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Resolution on the "Immediate Tasks of Economic Policy".

Submitted by

Comrade Ossinsky

to the Meeting of the Party Nuclei Bureaus and of the Active Party Workers of the Moscow Organization.¹⁾

In view of the fact that the resolution of the Political Bureau of the C. C. on the "Immediate Tasks of the Economic Policy"²⁾ represents mainly an exposition of the resolutions adopted by the 12th Congress of the Russian CP. with the addition, however, of some new proposals of doubtful worth and the omission of some questions which have become ripe, the Meeting considers it necessary to amend the resolution of the Political Bureau in the following fundamental respects:

1. It is necessary, not only to bring forward the questions regarding the fundamental and decisive significance of knitting together the nationalized industries and the peasant economy, but also to explain the reasons for which this knitting together has not been realized during the past period and the reasons why the connecting of the villages with the private home industry and with private commercial capital have developed more successfully. The fundamental reasons for all this are: the lack of a plan uniting the work of all the branches of state economy, the casualness and the unsystematized work of the leading organs, and in connection with this, the disharmony and crudeness prevalent in the work of the whole economic periphery.

Though reproaching "a number of economic organs" for having incorrectly applied the directives of the 12th Congress, and for having raised the prices higher than was justified, the resolution loses sight of the fact that such a reproach implies also the lack of leading on the part of the highest organs in the commercial activity of the economic organs. The reproach in the first place must therefore be directed against the highest organs.

2. Setting aside the question as to whether, under the conditions of the Nep, crises are unavoidable, or whether it is only so-called "depressions" which are unavoidable, it is necessary to state that the present crisis has nothing to do with such unavoidable economic disturbances. It is not the result either of a sudden reduction in the demand from the peasants, resulting from a bad harvest (which might be a possible cause of a depression and could not be overcome), or of a change in the movement of world prices. It is also impossible to explain it by pointing out the disparity between industrial and agricultural production, a disparity which, it is alleged, results from objective factors. If the development of the State industry is proceeding in an elementary way, and is not balanced by the development of agriculture, this is due to the lack of a plan of management.

The principal causes of the present crisis are: a) the chaotic nature of our industrial construction; b) the casual and improper credit policy; owing to the latter, in the period of spring and summer 1923, the financial means of the State Bank were totally engaged in operations of industry and wholesale trade on unsound bases and without retaining a reserve for the autumn period of grain crop.

The resolution must be modified, in order to state the real causes of the crisis and in order to make clear the concrete faults committed; to screen these faults means to prevent their being corrected.

3. In the resolution of the Political Bureau, there is no mention of the question of the administration of industry, which has a tremendous importance among the actual tasks of economic policy. It is necessary to put forward and work out concretely the question of establishing a close connection between the trusts, which at present in fact are autonomous, on the one hand, and the Supreme National Economic Council on the other, as well as the task of creating a firm and well-connected system of state economy on the basis of an economic plan

¹⁾ This resolution was rejected by an overwhelming majority at the above meeting which took place on the 29th December.

²⁾ This was published in our Special Number "Russian Party Discussions" I, Vol. 4, No. 7. of 29th January last, page 40.

and of a correct leadership of the State enterprises. This will strengthen to the highest degree the position of our State Economy in its struggle against private capital and also in regard to a real knitting together of the State Industry with the villages.

4. The resolution of the Political Bureau, in one of its points, lays down a totally incorrect task, namely to include in the calculation of the price of products merely "the necessary minimum profit". Such a task implies a revocation of the resolution of the 12th Congress, a transition to the position of a common bourgeois "fiscal economy", it excludes the possibility of basing the State budget on incomes deriving from industry. The corresponding task can only be formulated as follows: "obtaining the greatest profit with a given average price and with the obligation to strive to reduce the price by means of enlarging and perfecting the working capacity".

5. The resolution of the Political Bureau does not give a correct estimation of the successes of private capital in general and, in particular, of private commercial capital which has already come into possession of 14% of the wholesale trade, 15% of the wholesale-retail and 80% of the small trade, and has also accumulated large sums in goods and stable values. It is necessary to dedicate far greater attention than hitherto to the work in the sphere of commerce. In connection with this it is necessary (see Comrade Lenin's article on Co-operation), in the fight against private commercial capital, to bring to the forefront the co-operative organizations, elaborating a plan of increased credits to them, both by supplying them with goods from the State industry and also with financial means.

6. The demand for an active trade balance put forward in the resolution occupies a very extended, but completely unjustified position. This demand, in its essence, means: to export as much as possible, to import as little as possible and furthermore only to import means of production. To accumulate the difference in the form of a gold fund.

Regard, however, must be had to the following:

a) Soviet Russia cannot allow herself the luxury of spending means for the transition from bank notes to metal currency, but must spend these means for productive purposes;

b) the import of the necessary industrial raw materials (cotton) is to be developed as much as possible;

c) the private importation of articles for mass consumption in which we are lacking could be the principal and most profitable weapon for the State in its fight against speculation in goods;

d) the importation of articles for peasants' consumption is a very important means for developing our export. From this point of view it is necessary not to strive at the greatest preponderance of exports over imports, but at maintaining a solid equilibrium between the first and the second.

On the other hand, to the extent to which Soviet Russia obtains foreign loans and will be able to commence a large-scale importation of means of production, and partially also of articles of consumption in which she is lacking, her commercial balance can become a negative one without any detriment to the development of the productive forces, because her financial balance will be a positive one.

It is necessary, not to proclaim the abstract slogan of an active trade balance, but to proceed towards elaborating a rational import plan and to make a large use of goods intervention (i. e. partial importation from abroad of goods which we lack and of those of which the price has particularly increased.)

7. The lack of a well thought out credit policy, the practical autonomy of the State Bank (for instance the abolition of

credits to industry which took place in autumn without the consent of the State Planning Commission and the Supreme National Economic Council), the attempt, instead of aiming at a general economic plan, to regulate economy from the financial centre, the failure of these methods of a unique "planning" — all this demands decisive steps towards including the plan of the distribution of credits into the general economic plan, and also a corresponding modification of the mutual relations between the State Bank and the State Planning Commission.

8. The central question of the proletarian economic policy in the sphere of industry is the work for systematically improving the position of the working class. Successes in this direction are the most important guarantee for industrial successes. Measures for raising the standard of life of the workers and also for strengthening, reviving and freeing our trade unions from the stultifying influence of the "Party absolute tranquility" must be elaborated on a larger scale and more carefully.

It is necessary also to bring forward and to elaborate the question of measures for the fight against unemployment, a question which has been totally omitted from the resolution of the Political Bureau. It is also necessary to remark, that the establishment of plannedness in our economic construction, introducing it into the system of our State Industry, will, by facilitating the accumulation of productive resources on the Part of the State, become a powerful factor, reducing unemployment and raising the standard of life of the proletariat.

9. The fact that the resolution of the Political Bureau recognizes the necessity practically to carry out the resolutions of the 12th Congress regarding the State Planning Commission, and in general regarding the establishment of a planned administration of economy, can only be welcomed. But to the natural question, why this was not done after the 12th Congress, the resolution gives an evasive answer which is not to the point, and which provokes grave reflections regarding the future. The resolution connects the possibility of a planned administration with the introduction of a stable valuta, and thereby seeks to explain the dilatoriness in executing the resolutions of the 12th Congress, by the necessity of first of all carrying out the currency reform. Such a presentation of the question is incorrect and dangerous because, without the general and uninterrupted equilibrating of the finances with the other elements of the State and national economy, there can be no talk of securing a real stable currency. It is incorrect to assume that the pre-requisites for the planned administration of economy can be prepared piece-meal. It is precisely this way of handling the matter which, from time to time, causes a sharp disparity in the fundamental factors of economy and which appears to be one of the main causes of the present crisis, which, to a considerable extent, seems to be a crisis of disparity and of lack of prevision.

10. The tremendous importance and the complicated nature of the questions which the resolution of the Political Bureau places before the Party for discussion, necessitate a detailed handling of all their points in the press, the publishing of the most important figures and material regarding all the most important questions of economy, the edition of special manuals and the like — all of which has not been done up to the present. The discussion on the economic construction was introduced in such a way, that it cannot be correctly developed and utilized by the outlying sections of the Party, and by the mass of the rank and file nuclei. If we wish to have a really general Party discussion, these faults and omissions must be immediately remedied.

The Results of the Discussion in the Communist Party of Russia.

Resolution on Workers' Democracy and Petty Bourgeois Tendencies within the RCP.

The 13th Party Conference of the RCP at its sitting of the 18th January last passed the following resolution with only two dissentients:

I.

The Origin of the Discussion.

Already the Plenary Session of the Central Committee in September 1923, and still earlier the Political Bureau of the C. C. of our Party, long before any appearance of the "opposition", broached the question as to the necessity of reviving the Party activity and of strengthening the workers' democracy within the Party.

On the one hand, the improvement in industry, which put an end to the declassing of the proletariat, the cultural raising of the working class, the growth of activity among it, created more favourable conditions for putting into actual practice the principles of inner Party democracy. On the other hand, the economic conflicts of the summer — although in themselves they constituted no danger, and in their extent were far more limited than those in the past, — indicated that in some places, the connection of the Party organizations with the non-party working mass was not firm enough.

The Central Committee of the Party realized that the transition to a new course had to be accomplished in a very deliberate and cautious manner, and after thorough preparation. Conscious of this, the C. C. of the Party, in September 1923, proceeded to the preparatory work in this sphere.

At this moment, the old oppositional groups and grouplets, the policy of which had been condemned by the Party more than once, thought the time opportune for proceeding to an attack against the C. C. of the Party. Calculating that the question of the inner Party democracy would arouse a keener attention on the part of all members of the Party, the oppositional groups resolved to exploit this slogan in the interests of their fractions. After the September resolution of the Plenary Session of the C. C. of the RCP, there appeared the letter of Comrade Trotzky and, following it, the letter of the forty six opposition comrades. These documents gave a totally incorrect and ultra-fractional estimation of the economic situation in the country, and of the inner state of the Party, they predicted a profound economic crisis in the Republic and an inner crisis in the Party, and brought forward charges against the C. C. of the Party of leading the Party in an incorrect way.

The harm caused by these fractional actions of Comrade Trotzky and of the forty six, was still further increased by the fact that the above mentioned letters immediately became the common property of wide circles of Party members, were disseminated throughout the districts, among the Student Youth of Moscow and, immediately afterwards, were spread throughout the whole Soviet Union.

The October Joint Session of the Plenums of the C. C. and the C. C. C., with the participation of representatives of ten of the largest Party organizations, rightly condemned the action of Comrade Trotzky and of the forty six as an act of factionism and at the same time the Joint Plenums of the C. C. and the C. C. C. unanimously approved of the initiative of the Political Bureau regarding the question of reviving the inner Party activity and of strengthening the workers' democracy. The joint Plenums of the C. C. and the C. C. C. decided not to carry the disputes raised by Comrade Trotzky and by the forty six, beyond the confines of the C. C., neither to publish the letters of Comrade Trotzky and of the 46 nor the answer of the Political Bureau and the resolution of the C. C. and the C. C. C. condemning the opposition, which was adopted with a majority of 102 against 2 with ten abstentions.

Nevertheless, Trotzky and his 46 followers did not subordinate themselves to the decisions of such an authoritative Party institution, and continued a systematic offensive against

the C. C. of the Party, at first in broad circles of the Moscow organization, and afterwards also throughout the whole Soviet Union.

The Political Bureau, following the decision of the joint Plenums, proceeded to the elaboration of the resolution on the inner Party situation and on the workers' democracy. Notwithstanding the fractionist action of Comrade Trotzky, the majority of the Political Bureau deemed it necessary to arrive at an agreement with him. As a result of protracted efforts on the part of the majority of the Political Bureau, there was unanimously adopted and published on the 5th December 1923, the Resolution of the Political Bureau of the C. C. and of the Presidium of the C. C. C., concerning the Party structure.¹⁾ One of the most disputed questions, when elaborating the resolution of the Political Bureau of the C. C. and of the Presidium of the C. C. C., had been the question of the fractions. In the elaboration of the above-mentioned resolution, Comrade Trotzky at first did not raise objections to the prohibition of the fractions, but at the same time he insisted that the liberty of groupings be not forbidden. Nevertheless, a unanimously agreed formulation was arrived at, which, as regards the question of fractions, referred to the resolution of the 10th Congress of the RCP.

But the "opposition" continued its fractional fight. While the majority of the C. C. and the C. C. C., bound by their own resolution not to publish certain documents, loyally carried out this decision, the "opposition" continued to disseminate its fractional documents. Two days after the publication of the unanimously adopted resolution of the Political Bureau of the C. C. and the C. C. C., Comrade Trotzky published his renowned letter entitled "The New Policy",²⁾ which in reality was a fractional manifesto directed against the C. C. The articles of Comrade Trotzky³⁾ which appeared immediately after it, emphasized still further the fractionism of his proceedings just as did the brochure of Comrades Trotzky ("The New Policy") which appeared on the day of the opening of the Soviet Union Party Conference.

From the moment of the appearance of the fraction manifesto of Comrade Trotzky, the fight became still more aggravated. The "opposition" instituted a campaign unparalleled in the history of our Party, against the C. C. in Moscow, in particular in the military nuclei and in the nuclei of the High Schools, by sowing mistrust of the C. C. of the Party. Representatives of the "opposition" are sent throughout the whole Russia. The fight assumes forms of an unprecedented acuteness. The core of the "opposition" consists of members of the former group of "democratic centralism", which has been fighting against the Party line for years past. To this core there have joined several former members of the C. C. (Preobrajensky, Smirnov, Serebryakov) who, on Comrade Lenin's proposal, were not re-elected at the 10th Congress of the RCP. This entire oppositional bloc has at its head Comrade Trotzky and for this reason assumed for the first time a certain authority.

II.

The Ideological Import of the "Opposition".

The most important points of disagreement between the overwhelming majority of our Party and the present "opposition", as evidenced by the course of the discussion, are contained in the following six items:

¹⁾ Published in our Special Number Russian Party Discussions I. Vol. 4. No. 7, page 37. 29th January 1924.

²⁾ Published in our Special Number Russian Party Discussions III. Vol. 4. No. 12, page 83. 15th February 1924.

³⁾ Published in our Special Number Russian Party Discussion IV. Vol. 4. No. 16, page 133. 29th February 1924.

1. The "opposition", with Comrade Trotzky at its head, issued the slogan of shattering the Party apparatus and attempted to transfer the centre of gravity of the fight against bureaucratism in the State apparatus, towards "bureaucratism" in the Party apparatus. Such a summary criticism of and direct attempt to discredit the Party apparatus, can objectively lead to no other results than to the emancipation of the State apparatus from the influence exercised over it by the Party and to the estrangement of the State organs from the influence of the Party. The tendency towards the estrangement of the State organs from the influence of the Party, was shown by Comrade Trotzky already before the 12th Congress of the R. C. P. In the present discussion, this tendency merely assumed another form.

2. The "opposition" tried to set the Party Youth against the fundamental mainstays of the Party and against its Central Committee. Instead of teaching the Youth that our Party must orientate itself to its fundamental proletarian core, to the Communist workers engaged at the bench, the "opposition", headed by Comrade Trotzky, sought to prove that the "barometer" of the Party is the Student Youth.

3. Comrade Trotzky made general allusions to the degeneration of the fundamental mainstays of our Party, and thereby tried to undermine the authority of the Central Committee, which between the Congresses constitutes the only representative of the whole Party. Comrade Trotzky not only attempted to oppose himself to the whole of the rest of the Central Committee, but he also brought forward such charges which could not but provoke unrest among broad circles of the working class and stormy protests from the ranks of the whole Party.

4. In the questions of economy, the "opposition" showed the greatest bankruptcy, since it was unable to bring forward anything to conform its charges against the C. C. of the Party, and since it did not even attempt to oppose to the Policy of the Party any kind of systematic proposals regarding the economic questions*).

In the criticism of the economic policy of the Party on the part of the "opposition", two shades of opinion were to be observed. One section of the "opposition" abandoned itself to a considerable degree to the "left" phraseology against the Nep in general, by marking declarations which would only possess any relevance in the event of these comrades recommending that the New Economic Policy be given up and a return made to War Communism. The other, far more influential, section of the "opposition" — on the contrary — reproaches the C. C. for not doing sufficient to meet foreign capital, and for making insufficient concessions to the imperialist states and the like. This section of the "opposition" (Radek) came forward with direct proposals to revise those conditions which the Party endorsed in connection with the Geneva Conference, and to grant greater concessions to international imperialism, in order to strengthen commercial relations with international capital. The Party unhesitatingly rejected both these errors.

5. The "opposition", in all its shadings, disclosed entirely non-Bolshevist views in regard to the importance of Party discipline. The attitude of a whole number of representatives of the "opposition" constitute in themselves an unheard-of infringement of Party discipline, and call to mind the occasions when Comrade Lenin was compelled to fight against the "anarchism of the intelligenzia" in organizational questions, and to defend the fundamentals of proletarian discipline in the Party.

6. The "opposition" has openly violated the resolution of the 10th Congress of the Russian Communist Party, which forbids the formation of fractions within the Party. The Bolshevik conception of the Party as being an undivided whole, is substituted on the part of the "opposition" by the conception of the Party as being a sum of all kind of tendencies and fractions. These tendencies, fractions and groupings, according to the "new" opinions of the "opposition", must enjoy equal rights within the Party, and the C. C. of the Party has to appear, not so much as a leader of the Party, but as a simple recorder and intermediary between the tendencies and the groupings. Such a conception of the Party has nothing to do with Leninism. The fraction-work of the "opposition" could not fail to become anything else than a threat to the unity of the state apparatus. The fractional activities of the "opposition" have revived the hopes of all the foes of the Party, including also the Western European

bourgeoisie, for a schism in the ranks of the R. C. P. These fractional actions have again put forward, in all its acuteness, the question as to whether the R. C. P. as the governing party will allow the formation of fractional groupings within the Party.

Summing up the results of these disagreements, and analysing the whole character of the activities of the representatives of the "opposition", the Soviet Union Party Conference arrives at the conclusion that in the form of the present "opposition", we have before us, not only an attempt at a revision of Bolshevism, not only a direct aberration from Leninism, but also a blatant petty bourgeois deviation. There is not doubt that this "opposition" objectively reflects the pressure of the petty bourgeoisie on the position of the proletarian Party and on its policy. The principles of inner Party democracy are already, outside of the Party, beginning to be the objects of very elastic interpretations: In the sense of a weakening of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of an enlarging of the political rights of the new bourgeoisie.

In such a situation when the R. C. P., embodying the dictatorship of the proletariat, enjoys the monopoly of legality in the country, it is unavoidable that the least steadfast groups of Communists surrender themselves sometimes to non-proletarian influences. The Party as a whole must clearly recognize these dangers and carefully preserve the proletarian line of the Party.

Against this petty bourgeois deviation, a systematic and energetic fight of our whole Party is necessary.

III.

The Positive Results of the Discussion.

The growth of activity and the raising of the cultural level of broad strata of non-Party workers and a portion of the working peasants, appears to be a new factor which, given an appropriate policy on the part of the Party, will bring the greatest advantage to the cause of revolution. In order to be fully adequate for these tasks, in order to have the possibility of leading these mass-strata of workers and propertyless peasants, who are striving to participate actively in the construction of Socialism, the Party itself had to revive and to stimulate its inner life at all costs. In this sense the discussion, notwithstanding the petty bourgeois deviation of the "opposition", has brought considerable advantage to the Party.

The petty bourgeois errors of the "opposition" have been promptly and energetically rectified by the Party. As soon as the discussion began within the Party, one after the other of the strongest proletarian organizations of the R. C. P. intervened with a severe criticism of the petty bourgeois waverings of the "opposition", and with support for the line of the C. C. First of all, as has always been the case hitherto on the occasion of principle debates in the Party, there intervened the oldest Bolshevik workers' organization — the Petrograd Organization of the R. C. P. The letter of the Petrograd organization was fully endorsed by dozens of the strongest proletarian organizations — of the Soviet Union. The resolution of the Moscow Government Conference, adopted by a huge majority, expressed the same decisive condemnation of the "opposition". At the moment of the Soviet Union Party Conference, the whole Party, in its absolute overwhelming majority, unanimously condemned the petty bourgeois aberration.

As a result of the discussion, the fundamental mainstay of the Party has closed its ranks still more firmly. The workers' nuclei in the whole Soviet Union, without a moment's hesitation, immediately resisted in the most determined manner the errors of the "opposition". The young generations of the Party, who witnessed for the first time acute disputes within the Party, were given the opportunity of realizing by a living example, what real Bolshevism is. The young Communists of the Communist Youth Union, being nearest to the factory life, without any hesitation, supported the fundamental line of the Party. The waverings of a part of the Student Youth in the High Schools were a passing phenomenon. With appropriate instructive work on the part of the Party, these waverings will soon be overcome.

The activity and the class-consciousness of all Party members have increased. Again there were opened up the earnest economic and Party questions which will be worked out by the Party in the course of the next period.

With particular acuteness there was emphasized the striving of the whole Party at securing Party unity. The least allusion to the possibility of the danger of a split provoked, and continues to provoke, the sharpest and most stormy protest on the part of the whole mass of Party members. The Party will

* See the Resolution brought forward by Comrade Ossinsky, one of the members of the "opposition", at the beginning of the present number.

politically annihilate anybody who will venture to attack the unity of the Party ranks. The Party unity is secured more than ever.

IV.

Practical Conclusions.

Taking in account the whole situation of the masses of the Party, the Soviet Union Party Conference considers it necessary:

1. To enlarge at any cost the proletarian mainstay of the Party, both as regards quantity and its real effect on the whole policy of the Party. In the course of the coming year, there is necessary an intensified recruitment of Party members from among the workers at the bench, in order to draw into the ranks of the R. C. P. from the genuine proletarian elements not less than 100,000 new members. For this purpose, workers must be afforded every facility for entering the Party. At the same time, during the recruiting campaign, entry into the Party must be entirely closed to all non-proletarian elements. Within the Party there must be conducted a systematic propaganda having in view the orientation of the whole Party to its fundamental workers' mainstay.

2. In order to strengthen the connection of the Party with the non-Party masses, it is necessary to ensure that, in all Soviets and in all Soviet organs, non-Party workers be granted a sufficiently adequate representation, not in words, but in fact. The Central Committee of the Party must exercise a strict supervision of the realization of this decision and sharply call to order all those local organizations which violate it.

3. The Party organizations must carry out a particularly careful work of enlightenment amongst those nuclei which, during the past discussion, were wavering, to a greater or less extent, regarding the question of the Party line. Enlightenment, enlightenment and still again enlightenment — this is the main task which, before all, lies on the shoulders of the fundamental mainstays of the Party.

4. Special attention must be devoted to the work of enlightenment among the Youth. When material means are inadequate, the Party must prefer to have a smaller contingent of students, but, to make up for this, the material situation of the students must be improved and the qualitative side of the work in the High Schools must be raised to a higher level. It is necessary to adopt special measures for securing the appropriateness of the Party leadership of the work among the Youth. The Party cannot permit the Youth to be flattered, but neither must it tolerate the system of intimidation and bureaucratic tutelage. Only a persevering enlightenment on the fundamentals of Leninism can achieve this aim.

5. One of the most important tasks consists in raising to its proper level the study of the history of the R. C. P. and mainly of the fundamental facts of the struggle of Bolshevism against Menshevism, of the role of the single fractions and tendencies during this struggle, in particular of those eclectic fractions which sought to "reconcile" Bolshevism with Menshevism. The C. C. of the Party must adopt a number of measures in order to raise to the proper level the publication of suitable manuals on the history of the R. C. P. and also to render the teaching of Party history obligatory in all Party schools, in the High School's circles and the like.

6. Following the example of the strongest proletarian organizations, it is necessary to establish circles for the study of Leninism in all our organizations, using as a foundation, in the first place, the complete works of Comrade Lenin and securing a reliable leadership of these circles.

7. It is necessary to strengthen the central organ of the Party ("Pravda") with reliable forces, in order to impart to it the possi-

bility for a systematic enlightening regarding the fundamentals of Bolshevism and for carrying on a campaign against all deviations from it.

8. The present discussion must from now on be transferred from the pages of the "Pravda" to the pages of a special "Discussion Supplement" of the "Pravda".

9. Liberty of discussion within the Party by no means signifies the liberty to undermine Party discipline. The Central Committee of the Party, and all the Party centres of the provinces, must immediately adopt the strictest measures for preserving an iron Bolshevik discipline everywhere where any attempt is made to shake it.

10. To counteract the spreading of unfounded rumours and of documents the spreading of which is forbidden, and against analogous action, which is a favourite method of groups possessing no principles and infected with petty bourgeois moods, resolute measures must be adopted right up to expulsion from the Party.

11. An improvement in regard to information on the activity of the Central Committee and of the inner Party life in general is indispensable. For this purpose, stenographic reports of the sessions of the Plenums of the C. C. must be sent to all members and to all substitute members of the C. C. and the C. C. C. In the "Pravda", in the "Izvestiya of the C. C." (Informations of the C. C.) and in other newspapers in the centre and in the provinces, there must be arranged on a large scale a section regarding Party life. In the C. C. of the Party, a special section for information must be created.

12. Special attention must be given to an appropriate and sound management of Party work in the Army. Any attempt to conduct fractional "work" in the ranks of the Red Army must be punished by the Party in a particularly severe manner.

13. The Conference considers it fully appropriate to identify itself entirely and without reservation with the decision of the 10th Congress of the RCP, which forbids fractional groupings. The Conference considers it necessary to propose to the 13th Congress of the RCP, that it confirm this decision in the name of the highest organ of the Party.

14. The Conference proposes to the C. C. that it publish the hitherto unpublished clause 7 of the resolution on unity, adopted according to the proposal of Comrade Lenin by the 10th Congress of the RCP, which empowers a joint sitting of the C. C. and the C. C. C., to transfer two thirds of the votes from members to substitute members or even to expel from the Party any member of the C. C. in the case of violation of the Party discipline or of "committing fractionism".

15. The Conference cannot neglect the decision of the last Moscow Government Conference, which notified the whole Party that at Moscow a fraction-grouping formed itself undermining the unity of the Party. The Conference is of opinion that the C. C. of the Party and the C. C. C. must immediately adopt the most decisive measures, right-up to expulsion from the Party, against those who, in the main political centre of the Soviet Union, try to introduce a schism into the ranks of the Party.

Declaring the discussion hitherto conducted concerning the questions in dispute as closed for the whole country, the Conference calls upon all Party organizations to proceed to active work. The fundamental premise for further success of the proletarian revolution is the unshakable unity of the RCP — of the ruling Party of the proletarian dictatorship. The unity of the Party appears as the main achievement of the proletarian vanguard. The RCP must preserve its unity as the apple of its eye. The Soviet Union Conference is convinced that the C. C. of the Party around which, as the result of the discussion has shown, the whole Party is again rallying, will firmly maintain this unity.

Report given by

Comrade Zinoviev

at the Session of the Executive of the Communist International, held on
January 6, 1924.

Comrades!

I shall try to make clear the main points of difference. I believe the following questions to be most important:

1. The dispute with regard to the essential character of the Bolshevik Party, and, in connection therewith, the permissibility of the formation of fractions within our Party.
2. Party Apparatus and Party Bureaucracy.
3. The Young and the Old in our Party.
4. The "degeneration" of the Old Guard, especially of the core of the Old Guard.
5. Economic Questions.
6. Special Differences of Opinion with comrade Trotzky.
7. The Proportion of Forces in the Party.

I shall now deal with these seven points.

I.

The Essential Character of the Bolshevik Party.

This question forms the real central point of our discussion.

Our Party as a party which has already held power for over six years, possesses a number of peculiar features which we find in no other communist party. During the course of the discussion, one of our oppositional students observed that the whole misfortune of the Russian CP. consisted of the fact that it was in possession of power. In a certain sense this is right. But only in a certain sense; for on the other hand the whole fortune of our Party lies in the fact that it is in possession of power. If we are to express ourselves with perfect correctness we must therefore say: The whole difficulty of the problem consists precisely of the fact that we have become a state party.

The history of our Party is very singular; to a certain extent it is unique in the history of the International. We can look back upon a history extending over 25 years, or at least — if we take as a starting point the year 1903, the year of the first split of the Party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks — over 20 years. Our history thus goes very far back, a whole quarter of a century. But the living inventory of the Party, the majority of the members, have only belonged to the Party for a short time, 2 or 3 years. This is a very remarkable state of affairs. Other parties have developed organically, successively. But we have developed along entirely different lines. First we passed through a period of 20 to 25 years of preparatory work, of illegality, and then suddenly an immense influx of quite young comrades streamed into the Party who now form its bony framework.

I shall now attempt to give you a schematic survey of the peculiar position of our Party.

This peculiarity is characterized by the following factors:

First factor: Territory of unheard-of extent. The Union of our republics comprises no more and no less than the sixth part of the total surface of the globe, with one united party for the whole of this territory.

Second factor: The national factor. Within our territory we have at least 100 nations, but at the same time one united party. The national factor is not allowed to play any role in our Party. We thus possess a united international organization, involving however great complications.

Third factor: Russia's economic many-sidedness. Lenin pointed out, in one of his works*) that we in Russia possess various systems of economics; firstly a purely industrial economic system, which may fairly deserve the designation of Communism, and then a large number of economic systems which are actually very backward, reminding us of conditions ruling in the middle ages. Thus the economic many-sidedness of Russia forms a factor greatly complicating the work of the Party.

*) N. Lenin. "The Tax in Kind."

See further: N. Lenin. Speech at the IV. World Congress of the C.I. Protocoll, Hamburg, 1923.

Fourth factor: The large number of Party members who have only belonged to the Party for a short time. This I can illustrate with the aid of a small table.

At the present time we have 390,000 members. Of these 2500 comrades belonged to the Party before 1905, that is, before the first revolution; 7900 are comrades who joined the Party up to the year 1917, making a round total of 10,000 comrades who were already members of the Party before the year 1917. In 1917 35,000 new members joined. Thus we have about 50,000 comrades who were members by 1918. The year 1918 brought us 63,000 new members; 1919: 107,000; 1920: 120,000; 1921: 400,000; in the year 1922 we resolved to admit no new members.

As you will see, three quarters of our members joined us in the year 1920 and 1921. Although we can look back upon a history extending over 25 years, our membership is composed to the extent of three quarters of comrades who have only belonged to the Party for two or three years. This is a most important fact, and one which must be accorded due consideration, if our Party is to be understood.

To this, the fluctuations in the Party must be added. Naturally, every party is subject to fluctuation; members join, others leave. But in our case the matter is very different; up to the year 1918 we had about 50,000 members, as stated above, and then we had a tremendous influx of nearly a million members. At one time we exceeded the number of 700,000 members. But after this the necessary purging of the Party obliged us to exclude about a quarter of a million members again, whilst a number of others left of their own accord. Thus about 400,000 comrades were left in the end. It need not be said that such an extraordinary fluctuation has never been observed in any other country. And it has been the cause of great difficulties to us.

To this must further be added the division of work in the Party. We rule the country, the state apparatus is in our hands. It is thus incumbent on us as a Party to find: the Red diplomatist, the Red factory manager, the cooperative, the economist, the editor, etc. The Party has to provide all these from amongst its numbers.

Consider the most important strata of the Party — here I select the most important ones only — and you will find:

1. a stratum, the best, consisting of the 56,000 to 60,000 comrades working directly in shops and factories, that is, plain workmen;
2. a stratum, the second best, composed of peasants; about 60,000 peasants with small farms, that is, small holders;
3. a third stratum, composed of members of the Red Army, numbering at the present time 40,000 in the whole army; the majority of these are no longer serving actively, but belong to the reserves, the army administration, commissariat, etc.;
4. a fourth stratum, consisting of students, mostly workers, numbering about 40,000 comrades.

The remainder is distributed among various small groups, as trade unionists, economists, etc.; there are about ten such groups, subdivided again into smaller groups.

If we analyse the structure of the Party with regard to the social origin of the members, we find that proletarians form the great majority, and that workers still working today in the factories as plain workmen are in the minority, numbering about 56,000 to 60,000.

And this factor must not be overlooked, comrades, this far-reaching division of labour in the Party, for it is absolutely unavoidable. Without this division of labour it is impossible to rule the state, and it is thus indispensable, though its strong positive aspects are opposed by strong negative ones.

Thus the state of affairs. And at the same time you must recollect that we have in the Party a considerable group of members who once belonged to other parties — anarchists, social revolutionists, Mensheviks, and the like. These comrades number about 25,000 to 26,000, and many of them played active leading parts in the parties to which they formerly belonged. This again

creates a most peculiar situation. To be sure it is a positive phenomenon, showing that we have beaten all other parties from the field, and showing too, we hope, that we have won the best elements of these parties for our Party. But it is none the less a fact that there are still elements amongst us to whom some slight shade of the past still clings, and who have not yet completely merged themselves in our Party. This is a factor which must also receive due attention.

The final factor to be considered consists of our monopoly of legality. Consider for a moment the conditions in any other country, in Germany for instance, and you will find three workers' parties; in other countries there are two, in others again four. Here the parties struggle with one another, that is, every individual finds his place in that party for which he really feels the greatest sympathy. In our case the matter is entirely different. The dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be realized without the simultaneous annihilation of all other parties, that is, the monopoly of legality must be secured. This monopoly thus represents a visible symptom of the dictatorship of the proletariat. And it is impossible for it to be otherwise. But it has not only its bright side, it has its shady side as well. A new generation is springing up, among the Red Army soldiers, in part also among the workers, among the active petty bourgeois elements and the Youth. These are all seeking for an outlet for their fighting powers, for a possibility for exercising their impulse towards activity, and find no other field open than in our Party. Thus many support our Party, and even join it, simply because there is no other party, and not because they have really become communists. If there were two other parties, for instance, many of these elements would perhaps join these, or take up a position between one party and another. In our present situation it is important to realize clearly that certain elements whom we have in our midst are only there because we possess a monopoly of legality.

This, comrades, is the approximate structure of our Party. It is upon this structure that our attitude towards the formation of fractions is based. You are aware that during the whole epoch of the Second International, practically every party had its fractions. Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin, and Clara Zetkin; what were they but a fraction of the II. International? They represented the left wing of the II. International. Every party had its Left and its Right; everywhere there was strife. This is to be different in the III. International. Fractions can only be tolerated in exceptional cases. Otherwise the III. International cannot fulfil its historical task. We all regard the III. International as an organization which must be cast in one piece. Its historical mission is entirely different to that of the II. International. It must not represent a conglomeration of tendencies, shades of opinion, etc. This would be entirely unallowable for a Party such as ours, ruling the state apparatus as it does, and possessing the internal structure which I have just briefly sketched.

This explains our attitude with reference to fractions. Try to realize the actual position. Consider for instance the younger members of the Party. Here we have 5 to 6 Party generations: one generation until 1905, one until 1917, one belonging to 1917, one belonging to 1918, one belonging to 1919 and 1920; about 5 generations. If you then add the division according to occupation, involving at least 10 groups: workers, small holders, economists, Red Army soldiers, students, etc., you will find that you have already arrived at 50 possible combinations in the Party. And all this has to be held together by one single knot, the knot of Party discipline. If you allow these 50 combinations the liberty of forming fractions, you will certainly give rise to five further possibilities of combination within each of these 50 divisions, that is, you increase the danger five-fold, and a general dissolution would be the inevitable result. Thus the formation of fractions within our Party is a thousand times more dangerous for us than fractionism in any other party.

And again, try to realize what the formation of fractions would mean in the Red Army for instance. Two fractions in the Red Army signify that there is no Red Army whatever, two fractions in the GPU. (Political Administrative Headquarters) signify that there is no GPU. And yet even this has been attempted! It need not be said that the attempt was unsuccessful!

In the course of our present discussion I was, for instance, obliged to spend two nights with the comrades of the GPU, at meetings where 2000 comrades were gathered together. And what was the question in dispute? The question, comrades, was whether we were to pass a vote of confidence in the Central Committee or not. The same thing occurred among the military students in the Kremlin, the same in the army staff academy

of the Red Army. These are facts. The minority fraction fought for a vote of non-confidence, we for a vote of confidence. We were victorious! but just imagine the fact of contests in these three institutions!

If you really want to understand what our Party is, comrades, I must beg you to keep before your mind's eye the scheme of the Party structure which I have here drawn up. To be sure it is easy enough to declare, like the Mensheviks: "Just look at this party! What a number of groups and sub-groups it has, and how few workers from the shops and factories! This is no communist party!" This is of course silly chatter. We are of the opinion that for a party in possession of power, and faced by extraordinary difficulties and placed in an extremely complicated situation, the Bolshevik core of the Party — those workers who were maturing during the 25 years of preparatory work, and were potential members attaining actual membership in 1917-1918 — forms the element representing a cement holding the Party together, and without which all the above named strata would fall to pieces within a very brief period.

With such a constitution of the Party, the demand is now raised within the Party for the workers' democracy. Workers' democracy is a relatively simple problem as far as other parties are concerned. In Germany, for instance, it is a question of our legality. If we are legal, we can carry out the workers' democracy fully. But if we are illegal or semi-legal, then we have to adapt ourselves to circumstances and limit democracy somewhat. We in Russia, on the other hand, are faced by positive obstacles of quite another nature. It is true that we need not fear the police, but we are confronted by a number of objective social difficulties, resultant on the fact that we are working in a country in which the peasantry is in the majority, and we have besides to contend with all those other difficulties which have already briefly described to you.

From the very beginning, Bolshevism fought against Menshevism in the question of the workers' democracy. We, the Bolsheviks, were anti-democrats before 1905. Lenin was expressly anti-democrat. At that time, Bolshevism defended the thesis: We cannot develop a workers' democracy in a country in which absolutism rules, we cannot elect our committees. In very bad times we had, for instance, a tradition that not even the whole of the Central Committee was to be elected. Three comrades were elected at the Party conference, but only one was named, in order to have an address. Not even the Party conference was to know who had been elected. The elected comrades were then given the right to co-opt further comrades. The same applied to the local committees. The Mensheviks, already at that time inclined to glorify democracy in its petty bourgeois sense, railed at Lenin as a "despot", "bureaucrat", etc*). Indeed, even such a fighter as comrade Rosa Luxemburg once adopted this tone with reference to this matter, and scoffed at Lenin**). Even she put the question: Where is democracy? She had not grasped the situation. The whole of international Menshevism, even such participators in the International as Rosa Luxemburg, did not understand the matter at that time.

When the revolution of 1905 broke out, we began to reorganize the Party at once. But the period of legality was of but brief duration.

A general differentiation into the following periods may be made in the history of the Bolsheviks:

- 1st. period until 1905. Expressly anti-democratic.
- 2nd. period 1905 until 1907. Comparative freedom, commencement of the introduction of a certain democracy into the Party.
- 3rd. period, 1908 until 1910. Counter-revolution, no trace of democracy.
- 4th. period, 1911 until 1914. Revival of labour movement, publication of the "Pravda" in Petrograd, peculiar combination of legality and illegality.
- 5th. period, complete illegality from August 1914 until 1917. During the whole of this time the C. C. consisted of two comrades only, Lenin and Zinoviev, who both lived in Switzerland. No trace of democracy.
- 6th. period, 1917 until 1921. Civil war general mobilization, utmost exertion of powers. During this period a really military discipline existed in the Party.

* N. Lenin. "One Step Forwards, two Steps Backwards." Geneva 1904 (Russian).

** Rosa Luxemburg. "Organisation Questions in Russian Social Democracy." ("Neue Zeit", 1904.)

From the year 1921 onwards, the workers' democracy is spoken of.

At the X. Party conference in 1921 three groups of questions were discussed, all of extraordinary importance:

1. The introduction of the New Economic Policy. This question arose during the Kronstadt insurrection, though this broke down. Lenin gave the address. The Party conference resolved unanimously on the transition to the New Economic Policy.

2. The introduction of the workers' democracy into the Party. The address was delivered by Bukharin, who spoke on behalf of the whole C. C. It was almost unanimously resolved to go over to democracy in the Party.

3. The question of the formation of fractions. Lenin again delivered the address. A resolution was passed against the permissibility of the formation of fractions. The Party conference resolved to expel from the Party all those who formed fractions.

After the resolution on the introduction of the workers' democracy had been passed, Lenin delivered a speech which acted like a cold douche on all who had been too enthusiastic for democracy. Lenin, in the course of his speech, declared that:

"It is not true that we do not call upon the masses to take part in the work. On the contrary, any barely noticeable talent, any quality, be it only the slightest degree above the working masses, has met with our sincerest support. There is only one thing in which we are still lacking: a slight amelioration of our position. We now need one or two years in which to recuperate from the famine, and a shorter time will not suffice. Viewed from the historical standpoint, the term is exceedingly short, but for our conditions it is a considerable period. One to two years of recuperation from famine, one or two years of properly regulated fuel supplies, in order that the factories may be set running again, and we shall receive a hundredfold more support from the working class, we shall see greater numbers of talented individuals arise from its ranks. Nobody can doubt this."

Comrades, this is our position with regard to the question of the workers' democracy. You will perceive that many of the semi-bourgeois elements which have found their way into our Party naturally regard the idea of democracy from the petty bourgeois standpoint. *Fiat democratia, pereat mundus* — that is their watchword. Let there be democracy, even though the heavens fall. We on the other hand hold to the viewpoint formulated as follows in the year 1903 by the late Georg Plekhanov, at the time when he was still a revolutionary Marxist — and it is a fact that for a short time he was a Bolshevik:

"Every given democratic principle is not to be taken abstractedly by itself, but in its relations to that principle which may be designated as the fundamental principle of democracy, that is, the principle expressed in the words: *salus populi suprema lex*. Translated into the language of the revolutionist, this means that this supreme law is the success of the revolution. And should the success of the revolution require the temporary limitation of the application of this or that democratic principle, then it would be a crime to hesitate to carry out this limitation. It is my personal opinion that even the principle of universal suffrage is to be condemned from the viewpoint of the above-mentioned fundamental principle of democracy. It is possible to imagine a hypothetical case in which we social democrats would be opposed to universal suffrage. At one time the bourgeoisie of the Italian republics deprived representatives of the nobility of political rights. It is possible that the revolutionary proletariat could limit the political rights of the upper classes in the same manner. The fitness of such a measure could be judged solely from the standpoint of *salus revolutionis suprema lex*. We should have to be guided by the same viewpoint in the question of the maintenance of parliament. Should the people elect a very good parliament — a description of *chambre introuvable* — as the result of the commencement of revolutionary enthusiasm, we should have to make it our endeavor to keep this parliament in office as long as possible. But should the result of the election prove unfavourable, we should then have to make it our endeavor to drive out the parliament again within two weeks if possible — and not wait for two years."

Thus Plekhanov in 1903. And we are still holding fast to this viewpoint. But there are many semi-petty bourgeois elements, not yet fully freed from Menshevism, and still cheri-

shing the idea of democracy as such. This can only be comprehended if we regard things from the class standpoint. The fact must be realized, that we are living in an agricultural country with considerable strata of petty bourgeoisie.

I believe, comrades, that after hearing the above remarks you will no longer wonder that the question of the formation of fractions is so hotly contested amongst us. We declare: Two fractions in the Party is synonymous with the germs of two governments; two fractions in the Red Army is synonymous with the germs of two armies. The same applies to the GPU, and to the whole state apparatus. As you all know, the state apparatus is of course formally completely in our hands. The leading positions everywhere are held by communists. But as a matter of fact, the leadership is still partially in the hands of the elements of the old regime. Lenin somewhat exaggeratedly designated our state apparatus as an old "Czarist" apparatus.

But in actual fact it is still in part a Czarist apparatus. And this apparatus is now listening to our discussion with the intensest interest. All the specialists, the engineers, etc., are pricking up their ears and waiting impatiently for what is coming. It goes without saying that a fraction struggle in our Party, possessing as it does state power, signifies the beginning of the formation of two governments. If even in bourgeois countries, as in England for instance, a contest within the Liberal party leads with the utmost rapidity to the formation of two governments, how much more certainly would this occur in our case, since we have no democracy, but the dictatorship of a class, and this in a country whose population consists mainly of peasants.

II.

Party Apparatus and Workers' Bureaucracy.

Now to the second point of the discussion, the question of the Party apparatus.

We must first differentiate between the state apparatus and the Party apparatus. As already mentioned above, the state apparatus is formally in our hands, but we have many years of endeavour before us before it is actually entirely ours. We have first to educate a whole generation of our own people in the practical work of running this apparatus. We have always been aware that the apparatus is very faulty in many respects, that it is bureaucratic, decayed. It is therefore evident that the state apparatus has to be improved. But what do we need for this purpose? A good communist party. And what is the real meaning of the demand for a good communist party in this connection? We may have 15,000 competent proletarians in the Party, but that does not in the least render it possible for us to cure the state apparatus. Why not? Because mere resolutions, meetings, and words, do not suffice to rule the bureaucrats. At the present time, comrades, you may observe a very interesting phenomenon at all discussion meetings. It is precisely the most emphatically bureaucratic elements working in the state apparatus who now pose as the greatest democrats, who delight in passing all sorts of resolutions, and accentuate the democratic role. And yet everything will remain the same as before. If we are really to obtain a firm grip over the bureaucrats in the state apparatus, the first premise is the existence of a strong Bolshevik state apparatus. In other words: It is not sufficient to pass resolutions, we must besides possess a suitable instrument, must possess the possibility of setting our knee on the breast of the bureaucrats, you will gain nothing by resolutions. The bureaucrat himself will move hundreds of democratic resolutions, without altering conditions in the least. Hence the great significance of the Party apparatus for the maintenance of our power.

When Lenin exposed our state apparatus by his inexorably trenchant characterisation, he appealed simultaneously to the Party, and made definitely concrete proposals for the transformation of our Party apparatus, pointed out how we could really get at the bureaucrats.

We know very well what a workers' bureaucracy means. I myself have for instance studied the fate of the German Social Democratic bureaucracy. At that time I tried to enlighten the Russian workers as to the reasons for the decay of German Social Democracy, and to show what had been the social roots of German Social Democratic opportunism. I adduced three main factors as causes of the decay of Social Democracy in Germany:

1. the existence of petty bourgeois elements following the Party when they thought this was to their advantage, but without conviction. At the elections the German Social Democrats com-

peted energetically with the bourgeoisie for the favor of these elements, and abandoned the Marxist principles step by step;

2. the rapid growth and increasing influence of the workers' aristocracy, composed of the economically privileged strata of the working class, and

3. the rising of a workers' bureaucracy, the twin brother of the workers' aristocracy, and the increasing importance of this bureaucracy in the whole proletarian movement, and particularly in the policy of the Party.

I followed up Robert Michels by drawing up the following diagram of the structure of the stratification in German Social Democracy:

Chairmen of the Party Committees
Party Committees
Party officials
Participants in general meetings
Party members
Voters

To this I observed:

"The base of the pyramid is formed by the four millions of Social Democratic voters. Then comes another stratum, also numerically powerful, formed by the Party members, counting about a million. Then come the participators in the general Party meetings, already much fewer in number. Above these stands a small ruling group of Party officials. And the apex of the pyramid is finally formed by the small staff of the most prominent Party officials, the committees and their chairmen."

The three main factors mentioned above are all counter-revolutionary in effect, and Anton Pannekoek was thus entirely in the right in his critical articles in which he threw much light on these aspects of Social Democracy. The workers' aristocracy is, and always has been, a reactionary caste. But none the less we had to admit, even at that time, that a comprehensive labour movement cannot possibly entirely dispense with a certain bureaucratic apparatus. To be sure: if we have only 1,000 members, then we can dispense with paid functionaries with ease. But it is impossible for extensive memberships to manage without a certain number of paid workers' bureaucrats. In the end it is a question of so organizing matters that we obtain a really good labour bureaucracy, one entirely in accord with the working masses.

The labour bureaucracy of our Party cannot by any means be designated as especially bad. The traditions of the Bolsheviks, who have fought for decades against the Mensheviks, and have thus formed a chosen elite of revolutionists, have enabled us to create a fairly competent Party apparatus. It is not excessively powerful in numbers, for 18,000 comrades serve the machinery of the apparatus over a gigantic territory, comprising a sixth of the surface of the globe. Over one half of these 18,000 comrades are technical workers, whilst only 7000 to 8000 comrades are politically active. Quantitatively, the number does not appear to us to be excessively high. And it must not be forgotten that our Party apparatus is not merely occupied with propaganda and agitation, as is the case in other countries, but that its main efforts are directed towards the regulation of the state machinery. The Party apparatus has to concern itself with every question, whether it relate to the mobilisation of an army, to the grant of debentures for a gold loan, or to some campaign to be undertaken out in the country.

We are of the opinion that our Party apparatus is the best part of the Party, that it forms the firm bony framework of the Party. When our "opposition" begins to criticise the apparatus, we declare such an attitude to be entirely un-Bolshevik. It is completely unpermissible to oppose these two ideas, and is equal to an attempt to oppose the bony framework of a human being to the human organism as such. Of course it goes without saying that the framework does not suffice in itself. Bones can do nothing without muscles.

The Party apparatus represents the bony framework of the Party. We know very well that there are such things as diseases of the bone, even incurable ones. But this does not apply to our framework. It is solely the semi-Menshevik elements, unable to bear the Bolshevik fist, the Bolshevik centralism, the firm Bolshevik grasp which alone is capable laying hand on the bureaucrats, who are continually groaning that the apparatus is an armoured shell, perfectly unbearable. But only unbearable, we reply, to those whom we are obliged to hold on the lead.

A small minority of our Party has just started a great campaign against the Party apparatus. The comrades of the "opposition" are here lapsing into a semi-Menshevik manner of

thought. But it is nevertheless a rather too primitive weapon, and a demagogic insinuation, to exclaim now: "Aha! Now you want to maintain that Trotzky and Kadek are Mensheviks?" People do not become either Bolsheviks or Mensheviks overnight. This is a matter of gradual development. Often it requires months, sometimes it even takes years. All that we can assert is that the attitude adopted indicates a development in the direction of Menshevism. This view of the role of the old Bolshevik Party apparatus reminds us strongly of our old differences with the Mensheviks.

If comrade Kadek and the other comrades revise their standpoint, our present dispute will have become a mere episode within a few weeks; it will seem to us like a bad dream, speedily forgotten. But if the "opposition" perseveres in its error, or goes to the length of forming a faction based on its wrong views, then this will be an obstinacy degenerating into Menshevism.

I recall to your recollection the first conflict in the Social Democratic Party of Russia, at its II. Party Congress in London in 1903, leading to the first split of the party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. What was the cause of the schism at that time? It was carried through at that time by Lenin along the line of the following differences of opinion. The point under discussion was § 1 of the Party statutes, defining membership of the Party. Two drafts formulating this paragraph were submitted, one drawn up by Lenin, the other by Martov*). The Lenin draft was as follows: "Everyone is taken to be a member of the Party who recognizes its program, and who supports it by material means, and by personal participation in the work of one of the organizations of the Party." Martov's draft, on the other hand, was worded as follows: "A member of the Party is he who recognizes its program, supports the Party materially, and gives the Party regular personal support under the control of the Party."

Martov, seconded by Paul Axelrod, thus demanded a looser and less definite form of organization. Lenin, who had at that time Plekhanov as comrade in arms, was on the other hand anxious for a really strict organization of disciplined revolutionists.

This at the beginning was the extent of the whole difference of opinion in both directions. At that time many comrades believed that the whole disagreement was merely a matter of choice of wording. But Lenin had already made a correct diagnosis of both tendencies on the basis of these differences, and wrote as follows:

"The conflict has split our Party into two camps, into the camp of the Jacobins and that of the Girondists of the proletarian revolution."

This was indeed a penetrating diagnosis, and not only this, but at the same time an ingenious prognosis.

Now, comrades, compare our present differences of opinion with the "opposition" to the differences which arose 20 years ago. You will be compelled to come to the conclusion that these are very much greater today, in the year 1923, than they were in 1903. And yet they do not by any means imply the necessity of a split in the Party. I repeat: If the minority recognize their errors, and liquidate these within a few weeks, then the whole dispute will remain nothing but an episode. But if the attempt is made to gather together all the tendencies which have already shown themselves, and which will continue to make themselves felt; if these tendencies are tenaciously pursued until a faction is formed, then a broad chasm will appear between the two trends of opinion, broader than the chasm which once divided us from the Mensheviks.

The minority, as is invariably the case, seeks to mask its position. It naturally does not say that it is opposed to the Bolshevik Party apparatus, but "only" that it is opposed to the bureaucracy in the apparatus, which has got into a rut, requires renewal, etc. It need not be emphasized that we are all opposed to our apparatus falling into a rut of bureaucracy. But what is the real truth about bureaucracy? We have been fighting it openly in the state apparatus for years! At the VIII. Soviet Congress, held in December 1920, a special address was devoted to the struggle against the bureaucracy of our apparatus. Bureaucracy has thus been fought quite openly. At that time the Central Committee had chosen me to speak on this subject. In 1920 the Mensheviks were still a legal party. Martov, who took part in

*) See: G. Zinoviev. "History of the Russian Communist Party." 1923. Chap. 3.

this congress, scoffed at us: "Now you have had three years of your dictatorship, and you suddenly come along with a fight against bureaucracy!"

We replied to these gentlemen: "Laugh as much as you like, all the same bureaucracy will have to be fought against for years." Lenin, in the course of his speech, made the following observation: "Anyone who believes that bureaucracy can disappear within a few months is a charlatan, for bureaucracy is deeply rooted in the structure of the country, and in the whole social history of Russia. There are many illiterates in our country, it was bureaucratically ruled for centuries under Czarism, the rule of absolutism rendered bribery a general phenomenon, customary all over the country. Besides this, the country is poor, which again conduces to bureaucracy. At one time we were in such a position that we had to divide ten pairs of boots among three hundred persons. How could we manage this? Well, commands were given, then counter-commands, special commissions were appointed. All this naturally strengthened bureaucracy."

The conclusion arrived at by Lenin was as follows: "In order to destroy bureaucracy, the first thing is to have an adequate supply of boots, that is, the country must not be so poor. Further, illiteracy must be abolished, and finally, bribery must disappear. In other words, the cultural level of the working class must be raised."

We put the question in the same manner at the present juncture. We are as little able today as then to open out rose-colored vistas, and can promise nothing. Perhaps comrade Radek can promise us that if we give him the workers' democracy (interjection from Radek: No, I cannot promise it.) — well then, if not Radek, then perhaps comrade Trotzky — he will abolish bureaucracy in Russia within half a year, or even a whole year. We for our part cannot promise any such thing. We state candidly that we require years, for the first prerequisite is the raising of the cultural level of the country, and the disappearance of illiteracy.

It is not at all the case that Radek and Trotzky hate bureaucracy, whilst we of the CC. love it. This is not the question at all, comrades, the real point is the significance of the iron framework represented by the Bolshevik Party apparatus, our real fighting weapon against Menshevism. It is precisely this iron weapon which is so detested, for it causes much unpleasantness to certain elements.

III.

The Old and the Young.

I now come to the third point in dispute, to the question of the old and the young in our Party. On this point, comrades, you yourselves already possess a certain amount of experience, dating from the time of the earlier International; this applies especially to the comrades in the German labour movement. You know who were the so-called youth in Germany in the nineties. This "youth" was very radical in gesture at that time, but in reality it was only a variety of revisionism. Engels was entirely right when he wrote at that time to Bebel: "I, the old one, and you, are in reality the only young ones in the party." I believe, comrades, that our so-called old guard of Bolsheviks may lay equal claim with Engels to representing the actual youth of the Party. There is no question of old papas, anxious to force their children to be good and obedient! The old Bolshevik guard is not so stupid as all that. But all the same it holds a place of some significance in the International, and has given sufficient proof that it is able to rear a Bolshevik party.

Then what is our conflict about? A twofold current may be observed among our youth. The whole youth of the working class is on our side. This is an established fact. The working youth of Moscow, Petrograd, Ukraine, and the Ural, as also the working youth of all the other industrial centres, have joined the "old guard" without hesitation, and have categorically declared: "Take care, these older ones are our teachers!" The Student youth, on the other hand, has immediately split into two camps. In Moscow there has even been a majority against the old Bolshevik guard among the student youth. An interesting and remarkable phenomenon. Our students include a great number of workers, but also many petty bourgeois elements. The sympathies of the students have thus been divided between two camps. Whilst one party has supported us, another has opposed us. The latter party immediately issued the war-cry of: Youth on one side, age on the other. But we know no problem of youth or age, but solely a problem of the political line, the one and only question which exists for us.

Comrade Trotzky appeared with an article in a form which no one could have expected from a comrade like Trotzky, endeavouring to incite the youthful elements of the Party against the old guard in a manner which may almost be designated as vulgar. What caused him to take this step? In my opinion, comrades, he only made use of these vulgar arguments because he had no better ones. Trotzky seeks support among those strata most easily accessible to his point of view, a point of view which has prevailed among us to a certain extent of late, and represents in a certain sense a revised Bolshevism. He needed a base, and found this among the students, and even among certain elements of the Red Army. It need not be said that we shall not let him have even these minorities, but shall win them over for ourselves. This will of course take place gradually. It will take time. As Marxist education is not yet deeply rooted among these strata, temporary success is easily attained by demagogy. Preobrajensky, for instance, goes to the Sverdlov university and addresses the students somewhat to the following effect: "You are studying at the Sverdlov university, this monument of our cultural advancement, and are endeavouring to gain a knowledge of Marxism. This is a very great and important task. But of what use will the study of Marxism be to you if you are not able to apply your scientific knowledge to practical life?"

Preobrajensky can of course earn cheap applause for such words among a section of the students, who have perhaps studied Marx's "Capital" for half a year, but have not yet ruled the country. This section of the students is somewhat displeased with us because we do not offer them the immediate possibility of putting theory into practice. But such methods of agitation are nothing more nor less than mere vulgar demagogy. Preobrajensky's proceedings, too, are simply explicable by the lack of more serious arguments. In a country of Russia's dimensions, in which there are so few Marxists, so few people who can read and write properly, in which there is such a tremendous demand for people possessing real knowledge — to stand up before youthful students in such a country and to declare to them: After you have passed through this university, you will find no opportunity for the application of your knowledge — this is mere vulgar demagogy. It is no great feat to attract by such cheap bait those strata of our students whose petty bourgeois ideology is still very strong. These methods remind us almost too strongly of the similar methods practised by the right wing of international Socialism. I believe that I have no need to prove this.

IV.

The "Degeneration" of the Old Guard.

In the midst of the discussion, Trotzky surprised us with an article something to the following effect:*)

— We are being everlastingly bothered with these accursed scholars of Lenin. Were not Bernstein, Kautsky, and Guédsé scholars of Marx and Engels, and did they not degenerate? Did they not gradually develop into traitors? Who can give us a guarantee that Lenin's scholars are immune against degeneration?

Trotzky naturally clothed this mere tekel in a more elegant form, in the form which we are accustomed to see him utilize, and which is admirable when used against the bourgeoisie, but most unhappy when applied against the old Bolshevik guard. Trotzky here operated with insinuations only, and believed that nobody would understand him, thus proving that he does not yet thoroughly know our Party. Scarcely a week had passed after the publication of his article, when a storm of indignation against Trotzky's procedure broke out in the Party. As you have seen, comrade Fadek has confirmed this. The indignation was sincere among the ranks of our best workers, who declared openly: "Comrade Trotzky, we all love you, we all respect you, but we beg you to let us alone with such insinuations. We know our Bolshevik guard, which has created our Party; we know it thoroughly, and we know too that you, comrade Trotzky, were a Menshevik for a long time — Trotzky came over to us from the Mensheviks, we did not go over to him — so please make an end of all such insinuations. If you really seriously believe that our old guard could follow in the footsteps of Bernstein and Kautsky, kindly state this straightforwardly, but not in the form of vague insinuations."

*) See letter from comrade Trotzky "The New Policy" in Special Number, Russian Party Discussions III, Vol. 4, No 1, page 84.

As I have already said, a real storm of indignation broke out. Trotzky was obliged to publish three further articles*), in order to define his views more precisely. Now, this clearer definition did not clear up the matter at all, but rather aggravated it.

No proofs can be adduced that our old guard is on the road to degeneration. To be sure, there exists no absolute guarantee against degeneration. We have said again and again that, should the speed of social revolution slow down, seen from the historical standpoint, we may very well be threatened by the danger that our dictatorship gradually assumes the aspect of a petty bourgeois state. And we repeat it here once more: This danger exists. As Marxists, we observe it, but at the same time we seek to counteract this danger by every possible means. But the final result of our exertion depends in the end, not upon the preventive means adopted by the Party, but from the course taken by world events, from the development of the world revolution. But Trotzky did not speak of this general danger, but permitted himself to be drawn, in the heat of the discussion, into a concealed attack against the political bureau of the CC. And thus he avoided a detailed designation of those scholars of Lenin against whom he directed his arrows, and omitted to name Kameneff, Stalin, Zinoviev, and Bukharin, precisely the men whom he had in his mind's eye when speaking of the degenerated Bernstein, Kautsky, Guédsé, etc. Now, I think we are a little better than Bernstein and Kautsky, and believe too that precisely this comparison should induce comrade Trotzky to regret having made it.

V.

Economic Questions.

A chapter of extraordinary importance.

Do any essential differences of opinion exist in our Party with regard to economic questions? No, such do not exist. But still various tendencies may be observed even in this sphere. It appears as if certain elements of the "opposition" — not, so far as I am aware, comrades Radek and Trotzky — have the intention of proposing a revision of the New Economic Policy as such. This has not yet been stated openly, but during the course of the contest waged against the old guard the attempt has frequently been made to play off against us the hate and contempt felt by the workers against the so-called "Nepman".

You will comprehend, comrades, that hatred against the bourgeoisie is not a privilege belonging solely for instance to the German working class, among which it takes a very crass form at present, for the reason that class warfare is being carried on in the crassest possible form in Germany. Matters are very different in Russia. Our workers, too, hate the bourgeoisie, but find themselves in the remarkable position that they cannot yet kill off the bourgeoisie, but have to tolerate it. They see the elegant shops, are in a position to close these at any time, but are obliged to continue to tolerate them. This circumstance has created a unique psychology among our workers. They understand that our present bourgeoisie is a necessary evil. They understand this with their brains, with their understanding. But the passionate hate of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie is still as strong as ever. And this the "opposition" is utilizing for its own purposes, for lack of better arguments. Up to the present, however, no positive proposition towards the revision of the New Economic Policy has been submitted.

In economic question we — that is, Lenin and we — differed often and greatly in opinion from comrade Trotzky. Again and again Lenin explained to Trotzky: You must comprehend that economic matters are entirely different to military matters. If we for instance decisively defeat a Wrangel in civil war, this success creates a fundamentally new situation for us. In economics, on the other hand, Lenin considered the matter to be quite different. Here, successes of this nature do not exist, and it is of the utmost importance to exercise patience, to realize that time is the main factor, and that years must pass before economic success really becomes visible.

Trotzky has always been among the impatient comrades, satisfied with nothing. He has always thought that everything was going wrong. Trotzky lacks the comprehensive glance of the steward, of the proletarian steward, who now actually has an economic system under his stewardship. He is entirely lacking in this capacity. He possesses no feeling for the actual economic

conditions of Russia, and has never possessed it. This is a psychological factor which must not be forgotten.

It is upon this soil that our differences of opinion with reference to economic planning have arisen.

I shall first briefly enumerate the names of our decisive leading organs of state economics. In the first place we have the Council of People's Commissaries, to which belong a number of the members of the Central Committee of the Party, some of our best state functionaries. Thus transport affairs, for instance, are managed by one of our most excellent comrades, a member of the CC., comrade Dserjinsky. The leadership of finance is in the hands of an old tried and tested Bolshevik, a member of the CC., comrade Sokolnikov. Our highest economic authority is again an old Bolshevik of long service, a member of the CC., comrade Rykov. To this must be added the "Council for Labour and Defence", in which there are also members of the CC. These two authorities represent the corporation actually controlling economics. Besides this, we possess another institution, the "State Planning Commission". This is composed of about 300 professors and specialists, one-time workers in the sphere of economics, whose experience and knowledge are very valuable to us, but who represent for the most part quite ordinary bourgeois elements. This institution is headed by comrade Krshyshanovsky, a capable old communist, further aided by comrade Zyuryupa, another old communist. This "State Planning Commission", though headed by a communist, is nevertheless an institution composed entirely of bourgeois professors and bourgeois intelligentsia. The task set these people is to work out a scientific economic plan, and to collect and sift suitable material for the solution of general economic questions.

And now comrade Trotzky has taken the idea into his head that just this "State Planning Commission" should be made into the most important economic institution of Russia, and this at the expense of the rights of supremacy enjoyed by the Council of People's Commissaries and the Council for Labour and Defence. Trotzky himself has been a member of the Council of People's Commissaries for years, and is also a member of the Council for Labour and Defence, but has never attended the sessions of either of them. He has boycotted both institutions for years. When Lenin fell ill, Lenin himself proposed, with the support of the CC., that Trotzky should be chosen as his deputy, as chairman in the Council of People's Commissaries and in the Council of Labour and Defence. Trotzky rejected this proposal indignantly. Indeed, Trotzky has boycotted all the most important leading institutions of the state, and is always complaining about the secondary position accorded to the State Planning Commission, which, in his opinion, would organize everything much better. This is a grave error on Trotzky's part, a schematic conception not entirely free, in my opinion, from a dash of Menshevism.

And indeed. How do the worthy Mensheviks picture to themselves the state of transition to socialist economics? Something in the following manner: one fine day the working class discovers that it possesses the majority in the country, a majority of real genuine proletarians in dungarees. This majority takes over power, and immediately works out a thorough and first class system of economics, upon which everything proceeds in perfect harmony in accordance with this plan. The Erfurt program was one of the recipes for the plan which will stick, glue, and cement everything together. It might as well be named the Bellamy recipe, for the Utopian Bellamy worked out his finished plan on very similar lines. Thus the social revolution is imagined. This Utopian idea forms the core of the views of the opportunists as to the introduction of Socialism. Comrade Lenin tried over and over again to make this clear to us, and to comrade Trotzky: Do you see now — he asked us — how real Socialism will actually come into being? You realize that Socialism will not come about as the realization of an ingenious plan, but on the basis of the special condition of the actual relations of forces.

And in point of fact the transition to Socialism did not begin in Russia by the realization of a plan, but with a struggle against — what do you think? — the louse. The problem of fighting the louse was a cardinal problem for us, for it was the problem of fighting spotted fever. Comrade Lenin spoke publicly of this as early as 1919, at the VIIIth All Russian Soviet Congress. On that occasion he said: "Either Socialism conquers the louse, or the louse conquers Socialism."

Socialism began to be a reality in a poverty-stricken agrarian country, crushed by wars, and long before the executors of the will of the revolutionary masses had worked out any finished

*) See the articles "The New Policy" in Special Number, Russian Party Discussions IV, Vol. 4, No 16, page 133.

plan. How could we work out any description of plan up to now, when as recently as eighteen months ago we were obliged to send almost our last gold abroad to obtain rye for Petrograd and Moscow, in order that our workers should not actually starve? What sort of plan could we have at a period when our railways, even as late as 1922, had only twelve hours reserve fuel for the line between Petrograd and Moscow? And what fuel! Green wood straight from the forest! The Donetz basin, our colliery centre, was in the hands of the Whites, naphta production had ceased, the rouble was no longer a rouble. If anyone was paid 100 million roubles, he found they had sunk in value to 80 millions by the next morning, and even further by the next day. How is it possible to execute any plan when the first necessities are lacking, when we have no bread, no means of transport, no money, no coal, no naphta?

This is why comrade Lenin insisted again and again on the recognition of this crude reality, which pointed out the path along which living Socialism had to march. Socialism follows neither Bellamy nor the Erfurt program. It follows in the track of the erection of disinfecting establishments, of the improvement of the conditions of the soldiers' lives, of the struggle against poverty, against the depreciation of Soviet money, against the shortage of fuel, etc.

And it seems to me, comrades, that the obstinate persistence in clinging to a beautiful plan is intrinsically nothing else than a considerable concession to the old-fashioned view that a good plan is a universal remedy, the last word in wisdom. Trotzky's standpoint has greatly impressed many students. "The CC. has no plan, and we really must have a plan!" is the cry which we hear today from a certain section of the students.

Comrades! The reconstitution of economics in a country like Russia is indeed the most difficult problem of our revolution. As I have already stated, the two most important leading institutions of our state have had to work without Trotzky's aid. Trotzky does not work for them even yet. We want to have transport affairs managed by Dserjinsky, economics by Rykov, finance by Sokolnikov; Trotzky, on the other hand, wants to carry out everything with the aid of a "state plan". The State Planning Commission is an important corporation, called into being by Lenin himself. But the "state plan" is no universal remedy.

And what is our actual economic situation at the present moment?

In October comrade Trotzky, and after him 46 comrades of his fraction, addressed a letter to the CC., stating that we are in the midst of an internal political and Party crisis; in a word: the country is on the verge of a precipice. This is the way it looks to these comrades. How does this come about? It comes about because comrade Trotzky has no eye for the actual situation of our country. He knows neither our peasantry nor our workers to a sufficient degree. He knows Russia too little, and has no feeling for the realities of our country.

Russia's actual economic condition is better today than we might have expected. The bread question no longer exists. The year before last we exported 45 million poods abroad, in 1923 this export had risen to 250 million poods, and we hope to realize an even more extensive program in 1924. We are beginning to be felt as factor in the international bread market. Further: in 1922 our naphta output amounted to 218 million poods; in the year 1923 it amounted to 300 million poods. Today we may regard the most urgent necessities of the country as covered, so that we are in a position to export a part of our real values. With respect to the coal of the Donetz basin, we have exceeded the fixed normal output, for the first time, by 10%. The deficit on our traffic and transport, which was previously 150 millions, has been reduced in 1923 to 40 to 50 millions, so that our traffic is now almost free from deficit. Comrade Dserjinsky has performed perfect miracles here. We are now engaged in the promotion of our metallurgy. This is now rendered possible by the regulation of our coal and naphta output. One depends upon the other. Metallurgical production increased fourfold in 1923, as compared with the year 1922. Naturally, this is but a modest gain, a diffident beginning. Metallurgy had reached a specially low ebb. You see, comrades, that we record progress even here. And above all we have one thing today: Money. After he had been ill for a few months, Lenin once asked us with a smile: "Comrades, how is it that we manage to go on existing with our wretched Soviet rouble?" Lenin frequently remarked: "I have no fear that our power will be overthrown by an insurrection. What I am afraid of is that our miserable rouble will strangle us some day by running us into financial bankruptcy. To be sure we have secured

our place in the Kremlin, but nobody will accept our rouble!" Scarcely a year has passed since Lenin said this. Today, comrades, we have the Chervonetz, known to all of you. At the present time there are 300 million gold roubles in circulation, of which 270 million are in chervonetz. The whole international bourgeoisie envies us for this. The chervonetz represents a real value. You know that finance mirrors the situation of the economic totality. If our economics had not improved, we should have no chervonetz today. We are now about to carry out a comprehensive financial reform. The CC. has already worked out a suitable project, and will submit this in a few days to the Federal Council Congress meeting in Moscow. This reform deals with introduction of a uniform gold and silver currency, having as security a considerable gold reserve which has accumulated of late. At the IV. World Congress of the C. I., Lenin laid special emphasis on the fact that we had already earned 20 million gold roubles by commerce, and observed: "So we have made a beginning". Now, I am not betraying any great secret when I tell you that since then we have earned 20 times 20 millions, if not more. We possess a real gold basis for our currency, and need no longer fear that our rouble will strangle us.

This is a fact, comrades. Even should the other symptoms proving the uplift of our economics be lacking — the increase of coal and naphta output, etc. — the above mentioned financial symptom suffices in itself to prove the improvement of our position. For it is perfectly clear that if our finances were to collapse, then not even an old Bolshevik guard could keep itself above water by any heroic deeds, the less so that precisely this guard possesses no very great experience in financial questions. It is true that even before the war we raised international loans, as for instance, when we borrowed the impressive sum of 25 francs at the time when we formed the Zimmerwald Left. We cannot cite any greater financial operations from our past. But we were nevertheless successful in finding a member of the CC, a comrade who is at the same time an old revolutionist, who understands financial questions, and has so far managed our affairs entirely satisfactorily.

Further, Agriculture has recuperated in an equal degree. Production has reached 70 to 80% of pre-war production. There are many comrades, even among those belonging to the "opposition" as for instance comrade Sosnovsky, who is well-informed on this subject, who even assert that we have already attained 100% of pre-war production. We have reached 40% in state economics, whilst we were only at 22% a year ago.

You see, comrades, that we are marching forwards. Truly we are advancing slowly, truly it would be better if our pace were quicker; but at least we are progressing.

With respect to the position of the working class, we are by no means satisfied with this. We cannot by any means designate it as good. It would be highly agreeable if we receive 100 gold roubles monthly. But unfortunately we cannot do this yet. But we can at least maintain, that in all the leading centres of the country, the position of the working class is such that the worker can manage to live on his earnings. Everyone knowing the circumstances will acknowledge this. In the most important centres wages have almost reached prewar level. Besides this, the average worker now enjoys a number of privileges which must also be taken into account. The productivity of work has increased. During the war years, the position of the worker was the worst imaginable. In order to support bare life, he was frequently obliged to steal, or to produce articles quite outside his actual profession. Thus many manufactured lighters and sold them. Today we have an entirely different working class, with an entirely different psychology. This may be observed with especial clearness in Petrograd. In 1922 we had 33,000 metal workers in Petrograd, and in 1923 almost double this number, 61,000. Two years ago workers stole all sorts of materials, made all sorts of worthless articles, and attempted to sell these or speculate with them, for they saw no other possibility of earning enough to live on. But today the workers work systematically, as for instance, in the manufacture of tractors. This has made the workman an entirely different human being. Today he comprehends the needs of the country, and has taken up his real profession again. This explains the extensive support now accorded to our Party by the broad masses of the working class. The working class has not supported us to such an extent since the months of the year 1917.

And now, comrades, can you imagine it possible that comrade Trotzky stands up before the CC. and declares that the

country is on the verge of an abyss? „The state plan“ exercises too little influence amongst us.

The comrade who makes such an assertion is entirely lacking in ability to realize Russia as it actually is. Trotzky is not Radek. When Radek does not understand these things, we can comprehend the reason. Radek has his own line, in which he is an expert.

So much for our differences of opinion with the „opposition“ in the sphere of economics.

VI.

Special Differences of Opinion with comrade Trotzky.

I now come to the discussion of some special differences of opinion with comrade Trotzky.

These differences with comrade Trotzky have given rise to much uneasiness in our ranks and are naturally equally disquieting to our comrades of the International.

The „opposition“, seeing that it is defeated, insists upon its final argument. It has turned to the workers with a phrase to the following effect: „Very well, you may be right in all these things. But at least we may ask for one thing: polite treatment for Trotzky“. Thus comrade Radek, for instance, delivered a speech yesterday in Moscow, in which he declared that the CC. was at least 80% in the right, and that unity is necessary. But the Party lacks in „politeness“ towards Trotzky.

This is all the „opposition“ has to say in the present final stage of the discussion. You see, comrades, how weak are the foundations of this „opposition“.

But let us turn from the lighter side of this question, for it has another aspect as well. Trotzky is one of our most gifted comrades. You all know how much influence he possesses. I need not waste any words on this. But I must make our relations with comrade Trotzky clear to you.

In the first place: In 1903 comrade Trotzky was not only an express Menshevik, but he was one of those comrades who most energetically combated Bo'shevism, and already at that time the accusations which he brought against the Bo'sheviki were essentially the same as he raises today. At that time Trotzky wrote a pamphlet to the effect that whilst Lenin held the belief that he was a proletarian revolutionist, whilst he held himself to be a Marxist and proletarian revolutionist, in reality history was according him the role of leader of the petty bourgeoisie, of leader of the peasantry. The Bo'sheviki, in Trotzky's opinion, were bound to develop gradually into leaders of a peasants party. It seems to me, comrades, that the present indictments brought by comrade Trotzky, especially his insinuations as to the degeneration of the old guard, are a renaissance of his above-named old views, of his old idea that whilst we imagine ourselves to be proletarian revolutionists, we are in reality petty bourgeoisie. What can he otherwise mean by „degeneration“? Degeneration must be founded on a class basis! And of whom could such a class basis consist? Only of the proletariat or the peasantry. The accusation is an implication that we are inclining towards the petty bourgeoisie.

From the year 1905 onwards, Trotzky was fractionless, and even worked for our press for a time. Later, during the period of the counterrevolution, he again belonged to the Mensheviks, and for ten years he aided our worst enemies. In the year 1914, at the beginning of the great war, Trotzky was Internationalist, but in spite of this he continued to combat our revolutionary internationalism, and to support the Mensheviks by aiding the Duma fraction of the Menshevik Tcheidze, instead of the Bolshevik Duma fraction.

This reminds me of a similar attitude adopted by Trotzky at the time of the Copenhagen International Congress in the year 1910. On the opening day of the congress the Berlin „Vorwärts“ published an anonymous article declaring that Lenin and his immediate disciples were a band of criminals and scoundrels, undertaking expropriations, etc. The writer of this article was comrade Trotzky. Such was the state of affairs before the year 1917. In the year 1917, in about June, Trotzky joined our Party. At that time comrade Lenin was at first opposed to his admission. When the question of comrade Trotzky's entry into the editorial staff of the „Pravda“ arose, the voting was as follows; comrade Kameneff and I were in favour of his admission, Lenin against it. After Trotzky had become a member of the editorial staff, Lenin observed with a smile: „You have betrayed me. Well, we shall just have to increase the staff by two workers more, in order to have a majority against you and Trotzky in any case.“ So little confidence had Lenin in Trotzky.

Now, comrades, you all know what brilliant service Trotzky rendered after this, especially in the October days. Then came Brest-Litovsk. Again the penulum swung back. Trotzky insisted on the formula of: „Neither war nor peace“. Trotzky suddenly became a „left“ communist in company with Lukharin, Radek, and other comrades. What was the mistake committed by Trotzky during the Brest-Litovsk period? That he overlooked the peasantry. He was anxious to carry on a revolutionary war at a time when the whole peasantry did not want to hear anything of war. The old army, which was a peasant army, was in a state of complete dissolution, and could not be forced to fight by any means. Despite this, Trotzky had a beautifully worked out plan of his revolutionary war in his pocket, a plan with only one fault, the fact that he had no soldiers for the revolutionary army, for these were the peasants who would not fight.

Then came the trade union question in the year 1921. What was the position of the Soviet power at that time? Insurrection in Cronstadt, risings among the peasantry in Siberia and in the Tambov government. What signalized these events? The protest made by the peasantry against the limitation of agricultural productive powers by our war communism. And what was Trotzky's recipe for helping this? Further limitation, more effective limitation! Again he overlooked the real lever moving the interests of the peasantry, and at the same time he overlooked the demands of the working masses, still closely bound up with those of the peasants in Russia. At that time we fought a severe contest as to the role played by the working class, and its relations to the peasantry.

And now we have got into a discussion on the same subject for the third time, for Trotzky, whilst categorically insisting on the necessity of his plan, again overlooks the needs of agriculture. The basis of our economics is represented by the country, by the peasantry. This basis consists of our hundreds of millions of poods of bread.

Another bone of contention between us and Trotzky is the question of the concentration of state economics. Theoretically, the demand for increased concentration in state industry is perfectly correct. But here again matters look somewhat different viewed in a concrete political light. For instance, we possess a number of first-class large works, as the Putilov Works at Petrograd, or the Bryarsk Works, which are unprofitable enterprises from the financial standpoint. What is to be done with such undertakings? Trotzky answers briefly: Close them. But we, the majority of the Political Bureau, declare that we do not think of closing them. There are exceptional cases, in which we must grant subsidies, even when this is not in accordance with the immediate interests of the state budget. The unprofitable enterprise despite its unprofitability, must be held above water by artificial means. Why this? The reply is simple. Because these works keep occupied 8000 workers forming a picked troop of proletarian revolutionists. These are centres of crystallization for the revolution, and for us these are most important of all. But Trotzky nervously opposes us, he categorically demands that the works be shut down, and continues to bombard us with his question of: Where is your plan? What economic system are you pursuing?

I believe, comrades, that the picture which I have so far drawn of our disagreement with Trotzky will have shown you that our differences are not of a personal nature — all assertions to the contrary are idle gossip! — but of a purely political character. The reason lies in the fact that Trotzky has learnt in a very different school to ours, for we worked together with Lenin for years. We fully appreciate all Trotzky's brilliant qualities, and need not recount these here, but all the same he has not gone through a Bolshevik school. Again and again he overlooks the peasantry, and is thus unable to accord due weight to the specific role played by the working class of Russia, so closely bound up with the part played by the small holders.

Now, comrades, we are all of the opinion that Trotzky's cooperation is an unqualified necessity for us. We often hear it said by comrades — I heard it yesterday myself at a meeting — that: „The CC. has a fraction after all, and that is your fraction, the fraction of the majority“. This is pure nonsense. In the CC. the proportion of the majority to the opposition is 53 to 3, in the Political Bureau 9 to 1. Did you ever hear of such a fraction? Nearly all of us were unanimously elected by the last Party conference. The „opposition“ declares: Even if we gain the majority at the next Party conference, we shall still reelect you all unanimously. The accusation that we are a fraction has thus not a shadow of proof behind it.

We are reproached with maintaining especially close contact with one another, of coming into the Political Bureau with our proposals already agreed upon beforehand, and so forth. This is one of Kadek's greatest hits. Radek speaks at meetings somewhat as follows: Do you know, comrades, what our Political Bureau really is? The following: Zinoviev comes to an understanding with Kamenev and Stalin. This trio then overwhelms Bukharin, so that they have already four votes before coming into the Political Bureau. Then they only require two votes more, and they have the majority. What is this, if it is not a fraction? is the question then put by Radek to his astonished audience.

Comrades, you are naturally interested in the more intimate side of our disagreement as well, and an explanation of this is also due to you.

Yes, it is true that the members of the Political Bureau come to understandings with one another. But what does the Political Bureau really represent? Above all it represents the responsible corporation of our state, the government. The Political Bureau governs the country, and this is a country comprising one sixth of the surface of the globe. To this must be added that we are still in possession of a certain amount of influence in the International, and rule in this to a certain extent. Confronted by such responsible tasks, is it possible for us to deal with every subject in a purely formal manner, to act on some such scheme as the following: 12 o'clock, meeting of Political Bureau, opening of session, reading of agenda, and voting? This is of course absurd. We are an army staff, but a revolutionary army staff, whose members are in constant contact with one another, and maintain friendly relations to each other. We often hear it said at meetings that the members of the Political Bureau met at Zinoviev's house, and came to an understanding there. And how were matters at the time when Lenin was still in good health? Well, at that time we met in Lenin's rooms, in his study, or at his dinner-table, and discussed all manner of questions with him, seeking to arrive at a united standpoint on contested points. Often enough this was no easy matter. In the Urquhart affair, for instance, Lenin changed his point of view three times. At one time he was in favour of accepting the agreement, at another time opposed to it. I remember that at that time he once telephoned to me: "You see how weak I have become! I have thought the matter over again, and have come to a different conclusion again. What do you say to such a lack of character?"

How is it that we did not succeed in establishing similar relations with comrade Trotzky? The reason lies partly in Trotzky's personal character. Trotzky is an expressed individualist. This makes it impossible that he should ever form a firm fraction. During the Balkan war, Trotzky once made an excursion to the Balkans. He then proceeded to Copenhagen, where he was already able to unfold an excellent plan for the reconciliation of the broad-minded and the narrow-minded. Trotzky has always been wanting to reconcile the whole world, but he has never reconciled anybody. He has wanted to form a fraction, but has himself been fractionless, and has never succeeded in bringing a fraction together. Why not? Simply for the reason that he is an expressed individualist. This incapacity for collective work prevents the development of any friendly relations between Trotzky and the old Bolsheviks, though such relations are eminently desirable. To this we must add the whole of our past, comprising a period of 20 years, during which we old Bolsheviks, we Leninists, were fighting together through thick and thin.

After Lenin fell ill, we for our part did our utmost to improve our relations with Trotzky, to come into closer contact with him. Even after the conflict with him had begun we made two attempts, in November of last year, to come to a clear understanding with comrade Trotzky by means of private consultation with him. All the members of the Political Bureau took part in these private consultations. We did this in the consciousness that it was necessary to convince comrade Trotzky that we did not dream for a moment of persecuting him, but were actuated solely by the sincere wish to co-operate with him, and to arrive at an agreement with him on contested questions. We have done our utmost to come to an understanding with comrade Trotzky. And the result? The next day we have the same situation again, the same questions. And then there is a group of Trotzky's followers who have encouraged him to oppose the C. C., instead of enlightening him as to the real state of affairs in the Party. Now that Lenin is not there,

we can storm the C. C. — this has been the slogan of this group. And they have really attempted the attack. It has, however, not been quite successful either for Trotzky or Radek. It was a false speculation to assume that Lenin's absence would guarantee a victorious issue for the attack.

This is the situation, comrades. Naturally there is widespread disquietude, naturally we hear on all sides the question: What will happen now? Will there be a rupture with Trotzky? Indeed, even those comrades of the "opposition" who have changed their opinion in the course of the discussion, and are now ready to declare: "Yes, you are right, and we vote with you", are still asking: "But what is to be done about Trotzky?" To this we reply: Of course we shall continue to co-operate with him. We have already stated this publicly in a special resolution passed by the Political Bureau, in which we declare that we cannot imagine either the Political Bureau or the Soviet government without Trotzky. But on the other hand we must state with the utmost decision:

If there are any persons who believe that we shall now swallow everything which Trotzky offers us, they are mistaken. We shall not permit ourselves to be deprived of the right of representing the Party as it really is. It must be openly stated, once for all, that we never went over to comrade Trotzky, but that he came over to us into the Party.

This statement does not in the least alter the fact of Trotzky's admirable characteristics and capabilities. Trotzky must penetrate more deeply into the essence of our Bolshevik Party. He has tried to show the workers that we are on the road to becoming Bernsteins, and so forth. But nobody has believed him. This proves that he has not formed a correct estimate of our Party.

Comrades, you have nothing to fear. There will be no split in the Party. Trotzky will recognize his errors, as he did in 1921. A federal Party conference will first be held, then a federal Party congress. It need not be said that we shall do our utmost to keep comrade Trotzky in all his influential positions, despite the momentary tension, and to give him the opportunity of working. But we expect from you, comrades, that you fully realize the nature of our differences, that you are aware that it is no matter of trifles, but of serious political and organizational questions. Had it been a mere question of trifles, we should have given in long ago.

VII.

The Proportion of Forces in the Party.

In conclusion, a few words on the proportion of forces in the Party during the discussion.

As in every struggle, a so-called buffer group has been formed in the course of the present conflict. There was a similar buffer group during our trade union debates in 1921. At that time the leader of the buffer group was comrade Bukharin. Lenin, when speaking of this buffer group, remarked: If I could draw as well as Bukharin can, I should make a drawing of Bukharin with a bucket of petroleum, which he is pouring into a fire, and I should add the inscription: Buffer fire. Lenin was right. As a matter of fact the buffer fraction did not contribute to lessening the struggle, but rather to aggravate it. This is always the case. Instead of stating clearly what the conflict is about, instead of analysing the differences, quite another course is adopted: one of the fractions is actually supported under cover of intermediation. In questions concerning the vital interests of the revolution, it is imperative to take sides decisively, and not to demand that good and bad be combined.

Comrade Radek is pleased at present with his role of mediator. But this is merely a move in the game on his part, and only proves the existence of a division of work in the "opposition". In reality, Radek is a Trotzkyian. His past is almost parallel, and he possesses to a certain degree the same weaknesses and the same powers as Trotzky. Radek has been able to record a certain degree of success here in Moscow in his capacity as mediator, but the majority of the Party, that majority in whose hands the fate of the Party lies, is fully aware that Radek is in reality no mediator, but an adherent of the Trotzky fraction. For instance, he declares at meetings that the C. C. is 80% in the right, but at the same time he calls upon those present to vote for the resolution of the "opposition", although this must be 80% wrong if we are 80% right.

The proportion of forces in the Party is approximately 9 to 1. An attempt is made, in today's "Pravda", to give a numerical survey of the result of the discussion. I may interpose that almost the whole Party has expressed its opinion. The result

is as follows: 288 organisations for us, 8 against us. These figures give only an approximate idea of actual relations. Not one of the 8 oppositional organizations is an important centre. All important and decisive industrial centres, possessing really compact masses of proletarians, as Petrograd, Charkov, Baku, Yekaterinburg, etc., are on our side with an overwhelming majority. Matters are somewhat different in Moscow than in other industrial centres; here the "opposition" is considerably stronger. Our opposition made the attempt to bring off a performance à la Berlin here in Moscow, but with the difference that we are here concerned with a really revisionist current. It is highly probable that in Moscow, the final proportion of forces will be such that about 20 to 25% of the votes of the Party members will fall to the "opposition". I must explain to you why precisely Moscow has a comparatively powerful "opposition". First it is to be greatly explained by the fact that we have about 20,000 students in Moscow. And then we have the war commissariat. I have already pointed out that the main centre of the "opposition" is formed by the students and the war commissariat. I must, however, observe that the greater number of the Red Army soldiers naturally voted against Trotzky. But the overwhelming majority of the workers of Moscow are with the Central Committee. The relative success of the "opposition" in Moscow is further due to the fact that it has concentrated its main forces in Moscow. Here there are over 1000 responsible functionaries, many of whom have nothing to do after office hours, and have organized themselves illegally in the Party to a slight degree, after working in an oppositional direction for half a year. Thus the slightly greater strength of the "opposition" in Moscow. I emphasize once more that the "opposition" has found no support among the working people of Moscow. The position of the CC. is unshaken among the Moscow proletariat.

I come now to the conclusion comrades.

It goes without saying that the International must make a careful study of the reasons for our differences. We do not think of asking the International to believe every word we say; on the contrary, it must have all the documents involved submitted to it.

I believe, comrades, that after you have accorded careful consideration to the arguments brought against us by the "opposition", you will approve of our standpoint in all essentials. That there is alarm with respect to a possible split in the Party is only natural. Well, we assure you that we do not in the least underestimate the importance of the minority around Trotzky. But nevertheless we can assure you that there will be no split in our Party, there will not even be a splitting off of any section of Party masses. We have every reason to assert that we shall succeed in liquidating the whole affair rapidly and painlessly. The more energetic and determined our fight against the errors committed by the "opposition", the more quickly will these be wiped out. No complications will arise in the Party, just as none arose in 1921.

To sum up our differences with the «opposition» in a few words, I again recount the five most essential points. These are as follows:

1. The essential character of our Bolshevik Party,
2. The question of the formation of fractions within a party incorporating state power,
3. The relations between old and young,
4. The estimation of the part played by the peasantry, as the main question of our differences of opinion, and finally,
5. The role and character of our Party apparatus.

These are the most essential points. I think that I have amply proved that we differ essentially from the «opposition» in all these five points. If we sum up the divergence of our standpoints in these five points, we see at once that the views held by the two camps, taken on the whole, are divided from one another by a much wider chasm than that separating the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in 1903. But matters are, however, somewhat different today, for now we are a large Party, comprising great masses of workers. These masses of workers are in a position to call to order those comrades who have drifted on to a wrong course, and to rapidly correct the errors made by these comrades. Naturally, much depends upon the attitude of the "opposition" itself. If it holds obstinately to its fundamentally wrong views on the above five points, then it is possible that such obstinacy may cause a cleft in the Party. I should like to remind you here of the pamphlet published by Lenin in 1904, dedicated to the London Party Congress held in 1903: "One step forwards, two steps backwards", in which Lenin gave a graphic diagrammatic survey of the results of the divisions on the most important points of the agenda of the London Party congress, showing that Martov and

Axelrod inclined to the right in every question, not only in trivial matters, but in essentials. We young ones did not quite comprehend the significance of this diagram; we shrugged our shoulders, and asked one another: What is Lenin driving at? How can he take such slight differences of opinion as the basis for a whole method appeared to us somewhat artificial. But it speedily proved that Lenin was right. Comrades, were we to apply this Leninian method to our present Party conflict, and draw up a similar diagram, we should arrive at a result even more convincing than that come to by Lenin in 1904 by his analysis of the differences between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks.

One more point, comrades. We beg you, before you form a final judgment, to make a thorough study of the most important documents concerned. I accentuate this, because one of our best sections, the Polish, has preferred to act otherwise. Instead of first studying the material and hearing the disputants, the Polish party hastens to favour us with a love-letter, telling us not to forget how necessary it is to come to an understanding with Trotzky, if we are to avoid disastrous results. I must tell the Polish comrades candidly that if they have thought to impress us with such a love-letter, they are quite on the wrong track. It may be impolite to say so, but the pious hopes expressed in the letter have not made any impression on us whatever. It would have had more effect if the letter had stated: you are wrong in this or that point, this or that must be corrected. This would have been criticism, but it would have made an impression upon us.

We are fully prepared to give any Party full information at any time as to the steps we take. The Parties have a right, as the International, to intervene, but not until they have examined all arguments, documents, and standpoints. Where this is not done, any attempt at instructing our Party is not only lost labour, but is an actual support of Trotzky. Comrade Varsky has explained that the Polish communists are by no means on Trotzky's side, but are opposed to him, as they are old Bolsheviks. Very good; but all the same they have lent their aid to Trotzky and Radek. Three weeks ago comrade Radek prophesied, at a local students' meeting, that the German Party would in the first place declare itself to be against us, the majority, and that in the second place comrade Varsky had promised that the Polish party would protest against the false leadership of the Comintern. One part of this prophesy has come true. The central of the Polish CP, without giving us a hearing, without examining the arguments and documents, has sent us a letter which is practically an intervention in favour of Trotzky's fraction. I can only call this supporting fractionism. Comrade Varsky, we shall reply to your letter, and shall explain our standpoint to the Polish communist workers; and I wager hundred to one that the communist proletariat of Poland, which has fought side by side with us for twenty years, will decide in our favour, in favour of the Leninian core of the Party. It will not be the diplomacy of Radek and Varsky even aided by Valecki, which will convince the workers of the Polish party; we shall do this. Those who have committed this error should hasten to repair it, and the quicker the better.

The German comrades are equally disquieted, and are asking: What is to be the end of this affair? How will Social Democracy react upon it? The bourgeois press is already engaged upon a savage agitation, and is spreading the most unheard of lies abroad. This is true. Thus the French bourgeois press, for instance, has already reported splits in the Red Army, risings of the whole Army against the Central Committee, and similar nonsense.

We need not tell you that disagreements in the Party are no source of pleasure to us. Truly it is no pleasure to hang about at meetings day and night, as I have to do at present. But it cannot be helped. There are times when fundamental differences of opinion in the Party have to be fought out openly, and we are now passing through one of these periods. At the moment, this present struggle is practically over. Its product is as follows: If the minority insists on continuing the fight, its present unfavourable position will become worse from day to day. But there are many indications permitting us to hope that the greater part of the minority, including Radek, are beginning to grasp the significance of taking up arms against our CC, especially with the most frivolous arguments.

If the International is ready to help us to smooth out our quarrel, we shall heartily welcome such aid. Our federal Party conference will take place in a few days. It is very important

that the Executive be represented at this conference. Naturally, preliminary consultations are desirable. We are prepared to arrange these at any time. We are express Internationalists, and ready not only to hear the opinion of every section of the International but to accord every opinion the most careful considerations. But we beg you not to permit your judgment to be influenced by your sympathies, by the feeling which many of our best friends among the comrades of our brother Parties express when they say that they feel equal love for both sides. But in political matters, in questions decisive for the fate of the revo-

lution our slogan must be: *Amicus Plato, sed magis amicus veritas!* Plato is our friend, but the truth goes before Plato! In short: you must first examine into the true reasons of the Party crisis.

Examine fairly and conscientiously, without regard to your sympathy or friendship for this or that leading comrade of the Russian CP., and you will all be on our side. We have no doubt whatever but that a thorough examination into all reasons and counter-reasons will enable you to arrive at a mature and well-considered judgment.