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The V. World-Congress of the Communist International.

Ninth Session (Evening.)

June 23rd.

Schueller (V. C. I.)

If there was anyone who had not yet clearly seen that there is a right opportunist tendency in the Comintern, the speeches of Comrades Radek, Brandler and Thalheimer, and Comrade Smeral's declaration, have made this plain. These speeches conjured up before us the spirit of the Leipsic and Prague theses. The Fifth Congress must make an end of these discussions.

Radek's speech especially shows us that we have among us a tendency which is fundamentally wrong, and is bound to have had consequences especially as far as the Social Democratic workers in factories are concerned. Radek makes coalition with the Social Democrats dependent on the question whether the Social Democrats will or will not keep up their alliance with the bourgeoisie to the end of their days. Comrades, we know that the Social Democrats will remain united with the bourgeoisie to the end. It is clear from some parts of Radek's speech that he looks upon the Social Democratic Party as a workers' party, with whom coalition for a revolutionary workers' government is possible. Such conceptions lead us to revisionism of Communism. We must take up a definite attitude towards this revisionism, if it is not to degenerate into a devastating disease.

The Czech declaration does not make it clear if the Czech Party endorses the Prague theses or not. It is not because the situation has changed that we are against the Radek conception, but because this conception was wrong already at the Fourth Congress, and in Prague and Leipsic. Radek and Brandler tried, so to speak, to scare the Congress. They spoke as if we wanted to terminate the United Front tactics. We do not want to terminate these tactics, but merely Radek's conception of them.

The party has, of course, made mistakes, but out of this cannot make, by any means, a German question. We welcome Comrade Zinoviev's severe criticism of the Czech Party, and also the definite and clear statement made here by the Czech minority and the Czech Youth. We are also very glad that Comrade Zinoviev has broached the Polish question. What he said here about the English question, is also very significant. Comrade Roy's statement must be specially commended.

Today, no one will doubt that the tactics adopted by the Communist International towards the Norwegian Workers' Party were correct. I am sure everyone sees that the leadership of the Workers' Party consisted of avowed reformists, syndicalists, or in the best case, of centrists, and that it is going farther and farther on this downward path. In Sweden Comrade Hoeglund confronted the minority, which has adopted the platform of the Communist International, with an ultimatum. Not receiving a satisfactory reply, he convened a Party Congress for a date when the decisions of the world Congress will not yet be known. The Congress must at least demand the postponement of this Party Congress. The Congress must show that the entire International is solid in its support of the Russian Communist Party.

We must be prepared for a great and difficult fight. Therefore, we must protest emphatically against all prophecies of defeat, which we heard here in the speeches of Comrades Radek, Brandler, and Thalheimer. For us there are no grounds for such pessimism. We shall have great difficulties to contend with, but we can meet these difficulties courageously, and we are bound to overcome them if the Congress will give us clear and definite directions, and will work for the bolshevisation of all our Parties. We have every reason to believe that we are not appealing to the Congress in vain. (Loud applause).

Rienzi (Italy):

explained the reason why the minority of the Italian delegation entirely approved without reservation the report of Zinoviev.

He said, we deny that this report marks "the general liquidation of the united front tactics": The letters from the Presidium to the Central Committee of the German Party, the formula for the united front given by Treint in his speech, the passage in Severing's speech referring to "manoeuvres" which might be useful and also permissible, prove that there is no question of revisionism in regard to the united front.

We think that the political judgment pronounced by the workers and communists of Germany in shifting the party centre definitely to the left was a just one, though there may be some cases of personal "injustices".

On the Russian Question it was the duty of all the communist parties to declare their attitude, and the majority of the French Central Committee was quite right to reject a position of neutrality.

As to our relations with the Socialist Party of Italy, we are in favour of an immediate fusion with the Third Internationalists in order to continue the tactics of the united front with the Italian Socialist Party and to win over the workers who follow it.

Speaking for the Left Wing of the Italian Party, we shall do our best to help the efforts of the Communist International to eliminate the differences which exist between the theses adopted by the Rome Congress and the theses of the Communist International so that the whole Italian Party may stand firmly upon the basis of the International.

The Italian situation as it is today reveals a perspective of serious political action, and it is important that there should be complete and unequivocal unity of direction, in order to assure the homogeneity and efficacy of this direction.

When Comrade Rlenzi had ended his speech a delegation from the poor peasants of the Ukraine presented a banner to the German delegation as the representatives of the revolutionary proletariat of Germany. Comrade Rudeiko, the leader of the peasants' delegation, greeted the Congress and the German proletariat with heart-felt words, which were enthusiastically received by the Congress, which proceeded to the singing of the Internationale. Comrade Thälmann replied to Comrade Rudeiko on behalf of the German delegation, and Comrade Kolarov, as Chairman of the Congress, on behalf of the Congress. After this the discussion on the report of the Executive was continued by

Thälmann (Germany):

Since the Fourth World Congress we have two heavy defeats to record, which must guide us in our judgment as to the position of the parties concerned: In the Bulgarian defeat and the German defeat last October. The Bulgarian Party failed to understand when the decisive moment came, how to go into action and to rally the workers and peasants for the realization of our aims. In October the German Party announced that the struggle was there but when the situation had really become a revolutionary one, did nothing to make the struggle an actuality. The German Party leaders added to their other mistakes this important one, that after the October defeat, their Central Committee still failed to recognize its mistakes, and constructed instead its theory of the victory of Facism over the November Republic.

Comrades, the defeat is not a question of personalities, it is a political question. The question is, whether the party, in a given situation, fulfilled its task in the way the situation demanded and when Brandler tries to push merely formal and mechanical questions into the foreground, leaving the political aspect unmentioned, then we must make up for his deficiencies. Comrade Brandler tries to disguise the fact that, as early as the Leipzig Congress, we had recognized that the occupation of the Ruhr meant an intensifying of the crisis to a revolutionary pitch, and the German Party would be called in a very few months to carry out the proletarian revolution. But the majority of the Leipzig Congress took the view that the occupation was no doubt an important event, but need not be treated as the first point on the agenda; they did this in order to avoid the consequences.

The Cuno movement showed that the masses relied far more on their own initiative and activity than the Central Committee had believed. In Hamburg, despite the strength of the Social Democrats, we carried through a general strike, whereas in Saxony, upon which the Central Committee was concentrating its entire policy, the general strike was rejected. That alone shows the ideological differences existing within the party, and these differences had their practical influence upon the struggle. After the Cuno strike, the Executive became attentive to the revolutionary mood of the German proletariat. Comrade Brandler knows perfectly well that we were unanimously of the opinion that it was impossible to avoid a fight for the proletarian dictatorship within a few weeks time in Germany. The Executive and the comrades from other countries were also unanimously of the same opinion. But we realised, at the end of October, that the German Communist Party, was no true Communist

Party, even though 95% of it was made up of factory workers. Their leaders had not the necessary political and ideological attitude.

Brandler judges the situation mainly from the technical side. But a revolutionary leader should not limit himself to technical questions. He must reckon with the workers' will to fight. He is entirely wrong to compare the economic struggles of 1923 with those of 1924. In 1923 the proletariat had the feeling that the revolution might break out in the next five minutes. To-day it no longer has that feeling. The failure of the leaders consists in this, that they did not enter upon the struggle when there was so strong a determination to fight. The proletariat was better prepared for this struggle than is represented by Comrade Brandler.

What appeared in Dresden was the indication of the inner weakness of the whole Party leadership. When Comrade Böttcher declared that he was responsible not to General Müller, but to the majority of parliament, he had not understood that it was the task to use parliament, and to declare it to be the platform for revolutionary propaganda; and that he was responsible not to parliament, but to the revolutionary proletariat. A conflict should have been allowed to develop, so that the proletariat should understand that it had to overcome the bourgeoisie of Saxony and of all Germany. Nothing of the sort happened. The Saxon policy was really one of those tactics of the German Communist Party which have been developed during 1920—23.

Now as to the situation in October. As we told Comrade Brandler, when information was received from the railway workers that Reichswehr forces were being drawn from the garrisons to be moved into Saxony, it was the duty of the whole Party to issue a call to the railway workers demanding that they should not allow the transport of any Reichswehr troops. That also did not happen. The Central Committee of Saxony did not understand what was going on there. The bourgeoisie was more cunning. It represented the intervention of the Reichswehr in Saxony as the struggle against Bavarian Facism, and in league with the Social-Democrats, deceived the proletariat. The marching of the Reichswehr should have been the signal to take the struggle along the whole line.

The membership is winning confidence in us. The Party is consolidated. We stand before great tasks. If the Experts' Report is carried out, that means the throttling of the German working class. It is very easily possible that breathing space for the bourgeoisie may then take place, which it will attempt to introduce the 11 to 14 hours working day. But, as in Italy, the position of Mussolini was made more difficult by the attempt on a Social-Democratic in Germany, economic and political differences may arise which will present new and great tasks to us.

We were never so determined as now, at this Congress. We hope that the World Congress will show the German Party the way to achieve that which the Russian workers and peasants achieved in the year 1917: the victory of the revolution, the brotherhood in arms of the German workers and peasants, in order to erect a firm, steelarmoured wall against the world bourgeoisie.

Kussinen (Finland):

speaking on behalf of the Finnish delegation, announced in Finland, the day before yesterday, sentence was passed on the mass of members of the Central Committee and on the local organizations of the revolutionary Labour Party who had declared for affiliation to the Comintern, and who had been in prison since last August. Eighty-nine comrades were sentenced to periods of imprisonment amounting altogether to 300 years. Owing to its fear of the elections the government has only just dared to publish the sentences. Following on this statement the sidium proposed the following protest:

"The Fifth World Congress expresses the horror of the whole Communist International at the terrible sentence passed as the result of class hatred, and of the malignant class terror practised by the Finnish bourgeoisie. At the same time the Congress sends, far over the shameless heads of the Finnish government, a fraternal greeting to the fighters who have been sentenced for their part in the revolutionary struggle to

the Finnish proletariat. The Communist International is determined to support the revolutionary class struggle of the workers and the poor peasants of Finland with all its power, until the proletarian revolution itself passes judgment on the class government of the Finnish White Guards."

This protest was unanimously adopted by the Congress with loud applause.

The discussion on the report of the Executive was continued by Comrade Bukharin, who was greeted with loud applause.

Bukharin (Russia):

The two most important problems with which we are faced are those of the united front and of the labour government, viewed in the light of the Saxony experiment. How does the problem stand now? Is it true that any of us wishes to put an end to the policy of the United Front? Comrades, I think only exist in the imagination of Comrade Radek. What we are fighting is only an interpretation of the tactics of the united front which does really solve the greatest danger for our Communist Parties.

Now we come to the question of the Labour Government. The reason why this question is so controversial is that we setting ourselves a problem which cannot be solved. Our governments may be of the most various and peculiar forms, and have a very variable nature. Even a Labour Government, which is really a dictatorship of the workers, take many different forms. Take for instance the Russian dictatorship and the Hungarian dictatorship. There is no question that, in Hungary, a labour government did exist, and it did represent a dictatorship; there is also no question, at the time we joined with the Left Social-Revolutionaries in the government, we also exercised a dictatorship of the proletariat. But while, in Hungary, our party became merged into the Social-Democratic party, in Russia we were to go further. We consolidated our party, developed our organisations at a terrific rate, and undermined the strength of our "brothers in arms." At the right moment we called the other people from the government, and consolidated the dictatorship. The whole mistake of the comrades who have been speaking here lies in the fact that, instead of pursuing a "Russian Policy" in the definite sense of the word, they not only undertake nothing but sometimes pursue the very opposite policy. That was to be observed at the time of the Saxony experiment. The essential thing in a labour government is that one must always be driving on and developing things further — that is more important definitions.

I think it is pertinent to take as the text of our conclusions the conclusions which have been recognized even by Radek. Radek has said: we made two mistakes and must learn two lessons from them. First that we did not organise the united front from below and secondly that every labour government is bound to collapse if there are no mass organisations of the proletariat to support it. These conclusions are absolutely true, but they stand in the most violent contradiction to Radek's further declarations. What were the tactics which Brandler tried to develop here? He said, we wanted to gain time for our preparations. But if we are at all is being done in this preliminary period it surely be only one thing — action is the best preparation. Brandler says, we had to make our preparations, and so could not manage to do certain things like extending our organisations, etc., etc. There we have the whole picture before our eyes. Surely the most important elements cannot be eliminated from the preparations? Why then these particular preparations never made? The mistake admitted by Radek cannot be made to harmonize with the direction which the Central Committee was at that time pursuing.

We can never forget the sort of speeches that were made at this time about the "Basis of the Constitution" or how compensation for the Saxon royal family was made due to the parliamentary situation at the moment. I already replied that if that is the sort of opinion you hold if you believe that the parliamentary situation excuses the war credits by the Social-Democrats in 1914. These symptoms which show the whole attitude of the party.

The Central Committee of the German Party pursued a policy in October which would make the carrying on of the revolution impossible. We cannot blame the comrades because they did not establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. But we can blame them for not having done everything possible to make the necessary preparations for it. Brandler said: we have to gain time in order to make our preparations; that is why we could not make any experiments in socialization. But experiments of that kind are the preparation of the masses, they set masses in motion.

It may be said that our mistakes are partly due to former mistakes. There is no doubt that the question of utilizing the bourgeois democratic state machinery, as it was formulated by Brandler, has a certain connection with these mistakes. Comrade Thalheimer seemed to be making a good point when he spoke in support of the organic structure of the party as it exists in Russia. But if he really holds this view why should he complain that we broke up the continuity of the Cadres in the German party? Cadres of this kind are formations which are controlled by correct policy. If there is no correct policy with which to guide the cadres, then the cadres themselves have no existence. There is also no doubt that the contradictions within the party played their part in the October defeat. The division which existed between the party centre and the mass of party members formed a most violent contrast to the part, which Comrade Lenin outlined as that of a party. The most important preliminary condition for the guidance of a battle is that the party center should have sufficient authority. That was not the case in October.

And now a few remarks about the general position of the Communist International. The crisis which arose in the last year was no chance phenomenon. There are relations between the Russian crisis and the German, Bulgarian and French crises, etc., etc. Conditions which produced these crises were of a two-fold nature. We have solved problems which we all had in common. Our contact with the petty bourgeois elements had had as a result that certain petty bourgeois tendencies had become noticeable in our party. In the second place the defeats in Bulgaria, Germany, etc., have not been without their effect. There is no doubt that we shall overcome these critical conditions. It is just by fighting against deviations of this kind that truly Bolshevik parties may grow up. From one point of view, therefore, one can regard the crisis as the result of our defeats, from another one can look upon it as a crisis natural to the process of our growth.

I do not think it is as all a bad thing that the great revolutionary processes are just now developing in society. These revolutionary processes also have their own natural causes. Also, it is a very good thing that the German proletariat is altering its temperament a little. That seems to us quite a wholesome process. Marx pointed out long ago that, during a civil war, the temperament of the proletariat alters, and this change in the German proletariat is one of the preliminaries to victory in the future. (Loud applause).

The session was then closed.

Tenth Session.

June 24th.

The Session was opened by comrade Thälmann, who called upon comrade Brown (England) to speak to the discussion.

Brown (England):

said that the relation of the British Communist Party to the Labour Party and to the Labour Government was of special importance to the International. Comrade Petrovsky's statement that discontent with the MacDonald Government was growing among the masses, was liable to misunderstanding. It was important that there should be no misunderstanding here. It was true that during the past five months, considerable discontent had grown up among the masses within the Labour Party, but the Labour Government was not losing ground. It was gaining more and more support from the masses outside the Labour Party, who were beginning to speak in terms of the Labour Government's actions. MacDonald was making a bold and astute bid, by the popularisation of his various de-

VICES such as the relief of unemployment, the building of houses, etc., to capture the support of these masses. There were indications that MacDonald was winning, and would, by these means, get an increased majority at the next election.

Turning to comrade Ruth Fischer's criticism of the British Party, comrade Brown observed that our German comrade floated across to England for 24 hours, looked at comrade Ferguson's election address, and at once decided that a new policy was required for the British Party. She said that we were an inexperienced Party. That was partly true—but, when we were younger, we had taken comrade Ruth Fischer's view, that we should completely oppose official Labour Party candidates, and comrade Lenin had spent a considerable time in curing us of this "purist" view. He did this because he realised that the proletarian masses were inside the Labour Party, and that fighting that Party at the polls would drive us out of contact with these masses.

Comrade Ruth Fischer failed to distinguish between the Labour Party and the Labour Government. Affiliated to the Labour Party were over five millions of trade-unionists. The leadership of these masses was in the hands of liberal officials, who had succeeded in permeating the Party with pacifism and other bourgeois democratic doctrines, but the Party nevertheless remained a mass proletarian party. Our task was to get inside these masses and to capture their leadership. If we opposed any Labour Party candidate, the door would be shut upon us, and every communist member excluded from the Labour Party. In every part of the country, in the local labour parties and in trades councils also, our fractions were at work; and their task was to drive together the opposition inside the Labour Party. To adopt comrade Ruth Fischer's view would mean that we could not continue this task. We should become sectarian, and that was opposed to the whole spirit of Leninism. This was neither a minority nor a majority point of view, but the united view of the British Party Delegation, Executive, and Party Congress.

In conclusion comrade Brown referred to comrade Bordiga's letter, quoted by comrade Zinoviev, regarding the leadership of the Comintern. He expressed the view of the British Delegation, that although the Russian Party had lost its great leader, it was still from its experience and history fitted, beyond the possibility of challenge to provide the leadership of the Comintern.

Krajewski (Poland)

"A revolutionary party need not be ashamed to admit its mistake. The section of the Central Committee that is working in Poland has adopted a resolution in which it is stated that our December letter was a political mistake. We did not give a clear and Bolshevik answer to the burning political question. We believed at the time that we did not possess sufficient material to judge the questions on their merits. Our only answer could be that we supported the Central Committee against the opposition in the Russian as well as in the German question. We desire to cooperate with the comrades of the German Party and we believe that it was proper to hand over to these comrades the leadership of the Party. In our Polish Party we have noticed for some time the presence of opportunistic tendencies, which we endeavoured to combat.

It was stated here that the Polish Party has very good Bolshevik masses, but no Bolshevik leadership. This reproach is largely unjust. Long before any other Party, we adopted the slogan of the Bolshevisation of the Party, and exerted every effort to carry out with the utmost thoroughness.

Ever since our second conference, we have given a good deal of attention to the question of our relations with the peasantry, and have already made important progress, particularly in the occupied districts, where we have won the adherence of large masses. We have made big progress in the national question too.

One word about the mass actions. We were reproached with failure to assert ourselves during the Cracow revolt. The Cracow revolt was a brief episode in the big struggle which went on for a whole month. The revolution was expected in Germany, and we deemed it our duty to devote our main attention to the strategical districts of Upper Silesia, the Dombrów coal mining region, Warsaw and Lodz. The trouble with us was that after the Cracow revolt we did not sufficiently appreciate the events. We consider it rather as the

symbol of the alliance between the workers and the peasantry as the symbol of the armed rising. Our second mistake was after the liquidation of the general strike at Warsaw by the Polish Socialist Party, that we rushed to the conclusion that it was good for us to liquidate the fight, in deference to other organizations, and for the sake of a united front. Nevertheless, I must say that the Communist Party was always the head of those fights. In spite of the wishes of the social democrats, a splendid united front was built up from the bottom. Even to-day we wield unlimited influence in Upper Silesia.

As regards the tactics of the united front, we have committed the same mistake as all the other parties. We too contend with right deviations, which we had to combat. But it stands to reason that these mistakes cannot be rid of unless we see clearly that the right deviations are the result of a wrong opportunistic application of the tactic of the united front in the whole of the preceding period, as the slogan of the workers and peasants' government means to win the masses of the workers and peasants, in order to array them against the bourgeois government and overthrow the capitalist domination. In this sense the workers' and peasants' government is to us a synonym for the dictatorship. We reject all evolutionary ideas about the workers' and peasants' government.

We are of the opinion that it is quite proper at this congress to form a front against the dangers from the right, are fully in agreement with the view developed here by German comrades, and we desire to work hand in hand with them to the last fight.

Kolarov

Comrades, hitherto the discussion was concerned with the German question, and this is only natural. For the German question is one of the most important questions before us. No mention whatever was made of the Bulgarian question of tactical mistakes which were made and of the events of June and September 1923. The mistakes made in Bulgaria were of a kind common to all agrarian countries.

Comrade Radek declared that the defeat of our party very decisive. All I can say is that neither the June nor September defeat was decisive. The Bulgarian Communist Party is still in existence, and is getting ready for a new fight. Comrade Radek explained our defeat by the fact that the international conditions were not favourable for revolutionary action in a small country like Bulgaria. The international situation had nothing to do with the attitude adopted by the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party to the coup d'Etat of June 1923. The attitude of our Party was entirely determined by internal Party conditions, and Comrade Radek also said in his speech that the main cause of our Party's defeat was the lack of attention on the part of our Party to propaganda and work among the poorer sections of the masses.

Our chief mistake was not the attitude of our Party towards the poor peasantry, but its attitude towards the political peasant organisation and towards the peasant movement.

Our party allowed itself to be influenced by the victory achieved by the peasant government at the end of 1923. Besides, the Party was also influenced by the labour and anti-communist attitude adopted by the government at the time. At the time of the coup d'Etat the prisons were filled with communists sent here by the government. Our party also under-estimated its forces, over-estimated those of the bourgeoisie and of the reaction. Such was the situation at the time of the coup d'Etat.

As to the united front, I must say, that one of the mistakes of our Party consisted in its failure to apply united front tactics extensively enough. In Bulgaria we applied united front tactics only from below. We did not pay attention to the peasant organization and also to the social democratic organization which, it is true, had influence whatever. After the June defeat conditions were different, and our Party adopted the united front tactic as well as from below, and commenced a movement which is developing favourably. The slogan of the workers' and peasants' government, which before the coup d'Etat was an invitation to the workers and peasants to form a revolutionary alliance, was converted after the June and Sep-

into a slogan of revolutionary action. The workers' and peasants' government can only be achieved by revolutionary action.

Comrade Kolarov said in conclusion: It is wrong to say that external conditions preclude all revolutionary action. We, representatives of the Balkan countries, are of the opinion that the situation in the Balkans is as complicated, uncertain and revolutionary as before, and that it is pregnant with serious consequences. Therefore, we fully agree with the line adopted by the Executive Committee of the Communist International, whose aim is to organise and to guide the revolutionary campaign in all countries.

Lensky (Poland)

What we are witnessing in the German and also in the Polish Party shows us that both these parties are already consolidating their position on the basis of revolutionary united front practice. I am not going to deal here with the election in Germany, but I wish to say that the election results in spite of comrade Radek's doubts, have also been significant not only quantitatively but also qualitatively. For the first time in the history of the revolutionary labour movement, the French Communist Party polled almost a million votes for the slogan of the proletarian dictatorship in the fight against democratic illusions. But we cannot speak as favourably of the Polish party. Comrade Krajewski said here that the Polish Communist Party has already made good its mistake. I think that this is not so. It is true that the Cracow events were only an episode of the revolutionary advance during the October events. But Comrade Krajewski omitted to mention that during these October events our Communist Party did not assert itself anywhere in Poland as an independent Party. The Upper Silesian events were only the extension which confirms the rule, all the more as those events did not take place under the leadership of the Central Committee, but rather under that of Comrades inclined to criticise the Central Committee.

One cannot lay the responsibility for the mistakes which were made at the door of the minor organizations. The Central Committee alone is responsible for these mistakes. And the mistakes made in connection with the main question—those of the united front and of the workers' and peasants' government, still stand to-day.

It is true that the comrades from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Poland have reconsidered their attitude towards the Russian and German question. It is rather in the day, but better late than never. But the question is, although outwardly they appear to have changed their attitude, they still meander between the left and the right of the German Communist Party and between the Russian Central Committee, and the opposition. This was very conspicuous at the Ukrainian conference of our Polish Comrades. Such hesitancy cannot be tolerated. The material of the Russian and German discussions has not yet been published, and the Central Committee has not yet taken up a definite attitude toward the Frankfurt Party Congress. Comrades who tried to raise discussion on the main questions with which the entire international is concerned, and those who pointed out the Central Committee's chief mistakes during the October events, are relieved of their responsible party posts.

Comrade Zinoviev is wrong in saying that the mistakes made by the Polish Communist Party must be set right "a little". These mistakes must be set right not "a little" but thoroughly. We must create within the Polish Communist Party a healthy and militant Bolshevik nucleus and revolutionary leadership, if we desire to convert it into a body capable of carrying on the fight which is in store for it and the Parties of our International.

Neurath (Czecho-Slovakia)

Comrades, that the criticisms of Comrade Zinoviev of the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party are useful and in many respects to the point, is admitted by the Czecho-Slovakian Party in its declaration. The articles criticised by Comrade Zinoviev should neither be over-estimated nor under-estimated, inasmuch as they appeared in the Central organ of the Czecho-Slovakian Communist Party and were not contented either by the Central Committee or by Comrade Zinoviev. Some of the comrades, including Comrade Smeral, raise the question as follows: We are living in a period of

consolidation of capitalism which is going to continue for a long time, and for this reason we must prepare the party immediately not for revolutionary struggles but for the fight for every day demands, for the organisational building up of the party, while devoting greater attention to parliamentary activity.

Now, comrades, so far as the period of respite is concerned, I believe that we may speak of it in very limited sense. The increased defence of the German bourgeoisie signifies a simultaneous increase of the capital offensive in other countries, notably in Czecho-Slovakia. The sections, particularly in the important capitalist countries, must get ready for big fights, and as is properly pointed out in the instructions of the German Party, they must be prepared any day to lead the Party and its followers among the workers into decisive revolutionary fight.

The development of the European revolutionary movement depends largely on the fact whether or not the German Communist Party will become a good party. For this reason there is particular need for a clear and definite attitude by the various parties towards the decision taken by the Executive upon the German question. It should not be formulated in the manner in which it was done by Smeral: eighty-percent consent, and twenty percent mistrust.

As regards the Workers' and Peasants' Government, we may say that, as soon as the situation in Czecho-Slovakia becomes critical, Masaryk, Benes, and the others will even join the fascists against the communists. Nevertheless, the slogan is a good one. A situation may arise when the Czech party will have to consider seriously the question of a Workers' and Peasants' Government. Nevertheless, it is expressly understood that on the formation of a Workers' and Peasants' Government in which the Communist Party will be represented, our representatives will promptly reveal the fight for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Pepper (U. S. A.)

I want to begin my speech with a critical remark. I was afraid that the congress had become one-sidedly a German Congress, or at best a Central European Congress. So far it has been too little of a world congress. In one respect this is quite right since the German problem is the main problem, the vital question of the Communist International. As regards this problem, the German Party and the International has found the right answer in the various Left tendencies. On the other hand it is not right, because within the International there are other and newer problems than the German problem. The October defeat and the MacDonald Government have removed the centre of gravity from Germany to England. The next task is to crystallise a British Communist mass party.

In the discussions which have hitherto taken place only one side of the workers' and peasants' government came to the fore: the united front with the Social Democrats and the Workers' Government in Saxony. We have not spoken of the united front which requires consideration in connection with the labour parties in a number of countries, and especially in England. We must not forget that this is not only a British problem, it is also the problem of the labour movement in the United States, South Africa, Australia, etc. Here the united front has of course a quite different form from that on the European continent, where the tactics of the united front are conducted without organizational alliances. In the countries I have mentioned the tactics of the united front have gone so far that the members of the Communist Parties are also members of other non-Communist parties, Labour parties. We must of course not lose sight of the fact that the labour parties are not ordinary political parties in the continental sense. They represent a bloc of diverse political parties, trade unions, and other working class organizations. They are not based upon individual membership but upon the membership of whole organizations.

Before we determine our tactics in these countries, we must ask ourselves what is the true nature of the labour parties and how they have arisen. It is, of course, false and un-Marxian to think that their origin is due to the specific Anglo-Saxon psychology. They are the product of quite definite historical conditions. They have come into existence in the countries where the labour aristocracy developed so early and powerfully that a broad cleavage was formed between

the proletarian masses and the labour aristocracy. In the countries where the common interests of the proletariat as a class had not become sufficiently evident, no political mass parties could arise. For this reason the trade unions developed first and it was the trade unions which laid the foundations of the political labour party, in contradistinction to the European continent, where social democracy first came into being and in its turn founded the trade unions.

The period in which the Labour Parties arose is also important. In England the Labour Party came into being when the trade unions began to become a menace to the state power. In America the capitalist offensive and the new powerful bureaucratized state power of the trade unions are only just compelling the creation of a political mass party.

We must also not forget the role played by the small political parties. Everywhere we see, side by side with the trade unions, the beginnings of small, disciplined sects based upon individual membership which enter into mass organizations and facilitate the birth of mass political parties. In Britain this task fell to the Independent Labour Party and in America to our Workers' Party. It is very important to remember that the Independent Labour Party, with its 50,000 members, stands at the head of the Labour Party, with its 5,000,000 workers, and that our small Workers' Party was able to control a convention at which 600,000 workers and farmers were represented.

The situation in the United States is much more complicated than in England. In America there is a mass movement which is only just beginning to create a Labour Party. It is the task of the communists in America to sever the proletariat from the parties of finance capital.

In America there is not even a treacherous labour party which has organized the workers for any definite purpose. Another factor is that there is no labour party in America, but a Farmer-Labour Party, in which the workers and poor farmers are organized in common. There is a third peculiarity: the movement is bound up with the movement of petty-bourgeoisie and even of the rich peasants, from which it will be separated only with difficulty. This will be brought about only by the development of the class war. Comrade Zinoviev was right when he said that the situation in America is very complicated, and if the Executive hesitated long before it came to a decision, I hope that this decision will be adhered to.

What must be our tactics with relation to the Labour Party? Lenin said, and the Comintern in 1920 adopted a decision accordingly, that we were to enter the Labour Party not to use it mechanically as a means of contact with the masses, but to use it as a means of severing the masses from their opportunist leaders. Unfortunately, our parties have not understood these tactics correctly. There was a period when they refused to enter the Labour parties. There is now a period however when they want to remain in at all costs, even at the cost of our political independence and freedom of criticism. Neither of these standpoints is communistic. We must go in, but we must maintain our political independence. Comrade Murphy is wrong when he says that to leave the British Labour Party would be to leave the labour movement. Every communist can through his trade union membership remain a member of the Labour Party, but the Communist Party, as a party, is not obliged to remain in the Labour Party, (applause). This is determined historically. To-day I may be in favour of the British Communist Party remaining in the Labour Party, but to-morrow we may be against it, and I believe that the time will come when the whole Comintern will be against it. We must remain inside because the Labour Party still retains the confidence of its membership, and for three reasons: firstly, because it makes the workers certain small concessions which are important in their every-day life. Secondly because the working class masses hold the standpoint that the Labour Party is indeed in office but not in power. Thirdly, because we have still not been capable of spreading the idea of the proletarian revolution in Great Britain. The Communist Party in England must remain within the Labour Party organizationally, but outside ideologically.

It is very easy to criticise the British and American comrades, but it is a very important question, or as Comrade Zinoviev said, the central question of the Congress, to point out the way to the British, American, Canadian, South African and Australian comrades. We must give advice, not merely criticise. The crystallisation of the communist world party must be effected both intensively and extensively. Intensively in the sense that we must bolshevise the existing communist parties, and extensively in the sense that we must win new sections of the earth for communism (Great applause).

Eleventh Session (Evening)

At the afternoon session Comrade Thälmann took the chair and called upon Comrade Dunne, America:

Comrade Dunne:

said that in his report Comrade Zinoviev has dealt quite well with the American party not because that party had not made mistakes, but because these had been corrected. The mistakes made were due largely to the composition of the party and the difficult nature of the American population. There has not been a mass revolutionary party in the United States, and attempts to form one, hitherto, had failed. The American Party had from its very beginning met with the open hostility of the American bourgeoisie; and it had been able to operate in open only since 1922. The American Party was not faced with the necessity, as were the European parties, of splitting masses from socialdemocratic leadership. The American Socialist Party had been dispersed, with the exception of a handful who were now in the Compers Camp. There was no revolutionary party except the Communist Party of America. They were confronted with no dangers in the formation of the united front with lower strata of the petty-bourgeoisie and with trade union leaders.

Its object in carrying on the manoeuvres for the formation of the Farmer-Labor Party was to drive a wedge between exploited workers and the farmers. There were some differences within the party as to the basis for the Farmer-Labor movement. Some wished to base it upon the industrial workers, but the minority tended to over-emphasize the importance of the agricultural workers. In this connection Comrade Pepper's claim to represent the Left was not correct. To wish to base the agricultural worker the basis of the movement as against the industrial proletariat was not a left basis.

America was faced with a coming economic crisis, a great increase in unemployment, the closing of factories and general industrial paralysis. The Party had foreseen this and believed that the crisis would not come as quickly as estimated by Comrade Pepper. They were now fully prepared to meet the coming crisis but believed that the extent of the present crisis was over-estimated.

The St. Paul Conference did not result in the formation of a mass party, but in the gathering together of various elements including groups of bankrupt farmers. Until the industrial masses were drawn into the party, it would possess no basis as a real revolutionary mass party. But at present the American working class was too well employed, well paid, fed and clothed to be in a revolutionary state of mind.

Turning to the problem of American imperialism, Comrade Dunne pointed out that Latin America, which contained a population of 110,000,000 Spanish speaking peoples, had been replaced the lost German markets as far as the United States was concerned. The population of South America was a whole hostile to American imperialism, and it was the task of the American Party to organize these workers to resist American imperialist class.

The American trade union system, organising four millions of workers, was the world's most reactionary trade union system. It was the first line defender of capitalism and imperialism for American imperialism. The principal task of the American Party was to embrace and lead the whole 20 million America's industrial proletariat. It was a clean-cut fight between the communists and all sections of the bourgeoisie, ten to twelve million negroes, the most bitterly exploited in America, were led by people whose function it was to drive them servile henchmen of the bourgeoisie. They were driven into industry to compete with the white workers, constituted a serious problem, coupled with that of the influx into the industry of 2 million farmers, driven off the land by bankruptcy. The agricultural group was of increasing importance as an economic and political factor, but the American Party must not base its tactics of the united front on the proletariat. The American Party was now becoming a party and was united behind its present leadership. The experiences of the past two years had brought it knowledge and ability to deal with the complicated American economic situation.

Comrade Dunne then referred to the criticisms of the British Party, which, he observed, the British comrades seemed to resent. When Comrade Zinoviev had said that in England there was a tradition of small parties, the British delegates had seemed pleased. It seemed as if they thought that, if they had been a big party, they would have been out of the tradition and would have been wrong. The British Party needed an intensive political campaign linked up with the party. It would not gain the membership it needed by diffused propaganda and abstract communism. He believed that applications for membership were much better than a great many abstract speeches.

Chassaigne: (French Y. C. L.):

Comrades, on behalf of the Young Communist International, and especially on behalf of the French Young Communist League, I should like to record our complete agreement with Comrade Zinoviev's report.

We have in France a situation which, although not exactly revolutionary, has very little in common with the description given by Comrade Radek in the course of his speech. There is, after all, every hope of revolutionary developments on a large scale. There is no doubt whatever, that, by endorsing the Experts' Report, the Left Bloc will bring disillusionment into the ranks of French workers. We must be prepared for this eventuality, as well as for the eventuality of an offensive on the part of the French capitalists. We must be a mass party, and we cannot be that unless we have a strong bolshevik nucleus within our French Party.

Comrade Zinoviev said in his speech that there was already a left wing in the French Party, and that the Communist International supported this left wing. Many of us in the French Party identify ourselves entirely with the view point of the Communist International, and we declare here that we are willing to work in full accord with this left wing of the French Party. Moreover, Comrades, in spite of Comrade Radek's opinion of our Party, I am justified in saying that the French Party is full of vitality. This is shown by the influx into our ranks of workers who formerly belonged to the Socialist Party. They are joining us as a result of the efforts made during the election campaign to form a united front of workers and peasants.

Comrade Radek reproached us with our inability to mobilise the masses in the streets of Paris at the time of the Ruhr occupation. It is true that we were unable to do this, but we have done something else. We initiated an agitation within the Army of Occupation which resulted in many cases in fraternisation among French soldiers and German workers, to the profound alarm of the bourgeoisie.

I should like to say a few words about our brother party in Italy. It is, to say the least, not very pleasant to have to fight at this congress, which has manifested such a strong tendency to the right, against extreme left tendencies. But a left tendency exists in Italy. In Italy, as in France, it is essential to form a strong mass party. We think that one must fight against the extreme errors of Comrade Bordiga as well as against the revisionist tendencies of Comrades Graziadei and Lombardi.

I should like to emphasise the necessity of establishing factory nuclei, as this is the form of party activity in which the youth has been very successful. We think that we must insist on the reorganization of the Communist masses on a basis of factory nuclei, during the next twelve months because we have parties which are more in the nature of sects, and which have not taken a root in the working class.

We wish also to draw your attention to the British Communist Party, which has much to accomplish in that direction, because of the existence of a powerful navy, just as the French Party has to work on this field because France has the most powerful army in the world. Comrades, we must make it incumbent on all of our parties to carry on anti-militarist propaganda, and not to rest content with anti-militarist propaganda outside, but to carry it right into the ranks of the army.

The 14th Congress of the Communist International, together with the Young Communist International, made decisions on this subject, but very few parties put these decisions into practice. The army must be permeated with Communist ideas. This can be done by supporting the special demands of the soldiers, for it is by working for the realisation of such demands that the soldiers will begin to understand that their interests are identical with the interests of the workers.

We think that with our parties reorganised on a basis of factory nuclei, we shall be able to initiate throughout the International a well-organised propaganda within the army, and that, in France especially, we shall be able to confront French imperialism with a strong bolshevik party.

The next speaker was comrade Clara Zetkin who was greeted with loud and prolonged cheers.

Zetkin:

If we are now engaged in weighing and reviewing the road already traversed, it is because we wish to outline the path for the next courageous advance. For we are all united in the conviction and the desire that we must speed the courses of the revolution. In this respect the central points are the October retreat of the German Communist Party and the tactics of the united front, two subjects of international importance. We have listened to the statement of the majority representatives of the German Communist Party about the October defeat and its causes. We were entertained to a grotesque misrepresentation of the past, and to a heavenly glorification of the present. It was asserted that the October defeat was the inevitable outcome of the petty bourgeois, opportunist policy pursued by the Communist Party since 1921, which was calculated to liquidate the role of the Communist Party as an independent and leading revolutionary class party of the proletariat, and thus to deprive it of its right to exist. There are several facts which give the lie to this assertion. We are told here about Brandlerism and Radekism, regardless of the fact that until quite recently Radek was one of the most ardent champions of the left wing. Brandler, who is reproached with having pursued his policy quite consciously and systematically since 1921, did not come back to Berlin until the autumn of 1922. Yet another fact should be pointed out: the policy of the former Central Committee was endorsed by the Executive until the October defeat. Therefore, if the German Party is indeed guilty of any sin, the Executive is equally guilty, because it has not acted with the utmost vigour against the opportunist policy. It was asserted that comrade Brandler had deliberately chosen Saxony as the battle ground for the application of the tactics of the united front which was to culminate in the "workers' government", for the reason that the communist masses in that country were already contaminated with opportunism. The fact of the matter is that comrade Brandler did attach supreme importance to the development of the situation in Saxony, yet it was not because he considered the communist masses contaminated with social-democracy, but rather because he erroneously imagined the social-democratic masses to be so impregnated with our influence that they would join us in the fight. There was yet another important reason for choosing Saxony as the battle ground. It was the talk of the town that the fascisti in Berlin were going to restore the monarchy on the 9th of November. The only way to frustrate this plan was to retard the fascisti march from the South, in Saxony and Thuringia. If the events in Saxony did not bring about the proletarian revolution, they have at least contributed to the fact that the fascist attempt on the 9th of November resulted in nothing else but the Hitler farce at Munich. The majority representatives seem to share the view of comrade Zinoviev that the October retreat was due to a wrong application of the tactics of the united front, to a parliamentary comedy of workers' government. To my mind, the October defeat was due to a number of causes, which should prompt us to criticise severely the attitude of the Party prior to October.

Thanks to the occupation of the Ruhr, the situation was doubtlessly extremely revolutionary from an objective point of view, and it already began to grow even subjectively revolutionary. All of a sudden, so to speak, hundreds of hot springs bubbled forth from the ground that was rent by an outburst of volcanic forces. It was the task of the Party to merge these waters into one strong stream, and to set to this stream its course and its goal. In other words, the fight was to be waged for the conquest of power. This did not happen. The Party did not take timely cognisance of the revolutionary situation, nor did it take advantage of the situation with sufficient consistency and vigour. And by far the larger part of the blame rests upon the leadership of the German Communist Party, because it should have led the way instead of waiting to be driven into activity by the masses. It was the duty of the Party to lead up the common everyday demands of the proletariat to the

demand for the conquest of power, and to challenge a civil war, not abstractly, but by utilising and intensifying the movement for the amelioration of the situation of the people. The Party failed to utilise all the opportunities for action in parliament, in the communal councils, at public meetings and demonstrations, so as to transform every cry for bread, clothing or education into the cry: down with the capitalist dictatorship! The Party failed to concentrate and to permeate the factory councils and to organise them into centres of support for mass action. Neither did it infuse the breath of life into the militant organs of the united front, by making the proletarian hundreds active and by giving them a definite aim, or serve as the defence crops of the workers in their daily struggles.

How are these mistakes to be explained? The Party was convinced that the fight for the conquest of power would be inaugurated by an extreme effort, in which all the forces would pull and work together. It considered the partial fights and the partial demands merely as the premature dissipation of the energy of the masses. It did not consider the fight for partial demands as a means of recruiting, mobilising and educating the proletariat for the mass-fight for power. This wrong view is indeed a fatal social-democratic legacy. When the Party at last saw the full meaning of the revolutionary situation, it made a belated effort to rally the mass-organisations and to equip them militarily and technically for the armed rising. Of course, military and organisational preparation are both necessary things. But they alone do not suffice. They must go hand in hand with tireless and consistent education of the masses to the necessity and inevitability of the armed fight. It was Napoleon who said that 80 percent of the guarantees of victory are of a moral nature. This is twice, tenfold true of civil war; on the outbreak of the revolutionary fight, the masses will have to take into consideration the military and technical preparedness of the counter-revolution. The deficiency must be made good by moral factors: political insight, militant courage, self-sacrifice etc. The military and technical preparations will partly be effected in the actual course of the struggle. The most essential postulate for the start of the fight is for everyone to be convinced that the fight must be fought, and that he must take part in it. This conviction begets the desire to find one's own weapons, and it is quite possible that this desire will render every stick in the house, every hammer in the factory, and even every bare fist, a mighty weapon wherewith to fight the enemy. The Party has done little or nothing to imbue the large masses with the desire and consciousness of the necessity of the armed fight. By its policies and political activities it failed to get into innermost touch with the masses that are to be engaged in the fight, either in the whole of Germany nor even in Saxony, where the fight was to flare up. Under these circumstances the common "workers' government" of communists and social-democrats was indeed a huge mistake. The only sense in a workers' government was if it would be formed as the growing effect of a tremendous mass-movement, backed by the political organs of proletarian power outside of parliament, by the workers' councils and by their congress, and above all, by an armed working class. The very reverse was done. The workers' government was to be the starting point of a mass movement, and of the arming of the proletariat. Under these circumstances it was inevitable that some mistakes should be committed in the application of the tactics of the United Front. And so it happened. The feverish hunt for arms had the effect of frustrating the very revolutionary policy which was to arouse and to rally the masses and to get them to use the weapons in the fight. The net result was: no weapons and no men. Brandler had to admit subsequently at the Chemnitz Conference that the Communist Party was fighting while the masses were not ready to fight. And it was this sad state of affairs that urged him to refrain from appealing for a fight. It was asserted here that the retreat did not express the revolutionary sentiment which existed among the masses. Nothing of the kind. Of course, the Party, the leadership as well as the membership, was inspired by a strong and honest desire to fight. Nevertheless, the bare fact was that the masses were not prepared to fight; because the Party failed to make proper use of the spontaneous revolutionary outburst of the masses, it was allowed to flicker out uselessly. The same thing happened at the time of the Cuno strike. The Cuno strike was certainly an abortive attempt to lend political colour to the movement of the masses, but it revealed also the great lack of political maturity for the revolt, for the capture of power. How otherwise was it possible that the masses allowed

themselves to be lulled by the social-democratic cum bourgeois hotch-potch of the Stresemann-Sollmann-Hilferding Government. Then came the Emergency Powers Act, the dispatching of Reichswehr troops to Saxony, the proscription of the Communist Party, and the fascist dictatorship. Yet the masses remained dumb. No message came from the masses to indicate their revolutionary readiness and willingness to fight. But I will tell me, comrades: what about Hamburg? Well, Hamburg is a very strong argument in support of my view. All sincere admiration which I felt for the couple of hundred bourgeois souls who fought like lions at Hamburg could not make me oblivious of the mortifying fact that these fights were not accompanied by any action of solidarity either from the ranks of our party or from the ranks of the proletariat of Hamburg. A few hundred were allowed to fight unaided. (Thaelmann because they had no arms). I am aware of that, comrade Thaelmann, but what the devil became of the resolve to requisition arms by force? Under those circumstances not only the party members but the whole of the Hamburg proletariat should have been inspired by the call to arms that was once made in Herwegh:

Tear the crosses out of the ground,
Turn the crosses into swords!

I noticed no resolve of this kind. And where was the spontaneous action of solidarity, even in one industrial district of Germany? The militant revolutionary resolve of the Party proved an illusion.

We were told here by our friend Rwal that in October every party member and every worker was ready to fight. I was glad to hear that statement because I felt in my own expression of the desire and aspiration of a truly revolutionary temperament. But I would be content even if some of the comrades, if one out of fifty workers would be resolved to fighting for the conquest of power. Aroused and prepared for our propaganda and education, the masses would then follow us into the fight with the impetus of an elemental force. Yet tell me, comrades, that this was prevented by the party issuing the call for the retreat. I beg to differ. If in the midst of a truly revolutionary situation, if the party and the masses are imbued with the true revolutionary spirit then I follow the commandment: obey God more than men, then I snap my fingers at discipline in regard to a party leadership that is opportunist and cowardly, and is an obstacle to the revolution. In November 1918 we saw the revolutionary determination to work in Germany, without any slogan from the Party leadership, and even in spite of the leadership. It is a historic fact that the social-democratic leaders have stopped at nothing to prevent the revolution. Under the circumstances of October 1923 Brandler not only did the necessary and inevitable thing, but also rendered great service to the party when he did not take up the fight. Without this evasion the party would have been smashed, the flower of the proletariat in Saxony and Thuringia murdered. It would be contradiction to historical truth to send Brandler as the scapegoat into the wilderness. The guilt rests upon the party as a whole, it must now overcome its errors in the spirit of comradeship, and it is the purpose of my remarks to contribute towards the formation of a united party, which will stand on the firm grounds of clear policy, and which will be qualified to pass an examination of revolutionary leadership in a revolutionary situation.

We now come to the second part of the statement, to the heavenly glorification of the present.

When listening to the story of the consolidation of the party, of its increased activity, of its growing interest over the masses, and of its ever increasing resolve to fight, I attempted to exclaim: "I hear the message, but alas, lack of faith." Faith cannot be gained by fine words, but by deeds. In my estimation the party is still in the throes of a severe crisis of development, and it is not yet fully capable of action. I am going to substantiate my statement by a few facts. The party emerged from the underground into the open, but it was no forceful campaign to indicate to the masses that the Communist Party was no longer an outlawed party, but a strong and militant party. The slogan of such a campaign should have been: set the class war prisoners free! The May Day celebration, which should have been a stronger demonstration against reaction than ever before, was a tame affair in Berlin and in the rest of Germany, with but few exceptions. It is characteristic that the Central Committee had discussed for a long time whether a uniform May Day celebration should be organised or it should be left to every district to arrange

in celebration to suit the local circumstances. One more thing: The raid of the Berlin police on the Russian Trade Delegation should have been made the object of a forceful campaign. The masses should have been aroused to a vigorous fight against French imperialism, against world imperialism and also against the German bourgeoisie which was prepared to sell Germany to international imperialism as an article of merchandise. The national question should have been put by the proletariat as a means for the conquest of power by the proletariat. This calls for a vigorous campaign in favour of the most far-reaching alliance with Soviet Russia at this end. It was necessary to take advantage of the fact that the large, small and middle bourgeoisie are equally interested in such an alliance. Yet no campaign was started, and the party contented itself with a few good demonstrations. The elections have shown a very good growth of the Communist Party, but it is overshadowed by the fact that six million votes were given by the social-democrats, and some proletarian votes went to the fascists. I hail with delight the demonstration by our faction at the opening of the Reichstag, nevertheless I regret to see the absence of contact with the masses. There were no mass demonstrations to lend weight to the demonstration in the Reichstag. Then came the actions at Halle and Pustenwalde. They were necessary and equally necessary was their protection by armed workers. I do not put down as a mortal sin to the party leadership that these demonstrations were organised extremely badly. The knack of organising such actions must be acquired. Above all, it was essential to establish close contact with the masses, and to carry out effective political preparations. This was entirely lacking in the District of Halle-Merseburg where we polled 1000 votes, while the social-democrats got 110,000. Where are our electors, and what was the position of the united front from the bottom? It speaks volumes of our state of contact with the masses, that the railway workers did not make a single attempt to prevent the transportation of the fascist hords to Halle.

Yet another point about the activity of the party. In Upper Silesia alone the masses have shown great militancy, and they displayed great activity. As a result of the passivity of the party, or at least of insufficient activity, the proletarian masses were again landed into the lap of the Amsterdam leaders. The party gave them slogans, which differed in little or nothing from those of the trade union bureaucracy. The party failed to give a political trend to the tremendous economic fight and to the proper use of them. Its influence on the masses is limited, and its contact with the masses has become loosened. This was shown by the elections of the factory council and delegates. We have sustained appreciable losses. This is confirmed by the consolidation of the social-democracy, as further confirmed by the elections results, and certified by the party conference, where the "left" opposition made an enormous surrender. The surrender betrayed not only the weakness of the opposition leaders, but also the slight influence of the party on the social-democratic workers.

All these facts lead me to the conclusion: the party has not yet consolidated its forces and its activity to rally the masses to action by our propaganda and education, to unchain the activity of the masses, and to get the masses into the fight for the conquest of power. No doubt the October defeat is partly to blame for this, as well as the economic situation, the exodus from the trade unions (for which, by the way, the party is partly to blame), the wholesale victimisation of communists, and so on. But there were doubtless some other causes. For instance, the inadequate organisational shaping of the party and its insufficient theoretical schooling, and the vacillating policy of the Central Committee, which manifested itself particularly in its attitude upon the trade union question. I will only recall the hesitant attitude of the leadership towards the workers' congress, the weak action in the admission into the trade unions and for capturing

comrades. I regard it as essential that you should be clear as to what errors and weaknesses are to be overcome so that the party may become really consolidated and to the highest degree capable of action. The party will never overcome these errors if you declare that every successful action is due solely to your own work and that every weakness is the heritage of the old Central Committee. If you do so you are saying in one and the same breath that you are both

impotent and almighty. Greater tasks are facing our party than ever before. We must be prepared for them. It is very possible that the world situation will very rapidly become acute. An acute situation may arise with extreme rapidity in Germany since the reparations agreement and the basis of the Experts' Report is working in this direction. We must exert greater energies than ever in order to win over the masses and to fling them into the fight under our leadership. The party has begun to arm for the forthcoming struggles by its agreement with the communist parties of the neighbouring countries. I welcome this feature. But we must not forget in our international mobilisation that imperialism must be defeated by the proletariat in their own country. Therefore the proletarian masses in Germany must be mobilised. I have so far heard nothing of the concrete slogans and measures that this necessitates. Moreover the proletariat must find allies in order to overthrow the domination of the capitalist class. What is our attitude towards the national question, the peasant question, and towards the question of the petty-bourgeoisie? Where are the practical concrete deductions from our policy? The present situation lends increased importance to our attitude towards the proletarian united front. It is certainly one of the most important duties of the World Congress to reach complete clarity on the subject of the united front, a tactic the culminating point of which is the workers and peasants government. Neither the report of Comrade Zinoviev nor the discussions have dealt with sufficient clarity with the question as to how the united front is to be concretely carried into effect. Comrade Zinoviev spoke in the manner of a Bible or biblical commentary of how the resolution of the Fourth Congress is to be understood. I frankly declare that it has not been explained how the united front is to be put into effect. On this subject I hold with Luther: "Have done with words!" The resolutions of the world Congress must be regarded as authoritative without explanations or comments. When they no longer suffice, they must be changed. We need unambiguous texts. If we permit explanations written by Zinoviev independently, or by Zinoviev misled by Radek, and are content with his opinion as to how resolutions are to be understood, then we must recognise the right of other comrades to interpret in their own way the resolutions of the world congress. This must not be in spite of our great respect for the chairman of the Communist International. It will lead in practice to the break-down of unity, the break-down of party discipline. We must clearly understand that the united front must be a union for life or death of all proletarians who are rebels against the capitalist profit system and the bourgeois state, a firm revolutionary fighting brotherhood under the leadership of the Communist Party. Two preliminary conditions are necessary for such a united front. Firstly, that the Communist Party must be a firmly consolidated, disciplined, centralised unit with unshakeable principles and convictions. It must never conceal its true character. In its actions it must never allow itself to be bound by considerations of other parties. It must always act with extreme firmness and independence as the revolutionary leader of the masses. The second condition for the united front is that we must be capable of improving our contact with the masses and their daily struggles for the daily needs of the proletariat and the producers in general. I cannot accept the statement of Comrade Zinoviev on the question of the workers' and peasants' government to the effect that the workers' and peasants' government was only a pseudonym, a synonym, or some other "nym" for the dictatorship of the proletariat. In Russia this may perhaps have been true, but in countries with an advanced capitalist development it is not true. In these countries the workers' and peasants' government is the political expression of a definite historical situation, as Engels foresaw. In other words, a state of affairs in which the bourgeoisie can no longer maintain power, but in which the proletariat is still not sufficiently mature and united to set up its dictatorship. Large sections of the proletariat still believe that they can exercise their power within the old forms; they are still bound by illusions as to parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy. The Labour Government can come only as the expression of a revolutionary mass movement. This is also true even if a parliament is its godmother. The workers will expect that it should conduct a revolutionary labour policy. This is impossible without dictatorial attacks of the most severe character upon capitalist economy and private property. It is therefore obvious that a Labour Government can never maintain itself by the strength of Parliament. It must base itself on the support of

Twelfth Session.

Moscow, June 25. (morning)

Comrade Stewart (Great Britain) was in the chair. Before the discussion was resumed, the names of the members of the Scandinavian Commission were read. They are:

Chairman: Treint
Secretary: Schueller
Russia: Bukharin, Kussinen, Lozovsk (Substitute Karayev)
Germany: Thaelmann, Miltwoch (Substitute Bruno)
France: Treint, Dupuy
Czecho-Slovakia: Fellmeier, Siltka
Italy: Erroll
Great Britain: Wilson
America: Carlson
Finland: Manner. (Substitute Strola)
Esthonia: Wakmann
Y. C. I. Unger, Hirschl.

Wynkoop (Holland):

In the opinion of the Dutch Delegation the German discussion is a great weight on the mind of this Congress. Comrade Zetkin was right when she said that we shall get the truth through this contest of opinions. But there is another thing which we must take into consideration, out of the contest of capitalist groups there comes a revolutionary force. Therefore, to bring about revolution, it is not enough to have our Communist Parties, our apparatus, in order. It much depends on the objective situation which will enable us not only to make revolution with the help of our Bolshevik apparatus, but also to maintain it. I am sure that the German Delegation will also admit that at present there is a kind of stagnation, of stabilisation, or whatever one may call it, in Europe. This does not, of course, mean that we have renounced all idea of revolution. The situation is somewhat similar to the situation in Russia between 1905 and 1917. Revolution is bound to come, and we must prepare our Parties for it.

From this objective viewpoint, we must say that the European events are only a Central European episode. Central Europe, like the Balkans, has become a colony of West European imperialism. This being so, we must apply the lever of revolution to the main factor of world capitalism, to the British Empire. We must pay much more attention hitherto to the colonial question, and especially to British India.

Just a few words about the Dutch movement. Comrade Zinoviev was right when he said that formerly we took a left wing attitude on the Labour Party question. At that time, we had no desire to enter into the Labour Party, this was not of course a final decision. Comrade Zinoviev said that to-day the Dutch Party stood on the right

The phrase, which comrade Ruth Fischer threw in his face, was taken out of its context. This phrase was intended to be a satirical allusion to Troelstra. In this speech he quite definitely said that Communists are true to their revolutionary theory and practice, that they bring forward their programme for a united front. The accusation made against Troelstra that he greeted the advent of the Labour Government as a victory of the British workers, is groundless. The comrades who made this statement have acknowledged that it was based on wrong information.

We think that the most important point is our attitude to the Indian Party. We have already achieved some success in connection with this question. Already some years ago we drafted the following programme: complete emancipation of the Dutch East Indies from Dutch capitalism. And we have record considerable achievements in the practical carrying out of this programme.

Although we live in a small and peaceful country, we have had our hard and sharp fights during the war, and also in the post-war period when trade-union struggles were raged. Several of our comrades were arrested during these fights.

We wish to tell the Congress that we honour international discipline and that we shall not allow any discussion to weaken our phalanx.

the organs of power of the revolutionary workers outside parliament: the soviet congress and the arming of the proletariat. The period of real revolutionary workers' governments cannot last long. As Comrade Treint said, the workers' government is the dictatorship in process of formation. In many countries of western Europe, the fight for the possession of power will immediately develop into the fight for the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship. In other countries it will perhaps have to pass through the workers' government stage.

I do not think that the pacifist-democratic wave, regarding the importance of which the opportunists are so eloquent, is very powerful or can last very long. Basing myself on this conviction I am of the opinion that every atom of power the proletariat can win must be exploited to the full. The world domination of the bourgeoisie has been shattered to its depths. It no longer maintains itself by the strength of its legal and illegal instruments of power but by the opportunist, reformist contamination of the workers. The ideas of the Social Democrats cripple and deaden the faith of the workers in their own revolutionary strength and degrade them to body guards of the bourgeoisie. Therefore the Communist International must regard it as its first duty to root out every trace of reformist opportunist tendencies. We must also be perfectly clear that such tendencies are not merely an inheritance of the past but that they continually arise out of the present situations. They are based on the desire of unenlightened workers to escape from the hell of poverty as quickly and as cheaply as possible. From the foregoing it is clear that reformist labour parties will continue to exist but that the communist parties must distinguish themselves from them in theory and practice with the greatest possible clarity. This brings to the fore the question of the complete independence of the communist parties as the leading revolutionary class parties of the proletariat. On the other hand, the same situation, the hesitating progress of the revolution, gives rise to another danger, a danger from the Left.

It is the danger of the point of view which leads to Putschism; in other words, the conviction that the party must undertake revolutionary, decisive, actions without the masses and for the masses, that mass action can be replaced by party action. I have noted this point of view running as an undertone to the assertions that the German Communist Party in October should have attacked in the fight for power even though the masses stood passively on one side. It was the concealed cause of the offensive in the March action. If we want to discover what should be our correct attitude both to the other workers' parties and to the awakened and inspired masses, we must acquaint ourselves with the teachings of the history of the Russian Revolution. We must learn what the Russian Communist Party has to say regarding the importance of discipline, centralisation, the whole organisation of the party, and its attitude and its relations to the masses. Our attitude to the masses must be such that the party should become the planning and leading brain, the organised backbone and the passionate forward-driving heart of the masses; the life of the party must become the life of the masses. For this purpose the communist parties must become steadily bolshevised. They must become permeated with the attitude and adopt the practice of what in my opinion is the organisational and political superiority of bolshevism. It is the principle that a revolutionary party cannot tolerate merely paying members, that every member must be an active working, fighting member, fulfilling definite party duties. We must fill every member, every working man and every working woman, with the conviction that although their will and their deeds may be but a drop nevertheless it may be the drop which will fill the cup of revolutionary will to act, to overflowing. If we succeed in working and fighting in this manner, the revolutionary wave will again well up from the depths of objective forces and to it will unite itself the will of the masses under the leadership of the Communist Party, tense for the fight, driving the wave of revolution forward with irresistible power, so that it swallows up bourgeois society. Let us exert every effort to make the wonderful, proud slogan of the young soviet pioneers a reality in our party: "Always ready!"

Hoeglund (Sweden):

We see quite clearly that the united front can come only from below. The Swedish Social Democracy has long since become what Comrade Zinoviev calls the Third Party of the bourgeoisie. For this reason we entertain no illusions as to the possibility of winning over the Social-Democratic leaders for a real class struggle. The parliamentary elections will take place in Sweden next September, and the Communists, together with the Social-Democrats, will perhaps obtain a majority of the Lower House. The Communist party will certainly oppose the idea of Communists joining the Cabinet. Exceptional circumstances may certainly arise in any country, when a voluntary alliance of the different labour parties into a workers' and peasant' government may be conducive of good results to the cause of the proletariat. It is important that this Congress should elaborate the principles for guidance in this respect. Comrade Zinoviev took me to task for my attitude on the Norwegian question. He said that as a minority we should how to discipline. I admit that my protest was not in accord with discipline. Neither on principle nor politically was I of the same mind as the followers of Tranmael. I was only opposed to the splitting of the Party under those circumstances. Ever since the split, the Norwegian Labour Party has been getting farther and farther away from Communism. Since December our Party has been fully in solidarity with the Norwegian sister party.

Within the Swedish Party there are no differences of principle, either politically or tactically. But a number of gross violations of discipline on the part of comrades from the minority, upon organizational and personal questions, has compelled us to convene an emergency conference to enforce the most elementary principles of Party discipline. Comrade Schueller criticised us for having convened our conference too soon after the world Congress. We have already postponed our conference once, and since the parliamentary elections are to take place in September, it is high time for us to enter into the electoral campaign as a united and solid party. I hope that the minority too will take to heart the golden word of Comrade Zinoviev about the necessity of being disciplined, in its bearing on the relations of the minority in our Swedish Party. The Swedish Party was reproached with opportunist tendencies. Well, comrade Varga in his report expressed the fear that he might be considered an opportunist too. And since Comrade Varga has furnished the economic basis for the political demands, Comrade Zinoviev, there must be a wee devil of opportunism concealed somewhere about the person of Comrade Zinoviev too. Comrade Bukharin is branded by certain ultra-left comrades in Germany as an incorrigible opportunist. Thus I find myself in good company. It is true, of course, that in Sweden and in other countries there have been opportunist deviations. It is a danger that must be combated. But this danger should not be exaggerated. Self-criticism is a good thing, but self-criticism, morning, noon and night is too much of a good thing. We must draw the line between the detection and prevention of mistakes, otherwise we are liable to tear ourselves into shreds. The Swedish Party is heart and soul with Soviet Russia and the Communist International. We in Sweden too shall endeavour to create a real, good Communist Party with an iron discipline which is the indispensable postulate to victory.

Kuusinen (Finland):

The Finnish delegation is in full agreement with the political standpoint developed by Comrade Zinoviev in his report. I wish to point out what we consider as the important task for the near future. At the Fourth World Congress, comrade Lenin gave us a farewell lesson by telling us to learn, particularly from the Russian experience. This lesson was amplified by Comrade Zinoviev's exhortation: develop the Communist International into a world party. The meaning of both these lessons is that we must devote our main attention to the development of our own organisation. The third Congress had directed our attention to the problem of winning the masses outside of our Party. This continued to be our practice long after the Fourth Congress. It is only now that we feel the need for the bolshevisation of our organisation.

The best way, to learn is by fighting, by constant revolutionary activity, in order to be victorious in the end. Before the October events, the German Party accomplished a good deal, but it did not fight. This was its defect. For the non-

fighting method is the very method of Social Democracy. The Party leadership in Germany cannot say that it was powerless, for it succeeded in doing that which all the troops of General Seeckt could not accomplish: it managed to prevent all mass action by the proletariat last autumn. It is here that see the opportunist tendency. To be sure, there is also a genuine "left" deviation, which wants to fight blindly for the revolution, in utter disregard of the external circumstances. This is the only thing which we recognise as a genuine left deviation; but it frequently happens that revolutionary phrases are merely a cloak for opportunism, for a tendency to sabotage the fight.

The character of the German Party is quite different now from what it was a year ago. It has now assumed a militant nature. Of course, this is not yet everything, but it is a good step in the right direction.

The mistake of many comrades in the application of the tactics of the united front was that they did not conceive it, at least in practice, as being associated with fighting. The whole tactics of the united front must always be carried out in connection with revolutionary mass actions.

A few words about Scandinavia. In Norway we had a Party which would not fight. At the Enlarged Executive we told comrades Tranmael and Hoeglund who came here in order to improve the Communist International: Comrades, you have a few things to put right at home. We did not succeed in putting comrade Tranmael on the right track. The Norwegian Party sabotaged all the decisions of the Communist International, and systematically suppressed the Communist minority. Thus the split came about. We have nothing to repent of. In the latest economic fights in Norway we saw the Tranmael Party siding flagrantly with the employers, and sabotaging the class struggle. At the time of the split, comrade Hoeglund indulged in some bitter and disloyal attacks upon the Executive and upon the Norwegian Communist Party. He now admits that he did the wrong thing then.

Comrade Hoeglund tells us there where no opportunists in Sweden, no differences of principle. Comrade Hoeglund forgets the good Communist rule which says that the leader of a party should take the initiative in clearing up the question and not obscuring it. When we think of his utterances in defence of the gospel of pacifism, or of his campaign against centralisation, we cannot help asking him for some definite statement of principle. At all events, we must bear in mind that the same forms of fighting as in Germany cannot be expected in that country. This is natural. Sweden is in the far-away North. It is a country which has vast deposits of ores, and you know that the deviation of the magnetic needle is very considerable there. If we cannot make large claims on that party, we should at least not authorise its systematic tendency of non-fighting. In the fight for the trade unions and in the fight for the reorganisation of the Party, the Party leadership has shown no initiative. The same thing happened in the fight against Social-Democracy. I have never noticed any serious fighting against Branting on their part, since his departure from office. And when, in Denmark, a Social-Democratic government came into power, comrade Hoeglund was profuse in his praises of the pacifism of this government. Hoeglund praises a government which has given the following reply to a question by Communists whether it would use the military against the workers:

"Certainly, we fully conceive the necessity of using the military against the working class as against any other class, if an attempt is made to upset the order of society. You may rest assured that any attempt against law and order will be crushed by the military forces." How on earth can Comrade Hoeglund detect anything praiseworthy in such a band of knaves? Comrade Hoeglund aims all his arrows in one direction only: against a minority of his own Party which wants to transform it into a fighting party, and against the youth organisation. It is against these that he wants to apply disciplinary measures, because they are loyal to the discipline of the International. When Comrade Hoeglund tells us frankly that if we do not convene this Party congress in Sweden before the elections, the Party majority will be constrained even to expel the representatives of this minority, we must say that the Communist International will not permit such methods. We do not wish to lose Comrade Hoeglund; but just because we wish to retain him, we must call him to order and say to him: No retreat from the front, but back to the front!

On reviewing the development of our Communist sections, we must admit that a certain beginning towards bolshevisation is already in evidence. It is our task to encourage this trend. We must learn to carry out better and more perfectly the precepts of Comrade Lenin, in order to attain the victory.

A delegation from the Naphtha works at Grosny greeted the Congress in the name of 12 thousand workers. Comrade Schatalow read the written greetings of the Naphtha workers and Comrade Kolarov replied on behalf of the Congress. The discussion was resumed by Comrade Dengel.

Dengel

The German question has taken up a great deal of time at the Congress. That is because the representatives of the German right have, as one might say, almost choked the Congress with their speeches. This is the reason why other questions have hardly been touched on at all, especially the question of our economic perspective. Only a few comrades have made any observations on Varga's thesis, and it is noteworthy that it was the representatives of the right who were in agreement with this thesis. That has not happened by chance.

Comrade Varga says that the situation is confused and that therefore one cannot delineate a clear perspective. This is false modesty on the part of comrade Varga. It is quite true that there is a good deal of confusion both in his book and in his report, but nevertheless he shows one quite unambiguous tendency which must be most strongly combated.

This tendency of his shows itself in his attempt to discover indications within the capitalist system of a liquidation of the present revolutionary crisis producing an end to the present contradictions in the capitalist system. He thinks it possible that normal capitalism will be reestablished. He asserts that the international inter-dependence of capitalistic interests has not yet proceeded so far that it has overcome all contradictions already. That shows that he looks forward to a period of super-imperialism, as Kautsky does, a period in which the inter-locking of all capitalistic interests is to be so strong that it will overcome the contradictions. To construct such a perspective is highly dangerous for the International. We have no reason for believing in the existence of such a development. The contradictions within the capitalistic system still exist as sharply defined as ever. We even see them becoming daily more intense. This false conception of Varga's gives rise to other deviations, for instance, in some parts of his theses he indulges in pacifist formula as when he speaks of the "utterly unjustifiable occupation of the Ruhr by the French". Varga's attitude towards the Experts' Report also comes near, at least, to a pacifist tone.

Varga indicates the ending of the revolutionary crisis, but declares that there are nevertheless still enough contradictions to make a revolution possible so long as the Communist Parties have the necessary determination to bring this about. This is no Marxian formula, it seems rather to be based on the theory of free will. It is quite true that revolutionary conditions become transformed in the consciousness of the working class into the will to fight, but if a revolutionary situation is not present, neither the will of particular individuals nor the will of the Communist Party can bring about a revolution.

I think the world Congress must take its stand firmly on the fact, stated long ago by Lenin, that the world war was the beginning of a period of world revolution.

Of course it is idle to discuss whether capitalism can or cannot get out of the present crisis: our own opinion is that the contradictions of the capitalist system have not grown less but greater.

The reparations question must also be the centre point of all our economic considerations, because it is here that we see the cancer in the body of world capitalism spreading further; and this cancer will probably attack the organs of capitalism more and more widely. The first effect of the Experts' Report will be that the German capitalists will attempt to use it for their own salvation, and that they can only do by tremendous oppression, and depletion of the German workers. But if they do succeed in this, and if the German proletariat submits to the most violent plunder-

ing, the German bourgeoisie will be faced with new difficulties. The English aim is to diminish the German export trade. The payment of reparations would involve export from Germany to an extent which would ruin English capitalist economy. Contradictions like this are so great that the whole position of capitalism is not improving, but growing worse. The occupation of the Ruhr and the reparation crisis are the continuation of the war by the use of other methods, and it must be our object to transform this war into civil war.

Varga's theses must be corrected in this light. The situation is an absolutely revolutionary situation and we shall soon be faced by conditions in which the German Party and other Parties will be forced to enter upon the decisive battle. I think that, notwithstanding the necessity of helping the English Party, our main efforts must be concentrated upon the German question. The German delegation is of the opinion that we are as much in the epoch of the world revolution now as we were before, and that the next stage of the world revolution will be in Germany. All the decisions, therefore, which the Congress takes, must be taken in the light of the German question, because in the near future that will be the decisive question of the International.

Alonso

makes the following declaration in the name of the Spanish delegation:

For four years without interruption the Spanish bourgeoisie has been employing systematic terrorism in order to destroy the political and revolutionary organisations of the proletariat.

The result of the military coup d'état has been to intensify the repression in our country. The military Directorate which is the political instrument of the worst reactionaries among the Spanish capitalists, does not shrink from striking the most formidable blows at the revolutionary workers.

Pursuing this policy of terrorism, the Spanish Directorate, in contempt of justice, threatens to carry out the sentence of death on our comrade Juan Bautista Acher, "The Poet" — who is lying a prisoner in the jails of Barcelona for the part he played in the social struggle.

J. B. Acher, in addition to his fine qualities as a fighter in the cause of the proletariat, is a great artist who has placed his pencil at the service of the revolutionary cause. His life is in imminent danger.

The international solidarity of the revolutionary workers can save him!

Save him from the hangman!

The Spanish Delegation submits the following resolution for the approval of the Congress:

"The Fifth World Congress of the Communist International sends its warmest greetings to Comrade Acher and protests in the most energetic manner against the sinister designs of the Spanish hangmen now in power who wish to execute a young artist and heroic worker."

For the Spanish Delegation:
Felicien Alonso, Secretary.

Moscow, June 21, 1924.

Freimuth

made the following statement on behalf of the German Delegation:

"In the discussion on the report of the Executive Committee, a number of supporters of the Radeck-Brandler tendency, which was rejected by the Frankfurt Party Congress, expressed with many details, their personal conception of questions concerning the German Party. The German Delegation listened patiently to these explanations, which it considers unnecessary and erroneous. The German Party, which has learnt its lesson from the October defeat caused by the representatives of this tendency, does not want to have anything more to do with this tendency, whose proposals do not obtain a single vote at the Frankfurt Party Congress. Thus, the representatives of this tendency represent at the World Congress no one but themselves and their erroneous policy. To prevent the true character of this policy to become known, they are reduced to the expedient of

ing for imperfections in the present policy of the German Party and to speculate on any future ill success of the Party. The criticism of these champions of a bankrupt policy are directed in reality, under the cloak of attacks on the German Party against the Executive and the entire International. Its aim is — to strengthen and coordinate the right tendencies within the Communist International. The German Party, on its part, has long ago washed its hands of the negative and fruitless criticism of a politically extinct tendency, and is doing its utmost to eliminate from its own policy the imperfections which are a relic of past mistakes, and to carry out by dint of hard work the new tasks which it set itself at the Frankfurt Party congress. The German Party trusts that the V. World Congress will, by its decisions and their proper application, eradicate the right wing tendencies within the Communist International in such a way that their representatives will not be able to present themselves again at any congress of the Communist International.

Hansen (Norway)

The Communist International is growing by getting rid of the relics of social democracy. These words of the Frankfurt congress sum up the main task of the congress. In spite of the hue and cry of the reformists and semi-reformists, we must look facts in the face and must recognise and acknowledge not only that tactical digressions have taken place in our ranks, but even that organic opportunism trying to find its way into the Communist International. We were painfully surprised to see our most reliable sections give way in the revolutionary fight. The Norwegian Party welcomed heartily the liquidation of Brandlerism in the German Party, and is of the opinion that in this the V. World Congress must follow the example of the German Party. What was it which the Parties lacked at the decisive moment? We knew that the right bolshevik fighting spirit was lacking. Comrade Stroem says in his work on the history of the Russian Revolution, that in Russia the Russian Communist Party is a sacred institution, that it is an honour to serve it and a duty to lay down one's life for it. In Europe economic organizations take first place. Therefore, other methods must be adopted. By this statement, Comrade Stroem, Hoeglund's co-ruler of the Swedish Party, rejects in principle the idea of the bolshevisation of the European parties. But there are also sections which cannot even stand the test of fights for partial demands.

In Norway this spirit of passivity made itself felt in the metal workers strike when it was said that employers had reduced wages 5% in a dictatorial fashion on the strength of the index. To maintain this decree is for the employers' federation a question of prestige and power. As we are unable to smash the employers' federation and the bourgeois state, it would be senseless to continue the struggle. We have not overcome this passivity theory in Norway.

The clash of class-interests has become more acute in Norway since the Fourth World Congress. Even Comrade Hoeglund will have to admit that in this atmosphere of acute class-struggle in Norway, the only revolutionary party is the Communist Party. If Comrade Hoeglund still stands on the platform of the Communist International, he will have to admit that Tranmaellism, as a revolutionary tendency, is bankrupt in Norway. At no time was Tranmael a communist. That he was for four years a member of the Communist International is due to a historical misunderstanding. He has betrayed the ideas of his own trade union opposition, which he represented for twelve years, and supports now the trade union policy of Lian. He throttled the heroic struggle of the metal workers. Unfortunately, our party was not strong enough to avert the defeat of the metal workers. Under these circumstances, Comrade Hoeglund in the early part of the party strike in Norway played the part of purveyor of arms and ammunition for Tranmael. We had foreseen that the class-struggle would become more acute in Norway, and formed in January the Scandinavian Party Federation. We made a number of important tactical decisions and initiated the Scandinavian Aid organization for working class actions, which however received very little support from the Swedish Party. The time came when the working masses began to express their dissatisfaction with Lian and Tranmael. At that time the Hoeglund Central Organ wrote as follows to the great delight of the Tranmaellists: No frictions in the national trade unions of the organisation. When Hoeglund says that

he made common cause with the Norwegian Communist Party after the December Moscow agreement, we must say that this is not the view of the Norwegian Communist Party. In the period of serious struggles, which is before us, we must appeal to the Swedian brother party to do its share in the common fight. On the question of the united front and of the workers' government, I agree with the definition of the Fourth Congress that united front tactics are a means of common action with all workers for the defence of the every day interests of the workers against the attacks of the bourgeoisie. I should like to meet the accusation that we have deserted the platform of the Third and Fourth Congresses, with a dictum of the Third Congress, which to some people will sound as banal as the slogan of the bolshevisation: by action alone can Communist Parties develop. After the speech of Comrade Radek, who is in favour of united front tactics only when this means coalition with the social-democrats, a revision of the working of the resolution on the workers' government at this congress is inevitable. The illusion of a proletarian social democracy as a political factor must also be dispelled. The slogan of the workers' and peasants' government is of the greatest importance for the Scandinavian countries and especially for Norway. We must emphasise the independent revolutionary role of our party as a leader of the masses. We must show to the workers that a deep gulf divides us from the reformists, and that reformist parties can no longer be considered as proletarian parties.

MacManus (England)

said that it was evident from Comrade Zinoviev's report and from the speeches of delegates, that the biggest problem before the International was the growth of opportunistic tendencies. There were indications of this tendency in Germany, Czechoslovakia, Russia, Poland and Great Britain. This opportunistic wave had common international characteristics and these were the results of definite abuses in the application in the tactics of the united front. The source of these abuses was the slow development of the social revolution. The biggest task therefore, was not to chastise the parties for their past errors, but to ensure that there should be no repetition of these errors. One way of ensuring this was the preparation by the Congress of a careful, complete statement in detail, of the application of the united front to individual parties. One of our mistakes up to the present had been to assume that having made the generalisation of the united front, we could rely on individual parties to interpret and apply the tactics.

Comrade Zinoviev's reference to the importance of the difficulties and problems of the British situation was welcome. The fact that it had led the delegations in their speeches to make some contribution to this problem, was an achievement. But hitherto the references had not been very helpful. There was a tendency to generalise and not to touch the kernel of the problem. The British problem was not the Party's attitude to the Labour Party nor to the Labour Government. These were secondary, the real problem was how to form a British mass party. This was the problem last June when the Executive of the International, and the British Party, studied the problem. The picture they then had was of the whole British working class movement under the control of opportunist, second Internationalist leaders; the Labour Party in opposition, with every probability of a Labour Government; the growing tide of workers' demands, stemming the capitalist offensive, the consequent probability of a period of strikes, with the masses making demands and waiting for leadership, and the old leaders not prepared to lead. It was then the task to define clearly the policy to fit this situation, and to lead to the building of a mass party. It was decided that the duty of the Party was to carry on a campaign in the trade unions and workshops to challenge the old leadership; that is the development of minority in every direction which would challenge the old leadership. It was the Party's duty to rally the minority movements in the individual unions into an opposition movement towards the entire trade union leadership.

The mass party could come only this way, namely, out of minority and opposition movements. The minority movement among the miners had been strong enough to compile a programme of demands and to thrust them on the Executive Committee. The opposition to these demands, led by the arch reactionary Frank Hodges had ended in his election

from the secretaryship and the substitution of A. J. Cook. At the present moment the miners' minority movement demands were being pressed upon the Executive Committee. In addition this movement was running its own weekly paper, with a circulation of 40,000. Comrade Mac Manus mentioned similar activities in the metal trades, docks, transport, seafaring, and textile industries.

Turning to the Party's attitude towards the Labour Government, Comrade Mac Manus pointed out that the Labour Party comprised practically all the working class bodies in Britain. He endorsed Comrade Murphy's statement that, if the British Party remained outside the Labour Party, it would remain outside the organised working class movement. The British Party was anxious to be inside the Labour Party because if it was to be a mass party, it must be where the masses were. There was a general demand of the sharpening of our criticism of the Labour Party and the Labour Government. The British Party agreed, but there was only one way of criticism, and that way was by getting into the masses and rallying them against the present leadership. There was a wrong impression abroad that the British Party took a static view of affiliation to the Labour Party, that is, that once affiliated it would be affiliated for ever. The British Party's only object inside the Labour Party was to bring about a conflict for power with the leaders, to bring the mass membership of the Party to challenge the present leaders at the Party conferences. When the masses had been brought to this point, the Party might decide that it was better to fight the leaders from outside the Labour Party than from inside.

The opposition within the British Communist Party was diminishing, and was no longer a serious problem. It was an inheritance from the old parties of whom the British Communist Party had been formed, and had manifested itself mainly in connection with the question of party candidatures for parliament. The Manchester Conference had made the position of candidates quite clear; their campaigns were now viewed only from the point of view of the Party's task as he had described it, within the Labour Party.

Comrade Mac Manus concluded by reading a declaration by the British delegation to the Congress.

Statement.

1. The "right" tendencies marked in different parties, especially in the German, Russian, Polish, Czecho-Slovakian and other parties, should not be considered as local or national deviations. We are witnessing a general development of opportunist tendencies in different parties including that of Great Britain which we consider to be the result of the slow development of the social revolution.

2. The reports and declarations made by different parties show that although as a rule these "right" deviations express themselves in different aspects in different countries, yet there is something common to them all. These opportunist groups abuse mostly the application of the correct principles of the United Front. For this reason we fully agree that the World Congress should not only explain the proper method to be adopted in the application of the United Front but it

should also give a concrete plan of action for each Party. The Congress should emphasize quite definitely and particularly that the United Front should be considered as a slogan to mobilise the Labour masses for revolutionary action under the leadership of the Communist Party.

3. As far as Great Britain is concerned we suggest that a closer stand should be taken against the leadership of the Labour Party as well as the policy of the Labour Government which has already become purely and simply a capitalist and imperialist government.

4. Considering the Labour Party as an amalgamation of different unions and labour organisations the Communist Party should fight on this field in order to get the leadership of the Labour Movement in Great Britain. For this purpose the British Communist Party should continue to struggle for affiliation to the Labour Party. Under no circumstances, however, should the Communist Party, in striving to secure affiliation, sacrifice its right of independent action and the fullest right of criticism.

5. The question of nominating Parliamentary candidates against the candidates of the Labour Party is a question of tactics and not of principle. It is the task of the Communist Party to see that the selection of candidates is only made after a strong and clear fight not in closed rooms before committees, but before the bulk of the masses. In this struggle the nominees of the Independent Labour Party, and Labour Party leadership should be opposed by nominees of the Communist Party and by the Party platform. When the Labour Party candidate, however, has been selected against the will of the Communist Party, we should not at this moment, under the present circumstances when the Communist Party is still weak, oppose with an independent candidate of our own, having in mind that according to the rules of the Labour Party, groups who oppose Labour candidates are liable to be expelled from the Labour movement. At this moment any such action on our part would simply help the old leadership to get rid of the Communist centre which is organising and mobilising the revolutionary elements of the Labour Movement. But while not opposing with an independent candidate of our own, we should participate in the campaign for the single purpose of urging the constituencies to demand revolutionary action from the Labour candidates. In this way the United Front becomes a battle and not a concession.

6. Communist candidates should be nominated and selected simply as left-wing representatives of the Labour Party. It should be made definitely clear from the commencement of the campaign what the communist candidate fights for. It should be remembered that it is of even greater importance to win the masses over to Communism than to win a parliamentary seat, on a vague opportunist Labour platform.

We expect to submit concrete propositions on this matter to the Political Commission as well as to the British Commission. We present this statement to the Congress at this time, however, in order to avoid misunderstandings about the position of the Communist Party of Great Britain.

That statement is a statement comrades, that has been drawn up and is signed, and is now presented to the Congress as a complete and unanimous opinion of the Delegation here representing the Communist Party of Great Britain.