtedly fraught with great political dangers in those cases where our party is not able to apply them in a revolutionary Marxist spirit. The most obvious dangers connected with the slogan "workers' and peasants' government" are as follows:

1) In the parties which have not passed through a sufficiently rigid Marxist school, the danger arises of interpreting this slogan in the spirit of the Russian Social Revolutionaries, in the spirit of petty-bourgeois "socialism" which regards the whole peasantry as one solid mass, closing their eyes to the fact that different classes exist among the peasantry themselves.

2) The second danger consists in the fact that communists with insufficient political training may endeavour to replace mass revolutionary work among the masses of working peasants by drawing the peasants into unprincipled parliamentary combinations with the so-called representatives of the peasantry and the leaders of the so-called peasant parties, who are often among the most reactionary elements of the bourgeoisie. While fully cognizant of these and similar dangers connected with the application of the slogan "workers' and peasants' government", the Communist Party cannot, however, reject these pre-eminently strategical tactics and must learn to combine the tactics of penetrating into the masses of the workers with the steady, indefatigable, and persistent defence of the principles of revolutionary Marxism.

It goes without saying that penetration into the masses of the peasantry and the slogan "workers' and peasants' government", by no means presuppose the transformation of our party into "Trudoviki" — a workers' and peasants' party. Our party must remain the party of the working class, but

a working class which carries with it all sections of the workers, and leads them into the struggle against capital."

It seems to me that these extracts are sufficient proof of the fact that many unreliable communists — as we of course expected — did not understand the essence of the matter. It even happened that in certain respects even Comrade Zetkin, one of the most trustworthy and foremost fighters in the Communist International, failed to understand it. Permit me to quote still another phrase from the speech which Comrade Zetkin made yesterday evening. She said:

"In regard to the question of the workers' and peasants' government it must be understood that I am entirely unable to agree with the statement of Comrade Zinoviev that the workers' and peasants' government is merely a pseudonym or synonym or any other kind of a "nym" for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

"It may be so in Russia, but for countries that have attained a higher degree of capitalistic development, this interpretation will not do.

"In such countries the workers' and peasants' government is the expression of a definite, concrete, historical period when the bourgeoisie can no longer retain power in their hands, and the proletariat are not yet sufficiently strong to take over full power."

It seems to me, Comrades, that for such words even Comrade Radek would not thank Comrade Zetkin. This is too much even for the Right to swallow. What pray, means the phrase: "For Russia it may be true, but for other countries it won't do?"

Comrades, this is nothing else than a resurrection of some of Levi's ideas. And Levi built up a very persuasive theory indeed. He said:

"Glory and honour to the Russian revolution, it has overthrown czarism, but just the same the Russian revolution is merely a peasant revolution in a backward country."

"In our Western European countries entirely different tactics must be pursued. We can do nothing without the social-democratic workers. We must work more closely with the social-democratic workers."

When the theory of the coalition of all labour parties. I do not wish, of course, to state that Comrade Zetkin is a supporter of Levi. But there was a familiar note in her words.

If Comrade Clara wished to say that before the victory of the proletarian revolution there were bound to be "labour" governments in Europe of the MacDonald or Scheidemann type — that is certainly true. But what does that mean? Is this then the kind of "workers' government" which we are demanding in our slogan? These "labour governments" are merely by-products of the struggle of the working class for the proletarian revolution. Objectively the MacDonald "labour" government represents historical progress, just as capitalism is historical progress in comparison with feudalism and bourgeois democracy by comparison with Black Hundred monarchy. But we are striving for something entirely different — a real workers' government. This will never be attained through a coalition of "all labour parties."

Undoubtedly in highly developed capitalist countries it will be necessary to act somewhat differently than in Russia. The forms of agitation cannot merely be transferred mechanically to other countries. I will have more to say on this later. But in the fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and in the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government as a "pseudonym" — as a means of transition to the dictatorship of the proletariat — what difference is there here between Germany and Russia, or for that matter between America and Germany?

In Germany, as in Russia, there are peasants — in Germany as in Russia, there are workers. In order to find the road to a mass-party, in order actually to influence the course of revolution — in order to do all this we make use of the term "workers' and peasants' government."

Here in Russia, when the mensheviks and the SR's were in the majority in the Soviets, we launched the slogan "All power to the Soviets." At the time this slogan was the best kind of magnet. Probably the time will also come in Germany for the launching of such a slogan. However it is possible that this slogan will then be couched in other terms. The slogan the "workers' and peasants' government" met the requirements of our transition period completely. We say to the social-democratic workers: "We are ready to enter into a

government which will accept our most elementary conditions — the disarming of the bourgeoisie, and the arming of the working class. All militant workers must understand this, otherwise they will simply be shot themselves. Herein is contained the art of proper approach to the masses. We must win them over and direct them if we wish to be victorious.

Radek and Kreibich to a certain extent have endeavoured to give the impression that we were formulating new tactics for the Western European countries, differing from the tactics in the Russian revolution. Radek asked, supposing that this question would be a very ticklish one for us, "Very well, does that mean that you will never participate in the same government with the social-democrats? Just let Zinoviev answer that question." Radek thought that was a very ticklish question which we would not be able to answer. We might answer that there is no use dividing the bear's skin before you have killed the bear. But in general we find ourselves in a period of struggle for power. Therefore all such questions are entirely in place. It seems to me that the point at issue is not our participation in a government together with Social-Democrats, but that we here have two opposing political systems. Permit me again to remind you of the experience of the Russian revolution. And not only because we love the Russian revolution, as we all do, but because it is our richest source of experience. After the victory of the German revolution the latter will undoubtedly be a still greater source of experience, until that time the Russian revolution remains unexcelled in this respect. Bukharin has already reminded you that we had a government in which the Left SR's who at that time represented part of the workers and peasants took part. Comrades, might it not be possible that in Germany the Communist government would include part of the social-democrats? In my opinion, this might happen. Who were the Left SR's? They were a part of the Social Revolutionary Party who had split off from the main group, and at a certain historic moment, gave us their support under the pressure of revolutionary events.

In fact, they behaved at the time as if they were farther "Left" than even the communists, and had considerable influence over part of the working class and the peasants. We took them in tow, made use of them, and then the best of them came over to us, after having learnt the lessons of the revolution. The rest went over to the camp of the counter-revolutionaries as was to be expected of infuriated petty-bourgeois.

Last year, during the October days in Germany, I was told that among the Social-Democrats there were people who at the proper time would come over to us. I know for a certain time that at the decisive moment a certain section of the Social-Democratic workers will come over to our side, that at the moment certain leaders will rise to the surface who express the temper of that section of the Social-Democrats. The question arises, should we then draw into the government this section splitting away from the disintegrating Social-Democracy, as representing a portion of the militant workers? Certainly one would oppose this. Such cases have already occurred.

Comrades, this is one political system. Another system, the following. And here we have the experience of the Russian revolution to guide us. When Kerensky's government had already experienced a severe set-back, i.e., in September 1917 when the mensheviks were singing their swan song, they launched the slogan, of a "socialist ministry." What pray, may that be? What they actually had in view was a government of SR mensheviks, trudovici, and other bourgeois democratic intelligentsia — peasant groups, with a mixture of bolsheviks thrown in. Such a government is by no means "uniform." It includes Communists, fighting for revolution, Mensheviks fighting against revolution, and SR's who were also against revolution. But the mensheviks and the SR's defended this hotch-potch under the slogan "socialist ministry." They applied the term "socialist" to a government in which there was neither uniformity nor socialism.

What impelled them to do this? It seems to me Comrade that it would be opportune to say here that our enemies at that time were also seeing a convenient formula with which to address the masses, a "pseudonym" for their policy. The slogan "socialist government" was for the mensheviks a pseudonym for their "democratic", that is, say, their "bourgeois" policy. Why did they choose that particular slogan? Because the socialist idea enjoyed great popularity, because there was at that time an almost universal tendency towards socialism.

I have cited a historical example for you. We are now living through a period which required that we seek a "pseudonym" so that we may the more easily win over the Social-Democratic and sections of the non-party workers. There was a time when the mensheviks also sought and found for themselves a pseudonym in the above mentioned euphonious slogan. The simple workers then said to themselves: "Aha, a socialist government — an excellent thing. Why should we not vote for it?" In particular if it might be attained without civil war.

I remember how the workers from the Putilov works in Petrograd, that strongest bulwark of bolshevism, sent to us a delegation composed of bolshevist and non-party workers who said to us:

"Of course, comrades, a coalition government with the bourgeoisie cannot be allowed. We are ready to fight to the last drop of blood against such a government. But what objection could there be to a socialist ministry. At that time we had to explain that this was nothing but pseudonym for bourgeois democracy.

And so, comrades, as you see, the matter is not so simple. There are two political systems. If Radek asks me: "Does that mean that the Social Democrats can never participate in the same government with us?", then I answer "The Left SR's — debris from the sinking SR — took part in our government. Fragments of the foundering ship of Social Democracy — fragments representing the revolutionary section of the Social Democratic workers, might share in our government even now. But what Comrade Radek wants is an entirely different kind of politics, reminiscent of the "socialist" ministry, or a coalition of all workers' parties."

Certainly, I know very well that the mensheviks wanted to dupe the masses, while comrade Radek wants to serve them no less than the rest of us, but we are concerned not with subjective intentions, but with the objective consequences of certain definite viewpoints.

Why, Comrade Radek, do you ask in such a typically journalistic and sensational spirit: "And so then, not a single Social Democrat may enter a communist government?"

You have a way of shaking your finger at the sky. Certainly the Social Democrats may enter our government. Why not? Comrade Radek has quoted my remark about the Christian Socialists. True, I did defend the viewpoint that it is necessary to say to the working class: "We are ready to go hand in hand with all workers, even with the 'Christian Socialists', but only on one simple condition—the disarming of the bourgeoisie, the arming of the working class, etc." Radek was under the impression that he was dealing me a knockout blow in quoting my words regarding my readiness to enter into an agreement with the "Christian Socialists". Here a certain French proverb to the effect that he who proves too much proves nothing at all, would be very apropos. My readiness to unite with the Christian Socialist workers on the conditions indicated, is nothing but a means of reaching the masses with an agitational slogan. This is simply a slogan for agitation, and no scheme for coalition with all the so-called workers' parties. Thus Radek has demonstrated that his viewpoint is fundamentally very dangerous for the Comintern.

This, comrades, is all that I care to say on the question of the workers' and peasants' government and the so-called revision of our tactics.

Comrade Radek's defeatist mood.

Radek has said that I was mistaken in my theory that at the beginning we were merely propaganda societies and only later grew into mass-parties. It is worth while elucidating this question. I am not speaking from the historical point of view. This question has a far greater practical importance for us and for our tactics. Radek said: "We were not merely propaganda societies. Were there not real fighters in the Spartacus Bund? Were there not Soviet Republics in Bavaria, and Hungary? Radek's present mood may be termed defeatist. Everything seems useful to him which might prove that we are going backward."

The followers of Brandler blamed the present Left Central Committee of the Party for the fact that the German Social Democrats still received 6,000,000 votes in the recent elections. The Lefts have already led the party for six whole weeks, and the Social Democrats have not yet been conquered! But we did blame Brandler for the fact that he was not victorious. No, we are quite aware that there are bound to be many defeats in

the course of the struggle. We do not say: "Why didn't you win?" but "Why didn't you fight, why didn't you strain every effort in the attempt to win?"

It seems to me that it is high time we stopped lamenting over the fact that in some election or another the Social-Democrats still received a majority of the votes. Actually you are asking just one question, namely "Why have you not seized power? Why hasn't the Left Central Committee conquered the bourgeoisie and the Social Democrats?" Just give us time, we will conquer them all right. Radek buzzes around like a bee gathering everything he can find to create the dismal, black picture that he needs.

In France everything is disheartening, he moans, and we still have not won in Germany. Certainly we should not close our eyes to our weak sides. But Radek's attitude towards them is one of ideological defeatism. Formerly, if you please, we were in powerful parties—we were in power in Hungary and in Bavaria and now what? It is true that at the end of the war the elemental temper of the masses was very revolutionary, and from hour to hour we expected that capitalism would crumble. But neither in Germany, in Hungary nor in Bavaria did we have real Communist Parties. That was the reason for our defeat, comrade Radek. That is what Radek fails to see. Herein there would seem to be a contradiction: the spontaneous agitation among the masses was very great, but the parties were very small—merely propaganda societies. Italy is the classic example of this. There was a whole sea of agitation and hatred against the war, and at the same time a corresponding party was absolutely lacking. True, we had in Italy a Socialist Party of 200,000 members, which was affiliated with the Third International. But in spite of the huge proportions of the mass movement, the communist movement actually consisted only of a small group of propagandists, a tiny faction within the large Italian "Socialist" party.

Before I take leave of comrade Radek, I should like to remind you of one more thing. Radek made the statement, "If we are so offensive, if we are reformists, then why don't you put us out?"

If anyone else but Radek had said this, we might have taken it seriously, but Radek very often speaks before he thinks, just as he very often writes without having deliberated beforehand. We do not say that he and his supporters are reformists but that they have certain reformist "petty-bourgeois deviations" which it is the business of the Russian Communist Party and the Comintern to correct. We hope that Radek will reform. A number of reformistic deviations have undoubtedly been exhibited at this Congress, although not all our comrades have spoken as openly as those of the German Right. The time taken up by their speeches is in inverse proportion to their influence on the labour movement. But in the right wing of the Comintern there are evidently some comrades who act according to the proverb "speech is silver, but silence is golden."

Apparently they think — "we'll wait a little longer, until this ultra-revolutionary mood dies down a bit."

The Right wing interpreted the slogan "workers and peasants' governments as a coalition of "all the workers' parties." Comrades! this is going too far. It is necessary for you to come to a halt. I hope that the resolution of the Comintern will be decisive for our Right Comrades as well.

The Czech Comrades and Their Diplomacy.

Now I will deal with the Czech comrades. They read two declarations, both drawn up in letter form and very carefully formulated. One was read by Comrade Smeral, the other by Comrade Kreibich. Comrade Smeral declared that the delegation was substantially in agreement with our political viewpoint on the workers' government. Kreibich declared just the contrary — that in the resolution of the Fourth Congress mention was made of a coalition of all workers' parties, etc.

I should have preferred to have Smeral speak more openly, and express his opinion frankly. We already have the advantage of having met together in other Congresses, and of knowing each other rather well. This is a great help. I must say that Comrade Smeral is the most responsible political leader in the Czechoslovakian Communist Party due to his great influence in the party.

Smeral expressed himself very cautiously. Smeral likes to take the attitude of allowing the other fellow to criticize the Comintern, sharply, and then jumping in to save the situation, declaring his solidarity with the Comintern etc. The political

responsibility for the opportunistic tendencies of the Czech Communist Party, rests, I repeat, mainly with Comrade Smeral, as political leader of the party. And therefore we must come to an entirely straightforward understanding with Comrade Smeral on these questions. Smeral's good points are well known. For that period when it is necessary to win over to your side the masses of the proletariat, to split the masses away from the social democrats, Smeral has no peer. He knows the country, he knows your proletariat. In the formulas of the Third and Fourth World Congress regarding the winning over of the proletariat, there is no change to be made. We might only add that we do not need a majority for the sake of a majority as such — but for the revolutionary struggle. This is the most important thing to be remembered in Czecho-Slovakia at the present time. We have no intention of provoking a crisis in the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party. We know its strong sides. Its composition is excellent, it is a proletarian party. We know that it contains splendid human material, and that the workers in its ranks are good fighters. The party already has important attainments to its credit. It was very successful in winning the majority from the social democrats. But this is no time to shower one another with diplomatic compliments. Certain people in the Czecho-Slovakian party must be corrected. I am in entire agreement with what Ruth Fischer has said in regard to Smeral's declaration. Why should we indulge in these diplomatic declarations at our Congress? This is not a bourgeois parliament, here one must speak openly, at times even sharply, even in criticism of the Executive. There is nothing wrong in that. We cannot limit ourselves here to paper declarations alone. In my opinion, the Czecho-Slovakian party must correct those things that need correction, avoiding a profound upheaval or crisis. And this may be avoided if the leading comrades in the party desire it.

The minority of the Czecho-Slovakian delegation, who have expressed themselves on the floor of the Congress against the opportunism of Smeral and Kreibich, receive our full support. Let Smeral himself make haste to correct his policy, and no internal struggle will be necessary.

Comrade Bukharin argued against one of Comrade Kreibich's articles. Comrade Kreibich supposes that the conclusions, deductions and decisions of the Comintern are based entirely on theses, articles and quotations; he was of the same opinion formerly, when he was with the left. And I say, why should we not form our opinions on the basis of articles, quotations and resolutions? Certainly, not only on the basis of such things, but undoubtedly theses, quotations and articles give sufficient basis for opinion. And therefore it seems to me that Comrade Kreibich would act correctly if he would not persist in his right mistakes, just as formerly he did not persist in his Left mistakes. In the full flower of his "leftism" he jumped too far to the left. Now, for the sake of maintaining equilibrium he has jumped just as far in the other direction. His spiritual preceptor at that time was Lenin, who gave him a thorough whipping. Unfortunately that is not possible now. I have heard many comrades say: "Yes, Lenin used to whip me sometimes, but it was really a pleasure to be whipped by Lenin." — I am in full agreement with that opinion, even whipping is pleasant when administered by a master. But what are we to do in the absence of Lenin? The Executive must now collectively replace Lenin. And the Executive is ready to whip Comrade Kreibich collectively (exclamations of approval), we will collectively intercede with Comrade Kreibich to repudiate his right mistakes, as formerly he repudiated his left mistakes.

Further Comrade Kreibich declares: "Lenin in his time did not permit comrade Smeral to be called a Centrist in the resolution of the Congress." He emphasized the word centrist. Very well. But in what resolution are we now calling Smeral a Centrist? We are not concerned with bringing about a crisis in the Czecho-Slovakian Party. We love the Czech Party and consider it at least a sound proletarian party. But we do not shut our eyes to the weakness of its leaders and beg them to have done with these parliamentary declarations and to correct these things which need correction.

Comrade Hoeglund Must Acknowledge His Mistakes.

I should like to say a few words with regard to Comrade Hoeglund. Every time I converse with him or listen to him on the tribune I say to myself: what a wise fellow. How much he might be able to give not only to a little country like Sweden, but to the Comintern as a whole, if only he would give up his illusions: Possessing as he does such rare qualities, why should

he defend such a clearly mistaken policy, entirely indefensible from the point of view of Communism? Just as before he defended Lian and Tranmael, he now quarrels with the splendid communist elements in the ranks of his own party on questions concerning prestige — and his own opportunistic mistakes. He does not wish to acknowledge that he has made mistakes. We have all committed very grave blunders. It is a shameful thing if we have not the courage to acknowledge our own mistakes. Comrade Hoeglund's speech was very skillfully prepared, and was full of clever material, but there was lacking the vital spark, and that which we need most of all, an acknowledgement of his mistakes.

Comrade Bordiga's Errors.

We have Comrade Bordiga as dessert, with whom I must have a few words. We waited for him a long time, he was late in arriving and appeared at the end of the discussion, like a sweet at the end of a dinner. Really his speech did in certain respects remind me of a sweet. I am prepared to make all concessions possible to him for we know Comrade Bordiga as an excellent revolutionary able to render enormous service to the Italian Party and the whole International. We are prepared to concede Comrade Bordiga all points that are not of questions of principle, or those that are simply personal differences of no importance, or pure formalities.

During part of his speech Comrade Bordiga behaved like a diplomat, a role that does not suit him at all. I think that he behaved yesterday like a diplomat for the first time in his life. Let us hope it will be the last. Take the question of fractions. I reminded him that he said that a left fraction was essential for the Communist International. Comrade Bordiga denied that he ever said these words and pointed out that he promised to form a fraction only in case the International moved to the right or becomes reformist in character. I give my word to Comrade Bordiga publicly, that if the International ever becomes reformist, I myself will form a left fraction (applause).

Comrade Bordiga asks, who will give guarantees that the International will not change into a reformist International. The question is ridiculous. Where is the foundation for such a question?

Comrade Bordiga knows that we formed a left wing and carried on a fight inside the Second International at Zimmerwald and consequently if such a thing were to happen, he can be quite calm on that score. However, I think it will not happen. I heard Comrade Bordiga's statement that he denied the words ascribed to him. But to-day I happened to come across an article written by Comrade Bordiga on the 5th of May in which he says: "The question of fractions will only disappear from the scene when we approach these organisational forms mentioned above (individual action, rejection of amalgamation, etc.) If we do not follow this, the existence of a left-opposition fraction will be essential in the International."

Consequently this will be necessary not when we become opportunists and reformists, but when we do not share Comrade Bordiga's point of view on some minor, incidental questions for example, if we do not agree that it is impossible to amalgamate with other parties or form our nuclei within other parties. This is sufficient ground for him to form a fraction.

We accept the challenge. If we could say that communism is here and menshevism there, we ourselves would support any revolts inside any organisation. But the case is different when Comrade Bordiga threatens the International that he will form a fraction because of some minor organisational differences. I ask, "Who is the real Bordiga? He whom we find in reading his article written on the 5th of May or he whom we heard in this hall on the 25th of June?" (applause).

Now we come to the three questions that have the greatest importance for Comrade Bordiga. In the first place he says that he considers any amalgamation of a communist party with any other party inadmissible on principle. Secondly, he opposes the formation of our nuclei in other parties and, thirdly, he is against admitting sympathetic parties into the International.

Let us analyse these questions seriously. What reasons can be brought against our amalgamation with other parties that were not communist previously but became so after? I remind you that the union of the Spartacus Bund with the left independents after Halle was an amalgamation. Was this profitable for the International and the German Party? Yes, I say. It is true, it created a series of crises, but at the same time

formed a powerful, mass communist party. The only labour party in Germany, the social democrats were deprived of their monopoly in Halle.

Take for example such a small country as Belgium. We had a very small communist party there. It amalgamated with the left wing of the social democratic party and formed a communist party. Was this move correct? In my opinion it was.

What was the class of these phenomena? Comrade Bordiga reasons abstractly. We must never forget that in part we have our origin in the Second International. The Second International was founded thirty years before us and this explains why it was that we were born within it. The communist parties are being formed out of the rising generation and out of the better part that is leaving the Second International. It is not, as the "consistent" comrade Bordiga thinks, because we were "eclectics" that this is taking place. Why should we argue against what has already taken place in Halle and in Belgium, and what will take place in Italy to-morrow with the better part of the previous socialist party? In my opinion Comrade Bordiga is quite wrong on this serious point.

His second proposition is that no communist nuclei should ever be formed in other parties. Why not, I ask. Take a classical example: the British Labour Party. We decided that the British communist Party should penetrate into the Labour Party. It did this with success. Nobody at the present time would demand that they should leave the Labour Party. Does Comrade Bordiga consider this incorrect? The position in England is peculiar. There is a powerful party affiliated to the Second International there. The masses in this organisation are responsive to our agitation. The Labour Party itself is a peculiar organisation. We must penetrate these masses, so as to bring them to the side of the communists. What is it that causes Comrade Bordiga to be against this in "principle"? Is his reason that he considers the application of these tactics in Italy incorrect? No, does he say? If this is the case, then it is still more incomprehensible. We must bind our British comrades to remain in the Labour Party and energetically continue to form our nuclei.

The third question concerning sympathetic parties. I know of three cases. The "German Communist Labour Party" and the American and Finnish Workers Parties entered and partly enter at present time as sympathetic parties. Now the question is whether we shall admit part of the Italian Socialist Party to the Communist International as a sympathetic party. Were we right to admit syndicalist elements into our International? Yes: we were. It was necessary to educate these masses and in this way gain the real revolutionary elements on our side. This was the state of affairs with the German Communist Labour Party. When this work was done, the better elements of the workers joined our party while the leaders showed their non-revolutionary character. A split took place and this very fact proves once again that our methods were correct.

Why is Comrade Bordiga so stubborn? He is wrong in all three cases. He states that if we do not concede him these three points he will form a fraction. Comrades, I am not speaking here what the International or Comrade Bordiga ordered. I know that Comrade Bordiga is just as devoted a soldier of the revolution as all of us. I said that Comrade Bordiga was our friend, but the International is a greater. In other words, Comrade Bordiga must do what the International orders and not the reverse. "Und der König absolut, wenn er unsern Willen tut." (The king is absolute when he obeys our will.) I remind Comrade Bordiga (applause). All tributes to the International but only when it obeys comrade Bordiga's commands. I cannot understand how he can be so stubborn, he whom we knew as an excellent comrade who has done great service for the Italian movement. Italy is a beautiful sunny country with many excellent proletarians; Mussolini will be smashed, but at the same time Italy is only a small corner from the point of the world revolution. You could have convinced yourself of the falsity of your views from the examples of Germany, England and America where our method of amalgamation is applied with such good results. You must remember that the countries just mentioned are of the greatest importance for our international movement. Why do you persist in your delusions, Comrade Bordiga?

The question of the United Front is of still greater importance. Comrade Bordiga tried to be amusing. "Well," he said, "if the words 'workers' Government' are the stumbling block then we are willing to make this concession." On this question Bordiga and Radék are the same. "The tactics accepted

at the Fourth Congress are being revised", they say. This sort of thing does happen when we have "ultra-left" and "ultra-right" tendencies; they often coincide in their opinions.

What is the position with the United Front? I am not an historian, but I must use some historical facts. Comrade Bordiga mentioned the enlarged plenum of the executive Committee that took place in February 1922, I believe that it would be better for Comrade Bordiga if he did not base his arguments too much on this plenum. Why? you ask. Here is the reason. How were the characters distributed then? I was an "unfortunate sinner", an "opportunist" wobbling now to the right now to the left, while Comrade Bordiga, as is well known, was always against the "right", always consistent, always follows a straightline, and firm. An Italian comrade remarked to me in a conversation that a telegraph pole was also "straight lined" and consistent" (laughter, applause). But, comrades, we know of other things that are much more flexible than telegraph poles. This flexibility is what the Communist International requires.

Well, Comrade Bordiga recollects the enlarged plenum of February 1922. How were the parts distributed at that time? I spoke on the question of the workers' government and stated: "This is a synonym of the dictatorship of the proletariat; all else are social-democratic deviations." What did friend Bordiga say then? He was in alliance with Comrade Daniel Renoult and even with Frossard, against the Executive Committee, against the tactics of the United Front. As you know, the French right-wing communists attacked the tactics of the united front and played themselves up as left-wingers. The delegation of the Italian communist Party, at that time led by Bordiga, formed a political alliance with the French against the F.C. on this question. I would recommend Comrade Bordiga, to recollect this enlarged plenum as little as possible (applause).

Comrade Bordiga states that he was never against the tactics of the United Front. But every one in the Communist International knows that the Italian comrades stubbornly emphasised the fact that they were supporters of the United Front only in the economic and not in the political field. I ask, what is this point of view? It is a peculiarly "Italian" doctrine. Must we understand that the present fight against Mussolini is economic or political? The fight for the eight hour working day is economic in character, but at the same time in the present situation it is political. Comrade Bordiga continues to keep his position even when we exhort him to abjure his artificial, non-communist separation of political and economical warfare. He considers this to be the honour of the Italian Communist Party. This is not a principle, it is a fetish.

I often try to find out what is the foundation for this petrified position of Italian comrades of Com. Bordiga's type. Naturally it cannot be a product of the idiosyncracies of one or the other Italian leaders. It is a product of the history of the Italian Labour movement. One must seek its roots in the old Italian Socialist Party, that united Turati, Bordiga and Serrati in its ranks without discrimination. Quite a mixture! However there is a certain reaction at the present time. There is a desire to have a real, "firm", "pure" chosen communist party, even without a large mass behind it. This is understandable. But, Comrades, three or four years have already passed since Livorno. Men come and go, but the revolution continues to develop. The Italian movement is reviving and soon the Italian proletariat will play a large part; it will enter the movement enriched by plentiful new experiences. This movement will not be the same as the movement in 1919—1920. With such a state of affairs, one should have discarded one's fetish long ago, and go hand in hand with the Communist International when it is in the right. The heart of the matter is not the "revision" of our old tactics or the division of the united front into economic and political fields, but in securing the support of the masses through economic and political warfare, and directing them to the path travelled by the Communist International. The measures used in England are one thing, those in America another, while those applied in Italy a third. Petrified "principles" are misplaced here, but comrade Bordiga persists in them.

This is what I wished to tell him. I am profoundly convinced that this is the opinion of the vast majority of the Congress, the real left Communist International. I am sure that all will be done to come to an agreement with Comrade Bordiga. He, in his turn, must understand that he is wrong. Yesterday, he did not speak of the problem of securing the support of the majority. Seemingly, this question is clear to everybody. If Comrade Bordiga will say that he insists on the

theses of the Rome Conference, we will answer him saying that these theses have been repeatedly refused. Comrade Bordiga did not mention this yesterday. Maybe this is a good sign that at the present time this is not a moot question and that the decision of the III Congress on securing the majority remains in force. Now Bordiga must abrogate his other errors and really go hand in hand with us. All the International and all the left wing will be glad when the question of Bordiga is settled and removed from the agenda.

The Situation in America

A few words on Comrade Amter's speech on the American situation. I must say that com. Amter often does the American movement a bad turn. The situation in America is difficult. The Executive Committee has complete trust in the American Central Committee, headed by Foster and Rutherford, two of the best men in America. Both the groups formed round these two leaders must unite and work together without friction. We know that the situation is serious there but the line of action has been found and it will be followed honestly and revolutionarily.

The American and English comrades both require aid. If a tendency towards the right is to be seen among them we must understand that it is not the same as that among the German comrades. As far as the question concerns the English and American comrades, it is to be explained by their youth and inexperience. These are young parties. Comradely help and not faction struggle is what is required here. The Executive Committee will see that faction struggle in America will be brought to an end so that these young parties receive the needed help. Only serious results can ensue from this.

In summarising all I have said, comrades, I consider that we must formulate something different to what was formulated by the IV congress. However, the line of the III and IV congresses on the question of the international economic situation will remain in force. That which we have to revise, liquidate theoretically (or in case of necessity apply more rigorous measures) is the opportunist distortion of the line of the Communist International.

Let the International proletariat, the social-democrats and all our enemies know what our strategical manoeuvres are. We have nothing to fear from this. Com. Smeral. The word "manoeuvre" is often interpreted to have a bad meaning, but to a certain extent we can say that all our tactics are manoeuvres. Let all our enemies know that we manoeuvre when it is necessary. He who thinks that we propose a political amalgamation with the so-called "labour parties" is mistaken. Let all the proletariat and the international counter-revolutionary social democratic parties know that the opinion expressed here by several comrades headed by Comrade Radek is NOT the opinion of the Communist International. The Communist International holds the opposite view, the revolutionary marxist and Leninist view.

We Require a World Party of Leninism

I now conclude. We exchange views here, often angrily, but all the same we have nothing to cause anger between us. Of course, the Communist International is not the Second International, it is not a parliament for exchanging opinions. We express our opinions openly among ourselves but our ideal is not to mix hot and cold and receive a luke-warm mixture. The Comintern must be monolithic. The opinions of the right wing are supported by an insignificant minority at this Congress. We argue heatedly, but the decisions carried by the highest instance in the Communist International have a decisive significance for all of us. We cannot be a parliament in the spirit of the II International. If we carry a decision here it means that the minority cannot continue to act as before. You can fight "to the last drop of blood" at the Congress, but afterwards when this convention which is the highest legal instance for all communists (we do not know of any higher

court for communists), when this congress gives its decision, it is essential to realise it shoulder to shoulder, hand in hand. There can be no question that the right winger will continue to act as before and actually become a fraction. The Communist International will not allow this to take place.

A Russian comrade who has not participated directly in International work but who has followed the movement closely, told me, "In looking at the Congress one cannot help noticing that it is different from all previous Congresses. Before, it often was an assembly of pleasant guests who had come to Moscow and were gladly received. Now they are Communists who hold the fate of even large parties in their hands; they are more experienced; they give mature decisions and feel themselves equal owners of the Communist International."

A new generation of real revolutionary leaders is growing from among the youth. There are delegations, the German for example, that have in them workmen with five years and more imprisonment behind them. Not only Russian but foreign comrades are now mature, dependable elements. These are not guests who were hospitably received by the Russians, they are representatives of strong and weak parties, part of which have become strong mass parties with their own experiences, though they may be heterogeneous in their construction.

Many talk of bolshevism in our parties, but one must not understand this to mean the mechanical transplantation of Russian experience on to German and other parties. Comrade Lenin warned us of this error. We understand "Bolshevisation" to mean the assimilation of the bolshevism which has a general international significance and that which Lenin mentions in his booklet "Infantile Sickness of Leftism." We understand bolshevisation to mean implacable hatred of the bourgeoisie and the social democratic, traitorous leaders, it means the use of any strategical manoeuvre to fight the enemy. Bolshevisation is the inflexible will to achieve the hegemony of the proletariat, it is fiery hate of all bourgeois, counter-revolutionary, social-democratic leaders, of the centre and centrists, of semi-centrists and pacifists and of all freaks of bourgeois ideology. Bolshevisation means the formation of a strongly cemented, monolithic, centralised organization, that eradicates in a friendly and brotherly manner all differences in its ranks, as Lenin taught us to do so. Bolshevisation is marxism in action, it means devotion to the ideal of the dictatorship of the proletariat, to the ideas of com. Lenin. This is what bolshevisation means. It is not a mechanical imitation of Russian bolsheviks, it means the assimilation of all that was and is immortal in bolshevism.

Many parties that were not even mentioned here have achieved great successes in their development. This is the case with the Spanish party, for example. Hundreds of comrades have been through bourgeois prisons there. Bolshevism is gaining ground in this classical country of syndicalism and anarchy. We have a strong group of honest, modest, revolutionary proletarians, who are ready to work seriously to help the proletarian revolution (applause). The French party which not so long ago was seething with opportunism, has made considerable progress. For a considerable time it seemed that it would be impossible to form a serious party. The Bulgarian party has learned much, and we will hope that it will be safe from regressions into opportunism.

We are all certain that the movement is growing. Propaganda groups have become strong organisations that have hardened in fighting. All of us have the feeling that at this Fifth Congress we have the right to call ourselves a world party. The resolutions of the congress will be imbued with this spirit. Those comrades who support other points of view, other positions, will agree with our decision as a product of the collective experience and reasoning of all that is the best, most honest and revolutionary in the working class of the whole world.

(Prolonged, stormy applause, becoming an ovation. The delegates sing the "International".)

Resolution on the Report of the Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The Fifth Congress of the Comintern approves of the activity as a whole of the Executive since the Fourth Congress and asserts that the correct and firm leadership of the Executive has contributed substantially to the report that the Communist International, during this stage of the fiercest attacks of capitalism, struggling for its dictatorship has proceeded almost everywhere with increased strength.

In this period of one and a half years the capitalist offensive which was earlier began, has developed in most capitalist countries into fierce attacks upon the revolutionary proletariat, as in Bulgaria, Italy, Germany, Poland, Finland, Roumania, Jugoslavia, Spain, Japan India. Even in France repressive measures against workers on strike and many imprisonments of Communists have been the order of the day. In Czecho-Slovakia special laws have been passed against communists, in Austria blood was shed by fascists, and in Norway brutal attacks by police upon the workers on strike were made while class injustice was intensified and a White Guard organisation formed.

These violent attacks have inflicted severe losses on the Communist movement, and the manner in which the movement has met these attacks was not altogether free from serious mistakes and back-slidings. In no country, however, was the power of capitalism able to break up the organisation of the communist leaders of the fight, or to cut their connection with the masses. Not even in Italy has the systematic uprooting of communism been able to achieve the slightest damage to its influence on the masses, not even in the parliamentary elections. In Bulgaria, after the most bloody defeat of the workers and peasants, defending themselves under communist leadership, the masses again rallied to the banner of the Communist Party in the elections. After the heavy defeat of the revolutionary movement in Germany, and a consequent dangerous internal crisis, and after the most brutal persecution from without, the Communist Party of Germany quickly rallied its ranks, set up a firm leadership, and by brilliant victory at the elections, polling three and three-quarter million votes, demonstrated that its revolutionary force is greater and stronger than ever before. The electoral victories in France and Czecho-Slovakia similarly showed the decisive growth of the influence of communism on the masses.

During these great class conflicts, the Executive Committee undertook a series of steps destined to be of decisive importance for the correct direction of the Sections of the Communist International. The Congress points out in particular the following cases:

1. The Executive rightly indicated at the International conferences in Essen and Frankfurt in the early months of 1923, the practical tasks of intensified revolutionary preparations arising from the occupation of the Ruhr, for the European proletariat and particularly for the Communist Parties of Germany and France.

2. When the rising revolutionary mass movement in August indicated the approach of a favourable situation for a decisive struggle for power in Germany, the Executive demanded that the German Party immediately set itself to the unqualified task of conquering power, assured it of all possible help to this end, and mobilised a number of other sections to support the German Revolution to the utmost of their power.

3. After the surrender in October, which took place almost without a struggle—circumstances rendered possible by the treachery of the social-democratic leaders and by the failure of the Communist Party leadership, it became both proper and necessary for the Executive—its attention being called by the strong leftist movement in the German Party, and supported by the leftists—severely to criticise the opportunist attitude of the German Party leadership, and above all the distortion of the united front shown in the Saxonia government experiment. The Executive determined to profit from its political and organisational consequences by an increased and relentless fight against opportunism. It had also become aware of the strong Left tendency in the German Party, by which it was supported in its decision.

4. The Executive—in accord with views of the leftists—had already criticised the opportunist digressions of the Leipsic Conference of the German Communist Party; it also made two attempts before October to get a representative of the left oppo-

sition included in the new Central Committee that was formed at Leipsic. Then the Executive brought about a union of the left and centre for the campaign against the right wing and gave over the leadership to this bloc, trusting that the masses of the party membership would confirm and approve this elimination of the politically bankrupt right wing, and so it happened. This resolute action of the Executive helped the German Communist Party to recover, as well as to overcome the menace of a split arising from the dissensions within the Party, and it also arrested the growth of the German Party crisis which threatened to become a crisis of the whole international, on account of the panic which overtook the unsteady elements in some places.

Credit is due, not only to the German Party, but also to the German working class upon demanding the ruthless expulsion of vacillating "right" deviations and founding strength enough within itself with the support of the International to overcome such severe crises without losing heart or weakening its fighting capacity.

5. In view of the danger of the "right" aberrations, which were revealed in the application of the tactics of the united front to a far larger extent than could be anticipated, the Executive rejected as opportunistic interpretation any attempt to construe the tactics of the united front into anything more than a revolutionary method of agitation and mobilisation of the masses, as well as any attempt to make use of the slogan of "workers' and peasants' government" — not for the agitation in favour of the proletarian dictatorship, but for a coalition with the bourgeois democracy. At the same time the Executive, as against the opportunist view of the social democracy stated the true character of social democracy as the left wing of the bourgeoisie.

6. On the basis of the lessons of the events in Germany, in relation to the development of Party organisation, the Executive has taken energetic steps, in Germany and elsewhere for the building up of factory nuclei as the foundation of Party organisation. These steps have already led in some countries to a noteworthy beginning of the factory nucleus system.

7. With regard to short-sighted opportunistic passivity, which showed itself in the conduct of the Bulgarian Party leadership with regard to the June coup d'Etat, the Executive sought immediately, by open and very penetrating criticism of the Party to set it on the path of serious preparation for armed struggle in the event of the prospective attack of the counter-revolution. The Party leadership failed to reach a sufficient understanding with the point of view of the Executive. Only after the experience of defeat was this point of view taken into its platform, and on its basis the Party again closed its ranks, and freed itself from the decaying right wing.

8. Similarly through the influence of the Executive and with the support of the majority of the Central Committee, the French Party was freed from the greater part of ballast of opportunism and became consolidated. This process in Norway took place under the greatest difficulties for there the Communists were a badly organised minority in the opportunist "Labour Party" and had to carry on difficult fractional struggles, and were thereby continually exposed to the danger of being expelled by the ruthless anti-communist party leadership. After the opposition of the opportunist leaders of the Norwegian Labour Party to the resolutions of the Comintern had developed into open systematic sabotage, and after the October defeat in Germany, into blatant desertion, it was impossible to allow this behaviour in the name of communism to continue.

Although it had been foreseen that if the Norwegian Labour Party broke with the Communist International, a section of the excellent proletarians who comprised it would follow the anti-communist leader, it was necessary for the Executive, to demand of the Party Congress of the Norwegian Labour Party a clear decision for or against loyal co-operation with the International. This led to a split in the Party, and to the foundation of an independent Communist Party in Norway. Within six months the Norwegian Communist Party by its activities, and above all as a result of the influential part it played in all the great workers' struggles, had won for itself the prestige of a revolutionary mass party.

The echo of the attack made by the Norwegian opportunist on the Comintern, which made itself heard in Sweden, and helped

to produce a panic-stricken mood, was definitely quietened by the Executive.

9. The Polish party, with the active sympathy of the Executive of the Comintern, at its Second Party Congress in 1923 adopted the decisions which provided for the bolshevisation of the Party and consolidated its power and influence. But the Party Centre did not show true revolutionary activity in a practical form, and this was especially the case in the period of the mass struggles in October. In the Russian and German discussions the Polish Central Committee supported the Right Wing and tried to suppress all Left criticism in its own ranks.

10. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia has not been free from opportunistic mistakes and deviations, and these manifested themselves, for instance, in the way in which the decisions of the Fourth Congress with regard to the united front and the labour government were interpreted. Opportunistic vacillation and confusion were also shown in the attitude of the Party to the Russian and German questions. It is true that the Party has shown increased activity in some fields, but it has not understood how to unite parliamentary action with mass action of the proletariat or how to prepare the proletariat for the ensuing revolutionary battle in a suitable way.

11. The mass movements in Hungary show the situation to be ripe for the organising and building up of a Communist Party. It is for the Hungarian communists to carry out the organising of the Party, and for the furtherance of this work to speed the liquidation of the factional fights.

12. Deviations to the right were also shown by the English and the American Parties in their treatment of the united front and of the relation of the Communist Party to the leaders of the Labour Party (especially with regard to the so-called "Third Party"). The Executive was able to persuade the English and American comrades of the necessity for a revision of their conceptions, and new and peculiar problems of the revolutionary movement in Anglo-Saxon countries were several times very thoroughly considered by the Executive and will in the future demand still more attention from leaders of the International.

13. The Executive has also assisted in overcoming deviations of the extreme left. In the section of the Italian Party there is still a tendency to an un-Marxian dogmatism which refuses on principle to take account of the concrete fact of the situation when laying down the rules of tactics, and in this way greatly hinders the capacity of the Party for active manoeuvring. If the Italian Communist Party wishes to solve the problem of becoming a mass party, it must take its stand uncompromisingly on the foundation of the tactics laid down by the Comintern. The union of the Third Internationalists with the Italian Communist Party has solved the problem which had been the cause of differences of opinion between the Italian Party and the Comintern. But even after this solution the Italian Party must go forward actively in dealing with the question of capturing those masses of workers who today still belong to the Italian Social Democratic Party.

14. In trade union work progress towards the unification and intensification of the work was made in several countries (above all in France) and some striking successes were won (for instance in England). In Germany last winter the result of the anti-trade union temper of reformist and bureaucratic trade union leaders was to produce a wholesale exit of communists and sympathisers from the trade unions. As the German Communist Party did not put up a determined opposition to this dangerous error for some time, the Executive intervened against it in a most decided way and later on the decisions of the Frankfurt Party Congress, energetically supported by the Executive, ordered an end to be made of this catastrophic action and produced a total change of feeling in favour of revolutionary work among the trade unions.

15. Propaganda among the semi-proletarian and pettybourgeois middle classes was constantly encouraged among the different sections in order that the ground be cut away from fascism. The German Communist Party has had striking success in this direction, but the Italian Party has hardly had any success at all.

16. The Executive has impressed upon all sections the great importance of a steady and active agitation towards winning over the masses of the poorer peasantry for the support of the proletarian revolution. With this end in view the slogan of the "workers government" has been extended and made into the slogan of the workers' and peasants government. The formation of the peasants' International which has shown itself to be a most important development, occurred with the active help of the Executive. There is no doubt the development of an independent

communist agrarian policy must be one of the most important tasks for almost all sections of the International in the near future.

17. On the National Question the Executive has had frequent occasion to remind many sections for whom this question is one of the greatest importance, that they were not carrying out the decisions of the Second Congress satisfactorily. One of the fundamental principles of Leninism, that communists should resolutely and constantly fight for self-determination, rights of nationalities (secession and the formation of independent states), has not been applied by all the sections of the Communist International in the desired manner.

18. In addition to winning the support of the peasant masses and of the oppressed national minorities, the Executive Committee, in its instructions, always emphasised the necessity for winning over the revolutionary movements for emancipation of the colonial peoples and for all peoples of the east so as to make them the allies of the revolutionary proletariat of the capitalist countries. This requires not only the extension of the direct contact between the Executive and the national emancipation movements of the moment, but also very close contact between the sections in the imperialist countries with the colonies of those countries, and, in the first place, a constant struggle against the imperialist colonial policy of the bourgeoisie in every country. In this respect the activities are everywhere still very weak.

As regards work in the army, the Executive, in conjunction with the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International, has been able to perform some excellent practical preparatory work (the Ruhr). However, the section which had to fight against the strongest imperialist powers, too often forgot the teachings of Lenin regarding the fight against war, the Executive had frequently to call them to order.

This line of Leninist strategy, tactics and organisation pursued by the Executive, this and no other must continue to serve as the guiding line of the Communist International in future. The bolshevisation of the Communist Party is to be pursued in exact accordance with the behests of Lenin, attention being paid, however, to the concrete circumstances in each country. The beginnings of this process already exist. The party leaderships, the organisations, and the individual members in many sections are beginning to display increasing, if slowly increasing activity. In case after case the best parties are beginning to show the revolutionary initiative, the determined energy and striking capacity, the shrewd ability to manoeuvre, and the conscious iron discipline of a truly revolutionary fighting organisation.

These beginnings of bolshevisation must be steadily, systematically, indefatigably and consciously developed. The consciousness of the Communist Party and the Communist International as the leaders of the revolution must become part of the blood of every party organisation and of every individual member so that out this consciousness of a communist fighting fraternity, may arise the iron faith which will fuse the party into a bolshevik organisation and the international into a victorious World Party.

At present much is still wanting for the development of the Communist International into a real world party. The Congress reminds the sections of their duty to assist collectively with greater energy than hitherto, by sharing in the solution of international questions, by regular information and correspondence, and by their members on the Executive in the further development of the leadership of the Communist International.

Experience has proved that it is often impossible to hold the national party congresses after the world Congress. The Congress, therefore, abolishes the resolution which provides for this. All national party congresses (ordinary or extraordinary) can, however, be held only in agreement with the Executive Committee.

The Congress instructs the Executive to demand a more iron discipline than hitherto from every section and from every party leader. The Congress notes that in certain cases the Executive, in order to spare the prestige of well-deserving comrades, did not act sufficiently energetically against breaches of discipline. The Congress empowers the Executive to act with greater decision if it becomes necessary and not to shrink from adopting even the most extreme measures.

In every country and in every Communist organisation we must work to fuse the Communist International into a single world party.

With this resolution, the Communist International goes forward to the next stage of the struggle, richer in the will to fight and confident of victory.