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(Telegram to the Inprecorr.)

MOSCOW, May 1, 1924.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International has decided to postpone the opening of the Session of the Enlarged Executive Committee of the Communist International to the 10th of June, and the opening of the V. World Congress of the Communist International to the 15th of June.

Executive Committee of the Communist International.

The Meaning of the Report of the Experts' Commission.

By E. Varga.

After a work of more than three months the Commission of Experts handed over its report to the Reparations Commission on April 9th. This report, along with its supplements, makes a rather large pamphlet and space does not permit of our fully setting forth its contents. We assume that the essential contents are known to the reader from the columns of the daily press and we shall only give prominence to the principal features of the report.

Payment of Reparations only when the exchange is stable.

In the past years the Reparations Commission demanded payment, both in foreign currencies and in goods, without any regard to the question whether the German rate of exchange could endure such a burden. Contrary to this the Expert Commission takes the standpoint that Germany can only afford reparation payments when the German rate of exchange is stable, because when the rate of exchange falls the state income automatically shrinks to such an extent that payments are impossible. Therefore the stability of the German currency is to be preserved in spite of reparation payments.

Reparation Payments in German Currency.

As a consequence of this, and with the exception of payments in goods, Germany shall only pay in German currency. The prescribed payments shall be made in German money to the account of the Reparations Commission at the Note Bank (Reparations Bank) which is to be founded. With the deposi-

ting of the prescribed sum Germany has carried out her share of the bargain. It is the business of the Allies as to how they shall get out of the country the amount of the reparation payments which have been made in German money. For this purpose the report provides for a commission of five and a special agent who shall see to it that the sums deposited by Germany are sent abroad in suitable form. It is the old question: *In which form of goods can Germany pay the reparations, that is, in which form of goods can the reparations be accepted by the Entente without causing serious damage to the industry of France, England, and the remainder of the capitalist world?* Naturally the report does not solve this question because it is insoluble. It decides that the German payments may be accumulated up to a sum of two milliard gold marks in money. All amounts beyond this shall be invested in German securities up to a maximum amount of five milliard gold marks. Should it prove that no method can be found for the acceptance of the reparation payments, Germany's payments will be reduced until such time when it will be possible for the Entente to carry out the transmission to foreign countries.

The Report Destroys all those plans which sought to solve the reparations question with one sweep by the taking up of an international loan running into milliards. (Proposal of the Cuno Government for a twenty milliard gold mark loan.) All the fairy tales of American help, the whole conception that by transferring the wealth that has been piled up in America, and which

is partly unused (the huge gold reserve of the Federal Reserve Banks), an important cause of the crisis could be settled at the same time as the reparations question, has faded away into nothing. The report provides for a single loan of eight hundred million gold marks which shall be employed for the payments in the first year.

From the point of view of World Politics this solution, if it is carried out in deed as well as in word by the Entente, signifies the defeat of the French Policy of force and the victory of England. The lines of French policy, the final separation of the Rhine and Ruhr districts from Germany, separatism in Bavaria and the separation of southern Germany from northern Germany, the breaking up of Germany in this way into three or four parts can be considered as shattered. The report is expressly based upon the standpoint that Germany must form a united economic whole if she is to be able to pay reparations. The solution at the same time prevents the uniting, in French hands, of the continental deposits of coal and iron, which is of great importance for the economic and political power of France in relation to England.

Germany becomes an International Colony.

The shattering of the French plans of power do not signify that Germany will now become a free state. On the contrary, the report provides for a severe, systematic control of Germany by the Entente. As a matter of fact, with the carrying out of the measures which are provided for, German economic life would find itself under the control of the Entente. This control will extend to the railways, the federal finances, and to the whole financial policy by means of the control of the Central Note Bank which is to be created (in which all existing note banks are to be taken up) and to the German taxes, the amount of which is to be laid down by the Entente.

The Payments and Germany's ability to pay.

As in known, the report provides for the following payments:

1st year	1000	million	gold	marks
2nd year	1220	"	"	"
3rd year	1200	"	"	"
4th year	1750	"	"	"
5th year	2500	"	"	"
In the first five years	7670	"	"	"

Of this sum 800 millions are to be obtained by a loan, so that for the first five years, payments of less than seven milliard gold marks are provided for. The payments from the fifth year onwards shall amount to 2500 million gold marks annually and perhaps more. A prosperity index has been provided for which shall be made up out of various, rather unrelated, elements (railway traffic, population, foreign trade, tobacco consumption, budget expenditure, and coal consumption). If these factors, reckoned according to a certain system, give an increase in the later years over the level of 1926—1929, Germany's obligations will be correspondingly increased.

The report lays down from what sources the reparations are to be drawn, that is it confiscates certain kinds of income for reparation payments. We do not wish to go into details here as we may assume that they are known. The principles pronounced in the report by the specifying of these sources were as follows:

1. The railways have got rid of all their debts by the depreciation of the currency. They represent a capital of 26 milliard gold marks. Before the war they had a net income of over 600 million gold marks, or at the present value of money of about 1000 million gold marks, whereby it is to be emphasised, that in the pre-war days the German railways were not treated as an enterprise for profit-making but in the first place as an instrument for the economic development of Germany. Under these circumstances it is easily possible to draw from the railways 660 million gold marks in the form of interest bearing bonds and amortisation of the same and in addition a railway traffic tax of 290 million yearly.

2. German industry has got rid of its debts by the depreciation of the currency. Therefore it can shoulder a reparations debt of five milliard gold marks, which at 5% interest and 1% amortisation shall yield 300 million gold marks yearly.

3. In the treaty of Versailles it is laid down that the rate of taxation in Germany may not be less than that of the Entente countries. On this basis it is reckoned that until the year 1928/1929 Germany can afford from its budget a sum extending up to 1250 millions gold marks for reparations payments. In order to secure these payments the income from the taxes on

tobacco, beer, alcohol, and sugar, as well as the customs receipts, are to be paid into the reparations account at the new note bank (Reparations Bank). If these taxes and customs yield a higher sum than is provided for, the surplus will be released for the needs of the German state. Two questions arise here:

1. Can the sums provided for be taken out the yield of the economic life of Germany, that is, out of the value produced by Germany as reduced to her present size?

As far as the first five years are concerned one can answer this question in the affirmative. By the saving which has been effected by the disappearance of the state debt and the reduction of the military expenditures, this amount can, in our opinion, be covered, assuming that the political rule of the bourgeoisie is firm and that the process of production is not disturbed by severe social struggles — an assumption that will hardly be realised. As regards the full payments after five years, we are compelled to doubt if the German economic system can bear the withdrawal of such great sums. In the meantime the extremely unstable balance of capitalism does not permit one to say very much as to how things will be in five years.

2. Can one find a form of goods in kind which will enable the German payments which are provided for to be brought out of the country?

For the first five years one can give an affirmative answer to this question, for when we deduct the deliveries of coal and coke, which are not only gladly accepted by France but which are absolutely indispensable for her industrial life, there remains an insignificant yearly amount which has to be exported in currency or in goods: an amount which can be absorbed in the form of German goods in the world market if no acute economic crisis occurs. The matter stands quite differently if the payments are to be made in full after five years. Annual payments of 2500 million gold marks can only be rendered if the exports of Germany exceed the pre-war figure by many milliards. We say many milliards, because Germany cannot export only those wares for which all the raw materials and auxiliary materials are to hand in Germany, but naturally must also import such materials from abroad. At present the whole of Western Europe cannot find a market for its full productive capacity and this state of affairs is, in our opinion, not a passing one and such a great export of German goods would lead, with the present reduced ability of absorption in the world market, to a severe disadvantage for French and English industry. We are therefore of the opinion that the whole payments can neither be made by Germany nor be accepted by the Entente.

The Meaning of the Report.

The report was accepted unanimously by the Experts. As we can assume that the Experts acted in agreement with their governments, this signifies that the Entente governments, that is, the Entente bourgeoisie considers the proposed solutions as right.

Now what is the economic significance of this report? In our opinion it is essentially the following:

The Entente bourgeoisie now sees that it is impossible to obtain reparations from Germany on such a large scale as was provided for in the various ultimata. The Entente bourgeoisie are faced with the alternative: Either to obtain reparations but at the price of the keen competition of Germany on the world market, and as a consequence, depreciation of the Mark, social disorders, and a dictatorship of the right or of the proletariat in Germany; or to renounce the reparations for the amount that was provided for, to gain a deciding influence in German economic life and to make such use of it that Germany can be kept down as an industrial rival. In other words: less reparations but no re-establishment of Germany as a dangerous competitor in the world. The Report signifies that the Entente bourgeoisie has decided on the latter solution. If we assume this to be the case the conclusions of the report, which in part are somewhat strange, become fairly clear.

The mortgage upon the railways and the control of the German railways signifies: The freight charges and fares of the German railways will be settled by the Entente, and in such a manner that German industry will not be able to give an artificial stimulus to its exports by means of preferential freights on goods destined for export, as was the case before the war.

The five milliard mortgage upon German industry signifies that the cost of production of German industry will be correspondingly increased.

The control of the Note Bank signifies that the discount policy of the central note institute will be fixed by the Entente

bourgeoisie and the amount of the credits to industry, as well as the rate of interest, will be set in accordance with the needs of the English and French bourgeoisie, while the development of German industry can be hindered by limitation of credit and high rate of interest.

The investment of five milliard gold marks in German shares (this amount may be increased), signifies that the Entente bourgeoisie, which, as it is already holds considerable amounts of the shares in German industries, gets possession of the most important branches of German industry.

Taken altogether this signifies that Germany comes under the economic control of the Entente bourgeoisie and that this control will be exercised before all with the idea of suppressing the ability of Germany to compete in the world market and to restrict the development of German economic life.

In our former reports we have often pointed out that the spokesmen of the English and French bourgeoisie are always emphasising the following: England has a debt of about 150 milliard gold marks upon which she must pay interest, whereas Germany, owing to the depreciation of the currency, is free of debts. This signifies that the English manufacturer has to pay much higher taxes than the German and that wages in England are higher than in Germany. Consequently a reparations policy must be adopted which ensures the ability of England and France to compete in the world market. As this does not harmonise with the payment of reparations on the old system of the payment of currency without regard to the further fate of the German rate of exchange, since this would compel Germany to force her export of goods, the economic meaning of the report is: less reparations, but the domination of the German economic system in order to prevent the dangerous development of a new competitor of the Entente bourgeoisie in the world market.

POLITICS

The Conference of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party.

By Ludwig Magyar.

After the defeat of the Russian Revolution in the year 1905—1906 there reigned the stillness of death in the Russian Labour Movement. The raging of the white terror, the crushing of all organizations of workers, the inner strife among the emigrants, the toilsome, almost hopeless, assembling of the revolutionary forces in Russia itself and the numerous failures of these attempts — these are the things which characterise this period. Plechanov completes his change of sides to the Mensheviks, and his cry of despair, "it was a pity to have taken up arms" gives a picture of the extent to which despondency and doubt of the revolution has seized hold of the best minds of the revolutionary labour movement. The Bolshevik fraction in the Social Democratic Labour Party of Russia was forced into the minority, and the Mensheviks were at that time able to declare in their periodicals that there really only remained three Bolsheviks: Lenin, Zinoviev and Kamenev and that the fourth would have to be found by means of an advertisement in the newspapers. The three Bolsheviks in emigration, however, carried on the struggle for revolutionary Marxism, defended the theory of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution against right and left opportunists in their own camp, maintained the Bolshevik propaganda centre and, in spite of the objections of the liquidators from the right and left, extended the illegal organization in Russia itself. Five years after the terrible defeat there is the strike of the miners in the Lena gold works. The gendarmes fire into the mass of the strikers, and as answer thereto, a new wave of strikes swells up, sweeping the whole of Russia and dispelling the nightmare of the white terror, which up to that time had oppressed the masses. And when this movement ebbs, an inwardly strengthened, enlightened, united Bolshevik Party is present in Russia.

* * *

Naturally one cannot fully apply this analogy to the situation in Hungary. The objective situation in Hungary in 1924 is somewhat different to that obtaining in Russia in 1911. Some of the elements of the situation, however, have a striking resemblance. A mass movement is welling up. The intolerable economic situation, the attempt of the bourgeoisie to shift all the burdens of reconstruction upon the mass of the workers, the land reform swindle, the crumbling of the united front of the bloody counter-revolution and the shrinking and narrowing down

of the social basis of the same, the attempt, in alliance with the bourgeoisie, but without the petty bourgeoisie in the towns and in the country, to restore the rule of the big land-owners, all this is forcing the proletariat to desperate resistance.

The national treason of the ruling class, the recognition of the shameful Treaty of Trianon by the loudest shouters of nationalism, the rewarding of the Roumanian Boyars for their robber-campaign against Soviet Hungary, the capitulation before the Little Entente, the open renunciation of the liberation of the oppressed Hungarians, the reduction of the civil servants etc. are forcing further groups of small bourgeois into the opposition. The demonstration of March 15th in the streets of Budapest, the appearance of the opposition in the national conference of the trade unions on March 30th and, not least of all, the appearance of the opposition in the conference of the Hungarian Social Democratic Party, show that the Labour Movement in Hungary has entered on a new period. We are standing before a new wave of mass movements and the opposition will make use of these mass movements in accordance with their own purposes. The struggle in the conference ended in a complete victory of the Horthy Socialists of the type of Payer, Peidl, Propper and Farkas, who provide the fig-leaf of legality for the Horthy-Bethlen system, but the fact that an organized opposition is making itself felt in the Hungarian Social Democratic Party indicates how deep the process of radicalising has proceeded among the masses themselves.

It is not worth the trouble to characterise the wretchedness and paltriness of the leading group of this opposition. The Viennese International has liquidated itself, and it would be a stupid and hopeless enterprise to revive it in Hungary. There is no essential difference between Garami and Payer, between Böhm and Farkas, between Kunfi and Propper or whatever other names are borne by the Horthy socialists in Hungary and the Hungarian drifters among the emigrants. It is only a question of who shall have the power in the party, who shall co-operate with Bethlen—the newest team, in the fullest sense of the word, who live in Hungary, or the old team who are living in emigration. The first team would like to send the present leaders of the party to the devil in order to continue the latter's policy of bargaining with Horthy themselves, and the present leaders wish to keep their snug places and to keep the leaders in emigration at a distance with the help of the police. Thus the struggle of the opposition would be merely a family matter of the Hungarian Mensheviks, but the fact that the leaders of the opposition not only declare their solidarity with the Károlyi revolution of 1918, but also with the proletarian revolution of 1919 and that they are attacking the coalition policy, shows that in this case it is a much more earnest matter than a struggle of various groups of leaders. It is true the Böhms, Kunfis, Stromfelders and Biros etc. have betrayed the proletarian dictatorship, that they combat it and are enemies of the Soviet idea. These heroes of the Noske International have carried on a most pitiable and ridiculous coalition policy with Jaszi, Hatvany and the other small bourgeois revolutionaries among the emigrants. And the opposition in Hungary itself, this opposition, will delude the masses of the Hungarian Workers with declarations of solidarity with the overthrown dictatorship, with phrases about class struggle and opposition to the policy of coalition. They must carry on this threadbare deception of the workers because there is also a real opposition in the Hungarian labour movement, a mass opposition, an opposition of the revolutionary proletarians who are just as fed up with the treachery of the Horthy socialists as they are with the half-measures and conscious deception of the "first team". It was in the highest degree instructive to observe how such people as Desidor Birós edged away from this real opposition, and how they surrendered to the leaders of the party in order to stem the further advance of this real opposition.

The masses of the Hungarian workers are in a ferment. Under unspeakable suffering the Hungarian proletariat is creating its class party. This class party will not in any event be the present official "opposition" to the party leaders. It is being formed and will be built up out of the mass opposition. The birth-pangs will be terrible, but the revolutionary working class will solve this task. This class party will then transform its solidarity with the Soviet dictatorship and the rejection of the policy of coalition into deeds, and will lead the proletariat of Hungary to new struggles and to new victories. It is already the driving force of the opposition, and the attempt of the Hungarian Centrists to get this movement into their hands will fail miserably.

The Hungarian workers spurn the declaration of solidarity with the Soviet dictatorship made by the social traitors as a desecration. The stubborn opposition of the masses, who here and there found a representative, is the best hope of the Hungarian labour movement. It is an earnest hint to the Hungarian Communists that this mass opposition is welling up more and more powerfully and is embracing wider masses of the workers.

After the volleys of the Tsarist gendarmes in the Lena gold mines, the Russian Bolsheviks began the struggle for organization, for winning over the majority of the proletariat, with new strength...

IN THE INTERNATIONAL

The Frankfort Conference of the C. P. of Germany.

I.

First Letter of the E. C. C. I. to the Party Conference.

Dear Comrades,

Your Party Conference is being held at a moment of profound change, stirring the thinking section of the whole German working class to its inmost depths. Never before has such a heavy responsibility lain upon the Party Conference of the German C. P. as on this occasion. Without exaggeration it can be said, your Party Conference will decide the fate of the German C. P. for many years to come, and with this the fate of the German revolution.

I. The International Situation.

At the present juncture the III. International is more than ever incorporated in Moscow, and the II. International more than ever in London.

The international position of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has become strengthened in a manner hitherto unheard of. The number of recognitions of the Soviet Government on the part of the mightiest governments of the European bourgeoisie is the outcome of the foreign policy pursued by the first proletarian government in the world. And that the balance thus drawn is satisfactory is due to the efforts made by the vanguard of the whole international proletariat. That the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics has been recognized *de jure* by a number of bourgeois governments is not the most important point. What is important is that the *de jure* recognitions have taken place without any material or moral concessions whatever being made to the international bourgeoisie on the part of the proletarian government.

The mightiest party of the II. International is in power at the moment in the mightiest of the bourgeois states. The so-called Labour Government, headed by MacDonald, is naturally pursuing a bourgeois and not a proletarian policy. At the present moment there are broad masses of workers in England who do not yet perceive MacDonald's policy in the same light as the German workers have perceived the policy pursued by Ebert and Noske. But MacDonald's government is showing itself in its true colors more and more. Since the time of Marx the greatest and most difficult problem of the labour movement in England has been the formation of a revolutionary proletarian mass party. At the present time the objective pre-requisites for the formation of a Communist mass party are given in England for the first time.

In the Far East and in the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the leaden clouds of imperialism are pierced by flashes of lightning with ever increasing frequency. In India, in Egypt and in China, the movement against imperialism is growing stronger and stronger.

New events are maturing in the Balkans, pregnant with fateful international consequence.

The knots tied by the shameful treaty of Versailles have not yet been cut.

The Anglo-French competitive antagonism becomes more and more acute. The French bourgeoisie is paying for the practical occupation of the Ruhr district with the disastrous fall of the franc and by financial ruin. The impending election to the Chamber will draw the balance of the inexorable combat going on within the various fractions of the French bourgeoisie.

The German bourgeoisie is enjoying an apparent breathing space. What is happening at the present time may be designated as the shadow of an improvement in the international situation of the German bourgeoisie. But it is nothing more than a shadow. Now as before, the drawn sword is hanging over

Germany. It will either become a colony exploited by victorious imperialism, or it will accomplish the proletarian revolution — Germany is definitely confronted by these alternatives.

II. The Further Prospects of the German Revolution.

The proletarian revolution in Germany is inevitable. The error made in the estimation of the speed of events in October 1923 has been the cause of much difficulty to the Party. But this is none the less a mere episode. The fundamental estimation remains. The revolution is coming.

It is difficult, at the present moment, to state definitely when the revolution is likely to take place. It is possible, and indeed highly probable, that the decisive struggle will begin much sooner than many people expect; it may be that before a year has passed we shall find ourselves in the midst of the decisive battle. But the possibility of the slower development of events is by no means excluded. The Party must at the given moment be prepared for both possibilities. And where the interests of our cause depend on the subjective factor, that is, upon the extent to which the proletarian vanguard is organized, the Party must so order its ranks that it is ready to plunge into the decisive struggle at the shortest notice.

The slogan of the fight for the proletarian dictatorship, for the establishment of Soviet power and the preparation of armed insurrection for this purpose remains fully and entirely in force. Persevering and tenacious work for the arming of the workers — this is the task to which we must now devote our most serious attention.

We can well comprehend the impassioned energy with which the German comrades discuss the question as to whether we should have resorted to arms in October and November 1923, or whether the retreat was unavoidable. To revolutionists such a question is bound to be a burning one. But despite everything the Party must not look backwards, but forwards. The Party is not demolished, the Party has retained its fundamental core, the Party has emerged with closely welded ranks and all honour from the period of illegality. The Party must now, more emphatically than ever before, make it clear to the working class of Germany that the most important of its tasks is: the preparation for the definite struggle for power, for the proletarian dictatorship.

III. Winning over the Majority.

The task of winning over the majority of the proletariat, and of augmenting its ranks by the largest possible number of sympathizers from the petty bourgeoisie of the towns and the peasantry, still remains one of the fundamental tasks of the Party. We must not underestimate the first successes gained by the Fascisti among the workers. These are extremely dangerous symptoms, and the Party must devote its serious attention to them. Unless we put the national question in a Bolshevik form, we shall not win over the man in small circumstances from the Fascisti. And to dispense with doing this signifies renouncing the hope of the hegemony of the revolutionary movement, and then it is superfluous to speak of the dictatorship of the proletariat at all.

There was much that was superfluous in the late campaign fought around Schlageter. But we cannot permit Nihilism in the national question.

We have no right to forget, even for a minute, that very considerable strata of the German proletariat are still under the influence of clericalism. The Party must regroup its ranks, and so conduct its work as to win the workers for Communism. This is rendered possible, beyond all doubt, by the pre-revolutionary period. In the coming parliamentary election the Party is marching forwards with closely welded ranks, penetrates into the deepest strata of the masses of the people, and seeks to further the cause of revolutionary enlightenment of millions and millions of working people. If the results of the elections are favourable to our Party, the working class will go forward with fresh courage, faith will be increased in the powers of the Communist Party, and the will to fight in the working class will be strengthened.

There can be nothing more dangerous for a revolutionary party, during a period in which it finds itself becalmed, than the under-estimation of the tasks bound up with winning over the majority. This task has not yet been accomplished. Until we have won over the majority of the socially decisive strata of the workers we cannot vanquish the bourgeoisie. Your Party Conference must consider the whole of its steps and resolutions from the standpoint of whether these conduce to the furtherance of the aim or winning over the majority, or whether they are likely to lead to

fresh danger of alienating the masses of workers, and of thus contributing to the conversion of the Party into a sect.

The trade union question must also be approached by us from this point of view. In the interests of winning over the majority of the working class it is our duty to maintain unity in the trade unions, and to keep in view the fact that the slightest false step in this direction may cost the Party its head. In view of the enormous importance of the trade union question, we devote a special document to its discussion.

IV. Party Work among the non-Proletarian Strata of the population.

A Party which demands the hegemony of the revolutionary movement, a Party which aims at the seizure of state power and the conversion of the bourgeois republic into a Soviet republic — such a Party must perform much preparatory work among the non-proletarian strata of the population. The working class and its party can only put the idea of the proletarian dictatorship into actual practice if they prove capable of neutralizing a part of the petty and middle bourgeoisie in town and country, and in bringing the other part over into their camp. We may as well candidly admit that up to now our Party has done extremely little towards winning the sympathy of the man in a small way of business, the employé, etc. in the cities, and still less towards winning over those strata of the peasantry whose class position is such that they can and must join the working class against the bourgeoisie. The party conference must devote its main attention to this problem.

V. The United Front Tactics and the Transition Slogans.

The most important statements to be made by the E. C. of the C. I. with reference to this subject have already been given in the January theses based on the Moscow consultation. At the debates held in January between the E. C. of the C. I. and the leading representatives of the German left, we defined the united front tactics as a method of our agitation, and as a method for the organization and mobilization of the masses for a long period in advance. Have we any reason to depart from this formulation? In our opinion no such reason exists.

If we are to understand, under united front tactics, such opportunist errors as were lately committed in Saxony, then it need not be said that we are opposed to united front tactics of this description. Happily, the fact that opportunist errors have occurred in this or that country, during the utilisation of revolutionary parliamentarism, has not yet led anyone to draw the conclusion that it is unallowable to utilize revolutionary parliamentarism at all, and that the Party should not take part in the Reichstag elections.

The Comintern will not abandon the continued application of united front tactics in other parts of the world simply because this or that great opportunist error has been committed in Saxony.

It is now perfectly clear that the united front tactics in particular have to be exactly adapted, in each separate country, to the stage of development which has been attained by the labour movement in the given country. In Germany the stage arrived at requires us to adopt the tactics of a united front from below, that is, we can dispense with negotiations with the official leaders of Social Democracy. The united front tactics from below must, however, be carried out sincerely and determinedly, down to their last logical consequence. In this question all fractional diplomacy is unallowable.

It is equally imperative to arrive at a clear conclusion with reference to the question of partial demands and transition slogans. The Russian Bolsheviks fought against the Mensheviks for ten years on the question of partial demands and transition slogans. What was the attitude of the Bolsheviks? They never opposed partial demands and transition slogans. The Bolsheviks themselves even put partial demands and issued transition slogans. The Bolsheviks did not differ from the Mensheviks in that they opposed partial demands and transition slogans, whilst the Mensheviks supported them. No, the Bolsheviks differed from the Mensheviks in standing for the preparation for proletarian revolution, whilst the Mensheviks opposed this. They differed in the fact that for the Bolsheviks every partial demand and every transition slogan was bound up with revolutionary agitation for the preparation of revolution, whilst for the Mensheviks the partial demands and transition slogans were substituted for revolutionary agitation, and opposed to the preparation of revolution.

It need not be said that the German C. P. cannot adopt an attitude of complete rejection with respect to partial demands and transition slogans. It need not be said that the German C. P.

cannot renounce the struggle for the eight hour day. There is no fundamental difference between partial economic demands and political transition slogans, so long as we understand how to issue every transition slogan to the masses in its true light as an organic constituent of revolutionary agitation for the dictatorship of the proletariat.

VI. Organizational Questions.

We are obliged to admit that up to now the German C. P. has not yet accomplished the task of building up its structure upon the basis of Communist nuclei in the works and shops themselves. In questions of organization, and in many other questions, we are still paying rich tribute to the traditions of Social Democracy.

And yet there can be no thought of creating a really revolutionary proletarian Party, capable of seizing power out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, until this Party is built up on the basis of Communist nuclei firmly anchored in the factories and shops themselves. The C. I. is of the opinion that it is high time for words to be converted into deeds in this matter. The Reich Party Conference must set a term, a term speedily expiring, within which the Party has to be reorganized everywhere on the principles here given. Without this prerequisite — we repeat — it is ridiculous to talk about the seizure of power by the German proletariat. Such a reorganization of the Party is not a simple organizational task, nor a question of organizational technique, it is a political question of the highest grade. The solution of this question decides whether the German C. P. is to be a mere machine for parliamentary elections, like the Social Democratic Party, or whether it is to be an organization capable of leading the millions of workers in the factories and workshops.

It is necessary that the Party Conference resolves upon the retention and completion of the illegal Party apparatus. We must not on any account calculate on the permanency of the present "legality". On the contrary, we must be definitely prepared for repeated periods of illegality for the Party. The present breathing space should indeed be utilized for the creation of a really powerful illegal apparatus, one existing not only on paper, but actually capable of action, and of working efficiently under any circumstances. Until this is accomplished, it is impossible to speak seriously about the further arming of the workers.

VII. Arming the Workers, the Red Defence Units.

The arming of the workers is still the most important task before the Party. The preceding period bequeathed us something. But that which has so far been accomplished is merely a drop in the ocean. The German workers are striving to gain possession of arms. The Party must count it amongst its leading duties to satisfy this striving. And this must be done without unnecessary fuss, properly and efficiently, without stinting forces and means.

The Party must understand the work of strengthening the Red Hundreds; not only those consisting of Party members, but those participated in by other revolutionary workers. The Party must once and for all grasp the fact that the Red Hundreds can never form a real source of power so long as they are looked upon as an organization solely intended to appear on occasions of revolutionary celebrations, at the moment of a general strike, etc. It is an imperative necessity to impress upon the German workers the idea that the Red Hundreds are necessary for the daily struggles. The Red Hundreds will only be able to strike firm root in the working class if they accustom themselves to the idea that they have to protect workers' demonstrations from the attacks of the Reichswehr, to defend the best fighters against arrest, to undertake this or that enterprise towards the arming of the workers, etc. The Red Hundreds must be rooted in the depths of the working class itself, in the factories and workshops. And then they will be immune against the attacks of the bourgeois authorities.

VIII. The Situation within the Party.

The German C. P. is at present undergoing a thorough regrouping of forces, is working for a fresh orientation, is endeavoring to be a really Bolshevik party. Danger from the Right has been overcome in the Party, although there can be no doubt but that this Right danger still exists, and may involve serious danger for the German C. P. and for the whole Comintern. During transitional periods between two revolutions — and the German proletariat is experiencing such a period at the present time — the proletarian party is threatened by two main dangers: on the one hand the opportunist deviations of the

Right, and on the other the phrases of the "Left". The lack of faith in the revolution of the one, the attempt to evade actually existing difficulties of the proletarian struggle by means of Left phrases of the other, form the two greatest dangers. Bolshevism in Russia fought under analogous circumstances against both aberrations, and it was solely in the struggle against these two aberrations that Russian Bolshevism became steered, and became the Party which we all know.

The victory of the left wing of the German C. P. is of enormous significance for the fate of the German revolution. There is no doubt but that this victory is a reflection of far-reaching processes going on in the working class, or at least in its vanguard. This victory signals the growing readiness to fight among the most advanced strata of the German working class. This victory bears witness to the commencing radicalisation of considerable strata of the German working class. But woe to us if we over-estimate these symptoms, if we imagine that what we desire has already been attained, if we imagine that the majority of the German proletariat is already prepared to plunge into battle under the leadership of the left wing of the German C. P. This is not yet the case. Work towards this goal is the leading task of the Party.

The acute crisis through which the German C. P. is passing at the present time may become the starting point for the rebirth and strengthening of the Party. The Party can now march forward on the broad road of revolution. The Party can at last free itself from opportunist errors, and take up a firm attitude towards the right and "left" leaders of German Social Democracy. We must succeed in finally creating a situation whereby the German proletariat will believe that the German C. P. will lead it, not only in word, but in deed, to revolutionary battle; and not only to heroic defeats as in January 1919 and in the year 1921, but to decisive victory over the bourgeoisie. Up to now the German proletarians have not had this faith in us. But it is a faith which the German C. P. must now impart to the working class.

It is an important duty incumbent on the Party to put an end to the existence of some factors within the Party, and to the contests of these fractions among themselves. It is time that we create a party which employs a hundred per cent of its forces in the struggle against the bourgeoisie and its agents, the Social Democrats, and does not waste its powers in squabbles among its own members. The victorious majority must be capable of taking a number of clear-sighted political and organizational steps, enabling the new majority to create a new regime in the Party, to utilize all forces of value, regardless of the camp to which they may have formerly belonged, and to lead the Party, on the basis of a firm and steadfast revolutionary communist line of action, to the fulfilment of the great historical tasks lying before it.

Your last conference of the Central Committee quite rightly declared, that the tasks of the European Communist Parties do not consist of demands that the Russian C. P. be de-Bolshevized, but on the contrary, of work towards the Bolshevisation of the West European Communist Parties. This is well said. We are firmly convinced that your Party Conference will make further great strides forward in this respect. Unity — a truly steadfast proletarian unity, not a merely external paper unity, but a downright Bolshevik unity — cost what it may — must be created by your Party Conference. Go to the masses, and once more — go to the masses! This was taught us by our lost comrade Lenin. The Party Conference must inspire the mass of Party members and all followers of the Communist Party with infinite devotion to the cause of proletarian revolution. The Reich Party Conference must impart to the workers the belief that the proletarian party is preparing, without losing an instant, for the great fight which is coming. The Reich Party Conference must create a firm revolutionary majority. The Reich Party Conference must prove that the German C. P. is to be held in high esteem among the sections of the Communist International.

The Communist International for its part, will do its utmost to aid the brother Communist Party in Germany to accomplish the great historical tasks with which it is confronted.

Long live the proletarian revolution in Germany! Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat in the German Soviet Republic! Long live the C. P. of Germany!

Moscow, 26. March 1924.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International.

Chairman: Zinoviev.

APPEALS

To the Communist Parties and Revolutionary Organizations of all Countries!

To the Workers, Working Peasantry and oppressed Peoples throughout the World!

The Roumanian Boyars (nobles) and bankers are determined not to be outdone by the white guards on the other side of the Danube. In Bulgaria the bourgeoisie took a bloody revenge on the revolutionary workers and peasants and now it is the turn of the Roumanian proletariat and of its class organizations to be the target for the fierce attacks of the ruling clique of the country.

Under the pretext of putting an end to the recent Fascist disturbances, the Roumanian Government declared martial law, but the prisons of the country were filled with workers and Communists instead of Fascists. Communist papers and the General Confederation of Labour itself were suppressed. Persecutions are the order of the day throughout the country. All leading comrades in the Communist and trade union movement have been arrested or are in danger of arrest. Working men and women, and even young workers, are subject to persecution, and no one is immune if he or she has shown devotion to the cause of the oppressed in any way. No workers' meetings and no independent workers' publications are allowed. Inhuman treatment is meted out to our imprisoned comrades.

Hunger Strikes are an everyday occurrence.

The Roumanian secret police is particularly brutal and cruel in the territories annexed by Roumania. The Hungarian, Bessarabian and Bulgarian peasants have once more to experience the horrors of the terrorist regime. Not so long ago comrade Berger, the secretary of the Communist Party of Transylvania and the Banat, was delivered by the Roumanian police to Horthy's bandits. Also five Bulgarian peasants were shot quite recently in the Dobrudja without trial.

The Roumanian Boyars and bankers, who assumed the role of guardians of "European civilisation, on the borders of the barbarian East", gave an example of their cruelty and ferocity in 1907, when they crushed the peasant rising and shot several thousands of poor peasants. But since the Roumanian plutocracy has appropriated large tracts of foreign territory and the dissatisfaction of the ruined and oppressed working and peasant masses has assumed enormous proportions, white terror has become the order of the day.

December 10th, 1918 will always be remembered, for on that day over one hundred workers taking part in a demonstration in Bukarest were mown down by machine guns. In connection with the general strike in October 1920, thousands of workers throughout the country were arrested, and several hundreds of them were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment. In May 1921 all those who participated in the congress of the socialist party were arrested, because the Congress had decided to adhere to the Communist International. After 14 months of ill-treatment and tortures, the imprisoned comrades were declared innocent by the Courts and set free.

The number of victims of the white terror is growing. The best workers are frequently done to death, naturally always under the time-worn pretext of "attempts to escape". The imprisoned comrades in the salt mines and fortresses are doomed to a slow but certain death and are exposed to indescribable physical and mental torments.

The recent mass arrests and mass persecutions are an answer to the growing strength of the Communist Party, to the growth of the workers' movement and to the struggle of the Communist Party against the reduction of wages and salaries, for land for the peasantry, against the oppression and total absence of rights of national minorities and for the right to self-determination for the peoples of Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia and Dobrudja.

By its reign of terror, the Roumanian Government is proving to the oppressed peoples as nothing else could that they have no more faithful and devoted protector and defender of their rights than the Communists.

The persecution of Communists and revolutionary workers is taking place just at the time when the Roumanian Boyars have finally become vassals of imperialist France, when they contract military alliances, embark on enormous war prepara-

tions, forge new chains for the masses and launch the country into new adventures. All these acts of the Roumanian bourgeoisie go to prove that the Communists are the most determined enemies of military adventures and the staunchest champions of the vital interests of the masses.

The Roumanian Government, together with its bourgeoisie, thinks it has beaten the "enemy at home". But it is very much mistaken. The enemy at home are the millions of oppressed and ruined workers, clerks, and peasants, in fact the working people as a whole. The Government cannot beat these masses that are numbered by the million. The workers' and peasants' government, which will be set up by the might of an overwhelming majority of the people, will put into practice the right to self-determination of the oppressed nationalities, and will, in spite of everything, defeat the Boyars and capitalists.

Workers and peasants of the whole world!

Raise your voice against the Roumanian police terror! In your press and at meetings, expose the Roumanian Ministers and members of the royal family who perambulate the world begging for credits. Show your class solidarity with the enslaved peasants and workers of Roumania!

Roumania comrades!

Do not flinch in your struggle! Do not give ground! Close up your ranks more and more in the struggle for political liberties, in the struggle against the ruling class. Have faith in the Communist Party, the champion of the working class in its struggle for the emancipation of all workers in town and country.

Workers and peasants of Roumania!

Retain your confidence in the Communist Party and its class organizations! Communists are persecuted, oppressed and are suffering from many wounds. But they are not crushed. They find always new ways and means to approach the workers in factory and field. Firm confidence in them is the shortest way to victory for you. The Roumanian Communists and class-conscious workers and peasants do not stand alone in this struggle. The revolutionary workers and peasants throughout the world are their truest, strongest and most faithful allies.

Long live the Roumanian Communist Party!

Long live the class organizations of the Roumanian proletariat!

Long live the struggle of the working class and of the peasantry!

Long live the Communist International!

Executive Committee of the
Communist International.

POLEMICS AND DISCUSSIONS

The Discussions in the C. P. of Germany.

III.

A Warning Signal.

By August Thalheimer.

"The communists will have to exert their utmost endeavours in order to lead the labour movement, and our whole social development, upon the straightest and directest path to the world victory of Soviet power, and to the dictatorship of the proletariat. This is an incontestable truth.

But it is only necessary to go one small step further — apparently in the same direction — and the truth becomes converted into an error. It is only necessary to say, as the German and English radical communists say, that we recognize one straight path only, that we permit no deviation to be made from the course, no making of compacts, no compromises, and we are at once involved in an error capable of doing serious harm to Communism, an error which has indeed already done it much harm."

N. Lenin, "Radicalism, the Infantile Malady of Communism".

I. The Platform of the Left: Against the United Front. Decisive Struggle in October. "Cognizance" of the Political Resolution of the Executive.

According to the Party press correspondence of 6. March 1924, No. 4, the Party Conference of our Party district of Rhineland-Westphalia-South, held on 3. March, after hearing and

discussing in detail speeches by Ruth Fischer and Walther Stöcker, passed the following resolution by 60 votes against 21:

"The Party Conference of the Rhineland-Westphalia-South District section of the CP. of Germany, held on 3. March, points out that the CP. of Germany and the Comintern are involved in an acute crisis owing to the policy of the reformist and opportunist groups. The district Party conference regards the disputes being raised by the Russian opposition in the Russian CP. as an attempt to weaken the dictatorship of the proletariat and to endanger the Soviet power, and stands unanimously for the decision of the Russian Central Committee and for the resolution unanimously passed at the Russian Party conference. The Party conference has duly taken cognizance of the resolution passed on the German question. It demands that the struggle be carried on with the utmost energy, in the CP. of Germany and in the Communist International, for the destruction of all reformist and opportunist tendencies. The conference states that the policy of the united front tactics, of the labour government and of the seizure of real values, was the expression of the reformist currents in the Party which led to the failure of the CP. of Germany in October of last year. It expressly approves the views held by the Party opposition in these fundamental questions.

The conference declares that in October of last year the decisive revolutionary struggle was a historical necessity. Neither the avoidance of the struggle, nor the substitution of the final struggle by so-called rear-guard fighting, partial action, or similar manoeuvres were permissible.

The conference regards it as the task of the Reich Party Conference, to create the pre-requisites for the final liquidation of all opportunist and reformist tendencies. This will only be possible when the leadership of the Party is placed in the hands of the Left. The district Party conference resolves that the leadership of the district be placed in such hands as will assure that the district will be led according to the views of the Left."

Thus runs the resolution.

The resolution was passed after an address from comrade Ruth Fischer. It is nowhere stated, or even indicated, that the speaker was not in agreement with this resolution. Thus the resolution must be regarded as in accordance with the views of the Left.

The same train of ideas, expressed more briefly, is contained in the resolution passed on the 5. March by the Berlin functionary meeting of our Party, in which we find it expressly stated:

"The Left will not depart by a hair's breadth from its views on the question of the united front, and with regard to the intermediate slogans for which it has fought in the Party."

The Elberfeld resolution, which must be thus regarded as a really authentic expression of the views of the Left, contains the following extremely characteristic points:

1. The rejection of the united front tactics, not only for the present, but also for the past, and not only for the German section, but for the whole of the sections of the Comintern. This last may be gathered from the fact that these tactics are unreservedly designated as reformist, and further from the fact that the views held by the Party opposition on these fundamental questions are "expressly" approved;

2. the resolution declares that the decisive struggle was a necessity in October, that is, that it should have been undertaken. To be sure the first sentence of this paragraph speaks of a "historical necessity", an expression obviously intended to intensify the character of the necessity. (In reality the term "historical necessity" is a weak and inaccurate expression, and not invariably synonymous with "political necessity".) But in the next sentence the substitution of the final struggle by so-called rear-guard fighting, partial action or similar manoeuvres is declared to be unallowable. There is thus no doubt whatever but that what is meant is that the Party should have undertaken the decisive revolutionary struggle in October, that it was a political necessity, and thus absolutely imperative.

3. The resolutions passed on the German question have been taken "cognizance" of. This term can scarcely have been chosen out of negligence. For in the preceding sentences the decisions of the Russian C. C. and of the Russian Party conference on the Russian question are emphatically approved. The approbation, or even the carrying out, of the resolutions passed by the Executive on the German question is not expressed, but is avoided and evaded.

These three questions form the core of the Elberfeld resolution, are decisive for the platform of the Left. They point out serious dangers, they are actual warning signals.

II. What are the Political Consequences of dropping the United Front, and on what Premises is such a Line of Action based?

Of what does the danger and inadequacy of this platform consist, in what does it deviate from the true line of Communism? It might be said that the condemnation of the united front from above in the past possesses no significance for the present. For in the present we in Germany reject the tactics of the united front from above, that is, we do not negotiate with the Social Democratic leaders. On this point no differences of opinion exist. Neither is this rejection anything new. It was already contained in the well known theses issued by the Central Committee at the beginning of November last year, in which we read:

"The leaders of Social Democracy have thus finally broken with the proletariat. Our future attitude to these leaders of Social Democracy can only be a fight to the death... Until the so-called left Social Democrats bring about an open, clear, political and organizational rupture with the right leaders of Social Democracy, they are their accomplices... The united front of the proletariat is to be built up from below. The CP. of Germany must go everywhere to the Social Democratic workers, to the lower strata of Social Democratic functionaries, with the watchword: Break away from the betrayers of the proletariat. Unite and gather round the flag of the German CP."

Thus no difference of opinion exists in the question of the rejection of the united front from above since the October defeat in Germany.

But the views of the Left carry us considerably further to the "small step further in the same direction", where the truth becomes converted into error.

Not only is the united front from above, the workers' and peasants' government, and the seizure of real values rejected for the past in Germany, but the united front tactics are rejected wholesale and entirely, as reformist, and **with them the united front from below**, and the application of united front tactics from above, the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government, and the slogan of the seizure of real values, **for other countries**. Now it is certainly no trifle to assert that for two years our Party has been pursuing false and reformist tactics, and that its leading slogans and fighting methods have been false and reformist. To do this is to facilitate considerably the efforts of Social Democracy in its fight against us. And the assertion is again no trifle, for the reason that these tactics were not only the tactics of the so-called "Right" or Party majority, but at the same time the tactics of the Communist International. The Communist International has repeatedly observed and condemned errors in the application of these tactics in Germany and other countries. But the tactics themselves, as such the slogans of the workers' and peasants' government, and of the seizure of real values, have been repeatedly and expressly approved by the Comintern, and their application prescribed for other countries.

But even the tactics of a united front from above are not yet out of date for some countries outside of Germany. Are they no longer suitable for application to France? It is certain that they can still be employed here. In France the slogan of the workers' and peasants' government is an imperative necessity of the hour, as a fighting slogan against the probability of a Left bloc, whose coming into existence obviously expresses the existence of widespread democratic-pacifist illusions (or of a democratic-pacifist "psychology") among broad strata of the working class and petty bourgeoisie. The slogan of the seizure of real values meets a question which is just beginning to be a burning one in France, now that the currency is depreciating with greater rapidity, and it will speedily become apparent that the taxation methods hitherto employed by the bourgeoisie are insufficient, so that the gradual expropriation of the petty bourgeoisie, and the lowering of the standard of living of the proletariat, will begin to take place as they have done in Germany. Should we accept the views of the Left, we should be obliged to reject these slogans for the CP. of France. In this we should be expressly in the company of the "right", for it is well known that the Right of the French CP. carried on an obstinate struggle against the united front tactics.

Are the tactics of the united front from above out-of-date for England? We do not think so. And within certain limits and along certain lines, they are still suitable for application in

Italy, where our Party has called upon the parties of the II International to form an electoral bloc against Fascism. Errors have been committed of late in the application of the tactics of the united front from above, both in France and in England. (Especially with regard to the attitude towards the Labour Party.) But solely for this reason, to reject the tactics of the united front from above, for these countries, wholesale, and for the present epoch only, is the "small step further which converts the truth into an error". Such a judgment signifies that we are to throw overboard the materialistic dialectics which require that given general tactics be adapted in every case to the exigencies of time and place, to the demands of the situation as a whole. We in Germany committed the error of not changing the slogans of the Workers' government and the seizure of real values rapidly enough when the political situation became acute. The error now being committed by the Left is an error of the same nature, but in the opposite direction. This is not the way to correct errors, but the way to perpetuate and multiply them.

For Germany in the present period we have the slogan of the united front from below, upon which the theses of the Central Committee and the political theses of the Executive are in agreement. In this regard the theses of the Executive are more elastic than those of the Central Committee. Does the Left consider the tactics of the united front from below to be false for Germany at the present epoch and in the immediate future? This is the logical conclusion to be drawn from the Elberfeld resolution, but it is not stated openly and definitely. And this must be done. The question is one of far-reaching importance for the policy of the Party, for our everyday political and trade union work.

It is not our intention to enter here into the consequences which have already followed on these views. It is however obvious that a viewpoint which totally rejects the united front tactics as reformist is bound to have serious and harmful political effect.

The foundation for the tactics of the united front, in their various forms of application, is given as soon as the "proletarian vanguard has been ideologically won over", and it is merely a question of "finding forms for the drawing in or transition of the masses into the proletarian revolution" (Lenin).

The fundamental principle of these tactics was given by Lenin as early as 1920, in the following sentences, which, it seems to me, precisely meet the needs of the case in Germany today:

"The proletarian vanguard is won over ideologically, that is the main point. Without this it is not possible to take even the first step towards victory. But it is still a long way from here to victory. Victory cannot be gained by the vanguard alone. To fling this vanguard alone into the decisive struggle, **before the broad masses have taken up a position in which they either afford direct support, or at least benevolent neutrality and complete certainty that they do not aid the enemy** this would not be merely foolish, but criminal. But to bring this whole class, the whole of the broad masses of the working people, to this position, **this requires more than propaganda and agitation. It requires personal political experience among the masses.** This is the fundamental law of all great revolutions, and is now being confirmed with surprising force and clearness, not only in Russia, but in Germany as well."

(The heavy type is mine. A. Th.)

Where do we stand in Germany? The vanguard of the proletariat has been won over. And more than this. We have already encircled the Party with a belt of sympathisers, of a breadth varying with the circumstances. But we have not yet a **firm majority** sympathising with the aims and principles of Communism, and the theses of the Executive also show that we had not this in October either. We are on the road to it. That is the task before us. And the realization of this task means that we need the united front tactics — in an altered form adapted to the present circumstances, the tactics of the united front from below.

It is evident that, if the concrete prerequisites for these tactics are not clearly understood, there will be more groping about in a fog, and one error will be substituted by another. Thus tactical errors in the present are inevitable when the tactics of the immediate past are not comprehended on the basis of their concrete premises.

It is of course clear to every Marxist that the tactics of the united front from below, and with these all united front tactics, become unsuitable for application under certain circumstances and for certain countries. This point is reached as soon

as the majority of the workers have been won over for the aims and principles of Communism, that is, as soon as the object of these tactics has been gained by their correct and persevering application. They are no longer suitable of application in countries where Communism is victorious, where the proletariat has established its class dictatorship, and has thereby suppressed all other parties. And on the other hand, these tactics must not be applied too soon; their employment is impossible or extremely limited where the firm proletarian vanguard has not yet been formed.

But it is possible to imagine another eventuality, in which it would be necessary to drop the united front tactics in any form, after we had already made use of these tactics, after we had already won over the revolutionary vanguard for Communism, and although the employment of these tactics had not yet attained its object of grouping the majority of the working class around the communist parties.

What eventuality is here indicated? Of what does it consist, of what can it consist?

Such an eventuality can only arise when the working class of any country has suffered so severe a defeat, so great reverses, that the revolutionary vanguard is shattered, and the workers are faced with the task of building it up afresh; and when at the same time the working class has reached a point where no mass action is possible for a long time, but only revolutionary agitation and propaganda.

This in truth is the premise upon which a dropping of the united front tactics (in any form) in Germany at the present time is unexpressedly based: the prospect of a considerable period of time during which the C. P. is confined solely to agitation and propaganda; a long and weary prospect, and a profound depression of the activity of the working class.

But if mass action is possible and intended, then the united front cannot be dropped. That is clear.

But the Left accomplishes the feat of demanding that the united front be dropped, and of simultaneously proclaiming the prospect of mass struggles in the near future. One thing or the other. Here it is necessary to speak plainly.

The Left likes to talk of liquidationism (an idea which it first learnt from the "Right"). The ideas upon which the dropping of the united front in Germany are based have certainly much in common with liquidationism, but they are not the ideas of the so-called "Right".

As we have not yet a certain proletarian majority in Germany, we must hold fast to the tactics of the united front. As our reverses have not been so severe as to compel us to set about building up a revolutionary vanguard afresh, we must not abandon the united front. But since, and owing to the October retreat many essentials have been changed, and the form in which we apply the tactics must change accordingly. United front from below instead of from above.

The essential circumstances whose changes render a change in our united front tactics necessary are as follows:

a) The change in the form of the capitalist dictatorship; the bourgeois democracy has been transformed into the big capitalist Fascist dictatorship. Even though the military state of emergency has been dispensed with, the "civil state of siege" still obtains, the parliament subordinates itself to the military dictatorship, and the Fascist "purging" of the state apparatus is permitted to continue, so that the big capitalist Fascist dictatorship still essentially exists.

b) The democratic illusions have been dispelled from the consciousness of broad masses of the workers, and these are giving their sympathy, partly, to the proletarian dictatorship, in part to the Fascist dictatorship. The petty bourgeoisie, in its majority, inclines to the latter, and is even followed by sections of the working class, as the last elections in Saxony, Thuringia, and Mecklenburg prove, and as the Reichstag elections will certainly prove still further.

c) The open or concealed going over of Social Democracy into the camp of big capitalist Fascism, its open treason to the working class, palpable to broad masses, and the dropping of democratic reformist demands by Social Democracy.

d) The change in the relation of forces within the organized active core of the working class.

Still another change must be accorded attention. The Pan-Germans (Fascisti) have already obtained an organizatory footing among the town and agricultural workers. They have founded political, military, and trade unionist organizations, and in many of these groups workers preponderate. They operate with a demagogic slogan, that is, with a fraudulent pseudo anti-capitalist and anti-junker slogan. After the Saxon, Thuringian and

Mecklenburg elections we heard a lot of talk that special attention must be devoted to the Fascist movement. Practical proposals, new tactical ideas, have not been forthcoming.

It seems to me that the new idea which is adapted to the circumstances, could very well be a special form of the employment of the tactics of the united front from below, towards such Fascist organizations which for the greater part consist of workers. This is only by the way. I will perhaps deal more exhaustively with the question on another occasion.

Let us now deal with the altered circumstances and the resulting necessity of tactical changes. Let us take for example the "transition slogan" of the "Seizure of Values". The demand was first raised by the Social Democracy. It was then taken up by us and linked up with the demand for the Control of Production, the establishment of State Trusts and the Workers' Government. To what end? To attempt: either to attain common action with the Social Democrats for this demand, or, if they refused to act with us, to expose them before their own adherents and the non-party masses. The carrying on of a mass struggle under this slogan would have brought us to the limits of the capitalist Order and in due course would have led us beyond these limits. Social Democracy sabotaged the struggle under this slogan. Was the struggle therefore of no avail? No, it opened the eyes of tens of thousands of Social Democratic and trade union organized workers with regard to the Social Democracy and brought them to us. The practical experience that the Seizure of Values was not carried out, led broad masses to a perspective which must come to extend beyond the limits of the capitalist Order and of the bourgeois state.

The propaganda made for the seizure of real values, and the negative result so far as execution was concerned, were preparatory work, a preparatory school in which the masses learned the slogan of socialisation, of the complete expropriation of the big capitalists and big landowners. This is clear to everyone capable of dialectic thought.

Social Democracy has now completely dropped the slogan of seizure of real values. It stands for the Stinnes program of stabilisation. It has retired from a position which it only held hypocritically, for the sake of appearances. Thus this slogan has no other foothold — here in Germany at the present time — than that of the united front. But as a revolutionary propaganda slogan it does not go far enough, whilst as a slogan of action, as a demand corresponding to the need of the day, it is too far removed from anything which the German working class, in the present situation, can immediately take up.

The above may serve to show what has been false in the development of the Left as regards the united front tactics, as evidenced by the Elberfeld and other resolutions. It is clear that this estimation of the united front tactics not only for the past, but for the present, not only for the Communist Party of Germany, but also for other countries, is false and harmful, a relapse into a Left infantile sickness, or rather a reappearance of the Left infantile diseases as diseases incident to puberty, to hobbledehoy period: for the Party has left its childhood behind it.

III. The Decisive Struggle in October.

What is the significance, for the present time, of the phrases that "the decisive revolutionary struggle was a historical necessity" in October, and that "neither an avoidance of the struggle, nor the substitution of the final struggle by so-called rearguard fighting, partial action, or similar manoeuvres, was permissible"?

Either these are mere phrases, not intended to be taken seriously, a drifting with and an exaggeration of a trend of feeling existing among a section of the members. If this is the case, then a non-permissible and dangerous game is being played, dangerous above all to those who believe that they can play with such phrases. For the members, and beyond these the rest of the working class, take such phrases seriously, have to take them seriously, and have to act seriously upon them under some circumstances. Those who play with such ideas are thus responsible for what follows if their words are taken seriously, as they must be taken. The "decisive revolutionary struggle" is not a game.

If the phrases are really meant seriously, what follows therefrom? In October we still had no firm majority in the working class. This is not contested and cannot be contested. The fact is also unequivocally expressed in the first draft of comrade Zinoviev's thesis. Our arming was insufficient. The first decisive factor was the cleft in the proletarian front, the standing aside or even the enmity of broad masses of workers. The lack of military equipment may be replaced to a certain extent in ordinary war, and in civil war still more, by the mass and tensivity of the will to victory. But victory is impossible without the support of

the majority of the working class, or at least its benevolent neutrality. This is a fact founded on experience. Neither is it possible here to indulge in Ifs and Whens: "if we had secured a majority by means of better preparatory work" (the preparatory work could certainly have been better, and should have been thoroughly examined and criticised). The majority was not ours at the moment when the decision had to be made as to whether we should enter the decisive battle or not. (Moltke observed rightly that in war, errors committed in the marching up can scarcely ever, or rarely be subsequently retrieved. He himself retrieved his own in the campaign of '66.) We should have suffered an annihilating defeat. Our greatest error, after the grave preliminary errors of the marching up, of our political, military and organizational preparation, did not consist of the fact that we did not strive for the revolutionary decision which was at that time beyond the powers of the working class, but that we did not draw on all the powers which we actually possessed for our resistance and for our rearguard fighting. I shall later on deal with the question of the comparative forces and reciprocal relations among the classes during revolutionary struggles in general, and in October in particular.

What is the consequence of the attitude adopted by the Left, of the lack of recognition of the real errors of our marching up, and of our preparation for and carrying out of the struggle? The consequence is obviously the impossibility of improving these errors, the repetition and enhancement of error in one direction or another. That is, we shall either be involved in a struggle so imperfectly prepared for, so handicapped by insufficient insight into the reciprocal relations among the classes, that it is bound to end in defeat, or we shall be led to abandon even those partial struggles which the powers of the working class would enable it to cope with from time to time.

"Defeated armies learn well." Let us learn, but let us not repeat and enhance the errors already committed, or a second and even severer defeat is inevitable.

But does not defeat play a decisive rôle in the process of the revolutionary development of the working class? The struggle in June 1848, the Commune in 1870—71, the defeat suffered by the Russian working class in December 1905, the January and March struggles in 1919 in Germany?

Yes, it is clear to every revolutionist that these defeats were immeasurably fruitful for the working class. But every defeat is not fruitful for the working class; it depends upon the concrete circumstances. It is a question which has to be carefully examined in the light of these circumstances. In June 1848 almost the whole of the Parisian proletariat fought against the big and petty bourgeoisie and the rabble. It was systematically provoked by a bourgeoisie determined to put a stop to all proletarian nonsense about a social republic, and anxious to disarm the workers of Paris. The Parisian proletariat suffered a bloody defeat. All Europe trembled at the concussion. The course taken by revolution made a decisive turn, not only in France, but in Germany and Austria as well. The bourgeoisie which had been rising against feudalism and absolutism now reversed its tactics in the face of the threatening proletarian revolution, turned against the proletariat, and entered into compromises with the feudal classes, the junkers, and royalty. The petty bourgeoisie vacillated. In the June struggle the Parisian proletariat fought as a class, turned its face towards its final goal amid streams of blood, underwent the profoundest class experiences in the midst of a frightful struggle, and laid the foundation for the next stage of the fight. The June struggle dispelled the delusions of the Parisian (French) working class as to a peaceful transition to Socialism, and it collided at the same time with the third class of French society, the peasantry, but without learning all that this could have taught it. On the other hand, the June struggle gave an accelerating impetus to the development of counter-revolution. The Second Empire, the rule of Louis Bonaparte and the Bonapartist military dictatorship, were the results. And, as Marx observes with his customary insight, revolution matures on counter-revolution. The Commune of 1871 was the fruit of the June struggle of 1848.

The June struggle and the June defeat were historically fruitful as mighty class experiences for the proletariat, by which the proletariat became more mature, raised its class consciousness to a higher level, and thereby prepared a higher stage of the struggle.

The Commune and its defeat in 1871 played the same rôle. Here again the greater part of the Parisian working class engaged in the fight. They were defeated, and not only with the aid of Bismarck and the French bourgeoisie, but by rural France, the peasantry. But the Commune has proved a treasury of fresh

class consciousness, of moral force for the proletariat of all countries. It is a landmark of progress in the consciousness of the whole working class of the world. In the Commune the dictatorship of the proletariat first took tangible shape within the compass of a world city. Without the June defeat of 1848 there would have been no Commune, and without the defeat of the Commune there would have been no victory for the Soviet dictatorship in Russia in October 1917.

And then the barricade fighting in Moscow in December 1905, the transition from mass strike to armed insurrection. These brought the Russian working class its first experience of proletarian insurrection. Without December 1905 there would have been no 1917. The acute aggravation of class warfare as experienced at the beginning of the rising in 1905 was, in the first place, the starting point enabling the proletarian class struggle of 1917 to be carried out on a higher level, and in the second place it gave the impetus causing the revolution of 1917 to at once accompany the democratic republic by workers' Soviets, so that the bourgeoisie was pressed abruptly forwards, far beyond its own actual aims, by a working class wiser by the experiences of 1905. Without the barricade fighting in Moscow in December 1905 there could have been no thought of either March 1917 nor October 1917. Plekhanov, who lamented in 1905 that armed insurrection should have been resorted to, was rightly derided as a Philistine by Lenin.

In January 1919 there were certainly more than half a million workers who took part in the struggle in Berlin, either as immediate participators or as sympathizers. Precisely as before June 1848, the Ebert-Scheidemann group had systematically provoked the struggle at the behest and with the aid of the bourgeoisie, in order to disarm the armed revolutionary workers, to put an end to the workers' councils, and to secure the position of the national assembly, that is, of bourgeois democracy. Our object was: the energetic defence of the threatened positions (the weapons of the working class, the presidency of police, etc.). It was perfectly clear to us that the overthrow of the Ebert-Scheidemann clique was beyond our powers at that time. It would have been wrong to make for the revolutionary decision, but it was right to defend with the utmost energy the threatened positions, and thus to pursue an aim, limited by the obtaining conditions. This course of action bore fruit. The first revolutionary fighting traditions were created.

All these historically fruitful defeats of the proletariat have one feature in common: that the greater part of the working class has taken part in the struggle. The defeat has shown the proletariat as a whole the limitations of its class consciousness and fighting methods, has dispelled illusions, introduced the new and more advanced stage of the struggle, prepared fresh forms of struggle, become a source of moral force and forced the hand of counter-revolution, against whose efforts the billows of revolution again rise higher and higher.

But if we consider the events of July 1917 in Russia and those in October 1923 in Germany, what do we find characteristic of the situation?

The greater part of the working class had not yet joined hands with the vanguard. In July 1917 Petrograd was far in advance of the rest of the country, was an outpost which could well be stormed, but scarcely retained. The case was similar in March 1921 in central Germany, and in October 1923.

To insist at such a moment on the revolutionary decision "is equivalent to a battle in which 10,000 soldiers plunge into conflict with an enemy force numbering 50,000, instead of standing still, of turning aside, or even making compromises, whilst waiting for the reinforcement of 100,000 men which is sure to arrive, but which cannot be on the spot at the moment. That is childish intellectualism, but it is not the serious policy of the revolutionary class" (Lenin: "Radicalism, the infantile mad lady . . .").

In such a situation, when the revolutionary vanguard does not bring along with it the greater part of the working class, a defeat cannot be regarded by the working class as one of its historical advances ending in defeat, but as a strategic error, a lack of judgment on the part of the revolutionary party. The result is a temporary alienation, a withdrawal of this majority from its party.

In view of the grave mistakes of the Left platform in this question, and of the want of clearness obviously still ruling in our Party with regard to it, and in view of the dangers threatening the Party and the working class if these errors are not discovered, acknowledged and amended, it is necessary to dis-

cuss the question very plainly, especially in a case like our present one, where one error is replaced by another equally great or even greater, even though this may prevent our being able to say: look, we have made no mistakes, we have been perfectly right. The interests of the Party as a totality are of higher importance than the creation of a feeling of fractional self-satisfaction upon an erroneous basis, and the mistakes committed by any side are to be thoroughly recognized and removed, without consideration of fraction.

It is considerably easier to generate a feeling of panic during a retreat, and to play this off against the leaders of the retreat, but it is a question whether such action is more useful to the Party.

In N. Machiavelli's Discourses there is an interesting chapter on the question of why the Romans, as opposed to the Greeks, did not execute their defeated generals. Machiavelli convincingly defends the conclusion that the Romans acted more cleverly and advantageously than the Greeks. This chapter appears to us to be capable of much useful application, from a non-military and not merely historical point of view.

IV. The Missing Dots to the i's.

The Elberfeld resolution (and not only this) confirms, even more rapidly and thoroughly than expected, what we foresaw and forecasted as to the inevitable consequences of the defeats, the want of clearness, and the lack of complete expression in the political resolution of the Executive.

In the declaration submitted as a supplement to the verbal declaration made by Clara Zetkin on behalf of Walcher, Pieck, Hannack, Brandler, Hammer and Eisenberg at the Presidium Session of the Comintern on 21. January 1924 to comrade Zinoviev, chairman of the Executive, we read:

"(The Theses) contain no unequivocal decision as to whether it was right, in the given circumstances, that the Party did not take up the armed struggle for power... They do not contain the necessary criticism of the faults and defects of the policy pursued by the so-called 'left Party Opposition', and it is thus made extremely difficult to convert the opposition from its errors, and to effectuate co-operation between the Party majority and the opposition."

It might seem as if this criticism relates to "trifles", to non-essentials. Facts have now shown us that this is not the case. The lack of clear expression in the resolution left innumerable small loopholes through which relapses into Left infantile complaints have been made possible. The Left believes its errors to be justified by that which is not contained in the resolution, by that which is left veiled and undecided. Those errors of the Left which are not plainly stated are regarded as justified, are continually repeated in resolutions and take practical effect. These resolutions and platforms are not mere scraps of paper. They are bound to have effect throughout the whole Party, and they are already doing so.

It follows therefore that this negligence must be made up for as rapidly as possible, the "forgotten" dots must be placed over the i's. Otherwise there is danger ahead.

V. The Centre or "Middle group".

According to the report published by the *Rote Fahne* of 6th March, Comrade Koenen is said to have made a sharp attack upon the Right, and to have threatened that it is going to be "crushed". He is further said to have opposed the idea that the middle group is to continue to exist permanently. This is not intended, since the Centre inclines more and more to the left. Unity can thus be arrived at to the advantage of the Party. On the next day Comrade Koenen published a correction of this report, and stated that his observations had been incorrectly reported. Above all he had never said that the Centre inclines more and more to the left and that unity in the Party should be thus attained. The following is a brief statement of the authentic wording of his remarks:

"The object held in view must be the liquidation of the Right, and all who oppose this object must be crushed. The great mistrust obtaining in the Party renders it imperative that all group formation be done away with, so that we may form a firm core for active work. *The Moscow decisions form the required basis* (the italics are Koenen's. We of the Centre will everywhere energetically defend these decisions..."

It is the Centre itself which has been "crushed". It proved unable to stand firm against Left currents. No wonder. We foresaw and forecasted this too. The original theses of the Centre were immediately characterised by us in the *Fahne der Revolution*, as a mixture of inextricable contradictions of "left" premises and "right" conclusions. We observed at the time that these contradictions could not possibly hold together very long. Either the "left" premises or the "right" conclusions would have to be abandoned. To this must be added that the Centre announced everywhere that it had been seduced by the Right, and brought accusations against the whole policy of the Party as pursued since Leipzig. The members drew correct conclusions from these premises. They rightly concluded that leaders capable of being seduced so thoroughly and continuously were no leaders at all. They drew left conclusions from left premises. It is characteristic that although the Centre announced that it would refute this article* (Left Premises — Right Conclusions), it made no attempt to do so. The theses forming the platform of unity with the Left were dropped. And my criticism of these contradictions was even followed by a still more annihilating one from the ranks of the Centre itself, from Comrade Gerhardt. Thus one position after another was abandoned — without partial fighting — and given up to the Left. Therefore it is no wonder, but entirely natural and inevitable, that the Centre should be "wiped out". But its action has unfortunately taken effect upon the whole Party. The concessions made (generally tacitly) to K. A. P. (Communist Labour Party) views, by which the alliance between Centre and Left was made, are still taking political and organizational effect. We gave warning of this danger in good time. But without effect at first. For the "Right" had to be "liquidated" or "crushed".

Another "small step further" in the turning towards the Left, and the "truth becomes converted into error", the victory becomes a defeat.

This was inevitable.

VI. The Left.

At the same Berlin functionary meeting at which Koenen made the above declaration, Comrade Scholem of the Left had previously declared in his address, that: "Brandler, Thalheimer, and their consorts are finally set aside. And for the reason that they have tried to drive the Party towards the right... We shall regard everyone as our enemy who does not hold firmly to the positions held by the majority at the coming party conference, to the position of the Left. The Left will not tolerate under any circumstances that a Social Democratic nucleus be formed within the Party..."

This is exceedingly kind of Comrade Scholem. He has also taken the opportunity of arriving at the recognition of various things, though different to what he imagines. That the "Right", supposed to be represented by Brandler and myself, has been finally done away with. This sentence is an advance. For this "Right", these "Social Democrats" were a flight of imagination. And it is of great advantage to the Party that comrade Scholem can assure us that it exists no more, has finally expired.

Further. If the acute crisis in the Party serves any purpose at all, it is that all sides learn thorough lessons from it. But this is not the case with comrade Scholem, nor does the Left show any signs of having learnt anything. The Party is making a trial with the Left. Of what does this consist? Precisely in testing whether it is capable of learning anything, not merely from other people's errors, but from its own as well. We too considered such a trial to be dangerous, but unavoidable, since it was not rendered possible for the group hitherto forming the majority to maintain a secure leadership. It was our duty to await the first results of this trial. Now that we have these before us, it is equally our duty to adopt a critical attitude towards them and to utter a warning against the rocks and sandbanks threatening the Party if the Elberfeld resolution is to form the decisive platform of the Party, if typical Left infantile diseases are not openly and effectually combatted. Dangers from the Right, in so far as they exist, and of course they do exist, cannot be wiped out by means of Left infantile diseases. It is rather enhanced by them. These infantile diseases must above all be combatted with the aid of the thinking brains among the Left. The Centre has proved itself to be — Centre.

* This article appeared in the *Inprekorr.* of January 24, 1924. Ed.

The Left has at least shown energy, if in a wrong direction. It is not yet too late for it to learn, to recognize and retrieve the errors of the past, without consideration for fractional self-love or dogmatism. If the Left does not do this, then it will prove that its victory has made it lose its head, as Levi's defeat made him lose his.

The above criticism is intended to help the Left in its task of learning. If it learns, it will retain its participation in the Party leadership. If it does not learn, then its victory will only be an apparent one.

VII. Social Democracy and our Party Differences.

If the Social Democrats believe that they can derive any benefit from our Party differences, then they will be ridiculously disappointed. They have no cause to rejoice. All our disagreements are precisely about the question of how we can best and most speedily get rid of the putrefying corpse of Social Democracy, how we can induce the Social Democratic workers to quit this party and join the Communists. In our desire to attain this goal we are at one. Our differences are concerned with the ways and means. The stupidity and clumsiness with which Social Democracy fancies that it can utilize our differences for its own ends can arouse nothing more than our contempt and derision.

Our Party will emerge stronger and more mature from these differences. They are complaints common to the period of puberty, to the epoch of adolescence accompanying the transition to ripe manhood. But the complaint attacking the German SP. is incurable and deadly and the party is only keeping up the appearance of being alive.

But we must not forget that we have not yet got rid of the corpse of Social Democracy, that it is still in the midst of the working class, and that the laws of inertia, which rule in the mental world as well as in the physical, hinder its speedy decay. Much depends on our attitude, if this process of decay is to be accelerated, and so far completed as is necessary to render the establishment of the dictatorship possible.

Postscript.

After concluding the above article, I had the opportunity of perusing "Der Funke" (The Spark), formerly "Tactics and Organization", published by the district organizers of the German CP., Berlin-Brandenburg. The introductory article of this little paper fully confirms what I have written with regard to the Elberfeld resolution. "Der Funke" designates it as its task (and as the task of the whole Left) "to create a Communist Party". "It is our task to become a Communist Party, that is, a Party cast in one piece, with uniform ideology and an organization hard as steel, with leaders who are clear as to their aims, really leading the Party and possessing its confidence." "The Russian Bolsheviks" the article goes on to say, "had an easier task in some respects than the German Communists. They first built up their party, in ideology and organization. But we have to drag at our heels the inheritance of Social Democracy, we have to re-form a given mass party, we are confronted by enemies whom the Bolsheviks knew nothing of." It is further considered that the Bolsheviks had the advantage of being able "to create the ideology of the Party with the utmost care, to a great extent untroubled by the pettiness of daily work and daily events".

Several points in the above sentences are worthy of notice. In the first place there is the idea that the Communist Party of Germany, after five years of organized existence, after five years of co-operation with the Communist International, 10 years after the Marxist left took up the struggle against Kautskyism in Germany, after the experience of November 1918, after the ideological political work accomplished by Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, after the discussions with the Communist Labour Party and with the Communist Working Union (K. A. G.) — the assumption that after all this we are no more advanced, in the development of the Communist vanguard of the German proletariat than Russian Social Democracy was developed at the time when the "Iskra" (The Spark) was founded. Such a fundamental failure to grasp the situation and the main task of the Party can scarcely be surpassed. In May 1920 Lenin wrote: "The proletarian vanguard has been won over, that is the main point. Until this is done, it is not possible to take even the first step towards the goal. But it is still a long way from here to victory. Victory cannot be won with the vanguard alone."

And shortly before this: "The most important of all — though of course not by any means everything — has already been done in forming the vanguard of the working class, in its transition to the side of the Soviet power against parliamentarism, to the side of proletarian dictatorship against bourgeois democracy. All forces must now be concentrated on the next step, one which appears to be of less importance — and is actually of less importance from one point of view — but which therefore approaches nearer to the practical solution of the task, and this is: forms must be found for the participation and transition of the masses to proletarian revolutions."

Thus Lenin wrote in May 1920 ("Radicalism, the infantile disease of communism." P. 70).

Are we in 1924 so far behindhand with the tasks of 1920 that we have to begin from the very beginning in the work of winning over the proletarian vanguard? I do not think so. There exist no doubt that we have made advances since that time in the conquest of the proletarian vanguard, very great advances, and we have progressed at the same time in the ideological education of the vanguard. To be sure, this task is today "not by a long way" yet accomplished. But should we today concentrate our chief energies upon this first step, the winning over and schooling of the vanguard, or upon the next step, the "forms for the participation or transition of the masses to proletarian revolutions?" There is no doubt whatever that during the present fighting period this next second step is our chief task. The "forms for the participation or transition of the masses to proletarian revolutions", of which Lenin said in 1920 that they must be found, have been found in the various forms and methods of application of the united front tactics. It is perfectly clear that anyone who so entirely fails to recognize the main task of the Party at the present juncture as the Left fails to recognize it, is bound to take up the attitude of the Left towards the united front tactics, is bound in practice to reject these tactics (even whilst accepting them in words). The purport of the Elberfeld resolution is thus not accidental, no result of unhappy formulation, but is typical and characteristic of the standpoint of the Left. Another characteristic point is the attitude of the preface of the "Funke" to the "pettiness of daily work and daily events". It finds these a burden. And this is again a logical conclusion if the main task of the Party does not consist of incorporating the whole working class, or its overwhelming majority, in the communist vanguard, in the systematic utilization of petty daily events, that is, in current action. This "Funke" will not prove a second "Iskra". It gives no light to the Party, but it sheds light enough upon the ignorance of those leading members who are incapable of comprehending the main task of the Party during the present fighting period. It would have been better if the leading writers had adopted a more modest rôle, for it is no light matter to ascribe to oneself the part of a Lenin or Plekhanov. Such presumption is only possible to those who understand as little of the history of the Russian Communist Party, of the work of a Lenin and of a Plekhanov (at the time when the latter was still a revolutionary Marxist) as they understand of the history of the German Communist Party and of the movements out of which it has arisen.

It is further interesting to note that in the "Funke", No. 1, it is openly stated that "the middle group possesses no right of political existence, no point of view, and no principles; this was our opinion from the beginning, and we have never concealed it". It is openly stated that this "superfluous group" must be politically combatted until its ideology is overcome and its organization liquidated. This is clear enough.

This middle group has already made great concessions, far too great concessions, to Communist Labour Party views in its collaboration with the Left. And it has been vanquished. It has permitted or promoted deviations from the correct communist line at times when it was its plain duty to fight these with utmost energy. But it did not want to do this, and could not do it, for the group desirous of co-operating with the Left without making ideological concessions to Left deviations, the so-called Right, was for the Centre not merely its greatest enemy, but the sole enemy. According to the viewpoint of the Centre, no danger threatened from the Left.

I believe that I have been able, with the aid of the programmatic utterances of the Left, to show that this danger from the Left exists, and will, if not combatted, land the Party on a shoal or a reef.