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**Report of the  
Eighteenth Congress  
of the Communist  
Party of the Soviet  
Union (Bolsheviks)**



# THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

ORGAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE  
OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

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VOL. XIV

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## C O N T E N T S

### **The Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)**

OPENING SPEECH . . . . .	V. M. MOLOTOV . . . . .	517
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	JOSEPH STALIN . . . . .	520
I. THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS . . . . .		520
1. New Economic Crisis in the Capitalist Countries. Intensification of the Struggle for Markets and Sources of Raw Materials and for a New Redivision of the World . . . . .		520
2. Aggravation of the International Political Situation. Collapse of the Post-War System of Peace Treaties. Beginning of a New Imperialist War. . . . .		522
3. The Soviet Union and the Capitalist Countries . . . . .		525
II. INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION . . . . .		527
1. Further Progress of Industry and Agriculture. . . . .		527
2. Further Rise in the Material and Cultural Standards of the People . . . . .		534
3. Further Consolidation of the Soviet System. . . . .		536

III. FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS) . . . . .	537
1. Measures to Improve the Composition of the Party. Division of Organizations. Closer Contact Between the Leading Party Bodies and the Work of the Lower Bodies . . . . .	538
2. Selection, Promotion and Allocation of Cadres . . . . .	539
3. Party Propaganda, Marxist-Leninist Training of Party Members and Party Cadres . . . . .	541
4. Some Questions of Theory . . . . .	543
REPORT OF THE DELEGATION OF THE C.P.-S.U.(B.) IN THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL . D. Z. MANUILSKY . . . . .	550
I. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION . . . . .	550
Events of the Past Five Years in the Capitalist World . . . . .	551
II. THE STRUGGLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR THE UNITED FRONT AND PEOPLE'S FRONT . . . . .	555
III. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES . . . . .	563
A. Some Questions of Communist Party Tactics . . . . .	563
B. The Condition of the Communist Parties . . . . .	564
C. The Road of Struggle of the Communist Parties and the Working People Against World Reaction . . . . .	571
SPEECH OF MARSHAL KLEMENTI VOROSHILOV . . . . .	576
The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army . . . . .	578
Personnel . . . . .	584
Material and Cultural Conditions in the Red Army . . . . .	587
The Air and Chemical Defense Society and Other Public Organizations . . . . .	588
Political Education of the Red Army . . . . .	589
Military Training of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army . . . . .	590
Political and Moral State of the Red Army . . . . .	592
SPEECH OF L. MEKHLIS . . . . .	595
SPEECH OF G. STERN . . . . .	604
RESOLUTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS ON THE REPORT OF JOSEPH STALIN . . . . .	610
RESOLUTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS ON THE REPORT OF D. Z. MANUILSKY . . . . .	611



<b>REPORT ON THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOP- MENT OF THE U.S.S.R. . . . .</b>	<b>V. M. MOLOTOV . . . . .</b>	<b>612</b>
I. RESULTS OF THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . .		612
II. THE CHIEF ECONOMIC TASK OF THE U.S.S.R. . . . .		619
III. THE PLAN FOR THE FURTHER ADVANCEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY . . . . .		623
1. Industry . . . . .		624
2. Agriculture . . . . .		628
3. Transportation and Postal, Telegraph and Telephone Communication . . . . .		630
4. Capital Construction . . . . .		631
5. Our Reserves and Potentialities . . . . .		635
IV. PLAN FOR A FURTHER RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STAND- ARDS OF THE WORKING PEOPLE . . . . .		638
Increase in Market Supply of Principal Manufactured Goods . . . . .		639
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . .		644
SPEECH IN REPLY TO DISCUSSION . . . . .		648

<b>RESOLUTION OF THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS ON THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN FOR THE NATIONAL-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE U.S.S.R. (1938-1942) . . . . .</b>	<b>658</b>
I. THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE CHIEF TASKS OF THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN . . . . .	658
II. PLAN OF INCREASE IN OUTPUT DURING THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN PERIOD . . . . .	662
III. NEW CONSTRUCTION AND ITS DISTRIBUTION DURING THE THIRD FIVE- YEAR PLAN PERIOD . . . . .	670
IV. THE PLAN FOR THE FURTHER RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARDS OF THE PEOPLE DURING THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN PERIOD . . . . .	676

<b>REPORT ON AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF THE C.P.S.U. (B.) . . . . .</b>	<b>A. A. ZHDANOV . . . . .</b>	<b>680</b>
Introduction . . . . .		680
Abolition of the Categories of Admission to the Party . . . . .		683
Rights of Party Members . . . . .		686
Abolition of Mass Purges . . . . .		688
Mastering or Accepting the Party Program . . . . .		695

Inner-Party Democracy . . . . .	696
Remedying the Territorial and Political Deficiencies of Cadres .	701
Reconstruction of the Party Apparatus. All-Union Conferences .	703
The Duties of Primary Organizations in Industry and in Soviet Institutions . . . . .	704
Summary of the Discussion of the Theses of the Report on "Amendments to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.)" . . . .	708

<b>THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) ELECTED BY THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS . . . . .</b>	<b>718</b>
MEMBERS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	718
CANDIDATES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	718
THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE . . . . .	719
THE ORGANIZATIONAL COMMISSION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE . . .	719

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# THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS)

## Opening Speech

March 10, 1939

BY V. M. MOLOTOV

*Chairman, Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.*

[*On March 10, 1939, the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) was called to order on behalf of the Central Committee by Comrade V. M. Molotov, who delivered the following opening speech:]*

COMRADES, our Party comes to the present Congress with victories of historic importance. In place of the old country, backward even from the viewpoint of capitalism, a new system has been created—socialism has been built in the main. We have long ago driven out the landlords and capitalists, but it is only in recent years that we have finally cleared our land of all exploiters. A new society has been established, a society equipped with the most advanced technique. The socialist state of the workers and peasants has taken shape and is marching onward and upward, marching along its tried and tested Bolshevik road to the complete triumph of communism. This at a time when capitalism is seeking salvation in fascism which is executed by all friends of human progress, when capitalism, stricken by crises and parasitic decay at its roots, is more and more dragging Europe and Asia into a new world imperialist war.

It is with feelings of joy that the working people of the Soviet Union welcome our congress. We understand and share these feelings. They are the offspring of great battles, and of the moral and political unity that has grown up in our country. They have been created by the great friendship of the peoples of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, cemented into the great army of communism and ready for new battles under the banner of Lenin-Stalin. (*Applause. All rise.*)

We have completed yet another historical stage of the Communist revolution in the U.S.S.R. We have, in the main, completed a whole epoch of constructive work and are entering a new epoch, the epoch of gradual transition from socialism to communism. Our experience, the experience of the builders of communist society, has already shown to the full that the possibilities for the growth of the forces of the U.S.S.R. are boundless.

At present everything has been done in our country for the creative activity of the people to surge over the vast expanse of the multinational Soviet Union, for the well-being of the people to grow with every passing day, for the cultural

construction of the land of socialism to develop in extent and depth.

At the same time the experience of recent years has shown that there had been a certain underestimation of the external hostile forces, an underestimation of their inimical activity and resourcefulness in the struggle against the U.S.S.R. Matters developed to a point where our external enemies of the capitalist camp conceived a kind of intervention in our domestic affairs. This peculiar intervention in Soviet affairs consisted of the attempt of certain imperialist powers, especially fascist powers, to slip in and distribute their agents in the organs of state power of the U.S.S.R. They wanted, in fact, to apply to the Soviet Union their rich experience in dealing with weaker bourgeois states where sometimes none other than paid agents and spies of big foreign powers sit in high governmental places and decide the affairs of the state.

Brazen as this is on their part, such attempts were also made by them in relation to the Soviet Union through individuals who but yesterday masked their base perfidy and treachery behind a Communist Party membership card. This will occur also in the future, unless we meet the cunning and resourcefulness of foreign intelligence services with twofold and tenfold adroitness and resourcefulness of the Soviet Intelligence Service. (*Applause.*) As you know, we have smashed to smithereens the designs of the foreign class enemy of the capitalist camp, especially of the fascist camp. Their novel, spy method of intervention, in which all these Trotskys, Rykovs, Bukharins, Zinovievs, Tukhachevskys, Radeks, Ikramovs and Lubchenkos played the miserable role of spies and wreckers, of filthy agents of foreign intelligence services, was a complete fiasco.

We received a new lesson on the question of the state and a new rich experience regarding the perfidious methods in the struggle against the Soviet power. Our answer to this was the resolute Bolshevik consolidation of the Soviet state, the Red Army and all other combatant organs of the state power, as well as with

the intensification of the struggle against fascism and the agents of fascism. (*Applause.*)

The new stage confronts us with new tasks.

From the point of view of our internal tasks the center of gravity is now shifted to questions of enlightenment, of communist upbringing, to the tasks of eradicating the still tenacious survivals of capitalism in the minds of working people. We are outlining new plans for the development of the national economy, new plans for improving the well-being of the people and for an all-sided enhancement of the cultural level of the working people. We have set going on a wide scale the work for the ideological and organizational strengthening of the Party and the further strengthening of the fighting qualities of our Party organizations. In order to appreciate fully our political, our economic, our cultural, our organizational and all other tremendous possibilities and to utilize them for the maximum of practical results in the interests of the people, we need in the present period above all to improve in every way the work of communist upbringing.

If we are to be still more successful in solving all organizational problems in regard to enhancing the might of our state, if we are to advance with still greater rapidity in solving the main economic task of the Soviet Union, that of rapidly overtaking and outstripping the most developed capitalist countries in the level of our economy as well, we must bring to the forefront the tasks of educating the masses in the spirit of a conscious, communist attitude to work, the tasks of further raising the ideological training of the cadres of the Party and state apparatus and of the entire Soviet intelligentsia in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, in the spirit of Bolshevism.

The present congress will give rise to a new upsurge in all our work, a new upsurge in the work of communist education and scientific and theoretical work. Our congresses have always shed light far ahead on ripe tasks facing the Party and have always been an important stage



in raising the communist consciousness of the masses, in the communist enlightenment of the working people.

No enemy is any longer able to crush our Soviet Union. Any aggressor will break his brass skull against the Soviet frontier. (*Stormy applause.*) Those who will not heed our open warnings will find this out in due time. And the more energetic and effective our work of communist enlightenment in our country, the greater will be our victory in the coming struggle with the forces of foreign aggression, and the greater its international significance.

Comrade delegates, permit me to express assurance that in this respect, too, the Eighteenth Congress will fulfil its historic mission. The guarantee of this is

the fact that in our country the working class and the toiling people are marching ahead with the victorious banner of the party of Lenin and Stalin raised high aloft. (*All rise, applause.*) The guarantee of it is in the fact that our Party is led by the great organizer of the glorious victories for communism, the great inspiring genius of the communist upbringing of the masses—our Stalin. (*All rise, applause and cheers. Voice: "Long live Comrade Stalin."*)

Comrades, of the 1,574 voting delegates elected to the Congress, 1,567 have already arrived. Permit me, therefore, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Party, to declare: the Eighteenth Congress is now open.

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# Report on the Work of the Central Committee

March 10, 1939

BY JOSEPH STALIN

*General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*

## I. THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

**C**OMRADES, five years have elapsed since the Seventeenth Party Congress. No small period, as you see. During this period the world has undergone considerable changes. States and countries, and their mutual relations, are now in many respects totally altered.

What changes exactly have taken place in the international situation in this period? In what way exactly have the foreign and internal affairs of our country changed?

For the capitalist countries this period was one of very profound perturbations in both the economic and political spheres. In the economic sphere these were years of depression, followed, from the beginning of the latter half of 1937, by a period of new economic crisis, of a new decline of industry in the United States, Great Britain and France; consequently, these were years of new economic complications. In the political sphere they were years of serious political conflicts and perturbations. A new imperialist war is already in its second year, a war waged over a huge territory stretching from Shanghai to Gibraltar and involving more than five hundred million people. The map of Europe, Africa and Asia is being forcibly redrawn. The entire post-war system, the so-called regime of peace, has been shaken to its foundations.

For the Soviet Union, on the contrary, these were years of growth and prosperity, of further economic and cultural progress, of further development of political and military might, of struggle for the preservation of peace throughout the world.

Such is the general picture.

Let us now examine the concrete data illustrating the changes in the international situation.

### I. NEW ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES. INTENSIFICATION OF THE STRUGGLE FOR MARKETS AND SOURCES OF RAW MATERIAL, AND FOR A NEW REDIVISION OF THE WORLD

The economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist countries in the latter half of 1929 lasted until the end of 1933. After that the crisis passed into a depression, and was then followed by a certain revival, a certain upward trend of industry. But this upward trend of industry did not develop into a boom, as is usually the case in a period of revival. On the contrary, in the latter half of 1937 a new economic crisis began which seized the United States first of all and then England, France and a number of other countries.

The capitalist countries thus found themselves faced with a new economic crisis before they had even recovered from the ravages of the recent one.

This circumstance naturally led to an

increase of unemployment. The number of unemployed in capitalist countries, which had fallen from thirty million in 1933 to fourteen million in 1937, has now again risen to eighteen million as a result of the new economic crisis.

A distinguishing feature of the new crisis is that it differs in many respects from the preceding one, and, moreover, differs for the worse and not for the better.

Firstly, the new crisis did not begin after an industrial boom, as was the case in 1929, but after a depression and a certain revival, which, however, did not develop into a boom. This means that the present crisis will be more severe and more difficult to cope with than the previous crisis.

Further, the present crisis has broken out not in time of peace, but at a time when a second imperialist war has already begun; at a time when Japan, already in the second year of her war with China, is disorganizing the immense Chinese market and is rendering it almost inaccessible to the goods of other countries; when Italy and Germany have already placed their national economy on a war footing, squandering their reserves of raw material and foreign currency for this purpose; and when all the other big capitalist powers are beginning to reorganize themselves on a war footing. This means that capitalism will have far less resources at its disposal for a normal way out of the present crisis than during the preceding crisis.

Lastly, as distinct from the preceding crisis, the present crisis is not a general one, but as yet involves chiefly the economically powerful countries which have not yet placed themselves on a war econ-

omy basis. As regards the aggressive countries, such as Japan, Germany and Italy, which have already reorganized their economy on a war footing, they, because of the intense development of their war industry, are not yet experiencing a crisis of overproduction, although they are approaching it. This means that by the time the economically powerful, non-aggressive countries begin to emerge from the phase of crisis the aggressive countries, having exhausted their reserves of gold and raw material in the course of the war fever, are bound to enter a phase of very severe crisis.

This is clearly illustrated, for example, by the figures for the visible gold reserves of the capitalist countries:

VISIBLE GOLD RESERVES OF THE  
CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

(In millions of former gold dollars)

	<i>End of</i> 1936	<i>Sept.,</i> 1938
<i>Total</i> .....	12,980	14,301
U.S.A. ....	6,649	8,126
Great Britain .....	2,029	2,396
France .....	1,769	1,435
Holland .....	289	595
Belgium .....	373	318
Switzerland .....	387	407
Germany .....	16	17
Italy .....	123	124
Japan .....	273	97

This table shows that the combined gold reserves of Germany, Italy and Japan are less than the reserves of Switzerland alone.

Here are a few figures illustrating the state of crisis of industry in the capitalist countries during the past five years and the trend of industrial progress in the U.S.S.R.:

VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT COMPARED WITH 1929  
(1929 = 100)

	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
U.S.A. ....	66.4	75.6	88.1	92.2	72.0
Great Britain .....	98.8	105.8	115.9	123.7	112.0
France .....	71.0	67.4	79.3	82.8	70.0
Italy .....	80.0	93.8	87.5	99.6	96.0
Germany .....	79.8	94.0	106.3	117.2	125.0
Japan .....	128.7	141.8	151.1	170.8	165.0
U.S.S.R. ....	238.3	293.4	382.3	424.0	477.0

This table shows that the Soviet Union is the only country in the world where crises are unknown and where industry is continuously on the upgrade.

This table also shows that a serious economic crisis has already begun and is developing in the United States, Great Britain and France.

Further, this table shows that in Italy and Japan, which placed their national economy on a war footing earlier than Germany, the downward course of industry already began in 1938.

Lastly, this table shows that in Germany, which reorganized its economy on a war footing later than Italy and Japan, industry is still experiencing a certain upward trend—although a small one, it is true—corresponding to that which took place in Japan and Italy until recently.

There can be no doubt that unless something unforeseen occurs, German industry must enter the same downward path as Japan and Italy have already taken. For what does placing the economy of a country on a war footing mean? It means giving industry a one-sided, war direction; developing to the utmost the production of goods necessary for war and not for consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost the production and, especially, the sale of articles of general consumption—and, consequently, reducing consumption by the population and confronting the country with an economic crisis.

Such is the concrete picture of the trend of the new economic crisis in the capitalist countries.

Naturally, such an unfavorable turn of economic affairs could not but aggravate relations between the powers. The preceding crisis had already mixed the cards and intensified the struggle for markets and sources of raw materials. The seizure of Manchuria and North China by Japan, the seizure of Ethiopia by Italy—all this reflected the acuteness of the struggle among the powers. The new economic crisis must lead, and is actually leading, to a further sharpening of the imperialist struggle. It is no longer a question of competition in the markets, of a com-

mercial war, of dumping. These methods of struggle have long been recognized as inadequate. It is now a question of a new redivision of the world, of spheres of influence and colonies, by military action.

Japan tried to justify her aggressive actions by the argument that she had been cheated when the Nine-Power Pact was concluded and had not been allowed to extend her territory at the expense of China, whereas Britain and France possess enormous colonies. Italy recalled that she had been cheated during the division of the spoils after the first imperialist war and that she must recompense herself at the expense of the spheres of influence of Britain and France. Germany, which had suffered severely as a result of the first imperialist war and the Peace of Versailles, joined forces with Japan and Italy, and demanded an extension of her territory in Europe and the return of the colonies of which the victors in the first imperialist war had deprived her.

Thus the bloc of three aggressor states came to be formed.

A new redivision of the world by means of war became imminent.

## 2. AGGRAVATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SITUATION. COLLAPSE OF THE POST-WAR SYSTEM OF PEACE TREATIES. BEGINNING OF A NEW IMPERIALIST WAR.

Here is a list of the most important events during the period under review, which mark the beginning of the new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacked and seized Ethiopia. In the summer of 1936 Germany and Italy organized military intervention in Spain, Germany entrenching herself in the north of Spain and in Spanish Morocco, and Italy in the south of Spain and in the Balearic Islands. Having seized Manchuria, Japan in 1937 invaded North and Central China, occupied Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai and began to oust her foreign competitors from the occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany seized Austria, and in the autumn of 1938 the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938 Japan seized Canton, and at



the beginning of 1939 the Island of Hainan.

Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly upon the nations, has drawn more than five hundred million people into its orbit and has extended its sphere of action over a vast territory, stretching from Tientsin, Shanghai and Canton, through Ethiopia, to Gibraltar.

After the first imperialist war the victor states, primarily Britain, France and the United States, set up a new regime in the relations between countries, the post-war regime of peace. The main props of this regime were the Nine-Power Pact in the Far East, and the Versailles Treaty and a number of other treaties in Europe. The League of Nations was set up to regulate relations between countries within the framework of this regime, on the basis of a united front of states, of collective defense of the security of states. However, three aggressive states, and the new imperialist war launched by them, have upset the entire system of this post-war peace regime. Japan tore up the Nine-Power Pact, and Germany and Italy the Versailles Treaty. In order to have their hands free, these three states withdrew from the League of Nations.

The new imperialist war became a fact.

It is not so easy in our day to break loose suddenly and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians know this very well. So do the fascist rulers. That is why the fascist rulers decided, before plunging into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, that is, to mislead, to deceive it.

A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the interests of England and France in Europe? Bless us, do you call that a bloc! "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome axis"; that is, just a geometrical equation for an axis. (*Laughter.*)

A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against the interests of the United States, Great Britain and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind! "We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is

an innocuous "Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle"; that is, a slight penchant for geometry. (*General laughter.*)

A war against the interests of England, France, the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war on the Comintern, not on these states. If you don't believe it, read the "anti-Comintern pact" concluded between Italy, Germany and Japan.

That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of framing public opinion, although it was not hard to see how preposterous the whole clumsy game of camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern "hotbeds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the mountains of Ethiopia, or in the wilds of Spanish Morocco. (*Laughter.*)

But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under any guise. For no "axes," "triangles" or "anti-Comintern pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that Italy has seized Ethiopia, that Germany has seized Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and Italy together have seized Spain—and all this in defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive states. The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain aggressors.

It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist war that it has not yet become universal, a world war. The war is being waged by aggressor states, which in every way infringe upon the interests of the non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and the U. S. A., while the latter draw back and retreat, making concession after concession to the aggressors.

Thus we are witnessing an open re-division of the world and spheres of influence at the expense of the non-aggressive states, without the least attempt at resistance, and even with a certain amount of connivance, on the part of the latter.

Incredible, but true.

To what are we to attribute this one-

sided and strange character of the new imperialist war?

How is it that the non-aggressive countries, which possess such vast opportunities, have so easily, and without any resistance, abandoned their position and their obligations to please the aggressors?

Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the non-aggressive states? Of course not! Combined, the non-aggressive, democratic states are unquestionably stronger than the fascist states, both economically and militarily.

To what then are we to attribute the systematic concessions made by these states to the aggressors?

It might be attributed, for example, to the fear that a revolution might break out if the non-aggressive states were to go to war and the war were to assume world-wide proportions. The bourgeois politicians know, of course, that the first imperialist world war led to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest countries. They are afraid that the second imperialist world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution in one or several countries.

But at present this is not the sole or even the chief reason. The chief reason is that the majority of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England and France, have rejected the policy of collective security, the policy of collective resistance to the aggressors, and have taken up a position of non-intervention, a position of "neutrality."

Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with the aggressors and with their victims." But actually speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving at aggression, giving free reign to war, and, consequently, transforming the war into a world war. The policy of non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work, not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet

Union; not to hinder Germany, say, from enmeshing herself in European affairs, from embroiling herself in a war with the Soviet Union; to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this; to allow them to weaken and exhaust one another; and then, when they have become weak enough, to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate conditions to the enfeebled belligerents.

Cheap and easy!

Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that before Japan invaded North China all the influential French and British newspapers shouted about China's weakness and her inability to offer resistance, and declared that Japan with her army could subjugate China in two or three months. Then the European and American politicians began to watch and wait. And then, when Japan started military operations, they let her have Shanghai, the vital center of foreign capital in China; they let her have Canton, a center of British monopoly influence in South China; they let her have Hainan, and they allowed her to surround Hongkong. Does not this look very much like encouraging the aggressor? It is as though they were saying: "Embroider yourself deeper in war; then we shall see."

Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; they let her have the Sudeten region; they abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating all their obligations; and then they began to lie vociferously in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," "the demoralization of the Russian air force," and "riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on to march farther east, promising them easy pickings, and prompting them: "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, and everything will be all right." It must be admitted that this too looks very much like egging on and encouraging the aggressor.

The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and American press over the

Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. The gentlemen of the press there shouted until they were hoarse that the Germans were marching on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, which has a population of more than thirty million, to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible grounds.

It is quite possible, of course, that there are madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find enough straitjackets for them in our country. (*Thunderous applause.*) But if we ignore the madmen and turn to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish seriously to talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? Imagine: The gnat comes to the elephant and says perkily: "Ah, brother, how sorry I am for you. . . Here you are without any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national oppression, without any fascist bosses. Is that a way to live? . . . As I look at you I can't help thinking that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself to me. . . . (*General laughter.*) Well, so be it: I allow you to annex your tiny domain to my vast territories. . . ." (*General laughter and applause.*)

Even more characteristic is the fact that certain European and American politicians and newspaper writers, having lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what is really behind the policy of non-intervention. They are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" them, for instead of marching farther east,

against the Soviet Union, they have turned to the west, you see, and are demanding colonies. One might think that the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing to meet their bills and sending them to Hades.

Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people who recognize no human morality. Politics is politics, as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. It must be remarked, however, that the big and dangerous political game started by the supporters of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious fiasco for them.

Such is the true face of the prevailing policy of non-intervention.

Such is the political situation in the capitalist countries.

### 3. THE SOVIET UNION AND THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

The war has created a new situation with regard to the relations between countries. It has enveloped them in an atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty. By undermining the post-war peace regime and overriding the elementary principles of international law, it has cast doubt on the value of international treaties and obligations. Pacifism and disarmament schemes are dead and buried. Feverish arming has taken their place. Everybody is arming, small states and big states, including primarily those which practise the policy of non-intervention. Nobody believes any longer in the unctuous speeches which claim that the Munich concessions to the aggressors and the Munich agreement opened a new era of "appeasement." They are disbelieved even by the signatories to the Munich agreement, Britain and France, which are increasing their armaments no less than other countries.

Naturally, the U.S.S.R. could not ignore these ominous events. There is no doubt that any war, however small, started by the aggressors in any remote

corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peaceable countries. All the more serious then is the danger arising from the new imperialist war, which has already drawn into its orbit more than five hundred million people in Asia, Africa and Europe. In view of this, while our country is unswervingly pursuing a policy of preserving peace, it is at the same time doing a great deal to increase the preparedness of our Red Army and our Red Navy.

At the same time, in order to strengthen its international position, the Soviet Union decided to take certain other steps. At the end of 1934 our country joined the League of Nations, considering that despite its weakness the League might nevertheless serve as a place where aggressors can be exposed, and as a certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that might hinder the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union considers that in alarming times like these even so weak an international organization as the League of Nations should not be ignored. In May, 1935, a treaty of mutual assistance against possible attacks by aggressors was signed between France and the Soviet Union. A similar treaty was simultaneously concluded with Czechoslovakia. In March, 1936, the Soviet Union concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the Mongolian People's Republic. In August, 1937, the Soviet Union concluded a pact of non-aggression with the Chinese Republic.

It was in such difficult international conditions that the Soviet Union pursued its foreign policy of upholding the cause of peace.

The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear and explicit:

1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of business relations with all countries. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass on the interests of our country.

2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighboring countries which have common frontiers

with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state.

3. We stand for the support of nations which are the victims of aggression and are fighting for the independence of their country.

4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders.

Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon:

1. Its growing economic, political and cultural might;
2. The moral and political unity of our Soviet society;
3. The mutual friendship of the nations of our country;
4. Its Red Army and Red Navy;
5. Its policy of peace;
6. The moral support of the working people of all countries, who are vitally concerned in the preservation of peace;
7. The good sense of the countries which for one reason or another have no interest in the violation of peace.

\* \* \*

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign policy are:

1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening business relations with all countries;

2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for them;

3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and Red Navy to the utmost;

4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship with the working people of all countries, who are interested in peace and friendship among nations.



## II. INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION

LET us now pass to the internal affairs of our country.

From the standpoint of its internal situation, the Soviet Union, during the period under review, presented a picture of further progress of its entire economic life, a rise in culture, and the strengthening of the political might of the country.

In the sphere of economic development, we must regard the most important result during the period under review to be the fact that the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new, modern technique has been completed. There are no more or hardly any more old plants in our country, with their old technique, and hardly any old peasant farms, with their antediluvian equipment. Our industry and agriculture are now based on new, up-to-date technique. It may be said without exaggeration that from the standpoint of the technique of production, from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of industry and agriculture with new machinery, our country is more advanced than any other country, where the old machinery acts as a fetter on production and hampers the introduction of modern technique.

In the sphere of the social and political development of the country, we must regard the most important achievement during the period under review to be the fact that the remnants of the exploiting

classes have been completely eliminated, that the workers, peasants and intellectuals have been welded into one common front of the working people, that the moral and political unity of Soviet society has been strengthened, that the friendship among the nations of our country has become closer, and, as a result, that the political life of our country has been completely democratized and a new Constitution created. No one will dare deny that our Constitution is the most democratic in the world, and that the results of the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., as well as to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, have been the most exemplary.

The result of all this is a completely stable internal situation and a stability of government which any other government in the world might envy.

Let us examine the concrete data illustrating the economic and political situation of our country.

### I. FURTHER PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

*A. Industry.* During the period under review our industry presented a picture of uninterrupted progress. This progress was reflected not only in an increase of output generally, but, and primarily, in the flourishing state of socialist industry, on the one hand, and the doom of private industry, on the other.

Here is a table which illustrates this:

#### INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS IN THE U.S.S.R. IN 1934-38

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	
	<i>In millions of rubles at 1926-27 prices</i>						
Total output . . . . .	42,030	50,477	62,137	80,929	90,166	100,375	
Of which:							
1. Socialist industry	42,002	50,443	62,114	80,898	90,138	100,349	1938 comp with 1933 (per cent)
2. Private industry.	28	34	23	31	28	26	
	<i>Per cent of previous year</i>						
Total output . . . . .		120.1	123.1	130.2	111.4	111.3	238.8
Of which:							
1. Socialist industry.		120.1	123.1	130.2	111.4	111.3	238.9
2. Private industry.		121.4	67.6	134.8	90.3	92.9	92.9
	<i>Per cent</i>						
Total output . . . . .	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	
Of which:							
1. Socialist industry.	99.93	99.93	99.96	99.96	99.97	99.97	
2. Private industry.	0.07	0.07	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	

This table shows that during the period under review the output of our industry more than doubled, and that, moreover, the whole increase in output was accounted for by socialist industry.

Further, this table shows that the only system of industry in the U.S.S.R. is the socialist system.

Lastly, this table shows that the complete ruin of private industry is a fact which even a blind man cannot now deny.

The ruin of private industry must not be regarded as a thing of chance. Private industry perished, first, because the socialist economic system is superior to the capitalist system; and, second, because the socialist economic system made

it possible for us in a few years to re-equip the whole of our socialist industry on new and up-to-date technical lines. This is a possibility which the capitalist economic system does not and cannot offer. It is a fact that, from the standpoint of the technique of production and from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of industry with modern machinery, our industry holds first place in the world.

If we take the rate of growth of our industry, expressed in percentages of the pre-war level, and compare it with the rate of growth of the industry of the principal capitalist countries, we get the following picture:

GROWTH OF INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE PRINCIPAL  
CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IN 1913-38

	1913	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
U.S.S.R. ....	100	380.5	457.0	562.6	732.7	816.4	908.8
U.S.A. ....	100	108.7	112.9	128.6	149.8	156.9	120.0
Great Britain ....	100	87.0	97.1	104.0	114.2	121.9	113.3
Germany ....	100	75.4	90.4	105.9	118.1	129.3	131.6
France ....	100	107.0	99.0	94.0	98.0	101.0	93.2

This table shows that our industry has grown more than ninefold as compared with pre-war, whereas the industry of principal capitalist countries continues to mark time round about the pre-war level, exceeding the latter by only 20 or 30 per cent.

This means that as regards rate of growth our socialist industry holds first place in the world.

Thus we find that as regards technique of production and rate of growth of our industry, we have already overtaken and outstripped the principal capitalist countries.

In what respect are we lagging? We are still lagging economically, that is, as regards the volume of our industrial output per head of population. In 1938 we produced about 15,000,000 tons of pig iron; Great Britain produced 7,000,000 tons. It might seem that we are better off than Great Britain. But if we divide this number of tons by the number of population we shall find that the output of pig iron per head of population in 1938 was 145 kilograms in Great Britain, and only 87 kilograms in the U.S.S.R.

Or, further: In 1938 Great Britain produced 10,800,000 tons of steel and about 29,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity, whereas the U.S.S.R. produced 18,000,000 tons of steel and more than 39,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity. It might seem that we are better off than Great Britain. But if we divide this number of tons and kilowatt-hours by the number of population we shall find that in 1938 in Great Britain the output of steel per head of population was 226 kilograms and of electricity 620 kilowatt-hours, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the output of steel per head of population was only 107 kilograms, and of electricity only 233 kilowatt-hours.

What is the reason for this? The reason is that our population is several times larger than that of Great Britain, and hence our requirements are greater: the Soviet Union has a population of 170,000,000, whereas Great Britain has a population of not more than 46,000,000. The economic power of a country's industry is not expressed by the volume of industrial output in general, irrespective of the size of population, but by the

volume of industrial output taken in direct reference to the amount consumed per head of population. The larger a country's industrial output per head of population, the greater is its economic power; and, conversely, the smaller the output per head of population, the less is the economic power of the country and of its industry. Consequently, the larger a country's population, the greater is the need for articles of consumption, and hence the larger should be the industrial output of the country.

Take, for example, the output of pig iron. In order to outstrip Great Britain economically in respect to the production of pig iron, which in 1938 amounted in that country to 7,000,000 tons, we must increase our annual output of pig iron to 25,000,000 tons. In order economically to outstrip Germany, which in 1938 produced 18,000,000 tons of pig iron in all, we must raise our annual output to 40,000,000 or 45,000,000 tons. And in order to outstrip the U.S.A. economically—not as regards the level of 1938, which was a year of crisis, and in which the U.S.A. produced only 18,800,000 tons of pig iron, but as regards the level of 1929, when the U.S.A. was experiencing an industrial boom and when it produced about 43,000,000 tons of pig iron—we must raise our annual output of pig iron to 50,000,000 or 60,000,000 tons.

The same must be said of the production of steel and rolled steel, of the machine-building industry, and so on, inasmuch as all these branches of industry, like the other branches, depend in the long run on the production of pig iron.

We have outstripped the principal capitalist countries as regards technique of production and rate of industrial development. That is very good, but it is not enough. We must outstrip them economically as well. We can do it, and we must do it. Only if we outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically can we reckon upon our country being fully saturated with consumers' goods, on having an abundance of products, and on being able to make the transition from the first phase of communism to its second phase.

What do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically? First of all, we require the earnest and indomitable desire to move ahead and the readiness to make sacrifices and invest very considerable amounts of capital for the utmost expansion of our socialist industry. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have! Further, we require a high technique of production and a high rate of industrial development. Have we these requisites? We undoubtedly have. Lastly, we require time. Yes, comrades, time. We must build new factories. We must train new cadres [personnel—*Tr.*] for industry. But this requires time, and no little time at that. We cannot outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in two or three years. It will require rather more than that.

Take, for example, pig iron and its production, to which we have already referred. How much time do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically in regard to the production of pig iron? When the Second Five-Year Plan was being drawn up, certain members of the old personnel of the State Planning Commission proposed that the annual output of pig iron towards the end of the period of the Second Five-Year Plan should be fixed in the amount of sixty million tons. That means that they assumed the possibility of an average annual increase in pig iron production of ten million tons. This, of course, was sheer fantasy, if not worse. Incidentally, it was not only in regard to the production of pig iron that these comrades indulged their fantasy. They considered, for example, that during the period of the Second Five-Year Plan the annual increase of population in the U.S.S.R. should amount to three or four million persons, or even more. This was also fantasy, if not worse. But if we ignore these fantastic dreamers and come down to reality, we may consider quite feasible an average annual increase in the output of pig iron of two or two and a half million tons, bearing in mind the present state of the technique of iron smelting. The industrial history of the

principal capitalist countries, as well as of our country, shows that such an annual rate of increase involves a great strain, but is quite feasible.

Hence, we require time, and no little time at that, in order to outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically. And the higher our productivity of labor becomes, and the more our technique of production is perfected, the more rapidly can we accomplish this cardinal economic task, and the more can we reduce the period of its accomplishment.

**B. Agriculture.** Like the development of industry, the development of agriculture during the period under review has followed an upward trend. This upward trend is expressed not only in an increase of agricultural output, but, and primarily, in the growth and consolidation of socialist agriculture on the one hand, and the utter decline of individual peasant farming on the other. Whereas the grain area of the collective farms increased from 75,000,000 hectares in 1933 to 92,-

000,000 in 1938, the grain area of the individual peasant farmers dropped in this period from 15,700,000 hectares to 600,000 hectares,\* or to 0.6 per cent of the total grain area. I will not mention the area under industrial crops, a branch where individual peasant farming has been altogether ousted. Furthermore, it is well known that the collective farms now unite 18,800,000 peasant households, or 93.5 per cent of all the peasant households, aside from the collective fisheries and collective trapping and handicraft industries.

This means that the collective farms have been firmly established and consolidated, and that the socialist system of farming is now our only form of agriculture.

If we compare the areas under all crops during the period under review with the crop areas in the pre-revolutionary period, we observe the following picture of growth:

\* A hectare equals 2.47 acres.

AREAS UNDER ALL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.							
	1913	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 comp. with 1913 (per cent)
	<i>Millions of hectares</i>						
Total crop area . . . . .	105.0	131.5	132.8	133.8	135.3	136.9	130.4
Of which:							
a. Grain . . . . .	94.4	104.7	103.4	102.4	104.4	102.4	108.5
b. Industrial . . . . .	4.5	10.7	10.6	10.8	11.2	11.0	244.4
c. Vegetable . . . . .	3.8	8.8	9.9	9.8	9.0	9.4	247.4
d. Fodder . . . . .	2.1	7.1	8.6	10.6	10.6	14.1	671.4

This table shows that we have an increase in area for all cultures, and above all for fodder, industrial crops and vegetables.

This means that our agriculture is becoming more high-grade and productive, and that a solid foundation is being pro-

vided for the increasing application of proper crop rotation.

The way our collective farms and state farms have been increasingly supplied with tractors, harvester combines and other machines during the period under review is shown by the following tables:

1. TRACTORS EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.							
	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 comp. with 1913 (per cent)
	<i>I. Number of tractors (thousands)</i>						
Total . . . . .	210.9	276.4	360.3	422.7	454.5	483.5	229.3
Of which:							
a. In machine and tractor stations . . . . .	123.2	177.3	254.7	328.5	365.8	394.0	319.8
b. In state farms and auxiliary agricultural undertakings . . . . .	83.2	95.5	102.1	88.5	84.5	85.0	102.2



II. Power (thousand h.p.)

All tractors .....	3,209.2	4,462.8	6,184.0	7,672.4	8,385.0	9,256.2	288.4
Of which:							
a. In machine and tractor stations .....	1,758.1	2,753.9	4,281.6	5,856.0	6,679.2	7,437.0	423.0
b. In state farms and auxiliary agricultural undertakings .....	1,401.7	1,669.5	1,861.4	1,730.7	1,647.5	1,751.8	125.0

2. TOTAL HARVESTER COMBINES AND OTHER MACHINES EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R.

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 comp. with 1913 (Per cent)
	<i>(In thousands; at end of year)</i>						
Harvester combines ...	25.4	32.3	50.3	87.8	128.8	153.5	604.3
Internal combustion and steam engines .....	48.0	60.9	69.1	72.4	77.9	83.8	174.6
Complex and semi-complex grain threshers.	120.3	121.9	120.1	123.7	126.1	130.8	108.7
Motor trucks .....	26.6	40.3	63.7	96.2	144.5	195.8	736.1
Automobiles (units) ..	3,991	5,533	7,555	7,630	8,156	9,594	240.4

If, in addition to these figures, we bear in mind that in the period under review the number of machine and tractor stations increased from 2,900 in 1934 to 6,350 in 1938, it may be safely said that the reconstruction of our agriculture on the basis of a new and up-to-date machine technique has in the main already been completed.

Our agriculture, consequently, is not

only run on the largest and most mechanized scale in the world, and therefore produces the largest surplus for the market, but is also more fully equipped with modern machinery than the agriculture of any other country.

If we compare the harvests of grain and industrial crops during the period under review with the pre-revolutionary period, we get the following picture.

GROSS PRODUCTION OF GRAIN AND INDUSTRIAL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R.

	1913	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1938 comp. with 1913 (Per cent)
	<i>In millions of centners</i>						
Grain .....	801.0	894.0	901.0	827.3	1,202.9	949.9	118.6
Raw cotton .....	7.4	11.8	17.2	23.9	25.8	26.9	363.5
Flax fiber .....	3.3	5.3	5.5	5.8	5.7	5.46	165.5
Sugar beet .....	109.0	113.6	162.1	168.3	218.6	166.8	153.0
Oil seed .....	21.5	36.9	42.7	42.3	51.1	46.6	216.7

From this table it can be seen that despite the drought in the eastern and southeastern districts in 1936 and 1938, and despite the unprecedentedly large harvest in 1913, the gross production of grain and industrial crops during the period under review steadily increased as compared with 1913.

Of particular interest is the question of the amount of grain marketed by the collective and state farms as compared with their gross harvests. Comrade Nemchinov, the well-known statistician, has calculated that of a gross grain harvest

of 5,000,000,000 poods\* in pre-war times, only about 1,300,000,000 poods were marketed. Thus the proportion of marketed produce of grain farming at that time was 26 per cent. Comrade Nemchinov computes that the proportion of marketed produce to gross harvest in the years 1926-27, for example, was about 47 per cent in the case of collective and state farming, which is large-scale farming, and about 12 per cent in the case of individual peasant farming. If we approach the matter more cautiously and assume

\* A pood is equal to 31.113 pounds.



	TRADE						1938 comp. with 1913 (per cent)
	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	
1. State and cooperative retail stores and booths—at end of year . . . . .	285,355	286,236	268,713	289,473	327,361	356,930	125.1
2. State and cooperative retail trade, including public catering (in millions of rubles) . . . . .	49,789.2	61,814.7	81,712.1	106,760.9	125,943.2	138,574.3	278.3
3. Trade in collective farm markets (in millions of rubles) . . . . .	11,500.0	14,000.0	14,500.0	15,607.2	17,799.7	24,399.2	212.2
4. Regional wholesale departments of the People's Commissariats of the Food Industry, Light Industry, Heavy Industry, Timber Industry, and Local Industry of the Union Republics—at end of year . . . . .	718	836	1,141	1,798	1,912	1,994	277.7

It is obvious that trade in the country could not have developed in this way without a certain increase in freight traffic. And indeed during the period under review freight traffic increased in all branches of transport, especially rail and air. There was an increase in water-

borne freight, too, but with considerable fluctuations, and in 1938, it is to be regretted, there was even a drop in waterborne freight as compared with the previous year.

Here is the corresponding table:

	FREIGHT TRAFFIC						1938 comp. with 1913 (per cent)
	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	
Railways (in billions of ton-kilometers). . . . .	169.5	205.7	258.1	323.4	354.8	369.1	217.7
River and marine transport (in billions of ton-kilometers) . . . . .	50.2	56.5	68.3	72.3	70.1	66.0	131.5
Civil air fleet (in millions of ton-kilometers) . . . . .	3.1	6.4	9.8	21.9	24.9	31.7	1,022.6

There can be no doubt that the lag in water transport in 1938 will be remedied in 1939.

## 2. FURTHER RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARD OF THE PEOPLE

The steady progress of industry and agriculture could not but lead, and has actually led, to a new rise in the material and cultural standard of the people.

The abolition of exploitation and the consolidation of the socialist economic system, the absence of unemployment, with its attendant poverty, in town and country, the enormous expansion of industry and the steady growth in the number of workers, the increase in the productivity of labor of the workers and collective farmers, the securing of the land to the collective farms in perpetuity, and the vast number of first-class tractors and agricultural machines supplied to the collective farms—all this has created effective conditions for a further rise in the standard of living of the workers and peasants. In its turn, the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and peasants has naturally led to an improvement in the standard of living of the intelligentsia, who represent a considerable force in our country and serve the interests of the workers and the peasants.

Now it is no longer a question of finding room in industry for unemployed and homeless peasants who have been set adrift from their villages and live in fear of starvation—of giving them jobs out of charity. The time has long gone by when there were such peasants in our country. And this is a good thing, of course, for it testifies to the prosperity of our countryside. If anything, it is now a question of asking the collective farms to comply with our request and to release, say, one and a half million young collective farmers annually for the needs of our expanding industry. The collective farms, which have already become prosperous, should bear in mind that if we do not get this assistance from them it will be very difficult to continue the expansion of our industry, and that if we

do not expand our industry we will not be able to satisfy the peasants' growing demand for consumers' goods. The collective farms are quite able to meet this request of ours, since the abundance of machinery in the collective farms releases a portion of the rural workers, who, if transferred to industry, could be of immense service to our whole national economy.

As a result, we have the following indications of the improvement in the standard of living of the workers and peasants during the period under review:

1. The national income rose from 48,500,000,000 rubles in 1933 to 105,000,000,000 rubles in 1938;

2. The number of workers and other employees rose from a little over 22,000,000 in 1933 to 28,000,000 in 1938;

3. The total annual payroll of workers and other employees rose from 34,953,000,000 rubles to 96,425,000,000 rubles;

4. The average annual wages of industrial workers, which amounted to 1,513 rubles in 1933, rose to 3,447 rubles in 1938;

5. The total monetary incomes of the collective farms rose from 5,661,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 14,180,100,000 rubles in 1937;

6. The average amount of grain received per collective farm household in the grain-growing regions rose from 61 poods in 1933 to 144 poods in 1937, exclusive of seed, emergency seed stocks, fodder for the collectively-owned cattle, grain deliveries, and payments in kind for work performed by the machine and tractor stations;

7. State budget appropriations for social and cultural services rose from 5,839,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 35,202,500,000 rubles in 1938.

As regards the cultural standard of the people, its rise was commensurate with the rise in the standard of living.

From the standpoint of the cultural development of the people, the period under review has been marked by a veritable cultural revolution. The introduction of universal compulsory elementary education in the languages of the various nations of the U.S.S.R., an increasing number of schools and students of all

grades, an increasing number of college-trained experts, and the creation and growth of a new intelligentsia, a Soviet

intelligentsia—such is the general picture of the cultural advancement of our people. Here are the figures:

## 1. RISE IN THE CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE

	Unit of measurement	1933-34	1938-39	1938-39 compared with 1933-34 (per cent)
Number of pupils and students of all grades .....	thousands	23,814	33,965.4	142.6
Of which:				
Elementary .....	"	17,873.5	21,288.4	119.1
Secondary (general and special)....	"	5,482.2	12,076.0	220.3
Higher .....	"	458.3	601.0	131.1
Number of persons engaged in all forms of study in the U.S.S.R....	"	—	47,442.1	—
Number of public libraries.....	"	40.3	70.0	173.7
Number of books in public libraries..	millions	86.0	126.6	147.2
Number of clubs .....	thousands	61.1	95.6	156.5
Number of theatres .....	units	587	790	134.6
Number of cinema installations (excluding narrow-film) .....	"	27,467	30,461	110.9
Of which:				
With sound equipment .....	"	498	15,202	31 times
Number of cinema installations (excluding narrow-film) in rural areas	"	17,470	18,991	108.7
Of which:				
With sound equipment .....	"	24	6,670	278 times
Annual newspaper circulation .....	millions	4,984.6	7,092.4	142.3

## 2. NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BUILT IN THE U.S.S.R. IN 1933-38

	In towns and hamlets	In rural localities	Total
1933 .....	326	3,261	3,587
1934 .....	577	3,488	4,065
1935 .....	533	2,829	3,362
1936 .....	1,505	4,206	5,711
1937 .....	730	1,323	2,053
1938 .....	583	1,246	1,829
Total (1933-38) .....	4,254	16,353	20,607

## 3. YOUNG SPECIALISTS GRADUATED FROM HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN 1933-38

	1933	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Total for U.S.S.R. (exclusive of military specialists) .....	34.6	49.2	83.7	97.6	104.8	106.7
1. Engineers for industry and building .....	6.1	14.9	29.6	29.2	27.6	25.2
2. Engineers for transport and communications .....	1.8	4.0	7.6	6.6	7.0	6.1
3. Agricultural engineers, agronomists, veterinarians and zootechnicians .....	4.8	6.3	8.8	10.4	11.3	10.6
4. Economists and jurists .....	2.5	2.5	5.0	6.4	5.0	5.7
5. Teachers of secondary schools, workers' faculties, technical schools, and other educational workers, including art workers	10.5	7.9	12.5	21.6	31.7	35.7
6. Physicians, pharmacists, and physical culture instructors...	4.6	2.5	7.5	9.2	12.3	13.6
7. Other specialists .....	4.3	11.1	12.7	14.2	9.9	9.8

As a result of this immense cultural work a numerous new, Soviet intelligentsia has arisen in our country, an intelligentsia which has emerged from the ranks of the working class, peasantry and Soviet employees, which is of the flesh and blood of our people, which has never known the yoke of exploitation, which hates exploiters, and which is ready to serve the peoples of the U.S.S.R. faithfully and devotedly.

I think that the rise of this new, socialist intelligentsia of the people is one of the most important results of the cultural revolution in our country.

### 3. FURTHER CONSOLIDATION OF THE SOVIET SYSTEM

One of the most important results of the period under review is that it has led to the further internal consolidation of the country, to the further consolidation of the Soviet system.

Nor could it be otherwise. The firm establishment of the socialist system in all branches of national economy, the progress of industry and agriculture, the rising material standard of the people, the rising cultural standard of the people and their increasing political activity—all this, accomplished under the guidance of the Soviet power, could not but lead to the further consolidation of the Soviet system.

The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today from any capitalist society is that it no longer contains antagonistic, hostile classes; that the exploiting classes have been eliminated, while the workers, peasants and intellectuals, who make up Soviet society, live and work in friendly collaboration. While capitalist society is torn by irreconcilable contradictions between workers and capitalists and between peasants and landlords—resulting in its internal instability—Soviet society, liberated from the yoke of exploitation, knows no such contradictions, is free of class conflicts, and presents a picture of friendly collaboration between workers, peasants and intellectuals. It is this community of interest which has formed the basis for the development of

such motive forces as the moral and political unity of Soviet society, the mutual friendship of the nations of the U.S.S.R., and Soviet patriotism. It has also been the basis for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. adopted in November, 1936, and for the complete democratization of the elections to the supreme organs of the country.

As to the elections themselves, they were a magnificent demonstration of that unity of Soviet society and of that amity among the nations of the U.S.S.R. which constitute the characteristic feature of the internal situation of our country. As we know, in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. in December, 1937, nearly ninety million votes, or 98.6 per cent of the total vote, were cast for the Communist and non-Party bloc, while in the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics in June, 1938, ninety-two million votes, or 99.4 per cent of the total vote, were cast for the Communist and non-Party bloc.

There you have the basis of the stability of the Soviet system and the source of the inexhaustible strength of the Soviet power.

This means, incidentally, that in case of war, the rear and front of our army, by reason of their homogeneity and inherent unity, will be stronger than those of any other country, a fact which people beyond our borders who love military conflicts would do well to remember.

Certain foreign newspaper writers have been talking drivel to the effect that the purging of the Soviet organizations of spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Rosengoltz, Bukharin and other fiends has "shaken" the Soviet system and caused its "demoralization." One can only laugh at such cheap drivel. How can the purging of Soviet organizations of noxious and hostile elements shake and demoralize the Soviet system? This Trotsky-Bukharin bunch of spies, murderers and wreckers, who kowtowed to the foreign world, who were possessed by a slavish instinct to grovel before every foreign bigwig, and who were ready to enter his employ as spies—this

handful of people who did not understand that the humblest Soviet citizen, being free from the fetters of capital, stands head and shoulders above any high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears the yoke of capitalist slavery—who needs this miserable band of venal slaves, of what value can they be to the people, and whom can they “demoralize”? In 1937 Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were held. In these elections, 98.6 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. At the beginning of 1938 Rosengoltz, Rykov, Bukharin and other fiends were sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics were held. In these elections 99.4 per cent of the total vote was cast for the Soviet power. Where are the symptoms of “demoralization,” we would like to know, and why was this “demoralization” not reflected in the results of the elections?

To listen to these foreign drivellers one would think that if the spies, murderers and wreckers had been left at liberty to wreck, murder and spy without let or hindrance, the Soviet organizations would have been far sounder and stronger. (*Laughter.*) Are not these gentlemen giving themselves away too soon by so insolently defending the cause of spies, murderers and wreckers?

Would it not be truer to say that the weeding out of spies, murderers and wreckers from our Soviet organizations was bound to lead, and did lead, to the further strengthening of these organizations?

What, for instance, do the events at Lake Khasan show, if not that the weeding out of spies and wreckers is the surest means of strengthening our Soviet organizations?

\* \* \*

The tasks of the Party in the sphere of internal policy are:

1. To increase the progress of our industry, the rise of productivity of labor,

and the perfection of the technique of production, in order, having already outstripped the principal capitalist countries in technique of production and rates of industrial development, to outstrip them economically as well in the next ten or fifteen years.

2. To increase the progress of our agriculture and stock breeding so as to achieve in the next three or four years an annual grain harvest of eight billion poods, with an average yield of 12 to 13 centners per hectare; an average increase in the harvest of industrial crops of 30-35 per cent; and an increase in the number of sheep and hogs by 100 per cent, of cattle by about 40 per cent, and of horses by about 35 per cent.

3. To continue to improve the material and cultural standards of the workers, peasants and intellectuals.

4. Steadfastly to carry into effect our Socialist Constitution; to complete the democratization of the political life of the country; to strengthen the moral and political unity of Soviet society and fraternal collaboration among our workers, peasants and intellectuals; to promote the friendship of the people of the U.S.S.R. to the utmost, and to develop and cultivate Soviet patriotism.

5. Never to forget that we are surrounded by a capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage services will smuggle spies, murderers and wreckers into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen our socialist intelligence service and systematically help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the people.

### III. FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION (BOLSHEVIKS)

**F**ROM the standpoint of the political line and day-to-day practical work, the period under review was one of complete victory for the general line of our Party. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

The principal achievements demonstrating the correctness of the policy of our Party and the correctness of its leadership are the firm establishment of the socialist system in the entire national economy, the completion of the reconstruction of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new technique, the fulfill-

ment of the Second Five-Year Plan in industry ahead of time, the increase of the annual grain harvest to a level of seven billion poods, the abolition of poverty and unemployment, and the raising of the material and cultural standard of the people.

In the face of these imposing achievements, the opponents of the general line of our Party, all the various "Left" and "Right" trends, all the Trotsky-Pyatakov and Bukharin-Rykov degenerates were forced to creep into their shells, to tuck away their hackneyed "platforms," and to retreat into hiding. Lacking the manhood to submit to the will of the people, they preferred to merge with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and fascists, to become the tools of foreign espionage services, to hire themselves out as spies, and to obligate themselves to help the enemies of the Soviet Union to dismember our country and to restore capitalist slavery in it.

Such was the inglorious end of the opponents of the line of our Party, who finished up as enemies of the people.

When it had smashed the enemies of the people and purged the Party and Soviet organizations of degenerates, the Party became still more united in its political and organizational work and rallied even more solidly around its Central Committee. (*Stormy applause. All the delegates rise and cheer the speaker. Shouts of "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for the Central Committee of our Party!"*)

Let us examine the concrete facts illustrating the development of the internal life of the Party and its organizational and propaganda work during the period under review.

#### 1. MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COMPOSITION OF THE PARTY. DIVISION OF ORGANIZATIONS. CLOSER CONTACT BETWEEN THE LEADING PARTY BODIES AND THE WORK OF THE LOWER BODIES

The strengthening of the Party and of its leading bodies during the period under review proceeded chiefly along two lines: along the line of regulating

the composition of the Party, ejecting unreliable elements and selecting the best elements, and along the line of dividing up the organizations, reducing their size, and bringing the leading bodies closer to the concrete, day-to-day work of the lower bodies.

There were 1,874,488 Party members represented at the Seventeenth Party Congress. Comparing this figure with the number of Party members represented at the preceding congress, the Sixteenth Party Congress, we find that in the interval between these two congresses 600,000 new members joined the Party. The Party could not but feel that in the conditions prevailing in 1930-33 such a mass influx into its ranks was an unhealthy and undesirable expansion of its membership. The Party knew that its ranks were being joined not only by honest and loyal people, but also by chance elements and careerists, who were seeking to utilize the badge of the Party for their own personal ends.

The Party could not but know that its strength lay not only in the size of its membership, but, and above all, in the quality of its members. This raised the question of regulating the composition of the Party. It was decided to continue the purge of Party members and candidate members begun in 1933; and the purge actually was continued until May, 1935. It was further decided to suspend the admission of new members into the Party; and the admission of new members actually was suspended until September, 1936, the admission of new members being resumed only on November 1, 1936. Further, in connection with the dastardly murder of Comrade Kirov, which showed that there were quite a number of suspicious elements in the Party, it was decided to undertake a verification of the records of Party members and an exchange of old Party cards for new ones, both these measures being completed only in September, 1936. Only after this was the admission of new members and candidate members into the Party resumed.

As a result of all these measures, the Party succeeded in weeding out chance,



passive, careerist and directly hostile elements, and in selecting the most staunch and loyal elements. It cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more mistakes than might have been expected. Undoubtedly, we shall have no further need of resorting to the method of mass purges. Nevertheless, the purge of 1933-36 was unavoidable and its results, on the whole, were beneficial. The number of Party members represented at this, the Eighteenth, Congress is about 1,600,000, which is 270,000 less than were represented at the Seventeenth Congress. But there is nothing bad in that. On the contrary, it is all to the good, for the Party strengthens itself by clearing its ranks of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in membership, but on the other hand it is better in quality.

That is a big achievement.

As regards the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the Party by bringing it closer to the work of the lower bodies and by making it more concrete, the Party came to the conclusion that the best way to make it easier for the Party bodies to guide the organizations and to make the leadership itself concrete, alive and practical was to divide up the organizations, to reduce their size. This measure was adopted with regard both to the People's Commissariats and the administrative organizations of the various territorial divisions, that is, the Union Republics, territories, regions, districts, etc. The result of the measures adopted is that instead of seven Union Republics, we now have eleven; instead of fourteen People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. we now have thirty-four; instead of seventy territories and regions we now have 110; instead of 2,559 urban and rural districts we now have 3,815. Correspondingly, within the system of leading bodies, we now have eleven central committees, headed by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), six territorial committees, 104 regional committees, thirty area committees, 212 city commit-

tees, 336 city district committees, 3,479 rural district committees and 113,060 primary Party organizations.

It cannot be said that the division of organizations is already over. Most likely it will be carried further. But, however that may be, it is already yielding good results both in the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the work and in bringing the leadership itself closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies. I need not mention that the division of organizations has made it possible to promote hundreds and thousands of new people to leading posts.

That, too, is a big achievement.

## 2. SELECTION, PROMOTION AND ALLOCATION OF CADRES

The regulation of the composition of the Party and the bringing of the leading bodies closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies were not, and could not be, the only means of further strengthening the Party and its leadership. Another means adopted in the period under review was a radical improvement in the training of cadres, an improvement in the work of selecting, promoting and allocating cadres and of testing them in the process of work.

The Party cadres constitute the commanding staff of the Party; and since our Party is in power, they also constitute the commanding staff of the leading organs of state. After a correct political line has been worked out and tested in practice, the Party cadres become the decisive force in the work of guiding the Party and the state. A correct political line is, of course, the primary and most important thing. But that in itself is not enough. A correct political line is not needed as a declaration, but as something to be carried into effect. But in order to carry a correct political line into effect, we must have cadres, people who understand the political line of the Party, who accept it as their own line, who are prepared to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into practice and are capable of answering for it, defending it and fighting for it. Failing

this, a correct political line runs the risk of being purely nominal.

And here arises the question of the correct selection of cadres, the training of cadres, the promotion of new people, the correct allocation of cadres, and the testing of cadres by work accomplished.

What is meant by the correct selection of cadres?

The correct selection of cadres does not mean just gathering around one a lot of assistants and subs, setting up an office and issuing order after order. (*Laughter.*) Nor does it mean abusing one's powers, switching scores and hundreds of people back and forth from one job to another without rhyme or reason and conducting endless "reorganizations." (*Laughter.*)

The proper selection of cadres means:

First, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the Party and the state, treasuring them, respecting them.

Second, knowing cadres, carefully studying their individual merits, and shortcomings, knowing in what post the capacities of a given worker are most likely to develop.

Third, carefully fostering cadres, helping every promising worker to advance, not grudging time on patiently "bothering" with such workers and accelerating their development.

Fourth, boldly promoting new and young cadres in time, so as not to allow them to stagnate in their old posts and grow stale.

Fifth, allocating workers to posts in such a way that each feels he is in the right place, that each may contribute to our common cause the maximum his personal capacities enable him to contribute, and that the general trend of the work of allocating cadres may fully answer to the demands of the political line for the carrying out of which this allocation of cadres is designed.

Particularly important in this respect is the bold and timely promotion of new and young cadres. It seems to me that our people are not quite clear on this point yet. Some think that in selecting people we must chiefly rely on the old

cadres. Others, on the contrary, think that we must chiefly rely on young cadres. It seems to me that both are mistaken. The old cadres, of course, represent a valuable asset to the Party and the state. They possess what the young cadres lack, namely, tremendous experience in leadership, a schooling in Marxist-Leninist principles, knowledge of affairs, and a capacity for orientation. But, in the first place, there are never enough old cadres, there are far less than required, and they are already partly going out of commission owing to the operation of the laws of nature. Secondly, part of the old cadres are sometimes inclined to keep a too persistent eye on the past, to cling to the past, to stay in the old rut and fail to observe the new in life. This is called losing the sense of the new. It is a very serious and dangerous shortcoming.

As to the young cadres, they, of course, have not the experience, the schooling, the knowledge of affairs and the capacity of orientation of the old cadres. But, in the first place, the young cadres constitute the vast majority, secondly, they are young, and as yet are not subject to the danger of going out of commission; thirdly, they possess in abundance the sense of the new, which is a valuable quality in every Bolshevik worker; and, fourthly, they develop and acquire knowledge so rapidly, they press upward so eagerly, that the time is not far off when they will overtake the old fellows, take their stand side by side with them, and become a worthy replacement for them. Consequently, the thing is not whether to rely on the old cadres or on the new cadres, but to steer for a combination, a union of the old and the young cadres in one common symphony of leadership of the Party and the state. (*Prolonged applause.*)

That is why we must boldly and in good time promote young cadres to leading posts.

One of the important achievements of the Party during the period under review in the manner of strengthening the Party leadership is that, when select-

ing cadres, it has successfully pursued, from top to bottom, just this course of combining old and young workers.

Data in the possession of the Central Committee of the Party show that during the period under review the Party succeeded in promoting to leading state and Party posts more than five hundred thousand young Bolsheviks, members of the Party and people standing close to the Party, more than 20 per cent of whom were women.

What is our task now?

Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres, from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level.

This entails putting an end to the division of the work of studying, promoting and selecting cadres among various departments and sectors, and concentrating it in one body.

This body should be the Cadres Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and a corresponding cadres department in each of the republic, territorial and regional Party organizations.

### 3. PARTY PROPAGANDA, MARXIST-LENINIST TRAINING OF PARTY MEMBERS AND PARTY CADRES

There is still another sphere of Party work, a very important and very responsible sphere, in which the work of strengthening the Party and its leading bodies has been carried on during the period under review. I am referring to Party propaganda and agitation, oral and printed, the work of training the Party members and the Party cadres in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, the work of raising the political and theoretical level of the Party and its workers.

There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance of Party propaganda, of the Marxist-Leninist training of our people. I am referring not only to Party functionaries. I am also referring to the workers in the Young Communist League, trade union, trade, cooperative, economic, state, educational,

military and other organizations. The work of regulating the composition of the Party and of bringing the leading bodies closer to the activities of the lower bodies may be organized satisfactorily; the work of promoting, selecting and allocating cadres may be organized satisfactorily; but, with all this, if our Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, if the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres flags, and the cadres themselves cease on account of this to show interest in the prospect of our further progress, cease to understand the truth of our cause and are transformed into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above—then our entire state and Party work must inevitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of state or Party work, the better and more fruitful will be the work itself, and the more effective the results of the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level of the workers, and the less they are imbued with the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry plodders, of their degenerating altogether.

It may be confidently stated that if we succeeded in training the cadres in all branches of our work ideologically, and in schooling them politically, to such an extent as to enable them easily to orientate themselves in the internal and international situation; if we succeeded in making them quite mature Marxists-Leninists capable of solving the problems involved in the guidance of the country without serious error, we would have every reason to consider nine-tenths of our problems already settled. And we certainly can accomplish this, for we have all the means and opportunities for doing so.

The training and molding of our young

cadres usually proceed in some particular branch of science or technology, along the line of specialization. This is necessary and desirable. There is no reason why a man who specializes in medicine should at the same time specialize in physics or botany, or vice versa. But there is one branch of science which Bolsheviks in all branches of science are in duty bound to know, and that is the Marxist-Leninist science of society, of the laws of social development, of the laws of development of the proletarian revolution, of the laws of development of socialist construction, and of the victory of communism. For a man who calls himself a Leninist cannot be considered a real Leninist if he shuts himself up in his specialty, in mathematics, botany or chemistry, let us say, and sees nothing beyond that specialty. A Leninist cannot be just a specialist in his favorite science; he must also be a political and social worker, keenly interested in the destinies of his country, acquainted with the laws of social development, capable of applying these laws, and striving to be an active participant in the political guidance of the country. This, of course, will be an additional burden on specialists who are Bolsheviks. But it will be a burden more than compensated for by its results.

The task of Party propaganda, the task of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres, is to help our cadres in all branches of work to become versed in the Marxist-Leninist science of the laws of social development.

Measures for improving the work of propaganda and of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres have been discussed many times by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) jointly with propagandists from various regional Party organizations. The publication in September, 1938, of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)—Short Course* was taken into account in this connection. It was ascertained that the publication of the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* had given a new impetus to Marxist-Leninist propaganda

in our country. The results of the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) have been published in its decision, "On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Publication of the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)—Short Course.*"

On the basis of this decision and with due reference to the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of March, 1937, "On Defects in Party Work," the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has outlined the following major measures for eliminating the defects in Party propaganda and improving the work of Marxist-Leninist training of Party members and Party cadres:

1. To concentrate the work of Party propaganda and agitation in one body and to merge the propaganda and agitation departments and the press departments into a single Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and to organize corresponding propaganda and agitation departments in each republic, territorial and regional Party organization;
2. Recognizing as incorrect the infatuation for the system of propaganda through study circles, and considering the method of individual study of the principles of Marxism-Leninism by Party members to be more expedient, to center the attention of the Party on propaganda through the press and on the organization of a system of propaganda by lectures;
3. To organize one-year Courses of Instruction for our lower cadres in each regional center;
4. To organize two-year Lenin Schools for our middle cadres in various centers of the country;
5. To organize a Higher School of Marxism-Leninism under the auspices of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) with a three-year course for the training of highly qualified Party theoreticians;
6. To set up one-year Courses of Instruction for propagandists and journalists in various parts of the country;
7. To set up in connection with the Higher School of Marxism-Leninism six-month Courses of Instruction for teach-

ers of Marxism-Leninism in the higher educational establishments.

There can be no doubt that the realization of these measures, which are already being carried out, although not yet sufficiently, will soon yield beneficial results.

#### 4. SOME QUESTIONS OF THEORY

Another of the defects of our propagandist and ideological work is the absence of full clarity among our comrades on certain theoretical questions of vital practical importance, the existence of a certain amount of confusion on these questions. I refer to the question of the state in general, and of our socialist state in particular, and to the question of our Soviet intelligentsia.

It is sometimes asked: "We have abolished the exploiting classes; there are no longer any hostile classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for the state; it must die away. Why then do we not help our socialist state to die away? Why do we not strive to put an end to it? Is it not time to throw out all this rubbish of a state?"

Or further: "The exploiting classes have already been abolished in our country; socialism has been built in the main; we are advancing towards communism. Now, the Marxist doctrine of the state says that there is to be no state under communism. Why then do we not help our socialist state to die away? Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum of antiquities?"

These questions show that those who ask them have conscientiously memorized certain propositions contained in the doctrine of Marx and Engels about the state. But they also show that these comrades have failed to understand the essential meaning of this doctrine; that they have failed to realize in what historical conditions the various propositions of this doctrine were elaborated; and, what is more, that they do not understand present-day international conditions, have overlooked the capitalist encirclement and the dangers it entails for the socialist

country. These questions not only betray an underestimation of the capitalist encirclement, but also an underestimation of the role and significance of the bourgeois states and their organs, which send spies, assassins and wreckers into our country and are waiting for a favorable opportunity to attack it by armed force.

They likewise betray an underestimation of the role and significance of our socialist state and of its military, punitive and intelligence organs, which are essential for the defense of the socialist land from foreign attack. It must be confessed that the comrades mentioned are not the only ones to sin in this underestimation. All the Bolsheviks, all of us without exception, sin to a certain extent in this respect. Is it not surprising that we learned about the espionage and conspiratorial activities of the Trotskyite and Bukharinite leaders only quite recently, in 1937 and 1938, although, as the evidence shows, these gentry were in the service of foreign espionage organizations and carried on conspiratorial activities from the very first days of the October Revolution? How could we have failed to notice so grave a matter? How are we to explain this blunder? The usual answer to this question is that we could not possibly have assumed that these people could have fallen so low. But that is no explanation, still less is it a justification; for the blunder was a blunder.

How is this blunder to be explained? It is to be explained by an underestimation of the strength and consequence of the mechanism of the bourgeois states surrounding us and of their espionage organs, which endeavor to take advantage of people's weaknesses, their vanity, their slackness of will, to enmesh them in their espionage nets and use them to surround the organs of the Soviet state. It is to be explained by an underestimation of the role and significance of the mechanism of our socialist state and of its intelligence service, by an underestimation of this intelligence service, by the twaddle that an intelligence service in a Soviet state is an unimportant trifle, and that the Soviet intelligence service and

the Soviet state itself will soon have to be relegated to the museum of antiquities.

What could have given rise to this underestimation?

It arose owing to the fact that certain of the general propositions in the Marxist doctrine of the state were incompletely worked out and inadequate. It received currency owing to our unparadoxically heedless attitude to matters pertaining to the theory of the state, in spite of the fact that we have twenty years of practical experience in matters of state which provide rich material for theoretical generalizations, and in spite of the fact that, given the desire, we have every opportunity of successfully filling this gap in theory. We have forgotten Lenin's highly important injunction about the theoretical duties of Russian Marxists, that it is their mission to further develop the Marxist theory. This is what Lenin said in this connection:

"We do not regard Marxist theory as something completed and inviolable; on the contrary, we are convinced that it has only laid the cornerstone of the science which Socialists *must* further advance in all directions if they wish to keep pace with life. We think that an *independent* elaboration of the Marxist theory is especially essential for Russian Socialists, for this theory provides only general *guiding* principles, which, *in particular*, are applied in England differently from France, in France differently from Germany, and in Germany differently from Russia."\*

Consider, for example, the classical formulation of the theory of the development of the socialist state given by Engels:

"As soon as there is no longer any class of society to be held in subjection; as soon as, along with class domination and the struggle for individual existence based on the former anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses arising from these have also been abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed which would make a special repressive force, a state, necessary. The first act

in which the state really comes forward as the representative of society as a whole—the taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is at the same time its last independent act as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then ceases of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of things and the direction of the process of production. The state is not 'abolished,' *it withers away.*"\*

Is this proposition of Engels' correct?

Yes, it is correct, but only on one of two conditions: (1) *if* we study the socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of the country, abstracting ourselves in advance from the international factor, isolating, for the convenience of investigation, the country and the state from the international situation; or (2) *if* we assume that socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no more danger in foreign attack, and that there is no more need to strengthen the army and the state.

Well, but what if socialism has been victorious only in one country, and if, in view of this, it is quite impossible to abstract oneself from international conditions—what then? Engels' formula does not furnish an answer to this question. As a matter of fact, Engels did not set himself this question, and therefore could not have given an answer to it. Engels proceeds from the assumption that socialism has already been victorious in all countries, or in a majority of countries, more or less simultaneously. Consequently, Engels is not here investigating any specific socialist state of any particular country, but the development of the socialist state in general, on the assumption that socialism has been victorious in a majority of countries—ac-

\* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. II, p. 492, Russian ed.

\* Frederick Engels, *Herr Eugen Duehring's Revolution in Science [Anti-Duehring]*, pp. 308-9. International Publishers, New York.

ording to the formula: "Assuming that socialism is victorious in a majority of countries, what changes must the proletarian, socialist state undergo?" Only this general and abstract character of the problem can explain why in his investigation of the question of the socialist state Engels completely abstracted himself from such a factor as international conditions, the international situation.

But it follows from this that Engels' general formula about the destiny of the socialist state in general cannot be extended to the partial and specific case of the victory of socialism in one country only, a country which is surrounded by a capitalist world, is subject to the menace of foreign military attack, cannot therefore abstract itself from the international situation, and must have at its disposal a well-trained army, well-organized punitive organs, and a strong intelligence service—consequently, must have its own state, strong enough to defend the conquests of socialism from foreign attack.

We have no right to expect of the classical Marxist writers, separated as they were from our day by a period of forty-five or fifty-five years, that they should have foreseen each and every zig-zag of history in the distant future in every separate country. It would be ridiculous to expect that the classical Marxist writers should have elaborated for our benefit ready-made solutions for each and every theoretical problem that might arise in any particular country fifty or one hundred years afterwards, so that we, the descendants of the classical Marxist writers, might calmly doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions. (*General laughter.*) But we can and should expect of the Marxists-Leninists of our day that they do not confine themselves to learning by rote a few general tenets of Marxism; that they delve deeply into the essence of Marxism; that they learn to take account of the experience gained in the twenty years of existence of the socialist state in our country; that, lastly, they learn, with the use of this experience and with knowledge of the essence of Marxism, to apply the various

general theses of Marxism concretely, to lend them greater precision and improve them. Lenin wrote his famous book *State and Revolution* in August, 1917, that is, a few months before the October Revolution and the establishment of the Soviet state. Lenin considered it the main task of this book to defend Marx's and Engels' doctrine of the state from the distortions and vulgarizations of the opportunists. Lenin was preparing to write a second volume of *State and Revolution*, in which he intended to sum up the principal lessons of the experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917. There can be no doubt that Lenin intended in the second volume of his book to elaborate and develop the theory of the state on the basis of the experience gained during the existence of Soviet power in our country. Death, however, prevented him from carrying this task into execution. But what Lenin did not manage to do should be done by his disciples. (*Loud applause.*)

The state arose because society split up into antagonistic classes; it arose in order to keep in restraint the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The instruments of state authority have been mainly concentrated in the army, the punitive organs, the espionage service, the prisons. Two basic functions characterize the activity of the state: at home (the main function), to keep in restraint the exploited majority; abroad (not the main function), to extend the territory of its class, the ruling class, at the expense of the territory of other states, or to defend the territory of its own state from attack by other states. Such was the case in slave society and under feudalism. Such is the case under capitalism.

In order to overthrow capitalism it was not only necessary to remove the bourgeoisie from power, it was not only necessary to expropriate the capitalists, but also to smash entirely the bourgeois state machine and its old army, its bureaucratic officialdom and its police force, and to substitute for it a new, proletarian form of state, a new, socialist state. And that, as we know, is exactly what the Bolsheviks did. But it does not follow

that the new proletarian state may not preserve certain functions of the old state, changed to suit the requirements of the proletarian state. Still less does it follow that the forms of our socialist state must remain unchanged, that all the original functions of our state must be fully preserved in future. As a matter of fact, the forms of our state are changing and will continue to change in line with the development of our country and with the changes in the international situation.

Lenin was absolutely right when he said:

"The forms of the bourgeois state are extremely varied, but in essence they are all the same; in one way or another, in the last analysis, all these states are inevitably the *dictatorship of the bourgeoisie*. The transition from capitalism to communism will certainly create a great variety and abundance of political forms, but in essence there will inevitably be only one: *the dictatorship of the proletariat*."<sup>\*</sup>

Since the October Revolution, our socialist state has passed through two main phases in its development.

The first phase was the period from the October Revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes. The principal task in that period was to suppress the resistance of the overthrown classes, to organize the defense of the country against the attack of the interventionists, to restore industry and agriculture, and to prepare the conditions for the elimination of the capitalist elements. Accordingly, in this period our state performed two main functions. The first function was to suppress the overthrown classes inside the country. In this respect our state bore a superficial resemblance to previous states whose functions had also been to suppress recalcitrants, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state suppressed the exploiting minority in the interests of the laboring majority, while previous states had sup-

pressed the exploited majority in the interests of the exploiting minority. The second function was to defend the country from foreign attack. In this respect it likewise bore a superficial resemblance to previous states, which also undertook the armed defense of their countries, with the fundamental difference, however, that our state defended from foreign attack the gains of the laboring majority, while previous states in such cases defended the wealth and privileges of the exploiting minority. Our state had yet a third function: this was the work of economic organization and cultural education performed by our state bodies with the purpose of developing the infant shoots of the new, socialist economic system and re-educating the people in the spirit of socialism. But this new function did not attain to any considerable development in that period.

The second phase was the period from the elimination of the capitalist elements in town and country to the complete victory of the socialist economic system and the adoption of the new Constitution. The principal task in this period was to establish the socialist economic system all over the country and to eliminate the last remnants of the capitalist elements, to bring about a cultural revolution, and to form a thoroughly modern army for the defense of the country. And the functions of our socialist state changed accordingly. The function of military suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for exploitation had been abolished, there were no more exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress. In place of this function of suppression the state acquired the function of protecting socialist property from thieves and pilferers of the people's property. The function of defending the country from foreign attack fully remained; consequently, the Red Army and the Navy also fully remained, as did the punitive organs and the intelligence service, which are indispensable for the detection and punishment of the spies, assassins and wreckers sent into our country by foreign espionage services. The function of economic organization and cultural educa-

<sup>\*</sup> V. I. Lenin, "State and Revolution," *Selected Works*, Vol. VII, International Publishers, New York.



tion by the state organs also remained, and was developed to the full. Now the main task of our state inside the country is the work of peaceful economic organization and cultural education. As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence service, their edge is no longer turned to the inside of the country but to the outside, against external enemies.

As you see, we now have an entirely new, socialist state, without precedent in history and differing considerably in form and functions from the socialist state of the first phase.

But development cannot stop there. We are going ahead, towards communism. Will our state remain in the period of communism also?

Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disappeared. Naturally, of course, the forms of our state will again change in conformity with the change in the situation at home and abroad.

No, it will not remain and will atrophy if the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a socialist encirclement takes its place.

That is how the question stands with regard to the socialist state.

The second question is that of the Soviet intelligentsia.

On this question, too, as on the question of the state, there is a certain unclearness and confusion among Party members.

In spite of the fact that the position of the Party on the question of the Soviet intelligentsia is perfectly clear, there are still current in our Party views hostile to the Soviet intelligentsia and incompatible with the Party position. As you know, those who hold these false views practice a disdainful and contemptuous attitude to the Soviet intelligentsia and regard it as an alien force, even as a force hostile to the working class and the peasantry. True, during the period of Soviet development the intelligentsia has undergone a radical change both in its composition and status. It has come closer to the people and is honestly collaborating with the people, in which re-

spect it differs fundamentally from the old, bourgeois intelligentsia. But this apparently means nothing to these comrades. They go on harping on the old tunes and wrongly apply to the Soviet intelligentsia views and attitudes which were justified in the old days when the intelligentsia was in the service of the landowners and capitalists.

In the old days, under capitalism, before the revolution, the intelligentsia consisted primarily of members of the propertied classes—noblemen, manufacturers, merchants, kulaks and so on. Some members of the intelligentsia were sons of small tradesmen, petty officials, and even of peasants and workingmen, but they did not and could not play a decisive part. The intelligentsia as a whole depended for their livelihood on the propertied classes and ministered to the propertied classes. Hence it is easy to understand the mistrust, often bordering on hatred, with which the revolutionary elements of our country and above all the workers regarded the intellectuals. True, the old intelligentsia produced some courageous individuals, handfuls of revolutionary people who adopted the standpoint of the working class and completely threw in their lot with the working class. But such people were all too few among the intelligentsia, and they could not change the complexion of the intelligentsia as a whole.

Matters with regard to the intelligentsia have undergone a fundamental change, however, since the October Revolution, since the defeat of the foreign armed intervention, and especially since the victory of industrialization and collectivization, when the abolition of exploitation and the firm establishment of the socialist economic system made it really possible to give the country a new Constitution and to put it into effect. The most influential and qualified section of the old intelligentsia broke away from the main body in the very first days of the October Revolution, proclaimed war on the Soviet government, and joined the ranks of the saboteurs. They met with well-deserved punishment for this; they were smashed and dispersed by the or-

gans of Soviet power. Subsequently the majority of those that survived were recruited by the enemies of our country as wreckers and spies, and thus were expunged by their own deeds from the ranks of the intellectuals. Another section of the old intelligentsia, less qualified but more numerous, long continued to mark time, waiting for "better days"; but then, apparently giving up hope, decided to go and serve and to live in harmony with the Soviet government. The greater part of this group of the old intelligentsia are well on in years and are beginning to go out of commission. A third section of the old intelligentsia, mainly comprising its rank and file, and still less qualified than the section just mentioned, joined forces with the people and supported the Soviet government. It needed to perfect its education, and it set about doing so in our universities. But parallel with this painful process of differentiation and break-up of the old intelligentsia there went on a rapid process of formation, mobilization and mustering of forces of a new intelligentsia. Hundreds of thousands of young people coming from the ranks of the working class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia entered the universities and technical colleges, from which they emerged to reinforce the attenuated ranks of the intelligentsia. They infused fresh blood into it and reanimated it in a Soviet spirit. They radically changed the whole aspect of the intelligentsia, molding it in their own form and image. The remnants of the old intelligentsia were dissolved in the new, Soviet intelligentsia, the intelligentsia of the people. There thus arose a new, Soviet intelligentsia, intimately bound up with the people and, for the most part, ready to serve them faithfully and loyally.

As a result, we now have a numerous, new, popular, socialist intelligentsia, fundamentally different from the old, bourgeois intelligentsia both in composition and in social and political character.

The old theory about the intelligentsia, which taught that it should be treated with distrust and combated, fully applied to the old, pre-revolutionary intelli-

gentsia, which served the landlords and capitalists. This theory is now out-of-date and does not fit our new, Soviet intelligentsia. Our new intelligentsia demands a new theory, a theory teaching the necessity for a cordial attitude towards it, solicitude and respect for it, and cooperation with it in the interests of the working class and the peasantry.

That is clear, I should think.

It is therefore all the more astonishing and strange that after all these fundamental changes in the status of the intelligentsia people should be found within our Party who attempt to apply the old theory, which was directed against the bourgeois intelligentsia, to our new, Soviet intelligentsia, which is basically a socialist intelligentsia. These people, it appears, assert that workers and peasants who until recently were working in Stakhanov fashion in the factories and collective farms, and who were then sent to the universities to be educated, thereby ceased to be real people and became second-rate people. So we are to conclude that education is a pernicious and dangerous thing. (*Laughter.*) We want all our workers and peasants to be cultured and educated, and we shall achieve this in time. But in the opinion of these queer comrades, this purpose harbors a grave danger; for after the workers and peasants become cultured and educated they may face the danger of being classified as second-rate people. (*Loud laughter.*) The possibility is not precluded that these queer comrades may in time sink to the position of extolling backwardness, ignorance, benightedness and obscurantism. It would be quite in the nature of things. Theoretical vagaries have never led, and never can lead, to any good.

Such is the position with regard to our new, socialist intelligentsia.

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Our tasks in respect to the further strengthening of the Party are:

1. To systematically improve the composition of the Party, raising the level of knowledge of its membership, and admitting into its ranks, by a process of individual selection, only tried and tested

comrades who are loyal to the cause of communism.

2. To establish closer contact between the leading bodies and the work of the lower bodies, so as to make their work of leadership more practical and specific and less confined to meetings and offices.

3. To centralize the work of selecting cadres, to train them carefully and foster them, to study the merits and demerits of workers thoroughly, to promote young workers boldly and adapt the selection and allocation of cadres to the requirements of the political line of the Party.

4. To centralize Party propaganda and agitation, to extend the propaganda of the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, and to raise the theoretical level and improve the political schooling of our cadres.

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Comrades, I am now about to conclude my report.

I have sketched in broad outline the path traversed by our Party during the period under review. The results of the work of the Party and of its Central Committee during this period are well known. There have been mistakes and shortcomings in our work. The Party and the Central Committee did not conceal them and strove to correct them. There have also been important successes and big achievements, which must not be allowed to turn our heads.

The chief conclusion to be drawn is that the working class of our country, having abolished the exploitation of man by man and firmly established the socialist system, has proved to the world the truth of its cause. That is the chief conclusion, for it strengthens our faith in the power of the working class and in the inevitability of its ultimate victory.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the people cannot get along without capitalists and landlords, without merchants and kulaks. The working class of our country has proved in practice that the people can get along without exploiters perfectly well.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that, having destroyed the old bourgeois system, the working class is incapable of building anything new to replace the old. The working class of our country

has proved in practice that it is quite capable not only of destroying the old system but of building a new and better system, a socialist system, a system, moreover, to which crises and unemployment are unknown.

The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the peasantry is incapable of taking the path of socialism. The collective farm peasants of our country have proved in practice that they can do so quite successfully.

The chief endeavor of the bourgeoisie of all countries and of its reformist hangers-on is to kill in the working class faith in its own strength, faith in the possibility and inevitability of its victory, and thus to perpetuate capitalist slavery. For the bourgeoisie knows that if capitalism has not yet been overthrown and still continues to exist, it has not itself to thank, but the fact that the proletariat has still not faith enough in the possibility of its victory. It cannot be said that the efforts of the bourgeoisie in this respect have been altogether unsuccessful. It must be confessed that the bourgeoisie and its agents among the working class have to some extent succeeded in poisoning the minds of the working class with venom of doubt and scepticism. If the successes of the working class of our country, if its fight and victory serve to rouse the spirit of the working class in the capitalist countries and to strengthen its faith in its own power and in its victory, then our Party may say that its work has not been in vain. And there need be no doubt that this will be the case (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

Long live our victorious working class! (*Applause.*)

Long live our victorious collective farm peasantry! (*Applause.*)

Long live our socialist intelligentsia! (*Applause.*)

Long live the great friendship of the nations of our country! (*Applause.*)

Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! (*Applause.*)

*(The delegates rise and hail Comrade Stalin with loud and stormy cheers. Cries of: "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for our great Stalin!" "Hurrah for our beloved Stalin!")*

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# Report of the Delegation of the C.P.S.U. (B). in the Executive Committee of the Communist International

March 11, 1939

BY D. Z. MANUILSKY

*Secretary of the Communist International*

## I. CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

**C**OMRADES, in the five years that separate the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) from the Seventeenth Congress, big changes have taken place in the life of classes, peoples and states, changes which testify that all the contradictions of the capitalist system have grown more acute and that the gulf between the world of socialism and the world of capitalism has grown wider.

In his historic report, which was so impatiently awaited by the Party, by the working people of our country, and by all friends and foes of the U.S.S.R., Comrade Stalin has made a most valuable contribution to the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the state; he has given a Marxist analysis, unsurpassed for its profundity, of the international situation; he has made an exhaustive summary of the socialist development of our country; and he has outlined the immense prospects which open up before the Soviet people as a result of its socialist victories. Comrade Stalin has shown how mightily the U.S.S.R. has advanced, having solved the most difficult task of the dictatorship of the proletariat, namely, the task of completely eliminating the exploiting classes and of bringing the millions of individual peasant

farms within the socialist system. He has shown how the socialist economic system has steadily grown during these years, how the material and cultural standard of the working people has risen, how the fraternity of the nations inhabiting the U.S.S.R. has been cemented, how socialist democracy has blossomed forth in the Soviet country, how strong the moral and political unity of the Soviet people has grown, and how mighty has become the defensive power of the Soviet country. (*Applause.*)

Comrade Stalin has shown that the wise peace policy of the U.S.S.R., combined with firmness in defending the frontiers of the Soviet country and with relentlessness in crushing the Trotsky-Bukharin gang of spies and warmongers, is not only in the interest of the Soviet people, but also in the interest of the entire international working class and of the nations of all countries.

Comrade Stalin's report is a historic landmark, indicating that the U.S.S.R. has entered a new phase of development, to be marked by the completion of the construction of classless society and a gradual transition from socialism to communism. And this immense victory of the U.S.S.R., which is an event of historic significance, is intensifying the process of revolutionizing the working people in the capitalist countries, and is filling the world reactionaries with fear

of the country which, despite all the machinations of the surrounding capitalist world, is carrying out the Third Stalin Five-Year Plan, that new gigantic stride towards the complete triumph of communism.

#### EVENTS OF THE PAST FIVE YEARS IN THE CAPITALIST WORLD

Analyzing the capitalist economic situation at the Seventeenth Party Congress, Comrade Stalin said that the depression which had set in after the crisis of 1929-33 would not be an ordinary one, but a depression of a "special kind."\* Describing the international situation, Comrade Stalin said that the growing acuteness of the imperialist contradictions had already created the ground for military conflicts, and that things were clearly moving towards a new imperialist war. This analysis has been completely confirmed.

The level of capitalist production, which reached its highest point, after the low point of 1932, in the middle of 1937, dropped again in 1938 to 91 per cent of the 1929 level. In the period 1929-37 production increased by only 3.5 per cent, whereas during the economic cycle of 1921-29 the increase in production was 49.5 per cent. This shows that the depression that set in after the crisis of 1929-33 really was a depression of a special kind and was followed neither by a general revival, nor by an industrial boom.

The condition of the working masses in the capitalist countries has grown markedly worse in the past five years. Capital is conducting a furious attack on the standard of living of the working people, particularly in the countries where there is a fascist dictatorship. Wages are sharply declining and the working day lengthening. In Germany, for example, despite the fact that the retail prices of staple foodstuffs have considerably risen, increases of wages have been strictly forbidden since the estab-

lishment of the fascist dictatorship. At the same time, the various compulsory deductions from wages made by the fascist authorities amount to 25-30 per cent. A ten-hour day has been established by law, and in the particularly important branches of industry, that is, in the munitions industry generally and on fortification work, the working day is fourteen hours. In the so-called "labor service camps," hundreds of thousands of young people are working for thin gruel and 50 pfennigs a day.

Since the fascist dictatorship was established in Italy the standard of living of the masses has been reduced by almost half. There has been a marked decline in consumption of all staple food articles since the war in Ethiopia. In Japan the working day is as long as twelve to sixteen hours, and even the miserable wage rates of 1929 have been reduced on the average by over 16 per cent, in spite of the fact that the cost of living has risen during this period by 30 or 40 per cent.

During the past five years the number of unemployed has never dropped below fourteen million, and by the end of 1938 it amounted to eighteen million, not counting the vast army of millions of unemployed agricultural laborers, or the workers on part-time jobs, or the unemployed of countries like India and China where half the population of the capitalist world lives.

The agrarian crises, which is again growing acute, especially in the U.S.A., Poland, Rumania, Jugoslavia and Hungary, as well as in the colonies, is leading to a still greater cleavage in the countryside and is reducing millions of peasants to pauperism. Parallel with this we observe the growing ruin of the urban lower middle class, especially in the fascist countries, where tens of thousands of small industries and businesses have been reduced to bankruptcy. In Japan, owing to the shortage of raw material, 88,305 small undertakings were closed down in 1938 alone.

The economic crisis, the increased unevenness of development of the capitalist countries, and the growing profundity of the general crisis of capitalism, have

\* See *Socialism Victorious*, International Publishers, New York.

rendered all the existing contradictions among the imperialist states acute in the extreme. The struggle for foreign markets, for spheres of influence, for colonies, for a new redivision of the world has grown more acute. This struggle has become exceptionally intense in the Mediterranean and the Pacific, in Latin America, in south and southeastern Europe, and along the world's major lines of communication.

The fascist states—Germany, Italy and Japan—have assumed the offensive in the international arena. The fascist rulers hope to improve their affairs, to put an end to the internal difficulties of the fascist regime, and to avert its bankruptcy by plundering other nations. War is necessary to the fascist rulers, because they cannot fulfil their demagogic promises to the masses, who are demanding butter, not guns—bread, and not dreadnaughts. For the fascist rulers war is a means of suppressing the discontent of the masses and holding the latter in subjection. They need wars in order to maintain their “prestige” in the eyes of their own supporters.

The fascist adventurers are in a hurry to take the offensive because they fear the growing movement of the people's front, the growing resistance of the nations to fascist aggression, the union and welding of the peoples into an international front of struggle against the fascist war-makers. The fascist rulers want to forestall the welding of the masses and to strike at them before they unite to repulse fascism. They are trying to divide the peoples, to sow discord among them, in order the more easily to defeat them one by one. They are making skilful use of the complaisance of the ruling classes of Great Britain and France, and are turning them into accomplices of their nefarious deeds, thus compromising and discrediting them still further, and endeavoring by this rascally maneuver to divert the indignation of the masses from themselves.

The fascist rulers are striving to take advantage of the fear of socialism and the working class entertained by the bourgeoisies of other capitalist countries

in order to secure their support in the attack on their peoples. They resort to bribery, deception, blackmail and threats of furtherance of their aims of conquest. Before hurling their armies of occupation into foreign territories, they first send an army of spies. They send them everywhere—to America, England, France and other countries. In France they maintain the Cagouard bands, through whom they engineer a series of explosions. They are forming gangs of diversionists in Rumania for the commission of terrorist acts; they are conducting extensive disruptive activities in Poland, preparation for her dismemberment; they are forming secret companies of armed men in the Baltic countries, in Finland, Hungary and Slovakia, and in the Balkan countries. They stage internal “rebellions,” as was the case not only in Austria and the Sudeten region, but in Mexico, Brazil and Peru.

The agents of the fascist bloc of aggressors conduct their disruptive work on a particularly wide scale in the British and French colonies. They engineer rebellion in Palestine, form a semi-military “National Volunteer Corps” in India, set up fascist military groups in South Africa, and supply arms and money to the feudal chiefs in the Arab countries. They sow discord everywhere, so as to disintegrate and weaken their possible opponents even before the outbreak of war.

The aggressive bloc of fascist powers, which is interested more than all others in a new forcible redivision of the world, is plunging the nations into a new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy invaded Ethiopia; in 1936 Germany and Italy began to intervene in Spain; in 1937 the Japanese militarists, having seized Manchuria, started a war with the aim of gaining possession of the whole of China and ousting America, England and France from that country; in March, 1938, Germany occupied Austria, and in September, 1938, she dismembered Czechoslovakia.

Would this have been possible if the capitalist governments of the other big powers had not connived at the aggress-

sion of the German and Italian fascists and of the Japanese fascist militarists? Of course not. It was possible only because the bloc of fascist aggressors was assisted, and is being assisted, by the forces of world reaction, by the reactionary elements among the French and especially the British bourgeoisie. These elements cherish the idea of utilizing German fascism as a mailed fist of reaction against the U.S.S.R., as a gendarme against the international working class, the people's front, and the movement of the enslaved peoples for national liberation.

The plan of the British reactionary bourgeoisie is to sacrifice the small states of southeastern Europe to German fascism so as to direct Germany eastwards—against the U.S.S.R., to attempt, by means of such a counter-revolutionary war, to retard the progress of socialism and the victory of communism in the U.S.S.R.; to buy off Germany, with her imperialist claims on British colonies. At the same time the British reactionaries would like to use the U.S.S.R. to draw the fangs of German imperialism, to weaken Germany for a long time to come, and to preserve the dominant position of British imperialism in Europe.

Secondly, the British reactionaries are striving to divide up Spain and the spheres of influence in the Mediterranean with Italy *at the expense of France*, and to reach an agreement with Italy for the sake of imperialist "equilibrium" in Europe, by severing her from the bloc with Germany.

Thirdly, in the Far East, the British reactionaries cherish dreams of partitioning China. They are allowing Japan to ruin and weaken China; but at the same time they are not hindering the military and economic exhaustion of Japan, so as to come forward later as an arbiter and establish a "Munich peace" in the Far East.

Fourthly, the British reactionaries do not want the collapse of the fascist regime in Germany, Italy or Japan; they want to help save the governments of these countries from financial bankruptcy by granting them credits, thus making

the fascist states dependent in a way on British imperialism.

As long ago as 1927, in an article entitled "Notes on Contemporary Themes," Comrade Stalin said:

"British capitalism always was, is and will be the most vicious strangler of popular revolutions. Ever since the Great French Revolution of the end of the eighteenth century, down to the Chinese revolution that is now in progress, the British bourgeoisie has always stood in the front ranks of the butchers of the liberation movement of mankind. . . . But the British bourgeoisie does not like to fight with its own hands. It has always preferred to wage war through others."

But the British reactionary bourgeoisie are digging their own graves with their predatory plans. By secretly supporting Japanese aggression in China, they are paving the way for the ousting of Britain from the Far East; by their concessions to Italian fascism, they are paving the way for the loss of Britain's position in the Mediterranean; by granting loans to the fascist aggressors, they are augmenting the latter's military might and the chances of their own defeat. By strengthening German fascism, they are paving the way for the partition of their own empire. By their plans of attack on the U.S.S.R., they are paving the way for the collapse not only of fascism, but of the entire capitalist system. (*Applause.*)

The Munich agreement was the first serious attempt to put this perfidious but hopeless plan of the British reactionary bourgeoisie into practice. It was not peace that the reactionary conspirators of Munich brought mankind, but the prospects of a new imperialist world war. In Munich they put an end even to that anemic European "equilibrium" which to some extent restrained the fascist aggressors in their plans of conquest. Under pressure of Germany and Italy, the reactionary cliques of France, tied to the apron strings of the British reactionaries, put an end with their own hands to the system of alliances which they had created after the imperialist World War of 1914-18, thereby paving the way for

the transformation of France into a second-rate power.

The Munich conspirators put an end to the system of collective security and completely eliminated the League of Nations they themselves had created from the settlement of highly important questions of European and world politics. They gave a free hand to the aggressors, permitting the Italian fascists to occupy Catalonia, and the Japanese fascist militarists to seize Canton and Hainan and to create a threat to French and British possessions in the Far East.

The Munich "peacemakers" have given new impetus to the armament race of the capitalist states. The Munich deal was followed by a new jump in armaments in Germany, where since the advent of the fascist dictatorship military expenditures have already increased thirty-two times, and in Italy, where during the war in Ethiopia they increased fourfold. Compared with 1936-37, military expenditures in Japan have increased more than five and a half times, in Great Britain three times, and in France over three times.

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However, the imperialist claims of the fascist vultures are encountering the resistance of certain capitalist states and of a large section of the ruling classes of those countries whose governments are capitulating to the fascist aggressors. The United States, *the biggest capitalist power in the world*, anxious to defend its own interests in the Latin American countries from Germany, Italy and Japan—which are straining towards and rapidly penetrating these countries—and its positions in the Philippines, China and the Pacific from Japan, is working for a bloc with the South American states to resist fascist expansion. The United States is thereby stimulating resistance to the aggressive plans of the fascists in other parts of the world, including Europe.

In Great Britain, fear for the integrity of the Empire, which is being menaced by German fascism, is impelling even a section of the imperialists, men like Duff

Cooper, Eden and Churchill, into the camp of opposition to the present Conservative government. The rapacious claims of the German and Italian fascists are scaring a section of the French bourgeoisie and strengthening the position of those who are in favor of resisting them. Alarm is growing in Poland over the threat of her dismemberment by Germany. Opposition is increasing in Hungary to her enslavement by German fascism.

At the same time there is growing indignation among the masses of Czechoslovakia and Austria, who have been enslaved by the fascist aggressors. Alarm is growing among the nations menaced by fascist aggression in the Balkans. There is a growing movement in the colonies, the peoples of which have no wish to be used as counters in the deals between the imperialist plunderers. Elements of a national front are ripening in a number of countries threatened by fascist invasion.

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Thus, the gulf between victorious socialism and decaying parasitic capitalism has grown still wider during the past five years. The U.S.S.R. is moving upwards, to the peaks of a classless society, to communism. The capitalist world is on the downward course to economic crises, reaction and wars. This means that the general crisis of the capitalist system has become more profound. And the more capitalism becomes entangled in its contradictions, the more desperate are the measures it resorts to in the attempt to escape from its plight. Hence the intensification of the capitalist offensive against the working people, the intensification of fascist terror, the assumption of the offensive by fascism in the international arena and the new imperialist war. Hence the growing threat of foreign military attack on the land of socialism, the realization of whose significance as a *stronghold of peace and of resistance to imperialist conquest and wars is growing immensely in the minds of millions of working people in the capitalist countries.*



## II. THE STRUGGLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES FOR THE UNITED FRONT AND PEOPLE'S FRONT

As fascism passes to the offensive in different countries and in the international arena, the anti-fascist movement grows and widens and increasingly assumes an international character. The five-year interval between the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was a period of big anti-fascist battles of the working people. It was a mighty struggle of labor against capital, of the forces of progress against the dark forces of reaction. We had the struggle of the Communist Parties for united working class action, for trade union unity, for an anti-fascist people's front. We had the formation of the People's Front in France. We had the development of the democratic movement on the American continent (in North and South America). We had the formation and extension of the national front in a number of colonial and dependent countries. *And, above all, we had the national revolutionary war of the heroic Spanish people, and the war of the great Chinese people for national liberation from the invading imperialist robbers.*

You remember how after the advent of fascism to power in Germany in 1933 the fascists raised their heads in other capitalist countries, and how they hastened to pass to the offensive in the expectation that the masses would retreat before them without a fight, as was the case in Germany.

But you also remember that it was just the victory of German fascism that, a year later, started a powerful anti-fascist movement all over the world. In February, 1934, the workers of France answered the fascist offensive by a general strike, which embraced four million people; in Austria the workers took to arms; in Spain, in October of the same year, the Asturian miners carried on a fight for two weeks. Everywhere the driving force of this mass resistance to fas-

cism was the Communist Parties, which in the process of the struggle forged the united action of all working people.

Applying the great Leninist-Stalinist strategic plan of uniting the forces of the proletariat and of enlisting the allies of the working class, the Communist International, in Comrade Dimitroff's report at its Seventh Congress, advanced the tactics of a united working class front and anti-fascist people's front to combat the capitalist offensive, fascism and the impending imperialist war. The speech of Comrade Dimitroff, that staunch disciple of Comrade Stalin, who held aloft the banner of communism in Leipzig, found an ardent response among the working people of the capitalist countries.

What were the immediate results of the anti-fascist movement that began in almost every capitalist country?

In France, the working people, by means of a general strike and mass demonstration, involving nearly a million persons in Paris alone, defeated the fascist putsch of February 6, 1934, secured a law dissolving the armed fascist leagues, and, in the process of the anti-fascist struggle, established a united working class front and a People's Front. The powerful strike movement in the summer of 1936, which was accompanied by the occupation of the factories, secured for the working class the forty-hour week, wage increases of as much as 30 per cent, vacations paid for by the employers, collective agreements and employers' recognition of the trade unions in the factories. Trade union unity was achieved, with the result that in the course of a few months the membership of the General Confederation of Labor increased from 900,000 to 4,000,000. The Communist Party increased its membership sevenfold; its influence over the working masses grew, which meant that the working masses grew stronger in the struggle against fascism.

In the U.S.A., the anti-fascist movement swept aside demagogues of the type of Father Coughlin. A Left wing, known as the Committee for Industrial Organization, emerged from the reactionary-led American Federation of Labor, lead-

ing the larger section of the American labor movement in the adoption of the position of the class struggle. Taking advantage of an improvement in the economic situation, the working class organized a number of big strikes, which in the majority of cases ended in victory for the workers. There were strikes of one million textile workers, four hundred thousand miners, and the workers in other branches of industry. Half a million students organized a demonstration strike against the impending war. The democratic movement grew and won an enormous victory at the presidential elections. On the wave of this movement, the Communist Party of the U.S.A. increased in size.

In Spain, the armed fighting in Asturias, followed by mass strikes and huge demonstrations, led to the fall of the Lerroux-Gil Robles government. On February 16, 1936, the People's Front won a big victory at the elections.

In Great Britain, Holland, Belgium and Rumania, would-be fascist dictators, like Mosley, Degrelle and Cordianos, suffered a headlong fall.

In Mexico, Cuba and Chile, the democratic movement was victorious. Mass trade unions were formed: about eight hundred thousand workers were united in the Mexican Confederation of Labor, four hundred thousand in the Cuban Confederation, and two hundred thousand in the Chilean Confederation.

In China, there was a rapid development of the movement of the masses for the freedom, independence and unity of China, for the establishment of a democratic system, and for the economic, political and national regeneration of the country.

In India, a strike movement developed. The three-month strike of the jute workers in Bengal alone involved 225,000 persons. The nationwide movement against the reactionary 1935 constitution gathered strength; in the two years 1937 and 1938, the membership of the National Congress increased from 630,000 to 4,000,000.

In the French colonies of Indo-China, Algiers, Tunis and Syria, the working

masses, as a result of the victory of the People's Front in France, secured a number of democratic liberties. Here also, as in India, a nationwide front of struggle against imperialist oppression was built up.

The reactionary bourgeoisie, scared by the sweep of the anti-fascist movement, furiously resisted the development of the united working class front and the People's Front. In France, by sabotaging production, exporting capital and gold, artificially forcing up prices, and speculating on the devaluation of the franc, it tried to discredit the People's Front and pave the way for the capitulation of the government which enjoyed the support of the People's Front.

In Spain, the landlords worked to bring about a famine by leaving their lands uncultivated; the bankers and capitalists engineered economic dislocation, and the generals plotted a revolt with the object of putting an end to the People's Front. In China, Japanese agents endeavored to incite the Kuomintang against the Chinese Soviets and employed every means to stir up internecine war, so as to disrupt the growing national front at all costs.

However, it was becoming ever clearer that the reactionaries were unable with their own internal forces to cope with the People's Front in France and Spain, or to disrupt the national emancipation movement of the Chinese people. World reaction came to their aid. The reactionary circles of the British bourgeoisie brought tremendous pressure to bear on the home and foreign policy of France in order to direct it into the channel they desired. In Spain, German and Italian fascism passed on to open intervention. In the Far East, the Japanese militarists launched a big war against the Chinese people.

The peoples who were victims of aggression put up armed resistance. The Spanish and Chinese people started their heroic struggle against the foreign invaders. This struggle is the most important event in the life of the nations since the great Socialist Revolution and its magnificent victories, and since the

revolutionary movements of 1918-23 in Europe. The significance of this struggle is enormous. It is fettering the forces of the aggressors, checking the further spread of the second imperialist war, facilitating the struggle of the world proletariat against its exploiters, and assisting the anti-fascist movement in all countries.

When they engineered the mutiny of the generals in Spain, the German and Italian fascists expected an easy and rapid victory. They thought that the comic-opera march on Rome in 1922 could be duplicated in Spain. They thought it would be one of those military coups of which there have been many examples in the history of Spain, and that it would end in one night with the victory of the general who was seeking to mount the pedestal of a fascist dictator. The Spanish people has shown by its heroic struggle that the time of easy victories for fascism is passing. The intervention in Spain has cost the German and Italian fascists about a billion American dollars, and has involved them in an enormous loss of war material and a considerable loss of manpower and trained army cadres.

For nearly three years the poorly-armed Spanish people, betrayed by the so-called bourgeois-democratic states, has been waging an unequal and heroic struggle for its independence, for the cause of the whole of progressive and advanced humanity. (*Applause.*) It has had to contend in this struggle against the military intervention of two big imperialist powers, fascist Italy and Germany, as well as against the veiled intervention of world reaction, which has blockaded the Spanish republic under the hypocritical guise, in Europe, of "a policy of non-intervention" and, in America, of a policy of "isolation."

The republic has had to overcome incredible difficulties in this period. The republic had no army. Under the fire of the enemy, it created a people's army which has inscribed in the history of the national-revolutionary war of the Spanish people such chapters as the battles of Madrid, Guadalajara, Jarama and the

Ebro. The republic had no officers. Thousands of staunch commanders and splendid political commissars were trained in the process of the struggle; the ranks of the Spanish people have produced men like Modesto and Lister, whose names are pronounced with affection and respect by every honest anti-fascist, and with hatred by all enemies of the Spanish people. The republic had no munitions industry. It built one as it went along. Old men and boys, Spanish mothers and girls put their heart and soul into this work. The republic had no fortifications; the Spanish people took pick and spade and fortified the fronts for the republican armies.

How was it that the Spanish republic performed the miracle of holding out so long on its comparatively small peninsula, contending against blockade and the vast superiority of its adversary in armaments? This miracle was made possible by the establishment of unity of action of the working class, by the formation of a close alliance between the working class and the peasantry, by the union of the masses of Spain in an anti-fascist people's front, and by the fact that this front was cemented by the Communist Party, which had grown into a great political force; it was made possible by the international support given the Spanish people by the working people, and, above all, the political support given them by the nations of the Soviet Union and by the father of all working people—Comrade Stalin. (*Stormy applause.*)

For nearly three years the struggle of the Spanish people has focused the attention of the entire world. It has everywhere aroused the admiration of millions of working people and the savage fury of the world reactionaries. The example of the Spanish people has served as a clarion call to all other peoples to resist the fascist warmongers; it has helped to consolidate the forces of peace and liberty in all capitalist countries. A mass movement of solidarity embracing nearly every country of the world has rallied around republican Spain. It is the most powerful movement of solidarity of the working people since the imperialist intervention in the land of the Soviets.

It has manifested itself in various forms, ranging from collections of money, mass meetings, demonstrations and the organization of committees for the defense of Spain to political strikes and the formation of volunteer units. Record demonstrations were held in the Latin American countries; far-off India held a national day of solidarity with Spain.

The movement of solidarity with the Spanish people has penetrated into the fascist countries. In Italy, anti-fascists take up secret collections, distribute thousands of leaflets, chalk anti-fascist slogans on houses at night; there are increasing cases of sabotage in munitions plants, and of soldiers refusing to embark to fight republican Spain.

This solidarity movement has been developed everywhere into a struggle of the working people against fascism in their own countries, into an international struggle of anti-fascist forces against world reaction. Help for republican Spain has become a platform for a spontaneously formed international united working class front.

At the other end of the world the four hundred and fifty millions of a vast country, the biggest nation in the world, whom the imperialist robbers have always ground down, beaten, plundered and humiliated, have risen in defense of their country and their national independence. The war in China is the biggest war for national emancipation in a semi-colonial country history has ever known. Its importance is all the greater in that it is being waged by the Chinese people against an imperialist state which performs the role of gendarme of all the forces of world reaction in the Far East. In the course of this struggle the Chinese people have put an end to the internecine warfare which was rending the country to pieces and are forging their national unity—which is what the imperialists have always feared most of all. China's war against Japanese imperialism is becoming more and more a war of the entire nation. In spite of Japan's superiority in military equipment, the Chinese people are offering stubborn resistance to the enemy, attacking him in the rear, en-

circling him with a ring of guerrilla detachments, destroying the Japanese lines of communications, and exhausting and undermining the strength of the enemy by a *protracted war*.

Japan's war on China has cost her 2,500,000,000 American dollars, yet the Japanese fascist militarists have not become masters in China. The Japanese troops hold railway lines and urban centers, but a huge part of the country, with its Chinese inhabitants, remains under the control of the national Chinese government. Chinese administration and Chinese law function in the rear of the Japanese forces of occupation; there, too, mobilization is conducted for the Chinese national army. The watchword of the national war passes from mouth to mouth: "When the father falls in battle, the son takes his place; brother takes the place of brother, and wife takes the place of husband."

The stubborn resistance of the Chinese people is having an increasing effect in revolutionizing the working masses of Japan, who are languishing under the yoke of oppression, monstrous exploitation and the intolerable burden of taxation. The difficulties encountered by the Japanese militarists are stimulating the growth of opposition sentiments among all sections of the people and accentuating the contradictions even in the camp of the ruling classes. The strike movement is gaining impetus, and the discontent of the Japanese laboring masses with the protracted war is growing. Exhausted by continuous battles, confronted with a nation that is defending its country, the Japanese soldiers are beginning to lose patience. More and more frequent are the symptoms of ferment in the army of the Japanese invaders. The heroic struggle of the Chinese people is not only demoralizing the Japanese army and the Japanese rear; it is also serving to stir up the masses of Asia and to awaken all the colonial peoples. The example set by the Chinese people in forming a national front against the Japanese has placed in the hands of the oppressed colonial peoples a mighty weapon for their national emancipation, a weapon tried and tested

by the experience of a vast country, by the experience of millions.

"Of course, the heroic struggle of the Chinese people and their army against the Japanese invaders, the tremendous national revival in China, her huge resources of manpower and territory, and, lastly, the determination of the Chinese National Government to fight the struggle for emancipation to a finish, until the invaders are completely driven out from Chinese territory, all goes to show beyond a doubt that there is no future for the Japanese imperialists in China, and never will be." \*

But the longer the intervention in Spain and the war in China dragged on, the more uneasy world reaction became. The duel between fascism and the anti-fascist forces threatened to end unfavorably for the fascist aggressors. The people began to grumble against the military adventures of the fascist governments. More frequently and loudly were voices raised among the masses, asking: "Where are they leading us?" The internal isolation of fascism and the shrinking of its social base became more and more apparent. In Germany the workers became ever more incensed at their appalling conditions, at the introduction of the fourteen-hour day, their lack of rights, and their being tied to the factories like serfs; the peasants became ever more incensed at the brazen interference of the fascist authorities in their affairs, the robbery of "Fuehrers," big and little; the petty bourgeois were discontented because the fascist rulers were deliberately driving them into the abyss of ruin in order to secure cheap labor power; the Catholic masses were stirred into action by the ill usage to which they were subjected by fascism; opposition was growing in the ranks of the Reichswehr, which feared defeat in the war for which fascism was working; the German people grew increasingly incensed at the venality, peculation and tyranny of the corrupt fascist bureaucracy. The Gestapo

met this wave of discontent with new bestial repressions, with the block and the axe, and with Jewish pogroms, reviving the gloomy days of the Middle Ages. Himmler, the chief of the Gestapo, demanded the reinforcement of the S.S. troops in order to develop operations in "the internal theater of war."

The British reactionaries, in their endeavor to help German fascism extricate itself from its internal difficulties and strengthen its position in the fight against the anti-fascist forces, allowed it to seize Austria and obligingly opened the doors of Czechoslovakia to it. In preparation for the Munich deal they and the French reactionaries brought pressure to bear on the Czechoslovakian government, demanding that it capitulate and behave in the "Austrian manner." The Czech people and their army wanted to behave in the Spanish manner. The partial mobilization undertaken in France and Britain with the object of hoodwinking the masses was transformed into a demonstration of anti-fascist sentiments, while the mobilization in Germany revealed that indignation against the fascist rulers as the true instigators of war was widespread among the people.

The Munich deal, which sacrificed Czechoslovakia to German fascism, was a conspiracy of reaction against the international working class, against the anti-fascist movement in all countries, against peace and against the freedom of all nations. It was a conspiracy against the Spanish republic. The seizure of Catalonia by the interventionists was a direct consequence of Munich. It was hatched not only in Rome and Berlin but also in London and Paris. The whole world knew that, having succeeded in forcing Prague to capitulate, the Munich politicians would descend upon republican Spain. The Munich deal gave German and Italian fascism an entirely free hand in their intervention in Spain.

When the Italian and German forces of intervention seized Catalonia the British and French reactionaries dropped their mask. From covert intervention they passed to open intervention. At the orders of Berlin and Rome, they made

\* *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, p. 333. International Publishers, New York.

haste to recognize Franco. They engineered the treacherous operation which transferred the naval base of Minorca to the Italian and German interventionists. The French reactionaries, having systematically refused to hand over Spain's gold reserve in France to the lawful republican government of Spain, subserviently tendered it to Franco, the creature of world reaction. The British bankers, with the blessing of the Conservative circles of Great Britain, expressed their readiness to grant the Spanish rebels a loan to cover the expenses of the German and Italian intervention and to save the internal regime of the Spanish fascists from collapse. More, the British and French reactionaries, with the aid to treasonable elements inside Spain, engineered a counter-revolutionary coup in Madrid and Cartagena in order to break the resistance of the Spanish people to the interventionists at the gravest stage of the struggle.

But world reaction will not bring the Spanish people to their knees. Only a madman can think that this proud and freedom-loving people will reconcile themselves to the colonial dependence to which world reaction is seeking to reduce their country; only a madman can think that they will humbly bow their backs to Franco, the traitor, adventurer and agent of foreign fascism. In spite of all the support of world reaction, neither kings nor dictators, neither Alfonsos nor Primo de Riveras have succeeded in staying on the backs of the Spanish people. How then can this monster who has destroyed Spanish cities and villages with German artillery, who has slaughtered thousands of Spanish women and children with Italian bombs, this butcher who has drenched Spain with blood and who has been spurned and anathematized by the Spanish people, expect to stay on their backs? (*Voice from the floor: "Hear, hear!" Applause.*)

World reaction will not succeed in erasing from the memory of the Spanish people the heroic struggle of almost three years against the foreign invaders. This people has known better days. It has held arms in its hands; it has sown the land

of the landlords for itself; it has organized production in the mills and factories itself; it has tasted a life of freedom. Such a people will never be subjugated. (*Loud applause.*) Its sacrifices will be repaid a hundredfold. They will remain forever in the minds of the working people an indelible memory of the infamy, not only of the fascist governments, but also of their British and French abettors, and of all the exploiting classes. They will raise a storm of hatred among the peoples against their exploiters, and will transform the revolutionary indignation of the masses into great revolutionary deeds of the peoples. The French reactionaries are mistaken if they think that their treacherous policy toward republican Spain will put at end to the working class and anti-fascist movements in France. It is true that this infamous policy has encouraged all the opponents of the people's front. The agents of the bourgeoisie who insinuated themselves into the ranks of the people's front in order to destroy it from within have come out into the open. All the capitulators who were driven by the wave of the revolutionary movement to the anti-fascist shores have now raised their heads. These enemies of the people's front have now thrown off all restraint; they are firing on Communists in Madrid, demanding the disruption of the united working class front in France, and working for the liquidation of the people's front movement in other countries. By ridding itself of this treacherous capitulating scum the anti-fascist movement will only become stronger and more effective in the fight.

The treacherous policy of the Munich politicians is stirring into action sections which have hitherto held aloof from the political struggle; it has given the signal for a concentration of forces against world reaction on a broader basis than the people's front; it is giving an impetus to a new rise of the anti-fascist movement all over the world, and in Great Britain in the first place; it is helping to ripen in the minds of the masses the idea of storming the citadel of capitalism.

But could the conspiracy of world re-

action against the Spanish republic have been foiled? Undoubtedly it could. It could have been foiled if the international proletariat had united its forces from the very beginning of the national revolutionary war of the Spanish people, if the leadership of the Second International had accepted the proposal of the Communist International to establish united action to combat the offensive of capital, fascism and imperialist war.

The Executive Committee of the Communist International has proposed unity of action ten times in the past five years. What reply did we get from the reactionary leaders of the Socialist International? They replied that international united action required the preliminary formation of a united front in the various countries. When the Sections of the Comintern approached the various Social-Democratic Parties, the leaders of these parties replied that it was first necessary to reach agreement on an international scale. When the fighting in the Asturias was at its height the leaders of the Second International cynically proposed that the Communist International should wait a few months until their Executive Committee held its meeting. The Executive Committee met; the majority of its Sections voted for international united action, but the British Laborites were against united action. And the majority submitted to the Citrines and Morrisons; they submitted to the will of the reactionary British bourgeoisie that stood behind their backs.

Yet, if the international proletariat had united its forces it could have enforced the opening of the frontiers to republican Spain, it could have prevented the blockade of republican Spain, it could have helped the Spanish people to victory, and thereby would have averted the occupation of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and prevented the very possibility of the Munich conspiracy. It could have brought about the defeat of Italian fascism in Ethiopia and compelled the bourgeois governments really to apply the sanctions proclaimed by the League of Nations. It could have aroused world public opinion against

Japan, prevented her receiving raw materials and munitions, and brought the Japanese militarists to bay. But the capitulators of the Second International did not want this, for they dread the victory of the people's front more than the victory of fascism.

Is it still possible to arrest the further development of the second imperialist war and to defeat fascism? Yes, it is, although it is harder now than before.

What is needed now to defeat the fascist aggressors?

First, a resolute struggle against the capitulators, carried to the point of unmasking them completely, isolating them and routing them. The capitulators are not only collaborating with the bourgeoisie, they are collaborating with the most reactionary part of the bourgeoisie, with fascism. The capitulators are lieutenants of fascism in the labor movement, acting under the mask of "pacifism" in order to dupe the masses. In 1933 the reactionary leaders of the Social-Democratic Party brought the people of Germany under the axe of the fascist dictatorship, fooling the masses by asserting that they were saving them from civil war. The capitulators today are helping the bourgeoisie to drag the nations into imperialist wars, while claiming that they are saving the cause of peace, saving the nations from war. They are paving the way for war by the same methods they employed when they paved the way for the establishment of the fascist dictatorship. On the pretext that they wish to preserve peace they exhort the peoples to retreat before the fascist aggressors. Like Otto Bauer, they surrender one position after another to fascism while threatening to "take to arms when attacked." But in the meantime they surrender Austria, the Sudeten region and Czechoslovakia to German fascism, allow it to entrench itself in the Danube basin and in the Balkans, surrender Spain to be ravaged by the interventionists, and yield to the fascist aggressors all the approach roads for aggression against other nations.

They try to demoralize the masses with the vile and treacherous slogan: "Better

slavery than war." But the people know that the imperialist robbers convert their slaves into cannon fodder for their wars of plunder. Slaves do not escape war; they have to fight on the side of their enslavers, who use them to throttle the independence of other nations.

The British and French capitulators cherish the dream of diverting German fascism to the East. This is also called preservation of peace in the language of these gentlemen. But we know that the German fascists dislike impassable roads and insurmountable obstacles; they prefer to go where the going is easiest, where people capitulate to fascism.

The capitulators of the neutral countries, the Scandinavian, for instance, propose to weather the storm of war in a refuge of "neutrality" and to help their bourgeois enrich themselves on military contracts, as they did in 1914-18. But times are different now. Today the fascist aggressors will not leave a single neighboring state in peace until they have drawn it into the orbit of their military adventures, until they have revised its frontiers in the interests of the "Aryan race."

The capitulators try to frighten the masses by asserting that the people's front provokes the fascists to aggression. But the formation of the people's front means resisting the fascist aggressors. It is not resistance but the absence of it that whets the appetite of the fascists.

The capitulators go around insinuating to the masses: "See how much Spain has suffered. Isn't it better to surrender without a struggle like Czechoslovakia?" But if the peoples were to follow these suicidal promptings, fascism would now be master in Europe. If Spain had gone the way of Czechoslovakia, other peoples, and the French in the first place, would today be the victims of fascist aggression.

Secondly, in order to defeat the fascist aggressors *action* is needed, backed by the arguments of *material force*—the action of the states against whom fascist aggression is really directed (France, Britain and the United States). The world reactionaries are deliberately creating the legend of the might of Ger-

man fascism in order to weaken the people's determination to resist.

Fascist Germany is not prepared for a big and serious war—she has not enough raw material and foodstuffs; her financial position is critical; her coasts are vulnerable to naval blockade; her army is inadequately officered; her rear is a dangerous one for fascism. The superiority of material force is undoubtedly on the side of the so-called democratic states. These states have *three* times the population of the bloc of aggressors, they produce from 50 to 100 per cent more steel, *twice* as much electricity, *fourteen* times as many automobiles, *fifty-five* times as much liquid fuel, *nine* times as much raw material for textiles, *four* times as much food. They can meet their own requirements in raw material completely, whereas even in peace time the bloc of aggressors has a deficit of 50-55 per cent. Their gold reserves are *forty-nine* times greater than the gold reserves of the fascist states. Their potential production of aircraft, mechanical traction for the army, and other technical equipment and munitions far exceeds the boldest calculations of the fascist bloc. The naval forces of France, Britain and the United States are *twice* as strong as the naval forces of Germany, Italy and Japan.

If the so-called democratic state pursued a firm policy of resistance to the fascist aggressors, combined with *economic pressure*, this would be a quite effective means of forcing the fascist states to retreat. This would be a real policy of peace. It would be supported by all the peoples. It would bring back to the side of France, England and the United States the small states which the Munich policy has thrown into confusion and dismay. It would be a policy of consolidating the democratic gains of the peoples that would be supported by the international working class.

But in order to bring about such a turn in the policy of the so-called democratic states, it is necessary that the working class also bring the forces of *material pressure* to bear on the bourgeois governments. The weapons of the working class are strikes, mass demonstrations, and



popular movements against wars of plunder. The use of these weapons will be the more effective the sooner the working class establishes international unity of action. To combat wars of plunder there must be joint action by the proletarians of all countries.

### III. THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

#### A. SOME QUESTIONS OF COMMUNIST PARTY TACTICS

I shall now pass to the third part of my speech, which will deal with the condition of the international Communist movement. First a few remarks on some questions of Communist Party tactics.

The second imperialist war is developing in a situation which differs from that of the first imperialist war, the war of 1914-18. Unlike 1914-18, the world today is divided into two diametrically opposed systems: the world of capitalism and the world of socialism. Now there are not only imperialist states, but imperialist states which have established a fascist regime, which are trying to impose this regime on other nations by force of arms, and which are acting as instigators of wars of plunder.

"A distinguishing feature of the second imperialist war is that so far it is being waged and extended by the aggressor powers, while the other powers, the 'democratic' powers, against whom in fact the war is directed, pretend that it does not concern them, wash their hands of it, draw back, boast of their love of peace, scold the fascist aggressors, and . . . surrender their positions to the aggressors bit by bit, at the same time asserting that they are preparing to resist."\*

The fascist states have begun to divide up Europe, they are "self-determining" the small nations by force, they are demanding a redivision of colonies.

In view of this new situation, the Communists must define their attitude to present wars, to the colonial claims of

the fascist states and to the attempts of the fascist demagogues to exploit the slogan of "national self-determination."

In conformity with the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* divides wars into just wars and unjust wars.

"A. Just wars, wars that are not wars of conquest but wars of liberation, waged to defend the people from foreign attack and from attempts to enslave them, or to liberate the people from capitalist slavery, or, lastly, to liberate colonies and dependent countries from the yoke of imperialism; and

"B. Unjust wars, wars of conquest, waged to conquer and enslave foreign countries and foreign nations."\*

This description provides the clue for Communists *when defining what the attitude of the working people should be towards each specific war*. This means that the working people will support the just war waged by any people against the imperialist marauders for its national independence. They will support a war that speeds the defeat of world reaction, and of its shock troops—Germany, Japan and Italy. They will support a war that hastens the victory of the world proletariat, whose interests fully and completely coincide with those of the land of victorious socialism, the fatherland of all working people.

Communists consider it their cardinal duty to mobilize the working people of all countries to assist any nation waging a just war, so as to promote its victory in every way.

The description of just and unjust wars given in the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* helps the Communists to define a clear *Leninist-Stalinist policy toward the struggle now flaring up among the imperialist robbers for supremacy over the colonial peoples*.

Communists are thoroughly consistent in opposing *all* oppression and enslavement of colonial peoples by the imperialists. It is not their business to defend the existing colonial empires. All the

\* *Ibid.*, pp. 333-34.

\* *Ibid.*, pp. 167-68.

more irreconcilable is their hostility to the colonial claims of the fascist states, which would impose an even worse slavery on the colonial peoples. Communists support the movements in the colonies for the formation of a national front of struggle against imperialist oppression, and work for the establishment of united action of the working class of the home countries and the oppressed peoples of their colonies. They demand of the imperialist governments of the so-called bourgeois-democratic states an immediate and radical improvement in the conditions of the toiling masses in the colonies and the granting of broad democratic rights and liberties to the colonies.

At the same time, Communists denounce the cynical deception practised by the fascist warmongers in trying to exploit the discontent of the colonial peoples for their own rapacious ends. While upholding the right of the colonial peoples to self-determination, including even secession, Communists follow the teachings of Lenin and Stalin in subordinating the actual realization of this right of secession to the fundamental interests of the struggle of the colonial peoples themselves for emancipation, to the interests of defeating fascism, that most vicious enemy of the working people, and to the interests of the victory of the international working class over its exploiters.

The description given in the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* also helps the Communists to adopt a *correct attitude towards fascist speculation on the slogan of "national self-determination."* The fascist warmongers, who have crushed their own peoples and are enslaving other peoples, are trying to turn the democratic slogan of "national self-determination" into a counter-revolutionary weapon for the furtherance of their own aggressive plans. Hypocritically adopting the guise of supporters of national self-determination, they are trying to disintegrate the multi-national capitalist states which lie in the path of fascist expansion and to convert the smaller countries into a base for their offensive against other states.

Consistently combating all forms of

national oppression in the capitalist countries, defending the right of the oppressed nations to self-determination, including even secession, and calling upon the oppressed nations to fight for the establishment of mutual relations on the lines indicated by the great example of the Stalinist commonwealth of nations of the U.S.S.R.—the Communists concentrate their main fire in the present specific historical situation on the fraudulent fascist "self-determination of nations," which is the most cynical attempt to deceive the oppressed peoples and an atrocious crime against the freedom and independence of nations. Communists lay prime emphasis on the struggle for the achievement of self-determination by the nations enslaved by the fascist states. They demand free self-determination for Austria, which was forcibly annexed by fascist Germany on the eve of the plebiscite, and for the Sudeten region, which Germany seized from Czechoslovakia, free self-determination for Korea, Formosa and Ethiopia, and the evacuation of Spain and China by the imperialist robbers.

#### B. THE CONDITION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES

At the time of the Seventeenth Party Congress the membership of the Communist International in the capitalist countries numbered 860,000. Today the membership is 1,200,000. The number of Y.C.L. members and young revolutionaries affiliated to the Young Communist International has increased from 110,000 to 746,000. Altogether, this constitutes an army of nearly *two million*.

However, these figures do not give a picture of the real organized strength of the Communist Parties. There are tens of thousands of Communists working devotedly in enforced secrecy who are not covered by any statistics. The Communists of China who left the Soviet district of Kiangsi in 1935 marched a distance of 12,000 kilometers with the Red Army and performed extensive political work among the masses on the way. The nuclei they set up are alive, functioning

and active, although they are not registered anywhere.

Our statistics do not include the tens of thousands of Communists who are languishing in prisons and concentration camps. Every Section of the Communist International has a following of militant workmen who carry on activities under the guidance of the Party and whose numbers several times exceed the membership of the Party.

Besides this active following, each Communist Party has a wider circle of workers who are devoted to it, believe in it and support it. The Belgian Communist Party is not large numerically, it has only 7,000 members; but at the last municipal elections it secured 160,000 votes. The Communist Party of Holland has 10,000 members, but 137,000 people voted for it. An analysis of election results and of other indications of the influence of the Communist Parties permits us to draw the conclusion that every Party member represents a following of at least fifteen or twenty workers.

The Communists have increased their influence in the trade union movement: in a number of countries the self-sacrificing efforts of the Communists have won them the confidence of the rank-and-file trade union members, who have promoted them to leading positions in the trade union movement.

However, the growth of the Communist Parties in the various countries during the past five years has been uneven. There has been an increase in the size and strength of those which have been waging an armed struggle against the nefarious invasion of their countries, like the Spanish and Chinese Communist Parties. There has been an increase of Communist Party membership in countries where the proletariat has been able to stand firm against reaction, and where its struggle has been supported by the peasants and small townfolk, as, for instance, in France. There has been a growth in the membership of Communist Parties which exist more or less legally, and where the Social-Democrats are weak, as, for instance, in the United States and in many Latin American

countries. The growth of the Communist Parties has been much slower in countries where the Social-Democrats are strong and where their reactionary leaders have disrupted the unity of the working class and the working people; I refer to Great Britain and the Scandinavian countries. The growth of the Communist Parties has been greatly retarded in countries where the labor movement has been crushed, especially in the countries under totalitarian fascist dictatorships.

Among the Communist Parties which have grown in the period under review, one of the foremost places belongs to the heroic Communist Party of Spain, a party which has thoroughly mastered Comrade Stalin's wise counsel that real Bolsheviks should be "free of all panic, when things begin to grow complicated and some danger or other looms on the horizon." Since 1931 the Spanish Communist Party has grown from a membership of eight hundred into a mighty party of three hundred thousand, a party that has been through a schooling of illegal existence, revolution, civil war, and war against foreign counter-revolutionary intervention. It is a model of a real people's party, whose deep roots among the masses of workers and peasants no fascist terror can destroy.

The Communist Party of Spain has won great prestige among all sections of the people by its correct policy, in which the center of all its care and thoughts is the achievement of the *victory of the Spanish people* over their enemies. It has won the confidence of the people by its supreme heroism. The people have seen how it has rushed into the most dangerous places at moments of greatest peril. It has been the first to enter battle and the last to quit the field. It has won the affection of the people because it has proved itself by its Bolshevik deeds. It has produced such splendid people, such staunch Stalinists as Jose Diaz and Dolores Ibarruri (*applause*), the pride of the entire international Communist movement.

Another Section of the Comintern to play an important role in the life of its

country and its people is the Chinese Communist Party. It now numbers 148,000 members; it is connected not only with the workers, but with wide masses of peasants, and also enjoys considerable influence among the intelligentsia, especially the students.

The Communist Party of China is an armed section of the Chinese people. It is a party steeled and tempered in the fire of years of civil war and war for national emancipation; it has accumulated in the past the experience of the Soviet movement and of the organization of a Soviet power; it has a wealth of experience in the organization of a broad partisan movement, which is of such value in the present national war in China.

It is highly skilled in the art of demoralizing the enemy's forces, of penetrating deep into the enemy's rear and conducting extensive political work in the enemy's army. The Chinese Communist Party is at present growing fastest in the districts embraced by the partisan movement, in the rear of the Japanese army.

It is a model of tenacity and flexibility in consolidating and developing the national front, which is the basic condition for victory over the Japanese imperialist invaders. A strong point of the Chinese Communist Party is its work in training and promoting new cadres. The Chinese Communist Party has fine people like Mao Tse-tung and Chu Teh, who successfully combine the qualities of political leaders and talented generals. (*Applause.*)

The Communist Party of France was the pioneer in the struggle for the anti-fascist people's front. In these five years its membership has grown from 40,000 to 270,000. In the same period the circulation of *l'Humanité*, its central organ, has increased from 120,000 to 350,000 copies. *L'Humanité* has the third largest circulation in France, outdistancing dozens of bourgeois newspapers like *Le Temps*, *Le Matin* and others. The circulation of the Communist Party's provincial press amounts to 470,000 copies.

The number of votes obtained by the Party at the last parliamentary elections,

in 1936, reached one and a half million, or 90 per cent more than at the previous elections. In Paris and its suburbs the Communist Party won 33 seats out of 60—an absolute majority. It is the strongest party in the Paris department, especially in the big metal works. The strength of the French Communists lies in the great confidence they enjoy among the masses in the trade unions. They have won this confidence by their valiant fight for the unity and consolidation of the trade unions, and for the immediate demands of the working people. In developing the anti-fascist movement the Communist Party of France has invoked the best revolutionary traditions of its working class and its people. It has done tremendous work in rendering effective aid to the Spanish republic.

Considerable progress has been made by the Communist Party of the U.S.A. By doing its utmost to assist in crystallizing the class movement of the proletariat it has increased its membership from 20,000 to 90,000. Its membership has grown because its work has helped to strengthen the industrial unions, which have as many as four million members, and because it has worked tirelessly and patiently among the three and a half million workers who belong to the American Federation of Labor for the restoration of trade union unity on the basis of the class struggle. The Party has won great prestige among the Negro workers and also among the best representatives of the American intelligentsia. By participating in the broad democratic movement and criticizing its irresoluteness, the Communist Party of the U.S.A. has set this movement on the path of a more consistent struggle against fascism. One of the Party's serious defects is that it still lacks sufficient contact with the farmer masses and the farmers' movement.

The Communist Party of Great Britain can record a certain growth in membership—from 6,000 to 18,000; its influence in the trade unions and in the Labor Party has also grown. Although rejected by the leadership of the Labor Party, the British Communist Party's ap-

plication to affiliate to the Labor Party was supported by 1,400 trade union and local Labor Party organizations. Its campaign for the formation of a people's front in Britain is meeting with even greater response. Cripps' memorandum in favor of the people's front received 250,000 signatures in the space of a few days.

Yet, despite all these achievements, the British Communist Party is one of the backward Sections of the Comintern. It has not succeeded in reaching the main body of the British working class, which bears a tremendous responsibility for the fact that the policy of the British reactionaries with regard to the blockade of the Spanish republic was not thwarted in good time by action on its part.

All the legal Parties have progressed as a result of an improvement in their work in the trade unions, their struggle for the united front and the people's front, and their activity in assisting the Spanish people. The Communist Party of Canada, for instance, has increased its membership from 8,000 to 18,000; the Communist Party of Cuba from 3,000 to 23,000; the Communist Party of Mexico from 2,000 to 30,000; the Communist Party of Sweden from 8,000 to 19,000; the Communist Party of Denmark from 3,000 to 9,000. The Communist Parties have grown in certain of the colonial countries, wherever they have succeeded in taking an active part in the movement for the anti-imperialist national front and in winning, together with the masses, at least some modicum of democratic rights and liberties. This period has witnessed the outlawing of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which had 60,000 members before it became illegal. It has been able to preserve its leading people and the main body of its membership even while existing illegally. Severe blows have been suffered by the Communist movement in the countries under the heel of fascist dictatorship, particularly in Germany, Japan and Italy. The bourgeois casts tens of thousands of Communists into prisons and concentration camps, executes them with and without trial, nefariously assassinates them. It surrounds the workers with a

system of spying in the houses where they live, in the factories where they work, and in the fascist organizations into which it tries to drive them. It sets the fascist riff-raff on them, accusing them of "high treason."

How do the Communists work in these countries? In the conditions obtaining under a totalitarian fascist dictatorship it is difficult for them to build a Party organization centralized from top to bottom. They form a ramified network of groups consisting of people who have known each other for a long time and are bound by ties of mutual trust. There are hundreds of such groups. They are kept profoundly secret, are mobile and flexible. It is hard for the police to discover them. These groups are strenuously active in their houses, streets and districts. The Communists are further active in the factories. Thanks to their active efforts, the fascists have not been able to win influence in the factories either in Germany or Italy. Lastly, the Communists utilize the fascist mass organizations for their work among the laboring people.

Despite the fact that Comrade Thaelmann, the leader of the German Party, has already been languishing in a fascist jail for six years, despite the very severe handicaps of an illegal existence, the German Communist Party has succeeded in maintaining its organization. It is the only anti-fascist party conducting mass political work in Germany. (*Stormy applause.*)

But, unfortunately, the Party remained far too long under the hypnotic influence of its former mass strength, counting on the rapid and easy collapse of the fascist regime. Later, when it re-adjusted itself and adopted the course of prolonged and painstaking work in gathering together the proletarian forces and consolidating their organization, certain German Communists went to the other extreme. They failed to realize how rapidly the discontent of the masses with the fascist regime was rising, and were caught unawares by the growth of the anti-fascist sentiments to be observed in recent months in Germany.

The Communist Party of Japan has a

tradition of struggle against the predatory plans of the Japanese fascist militarists. It fought the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese imperialists, holding demonstrations and anti-war strikes and organizing the soldiers and sailors. Since 1937, when the Japanese imperialists again invaded China, the Party has been carrying on intense anti-war work, fighting chauvinism, organizing a wide campaign of assistance for the families of mobilized men and demanding the withdrawal of the Japanese armies from China; it has become the driving force of the movement for a people's front. Despite savage terror, the Party has succeeded in maintaining contact with the masses, although the numerical growth of the Party falls far short of its mass influence.

We must note the serious weakness of the Italian Communist Party. In all the long years of the fascist dictatorship it has not been able to weld together a strong illegal organization, to carry on serious work in the fascist trade unions and other fascist mass organizations, or to wean any considerable section of the younger generation from the influence of fascism. The theory of certain Italian Communists that only defeat in war can bring about the collapse of fascism is in reality but a mask for opportunistic passivity. This to a large extent explains why the Party has been unable to give leadership to the discontent of the masses with the war of Italian fascism in Ethiopia and Spain which has found expression in a number of spontaneous mass actions.

As against the Communist Party of Italy, there are a number of Parties functioning in small countries where the fascist dictatorship was established much later than in Italy, which, thanks to their militant activity, are now in the forefront of the illegal Communist Parties. I refer to certain Parties in countries lying in the path of German fascist penetration to the Near East.

The Communist movement has suffered greatly from the disrupting activities of the fascist secret services, which do their best to smuggle agents-provocateurs and

spies into the Communist ranks. In the past ten years sixty thousand Communists have been arrested in Japan; since 1934 the Central Committee of the Japanese Communist Party has had to be changed four times. The fascist secret services are assisted by Trotsky and the Trotskyites. In Poland, Italy, Japan and Germany the secret services make wide use of Trotsky's vile literary effusions for the purpose of demoralizing imprisoned Communists. On the instructions of the fascist secret services Trotskyites worm their way into the organizations of the people's front and of the national emancipation movement in order to disrupt them from within.

In Japan the Trotskyites are known as the "brain trust of the secret service." They work in special schools organized by the police, teaching Japanese spies how to combat the Communist and working class movement. In China the Trotskyites act as Japanese military spies. The chief of the Japanese espionage service in Peiping wrote of them in a secret report:

"We should support the group of Trotskyites and promote their success, so that their activities in various parts of China may benefit and advantage the empire, for these Chinese are destructive to the unity of the country. They work with remarkable finesse and skill."

In Spain the Trotskyites act as spies for fascist Germany and Italy and as agents of the Fifth Column, engineering counter-revolutionary revolts in the rear of the people's army. Everywhere, the Trotskyites act as fascist agents-provocateurs in the labor movement, as spies and diversionists against the U.S.S.R. The bourgeois espionage services make wide use of the Trotskyites and every other kind of fascist scum, sending them under the guise of political refugees to do espionage work in the U.S.S.R.

In order to disrupt the Communist movement the fascist-Trotskyite spies attempted to form artificial "factions" and "groups" in some of the Communist Parties and to stir up a factional struggle.

Most contaminated by hostile elements was the Communist Party of Poland, where agents of Polish fascism managed to gain positions of leadership. These scoundrels tried to get the Party to support Pilsudski's fascist coup in May, 1926. When this failed, they feigned repentance of their "May" error, made a show of self-criticism, and deceived the Comintern just as Lovestone and the police "factionalists" of the Hungarian and Yugoslav Parties had once done. And it was the fault of the Comintern workers that they allowed themselves to be deceived by the class enemy, failed to detect his maneuvers in time, and were late in taking measures against the contamination of the Communist Parties by enemy elements.

What have the Communist Parties done to remedy the consequences of the wrecking and undermining activities of the class enemy? The Communist Parties have drawn the lessons from the trials of the Trotskyite and Bukharinite scoundrels and have made wide use of them to heighten Bolshevik vigilance in their ranks. They have investigated their leading workers and removed those whose political honesty was questionable. They have dissolved illegal organizations which were particularly contaminated and have begun to form new ones in their place. They are carrying on a systematic fight against Trotskyism as an agency of fascism.

One of the most important measures in combating the undermining activities of the enemy and the demoralizing influence of bourgeois ideology on the weaker elements in the Parties is to raise the ideological and political level of the Communist Parties.

If the Communist Parties have overlooked the fact that the Trotskyites had degenerated into "a rabid and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies and murderers, working on the instruction of the espionage services of foreign states," this was due, among other reasons, to the theoretical deficiencies of the Communist Parties.

In the work of remedying the theoretical deficiencies of the Communist

Parties, the translation into foreign languages of the classics of Marxism-Leninism—the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin—and particularly the publication of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)* in many languages is of the greatest significance. The Communists in the capitalist countries hailed the appearance of the *History* with enthusiasm. They realize that this book arms them with an indispensable theoretical weapon, that it will help them to comprehend the development of the revolutionary movement in their countries, its peculiarities and its prospects, in the light of the experience of the Party of Lenin and Stalin.

In some of the Communist Parties the application of the tactics of the united working class front and the anti-fascist people's front has been marked by certain tendencies of a Right-opportunist character—a tendency to minimize the importance of the struggle against the capitulators, to idealize the role of the so-called democratic states, and to gloss over their imperialist character. The appearance of such tendencies, if only in the germ, points to the necessity of intensifying the struggle against opportunism.

While there has undoubtedly been a general improvement in the work of the Communists in the trade unions and some considerable achievements in this field, the majority of the Communist Parties have not yet been able to gain a firm foothold in the trade unions, to form an active following of militant trade unionists and to destroy the influence of the reactionary elements in the trade union movement.

The Communist Parties have not yet learned to combat fascist demagoguery effectively; they were unable to foil the speculation of German fascism on the national question in the Saar, in Danzig and in the Sudeten region.

They have still a poor grasp of Stalin's great art of foreseeing events, of estimating the part played by the various states, classes and parties in these events, and of anticipating the maneuvers of the enemy and thwarting his plans in time.

The Communists of the capitalist coun-

tries are not sufficiently prepared for abrupt turns of events and have not yet mastered the forms of struggle dictated by the tense international situation. It must, however, be noted that also in the mastery of these forms of struggle the Communist Parties have accomplished a great deal. The Spanish people will never forget the help the world Communist movement rendered them by the forming of the International Brigades.

The International Brigades did not consist of Communists only, but it was on their initiative that these brigades were formed and organized. The French Communist Party assigned this work to its most capable workers, its finest organizers. It was no easy task to convey tens of thousands of men through closed frontiers, overseas and even across the Atlantic Ocean.

The bourgeoisie raided the volunteers, persecuted and prosecuted them; but these men defied all obstacles, made their way through mountain paths, by night, waist deep in snow, and in fishing smacks, at the risk of being sunk any minute. The ranks of the volunteers were joined by French proletarians—the descendants of the Paris Communards—by Italian refugees, German anti-fascists, Canadian lumberjacks, who proved to be marvelous snipers, and Polish workers, whose battalion, the Dombrowsky Battalion, was the first to fall upon the enemy forces during the Ebro offensive, having swum the river without waiting for the pontoon bridges to be built.

The Communist Parties of fifty-three countries were represented in the International Brigades, having sent, in addition to the others who were eager to join, quite a number of Central Committee members and leading Party workers. Among them were men like Hans Beimler, a member of the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, who had been crippled in a German concentration camp, and who fell at Palasete crying "Rot Front!" There were men like the Hungarian Communist, old Hevesi, who led the Rakosi Battalion in an attack on one of the enemy's concrete fortifications at Muesca, captured it, but,

like the battalion commissar, died a heroic death. There were rank-and-filers like John, an English truck driver, who under heavy fire brought water to the men who were tormented with thirst; when mortally wounded, he said: "If Comrade Stalin saw this he would clap me on the back and say: 'Well done, John, you're a fine comrade, John!'" (*Thunderous applause.*)

Who are these people? They are the men and women of the Stalin era, when heroism has become an inalienable characteristic of the Bolshevik, Party and non-Party. They are men and women of the same Stalin breed who went into the attack at Lake Khasan with the war cry: "For the fatherland, Communism and Stalin!" (*The delegates rise to their feet and applaud. Cries of "Long live our great Stalin!" "Hurrah!" Stormy applause.*)

The formation of the International Brigades was an indication of the maturity of the world Communist movement, an expression of the Bolshevik schooling of the Sections of the Comintern, a test under fire of the Communist cadres.

And now to sum up.

During the past five years the Communist movement has grown, gained strength and attained to manhood. All the legal Parties have grown in numbers and have increased their influence over the masses. The lagging illegal Parties have reorganized their ranks, displaying models of supreme heroism and self-sacrifice in their difficult struggle. Some of the Communist Parties have already become, and others are in the process of becoming, important political factors in the life of their countries. Closer bonds have been forming between the Communist and Social-Democratic workers and between the active members of the Communist and Social-Democratic Parties. The confidence of the workers in the Communists has increased. The Communists have learned to give better expression to the needs and demands of the masses, to speak the language of their working class and their people. The ideological unity of the Communist Parties has grown stronger. In the days of



Munich, which split the nations, the bourgeois parties and the Social-Democratic Parties into two camps—capitulators to fascism and advocates of resistance to fascism—the Communists were the only Party which preserved its monolithic unity, politically and organizationally.

Nevertheless, the numerical growth of the Communist Parties and the growth of their influence among the masses were not commensurate with the demands made on the Sections of the Comintern by the sharpening of the class struggle and the development of the second imperialist world war.

#### C. THE ROAD OF STRUGGLE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES AND THE WORKING PEOPLE AGAINST WORLD REACTION

For a successful struggle against fascism and predatory wars, the working people must realize where world reaction is heading, and must outline *their own* way of foiling the insidious designs of the reactionaries.

What do the reactionaries want? They want to crush the Spanish republic and establish a system in Spain that will suit the interests of the German and Italian interventionists and the British and French bankers; then to turn their attention to France, to strike at the Communist Party through the Radicals, to frighten the petty bourgeois with fairy tales about the Communist Party being a party of war, to put an end to the People's Front, and then throw the Radicals onto the muckheap like a sucked lemon and give the fascist scoundrels a clear thoroughfare to power.

In Great Britain the reactionaries want to establish the Tories firmly in power for many years to come as "saviors of peace," to squash the people's front movement with the help of the Labor leaders, and to demoralize and enfeeble the British working class; in the United States they want to help the Fords, Morgans and Hearsts to smash the democratic movement.

The reactionaries would like to destroy the labor movement and settle accounts with the country of socialism.

What do the working people want? They want at all costs to help the *Spanish people* to establish in their own country a system that suits them, to organize international defense of the Spanish people, and to develop such a movement all over the world as will make the reactionaries think twice before strangling the free Spanish people.

In the Far East they want to prevent the partition of China, to help the Chinese people drive the Japanese invaders out of their country; to force the bourgeois governments by a mass movement to withdraw their support from the Japanese militarists and supply China with all she needs for victory over the enemy.

In France the workers want to win back to the People's Front the vacillating section of the peasantry and small town-folk, who are becoming more and more convinced that the Munich policy will end by making the French people a vassal of German fascism; they want not only to preserve the People's Front but to widen it by drawing in those sections which do not wish either themselves to follow the fatal path of capitulation to the fascist aggressors or to lead others along it.

In Great Britain the workers want to fight to a finish the struggle which has already begun for the formation of a people's front, and thus to deal a crushing blow not only to British but to world reaction; at the same time, in the course of the fight for the people's front, they want to brush aside the pro-fascist elements among the British bourgeoisie and to support those who favor resisting the fascist aggressors.

In the United States the working people want to strengthen and extend the democratic movement in order to prevent the reactionary pro-fascist elements from getting into power.

As to the countries under fascist dictatorship—Germany, Japan and Italy—the working people of the whole world want the governments of these countries to be defeated in war; they want

to help the people of these countries to enter the broad path of an open mass struggle against the fascist regime, a struggle that will lead to the overthrow of the fascist government, in which the international working class and all working people are vitally interested. They want to prevent world reaction from throwing a life belt to the fascist governments of Germany, Italy and Japan, which are heading for the abyss of financial bankruptcy. They do not want world reaction to present the fascist governments with sources of food, raw materials, ore, oil, etc., for the development of new wars of plunder. They want to prevent easy "victories" for the fascist robbers, who attack weak nations, but stand in dread of serious resistance.

They demand the organization of resistance by the international working class, by the anti-fascist forces of the world, to fascist expansion, to the economic and political enthrallment of nations as a prelude to their military enslavement. They want to help the struggle against German fascism, the struggle of the enslaved people of Austria, of the enthralled peoples of Czechoslovakia and Hungary, and of the peoples of Rumania and Jugoslavia, who are under threat of enslavement. They want to support the enslaved people of Ethiopia against Italian fascism. They are *fighting for the formation of a front of nations, a front of international resistance to the bloc of fascist aggressors.*

The working people want a united front of the international working class, so as to put an end to the capitulatory policy of the reactionary Social-Democratic leaders. Such a front would lead the labor movement out of its state of dismay and disorganization onto the road of victorious battles against fascism. It would increase the confidence of millions of proletarians in their own strength, and it would infect wide sections of the working people, the peasantry and the small townfolk with this confidence. It would increase the strength of resistance of the masses to fascist aggression in all countries, and it would rouse the peoples of Germany,

Italy and Japan to overthrow the fascist dictatorship. *The establishment of a united international working class front would be a most severe defeat for fascism.*

The working people want a united front of the working class of the capitalist countries with the Soviet working class, with the armed Soviet people, who possess a powerful state and the material power of victorious socialism. This front would be the real guarantee of peace. World reaction would dash itself to pieces against the impregnable rock of such a front.

The working people of the capitalist countries, reduced to despair by crises, unemployment, poverty, fascist terror and imperialist wars, but stirred into movement by the immense socialist victories of the Soviet people, want to live without fascism, without capitalism. *They want socialism.* That is the reason for the fury of the moribund capitalist world. It wants to save itself by fascism. But fascism will not save capitalism from destruction, for fascism only drives the discontent of the masses deeper underground and paves the way for an explosion of enormous destructive power. Fascism will not be saved by imperialist wars, for its imperialist wars give rise to revolutions. Capitalism will not be saved by a new redivision of the world, for new redvisions of the world merely deepen the capitalist chaos.

The moribund capitalist world will not save itself by a counter-revolutionary war on the Soviet Union, but will only hasten its own destruction. The armed resistance of the great Soviet people will stir up the whole world of labor, all those whose right to liberty, work, a better life and an independent country has been trampled underfoot by fascism. It will rouse proletarians and working people in all corners of the globe, who will realize that the hour of retribution for their centuries of suffering is at hand. It will let loose throughout the world a mighty movement of anti-fascist forces, heartened by the tremendous power of resistance offered by the Soviet people to fascism. It will spur on

to struggle peoples who have hitherto avoided coming to grips with fascism. It will turn against fascism the peoples of the fascist states, who will have arms placed in their hands. For the fascist governments it will be a war not only against the Soviet Union, but also against their own peoples. For the Soviet people, for the working people of the world, for all advanced and progressive mankind, it will be the most just and sacred war ever waged in the history of humanity, a war which "*will most certainly loosen a number of revolutionary knots in the rear of the enemy, disintegrating and demoralizing the ranks of imperialism.*" (Stalin.)

#### TWENTY YEARS ALONG THE PATH OF LENIN AND STALIN

Comrades, the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) is meeting twenty years after the foundation of the Comintern.

"The historic significance of the Third, Communist, International," Lenin wrote, "lies in the fact that it has begun to give effect to Marx's great slogan summing up a century of development of socialism and the working class movement, the slogan which is expressed in the concept: dictatorship of the proletariat."\*

The Communist International was following the path of Lenin and Stalin when it united the proletarian vanguard that had been raised from the midst of the working class of all countries by the victory of the great socialist revolution. The formation of the Communist International answered to the fundamental interests and the historic aims of the world labor movement, which had been split by the policy of class collaboration with the bourgeoisie pursued by the Social-Democratic Parties and by

their open betrayal of the interests of the proletarian revolution during the first imperialist world war.

The Communist International was following the path of Lenin and Stalin when, in 1918-23, it made every effort to guide the movement of the revolutionary masses in Central Europe to the overthrow of capitalism. It was following this path when it fought the "reforms" and bourgeois democracy with which the bourgeoisie hoped to save itself from the onslaught of the revolutionary masses and block the road to proletarian revolution.

The Comintern was following the path of Lenin and Stalin when, during the period of partial and relative stabilization of capitalism, it concentrated its fire on the Social-Democratic Parties, which by their policy were helping the bourgeois reaction to consolidate itself and assume the offensive against the working people.

The Comintern was following this path when it purged its ranks of the fellow-travelers whom the revolutionary wave of 1918-23 had washed like jetsam to the Communist shore, when it ruthlessly cauterized the opportunist infection, the hangovers of the ideology of Social-Democracy, Centrism and Anarcho-Syndicalism. It was following this path when it adopted the course of Bolshevikization of its Sections, waged a struggle on two fronts, stamped out unprincipled factionalism and followed the aim of hammering out monolithic Communist Parties in battle.

It was the path of Lenin and Stalin that the Communist International was following in the world economic crisis, when, in the face of the fascist offensive and incipient imperialist wars, it called upon the masses to form a united working class front and an anti-fascist people's front against fascism and imperialist war. Thereby the Communist International answered the aspirations of millions of working people who wished to tighten their ranks and to unite for a combined effort to escape from the torments of fascist terror, from the bloody inferno of predatory wars, from

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\* V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. XXIV, p. 248, Russian edition.

the atrocities of the decaying capitalist system.

The path traversed by the Communist International in these twenty years, the path of struggle for socialist revolution, for the dictatorship of the proletariat, has been no easy one. It has been attended not only by victories but by tremendous difficulties and temporary defeats.

"... Revolution," said Comrade Stalin, "does not usually develop along a straight ascending line, as a continuous rise, but in zigzags, in advances and retreats, in an ebb and flow, hardening the forces of the revolution in the course of development and preparing the way for its final victory."\*

During these twenty years the world bourgeoisie has spared no efforts to wipe the Communist movement from the face of the earth. It has sent Communists to prison, tortured them, murdered them. It has driven them out of the factories, deprived them of a livelihood, organized brutal attacks on them. It has set fire to Reichstags, fabricated "Comintern" documents, concluded international police conventions. The henchmen of the bourgeoisie, the reactionary leaders of Social-Democracy and the reformist trade unions, have crusaded against the Communists time without number.

The rabid enemies of the working class who have become agents of the fascist espionage services have attempted to divert the Communist movement from the Bolshevik path, to disintegrate and destroy it. Comrade Stalin has helped the international Communist movement to expose and thwart the counter-revolutionary designs of the agents of the class enemy. Under his leadership the C.P. S.U.(B.) has utterly routed them, has brushed the despicable fascist insects from the victorious path of the builders of a classless, socialist society, and has

thereby strengthened the position of world communism.

Comrade Stalin has not only protected the great doctrine of Marx-Engels-Lenin from distortion by enemy elements, but has developed it further and applied it to the new conditions of the era of the general crisis of capitalism and the victory of socialism in the Soviet Union. He has armed the international proletariat with this doctrine, widened its horizons, made the prospects of its struggle more definite and imbued the workers of all countries with still greater confidence in victory.

Under the leadership of Comrade Stalin the peoples of the Soviet Union have erected a mighty socialist fortress, strengthening it by their socialist victories with every passing day; and in doing so they have ceaselessly strengthened the positions of the international proletariat and the working people of the whole world.

The hopes of the world bourgeoisie have been shattered because communism cannot be destroyed, just as the vehicle of communism, the working class, cannot be destroyed. They have been shattered because communism is the concentrated expression of the fundamental interests of the working class and of the ultimate aims of its movement, aims which correspond to the interests of all the working people. They have been shattered because the idea of communism is no longer an abstract dream of the finest minds of humanity; this idea now has its material embodiment in the Soviet Union, which shows the international working class and all working people the true road to their emancipation.

The hopes of the world bourgeoisie have been shattered because the great Stalinist work of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. has served to strengthen and consolidate the international proletarian ties of the working class of the U.S.S.R. with the working class of the bourgeois countries. They have been shattered because the mighty land of socialism gains strength with every day and with every hour, and because the Communist Parties light their path of

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\* Joseph Stalin, "Results of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of the Russian Communist Party," *Leninism*, Vol. I. International Publishers, New York.

progress with the torch of the immortal doctrine of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. (*Stormy applause.*)

The hopes of the world bourgeoisie have been shattered, and will be shattered, because the interests of the work-

ing people of the whole world are guarded by the genius of laboring humanity, Comrade Stalin.

(*Stormy applause and cheers. All rise. Cries of "Long live the great leader of world communism, Comrade Stalin!"*)

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# Speech of Marshal Klementi Voroshilov

*People's Commissar of Defense of the U.S.S.R.*

March 13, 1939

**C**OMRADES, the report of Comrade Stalin is a highly valuable contribution to the treasure store of Marxist-Leninist theory. It is also a splendid guide for our Party, for our state and for the people in the struggle for the further building of socialism, the building of a communist society. Comrade Stalin's brilliant Marxist-Leninist analysis of modern capitalist society and of its relations with the country of victorious socialism has disclosed all the ulcers, the putrefaction and the agony of modern capitalism and has drawn a clear picture of the mighty progress of the socialist Soviet Union.

The world bourgeoisie is seeking to escape from its mesh of unsolvable contradictions by a bestial fascism, allowing it complete freedom of action. It is egging it on to military adventures and inciting it to fight the Soviet Union. This international policy, if we may call it so, of the ruling imperialist bourgeoisie has not only surrendered whole states to the power of fascism, but has aided and abetted it in launching a second imperialist war, of which half a billion people and a number of peaceable countries are already victims.

Comrade Stalin said in his report that

“. . . any war, however small, started by the aggressors in any remote corner of the world constitutes a danger to the peaceable countries. All the more serious then is the danger arising from the new imperialist war which has already drawn

into its orbit over five hundred million people in Asia, Africa and Europe.”

The country of victorious socialism is the most peaceable country in the world. But it is surrounded by hostile imperialist countries and it is a thorn in the flesh to moribund capitalism, and it is, therefore, more in danger of military attack than any other country.

The peaceable countries, which include some of our near neighbors, are doing very little to strengthen the cause of peace and to prepare to resist the aggressors. We must therefore, as always, rely only on ourselves.

The blessings of peace which the peoples of the Soviet Union have been enjoying for over fifteen years are due to the tremendous work of our Party, the government and the whole people. The peace of the state is the work of our own hands.

The mighty development of our socialist economic system as a result of the splendid fulfilment of the two Stalinist Five-Year Plans, and the unparalleled development of socialist culture in our country, have enabled the Party Central Committee and the government, under the direct guidance of our Stalin, steadily to strengthen and perfect our armed forces—the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and Red Navy—which are a formidable power protecting the frontiers of our country and guaranteeing it against enemy invasion.

I want to tell the Eighteenth Party Congress in some detail, within the limits of what is permissible, of course, about the Red Army as it stands today.

But before passing to this, I want to dwell for a moment on the steady growth of armaments of the imperialist states, especially the fascist states. I know that this is widely known, that it has already set everybody's teeth on edge, nevertheless, something must be said on the subject.

On March 5 *Pravda* reprinted an article from a German fascist military magazine, *Die Deutsche Wehr*, dealing with the armies of the principal countries in peace time and their power of expansion for war purposes, and also quoting certain figures showing their equipment in artillery and aircraft.

This article prudently refrains from saying anything about the armed forces of Germany. It does not mention that the peace strength of the army of fascist Germany is 1,150,000 men, that the fascist militarized organizations number about 2,000,000 men, and that in war-time Germany will expand her army five and a half or six times.

They say nothing about themselves, but what they say about others is worth noting.

The peace strength of armies and their estimated war strength are as follows:

Country	Peace Strength	Estimated War Strength	Coefficient of Expansion
U.S.A. ....	384,000	2,500,000	6.5
Great Britain	529,200	2,000,000	3.6
France ....	760,000	5,100,000	6.7
Italy .....	400,000	2,000,000	5.0
Japan .....	328,000	1,500,000	4.6
Turkey .....	203,000	1,300,000	6.4
Rumania ...	217,000	1,600,000	7.4
Poland .....	302,000	3,600,000	11.9
Latvia .....	25,500	150,000	5.9
Esthonia ....	11,000	100,000	9.0
Finland .....	28,000	310,000	11.1

The figures given for the Italian and Japanese armies stand in need of very serious amendment; they are too low.

The Japanese army, for example, already has over one and a half million men under arms, and it is continuing to

grow. As for Italy, the fascist leaders of that country promise to expand their army to nine or ten million men.

As regards the other armies enumerated—with the exception of the Red Army, the figures for which the fascist *Deutsche Wehr* muddles in a most unholy fashion—without placing complete confidence in these figures, it may nevertheless be said that they are not very far from the truth and, at any rate, are good enough to allow us to draw certain conclusions.

And the conclusions are obvious.

The first thing that strikes the eye is the high coefficient of mobilization expansion of armies in war time. If we exclude Great Britain, which will expand her army only four times, all the other armies will in case of war be increased five, six, seven and nine times, and the Polish and Finnish armies even twelve times or thereabouts.

This testifies to the disastrously tense situation which will prevail in all these countries the moment they go to war.

Yet the experience of all wars has shown that no army on active service can keep its formations and numbers within the original limits, and in a very short space of time is obliged to swell and expand.

This is particularly true in prolonged wars. And modern wars, as the second imperialist war eloquently shows, will be prolonged, protracted, ruinous.

This tenseness is also borne out by the military budgets of the principal capitalist countries, and especially of the fascist countries.

### GROWTH OF MILITARY BUDGETS

Country	Percentage of military budget to total budget	
	1934-35	1937-38
Germany .....	21.0	67.0
Japan .....	43.4	70.0
Italy .....	20.0	52.0
Poland .....	32.9	33.6
Great Britain .....	15.5	32.2
U.S.A. ....	14.2	17.7
France .....	24.4	37.7

These figures only relate to the of-

ficially published military budgets. But it requires no great insight to guess that the fascist states directly or indirectly engaged in aggressive war have other sources to cover the military expenditures about which the public knows nothing.

The furious race in air armaments in the capitalist countries has already been going on for several years and it is undoubtedly one of the most characteristic

and decisive factors rendering a universal armed collision inevitable.

What was the state of the air forces of the principal world powers at the end of the first imperialist war and what is it today?

Leaving aside the question of types of aircraft, and without going into a detailed analysis of their quality, but taking only the aggregate figures published from time to time in the world press, we get the following picture:

#### COMPARATIVE TABLE

Showing the Size of the Air Forces of Foreign Countries, Their Bombing-Power and Their Fire-Power in Bullets per Minute in 1918, 1934 and 1938

<i>Year</i>	<i>Number of air-planes</i>	<i>Per Cent 1918 = 100</i>	<i>Bombing-power, tons</i>	<i>Per Cent 1918 = 100</i>	<i>Bullets per minute</i>	<i>Per Cent 1918 = 100</i>
<b>Great Britain</b>						
1918 .....	1,758	100	149	100	605,400	100
1934 .....	1,072	61	608	408	1,651,200	273
1938 .....	2,238	128	1,476	991	5,600,000	925
<b>Germany</b>						
1918 .....	2,730	100	134	100	984,800	100
1934 .....	620	23	350	261	954,000	97
1938 .....	4,020	147	2,995	2,235	10,400,000	1,054
<b>France</b>						
1918 .....	3,321	100	146	100	1,439,700	100
1934 .....	1,970	59	385	264	2,595,000	180
1938 .....	4,000	120	1,680	1,150	9,160,000	636
<b>Italy</b>						
1918 .....	812	100	—	—	—	—
1934 .....	931	115	489	100	1,352,000	100
1938 .....	2,161	416	1,534	314	5,248,000	388
<b>Japan</b>						
1918 .....	250	100	—	—	—	—
1934 .....	2,050	820	480	100	2,820,000	100
1938 .....	3,005	1,200	793	160	6,400,000	227
<b>Poland</b>						
1918 .....	—	—	—	—	—	—
1934 .....	634	100	23	100	783,600	100
1938 .....	1,101	175	61	265	2,376,000	303

Such was the state of the air forces of the principal capitalist countries in 1938; but, of course, it is entirely different now, in March, 1939.

All the capitalist countries are continuing to develop their air forces at an accelerated pace. Aviation—that young branch of the service—is regarded by all the imperialist armies as a panacea for all military ills. The imperialists have placed their stakes on aviation, and with its aid the bourgeois imperialist and fas-

cist ruling cliques hope to win the next war.

I shall speak about our air force later.

Comrades, these few figures are enough to show the tremendous growth in the armaments of the imperialist, and especially the fascist, states and what huge sums are being spent for the new, the second, universal imperialist slaughter.

In consequence of this altogether unrestricted and furious armament race,



and of those entangled and profound contradictions of capitalism of which Comrade Stalin has spoken in his report, the international situation today is such that a second universal imperialist war has become inevitable.

The second imperialist war for a new redivision of the world is already in swing. The fascist aggressors, meeting with no impediment to their course, are intoxicated by their first easy successes and are looking around for new victims. It is difficult to foresee how this second imperialist war will develop, what other countries will be engulfed in its bloody torrent, and when.

But one thing is unquestionable—it follows from the whole analysis of the present international situation made by Comrade Stalin—namely, that we must always have an unfailingly strong and invincible Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and an equally strong and invincible Red Navy.

We know now more than ever that the only reliable guarantee against military attack on the Soviet state is to keep the Red Army and Navy in a state of real and constant military preparedness, and that only in this way, by still further strengthening and perfecting the military forces of the state, can we insure ourselves against the foul attempts of the fascists to enrich themselves by easy pickings at the expense of our country, attempts to destroy the territorial integrity of the Soviet state by military attack.

#### THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY

During the past five years the Red Army and Navy have undergone considerable, I would say in part radical, change as regards organization, armament, technical equipment and fighting efficiency.

I will deal with the major points:

1. As you know, the majority of the rifle units, and to some extent the other branches of the Red Army were formerly built on a mixed principle, the so-called territorial and cadre systems.

In the event of mobilization, the territorial system predetermined the expansion of our rifle divisions around numerically small, and therefore weak, cadres. This meant that in the period immediately following mobilization, a large part of our rifle and certain other formations would have been poorly organized, and the fighting capacity of these troops would have been only relative.

The territorial system was tolerable as long as the armies of the capitalist countries were comparatively small and would also, in the event of war, have been developed around weak cadres.

The territorial system, as the basis of our army, began to conflict with the defensive requirements of the state as soon as the principal imperialist countries started to increase their armies and to put them in a state of readiness for war even in peace time. We had no right to adhere to our old system of organization, for this would have put us in an unfavorable position in relation to our probable adversaries. A radical reform was needed to fit the army for the new conditions of mobilization, the tactical and strategical problems of our Red Army and the defensive requirements of the state. We could not, we had no right, to allow our army to be worse trained and weaker than the armies of bourgeois countries.

Moreover, already in the period of the First Stalin Five-Year Plan the territorial system no longer harmonized with the increasing supply of fighting machines and modern equipment to the army.

As a consequence, it was found necessary to abolish the territorial system as the structural basis of our army and to adopt the cadre system exclusively. Today our whole army is uniformly built on the cadre principle, which is so far the only correct one.

2. Parallel with the placing of the army on a cadre footing, the military administrative bodies in the localities, whose organization was closely interlocked with the territorial system of

formation, and which could not cope with the growing complexity of their tasks, were thoroughly reorganized.

Today the whole system of military commissariats has been reorganized. In place of the former regional corps and divisional mobilization areas, which were under the charge of the district military commissariats, a duty they did not cope with very well, independent military commissariats have been set up in the autonomous republics, territories, regions, autonomous regions and cities, while the number of district military commissariats has increased three and a half times. This measure has helped considerably to improve the system of registration and calling up of persons liable to military service, as well as the conditions of mobilization.

3. With the object of improving the administration and direction of military training of the army, two new military areas have been formed during this period—the Kalinin and Orel.

4. The administration of the forces in the Far East has been reorganized. In place of the former Far-Eastern Red Banner Front two separate army administrations have been formed. This measure has markedly improved the conditions and military training of our troops in the Maritime and Pre-Amur Regions.

5. In conformity with the Stalin Constitution, the national units have been reorganized.

The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army constitutes an integral army of the Soviet state and is recruited from among the citizens of the Soviet Union on a uniform and equal basis. The existence of separate small national military units, permanently tied to their territory, was, therefore, contrary to the principles of the Stalin Constitution and to the extra-territorial principles of formation of our army. The national units have been merged with the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on general lines.

6. As you know, our frontiers are girdled in their more vulnerable parts by a zone of fortified areas. During this

period measures were taken to strengthen the existing fortifications and to build a number of other fortified zones, the effect being radically to improve our whole system of frontier defenses. The number of special troops in the fortified zones has considerably increased.

7. In view of the growth in the numerical strength and technical equipment of the army, as well as of the steadily growing requirements of the men with regard to culture and political knowledge, it was considered necessary to institute a system of commissars.

8. It should be added that last year the Party Central Committee and the government set up a Supreme Military Council consisting of eleven persons, one of whom is our Stalin. (*Loud applause.*)

It is the function of the Supreme Military Council to examine and decide all major and important questions pertaining to the Red Army.

Military Councils have been set up in the Military Districts.

9. And, lastly, during this period the Navy has been separated from the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and placed under a separate People's Commissariat, as you all know.

I shall now deal with the changes that have taken place during this period in the combatant units themselves.

How has the numerical strength of the Red Army changed during this period?

Taking the strength of the Red Army at the time of the Seventeenth Party Congress as 100, now, in 1939, at the time of the Eighteenth Party Congress, it is 203 (*loud applause and cheers*), or an increase of 103 per cent. In other words, the size of the army has more than doubled.

This increase was not distributed evenly among all branches of the service, but in accordance with their relative importance. This quite respectable increase in the size of the army led to other very important changes.

We have now ten times as many cadre rifle divisions as before, when the territorial system prevailed and the army was smaller.

The peace and war strength of the rifle divisions has undergone a marked change. Whereas formerly the war strength of a rifle division was 13,000 men, it is now 18,000. The increase is chiefly due to additional artillery—from what is known as in-fighting artillery to divisional artillery—to increased machine-gun equipment, and to an increase in the striking force of the companies, that is, in the number of riflemen per platoon.

Rifle divisions form part of rifle corps. A rifle corps consists of three, sometimes two, rifle divisions.

Thus a typical rifle corps of the Red Army constitutes a fairly imposing fighting unit: it has about 60,000 men and an appropriate quantity of artillery, tanks and other armament, all kinds of auxiliary services and motor transport.

In order to give you some idea of the fire-power of a modern rifle corps in some of the capitalist armies as compared with ours, I shall cite some figures compiled by our experts at my request.

I shall take the German and French corps for purposes of comparison, as their structure is most analogous to that of our rifle corps.

The aggregate artillery salvo of a French rifle corps (consisting of three divisions) is 6,373 kilograms; that of a German rifle corps of the same composition—6,078 kilograms. The aggregate artillery salvo of a Red Army rifle corps is 7,136 kilograms. (*Applause.*)

Consequently, the artillery salvo of our rifle corps is heavier than that of the German or French corps.

Further, the weight of shells that can be fired per minute by the rifle corps mentioned is: French—51,462 kilograms, and German—48,769 kilograms. Our rifle corps can deliver 66,605 kilograms of metal per minute. (*Applause.*)

In addition to artillery, a corps is equipped with rifles, machine-guns, mortars, grenade-guns and the like, which increases the total weight of metal that can be hurled by a corps per minute.

If we add together the weight of shells, mines, rifle grenades and bullets that

can be delivered per minute, we get the following figures:

	<i>Kilograms</i>
French corps .....	60,981
German corps .....	59,509
Our corps .....	78,932

(*Applause.*)

These figures show that our rifle corps, and consequently the whole Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, is not lagging behind, and if anything surpasses, the armies of the capitalist, fascist countries in fire-power. (*Applause.*)

I deliberately refrain from quoting figures—although I have them—regarding the Japanese, Polish and other armies, because the organization and armament of these armies, of their divisions and corps, are beneath all comparison with those of the armies of Germany and France.

The Party Central Committee, the government, Comrade Stalin, the whole Party and the entire nation demand that we shall not lag behind our neighbors in respect to armament and the defensive power of our state; and we are not lagging, as you see—we have no right to. (*Applause.*)

The Red cavalry, like other branches of the service, has also grown in strength. The increase in cavalry is 52 per cent. The increase in technical equipment of the cavalry is as follows:

Light machine guns.....	30%
Heavy machine guns.....	21%
Anti-aircraft guns and equipment .....	31%
Artillery .....	43%

In addition, the cavalry have been equipped with special anti-aircraft artillery, which securely protects it from air attack; the tank regiments of the cavalry divisions have been enlarged by 30 per cent and they have been furnished with special armored car units.

These are the main things—not to mention the numerous minor things—that have been done to increase the fighting power and striking force of our Red cavalry.

The armored car and tank troops have grown during this period as follows:

their total man-power has increased by 152½ per cent. The tank units and formations have been thoroughly reorganized to adapt them to tactical requirements. The number of tank units has increased by 180 per cent and the number of tanks by 191 per cent. The number of armored cars has increased seven and a half times.

Parallel with this the equipment of the tank troops has been modernized. New types of tanks have been introduced and the old ones have been perfected as regards the defensive armor and special equipment.

There has been a marked change in the armament of the tank troops, especially in respect to artillery.

In order to give you some idea of the fire-power of the tank troops today as compared with what it was five years ago, I shall mention the following figures:

If the aggregate salvo of all types of firing weapons of tanks and armored cars in 1934 be taken as 100, in 1939 it is 393. In other words, the fire-power of our tank troops is nearly four times as great as in 1934.

Further, if the aggregate fire-power per minute of our tanks in 1934 be taken as 100, in 1939 it is 334, or nearly three and a half times as much.

Artillery: Very serious attention has been paid to the artillery equipment of our troops, and the results are no mean ones.

Light artillery, not counting anti-tank guns and in-fighting artillery, has increased during this period by 34 per cent.

Medium artillery has increased by 26 per cent.

Heavy artillery has increased by 85 per cent.

Anti-aircraft guns have increased by 169 per cent.

Anti-tank and tank artillery, which was inadequately developed, has increased at an even faster pace than other types of artillery. I may say briefly that as regards anti-tank and tank artillery the Red Army is fully equipped, and moreover with first-class weapons.

We formerly did not have, or, to be exact, had very little, in-fighting artillery. Now we are manufacturing this highly important species of artillery (mortars and bomb-throwers) and are supplying it in the needed quantity and of good quality.

Parallel with the growth in the quantity of artillery, there has been an improvement in the quality both of new systems introduced and of the old, which have been thoroughly modernized.

In addition, the proportion between guns and howitzers in the artillery units has radically changed. I need only mention that howitzers have increased by 80 per cent, which means that our artillery has become more deadly and effective.

The range of all types of artillery has increased. The increase in the range of heavy artillery, for example, varies from 50 to 75 per cent, depending on the type.

There has also been an increase in the firing speed of all types of artillery, especially of tank and anti-tank guns, whose firing speed has more than doubled.

Shells are now of greater weight and effectiveness.

The chemical service troops of the Red Army, whose function it is to defend the army from chemical attack and to retaliate to a chemical blow of the enemy by a similar chemical blow, has also undergone a change of organization and has doubled in numerical strength.

Today the methods of chemical defense, both as to quality and quantity, are entirely different from what they were five years ago.

First of all, there has been an improvement in the means of protecting the exposed parts of the skin and the respiratory organs of our men; we are manufacturing in sufficient quantities means for protecting the men from chemical attack from the air; we also have means of protecting horses and of preserving materials from damage by chemicals.

There has been an improvement in the quality and a considerable increase in the quantity of mechanical and tech-

nical means of decontaminating affected localities. A great deal has been done in devising special machines for this purpose.

Just a few words regarding the signal corps, that very important branch of the service on which the whole work of administering and directing an army in peace time, and especially in war time, depends.

The strength of the signal corps has increased by 37 per cent, chiefly as a result of the modern equipment furnished to the troops.

Wireless apparatus with a larger radius of action and with automatic recording equipment has been introduced.

Fast-action telegraph apparatus has increased by 200 per cent. Long-distance telephone apparatus has been introduced.

The mobility of the signal corps has been increased.

The signal corps has been almost completely motorized.

All this, and much else, necessitated an increase in the numerical strength and an improvement in the quality of this branch of the service.

An important question is the active defense of our country from the air. Considerable attention was devoted to the question during this period, but it must be confessed that we have not yet done all we should. However, even as it is, there is already a marked improvement in the air defense of the major centers of our country.

I need only mention the numerical increase in anti-aircraft guns to show how much has been done in this field. Anti-aircraft guns have increased by 288.3 per cent.

The quality of the anti-aircraft guns has also improved; for example, the ceiling of fire has increased by 60 per cent. (*Applause.*)

As you know, the air defense of our important state centers and cities is based on the coordinated action of anti-

aircraft guns and pursuit planes. Parallel with an improvement in their coordination, there has been an increase in the number of pursuit planes, by 142.3 per cent.

I shall not dwell on what is known as passive (what a word!) air defense—it would be better and truer to call it local, or civil, air defense—although the question is one that deserves to be spoken about at length. I would only say that the position in this respect is not so good, and not owing so much to the fault of us (the military men), as to that of the officials in the localities. This matter must be tackled more energetically and without delay.

I shall make no mention of air defense in the army, which is developing normally and is commensurate with the growth of the army.

In order not to fatigue you, I shall leave out many matters relating to the auxiliary services, such as railway, engineer, searchlight, motor transport service and so on, which, like the army as a whole, have completely changed their aspect during this period, both as to quantity and, especially, as to quality.

Compared with 1934, the personnel of the air force has increased by 138 per cent, that is, it is nearly two and a half times as large. (*Applause.*)

The total number of planes has increased by 130 per cent, or considerably more than doubled.

If, however, the strength of the air force as compared with 1934 is expressed in engine power, we find that it has increased by 7,900,000 horse power, or an increase of 213 per cent compared with five years ago. (*Applause.*)

This quantitative growth of the air force has been accompanied by a change in its quality.

Here are a few figures that bear this out:

	Speed	Increase per cent Ceiling	Range
Pursuit planes	56.5	21.5	—
Bombers (short-range)	88.0	83.0	50.0
Bombers (long-range)	70.0	77.0	61.0
Scout and battle planes	67.0	23.0	45.0

During this period there has been a change in the relative proportion of the various types of military aircraft, which is a factor of great importance.

The proportion of heavy bombers has risen from 10.6 per cent to 20.6 per cent, that is, has doubled.

The proportion of light bombers, battle planes and scout planes has dropped from 50.2 per cent to 26 per cent, or by half.

The proportion of pursuit planes has increased from 12.3 per cent to 30 per cent, that is, two and a half times.

Thus the proportion of heavy bombers and pursuit planes has more than doubled.

This means that our air force has become more powerful and its striking effect has correspondingly increased.

Whereas in 1934 our air force could carry a total load of 2,000 tons of bombs in one flight, it can now carry 208 per cent more; that is, the aggregate bomb volley has trebled. This mass of destructive metal, capable of being hurled huge distances, may serve as quite an effective Soviet straitjacket for frenzied aggressors, if in an insane fit they should attempt to set foot on Soviet soil. (*Loud applause.*)

Parallel with this, there has been an increase in the aggregate machine-gun fire-power of our air force. If the total number of shots that could be fired per minute by our aircraft machine guns in 1934 be taken as 100, in 1939 the figure is 400.

I can understand the natural wish of comrades to know what sort of aircraft we have, at least to know what are their speed, ceiling and range, expressed not in percentages, but in figures comprehensible to the lay mind. In deference to this natural wish, let me mention that you may now meet in our military air-dromes not only pursuit planes but even bombers with a speed far exceeding 500 kilometers per hour (*loud applause and cheers. Shouts of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Voroshilov!" "Long live the Red Air Force!" The delegates rise and heartily cheer Comrade Stalin,* and with a ceiling of 14,-

000-15,000 meters. (*Applause.*) As for the range of our aircraft, nothing could be said more eloquently than was said by the deeds of the late Valery Chkalov, Hero of the Soviet Union, of Heroës of the Soviet Union Gromov, Baidukov, Yumashev, Belyakov, Danilin, Kokkinaki and the late Bryandinsky, and of our splendid airwomen, Heroës of the Soviet Union Grizodubova, Osipenko and Ras-kova. (*Applause.*)

And you all know, of course, that these and many, many other heroes, our Stalin falcons, will tell still more of the qualities of our aircraft to our people and to the whole world. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Comrades, I have said nothing about our valiant Workers' and Peasants' Navy, not only because it now constitutes a separate force directed by a separate People's Commissariat, but because, as you know from Comrade Molotov's speech in the Supreme Soviet and from other sources, the Party and the government have decided to build, and are already successfully building, a powerful navy, both for sea and ocean service, and also because other comrades will speak about the navy.

To conclude this section of my speech, I will cite some figures illustrating the extent to which our army is motorized.

Since 1934 the motorization of our army as a whole has increased by 260 per cent. The position is as follows: whereas in 1934 we had an average 7.74 horse power per Red Armyman, in 1939 we have an average of 13 horse power, or an increase of 67 per cent. (*Prolonged applause.*) This in spite of the fact that the size of the army itself has more than doubled.

#### PERSONNEL

Comrades, I have told you about the changes that have taken place during the past five years in the organization, armament and technical equipment of our army. Our army has completely changed as regards quantity, and especially as regards quality.

I have said nothing about the personnel, about our men, commanders, com-

missars, political workers, engineers, sappers, surgeons, quartermasters, in a word, about the human element of our army which in the long run decides everything and actually determines the fighting strength and military power of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army.

Without men, technique is dead. Technique in the hands of men who understand it and have mastered it is a great force.

Cadres decide everything. That is beyond question. That is why the Party Central Committee and the government have devoted, and are devoting, so much attention to increasing the number of our own, genuinely Soviet military cadres, people with a high sense of military duty and supremely devoted to their country and to the great cause of Lenin and Stalin. Much attention is being devoted to educating and perfecting our cadres both in political and in specialized military knowledge. We have all the cadres we need and of the right quality. They are steadily developing in all respects in step with the development of our great country and army. It is just these people, just these cadres that make our Red Army a first-class army, invincible in the power of its organization, armament and military efficiency, and unique in its spirit and political and moral strength.

When the Red Army was being purged of the scoundrels who had betrayed their state and their colors, the fascists and other imperialist aggressors raised a frenzied outcry claiming that our military cadres had been weakened and that as a result the fighting efficiency of the Red Army had suffered, and so on in a similar strain.

Comrade Stalin has made perfectly clear the true reasons for all this howling of our enemies. We are not playing the game, don't you see, in rooting out the secret agents and spies from the ranks of our army, where this scum had been sent by foreign espionage services. It would have been nicer for the fascist rulers and their servitors if vile traitors like the Tukhachevskys, Yegorovs and Orlovs and similar corrupt scoundrels

were allowed to continue operating in our midst, betraying our army and country. It would have been far more convenient, of course, for the instigators of world wars to carry on their sinister work having their own reliable agents in foreign armies. After all, it is easier for a burglar to break into a house if he has an accomplice inside to let him in.

No attention need have been paid to these insinuations of the fascist hacks about the alleged weakness of the Red Army and the rest if the fascist aggressors had not drawn very real conclusions from them.

I am referring to the gentry who, swallowing the reports of their friends about the weakness of the Red Army, and, which is the chief thing, having lost their own agents whom they had sent into our army, were incautious enough to hasten to "take advantage of a favorable opportunity," as it seemed to them, and to march on Lake Khasan with the object of squeezing through the Soviet gate, pocketing the property of others and thus improving their own shaky affairs.

The outcome of this burglarious scheme is well known.

The valiant First Detached Red Banner Army branded its reply with the weapons of its men, commanders and political workers on the backs of these light-fingered gentry, a reply which told the truth about the fighting efficiency of the Soviet army, and of the morale of its commanding and political personnel.

Let us hope that this object lesson will be remembered by those who are casting covetous eyes on the Soviet country, who delude themselves that the Red Army has been weakened, and who are inclined to believe the fairy tale that the Soviet soil is an easy prey for burglarious invasions.

But if the object lesson of Lake Khasan was not enough, our Red Army is prepared at any minute to repeat it on a larger and more convincing scale for the benefit of anybody who asks for it. (*Applause.*)

In view of the fact that the Red Army

has more than doubled in size, and in view also of its increased and more complex military and auxiliary equipment, there has been a corresponding growth in the number, and hence a decrease in the average age, of its commanding, political and other leading personnel.

The numerical growth of our cadres during the past five years is shown by the following figures:

The commanding and other higher personnel of our infantry, including their artillery units, has increased 118 per cent, cavalry 66 per cent, armored car and tank troops 154 per cent, artillery 124.5 per cent.

Our aviation personnel in general, including engineers, artificers and auxiliaries, has increased by 148 per cent, the number of airmen alone by 184 per cent, and aviation engineers by 801 per cent.

The Red Army as a whole represents—in peace time, of course—a huge school where hundreds of thousands of good Soviet citizens are not only learning their job, their particular specialty, the art of defeating the enemy, but are also—from the lowest rank to the highest—studying politics, perfecting their knowledge and mastering the theory of Marxism-Leninism.

How effectively is this gigantic adult school functioning? We may say one thing, and that is that it is working hard and persistently. And the achievements are no mean ones. But it must work even harder and more energetically and its achievements must be multiplied, they are still not enough.

The armies of all bourgeois countries forbid, absolutely forbid, at least the small fry, to take any part in politics. Soldiers are punished for taking part in politics in those countries. Our army is strong because of its political consciousness and political activity. Hence the demand made of the commanding and other personnel of the Red Army: if you want to be useful in your post and of benefit to your subordinates, if you want to serve your people and the cause of Lenin and Stalin conscientiously, if you want to be a real Bolshevik Leninist, then

study, study hard, steadily perfecting your knowledge; you must know your specialty like the palm of your hand, otherwise you will be unable to cope with the job entrusted to you and will disgrace yourself in the eyes of your subordinates. And the chief thing is that you must, absolutely must, be politically educated, and active as a Bolshevik should be; you must not only be a good expert at your job—good you must be, even if you cannot be excellent—but an equally good citizen of the socialist state, versed in political knowledge and a useful builder of the socialist state. Unfortunately, these requirements are not always punctiliously fulfilled by all the personnel of the Red Army; nevertheless, a great deal is being done, and done successfully, in the way of training the personnel of the Red Army in Marxism-Leninism.

We have a system of schools for the training of commanders and various kinds of experts for the Red Army, that is, for the replenishment of our Red officer corps. This system is not working at all badly.

We have sixty-three schools for land troops in which tens of thousands of splendid Soviet young men are studying and which annually turn over to the army thousands of well-trained and politically educated young officers—lieutenants—devoted to the Party of Lenin and Stalin.

Our aviation personnel is reinforced from the graduates of thirty-two flying schools and aeronautical engineering schools. The Party and the Young Communist League supply over twenty thousand of their finest members to these schools, where they study to be future Red pilots, navigators and aeronautical experts. The students of these aviation schools, as of the other military schools, in addition to their special curricula, take a course in social and political subjects.

The total number on the rolls of the various schools has during the past five years increased as follows: schools for land troops—117.8 per cent; military



political school alone—273.3 per cent; Air Force schools—187 per cent.

The officer schools supply the Red Army with well-trained commanders. This is specially true of the past few years, when nearly all the students on entering these schools already had a complete—in some cases incomplete—secondary education.

But in addition to these, the army needs, and in large numbers at that, commanders and various highly skilled experts with a university education.

For this purpose the Red Army has fourteen military academies and six military faculties in civil universities which together accommodate well over twenty thousand commanders, political workers, engineers, surgeons and others.

In this way the army is annually supplied with the required number of highly-trained, and in the majority of cases really educated commanders, commissars, engineers of various specialties, surgeons, commissaries, and so on.

In addition, the military academies conduct evening courses and correspondence courses in their respective programs. Some fifteen thousand commanders and other leading personnel of the army are enrolled in these courses.

I have said nothing about our regimental schools and courses which provide a twelve or eighteen months' course of study for petty commanders and in which the Red Army trains several hundred thousand persons annually.

These schools fill a big and important place in the life of the army. They provide it with the petty commanders, who form the backbone of the military organization, the direct and immediate superiors of the men, and who share all the joys and labors of military life with the rank and file both in peace time and in

time of war. The petty commanders gave a splendid account of themselves at Lake Khasan, they held high the fighting colors of our Red Army, and the insolent enemy is not likely to forget them. (*Loud applause. The delegates rise and cheer. Shouts of "Long live the Red Army!"*)

A word regarding the reserve cadres. However large the personnel of the army in peace time, it cannot meet the full requirements of the army in time of war. This necessitates a large amount of work in assembling a cadre reserve of commanding, political and other leading personnel, and maintaining them at the proper level of training.

The problem of satisfying their requirements in officers in time of war is the most difficult problem the armies of capitalist countries have to face. We experience no such difficulty. On the whole and in the main, we have already solved the problem of satisfying the requirements of the army in commanding and other leading personnel and of replenishing them in time of war.

#### MATERIAL AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS IN THE RED ARMY

The material conditions of our men are of a very high level. The question of provisioning, equipping, quartering and otherwise satisfying the requirements of the Red Armymen has been and always will be one of the utmost importance, and it is receiving the unflagging attention of the commanders, commissars and political personnel.

The material condition of the officer staff as a whole has undergone a marked change in the past five years.

The average pay of commanders, commissars, political workers and other leading personnel has increased by 286 per cent.

#### PAY INCREASES OF THE PRINCIPAL RANKS

	1934 (rubles)	1939 (rubles)	Increase per cent
Platoon commander .....	260	625	240
Company commander .....	285	750	263
Battalion commander .....	335	850	254
Regimental commander .....	400	1,200	300
Divisional commander .....	475	1,600	337
Corps commander .....	550	2,000	364

Cultural services in the Red Army have developed tremendously, which of course has had a most beneficial effect on the cultural growth of the men and of the whole army.

For example, we had 15,091 Lenin corners in 1934; in 1939 we have 26,435.

We had 1,336 clubs in 1934; now we have 1,900.

Whereas in 1934 we had 142 Red Army Centers, we now have 267.

There has been a big increase in wireless receiving sets, cinemas, traveling cinemas and so on. It need only be mentioned that there are now 350,000 wireless receiving points in the Red Army.

The libraries of the Red Army now have a total of twenty-five million volumes.

The personnel of the Red Army subscribe for 1,725,000 copies of daily newspapers, and regularly take in 471,500 copies of magazines.

The expenditures on cultural and educational work now amount to 230,000,000 rubles, as compared with 72,000,000 rubles in 1934.

Much useful work in catering to the cultural needs of the Red Army is performed by the Union of Art Workers. Whole theaters, concert and dramatic troupes, the finest musicians, actors, singers and others willingly display their skill and talent to the army. Scientists, technologists, engineers and other experts also perform valuable service to the Red Army by lecturing and catering to the needs of our men, commanders and other leading personnel, for which the Red Army rewards its friends with unflinching gratitude and esteem.

#### THE AIR AND CHEMICAL DEFENSE SOCIETY AND OTHER PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS

I think it necessary to say a few words about the Air and Chemical Defense Society and other public organizations.

The A.C.D.S. is a mass voluntary organization and carries on a great and useful work. It is the function of this organization to train workers, intellectuals, students and collective farmers for

the defense of the state. In addition, the A.C.D.S. helps the Red Army in the preliminary "rough" work of training forces in various military branches.

While I entertain the highest respect for the personnel of the A.C.D.S., especially for those active volunteers who like true patriots of the Soviet state sincerely devote much effort to the service of the country's defense, I must say that the A.C.D.S. could show much better results, and that we are not doing all we should to make the best and fullest use of this splendid organization. We must, in the nearest future, do our utmost to make the organizations of the A.C.D.S. cover all factories, institutions, educational establishments and collective farms. Its work must really acquire a mass, public character, and every one of its members must be got to realize the usefulness and necessity of its work.

We have other defense organizations, like the Red Cross Society and the Red Crescent Society. Unfortunately, they are not of a sufficiently popular character. Yet there was a time when they functioned quite well, and they could do important and good work if the Party organizations in the localities gave them some of their attention, if only from time to time.

It should be remembered that the fascist states, and not only the fascist states, have at present a large number of special defense organizations which, being built on military lines, represent an important and effective supplement to their regular armies.

We cannot, we have no right, to lag in this matter of organizing our population for the defense of our cities, factories, mills and collective farms, and the lives and property of our people from possible enemy attack.

Comrades, I shall not dwell on such an important state organization as the Civil Air Fleet, which, in the event of war, will be entirely adapted to the needs of defense. It is headed by Comrade Molokov, Hero of the Soviet Union, who maintains constant and close contact with the Red Army and who is doing his best

to strengthen and develop the Civil Air Fleet and to make it fit at the required moment to assist the military Air Force in the defense of the country.

#### POLITICAL EDUCATION OF THE RED ARMY

The Red Army is a unique army the like of which is unknown in history. It was created by the first people to defeat its enemies in the struggle for social emancipation.

The specific features of the Red Army are described in the words of Comrade Stalin:

“The first and principal feature of our Red Army is that it is the army of the emancipated workers and peasants, the army of the October Revolution, the army of the dictatorship of the proletariat. . . .

“The second feature of our Red Army is that it is an army based on the fraternity of the nations of our country, an army that emancipated the oppressed nations of our country, an army that is defending the liberty and independence of the nations of our country. . . .

“And, lastly, a third feature of the Red Army: it is the spirit of internationalism, the international sentiments which imbue our whole Red Army.”

This definition of the specific features of our Red Army given by Stalin is the guiding principle of all the Party's educational and political work in the Red Army. It is on these three precepts that the political life and morale of men and commanders rest.

The Red Army, like the entire Soviet people, lives and is trained in the teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. The army has its own political apparatus. Side by side with the strong Party and Young Communist League organizations, it is the function of the political apparatus of the Red Army to work for the steady and constant political development of the men, commanders and the whole personnel of the army. The Party has entrusted the military commissars, political guides and other political workers with the highly responsible task of serving the army, and especially the non-

Party men, commanders and other personnel, in the political field.

The place of the political commissars of the Red Army in this work is a highly important one. It is their duty to see that the staffs of the political organs themselves are always carefully selected, that the political workers are worthy of their jobs, that the Marxist-Leninist, the political knowledge and general cultural outlook of the political workers are always on a proper level. In short, it is the first duty of the military commissar to organize the political organs, the political workers, and through them—and with their cooperation and on their responsibility—the entire political work.

But this is only part, although, it is true, a most important part, of the work of the military commissar. The military commissar is a very responsible figure in the army. During the Civil War he played a highly important and responsible part. “Without the military commissar we would not have had the Red Army,” Lenin said. And today, too, when the army has been equipped with highly effective military and auxiliary equipment of the most diverse kinds, when the army has become a highly complex organism, and when the commander has to devote a large share of his time to military and special training, the military commissar plays an important and responsible part. The commander and the military commissar constitute a single unit in the matter of directing the military and political training and education of their unit. Both are responsible for the military, political, moral, administrative, living and other conditions of their unit. Both the commander and the military commissar will lead their unit, their formation, into action. It is therefore necessary, in addition to all that has already been mentioned, to work persistently to train every officer and commissar of the Red Army in strength of will and the ability to command.

A special responsibility for this work lies on the military commissar.

The political apparatus of the army, that is, the military commissars, political guides and political workers of all

kinds, has been considerably enlarged in the interval between the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Congresses. On January 1, 1934, we had fifteen thousand political workers; today the army has thirty-four thousand, an increase of 126 per cent.

As a result of the purge of the Red Army of traitors, spies and treasonable elements, and the purge of the political apparatus itself of such putrid and treacherous scum, the role and importance of the political apparatus, and the military commissar in the first place, have been considerably enhanced. And the sense of responsibility of the whole political personnel for their work has grown.

The political personnel of the Red Army have been largely renewed in the past few years. Thousands of fine young men, members of our Party, honest, devoted and capable workers, have been advanced from the lower ranks to various responsible posts.

These are some of the finest people in the Party organization of the army; these are active people who are supremely devoted to the cause of Lenin and Stalin, and who in the past two or three years have shown themselves to be real Party men, fighters for the purity of the ranks of the Party and for the might of the Red Army. It is they who, together with the whole Party organization and with the support of all honest non-Party men and commanders, have with an iron broom swept the army clean of traitors and scoundrels, so that it is now stronger and politically more closely welded than ever before. These political workers, in conjunction with all the active Party and Y.C.L. members in the army, are carrying on important educational work, raising the political level of our army with the object of preventing the appearance within it not only of treacherous and treasonable elements, but of all sceptics, malcontents and other dross who in the long run grow into, and are bound to grow into, real traitors and agents of our class enemies.

The political organs of the army have

now received so splendid an aid to their work as the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)—Short Course*. This remarkable work has not only become a handbook for political workers and commanders, but also a constant and indispensable aid in the political education of our Red Armymen.

Political educational work embraces all the men and commanders and the whole personnel of the Red Army. The many thousands of members of the Young Communist League in the army act as splendid assistants of the political organs and as a medium in the carrying out of all their measures to serve the needs of the non-Party men and commanders.

#### MILITARY TRAINING OF THE WORKERS' AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY

Every branch of the army, from the infantry to the engineers, has its full complement of commanding and political personnel, men who know their job to perfection.

There was a considerable improvement in 1937-38 in the efficiency and training of the troops in every combatant, technical and tactical branch.

The tactical training and marksmanship of the rifle units, in spite of the increased complexity of this branch of the service in every respect, are on a proper level. However, the infantry commanders, commissars and political workers must work harder and more persistently to achieve even better results with regard to marksmanship.

The Red Army has always been distinguished for its snipers and for its excellent riflemen and machine-gunners, and it will continue to spread and perfect this art, not resting content with what has already been achieved. We must work persistently to give our infantry an even more thorough training in tactics and marksmanship, and to increase the efficiency of staffs, regiments, divisions and army corps. We must work more persistently in training the rifle regiments in coordinated action with other branches of the army.

The training of the Red cavalry has

always been on a very high level and it may now serve as a model of organization and military efficiency. Our cavalry skilfully combine their own specialized cavalry training with their mechanical means of warfare. Our modern Red cavalry will in time of war prove a high model of military art in skilful and relentless battle with the enemy.

The efficiency of the artillery, of which we have large quantities in every branch of the army, is on a high level. Yet modern artillery differs very considerably even from the artillery of the recent past, and its handling has therefore become more complicated. So has coordination between artillery and other branches. The Soviet artillerymen, like the Soviet cavalry, have always loved their job, known it thoroughly and achieved good results in combatant and tactical training. Today our artillery of all types, and its men, commanders and commissars are highly trained and are capable of coping with any military task that may be assigned to them.

Our gallant tank operators know their job well. There are whole tank units and formations whose efficiency is estimated very highly. On the whole, all our tank units are well organized and quite efficient as regards firing and tactics. This branch of the service will undoubtedly cope with any military task entrusted to it, for the men, commanders, commissars and political personnel are skilled in their jobs and know it "to a T."

The special troops—signals, engineers, chemical, railway and so on—are quite efficient. These branches are not very numerous and have splendidly trained cadres, and as a rule are highly efficient in their special and tactical training.

Lastly, a few words about the military efficiency of the Air Force. Today our air force represents a highly complex arm. Its military efficiency entails considerable knowledge, skill and energy on the part of the commanders, commissars, political workers, engineers, technicians and the entire personnel.

Furthermore, the military efficiency of the air force always depends to a certain extent on meteorological conditions.

Nevertheless, thanks to its splendid pilots and other personnel, our Red Air Force shows a high level of efficiency both in its own special branch and in tactics. This has been proved more than once in practice. (*Loud applause.*)

The general training of the Red Army as a whole constitutes the main task of the command, and it is by no means on a low level.

That our Red Army is not badly trained is borne out even by the testimony of our enemies, who, as I have already said, were incautious enough to try to grab a piece of Soviet territory.

Here are some of the entries found in the diaries of fallen Japanese officers:

1. Major Hirabari, commander of a battalion of the 75th Infantry Regiment, made the following entry in his diary:

"We suffered heavily from the Soviet tanks. They took advantage of the terrain, came up quite close, and opened fire on us. Their aim was good and their fire terrible. Taking advantage of natural cover, the Soviet tanks would often only expose their gun towers for firing purposes. Our own shooting was not effective enough. When the tanks came under our artillery fire their operators would often leap from their machines and take cover in folds in the ground until our fire was diverted.

"The crews would often dismount the machine guns from the tanks and open telling fire on our soldiers, and then return to their tanks."

2. Major Nakana, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry Division, wrote in his diary as follows:

"Here we are already two days in the trenches while the Soviet army has been active. It passes to the offensive, and then rapidly resumes the defensive. It is dangerous to show one's nose. We used to be told that it was a weak army, but now that we have met it in action I see that this was a mistake. The Red troops attacked furiously again and again.

"Yesterday there were 137 men in No. 3 Company; today there are only fifty left, and it has already been reduced to a platoon.

"At dawn on July 31 our No. 1 Company attacked Hsa-tsao-feng Hill. For

five hours fourteen of the enemy's men stubbornly held back the advance of our company and inflicted heavy losses on it, and it was only after a hand-to-hand bayonet fight that they were driven out."

3. Lieutenant Kofuendo of No. 11 Company, 75th Infantry Regiment of the Japanese army, wrote in his diary:

"The Reds make good use of all forms of small arms—rifles, light machine guns and heavy machine guns. We suffered heavy losses from their telling rifle fire even at a distance of 900 to 1,000 meters. The Soviet snipers are very clever at camouflage, making skilful use of natural cover. Three or four soldiers will get together, at once dig themselves in and open a telling fire along our whole position with very destructive effects. We have many killed and wounded."

Here, comrades, we have evidence which, if prejudiced, is prejudiced in the other direction, in the direction of minimizing the fighting efficiency of our troops. It shows that our commanders and political personnel are earning their Soviet bread; they are doing "their bit," as you see, and not unsuccessfully. (*Applause.*)

The Red Army has always been the object of special attention of the Central Committee of our Party, of the Workers' and Peasants' Government and of Comrade Stalin personally. The two Stalinist Five-Year Plans have resulted in a tremendous growth of our industry and of our socialist economy generally, and our army has steadily grown in size and perfection commensurately.

I have dwelt in fairly great detail on the modern armament and technical equipment of our army. I have spoken of the changes that have taken place in this respect during the past five years, the result of which is that our army is so well armed and equipped, and our cadres and personnel generally so highly trained, that the Soviet people has now nothing to fear from the machinations of any enemy. It may go about its great socialist work calmly, in the full assurance that its country—the Soviet state—

is being protected by the might of the Red Army and the Red Navy.

I must say a few words of thanks to the workers, engineers, technicians and office personnel, and especially to the Party and Y.C.L. organizations of our socialist mills and factories, which, having purged themselves of traitors and enemies of the people, have done so much to equip the Red Army and Navy with modern fighting weapons and to strengthen the defensive power of our country. Not only has our industry produced many splendid individuals, but there are now quite a number of huge plants whose services have been noted by the Party and the government and awarded with distinctions of the Soviet Union.

Great work, and useful work, has been done by Comrade M. M. Kaganovich, the head of the former People's Commissariat of the Defense Industry. He has been ably assisted by Comrades Vannikov and Tevosyan and by a host of other fine Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, workers in our socialist industry. I suggest, comrades, we give them a cheer. (*The delegates rise and cheer enthusiastically.*)

#### POLITICAL AND MORAL STATE OF THE RED ARMY

The force and significance of the political and moral factor in the military action of troops were defined by Clausewitz, the classical military writer and thinker of the nineteenth century, in his book *War* as follows:

"... Most phenomena . . . consist partly of physical and partly of moral causes and effects. One might say that the physical are like the wooden hilt, while the moral are the noble metal, the keen blade itself."

The high political and moral standing of the Red Army is just this noble "metal" which Clausewitz wrote of, with the only difference that in the sum total of factors which make for victory, our communist morale, the "spirit" of our Red Army, is nothing like the spirit of

the old, semi-feudal and bourgeois armies.

During the Civil War the Red Army, poorly clad, ill-fed and indifferently armed, defeated and utterly destroyed the well-equipped and strongly armed forces of the interventionists and White Guards. This revealed the spirit and high morale of the new Red Army, a genuine revolutionary army of the people. The Civil War showed that in an army which fights for its own interests, an army inspired with the great teaching of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin and led by the Communist Party, the moral factor is immeasurably superior to that of any capitalist army, let alone the semi-feudal, bourgeois armies which Clausewitz had in mind.

The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is of the same flesh and blood as its people and shares the interests of the whole country. Under the leadership of the great Party of Lenin and Stalin it is waging a struggle for the new, communist society, and at the first call of the Party, at the orders of its government, it will stand in defense of its country, its people and the socialist state.

The Red Army, guided by its Party and non-Party Bolsheviks—its commanders and military commissars—and thanks to its powerful Party and Y.C.L. organizations and its efficient political work, has always a good grasp of home and foreign affairs. It is always keenly responsive to all events in the home and foreign affairs of the country.

Comrades, our army has grown up with the people and has fought side by side with the people; it fought and completely defeated all its class enemies, domestic and foreign in the Civil War. Many of the finest people of our Party, fighting in the ranks of the Red Army, laid down their lives for the cause of the people, for the cause of Lenin and Stalin.

In these past few years, when the army was being thoroughly reorganized and re-equipped and becoming an ever stronger and more mighty force of the Soviet state, the despicable traitors of the Trotsky-Zinoviev-Bukharin gang

tried, by treason to the colors and betrayal of the interests of the people and the state, to destroy our army from within, treacherously to enfeeble it and to make its defeat certain in time of war.

This suppurating ulcer of treachery has been lanced. The Red Army was rapidly and thoroughly purged of all this filth.

Comrades, the Red Army is a tremendous force. The men, commanders and political personnel of our army represent a monolithic collective body welded together by the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Red Army is ready at any moment, like one man, to perform its sacred duty as defender of the state where labor is victorious, is eager and willing, as one man, to sacrifice life itself for the great cause of Lenin and Stalin. (*Applause.*)

More than a half of our army consists of Communists and members of the Young Communist League. But even those who belong neither to the Party nor to the Young Communist League are genuine non-Party Bolsheviks, who are heart and soul with the Red Army, with their socialist country, with the cause of Lenin and Stalin.

We know how at Lake Khasan non-Party Bolsheviks vied with Party and Y.C.L. members in military valor and genuine heroism in battle with the enemy for our socialist country, for our Party, for Stalin. (*Applause.*)

Our army stands a watchful sentinel over the frontiers dividing the socialist world from the world of oppression, violence and capitalist barbarity. It is ready at any moment to launch into battle against any enemy who dares to set foot on the sacred soil of the Soviet state. (*Stormy applause.*)

A pledge that the enemy will be crushed and destroyed at short order is the political and moral unity of the Red Army with the entire Soviet people.

A pledge is the Marxist-Leninist ideology, the ideology of the Party of Lenin and Stalin, which inspires the army of the Soviet state. The men, commanders and political workers are always prepared to lay down their lives for this ideology.

A pledge is the fact that our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army is a first-class army, better than any other army, an army that is technically equipped and splendidly trained.

A pledge, too, are those numerous heroes of the Soviet Union who have earned this high title by their supreme service to the people in the ranks of the army.

Comrades, our army is invincible!

It is the offspring, the splendid creation of our Party, and it is always ready at the behest of the Party, of our government, and of our great Stalin, the leader of peoples, to fight for its social-

ist country and to put into practice the sacred words of the military oath:

"I swear to defend it courageously, ably, worthily and honorably, not hesitating to sacrifice life and limb for complete victory over the enemy."

Long live our great Communist Party of the Soviet Union!

Long live the Eighteenth Congress of our Party!

Long live our great Stalin!

*(All rise. Loud and prolonged cheers. Shouts of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Voroshilov!")*



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## Speech of Comrade L. Mekhlis

*First-Rank Army Commissar, Assistant People's Commissar of Defense, Chief of the Political Administration of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army*

March 14, 1939

COMRADES, it is a proud and happy feeling to be a delegate to the Eighteenth Congress of the Party of Lenin and Stalin, a delegate to the Congress which is to play so exceptional a part in the life of our country and of the entire international working class movement.

Our Congress has heard an analysis, unsurpassed for its mastery and skill, of the foreign and home affairs of the Soviet Union. Comrade Stalin's report has enriched the theory of Marxism-Leninism with a document of epoch-making importance; it raises the development of the great October Socialist Revolution to a new and higher phase.

Comrade Stalin, by drawing general conclusions from the twenty years' experience of our struggle and constructive work, and by analyzing the two principal phases of development of our society, deduced the theory of a socialist state surrounded by a capitalist world.

Lenin intended to write a second volume of his *State and Revolution*, but death intervened. And so no general conclusions were drawn from the rich experience provided by the existence of a socialist state. These general conclusions were drawn by the genius who is carrying on the work of Lenin, by our leader and teacher, Comrade Stalin. Describing the second phase in the development of the socialist state, Comrade Stalin said:

“. . . we now have an entirely new, socialist state, without precedent in history and differing considerably in form and functions from the socialist state of the first phase.

“But development cannot stop there. We are going ahead, towards communism. Will our state remain in the period of communism also?”

“Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military attack has disappeared. Naturally, of course, the forms of our state will again change in conformity with the change in the situation at home and abroad.

“No, it will not remain and will atrophy if the capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a socialist encirclement takes its place.

“That is how the question stands with regard to the socialist state.”\*

With all Stalin's profundity, and in a way comprehensible to the general masses, a reply has been given to the most urgent questions of our time. The political horizon of each of us and of the Party as a whole has been widened. Stalin's theory of the socialist state ushers in a new era in the competition between socialism and capitalism; it furnishes us with a program of great works for the entire period until communist society has been completely built and the world proletarian revolution has triumphed.

In its significance, Stalin's theory of the socialist state may be compared to the theory of the building of socialism in one country, taken separately. Armed with this Leninist-Stalinist theory, we defeated the enemies of the working class and have built a socialist society

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\* See p. 547.

in the main. Armed with Stalin's theory of the socialist state surrounded by a capitalist world, we shall achieve the victory of the proletarian revolution all over the world.

Comrade Stalin has also defined the functions of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the period of communism. These functions, as I understand them, are as follows:

1. We must always remember the capitalist encirclement and guard the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army as the apple of our eye, so as to prevent spies and diversionists from making their way into its ranks.

2. We must always be ready to defeat the enemy everywhere.

3. We must not only keep our powder dry, but must always have a sufficient number of straitjackets ready for madmen who cherish the dream of a "crusade" against the Soviet Union.

4. If the edge of the second imperialist war should be turned against the first socialist state in the world, we must carry military hostilities into the enemy's territory, perform our international duty and increase the number of Soviet republics. (*Applause.*)

Yesterday, Comrade Voroshilov, People's Commissar of Defense, recited at this Congress the military oath, which we will carry out loyally. It was with deep emotion that hundreds and hundreds of thousands of Red Armymen, commanders, commissars, and political workers took this oath. We know of moving scenes when the few solitary semi-literate Red Armymen (and there are indeed only a few of them now), although they were entitled to request a comrade to read the oath for them, refused this right, and with deep emotion read out the words of the oath literally syllable by syllable, although it took them twenty minutes to do so.

I would like to tell Comrade Stalin of this spirit in the words of a member of the Y.C.L., an assistant political guide, who during the action at Lake Khasan, literally a few minutes before going into the attack, applied for membership of the Party. Here is his letter:

"To the Party organization of Unit No. 6820.

"I request to be admitted to the ranks of the glorious Communist Party. Having been reared in the ranks of the Young Communist League since 1931, I have obtained a stern Bolshevik schooling. *I am about to go into battle. I shall fight like a true son of my country until victory is ours. For the cause of my country I am ready to sacrifice everything, if necessary life itself.*

"*I shall fight so that Comrade Stalin may say of me—'excellent!' I want to go into battle a member of the Communist Party.*

"D. K. Naumov,  
Assistant Political Guide,  
3rd Rifle Company.

"August 3"

(*Prolonged applause.*)

On behalf of the military commissars, political workers and our splendid Bolshevik commanders, on behalf of the Party and Y.C.L. organizations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, I want to assure this historic Bolshevik Congress:

1. That we will loyally carry out the behests of our great leader and teacher of the world communist movement, Comrade Stalin.

2. That we will work persistently to master Marxist-Leninist theory and to learn our military job to perfection.

3. That we will do our utmost to turn the salvos of our aircraft and rifle corps, our Red Army salvos, of which Comrade Voroshilov has spoken so vividly and convincingly at this Congress, into straitjackets and winding sheets for the insane fascist aggressors.

4. That we will fight the enemies of the Soviet Union in such a fashion as to expedite the end of the capitalist encirclement, and so that Comrade Stalin may say of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army: "Excellent!" (*Loud applause.*)

Comrades, we have heard Comrade Voroshilov's remarkably profound and vivid speech on the condition of the armed forces of the socialist state. There is nothing I can add to what Comrade

Voroshilov, the People's Commissar of Defense of the U.S.S.R., has said. I can only second his deductions, and will take the liberty of telling the Congress certain details about the Party and political life of the Red Army, of recounting certain experiences in Party political work during the action at Lake Khasan, and of informing you of the daily interest in the Red Army shown by the Central Committee of the Party and Comrade Stalin.

It is now two years since the Central Committee of the Party introduced the system of military commissars in the Red Army. Although our work still suffers from a number of defects and shortcomings, we may say that the military commissars, the political apparatus, the Party organizations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army—in conjunction, of course, with the Communist commanders—have done tremendous work in carrying out the decisions of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the instructions of Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov regarding the Bolshevization of the Red Army.

Where the Gamarnik-Bulin gang of spies did the greatest damage to the political apparatus was in the sphere of its leading personnel. They promoted to the most important posts enemies of the people, incompetents, utter degenerates, who had sold their souls to foreign secret service agents. They held down the best commissars and political workers, capable and efficient people who were loyal to the Party of Lenin and Stalin, kept them in minor ranks and in relatively unimportant posts. They did their best to save their own accomplices who were in danger of imminent exposure by transferring this scum to other posts. Now, under the guidance of the Party Central Committee and of Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov, many thousands of splendid Bolsheviks of the Leninist-Stalinist breed have been promoted from below to leading posts. These new forces are energetic and determined, and it is a labor of love for them to carry the words of Lenin and Stalin among the masses.

The commissar knows his place in the

army. During the Civil War Lenin said: "Without the military commissar we would not have had a Red Army." The first commissars in the Civil War were Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov. Comrade Stalin defined the place and function of the commissar in the army as far back as 1919, when he wrote in his instructions to the commissars on the Southern Front:

"The regimental commissar is the political and moral guide of his regiment, the prime defender of its material and spiritual interests. Whereas the regimental commander is the head of the regiment, the commissar must be the father, the heart and soul of his regiment."

The commissars and political workers are the eyes and ears of the Party in the Red Army. Nothing should escape the keen Bolshevik attention of the commissars. They should know all that is going on in every corner of the Red Army; they must be faithful instruments of the general line of the Stalinist Central Committee, and, together with the Party organizations, nip all treason in the bud, safeguard our beloved army from spies, and see to it that no enemy penetrates into our ranks.

The military commissar must direct the Party political work in his unit, help to cement discipline, assist real and staunch commanders to establish iron military discipline with a firm hand. He shares responsibility with the commander for the state of his unit and for its military efficiency. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army possesses a splendid body of commanders. It is the task of the political apparatus to support the authority of the commanders in every way and to train them to fear no difficulty, to be able to adopt decisions under all conditions and circumstances, and to carry them out with Stalin-like firmness.

We now have a new type of commissar, a man who knows the military business to perfection. Comrades Stalin and Voroshilov told us to appoint to posts of commissars in the air force the best Communists among the airmen. We car-

ried out these instructions, and I must say that the prestige of the commissar in the air force is very high. Formerly the commissar of a squadron, say, was not on the combatant rolls. When the squadron took off—for training or fighting purposes—the commissar would remain behind at the airdrome, in the rear. Naturally, such a commissar could not and did not enjoy much prestige among the flying personnel. Today the commissars in the air force are on the combatant rolls. The commissar aviators received their baptism of fire at Lake Khasan. The result has been to economize personnel and to raise the military efficiency of the squadron. In this sense we have gained doubly. Our task now is to see that all the commissars of the Red Army, in addition to having a perfect mastery of Marxist-Leninist theory, know the military business no worse than the commanders.

Under the guidance of the Party Central Committee and Comrade Stalin, under the guidance of Comrade Voroshilov, the military commissars, the political departments and the Party organizations of the Red Army have done valuable work in exposing enemies and spies who had entrenched themselves in various departments, chiefly in leading posts. We may say with a full sense of responsibility that the enemy has been crushed and destroyed, and that our Party organizations have gained considerably in strength and are supremely devoted to the Stalinist Central Committee of the Party and to our leader and teacher, Comrade Stalin. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*) We shall wash away the filth and incrustation day in and day out, and destroy enemies and traitors like mad dogs. The vile conspiracy of a handful of spies will never occur again in the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army! We shall work to place the Party organizations of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army in the front rank of the foremost organizations of our great Party.

The enemy scum that operated in the political organs did their utmost to cause a rift between the Communists of the

Red Army and the territorial Party organizations. Never will this happen again. The political organs are working to strengthen the ties between the Communists of the Red Army and the territorial Party organizations.

There are over three times as many delegates from the army at this Eighteenth Congress of our Party as there were at the preceding congress. The figures speak for themselves; they show that the prestige of the Communists in the Red Army has grown immensely, and that they now have the closest ties with the local Party organizations.

The Party organizations in the Red Army have developed considerably, especially during the past year. On Comrade Stalin's initiative, an all-Army conference of political workers was convened together with commanders. It has played a great part in our life, and its decisions are now a handbook for political workers. In 1938 the Central Committee of the Party adopted a decision regarding the admission of Red Armymen into the Party. The results have been highly valuable.

In 1937 the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) decided to admit into the Party twenty thousand members of the Young Communist League serving in the army. The former enemy leadership of the Political Administration of the Red Army and of a number of Area Political Administrations did their best to prevent the Party organizations in the army from admitting Young Communist League members into the ranks of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Only seven thousand Y.C.L. members were admitted into the Party in one year, and in all 13,158 persons were admitted into the ranks of the Party in 1937. In 1938 the political organs carried out in an honest Bolshevik way the instructions of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) regarding the admission of Red Armymen into the Party and the strengthening of the Party organization in the Red Army. In the course of that year 101,310 persons were admitted as members and candidate members of the C.P.S.U.(B.), while 10,581 were admitted in the course

of January, 1939. The Party organization in the Red Army has become far more vigorous and full-blooded, and its ranks have been reinforced by no inconsiderable number of Red Armymen.

Comrades, it is not seemly of political workers to give way to conceit. Our work still suffers from many defects; some of the political organs are guilty of grave practical mistakes. Nevertheless, a great amount of work is being done to train our people in Bolshevism, to educate our Red Armymen. By decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), we have begun to publish a magazine specially devoted to the political education of the Red Armymen. The appearance of the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)*, that splendid Stalinist work and precious gift to the Party, will help the Party and non-Party Bolsheviks of the Red Army considerably to improve their ideological and theoretical standard.

A few remarks about wrecking work in the sphere of propaganda, to which a stop was put only in 1938. There used to be a practice of taking commanders of companies, batteries, squadrons, etc., from their unit for a whole month on end, on the pretext of giving them a course in Marxism-Leninism. During the height of the military training season, commanders would be taken from their units and sent to school. This, of course, had a detrimental effect on military training. Furthermore, Red Armymen were kept for many hours from military exercises on the pretext of improving their education. Lastly, the work of the division Party schools was so arranged as to tear Communists and Young Communist League members from their military exercises. All this was stopped on the instructions of Comrade Voroshilov, People's Commissar of Defense.

The work of our Party commissions suffers from many defects. Political organs and Party organizations often expel Party members far too light-heartedly. The Party Commission of the Political Administration of the Red Army finds it necessary to reinstate about 50 per cent of the expelled men because the

expulsions were unjustified; and Comrade Shkiryatov, for his part, has to correct our actions. We must admit that the number of unjustly expelled men is very high.

There was even a bizarre case of expulsion like the following: The representative of the special department in a certain regiment told the commissar, Gashinsky, that he was after the club superintendent, a political guide by the name of Rybnikov. Gashinsky passed this on in confidence to the Party organization, and Rybnikov was expelled by the primary Party organization. It soon turned out that Rybnikov was not a bad Bolshevik and that the special department was after him . . . to get him to work in their department. The mistake was corrected, but only after Comrade Rybnikov had been put to a lot of mental suffering.

Complaints of unjustified expulsion from the Party are now coming in from people who were expelled in 1935, 1936 and 1937, when the enemy was busy here and there. In 1938 the Party commission of the Political Administration of the Red Army examined more complaints of wrong expulsion than during all the four preceding years together. In order to put a complete stop to cases of abuse in the expulsion of Communists from the Party, to put an end to this heartless, bureaucratic attitude to human beings, and to faithfully carry out the decision of the January Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), we instructed the political organs of all formations to summon meetings of the active body of Party members and to discuss the work of the Party commissions. It is time for all of us Bolsheviks in the army to treat Party members in a Stalin-like way, and not to tolerate the expulsion of a man on the grounds of vague hints and whispers, but to act only on the basis of documents and facts.

A few remarks about the Young Communist League members in the Red Army. Comrade Voroshilov quite rightly calls them the gold reserve of our country's defense. In one year alone—last year, that is—the number of Y.C.L.

members in the Red Army more than doubled. Here we see the effects of having cleaned up the conspirators who used to hinder the admission of Red Army-men into the Y.C.L. and hamper the education of Y.C.L. members. The insolence of the Gamarnik bandits went to such lengths that by 1938 there was not a single person in the Political Administration of the Red Army whose job it was to deal with Y.C.L. affairs. The situation was no better in the political administrations of the areas. There has now been a distinct change in this respect, but we must work still harder for the education of our splendid Y.C.L. members.

Of great influence in improving our work among the Y.C.L. and helping it to grow was the All-Army Y.C.L. Conference convened by decision of the Central Committee on the initiative of Comrade Andreyev. Among the new recruits this year there was a large number of Y.C.L. members. The country is working for us splendidly. Today the number of Y.C.L. members in the Red Army several times exceeds the total number of men in the Polish army in peace time. (*Applause.*) There are over 150,000 Y.C.L. members in the Red Army with a secondary or university education. That is one of the results of the socialist cultural revolution in the country. The Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the army of tsarist days are worlds apart. The proportion of Party members among the Y.C.L. members is fairly high. It more than trebled during the past year. But we cannot rest content with that.

The Y.C.L. has furnished, and is furnishing, large numbers of political workers for the army. I am referring, above all, to the system of assistant political guides. As you know, in 1938 the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.) gave us permission to appoint Y.C.L. members as assistant political guides. This splendid Stalinist brigade of political workers, although it has existed for only one year, has shown brilliant results. The assistant political guides live with Red Army-men in the barracks,

know their life and their needs, and enjoy great prestige among them.

The military mettle of the assistant political guides may be illustrated by the following facts: for heroism displayed at Lake Khasan the government has conferred the Order of Lenin on two assistant political guides; thirty have been awarded the Order of the Red Banner, sixteen the Order of the Red Star, twenty the Medal of Valor and nine the Military Merit Medal. Comrade Bamburov, an assistant political guide, has been awarded the Order of Lenin and the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, our army is strong and invincible owing to its revolutionary spirit and to the first-class technical equipment supplied to it by the Stalinist Five-Year Plans. Some time ago the Japanese militarists, in conspiracy with the German fascists, wanted to test our strength on Zaozernaya Hill, some ten thousand kilometers from Moscow. The upshot was, comrades, that it was we who tested the Japanese and administered a severe thrashing to the presumptuous aggressors.

Shigemitsu, the Japanese ambassador, threatened aloud for all the world to hear that Changkufeng Hill would be captured by force. This act of provocation was indeed attempted. But what was the result? Shigemitsu came running three times to our People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs begging for an armistice. We consented to terminate hostilities only when the Japanese invaders had been ignominiously driven from Soviet soil. It was not because he was sitting on top of the world that Shigemitsu came running to Litvinov, bowing and scraping, and bringing shame on the "Japanese arms." The fact is that the Kwantung Army disgraced itself under the thrusts of Red Army bayonets. That explains Shigemitsu's somersaults, which the finest acrobat might have envied.

In order to give you some idea of the sentiments of our army at Lake Khasan, I will quote a few documents.

A meeting was held by the company

of one regiment just before the engagement. What did the Red Army men decide? Their resolution is a brief one:

"We, the men, commanders and political workers of the unit, assure our command that we will do our duty and defend our country like true patriots. This is not the first time the Japanese have attempted to disrupt our peaceful labors and peaceful life. *Our patience is exhausted; the cup is filled to overflowing. The time has come to put an end to the Japanese vipers. It has fallen to our happy lot to take part in the decisive battle which will put a curb upon the overweening samurai. We go into battle cherishing in our hearts the name of him who has given us a happy life and who is leading us from victory to victory—the name of Stalin.*" (Loud applause.)

In the early days of the battle of Zaozernaya Hill there were many Soviet citizens who decided that there must be some sort of postoffice at Lake Khasan and sent patriotic telegrams addressed as follows: "Lake Khasan Postoffice, Far East." (Laughter.)

One of our Red Army men, whose letter I will read, gave as his return address: "Somewhere near Lake Khasan." This document shows how intimate are the ties between the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the whole people.

The letter runs as follows:

"Greetings, respected collective farmers of the Volodarsky Machine and Tractor Station and Machine and Tractor Shop. First, let me tell you that I am at present on the Far Eastern front. On July 30 we had a clash with Japanese troops when they invaded Soviet soil and occupied Zaozernaya Hill and Bezymyana Hill, where they set up concrete fortifications. They thought they were invincible. But when the Party and the government gave the order to smash the Japanese samurai who had invaded our territory, it was carried out in the sight of the people of our country in short order, in three or four days. There were not a few of them here either, and when our glorious falcons rose in the air, when our tank columns began to move, and our Red Army men went into the attack, Shigemitsu, the Japanese ambassador, got a pain in the belly and ran to Com-

rade Litvinov begging him to terminate hostilities and that the frontier be restored in a peaceful way, and he agreed to all the conditions put forward by the Soviet Union."

He sends Red Army greetings to his friends and relatives, and ends by signing himself:

"Your friend, member of the family of workers, Razumny." (Applause.)

Here is another splendid letter, sent to an address in Byelorussia, written by Lieutenant Matveyenko, a platoon commander:

"The whole country," he writes, "has been watching the fighting at Lake Khasan. The Japanese militarists are provoking us to fight. They stretched out their dirty fascist paw towards our flourishing and happy country. But the fascist raiders miscalculated. The rebuff they got was such that thousands of White bandits are missing from their ranks, and they have paid for every drop of our blood with gallons of their own. They have felt the strength and might of our Red Army. I have justified the confidence of the Party and government. My platoon and my tank did splendid service. We put out of action eight Japanese guns and a large number of samurai."

Matveyenko concludes his letter to the collective farmers with the words:

"Work in a friendly and collective spirit to build a cultured and prosperous life for all collective farmers. Let me assure you that I, a member of your collective farm, am defending your honest and peaceful labor. Member of your collective farm, Matveyenko."

Comrades, thousands of commanders and Red Army men who had not been assigned to the front wrote imploring to be sent into action.

Here is a laconic letter from a group of tank operators:

"We, V. M. Agarkov, tank commander, N. S. Zhitenev, tank driver and S. M. Rumyantsev, turret commander, junior officers on regular and extra term of service—tank men reared by the Leninist Young Communist League—having

mastered the operation of this formidable machine, *are burning with desire to crush the insolent Japanese samurai and cannot stand calmly by in this grave hour.*

"We request the Military Council of the First Army of the Red Banner Far Eastern Front to send us into action. We swear to our country, to the Party and to the government that we will avenge our comrades and ruthlessly destroy the fascist vipers.

"Please do not refuse our request.

"Agarkov, tank commander

"Zhitenev, driver and mechanic

"Rumyantsev, turret commander"

While the fighting was on, the Party and Y.C.L. organization received thousands of applications to join the Party and the Y.C.L. from commanders and men. The political organs of the forces in action were unprepared for this and had not taken along a sufficient supply of Party and Y.C.L. membership cards. Our valiant airmen had to get busy and deliver the necessary documents, as well as newspapers, to the units in action. Our own newspaper, quite a large one, soon appeared, published by the Political Department of the N. Corps and called *In Defense of the Country.*

Here are some letters from Red Army-men:

"To the Y.C.L. organization of the N. Company, OBS-40.

"I request the Y.C.L. organization of the company to recommend me for candidate membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Defending the inviolability of the frontiers of the Union, arms in hand, *I want to die, if die I must, a Communist, and only a Communist.*

"V. Kolesnikov

"Member of the Y.C.L. since February 16, 1929.

"Membership card No. 6289673."

On August 5, the eve of the general attack, Comrade Shchedlovsky sent in the following application:

"To the Party Bureau of Unit No. 6820.

"In view of the situation, I, like all the comrades, especially the Y.C.L. mem-

bers, deem it necessary once more to affirm my devotion to our Party of Lenin and Stalin. On this day of battle, I request the Party Bureau to accept me as a candidate member of the Party.

"I shall strictly carry out my duties in accordance with military regulations and in every case excellently. I undertake to fight the enemy ruthlessly, always to be in the front rank, and to sacrifice everything for the defense of the country and for its victory.

"Please do not refuse my request.

"*Shchedlovsky.*"

I want to acquaint the Congress with one more document, the number of which could be multiplied endlessly. It is written by Lieutenant Glotov. He writes:

"I am twenty-eight years old, which is not very much. But in all my short life I have always worked honestly for my country and people. In heart and in every fiber of my being I have been with the Bolshevik Party a long time. Now, when I am defending our frontiers from the enemy hordes, I want to be a Communist. *I request to be admitted into the ranks of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and if an enemy bullet should lay me low, I request to be regarded as a Bolshevik.*" (Prolonged applause.)

This splendid Bolshevik, Glotov, was admitted to the Party on August 4, but he never received his Party card. On August 6, this Communist and gallant son of his country met the death of a hero on Zaozernaya Hill. The men of Glotov's unit will long cherish the memory of their comrade.

The regiments of the 40th Division vied among themselves as to who would be the first to plant the banner on Zaozernaya Hill. This honor fell to Lieutenant Moshlyak and a handful of his men. Comrade Moshlyak is present at our Congress. He is the secretary of the Party bureau of his regiment. He has covered his Party organization and his regiment with glory. Does this not testify to the vanguard role played by the Communists in battle on Zaozernaya Hill! There can be no better testimonial to the Communists and Y.C.L. members



who fought at Zaozernaya Hill than the influx of new members into the Party and the Y.C.L.

During the battle of Zaozernaya Hill I happened to be in the Far East. I naturally felt drawn to the men at the front. I would ask the Red Armymen: "Tell me, comrades, do you know what duty has been assigned to you?" And they would answer: "Yes, Comrade Red Army Commissar. The Japanese are heavily in our debt, and the time has come to settle accounts." (*Laughter and applause.*)

When Comrade Stern set out to negotiate with the Japanese and asked a group of Red Armymen on Zaozernaya Hill whether they knew about the armistice and were they pleased about it, they looked rather glum. Our comrades thought at first that the men might be short of something, food or tea, and asked whether they had got all their rations. The answer was: "It's not the food. We had a plan."—"What plan, comrades?"—"Our plan was to give the Japanese a shove that would send them rolling back to Harbin at least, and teach them to leave us alone." (*Prolonged applause.*) Our unwise neighbor would do well to bear this in mind.

When the Japanese seized Zaozernaya Hill from a group of our heroic frontier guards, they hastened to change the name of Changkufeng Hill to Seiyuzan, and of course to vaunt the invincibility of their arms. Seiyuzan means "Mountain of Justice and Bravery." Not a bad name, I think, only the justice and bravery proved to be on the side of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. (*Laughter and applause.*)

Having disgraced themselves in the eyes of the world, the Japanese militarists tried to wriggle out of it. They had to give some account to their country. So they let it be known in their newspapers that it was the rain that

interfered. Only they did not tell their people what kind of rain it was. They were indeed prevented from remaining on Soviet territory by rain, but it was a rain of lead, produced by Voroshilov salvos. (*Prolonged applause.*)

Comrades, there is no finer soldier in the world than our Red Armyman, the son of our great and invincible Soviet people. (*Applause.*) We must only remember one thing, that is, not to get conceited and to work persistently to improve the military efficiency of our men, so that they may at all times and in all places destroy the enemy with the least bloodshed to themselves.

The fighting shed a light on our splendid and magnificent commanders, Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, who love their great Party of Lenin and Stalin, who love their country and are prepared, if necessary, to die for it. The fighting showed that a Bolshevik cohort of commissars has arisen, men of the Stalin breed, iron-willed and keen-eyed sentinels of the Stalinist Central Committee and the Soviet government.

To eliminate the danger of foreign capitalist intervention, the *History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)* says, the capitalist encirclement must be destroyed. The time is not far off, comrades, when our army, which by its prevailing ideology is an international army, will, in retaliation to the insolent attack of the enemy, help the workers of the aggressor countries to emancipate themselves from the yoke of fascism, from the yoke of capitalist slavery, and to eliminate the capitalist encirclement of which Comrade Stalin spoke. (*Loud applause.*)

Long live the Party of Lenin and Stalin, the Party of the world proletarian revolution!

Long live our leader and teacher, our own Stalin! (*Loud and prolonged cheers. Cries of "Long live our own Comrade Stalin!"*)

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## Speech of Comrade G. Stern

*Second-Rank Army Commander, Commander of the First Detached Red Banner Army*

March 13, 1939

**T**HE men who fought at Lake Khasan, the Red Armymen, commanders, commissars and political workers of the First Detached Red Banner Army send ardent Red Army, Bolshevik greetings to the Eighteenth Party Congress. (*Applause. All rise and cheer.*)

The men who fought at Lake Khasan, the Red Armymen, commanders, commissars and political workers of the First Detached Red Banner Army send ardent Red Army, Bolshevik greetings to him with whose beloved name on their lips, as the emblem of our cause, they attacked and routed the troops of the arrogant aggressors who dared to violate the sacred frontiers of the Soviet country—to Comrade Stalin! (*All rise and cheer. Shouts of "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!"*)

I would like to devote my speech in the discussion on Comrade Stalin's report to a brief account of the actions of the First Detached Red Banner Army units during the events of Lake Khasan, and of the work of the Bolsheviks in our army.

Comrades, we do not exaggerate the scale and significance of the operations at Lake Khasan. From the military point of view the engagement was only an episode. Only some tens of thousands of men took part in it, not hundreds of thousands and millions as in a big war. The fighting took place on a narrow front, not on a front stretching hundreds or thousands of kilometers. But as regards the character of the battle

and the weapons employed, it was a real operation of modern warfare. The seizure of Zaozernaya Hill and the adjacent heights was effected on the orders of the warmongers. It was planned by the Japanese militarists months in advance and executed by the command of the Japanese army quartered in Korea, the Korean Army, as it is called.

We possess documents seized on the field of battle which prove that the Japanese troops assigned for this operation underwent special and systematic training adapted to the given locality. The staff of the Japanese Korean Army studied the region, reconnoitered it, as we say, for the impending operations long before the outbreak of hostilities. Since the choice of the scene of action, the date of hostilities and the methods entirely depended on the Japanese command, it is only natural that the conditions were planned to afford the maximum advantages to the Japanese invaders and the maximum difficulties for us, the units of the Red Army.

The operations of the Red Army units at Lake Khasan, despite their limited scale—and to a certain extent, just because of their limited and local character—were highly complicated from the military standpoint.

After the insolent and sudden seizure by large Japanese forces of Zaozernaya, Bezymyannaya and other heights, which were defended by a handful of truly heroic frontier guards, the situation that arose for the Red Army units was

roughly as follows. All the commanding heights in the field of operations were in the hands of the Japanese, who were in a position to observe literally every move of our forces not only in the region of Lake Khasan itself but in the adjacent lines of approach. The character of the locality made it impossible for us to organize a sudden counter-attack or any broad maneuver.

Zaozernaya and the other heights were fortified by the Japanese, protected by a network of barbed wire entanglements and converted into regular forts. They could be attacked only along two narrow defiles, less than five hundred meters wide, leading from the north and south to Zaozernaya Hill between Lake Khasan and River Tumen-Ula. Every foot of these two defiles was under the fire of guns, mortars, rifles and machine guns already placed and trained by the Japanese.

This being the case, the success of the Red Army units would depend on the vigor of our operations, on the way the battle was organized, on the proper use of technical equipment, mainly of artillery and aircraft, on the skill of all types of arms, and especially on the skill of their commanders, and, above all, on the patriotism of our men, and, first and foremost, of our modest Red infantry, their self-sacrifice and determination to win. The Red Army units launched their general attack on August 6. It began at 5 p.m. After our aircraft and artillery had delivered a suitable blow to the enemy, bombarding him with quite a respectable quantity of Voroshilov kilograms (*loud applause and laughter*)—the infantry and tanks stormed the heights, and by nightfall our Soviet Zaozernaya Hill, and the entire Soviet territory seized by the Japanese, had been completely cleared of the enemy. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

Between August 7 and August 11, which was the day hostilities were terminated at the request, I believe, of Mr. Shigemitsu (*laughter*), the Japanese brought up fresh forces and delivered about a score of attacks with the object of recapturing the hill. They were all

beaten back by the Red Army units with heavy loss to the Japanese.

Such is the brief account of the events at Lake Khasan.

The Japanese militarists are now trying to keep up the fighting spirit of their soldiers, which, it should be said, has already been noticeably shaken by the war in China and is continuing to ebb. They are trying to maintain it by the bluff that the Japanese army is invincible. By the way, the armies of the great Chinese people have already called their bluff. For a long time the Japanese militarists tried to conceal from the Japanese people the defeat they had suffered and the recapture of Zaozernaya Hill by the Red Army. In this clumsy attempt to hide the truth, which is known to every soldier in the Korean and Kwantung armies, the Japanese militarists received the willing aid of certain pressmen in the camp of their "backers," or, to put it more plainly, the instigators of war in certain other states. Comrade Stalin has said that it is to certain people's interest to make out that our Red Army is a weak army. When it became absolutely impossible to conceal the fact that Zaozernaya Hill had been recaptured, there appeared a new version, namely, that the hill was not captured by our troops, but it was simply "evacuated" by the Korean Army because of . . . a rising flood. (*General laughter.*)

I do not know whether there is any point in entering into a controversy with the Japanese generals on this score. I only want to mention a point of fact, namely, that the Japanese troops launched into this provocative escapade were smashed to atoms as they say, that their losses were three times as heavy as ours, and that the flood had nothing to do with it, because it affected us just as much as the Japanese, and, moreover, began on August 14, that is, three days after the armistice was declared, whereas the Red standard was restored to its place on Zaozernaya Hill on the evening of August 6, and by none other than Lieutenant Moshlyak, secretary of the Party bureau of one of the rifle regiments, now Hero of the Soviet Union,

who is present here at this Congress (*loud and prolonged cheers*), and his splendid men.

What did the operations at Lake Khasan show?

First, that "the weeding out of spies, murderers and wreckers from our Soviet organizations is the surest means of strengthening the Soviet organizations," as Stalin says. The black traitors to the country, the spies of foreign states, the Trotsky-Bukharin fiends who had wormed their way into important posts in the armies of the Far East, acting in concert with the Japanese and other foreign masters, tried to undermine the strength of our Far Eastern defenses. Under the unswerving Bolshevik leadership of the great patriot of the Land of the Soviets, Comrade Stalin, the enemies of the people were smashed in time. (*Applause.*)

The events of Lake Khasan have once more confirmed the supreme devotion of the men, commanders, commissars and political workers of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army to their state, their government, their people, their Bolshevik Party, their own Stalin. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, there is no army in the world that can compare in the patriotism, bravery and heroism of its men, in their readiness and determination to fight the enemies of their country to their last drop of blood, to their last breath, with our Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of the Stalinist generation of the nations of the Soviet Union. (*Applause.*)

Secondly, the events of Lake Khasan have once more confirmed that as a result of the two Stalinist Five-Year Plans, as a result of the efforts of the entire Soviet people, and especially of the Bolsheviks, as a result of the untiring work of Comrades Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and of the late Comrade Orjonikidze, the Red Army has military equipment—aviation, tank, artillery, infantry, engineer, signals and so on—not only in large quantities, but of excellent quality, a quality worthy of its splendid men.

As one who had a hand in the fighting

at Lake Khasan, I make bold to declare to the Congress that we have finer equipment of all the main types than the Japanese Army. (*Applause.*)

Thirdly, the Khasan events have once more confirmed the high quality and correct line of the military and political training of all branches of the Red Army, achieved under the direct and daily leadership of the man who for fourteen years has been directing our army, that most gallant soldier, commander and commissar of the Civil War, our People's Commissar, Comrade Voroshilov. (*Loud and prolonged applause. All rise and cheer Comrade Voroshilov.*)

Fourthly, the action at Lake Khasan has once more confirmed that the organizational structure of the Red Army is fundamentally right. It has confirmed the fact that, in addition to powerful technical equipment, aircraft, artillery and tanks, a strong and well-trained infantry is of the highest importance for military success and continues to be the principal and decisive arm. (*Applause.*)

Fifthly and lastly, the Khasan events have shown that the remarkable courage, endurance, resourcefulness and other fighting qualities of the Russian soldier known to us from time of old have been supplemented by the political consciousness of the Red Army, and also by such valuable qualities as universal literacy of a high standard, sense of organization, intelligence, outstanding initiative, and knowledge and love of machinery—a result of the cultural revolution that has taken place in our country.

I must say a few words about our commanders. Press hacks abroad, for reasons which you and I perfectly understand, are trying to make out that because we destroyed that gang of scoundrels, the Tukhachevskys, Gamarniks, Uboreviches and suchlike swine, our Red Army lacks a good commanding staff. The commanding staff of the Red Army has been forged and molded under the direct guidance of Comrade Stalin, Comrade Frunze and Comrade Voroshilov. (*Applause.*)

The Red Army possesses a full complement of splendid men, commanders of platoons, companies, battalions, regi-

ments, brigades, divisions and higher formations.

All these people know their job; they have been tested not only in the military training of peace time, and not only at Lake Khasan. These people are thoroughly devoted to their country; they are prepared at any moment to lay down their lives for the cause of the Party, for the cause of Lenin and Stalin (*applause*); and if it proves necessary to lay down their lives, they will know how to do it in such a way as to make the enemy pay ten lives for the life of every one of our valuable men. (*Applause.*)

*Voroshilov*: Ten is not enough. Twenty. (*Laughter and applause.*)

*Stern*: I accept the amendment. Please put it down in the minutes. (*Laughter.*)

During the action at Lake Khasan our commanders, commissars and political workers, our Communists and Young Communist Leaguers fought, as is fitting, in the front ranks and showed splendid examples of bravery.

During the action at Lake Khasan the work of the political organs, of the Party and Y.C.L. organizations, the whole system of Party political work, attained an exceptional scope, which was greatly aided, in particular, by the energetic efforts of Comrade Mekhlis, Assistant People's Commissar of Defense, who happened to be in the Far East and at once came to the scene of operations. (*Prolonged applause.*)

During the action many splendid non-Party men and commanders applied for membership of the Party and the Y.C.L. and were admitted then and there, on the field of battle.

We have no intention of getting conceited over our success in the action at Lake Khasan. That would be an unpardonable mistake, which the commanders, political workers and Party organizations of the First Army could not allow themselves to commit. Our people have calmly and soberly analyzed every step they took both before and during the action at Lake Khasan.

The units of the Detached Red Banner Army are tackling their work with even greater energy and persistence. Stronger

than ever are the ties between our units, our Party and Y.C.L. organizations and the working people and Bolsheviks of the Maritime Region, who helped us in every way they could during the fighting, and burned with eagerness to join the ranks of our army and to engage the enemy. (*Applause.*)

We delegates from the Bolsheviks of the First Army want the Congress delegates to know how strong the Party organizations of our army have become, especially in the past year, and how much our Young Communist League organization has grown.

Our commanders and commissars are working harmoniously hand in hand, never relaxing their efforts to raise the ideological level of all our men. It is with a sense of great pride in our country and our army that we are able to report to the Party Congress that every one of our Red Armymen is a soldier and citizen conscious of his cause and filled with supreme love for his country and his Party, the Party of Lenin and Stalin. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, the question naturally arises whether the Japanese militarists and other incendiaries of war in the Far East have drawn the logical conclusion from the Lake Khasan episode. Of course, Comrade Litvinov could answer this question better than we can, but it seems to us (correct us if we are wrong) that the Japanese militarists have not drawn, and cannot draw, the necessary conclusions.

Everybody knows that the plans of world supremacy cherished by our unwise Far Eastern neighbors, as Comrade Voroshilov calls them, include war on the Soviet Union. Immediately they seized Manchuria, that is, in 1931, the Japanese imperialists set about turning the territory of that country into a base for war on the Soviet Union.

For seven and a half years the Japanese aggressors, oppressing and robbing the Manchurian population for all they are worth, have been working intensely to place the conquered country on a war footing. The Japanese militarists are devoting a lot of attention to building

railways and motor roads in Manchuria. Between 1934 and 1939 the length of railway increased from 6,500 kilometers to 11,000 kilometers. There has been a considerable increase in the length of motor roads as well, and no wonder, when tens of thousands of Manchurian peasants can be driven under convoy to work on road building. The roads as a rule are of a marked strategical character, designed against the Soviet Union, and also partly to make it more convenient to suppress the anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare of the Manchurian people.

The Japanese militarists are steadily concentrating forces in Manchuria and Korea. In spite of the rapacious war in China, which demands a large army on active service, military units and formations are unceasingly being transferred to Manchuria and Korea. That is going on to this day.

The growing numerical strength of the Japanese forces concentrated in Manchuria and Korea is shown by the following figures: 95,000 men in 1934; 100,000 men in 1935; 145,000 in 1936; 220,000 in 1937, and about 400,000 in 1938.

In all, the Japanese have on the mainland, that is, in China, Manchuria and Korea, about 1,400,000 men.

All this time the commands of the Kwantung and Korean Armies are intensively active, building barracks, stores, depots, arsenals, munition works and so on.

Airdromes are being built in Manchuria on a wide scale. There were 130 airdromes and landing fields in Manchuria in 1934; the number reaches 250 in 1939.

The Japanese are simultaneously mustering forces and preparing a theater of action for war against the Mongolian People's Republic. They have seized Inner Mongolia, on the very borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, and are making intensive preparations for war there too. But for all that, the Japanese military cannot, of course, eliminate the political weakness of their position in Manchuria and Korea. In time of war, the brutally oppressed masses of these

countries will certainly not be on the side of their present masters.

All means are good means to the Japanese militarists in their preparations for a war on the U.S.S.R. They have in their pay White-Guard generals, atamans and other riffraff of the White bands which were defeated in the Far East during the Civil War. These scoundrels, who can boast neither country nor honor, are being trained to act as detachments of diversionists and spies. The Japanese have also, as you know, comrades, paid no little attention to using the Trotsky-Bukharin scum against us as spies, diversionists and wreckers.

At the end of November, 1938, General Tojo, Japanese Vice-Minister of War, made a programmatic speech in which he frankly announced the imperialist policy of the Japanese militarists in the future. He said:

"We are confronted by the necessity of preparing for simultaneous action on two fronts—against the U.S.S.R. and against China. That is why we must start new military preparations on the broadest scale."

The response of the Tokyo stock exchange to Tojo's speech was a big drop in shares. The vast majority of the Japanese people do not want war with the Soviet Union. We know the spirit of dejection that prevailed among wide sections of the Japanese population during the events of Lake Khasan. Nevertheless, the militarists are persistently and obstinately pursuing their course.

The keynote of the debate on the huge military budget for 1939-40 at the present session of the Japanese parliament was the extension of military preparations against the U.S.S.R. General Itagaki, the Japanese Minister of War, expressed the same ideas as Tojo when he demanded huge appropriations for the army and for the expansion of the armaments industry.

When the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931 we had only very small land and air forces in the Far East, and no sea-going fleet at all. Now, as the result of the efforts made under the direct guid-

ance of Comrade Stalin, we need have no doubt that the required number of strait-jackets will be found in our Far East for any madmen who cherish the idea of converting the Soviet Maritime Region, or any other Soviet region, into a new "Kuo." (*Loud applause.*)

As regards the développement of our military and naval forces in the Far East, all that need be said is that on our side, too, 1934 was nothing like 1931, nor was 1935 like 1934, and, let us put it bluntly, in 1939 the Red Army and Navy in the Far East are even stronger than in 1938.

The men, commanders and political workers of the First Detached Red Banner Army, and the sailors, commanders and political workers of our neighbor and brother, the Pacific Fleet, like the whole Red Army and Red Navy, all understand and fully approve of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. This policy was stated on March 10 on behalf of the entire Soviet people in the words of Comrade Stalin. It is clear and explicit.

"We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations with all the neighboring countries which have common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our position; and we shall adhere to this position

as long as these countries maintain like relations with the Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state. . . .

"We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered by instigators of war who attempt to violate the Soviet borders."\* (*Applause.*)

Comrades, you know that the Red Army is an army of Bolsheviks, the flesh and blood of the Soviet people, a loyal and impregnable bulwark of its country, its government, and the great cause of Lenin and Stalin. (*Applause.*) The Red Army, commanded by Comrade Voroshilov (*applause*), is faithfully fulfilling, and always will fulfil, every behest of our great and beloved leader, the great patriot of our country, our own Stalin. (*Loud applause and cheers.*)

The Red Army knows that Stalin leads only to victory.

Long live our Party!

Hurrah for Comrade Stalin! (*Loud applause and cheers. Cries of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for the men, commanders and political workers of the Red Army!"*)

\* See p. 526.

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## Resolution of the Eighteenth Congress on the Report of Comrade Stalin

### RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF COMRADE STALIN ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

Having heard and discussed the report of Comrade Stalin on the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (B.), the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) resolves:

1. To approve the political line and the practical work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

2. To approve Comrade Stalin's report and to instruct all Party organizations to be guided in their work by the principles and tasks outlined in Comrade Stalin's report. (*Adopted unanimously.*)



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## Resolution of the Eighteenth Congress on the Report of Comrade Manuilsky

RESOLUTION ON THE REPORT OF  
COMRADE MANUILSKY ON THE  
WORK OF THE DELEGATION OF  
THE C.P.S.U.(B.) IN THE EXECU-  
TIVE COMMITTEE OF THE  
COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

Having heard and discussed the report

of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) to  
the Communist International, the Eight-  
eenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) ap-  
proves the political line and practical  
work of the delegation of the C.P.S.U.  
(B.) in the Communist International.  
*(Adopted unanimously.)*

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# Report on the Third Five-Year Plan for the National-Economic Development of the U. S. S. R.

March 17, 1939

BY V. M. MOLOTOV

*Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.*

## I. RESULTS OF THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN

**C**OMRADES, the Third Five-Year Plan for the national-economic development of the U.S.S.R. has been submitted to you for consideration. It is a gigantic program of expansion in the national economy, of progress in culture and of advance in the well-being of the people. This program has its foundation in our victory, the victory of the working people of the Soviet Union, in having carried to completion the First and Second Five-Year Plans.

The Third Five-Year Plan accords with the new period which we have inaugurated. It accords with the fact that the U.S.S.R. has already entered upon a new phase of development, the phase of the completion of the building of classless, socialist society and the gradual transition from socialism to communism. The Third Five-Year Plan will be one of the principal stages in accomplishing this great task, the task of passing on to complete communism. To undertake this matter means the taking on of complex and difficult tasks.

We are not dismayed by the difficulties of the impending struggle for the Third Five-Year Plan. We are fully confident of our ability to cope with these new tasks, also. In this we are fully warranted by the successes achieved in the

fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan.

That the Second Five-Year Plan has been a success is apparent to everyone. The *chief historical task* assigned by the Second Five-Year Plan has been accomplished: all exploiting classes have been completely abolished, and the causes giving rise to the exploitation of man by man and to the division of society into exploiters and exploited have been done away with for all time. All this is primarily the result of the abolition of the private ownership of the means of production. It is the result of the triumph in our country of state and of cooperative and collective farm property, that is, socialist property. Exceptions to this rule constitute but an insignificant fraction, and even these exceptions will soon disappear. In the cities, socialist economy and the working class, which embraces workers and employees, have exercised full dominion for quite some years now. The formerly backward countryside has undergone a transformation. The collective farm system has strengthened and become a powerful force for communism. Socialism, the first phase of communism, has in the main already been built in our country. The historic achievement of a socialist society and a socialist state has received the force of law in the great Stalin Constitution.

All this denotes that our society now

consists of two classes friendly to each other, of workers and peasants united in a common cause, the cause of building communism. This great cause brings the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. ever closer together, unites them ever more firmly in comradeship and amity as active and conscious builders of communist society. The line of demarcation between the two classes of the working people of the U.S.S.R. is becoming obliterated more and more, as is also the line between these classes and the intelligentsia, which is engaged in mental labor for the benefit of Soviet society.

Just see for yourselves what has taken place in our country.

In 1928 the picture was as follows:

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1928

*(In per cent of total)*

1. Workers and employees.....	17
2. Collective farmers and handicraftsmen organized in producers' cooperatives .....	3
3. Individual peasants, and handicraftsmen not organized in producers' cooperatives .....	73
4. Capitalist elements (private traders and kulaks) .....	5
5. Miscellaneous (students, the armed forces, pensioners, etc.)..	2
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Total .....	100

This is how matters stood in the U.S.S.R. when the work of laying the foundation of socialist society in our country was begun.

Thus, if we take that portion of the population which is wholly bound up with socialist economy, that is, if we take the workers, employees, collective farmers and the entire group classified as miscellaneous, we find that ten years ago this portion of the population represented in the aggregate 22 per cent, or less than one-fourth, of the total population of the U.S.S.R. Three-fourths of the population at that time were still tied to private enterprise; and approxi-

mately 5 per cent of them—private traders and kulaks—were to be classified as exploiters.

Today our country presents an entirely different picture. It is with good reason that we speak of the achievements of the First and Second Five-Year Plans. The social composition of our society has radically changed.

Here are some data on the social composition of the population of the U.S.S.R. in 1937:

SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1937

*(In per cent of total)*

1. Workers and employees .....	35
2. Collective farmers and handicraftsmen organized in producers' cooperatives .....	55
3. Individual peasants, and handicraftsmen not organized in producers' cooperatives .....	6
4. Miscellaneous (students, the armed forces, pensioners, etc.)..	4
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Total .....	100

This is what the U.S.S.R., our socialist society, looks like today.

It appears from the above that at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period, 94 per cent of the population was composed of workers, employees and peasants engaged in socialist, that is, in state and in cooperative and collective farm economy. Individual peasants and handicraftsmen not organized in producers' cooperatives accounted for about 6 per cent. The exploiting elements were abolished; they vanished from our land.

The transformation that has been going on in our society during the last decade found most striking expression in the conversion of the former peasantry into a collective farm peasantry, and in the great relative increase of the working class in the U.S.S.R. Whereas in 1928 workers and employees constituted only 17 per cent of the population, by 1937 the percentage had risen to 35. The proportion of workers and employees had doubled. The further growth of

cities and of industry entails a further proportionate growth of the working class, with a corresponding proportionate diminution of the peasantry.

What accounts for this transformation of our society, and for the complete abolition of exploiting classes and groups in the U.S.S.R. which we have achieved?

First, our successful fulfilment of the principal and decisive economic task of the Second Five-Year Plan, the task of completing the technical reconstruction of the national economy, whereby we established the material and technical base for the collective farm system in the countryside.

Second, the fact that we have done everything possible to enhance the well-being of the working people and to raise their cultural standard.

The following facts may be adduced to show the successful *completion of the technical reconstruction* of the national economy:

During the Second Five-Year Plan period the technical apparatus of production in industry and agriculture was radically renewed. In 1937 more than 80 per cent of the entire industrial output was yielded by the new establishments built or completely reconstructed during the years of the First and Second Five-Year Plans. About 90 per cent of the tractors and harvester combines in use in agriculture are of Soviet manufacture, and were produced during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan. Instead of the somewhat over twofold increase in the output of the machine-building and metal-working industries contemplated under the Second Five-Year Plan, the increase was almost threefold. More than 50 per cent of the total number of machine tools, as of January 1, 1938, were produced during the Second Five-Year Plan period. The electric power available per worker in industry as a whole rose from 2,100 kwh. to 4,370 kwh. The task of mechanizing such laborious and difficult industrial processes as coal cutting and oil and peat extraction, as well as the mechanization of fishing, etc., has been accomplished in the main.

According to the Second Five-Year Plan, *industrial* production was to have increased from 43,000,000,000 rubles to 93,000,000,000 rubles, but the actual output of industry in 1937 amounted to 96,000,000,000 rubles.

The Second Five-Year Plan provided for a 114 per cent increase in the output of our industry, but the actual increase in output was 121 per cent. On April 1, 1937, that is, within four years and three months, industry had already reached the level specified for the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period. Thus in industry the Second Five-Year Plan was carried out ahead of time.

In the Second Five-Year Plan the average annual rate of increase was fixed at 16.5 per cent, but the actual rate achieved was 17.1 per cent. Thus, the rates of increase of industrial output were higher than specified.

It goes without saying that not all branches of industry worked with equal success.

We scored our greatest successes in heavy industry, in the production of means of production. Here output increased almost two and a half times (by 140 per cent) and the plan was considerably exceeded: this line of production recorded a 122 per cent fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan. Still, in several important branches of heavy industry, such as the production of pig iron, coal and oil, there was a considerable deficiency in plan fulfilment.

In the manufacture of articles of consumption, though output was doubled (an even 100 per cent increase), the plan was not quite fulfilled. Because of the unsatisfactory work of light industry, plan fulfilment was only 85 per cent of consumers' goods, while the food industry under the People's Commissariat of the Food Industry of the U.S.S.R. fulfilled its plan 113 per cent, which was considerably in excess of specifications.

It must be stated also that during the Second Five-Year Plan period the growth of heavy industry was considerably more rapid than that of industry manufacturing consumers' goods. This was mainly due to the circumstance that

in the course of fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan it became necessary for us to introduce major corrections into the plan for the development of industry. As was the case under the First Five-Year Plan, the international situation compelled us to increase the rates of development that had been laid down for the defense industry, and, as you are aware from Comrade Voroshilov's speech at the Congress, not a little has been done in this regard. (*Applause.*) This made it imperative to accelerate considerably the expansion of heavy industry, at the cost of reducing, to a certain extent, the rates of growth of light industry. But in return we have compelled the most aggressive imperialists to be more restrained toward the U.S.S.R. (*Applause.*) It must be admitted, however, that now attention to the further intensive development of heavy industry must be accompanied by a considerable stimulation of the whole range of industries producing articles of general consumption.

In agriculture gross output has increased 54 per cent, or one and a half times, during the Second Five-Year Plan period. Grain growing in our country has coped successfully with the well-known task assigned by Comrade Stalin, having yielded a harvest in 1937 of more than 7,000,000,000 poods\* of grain. Final figures put the 1937 grain harvest at 7,340,000,000 poods, which is an over-fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan assignment.

The amount of cotton picked was also in excess of plan; it rose from 78,000,000 poods to 157,000,000 poods, a twofold increase. The sugar beet crop increased from 66,000,000 centners,\*\* an admittedly very low level, to 219,000,000 centners, or more than threefold. Flax, Indian corn and sunflower seed lagged very considerably behind. Livestock products increased 54 per cent, or more than one and a half times.

Great successes have been achieved in the mechanization of agriculture. The supply of tractors and harvester combines planned for agriculture has been exceeded. In technical level and large-scale production capacity, our agriculture is now ahead of any other country in the world. Cotton, flax and Indian corn picking is, however, still behind with regard to mechanization.

The state farms have achieved considerable successes, having exceeded the plan set for grain deliveries. It still remains for the future, however, to make the state farms highly remunerative.

The expansion of the national economy was largely due to the successful work of the *transport systems*, particularly the railroads, which fulfilled and over-fulfilled their five-year traffic plan in four years. Water-borne transport is far behind. Transportation by motor car and aircraft has developed rapidly before our very eyes.

All these economic successes indicate that the technical reconstruction of the national economy was steadily being carried out. But this does not mean that we may rest content with the level that has been achieved. Quite the contrary. The tasks before us relating to the further technical equipment of industry and the whole of the national economy have become not smaller but greater.

The Second Five-Year Plan for *improving the material conditions and raising the cultural standard of the working people*, with an attendant rise of 100 per cent and over in the level of popular consumption, has likewise been fulfilled.

This is borne out in the first place by the fact that the production of consumers' goods doubled in the course of these years. In a number of very important branches of industry output not only doubled but considerably more than doubled, as, for instance, in the production of sugar, butter, sausage, knit goods and footwear.

While there was an 18 per cent increase in the number of workers and employees, the national payroll showed an increase two and one-half times, or a rise of 151 per cent, as against 55 per

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\* One pood equals 36.113 pounds.—*Ed.*

\*\* One centner equals 100 pounds.—*Ed.*

cent specified in the Second Five-Year Plan. Real wages of workers doubled during the Second Five-Year Plan (a 101 per cent increase).

State expenditures on cultural and other public services for workers and employees, that is, on education and public health, increased from 4,300,000,000 to 14,000,000,000 rubles, that is to say, more than threefold.

The prosperity of the collective farmers grew considerably during the Second Five-Year Plan period. This is apparent from the rising incomes of the collective farms and their members. Thus, cash incomes of collective farms during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan rose from 4,600,000,000 rubles to 14,200,000,000 rubles, that is, more than trebled. The average amount of money paid out per collective farm household increased during this period three and a half times. Cash incomes distributed among collective farmers according to workday units showed a 330 per cent increase, the rise having been particularly great in industrial crop districts.

The increase from 1,000,000,000 rubles to 4,500,000,000 rubles in savings bank deposits is indicative of the growing prosperity of the population.

The following facts attest to the cultural growth of the population: The number of children attending primary and secondary schools increased from 21,300,000 to 29,400,000. The secondary schools grew particularly rapidly, there having been a twofold increase in attendance in the fifth, sixth and seventh grades and a fifteenfold increase in the eighth, ninth and tenth grades. The number of university and college students reached a total of 550,000. The student body in our institutions of higher learning is greater than the combined total of Germany, England, France, Italy and Japan. The vast development of our political and educational work is indicated by the considerable growth of book and newspaper publication, the increasing number of libraries and moving picture theaters, particularly those equipped for sound films. Our libraries contain seventy-five books for every one hundred

inhabitants of the Soviet Union, which is over three times as many as Germany had in 1934. In the republics of Kirghizia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan and Uzbekistan, that is, among the peoples of the Soviet East, the rates of increase in cultural development were greatest.

Considerable successes have also been achieved in the sphere of public health. Suffice it to say that the number of hospital beds was increased one and a half times during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan.

A total of 26,800,000 square meters of new housing space was thrown open to occupancy. It must be admitted that in this regard the Second Five-Year Plan was short of fulfilment by a considerable margin.

In trade the results achieved during the Second Five-Year Plan period were not small either. It need merely be stated that during 1935 the rationing system was abolished and the restricted sale, first of bread and then of all other foodstuffs and manufactured goods, was done away with. This we could achieve solely because of the rapid growth of industrial output and the considerable progress made in agriculture. The volume of trade in state and cooperative stores increased from 40,000,000,000 rubles to 126,000,000,000 rubles. In consequence of this prices on the collective farm markets dropped considerably. However, we did not succeed in fulfilling the task set by the Second Five-Year Plan with regard to reducing retail prices of consumers' goods. But it is well known that the failure to make good in this respect was more than compensated by wage increases to workers and employees considerably in excess of the amounts provided for by the Five-Year Plan, as well as by the rapid increase in cash incomes of collective farms and their members.

In order to be able correctly to assess the scope of the work accomplished by the Soviet people during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan, let us compare the results of the Second Five-Year Plan with those of the First Five-Year Plan.

We have every right to be proud of our first great victory in the economic life and the socialist transformation of our country—the fulfilment of the First Five-Year Plan. The echo of this victory reverberated throughout the world. It was a historic event of international significance.

But in many respects the Second Five-Year Plan stood on a higher plane than the First Five-Year Plan.

Take, for instance, the following facts:

First, during the Second Five-Year Plan period, the national income more than doubled, or, to be exact, increased 110 per cent. This enormous rise in the national income may be taken as a general summary of the economic successes achieved under the Second Five-Year Plan.

Second, during the First Five-Year Plan period 39,000,000,000 rubles worth of new and reconstructed plants was put into operation, while during the Second Five-Year Plan period the corresponding figure was 103,000,000,000 rubles, a 160 per cent increase as against the First Five-Year Plan. This testifies to the fact that during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan conditions have been created in the Soviet Union which will make possible a further and much more powerful expansion of the national economy.

The successes achieved under the Second Five-Year Plan did not come to us of themselves. We won them in stubborn battle, overcoming considerable difficulties.

Remnants of the exploiting classes stood in our way. They clung desperately to their position, but were completely swept away. However, after smashing the class enemy within the country, we did not dismiss the question of combating our class enemies.

As long as the Soviet Union is surrounded by a capitalist world, we cannot be discharged of the duty to contend with this encirclement, to fight against its constantly renewed attacks upon the Soviet power, upon the U.S.S.R. The intensified struggle against wrecking and

espionage, which occupied a great deal of our attention during the last few years, speaks for itself. In this struggle capitalism, and particularly its fascist forces, made use of every means of struggle against the U.S.S.R., even the most despicable and foul. They stopped at nothing, and utilized for their purposes all those Trotskyite-Bukharinite-Yagodaite-Rykovite degenerates and their allies among the bourgeois nationalists. But it was beyond their power to stop the growth of the U.S.S.R. or even to retard its progress. We have learned a new lesson in the class struggle, in the struggle against the capitalist encirclement, and, in particular, against the fascist forces of capitalism. Apparently we shall be able to make use of this lesson for the purpose of intensifying in many respects our struggle against all enemies of the Soviet power, and to this end shall strengthen our state in every way.

Though we have purged the U.S.S.R. of hostile classes, of exploiters, we have not yet abolished classes altogether. There remain the working class and the peasantry. But they are no longer the former working class nor are they the former peasantry. Their role in society and in the state has changed. Their mode of life, their culture and morals have changed in many respects.

Having eliminated the remnants of the exploiting classes, we have established a society of two mutually friendly classes, the working class and the peasantry. This society has given rise to an intelligentsia of its own, which is no longer bourgeois or bourgeois-democratic, but is, in the main, a socialist intelligentsia. This intelligentsia, linked with ties of blood to the working people and to socialism, plays a great part in the work of directing the development and consolidation of the new society and state.

The antagonism that used to exist between town and country has largely been uprooted, but a substantial difference between the above two classes still exists. This difference exists, primarily, because the workers are employed in establish-

ments which are the possession of the whole people, are socialist-state in character, while the peasants work on the collective farms, which are socialist-cooperative in character. Both of these classes, the working class and the collective farm peasantry, are already classes of socialist society. And while the working class, as the more advanced class and the one better trained for the establishment of complete communism, has retained its leading role, the peasantry in its turn does not maintain an attitude of passivity, but takes an active part in the building of the new society, in the building of communism. This principle is embodied in the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., an instrument of the utmost importance, which is inseparably linked up with the name of Comrade Stalin. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

Does this mean that *all* workers and *all* peasants have become advanced members of our society? No, it does not mean this yet.

Even among the workers, some are advanced while others are backward, not to speak of degenerates. It is the same among the peasants: some are advanced and others are backward. Some, of course, are worse than simply backward. The advanced people of our day are the active and devoted builders of communism, the best champions in the struggle for the consolidation of our state. These advanced people of our society are already consciously followed by the overwhelming majority of workers and peasants. But even among workers, not to mention employees, petty-bourgeois habits are still very much alive.

There are still quite a few left who are ready to grab from the state as much as they can, without caring a rap for the consequences. It is therefore necessary to fight for the interests of the state and for the strengthening of labor discipline in our offices and factories, to fight against loafers, good-for-nothings and those who flit from job to job. There are also quite a few among the peasantry who take no interest in the weal of the state or even of their own collective farm, who think only of stuffing their

own pockets with money and goods at the expense of the state and the collective farm. Here, too, energetic steps must be taken to improve discipline and educational work. If such steps are not taken and intensive work is not carried on to bring up the working people in the spirit of consolidating socialist property and the state, it will be impossible to change backward people into conscious and active builders of communism.

Our strength lies in the fact that in the Soviet Union it is the most advanced people who set the mark. Who are these foremost people? They are politically conscious Communists, non-Party Bolsheviks, Stakhanovites, those in the lead on the collective farms and members of the socialist intelligentsia. These are the people who are fashioning the new life. Their number and social importance are growing with every day.

One of the most outstanding phenomena of recent times has been the Stakhanov movement, a new form of socialist competition that has developed among us.

From the ranks of the working class have come people who, by dint of exemplary work in mastering the technique of production, rapidly occupied foremost leading posts in their respective industries. By their high labor productivity based on improved organization, these Stakhanovites have pointed the road to new successes in industry. A counterpart of this movement is steadily gaining ground in the collective farms. The glorious deeds of Stakhanovite workers are being matched by the foremost among the collective farmers, and more and more of the working people are following their lead. There has never been anything like the Stakhanov movement under capitalism, nor can there be.

The Stakhanov movement is one of the most magnificent results of the Second Five-Year Plan. It is evidence of the growth of our forces, of the growth of their communist consciousness, a guarantee that the U.S.S.R. will achieve new and still more glorious successes.

Such are the results of the Second Stalin Five-Year Plan.



## II. THE CHIEF ECONOMIC TASK OF THE U.S.S.R.

You know, comrades, that achievements have their seamy side, too. They sometimes evoke uncalled-for presumption. It cannot be denied that in some cases we are still uncritical and have a tendency to overrate our achievements. Therefore, we must analyze the facts as they are and see what they amount to.

We have indeed overtaken and surpassed the capitalist countries in our rates of industrial development. We have indeed overtaken and surpassed these countries in the technical side of production, as well. Both these achievements are of great consequence, but that is not all that is required. Comrade Stalin warned us long ago, at the Sixteenth Congress of the Party in 1930, that "*we must not confuse rates of development of industry with the level of its development*," that these are two totally different things; that "*we are outrageously behind the foremost capitalist countries in our level of industrial development*"; that we must have high rates of industrial development in order to "*overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically.*"

Nevertheless, in some quarters people have begun to forget that we are still behind some capitalist countries economically, that is, in industrial output per head of the population. They have begun to forget that, strictly speaking, it is only a mere ten or twelve years since we were able to begin the task of lifting our country out of its previous underdevelopment. They have begun to forget that the lag which we must make good in order to catch up with the other countries is the result of more than a century

of backwardness in Russia before the revolution. We must be sure not to forget this, and cannot possibly rest content with what we have achieved.

In the U.S.S.R. socialism has been built, but only in the main. We have still a lot of work, a tremendous amount of work to do before we can really provide the U.S.S.R. with all it needs; before we have an adequate output of all commodities, an abundance of all products; before our country is developed to such an extent, both technically and economically, that we shall not only not yield precedence to the most advanced capitalist country but tower far above it.

We have entered a new period of development, the period of gradual transition from socialism to communism. But this transition to communism implies an abundance of all commodities, from which we are still far removed. This transition to communism implies so high a level of technical and economic development in our country as will exceed by far the present level of any capitalist country, even the economically most developed. Hence, we are faced with new problems, problems of enormous importance in the economic development of the U.S.S.R.

These tasks arise, first of all, from the fact that in respect of economic development, that is, per capita output of industry, we are still behind the most highly developed capitalist countries. Nor must we lose sight of the fact that the population of the U.S.S.R. is much greater than that of the U.S.A., is more than twice that of Germany, and is approximately four times the population of either England or France.

I shall supplement my theses with a few figures. Here is the table in point:

### PER CAPITA OUTPUT OF SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

(U.S.S.R.—1937; other countries—latest figures published)

Branch of Industry	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	Germany	Great Britain	France	Japan
Electric power (kw. hrs.) . . . . .	215	1,160	735	608	490	421
Pig iron (kilograms) . . . . .	86	292	234	183	189	30
Steel (kilograms) . . . . .	105	397	291	279	188	62
Coal (kilograms) . . . . .	757	3,429	3,313	5,165	1,065	643
Cement (kilograms) . . . . .	32	156	173	154	86	60

These figures show that, computed in terms of per capita output, we are well behind in the production of electric power, pig iron, steel, coal and cement. Yet, unless these industries are highly developed we cannot ensure maximum expansion for the machine building and the defense industries, for transportation and the construction of new mills and factories. These figures further show that we still have much to do in the development of heavy industry, although we have been paying great attention to it all these years. Incidentally, it must be mentioned that there are major

branches of heavy industry, like the oil industry, in which the U.S.S.R., while very much behind the U.S.A., is far in advance of Germany, France, Italy and Japan, where practically no oil is extracted.

Let us now turn to the question of the level of industry producing articles for mass consumption. There, too, as we shall see, the U.S.S.R. is behind in the per capita output of manufactures like cotton and woolen fabrics, leather footwear, sugar, paper, soap and some others.

Here is another table:

PER CAPITA OUTPUT OF SOME OF THE PRINCIPAL PRODUCTS OF INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES

(U.S.S.R.—1937; other countries—latest figures published)

Product	U.S.S.R.	U.S.A.	Germany	Great Britain	France	Japan
Cotton fabrics (sq. meters) . . . . .	16	58	*	60	31	57
Woolen fabrics (meters) . . . . .	0.6	2.8	*	7.4	*	*
Leather footwear (pairs) . . . . .	1	2.6	1.1	2.2	*	*
Paper (kilograms) . . . . .	5	48	42	42	23	8
Sugar (kilograms) . . . . .	14	12	29	8	21	17
Soap (kilograms) . . . . .	3	12	7	11	10	*

\* No data.

How is it that in spite of all we have done, and in spite of the tremendous rate at which our industries have grown, we are still behind the most highly developed capitalist countries economically?

The reply to this question is clear. Because not so long ago our country was terribly backward industrially, and, considering the size of the population, had an exceedingly low per capita industrial output. In the short time which has elapsed since then it could not make up for the time previously lost.

Remember what Lenin wrote as long ago as 1913 in the *Pravda* of that day, in an article entitled "How to Increase the Per Capita Consumption in Russia." Castigating the paid hacks of the bourgeois press, Lenin wrote:

"Russia is still an incredibly backward country, backward to an unheard-of degree, poor and semi-barbarian, which,

in equipment of modern instruments of production, is four times worse off than England, five times worse off than Germany, and ten times worse off than America."

In pointing this out Lenin made a scathing attack on the capitalists and landlords who were in power in Russia, because "by their oppression" they were "condemning five-sixths of the population to beggary and the whole country to stagnation and decay."

Lenin kept returning to this question again and again. In the same year, 1913, in an article entitled "Iron in Peasant Farming," he compared Russia of that date with Hungary. He cited illuminating facts about the economics of Hungary, where the reins of government were held by reactionary landlords, as in Russia. Lenin at that time established the following fact: In 2,500,000 out of

the 2,800,000 peasant farms in Hungary, "plows with wooden coulters and harrows with wooden frames undoubtedly prevail, while almost half of the farm wagons have wheels with wooden hubs." And Lenin added: "The poverty, primitiveness and neglect of the overwhelming majority of our peasant farms are incomparably worse than in Hungary."

Such was really the case.

What was the level of industry at that time in Russia?

The per capita output of electric power in 1913 was one-seventeenth of the output in the U.S.A. and one-fifth of the output in Germany.

The per capita output of pig iron in 1913 was one-eleventh of the output in the U.S.A., one-eighth of the output in Great Britain, one-eighth of the output in Germany and one-fourth of the output in France.

The per capita output of steel in 1913 was one-eleventh of the output in the U.S.A., one-eighth of the output in Germany, one-sixth of the output in Great Britain and one-fourth of the output in France.

The per capita output of coal and lignite (in terms of coal) in our country in 1913 was one-twenty-sixth of the output in the U.S.A., one-thirty-first of the output in Great Britain, one-fifteenth of the output in Germany and one-fifth of the output in France.

That is how low the level of Russian industry was before the revolution. The landlords and capitalists who ruled the country used the iron hand of tsarism to shackle the mighty forces of our people and gave them no opportunity to develop.

Especially noteworthy is the fact that Russia at that time, far from overtaking the most highly developed capitalist countries, was, on the contrary, falling further and further *behind* them in a number of major industries.

Here are the figures for the production of pig iron in 1900 and 1913.

The per capita production of pig iron in tsarist Russia was one-eighth of the output in the U.S.A. in 1900, while in 1913 it had receded to one-eleventh

of that country's output. In comparison with Germany, the output of pig iron in Russia was approximately one-sixth in 1900, while in 1913 it had receded to one-eighth. In comparison with France it was one-third in 1900, while in 1913 it had receded to one-fourth.

The same applies to steel.

We can understand with what alarm and indignation Lenin, in the first of the articles I mentioned, wrote about the "increasing backwardness" of Russia, about the fact that "we are falling further and further behind."

That is why, just before the October Revolution, when Russia had been reduced to extremity by the imperialist war, Lenin put the question bluntly in an article entitled "The Threatening Catastrophe and How to Fight It."

"The war has created such an immense crisis, has so strained the material and moral forces of the people, has dealt such blows at the modern social organization, that humanity finds itself faced by an alternative: either it perishes, or it entrusts its fate to the most revolutionary class for the swiftest and most radical transition to a superior method of production.

"Owing to a number of historical causes—the greater backwardness of Russia, the unusual hardships incurred by her because of the war, the utter rottenness of tsardom and the extreme tenacity of the traditions of 1905—the revolution broke out in Russia earlier than in other countries. The result of the revolution has been that the *political* system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the advanced countries.

"But that is not enough. The war is inexorable, it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well.*"

Lenin put the question squarely: "Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries *economically as well.*"

As you see, the task facing the Bolsheviks was no small one and no easy one; but the Bolsheviks were not to be

frightened by difficulties. When the Bolshevik Party came into power, it set to work to solve this problem with the greatest enthusiasm. Much has already been done. Instead of lagging disgracefully behind the other countries, as Russia did before the revolution, the Soviet Union is steadily advancing from year to year, raising the level of development of its industry to the level of the most highly developed capitalist countries. The Bolshevik revolution saved Russia from her disgraceful backwardness as compared with other countries. It raised our industry to a high level. However, the problem has not yet been solved. We still have to admit that we are behind economically, but we do not intend to resign ourselves to this position and shall not do so.

The principal economic task of our country, of which Lenin spoke before the October Revolution, must now be faced squarely: the time has come to tackle in practice the main economic task of the U.S.S.R.: *to overtake and surpass also economically the most highly developed capitalist countries of Europe and the United States of America*, to solve this problem once and for all in the shortest possible time. This problem solved, we shall make the U.S.S.R. the most advanced country in the world in all respects: not only in respect to its political system—that we achieved long ago; not only in respect to its technical level of production—that we have also achieved. By solving this problem we shall raise the U.S.S.R. to world primacy economically as well. Then and only then will the significance of the new era in the development of the U.S.S.R., the era of transition from socialist society to communist society, be really revealed.

What must we strive for in practice in order to overtake and surpass the major capitalist countries economically?

Comrade Stalin has already told us in his speech what is necessary in the output of pig iron, for instance. I shall repeat these figures.

In order to surpass Britain in the output of pig iron, we must increase the annual smelting to 25,000,000 tons. This,

by the way, is not much more than the objective set by the Third Five-Year Plan, under which we must increase our output of pig iron to 22,000,000 tons by 1942. In order to surpass Germany in the output of pig iron, we must increase the annual smelting of pig iron to 40,000,000-45,000,000 tons. This, as you see, is a much bigger task. Before we can surpass the U.S.A. economically we must have an annual output of pig iron of 50,000,000-60,000,000 tons. As you see, this is a gigantic task, a task which is far beyond the bounds of the Third Five-Year Plan.

I shall cite another example—electric power.

In the per capita consumption of electric power at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period, the U.S.S.R. will outstrip the present level of France, but will still have only two-thirds of Germany's consumption and slightly over one-third of the present consumption of electric power in the U.S.A.

Need I explain why precisely now is the time to face squarely the task of "overtaking and outstripping"? That is clear without lengthy explanations.

We have amassed a tremendous amount of machinery in our industry and we have every chance of continuing our technical development at a rapid rate. We already have a large number of trained forces that have mastered technique and are ready for new and greater efforts to build up the economic power of the U.S.S.R. Furthermore, socialist society has already taken final shape in our country, and this society does not intend to and never will resign itself to being economically less developed than the capitalist countries, even though this is the result of the age-old historic backwardness of our country. This is why the Bolshevik Party must put the solution of this problem on the order of the day. At the same time we shall consider it our duty to utilize and apply extensively in our country all that is best in modern engineering and the technology of production, and also in scientific methods of organizing work. For this purpose we must utilize the ex-

perience of other countries in all respects, utilize it in Bolshevik fashion. Everything that can help us to speed the solution of the chief economic task of the U.S.S.R. must be taken into account.

The point now is to spur the ambition to accelerate our rates of industrial development, especially in heavy industry, which, in the last analysis, determines the rise of the whole national economy. The point is to inspire the Bolsheviks and all honest people in our country with the ambition to put an end to the inadequacy of the economic level of the U.S.S.R. in the shortest possible time. It is now a question of developing competition in the field of economy between the U.S.S.R. and the major capitalist countries. This question has been transferred to the international arena. All the stronger, therefore, must be our endeavor to solve this new problem creditably.

As Comrade Stalin said in his report, time is needed for the solution of this problem. We need another ten or fifteen years at least, another two or three Five-Year Plan periods. The fulfilment of the Third Five-Year Plan must, in many respects, predetermine the solution of this problem. Then let the Third Five-Year Plan become our banner of victory in the arena of the international competition for economic primacy between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries! (*Applause.*)

### III. THE PLAN FOR THE FURTHER ADVANCEMENT OF OUR NATIONAL ECONOMY

The Third Five-Year Plan is a continuation of the first two Five-Year Plans. It is based on the further development of the same Bolshevik general line. It consistently pursues the line of the further industrialization of the U.S.S.R., which underlay all our past economic achievements and guarantees new and still greater progress in our economic development.

The Third Five-Year Plan provides for a tremendous advance in all branches of the national economy. This advance

is particularly great in our industry, first and foremost in our heavy industry and defense industry. It ensures further progress in all the economic districts of the national republics, without losing sight of our major tasks in the interests of the state as a whole. This plan coordinates the development of the separate sections of the national economy, in pursuance of the general line, and provides for the accumulation of the necessary economic stocks and reserves. With the present enormous dimensions to which Soviet economy has grown, we cannot work normally and continue our advance in accordance with planned schedules unless the various industrial enterprises and the railways have sufficient reserves, such as fuel, for instance. But we require not only working reserves. In addition we need national reserves of fuel, electric power, manufactures and foodstuffs, not to mention a commensurate development of the railways and other forms of transport. The necessity for such reserves requires no proof, particularly in the light of our duty to ensure the defense needs of the U.S.S.R.

In the pre-Congress discussion on the theses for the Third Five-Year Plan, quite a number of valuable suggestions and amendments were proposed. Part of these suggestions should be duly considered when we adopt the Third Five-Year Plan theses in their final form. As regards the collective farms, there is an obvious need for certain additions to the theses. These I shall deal with later.

The Third Five-Year Plan must take special account of certain shortcomings in the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan. As an example I might refer to the state of affairs in the electric power industry.

As you know, the plan for the production of electric power in the Second Five-Year Plan period was very nearly fulfilled, that is, by 96 per cent, to be more exact; but, on the other hand, we are also aware that the plan of power station construction was only half fulfilled, by only 55 per cent. Hence, the increase in the output of electric power in the Second Five-Year Plan period was obtained

at the cost of somewhat excessive load on the existing electric power stations. This situation is obviously anomalous. It could only arise as a result of serious defects in the actual planning of our national economic development, for which a sufficient supply of electric power is of decisive importance.

Some people might say that in the present case it is not so much a question of defective planning as of shortcomings in the fulfilment of the plan, that is, of poor work in electric power construction and an inadequate output of electrical equipment. But such an argument would not hold water. Planning cannot be considered efficient if it takes no account of the course of plan fulfilment. Such swivel-chair planning, detached from the realities of life, is not worth much. Planning does not consist in piling up tables of figures, irrespective of how the plan is progressing. The tables themselves, of course, are indifferent to the fulfilment of our plans, but we who are conducting economic development according to plan cannot in the least afford to be indifferent.

We need plans in order to have a correct line for our economic activity. We need plans by branches and districts by years and shorter periods, with the various constituent plans correctly coordinated with the corresponding time limits. Corrections must be introduced in the planned figures and time limits for individual industries and districts to bring them in accord with actual plan fulfilment. We need plans as a check-up on our economic activity. If a plan is not followed up by a control of its fulfilment, it becomes a scrap of paper, a mere nothing. This concerns all our economic organizations, all our economic work. If we seriously organize the checking up on fulfilment, we shall improve our economic work and our planning as well.

We did not pay enough attention to keeping a check on plan fulfilment. This neglect was often utilized by our enemies for wrecking purposes. We must put an end to such a state of affairs, and then our plans will play an even greater part

in the economic life of the country. We already have a certain improvement in the sphere of planning, but the State Planning Commission and the People's Commissariats have still much work to do in this direction.

I shall now take up some points in the Third Five-Year Plan.

Under the Third Five-Year Plan the national income will increase (in 1926-27 prices) from 96,000,000,000 rubles to 174,000,000,000 rubles, that is, by 80 per cent. This, on the whole, corresponds to the rates of increase in the national income during the first two Five-Year Plans. The national income under the First Five-Year Plan increased also by 80 per cent; under the Second Five-Year Plan it increased 110 per cent. But in actual amounts the increase in the national income under the Third Five-Year Plan will be much greater than in previous years. In the First Five-Year Plan period, the increase in the national income was 20,500,000,000 rubles, in the Second Five-Year Plan period 50,500,000,000 rubles. Thus, during the two Five-Year Plan periods combined the national income of our country increased by 71,000,000,000 rubles. This, as you see, is not a small sum. But the increase in the national income under the Third Five-Year Plan is to total 78,000,000,000 rubles, that is, more than under the previous two Five-Year Plans put together.

I shall now deal with the various branches of our national economy.

## I. INDUSTRY

The output of industry in the U.S.S.R. in 1942—the last year of the Third Five-Year Plan—is set at 180,000,000,000 rubles (in 1926-27 prices), as against 95,500,000,000 rubles in 1937, which represents an increase of 88 per cent. Thus, the increase in industrial output under the Third Five-Year Plan will be 84,500,000,000 rubles, which is much greater than the aggregate increase of output under the first two Five-Year Plans. When this plan is fulfilled, the

volume of our industrial output will be approximately fifteen times as large as in pre-war times.

The average annual rate of increase of industrial output is set at 13.5 per cent, that is, at a somewhat smaller rate than during the Second Five-Year Plan period. It must, however, be borne in mind that by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period each per cent of growth of industrial output will equal 1,800,000,000 rubles, as against the 950,000,000 rubles represented by each per cent of growth at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period.

The plan provides for an average annual increase of 11 per cent in the output of articles of general consumption, and of 15 per cent in the output of the

means of production. As a result the output of articles of general consumption is to increase 70 per cent by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period, while the production of the means of production is to double, which will increase its share in the output of all industry from 58 per cent, at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period, to 62 per cent at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period. As you see, the plan provides for large rates of increase in the industry producing articles of general consumption, and at the same time for an even faster rate of development in heavy industry.

Here are the principal specifications for the major branches of industry producing means of production:

#### INCREASE IN OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY PRODUCING MEANS OF PRODUCTION

<i>Classification</i>	<i>1937</i>	<i>1942</i>	<i>1942 in per cent of 1937</i>
Production of means of production (in million rubles, in prices of 1926-27) .....	55,200	112,000	203
Of which:			
1. Machine-building and metal-working industries (in million rubles) .....	27,500	62,000	225
Inclusive of:			
a. Metal-cutting machine tools (in units)...	36,000	70,000	194
b. Main-line locomotives (in conventional "E" and "SU" equivalents, in units).....	1,581	2,090	132
c. Main-line freight cars (in two-axle equivalents, in units) .....	58,800	90,000	153
d. Automobiles (in units) .....	200,000	400,000	200
2. Electric power (in million kilowatt-hours)...	36,400	75,000	206
3. Coal (in thousand tons) .....	127,300	230,000	181
4. Oil with gas (in thousand tons) .....	30,500	54,000	177
5. Peat (in thousand tons) .....	23,800	49,000	206
6. Pig iron (in thousand tons) .....	14,500	22,000	152
7. Steel (in thousand tons) .....	17,700	28,000	158
8. Rolled steel, pipes and forgings from ingots (in thousand tons) .....	13,000	21,000	162
9. Chemicals (in million rubles) .....	5,900	13,400	227
10. Cement (in thousand tons) .....	5,500	10,000	183
11. Merchant timber hauled (thousand cu. mtrs.)	111,300	200,000	180
12. Saw-mill products (in thousand cu. meters)...	28,800	45,000	156

I shall also indicate the principal articles of general consumption: specifications for industry producing

### INCREASE IN OUTPUT OF INDUSTRY PRODUCING ARTICLES OF GENERAL CONSUMPTION

<i>Classification</i>	1937	1942	<i>1942 in per cent of 1937</i>
Production of articles of consumption (in million rubles, in prices of 1926-27) .....	40,300	68,000	169
Of which:			
1. People's Commissariat of Textile Industry...	8,500	13,400	157
2. People's Commissariat of Light Industry ....	6,700	9,800	147
3. People's Commissariat of the Fish Industry..	800	1,400	169
4. People's Commissariat of the Meat and Dairy Industry .....	2,900	6,100	206
5. People's Commissariat of the Food Industry.	9,100	15,000	164
6. People's Commissariat of Agricultural Stocks	1,900	2,800	142
7. Producers' cooperatives (in prices of 1932)..	13,200	26,400	200
<i>Separate Items of Production</i>			
1. Paper (in tons) .....	831,600	1,300,000	156
2. Cotton fabrics, including undyed (in thousand meters) .....	3,442,400	4,900,000	142
3. Woolen fabrics (in thousand meters).....	105,100	175,000	167
4. Leather footwear (in thousand pairs).....	164,200	235,000	143
5. Granulated sugar (in tons) .....	2,421,000	3,500,000	144
6. Canned goods (in thousand conventional cans)	873,000	1,800,000	206

Under the Third Five-Year Plan industries like machine building, electric power generation, the production of chemicals, of special steels and of some other manufactures are to develop at a rate set above the average.

The main tasks of our industrial executives, in furtherance of the success of the Third Five-Year Plan, are as follows:

A. *Machine building, iron and steel, and non-ferrous metal industries.* The task is to force the rate of development of machine building, and thereby make possible a further great increase in the technical equipment of industry itself, of the other branches of the national economy, and of the national defense. This forcing of the pace in machine building will inevitably lead to a new and greater advance, first, in iron and steel production: pig iron, steel, rolled steel and special steels; second, in non-ferrous metal production: copper, aluminum, zinc, lead, nickel, etc. On our success in the solution of this group of problems mainly depends the solution of the principal economic task of the U.S.S.R., the task of overtaking and sur-

passing the most highly developed capitalist countries economically as well.

In connection with the task of further developing mechanical engineering, we must emphasize the extraordinary importance of questions of *technical policy*. Not any kind of machine building industry will do. We must develop an up-to-date machine building industry, fully on a par with the principal achievements in world engineering. For instance, we must not merely increase the output of machine tools, but must insist on a decided increase in the proportion of high-efficiency lathes and special lathes, particularly of the automatic and semi-automatic types. This applies to all the other departments of machine building. We must not let our machine building industry fall behind modern technique, modern technical achievements, as will surely be the case if we become self-complacent or swell-headed in this regard. The policy of technique in Soviet machine building must be fully abreast of engineering progress throughout the world.

B. *Fuel and the power base of the*



*U.S.S.R.* The task is to advance at Bolshevik rates the fuel industry, which has fallen behind in recent years, especially coal and oil production, and quickly develop the construction of power stations and of electrical equipment. The expansion of the fuel and power base must not merely keep pace with the progress of industry and the national economy, but must run on in advance and create a sound basis for their further development. We must put an end to the present lag in the sinking of coal pits and the development of oil fields, and also in the cutting of peat and the quarrying of oil shales. Unless we have a decided and immediate improvement in the construction of power stations and in the development of coal and oil fields and of fuel bases in general in all the main economic districts of the country, we cannot solve the other great tasks which face us in the advancement of our national economy. Without such an improvement we shall not be able to provide a sound basis for the fulfilment of the Third Five-Year Plan.

In order to prevent the overloading of the transportation systems with tremendous shipments of fuel, we must ensure maximum rates of development for coal mining in the Moscow fields, in the Ural district, in the Far East and in Central Asia. The formation of a new oil-producing region, a "Second Baku," between the Volga and the Urals must be considered a task of prime importance and urgency to the state. We must put an end to our slow progress in the utilization of gases; we must make wide use of natural and industrial gases and also develop the underground gasification of coal; we must strictly hold to moderate and medium scales in the construction of electric power, heat and power and hydroelectric power stations, encouraging to the utmost the construction of small hydro-electric stations.

*c. The chemical industry.* Our task here is to quicken the advance of our chemical industry and the introduction of chemical processes into the national economy, for which we have boundless opportunities and the best prospects.

Here it will be particularly important to collect and properly allocate personnel. Good organization of staffs of chemists, engineers, technicians and workmen, the extensive employment of scientists in the development of the chemical industry, and the introduction of improved processes should ensure the realization of the slogan: "Make the Third Five-Year Plan a chemistry plan."

*d. The production of articles of general consumption.* Our task is to bring about the utmost expansion of the production of articles of general consumption, by developing all branches of light industry, the food industry and local industry. We must do everything to quicken the development of the textile industry, which is trailing considerably behind the supply of its raw material—cotton. The maximum cooperation on the part of local Party, Soviet and trade union organizations should do much to accelerate the increase in output of articles of general consumption.

*e. In the case of branches of industry that have particularly fallen behind, like the timber industry, the production of building material, fisheries, and some others, we need drastic and immediate measures.* The introduction of modern machinery and the proper organization of work, with a properly organized system of encouragement of the best, the most efficient workers, will provide a successful solution of the problem of making good the deficiencies of these branches.

*f. In all branches of industry we must:*

First, increase the responsibility of executives—Communists and non-Party people—for the work in their charge, and be more insistent in our demand for real Bolshevik efficiency in work, which means that executives must concentrate mainly on the selection of personnel and on keeping a check on fulfilment.

Second, increase our efforts to raise the productivity of labor, to tighten labor discipline, to develop socialist competition and the Stakhanov movement.

Third, reduce the cost of industrial production and improve in every way

the quality of production in all branches of industry.

The recent reorganization of the industrial People's Commissariats, that is, their division into smaller units, will bring the leadership of the People's Commissariats nearer to the respective establishments and is bound to have a favorable effect on the further advance of our industry.

## 2. AGRICULTURE

The Third Five-Year Plan provides for an increase in the output of all branches of agriculture from the 20,100,000,000 rubles (in 1926-27 prices) at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period to 30,500,000,000 rubles at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period, or a 52 per cent increase.

What will be the increase in the various branches of agriculture?

As regards grain crops, the plan provides for a 27 per cent increase in harvest yields. This means that by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period we must collect a harvest of grain crops amounting approximately to 8,000,000,000 poods. Are we equal to this task? Yes, we are. This is obvious from the fact that already in 1937, as the latest returns show, we had a harvest of 7,340,000,000 poods of grain, and thereby attained in all essentials the aim set by Comrade Stalin—to obtain a grain harvest of 7,000,000,000-8,000,000,000 poods. If we work well we shall certainly attain this goal of harvesting 8,000,000,000 poods. To appreciate what these figures mean, we need only recall that in pre-war times the average annual harvest of grain over a period of five years amounted to little more than 4,000,000,000 poods.

As regards industrial crops, the Third Five-Year Plan sets the following tasks for 1942: raw cotton—32,900,000 centners, 19 centners per hectare being the yield specified for irrigated fields, which means an increase in output of 28 per cent; sugar beet—a harvest of 300,000,000 centners, on the basis of a yield of 250 centners per hectare, or an

increase in output of 37.2 per cent; flax fiber—8,500,000 centners, on the basis of a yield of 4.6 centners per hectare, or an increase in output of 49 per cent. We must increase the cultivation of crops like sunflowers, hemp, Indian corn, rubber-bearing plants and new bast plants. Horticulture and viticulture must be intensively developed. We must also provide for a further great increase in the cultivation of subtropical plants like tea and citrus fruits, as well as in sericulture. In the vicinity of large cities we must develop the growing of potatoes and other vegetables, as well as the breeding of livestock, on a scale that will assure them a sufficiency of potatoes and other vegetables and, as far as possible, of milk and meat.

Exceptionally favorable conditions have been created in our countryside for a rise in the productivity of collective farm labor. In this respect cotton growing furnishes a very interesting example. No sooner had the state, acting upon Comrade Stalin's initiative in 1935, introduced special bonuses for increased cotton deliveries, than we began to record tremendous progress in a very short time. Just think: not so long ago, in 1934, the amount of cotton picked in the U.S.S.R. amounted to 12,000,000,000 centners, while in 1936 it already totaled 24,000,000,000 centners. In two years the cotton pick had doubled. That this was no adventitious increase we can see from the fact that the cotton yield and the total pick continued to increase steadily in the subsequent years.

Here are more detailed figures for the last five years referring to the Uzbek S.S.R., which is the main cotton producer in the U.S.S.R.:

### CROP YIELD AND GROSS HARVEST OF RAW COTTON IN THE UZBEK SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

	<i>Crop yield (in centners per hectare)</i>	<i>Total pick (in thousand centners)</i>
1934 .....	7.9	7,380
1935 .....	11.6	10,828
1936 .....	16.2	15,161
1937 .....	16.1	15,279
1938 .....	16.4	15,042

From these figures we see how cotton yield has progressed in Uzbekistan in the past five years. In 1934 the yield of cotton per hectare in Uzbekistan was 7.9 centners; in 1935, 11.6 centners; in 1936, 16.2 centners; in 1937, 16.1 centners; in 1938, 16.4 centners. It is no longer merely individuals or groups that have been so successful. No, this victory was achieved by the people of Uzbekistan, who have shown in practice what great potentialities are latent in our collective farms. (*Applause.*)

Thanks also to similar progress made in cotton cultivation in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Tadjikistan and in the Ukraine, the cotton problem is now solved in our country. The textile industry of the U.S.S.R. not only has an ample supply of cotton now, but is no longer able to work up all of it. If we had had no collective farms, such miracles could not have happened. (*Applause.*) But the collective farm system, supported by the state with agricultural machines, tractors and mineral fertilizer, has completely altered matters.

The example of cotton should give all our agriculturists food for thought. It shows that we have now exceptionally favorable, previously non-existent opportunities for increasing the productivity of labor in agriculture, and this is not confined to the cotton fields. Since the collective farms have acquired strength, they have begun to show their real power for the advancement of agriculture. All this goes to show that the great aims set by the Third Five-Year Plan for agriculture can and must be attained.

The following measures should supply the basis for the further advancement of our agriculture:

First, the further mechanization of agriculture and its extension to every process of agricultural work, the unflinching and complete provision of tractors with trailer implements and the wider introduction of mechanization for industrial crops;

Second, the intensified application of scientific farming methods, with special attention to seeds;

Third, the introduction in agriculture

of a proper system of fertilizing, an increase in the supply of mineral fertilizer and, in general, a more extensive use of chemical methods in agriculture;

Fourth, the adoption of proper systems of crop rotation and consequently the introduction of proper systems of land improvement.

Under the Third Five-Year Plan livestock will increase more rapidly than crops. During the Third Five-Year Plan period the number of horses is to increase by 35 per cent, cattle by 40 per cent, hogs by 100 per cent, and sheep by 110 per cent. The main prerequisite for such a rapid development of stock breeding is the great increase in fodder supplies envisaged by the plan. The area under fodder crops is to increase from 10,600,000 hectares to 23,600,000 hectares by the end of this period, which means an increase of 123 per cent. Now that the grain problem has been solved, the U.S.S.R. must solve once and for all, during the Third Five-Year Plan period, the livestock problem as well.

In the Third Five-Year Plan period our state farms must definitely become highly productive and highly remunerative. They must really become models of efficient farming.

The All-Union Agricultural Exposition which opens this year should play a great organizational part in improving agriculture. The foremost representatives of all branches of agriculture will take part in this exposition. But that is not the only thing. To qualify for the All-Union Agricultural Exposition, the collective farms, machine and tractor stations and state farms, and also the various categories of agriculturists, must show that they come up to certain fixed standards, which differ for the various crops, branches of agriculture and agricultural zones. These standards are such that when the whole mass of collective farms and state farms reach them we shall not merely fulfil but overfulfil the requirements of the Third Five-Year Plan as far as agriculture is concerned. Thus, the All-Union Agricultural Exposition is in effect a program of agricultural progress. It will serve to make

the leading agriculturists popular all over the country, will popularize and disseminate the best examples of their work. This exposition will give rise to competition among collective farms, machine and tractor stations and state farms, among districts, regions and republics. It can and must play a big part in organizing further progress in agriculture and in ensuring the fulfilment of the tasks assigned in the Third Five-Year Plan.

I should like to add a few words on a question of supreme importance—the *collective farms*.

In many cases organizational questions have been seriously neglected by the collective farm leadership. It is no accident that recently we have had to take a number of measures against breaches of the Rules of the Agricultural Artel. It was not without the influence of hostile elements and downright wreckers that the interests of the subsidiary establishments of the collective farmers began, in some cases, to be set up against the interests of the collective farms. But the peasants have only one sure way of making life better for themselves—the Bolshevik way of *strengthening the collective farms*. (*Applause*.)

We must put an end to breaches of the Rules of the Agricultural Artel, bring the size of the subsidiary plots and the number of cattle owned individually by the collective farmers within the range allowed, and give first consideration to the care of collective farm property, to the consolidation of the collective farms. Then the subsidiary establishments of the collective farmers will also develop properly. This is the way to the further improvement of agriculture, to an abundance of produce in our country, to a well-to-do and cultured life for all collective farmers. The questions of collective farm discipline and productivity of labor are also completely neglected in some cases. For instance, should we not ask ourselves if it is to be considered normal for some collective farms to have quite a number of members, collective farmers in name only, whose total year's work does not come to a single work-day

unit or at most amounts to some twenty or thirty days' work, just enough to keep up appearances, so to speak? Are these real collective farmers, and should they enjoy all the advantages which the state has provided for the collective farms and their members?

And then another question. The organization of teamwork on the collective farms has played a great part in raising the productivity of labor and advancing agriculture. So far the team system has spread only to a small part of the collective farms. But this system has been justified by experience and deserves wide acceptance in the collective farms. It is along the lines here indicated that I think additions should be made to the theses on the Third Five-Year Plan.

### 3. TRANSPORTATION AND POSTAL, TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMMUNICATION

The enormous growth of the national economy of the Soviet Union and a wide incorporation of remote districts into the economic life of the country put new big demands on transportation, especially the railways. I need only say that in 1937, for example, 90 per cent of the freight was hauled by the railways, 8 per cent by river transportation, and only 2 per cent by motor transport.

Under the Third Five-Year Plan, railway freight traffic is to increase from 355,000,000,000 ton-kilometers to 510,000,000,000 ton-kilometers, that is by 44 per cent, while the total freight carried is to be increased by 52 per cent. At the same time the gross output of industry and agriculture for this period is to increase by 82 per cent. From this it follows that we must take decisive measures to reduce the demands on railway transportation and improve our water and motor transport systems. From this it also follows that we must decidedly curtail cross shipments and certain long-haul shipments. If we correctly plan our industrial and agricultural production and our construction projects, we can eliminate much traffic by organizing the production of the necessary commodities locally. This includes the development of local collieries, the cessation of timber

shipments from Siberia to the European part of the country, the prohibition of shipments of potatoes and other vegetables from one region to another, etc.

On the other hand, we must continue to increase considerably the technical equipment of railway transportation. The traffic coefficient per kilometer of railway track in our country is comparatively high. Thus, on the railways in the U.S.A. the annual traffic per kilometer of track is 1,900,000 tons of freight, while in our country at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period we already had a load of 4,200,000 tons per kilometer. Therefore, our tracks, and our rolling stock, too, for that matter, are used much more intensively. This must be considered in our plan for strengthening the plant and the rolling stock of the railways. Our railway construction must ensure the inauguration of approximately 11,000 kilometers of new railway, as against 3,000 kilometers during the Second Five-Year Plan period. Eight thousand kilometers of second track are to be laid, and 1,840 kilometers are to be electrified. The number of locomotives must be increased by 7,370, mainly powerful locomotives, and particularly condenser locomotives. The number of railway cars is to increase by 178,000 four-axle freight cars and 12,000 passenger cars. Automatic coupling is to be provided for 300,000 cars, and automatic brakes for 200,000 freight cars.

Putting an end to the lag of water transportation and making it play a bigger part in the service of our national economy, especially in the haulage of bulk freight, such as timber, grain, coal and oil, is a problem that brooks no delay.

During the period of the Third Five-Year Plan the Northern Sea Route is to become a normally functioning water route providing us regular communication with the Far East.

Automobile transport is rapidly acquiring greater importance. The number of automobiles is to increase from 570,000 to 1,700,000 by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period. As many as 2,000,000 chauffeurs, mostly truck driv-

ers, must be trained during this time. The utilization of motor vehicles must be considerably improved.

Our civil aviation service is also developing rapidly, but its activities are somewhat too scattered. It should concentrate on the principal state air lines and see to it that the technical equipment of routes is brought up to the mark.

Under present conditions here, the development of postal, telegraph and telephone communications is of great state importance, but the production of communication equipment has been sadly neglected and the policy on technique is not sufficiently thought out. Serious attention must be paid to organizing and improving our communications facilities.

The Third Five-Year Plan imposes grave responsibilities upon our transportation and communication workers for the further expansion of these branches, the improvement of their technical equipment to meet modern requirements, and better organization in every respect.

#### 4. CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION

The huge plan for the promotion of the national economy in the Third Five-Year Plan period necessitates new construction on a corresponding scale.

The total volume of capital investments during the Third Five-Year Plan period is put at 181,000,000,000 rubles, as against 115,000,000,000 rubles invested during the Second Five-Year Plan period and 51,000,000,000 rubles during the First Five-Year Plan period. Thus, the volume of investments during the Third Five-Year Plan period exceeds the sum total of capital investments under both the First and Second Five-Year Plans.

For what *specific purpose* are these capital investments to be made?

More than half, or 103,600,000,000 rubles is to be applied to industrial development, which is an increase of 76 per cent as compared with the Second Five-Year Plan. Of this sum, 87,200,000,000 rubles are to be invested in industry producing means of production, and 16,400,000,000 rubles in industry producing articles of consumption, an increase of

almost 100 per cent as compared with the Second Five-Year Plan.

State investments in agriculture amount to 10,700,000,000 rubles, of which over 5,000,000,000 rubles are to be assigned to the machine and tractor stations. This does not include the investments to be made by the collective farms themselves in money and kind.

Capital investments in transportation amount to 35,800,000,000 rubles, as against 20,700,000,000 rubles during the Second Five-Year Plan period, that is, an increase of 73 per cent. At the same time capital investments in railway transport are to increase by 82 per cent.

Now let us see what undertakings will be opened up for use as the result of these investments.

The plan provides for the starting of new and reconstructed establishments during the Third Five-Year Plan period representing a value of 182,000,000,000 rubles, as against 103,000,000,000 rubles during the Second Five-Year Plan period and 39,000,000,000 rubles in the First Five-Year Plan period. From this we can see that even taking into account the increase in building costs during the last few years, the establishments brought into operation during the Third Five-Year Plan period will represent a greater production capacity than that of the two previous Five-Year Plan periods put together. (*Applause.*)

This program of capital construction and the plan for the inauguration of new and reconstructed establishments will ensure a further great increase in the industrial plant of the U.S.S.R. and the building up of certain reserve capacities in the major branches of the national economy. Suffice it to say that our fixed capital in industry is to be doubled.

Taking industries separately, we shall have the following increase in production capacity: electric power—from 8,100,000 kw. to 17,200,000 kw., that is, more than double; coal—a 70 per cent increase, which, by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period, will bring the capacity of the mines under the People's Commissariat of Fuel up to 285,000,000 tons of coal; oil refining—a 50 per cent

increase; pig iron—up to 25,000,000 tons; steel—a 50 per cent increase; copper—a 140 per cent increase; aluminum—a 250 per cent increase; cement—a 50 per cent increase; automobile industry—a 140 per cent increase; cotton spinning industry (spindles)—a 50 per cent increase; loom manufacturing—a 450 per cent increase; paper—a 50 per cent increase; tire-treads—an almost 200 per cent increase.

Of the biggest industrial construction projects, I shall mention the following: Between the Volga and the Urals we are building a "Second Baku," which by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period is to have an output capacity of 7,000,000 tons of oil. I might remind you that the Baku output of oil in 1913 was 7,700,000 tons. Near Kuibyshev we are working on a project which is the biggest of its kind in the world—the erection of two hydro-electric power stations with an aggregate capacity of 3,400,000 kw. These hydro-electric stations will solve the problem of irrigating the arid lands in the Trans-Volga area, will ensure us stable and plentiful harvests on these lands, and will likewise improve navigation on the Volga and the Kama. We are now solving the vast problem, so important to the state, of establishing a marine and ocean-going fleet, which also requires the establishment of new and powerful facilities for ship building. The Third Five-Year Plan calls for the completion of the Moscow and Gorky automobile works, and of the Magnitogorsk iron and steel mills. During the Third Five-Year Plan period not hundreds, but thousands, of large, small and medium-sized industrial establishments under a vast scheme of construction in all branches of industry will be put into operation throughout the country.

In the sphere of agriculture we shall build fifteen hundred machine and tractor stations. There is to be a great increase in repair facilities for tractors, combines and other agricultural machines. In the state farms, particularly intensive construction for stock-breeding purposes must be carried on and steps must be taken to install running water

in order to provide model conditions for the keeping of cattle. As regards irrigation and other reclamation schemes, the Third Five-Year Plan provides for the completion of huge projects like the Vakhsh, the Colchis, the Nevinnomys Canal and the Murgab Oasis development.

As you know, the shortage of materials is a big drawback in the building industry. The plan contemplates a considerable improvement in this respect. The new People's Commissariat, the People's Commissariat of the Building Materials Industry, must do its utmost to increase production, especially of standard and prefabricated parts.

The plan pays great attention to the proper distribution of construction projects among the several economic districts of the country.

The plan proceeds from the following premise: In keeping with the best interests of the state, industry should be brought nearer to the sources of raw material and the consuming districts. This will help to do away with irrational shipments and shipments carried over inordinate distances. It will also be instrumental in the further advance of the economically less developed districts of the U.S.S.R.

In the main economic districts of the Soviet Union we must secure a comprehensive economic development, which means that in each of these districts we must organize a fuel industry and the production of commodities like cement, plaster of paris, chemical fertilizer and glass, as well as mass consumption goods of the light and food industries in sufficient quantity to meet the needs of these districts. Each republic, territory and region must produce foodstuffs in general mass demand like potatoes and other vegetables, dairy products, flour, confectionery and beer; also manufactures like fancy goods, needle trades goods, furniture, bricks, lime, etc. On the other hand, we must strictly forbid the construction of new plants in Moscow, Leningrad and a number of other major industrial centers of the country. Lastly, in the construction

of new factories and mills we must prohibit such narrow specialization as would make the whole country depend upon one special factory for the supply of any given product. Our plans still err in this respect. We must resolutely put an end to this absurd schematism in construction plans.

The districts in the eastern part of the U.S.S.R., primarily the Far East, and also the districts located in the country's interior, are in a class by themselves. They are singled out for special attention in the Third Five-Year Plan.

The example of the Far East makes it particularly obvious that unless we have a comprehensive development of the principal economic centers of the country, we cannot safeguard our vital interests as a state. The Far East must produce locally all its requirements in fuel and, as far as possible, metal, machinery, cement, lumber, and building materials in general, as well as most of the bulk freight of the food and light industries. It goes without saying that the Far East must completely meet its own requirements in potatoes and other vegetables and in general must gird itself to effect a real improvement in agriculture and completely remedy its shortcomings in this sphere.

In the Far East industrial construction is developing on a large scale and railways are being built at a rapid rate. During the Third Five-Year Plan period part of the Baikal-Amur Railway will start operations, thus adding another powerful unit to the transportation facilities linking the Far Eastern Territory and Siberia. We regard the Far Eastern Territory as a mighty outpost of Soviet power in the East which must be strengthened in every way. (*Thunderous applause.*)

The Third Five-Year Plan will greatly increase the economic importance of the Volga Region. The establishment of a rich oil industry, a veritable "Second Baku," and the construction of powerful hydro-electric stations, together with the prospective irrigation of the Trans-Volga area on a wide scale and a considerable advance in traffic volume over the Volga-

Kama river basin will make this region a powerful economic center, where new industrial construction will develop on a vast scale and great progress will be assured in every line of agriculture.

The plan ensures the further economic and cultural advancement of the national republics and regions. Of the various examples I might mention, I shall cite only the following large construction projects in the Union republics: in the Ukrainian S.S.R., the Krivoy Rog and Zaporozhye iron and steel mills are approaching completion. In the Byelorussian S.S.R., the second section of the Byelorussian state regional electric station is being completed, while extensive construction is under way to develop the peat fields. In the Azerbaidjan S.S.R., construction has begun on the Mingichaur state electric station, while the railway between Minzhevan and Julfa, as also the second section of the Baku water works, will be completed. In the Georgian S.S.R., we shall complete the construction necessary for the draining of the Colchis lowlands, as well as the construction of the Black Sea Railway and the Tbilisi knit goods mills. In the Armenian S.S.R., we shall complete the construction of the Kanakir state electric power station and the "Sovpren" synthetic rubber works. In the Uzbek S.S.R., the construction of the Chirchik state electric power station and of the Tashkent calico and satin mill is to be completed.

Furthermore, the construction of the Zeravshan reservoir is to be started. In the Tajik S.S.R., we are to complete the construction of the Vakhsh irrigation system and the Stalinabad underwear and dress goods factory. In the Turkmen S.S.R., we are to complete the construction of the Ashkhabad electric power station. In the Kazakh S.S.R., we are to complete the construction of the Balkhash copper works and the Guryev-Makat-Koschagyl oil pipe line, and to build a railway between Akmolinsk and Kartali. In the Kirghiz S.S.R., we are to complete the construction of the Kant-Rybachye railway and of the Chuya irrigation system. The realization of the main objective—to secure a comprehen-

sive development of the principal economic centers of the country—will do much to strengthen the economic base of the national republics, territories and regions.

The plan requires the firm discouragement of megalomania in construction, which has become a positive obsession with a number of our executives; it requires the steady transition to the building of medium and small industrial units in all branches of the national economy, starting with electric power stations. This is necessary for the purpose of speeding up our rates of construction, so that new plants can be put into operation at the earliest possible date, and distributed over the principal economic districts of the country. Small and medium-sized electric power stations must come into vogue.

There are many instances of cases where we embarked upon the construction of gigantic projects, sank a lot of money into these schemes, but their completion dragged out interminably. As an example of what this megalomania can lead to I might mention the Frunze heat and power station in Moscow. This station was planned to be a giant, with a capacity of 200,000 kw., the first section to be rated at 100,000 kw. The builders have been on the job since 1932, and it is still unfinished. If we had gone about this job a little more modestly, if we had started off by building not one but several small heat and power stations, of, say 20,000-25,000 kw. each, we would now have two or three heat and power stations completed in Moscow. There are quite a few such lessons we have to learn.

Moreover, the wreckers, who were quite a bane to us in the field of construction, often resorted to various methods of disrupting building operations: They dissipated the money appropriated by starting many construction jobs at the same time. They froze investments by failing to finish a single one of the jobs they had begun. Besides, they began to reconstruct a number of plants just when we could not spare them.

Now we are faced with the task of



energetically introducing high-speed, express methods of building. On this score we already have very instructive examples, such as that of parallel operations on construction jobs: building processes and equipment assembly being performed simultaneously, with the workers following a precise time schedule which had been carefully drawn up beforehand. This is possible when proper use is made of mechanization in the building industry, in accordance with a plan prepared in advance, when the technological process of construction is worked out to the last detail; when the required building materials, parts and prefabricated sections are prepared beforehand at the corresponding factories; when the work of the builders on a job is not organized any old way, but runs like clockwork. With express methods we shall accelerate and cheapen construction, while the workers, engineers and technical personnel will earn considerably more. Soon only such work will be considered real Bolshevik work on construction jobs.

##### 5. OUR RESERVES AND POTENTIALITIES

Now as to our reserves and potentialities.

1. Our business executives must pay more attention to the economics of production and *energetically combat mismanagement.*

In his speech at the conference of leaders of industry in 1931, Comrade Stalin said:

"Owing to mismanagement, cost accounting principles have not been applied in a large number of our factories and business organizations. It is a fact that a number of factories and business organizations have long ceased to reckon, to calculate and draw up balance sheets of income and expenditure based on actual figures. It is a fact that in a number of factories and business organizations the conceptions 'regime of economy,' 'cutting down of unproductive expenditure,' and 'rationalization of production' have long gone out of fashion."

Comrade Stalin posed the question of what was necessary in order to in-

crease our accumulations, in order to secure an increase in capital investments, to strengthen our defenses and cover other state expenditure. He replied that this required:

". . . putting a stop to bad management, mobilizing the resources inherent in industry, introducing and enforcing cost accounting in all our establishments, systematically reducing production costs, and increasing accumulation within every branch of industry."

Comrade Stalin's directives hold good to this day in every respect. We still have a lot of mismanagement, much excess expenditure, outrageously large losses of raw materials, much waste of fuel and electric power, disgracefully long stoppages of machinery. That means that in many cases no real struggle is being carried on to reduce the cost of manufactured goods, no real fight is being made to reduce construction costs.

We must put an end to this. We must fight harder against mismanagement and loss of whatever description. We must indeed get attention paid to economics, to the cost of the things we produce. We must ascertain exactly what the work of every establishment, every organization costs the state. But even now we have executives who consider it beneath their dignity to look at a balance sheet, to study returns, to bother about cost accounting. We must put an end to this unconcern for and ignorance of economics, as an anti-Bolshevik practice detrimental to the state. Then we shall have much less mismanagement.

For instance can we leave unchallenged such disgraceful facts as the enormous delays occurring in the loading and unloading of vessels in water-way transportation? In 1937, before the wreckers had been ejected from the People's Commissariat of Water Transport, this demurrage reached staggering dimensions. Here are the facts: During season, that is, not counting time spent while laid up for winter or repairs, our dry-cargo tugboats were idle 35 per cent of their working time; oil tanker tugs were idle 33 per cent of their working time; raft

tugs 33 per cent of their working time; dry cargo barges 71 per cent of their working time; oil barges 56 per cent of their working time; sea-going tankers 29 per cent of their working time. Why, this means that the water transport fleet was standing idle for almost half of its working time. But even in 1938 matters did not improve. Our comrades in the water transport system must wipe off the stigma, put an end to these delays and set an example of efficient work.

But the example of the water transport system does not apply only to transport organizations; it is equally applicable to many industrial establishments, to state farms and machine and tractor stations. What we must achieve is that everybody in executive position, big and small, should always remember his responsibility to the state and the people, remember his duty to conserve public property, to husband it, to economize in expenditure and indeed take good care of the people's every kopek. (*Prolonged applause.*)

No less must we be careful with our fuel, must economize our raw materials, take care of equipment, look after our machines, and not waste our timber and building materials.

2. We must emphasize even more the *importance of mastering and using to the full the machinery* which we now possess in such great quantity. True, in a number of industries we have already demonstrated the wonderful superiority of socialist economy over capitalist economy in this respect. Examine the facts. First example: Our electric power stations are working much more productively, with a much greater use coefficient than the electric stations of any other country. We use the capacity of our electric stations with twice the intensity of the bourgeois countries. We can only feel gratified that in our country electric power generation has already been released from the manacles of capitalism and that we already receive its blessings in abundance. This, however, does not relieve us of the responsibility of preventing overload and risks.

Another example: Every kilometer of

railway track in our country is used more than twice as intensively as, say, in the United States of America. Of course, even rails have their limits; but let them, too, work harder and better for socialism than for capitalism. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

It is also a well-known fact that farm tractors are used in the U.S.S.R. three times as productively as in the United States of America or in Europe. And this with many machine and tractor stations and state farms working far from well. But, if tractors are already working better for us than for Europe or America, that is cause for gratitude and hope that they will work still better in the future. (*Loud applause.*)

But how much of our machinery is still inadequately utilized, how much splendid equipment is still standing idle for great lengths of time without benefit to the state! We must not forget this. Nor must we forget the big reserves that may be derived from the better application of inventions and rationalization measures. Huge new reserves will be revealed in our country as soon as we begin to show real solicitude for our host of inventors and rationalizers, and their assistants. We must actively encourage and promote their work, as Comrade Stalin teaches us, by giving them the necessary material and public support. (*Applause.*)

3. We must make greater efforts to *increase still more the productivity of labor.*

We are all well acquainted with Lenin's words that "labor productivity, in the last analysis, is the most important thing, the chief thing for the victory of the new social order." We know also that this thought of our great leader Lenin has been fully grasped by the shock workers and Stakhanovites of our industry and transport, that it has been thoroughly grasped by all the foremost people in the collective farms. But can it be said that there is real Bolshevik organization of effort to achieve a high level of labor productivity in all offices and factories, and in all collective farms? No, it cannot.

Here is an interesting fact. During both the First and the Second Five-Year Plan periods, the production plan for industry was exceeded. Both the First and Second Five-Year Plans for industry were exceeded in spite of the fact that the plan of construction was not fulfilled in either case. How could this happen? This could happen only because the productivity of labor in both Five-Year Plan periods proved to be higher than the plans had specified. Consequently, despite all shortcomings in the organization of labor, the workers exceeded the plan figures for productivity of labor and proved to all that we still have a poor knowledge of our real reserves for the advancement of socialist industry.

Consider the following facts: The Second Five-Year Plan provided for a 63 per cent increase in the productivity of labor in industry. Actually it increased by 82 per cent. As you know, the productivity of labor in the building industry was to increase 75 per cent during the Second Five-Year Plan period. Actually it increased by 83 per cent. The shock workers and Stakhanovites disregarded these specifications in the Five-Year Plans. All honor and glory to them for their good work, for their overfulfilment of the plan in regard to productivity of labor. (*Applause.*)

Our plans for increasing labor productivity during the Second Five-Year Plan period were exceeded because no plan could have made provision for the rise of the Stakhanov movement. And this movement not only did appear, but spread throughout the whole country, spread from town to countryside. We know also that our leading collective farmers often vie with the workers in increasing productivity of labor. Many are the cases where our leading collective farmers, our splendid tractor drivers, combine operators and team leaders increased the productivity of labor to an extent previously undreamed of. Who in our country does not know the names of the splendid people of the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, to whom belongs the honor of having taken the

initiative in increasing the productivity of labor and developing socialist competition? Who in our country has never heard of Stakhanov, Dyukanov, the Vinogradova girls, Nikita Izotov, Busygin, the smith; Smetanin, the Skorokhod boot and shoe worker; Krivonos and Ognev, the locomotive engineers; Tchaikovsky, the metal worker; Mussinsky of Archangel; Shashatsky and Gvozdyrkov, the miners; the machine toolmaker Gudov, and many others? Who in our country does not know the names of our leading agriculturists, like Maria Demchenko, or Kolyesov, Borin, and the Oskin brothers, combine operators; Pasha Angelina and Pasha Kovardak, tractor girls, and many others?

In the matter of increasing our efforts to raise the productivity of labor we shall be guided by what Comrade Stalin said at the conference of Stakhanovites:

“Why was it that capitalism smashed and defeated feudalism? Because it created higher standards of labor productivity, which enabled society to procure an incomparably greater quantity of products than was the case under the feudal system. Because it made society richer. Why is it that socialism can, should and certainly will defeat the capitalist system of economy? Because it can furnish superior models of labor, a higher productivity of labor, than the capitalist system of economy. Because it can give society more products and can make society richer than the capitalist system of economy can.”

All this means that if we fight in real earnest against mismanagement, improve the employment of machinery in a Bolshevik manner, develop further the Stakhanov movement and put more energy into our struggle for increased labor productivity and for the actual, not merely nominal, application of the achievements of science and technology to all branches of the national economy, the result will be such an advance in the national economy, such an advance in transportation and all other departments of economic life, as we have never witnessed before, as is possible only on the basis of socialist society become strong.

4. If we are to achieve this, we must *not weaken, but strengthen, our criticism of the defects* in the work of some of our organizations and executives. We must poke fun at the petty-bourgeois bashfulness from which we suffer. Then our business leaders will not lose sight of the Bolshevik guiding thread in the daily routine, nor, on the other hand, will they lose sight of the so-called minor problems, the neglect of which has so often spoiled the success of our work. Unless we have Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism we cannot have Bolshevik leaders. When criticism and self-criticism are practised for the purpose of arriving at a better and quicker solution of problems, of breaking down red tape and dispelling the petty-bourgeois prejudices of stick-in-the-muds, the forces for victory are not weakened, but mobilized for action. We must put new life into our administrative staffs and improve their work to the utmost.

Millions of people in our country are burning with eagerness to go forward, to accelerate the solution of the fundamental economic task of the U.S.S.R.—in the shortest possible time to overtake and outstrip the most highly developed capitalist countries economically. The Third Five-Year Plan assigns the immediate tasks directed toward the prompt attainment of this goal. The more conscientiously we all discharge our duties, the more exacting toward themselves our organizers, our leaders are, the greater will be our success. (*Applause.*)

#### IV. PLAN FOR A FURTHER RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARD OF THE WORKING PEOPLE

The time is long past when our country knew unemployment, from which so many millions of workers suffer under capitalism today. The time is long past when there were so many villages in our countryside with such appropriate names as Starvehurst and Hungryville. A good third of the peasants, if not more, were chronically undernourished and could never hope to improve their condition under the old regime. If capitalism had

been preserved in our country, it would have had today, like every capitalist country, many a million unemployed in the towns and tens of millions of hungry and semi-ruined peasants in the countryside. But we have now definitely left that state of affairs behind us and are making plans for a rise in the national standards of living which no country, even the richest and capitalistically most developed, can dream of, and which will fully meet the rapidly growing demands of the working people of town and country.

The Third Five-Year Plan provides for *an increase in national consumption of from fifty to one hundred per cent.* Has there ever been anything like it in capitalist countries? Let at least one capitalist country undertake to raise the standard of living of its people to, well, let us say half the extent of our plan. Let those who boast of bourgeois progress, of the wealth of capital, and so on, try to undertake anything like this. It would be interesting to have a look at such people. But, as you know, they are not to be found. The ruling classes of the capitalist countries do not breed individuals of such bold enterprise.

What does our plan provide for?

I shall begin with the working class.

The plan provides for an increase in the number of workers and employees from 27,000,000 to 32,000,000, or by 5,000,000 persons. The average wage of workers and employees is to increase during the period of the Third Five-Year Plan by 35 per cent. The total annual payroll of workers and employees is to increase by over 60 per cent. Of course, increases in wages will be greater in some categories of workers and employees than in others. Those who work better will be ensured an increase in remuneration well above the average level. The Bolsheviks have always been opposed to equalization in wages, as an alien, petty-bourgeois tendency. We must more consistently than ever pursue the policy of giving a material inducement for high productivity of labor on the part of our workers, foremen, engineers and all others professionally trained.

Now as to the peasantry.

The plan envisages a considerable increase in the incomes of the collective farmers in the period of the Third Five-Year Plan. The measures to be taken to improve agriculture should increase by over 70 per cent the cash incomes received by collective farmers for their workday units and from the sale of agricultural produce. If we bear in mind, in addition, the increase in the peasants' incomes derived from the further growth of the handicraft industries and other sources of earnings, we may safely say that the increase in incomes in the countryside will be even larger.

It will be seen from this that during the period of the Third Five-Year Plan the incomes of workers, peasants and intellectuals will increase by considerably more than 50 per cent. The question, therefore, is to what extent the increase in goods in the market will correspond to the growth of income.

The reply to this question is furnished by the following two tables:

The Third Five-Year Plan provides for a 72.5 per cent increase of retail trade in manufactured goods. The increase for individual classes of goods will be as follows:

**INCREASE IN MARKET SUPPLY OF PRINCIPAL MANUFACTURED GOODS**

<i>Commodities</i>	<i>1942 in percent of 1937</i>
Cotton fabrics .....	160
Woolen fabrics .....	236
Knit goods .....	182
Needle-trades goods .....	163
Footwear (various kinds) ....	160
Furniture .....	275

This table shows that in a number of the most important consumers' goods, the increase in the amount supplied to the market will not only keep pace with the increase in the incomes of the working people but even exceed it.

As regards foodstuffs, the Third Five-Year Plan provides for a 53 per cent increase in trade in these articles. The increase for individual staples will be as follows:

**INCREASE IN MARKET SUPPLY OF PRINCIPAL FOODSTUFFS**

<i>Commodities</i>	<i>1942 in percent of 1937</i>
Cereals .....	194
Macaroni .....	185
Meat .....	202
Poultry .....	263
Sausage .....	203
Fish, including herring.....	161
Butter .....	173
Sugar .....	149
Canned goods .....	305
Eggs .....	250
Cheese .....	197

This table shows that in the case of a number of the principal staples, including meat, butter and eggs, the increase in the amounts supplied to the market will be even larger than in the case of manufactured goods. But inasmuch as the consumption of commodities like flour, bread, salt and vodka, for instance, cannot, for obvious reasons, increase quite so rapidly, the increase in the amount of foodstuffs supplied to the market will, on the whole, be somewhat less than the increase in the amount of manufactured goods supplied to the market. It will be easily understood that this is fully in accord with the interests of the general mass of consumers.

It should be added that according to the plan the volume of public catering is to double. Lastly, it is calculated that trade in the collective farm markets will more than double.

Provision must be made to increase the number of state and cooperative retail stores accordingly, and to increase the efficiency of the trading system generally. It is time that the People's Commissariat of Trade exercised its right to use the lower floors of new houses as trading premises. We must also develop the building of wholesale centers, warehouses, and cold storages, and organize the cartage and delivery of goods on proper lines. We must increase the number of shops and trading booths in rapidly developing agricultural areas, and stock them with goods to meet the growing demand of the peasants for household, repair and building materials.

Both as regards rate of growth of income and rate of growth of trade, the plan envisages a certain advance of the countryside over the town. This is in accord with the Soviet government's policy of gradually bringing the material and cultural standard of the rural population into line with that of the urban population. It corresponds with our aim—that the working class, the foremost class in our society—should aid the peasantry, whose standard of living has for centuries been lower than that of the working class.

Parallel with this, there will be a considerable increase in government expenditure on *cultural and public services* for the working people of town and country.

Expenditure on social insurance and government expenditure on education, health, aid to mothers of large families, and other cultural and public services for workers and employees will increase during the period of the Third Five-Year Plan to 53,000,000,000 rubles, or by more than 70 per cent. Government expenditure on measures directly related to the improvement of public health will increase from 10,300,000,000 rubles in 1937 to 16,500,000,000 rubles in 1942.

These augmented government appropriations will go to improve the hospital service, extend sanatorium treatment and prophylactic measures, increase maternity aid, add to the number of children's hospitals, and improve labor protection, the services provided for working people during vacations and the facilities for recreation and sport.

The number of hospital beds in the cities of the U.S.S.R. will increase by 30 per cent. The number of hospital beds in the rural areas will increase as follows: in the R.S.F.S.R. by 35 per cent; in the Ukrainian S.S.R. by 43 per cent; in the Uzbek, Tadjik, Kazakh and Kirghiz Republics by nearly 100 per cent; in the Byelorussian, Azerbaidjan and Georgian Republics by over 100 per cent; in the Armenian Republic by over 200 per cent; and in the Turkmen Republic by over 400 per cent.

Accommodations in permanent nurs-

eries and kindergartens are to be increased during the period of the Third Five-Year Plan to 4,000,000 places, as compared with 1,800,000 at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period. Accommodations in seasonal nurseries and kindergartens are to be increased from 5,700,000 places to 13,600,000 places.

With the object of remedying the housing shortage, building operations in cities and industrial hamlets will be intensified. During the period of the Third Five-Year Plan, 35,000,000 square meters of new housing space will be made available for occupation. In addition, it is estimated that private individuals building their own homes will add another 10,000,000 square meters of housing space. We must see to it that this plan is carried out without fail. I must mention here an innovation introduced by the Moscow Soviet. On the initiative of architect Mordvinov, the Moscow Soviet has adopted a special plan of housing construction, over and above its regular plan, providing for the building of 23 houses with a total of 1,610 apartments in the course of this year. These houses will be built by the express method and with the wide use of standard building parts, which is something to be highly encouraged. The experience gained from this experiment in Moscow should be applied in other cities.

The plan for city development contemplates a considerable extension of operations for the improvement of urban and industrial centers. It provides for the installation of water supply systems in 50 towns, sewerage systems in 45 towns, and street car service in eight towns. There must be considerable improvement in the building of new public baths, a matter which has been unparadoxically neglected. In the cities there must be a real improvement in gas supply, and the practice of hauling huge amounts of wood fuel to the principal cities, which is an obnoxious survival of the past, must be positively reduced to a minimum, and subsequently abandoned altogether.

The Third Five-Year Plan outlines a

big program of *cultural development*.

It provides that full secondary education be made universal in the cities and towns, and that education up to and including the seventh class be made universal in the rural districts and in all the national republics. The number of children attending elementary and secondary schools in towns and industrial hamlets is to increase from 8,600,000 to 12,400,000, and in rural localities from 20,800,000 to 27,700,000. Thus by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period we shall have over 40,000,000 elementary and secondary school pupils, as compared with 8,000,000 in pre-revolutionary Russia.

As to the eighth, ninth and tenth classes of the secondary schools, there are already in these classes twelve times as many pupils as in the old days, and in 1942 there will be 34 times as many as before the revolution. (*Applause.*) Today there is hardly a working class family where there are no children with a secondary school education. And the number of families of workers and employees as well as of peasants in which children are receiving a higher education is growing from year to year.

It is interesting to note the growth in attendance at the elementary and secondary schools of the various republics: in the R.S.F.S.R., the Ukrainian S.S.R. and the Georgian S.S.R. it will be 25 to 35 per cent; in the Byelorussian, Kirghiz and Kazakh Republics 40 to 50 per cent; in the Azerbaidjan, Uzbek and Armenian Republics 55 to 70 per cent; in the Turkmen and Tadjik Republics 90 per cent. Here we see that in those republics in which schooling was practically unattainable by the working people in the past the situation has decidedly changed. While the progress in public education is considerable in all the republics, particular assistance in the advancement of education is given to the more backward national districts.

In view of the vast number of boys and girls who finish secondary school and in the majority of cases enter some practical profession, it is desirable that on graduating from secondary school

they should have already received at least some preparatory training for their future profession. This is a very important question, one to which the People's Commissariat of Education—and not only these Commissariats—should give their attention.

The number of students in universities and technical colleges will reach 650,000 in the period of the Third Five-Year Plan. And here main stress must be laid on improving the quality of higher education and, in this connection, on supplying the students with first-class textbooks.

There will also be a further growth in the training of skilled workers in the basic trades—in factory training schools, and in courses for tractor drivers, chauffeurs (mostly truck drivers), and so on. Vocational training of this kind should supply over 8,000,000 skilled workers in the various trades during the period of the Third Five-Year Plan.

The trained personnel with secondary education is to increase 90 per cent by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period; the trained personnel with higher education is to increase 72 per cent, from 750,000 to 1,290,000.

There will be an increase in the number of theaters and moving picture houses open to the general public, of clubs, libraries, reading rooms and cultural centers. The radio and the film, especially sound films, have become a huge cultural force of vast political significance.

Scientific institutions are growing in number. The Third Five-Year Plan opens up exceptionally favorable opportunities for our progressive Soviet science.

When we say that a veritable cultural revolution has taken place in our country during the past few years, this is no empty phrase. Indeed, we have created immense forces of intellectuals, of whom until quite recently we experienced a great shortage.

We have hundreds of thousands of offices and factories, and, in addition, 240,000 collective farms. All these require large forces of managerial personnel. Here are some figures supplied to

me by Comrade Sautin, head of the Central Board of National-Economic Statistics of the State Planning Commission

of the U.S.S.R., showing the number of executive personnel in our offices, factories and collective farms:

**NUMBER OF EXECUTIVES OF INSTITUTIONS AND ESTABLISHMENTS, AS OF JANUARY, 1937**

1. Executives of administrative, public health and cultural institutions	450,000
2. Directors and other executives of state industrial establishments, shops and departments	350,000
3. Chairmen and vice-chairmen of collective farms, and collective-farm dairy and livestock department superintendents	582,000
4. Directors of machine and tractor stations and of state farms, and state-farm dairy and live-stock department superintendents	19,000
5. Heads of producers' cooperative organizations	40,000
6. Store managers and department heads	250,000
7. Managers of restaurants and other public eating places	60,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,751,000</b>

We may therefore consider that the executive personnel in our country numbers not less than 1,750,000 persons. Actually, the figure is much higher, for we should undoubtedly count foremen, leaders of farm brigades and teams, and others as executive personnel, although they are not included in the figure mentioned. It would be more exact to say

that this figure of 1,750,000 includes only the higher and intermediate executive personnel in our country.

Now let us consider the Soviet intelligentsia as a whole. Its composition, according to the figures of the Central Board of National Economic Statistics of the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. is as follows:

**COMPOSITION OF THE SOVIET INTELLIGENTSIA, AS OF JANUARY, 1937**

(By professions)

1. Directors and other executives of establishments, institutions, factory departments, state farms, collective farms, etc.	1,751,000
2. Engineers and architects (exclusive of directors and other executives of establishments and factory departments)	250,000
3. Intermediate technical personnel (technicians, construction chiefs, foresters, railroad station masters and others)	810,000
4. Agronomists	80,000
5. Miscellaneous scientific personnel for agriculture (land surveyors and persons specially trained in land improvement, scientific farming and stock breeding)	96,000
6. Scientific workers (professors, university faculty members and others)	80,000
7. Teachers	969,000
8. Cultural workers (journalists, librarians, club managers and others)	297,000
9. Art workers	159,000
10. Physicians	132,000
11. Intermediate medical personnel (feldshers,* midwives, trained nurses)	382,000
12. Economists and statisticians	822,000
13. Bookkeepers and accountants	1,617,000
14. Judiciary and procurator status (judges, procurators, investigators and others)	46,000
15. University and college students	550,000
16. Miscellaneous groups of intellectuals (inclusive of the intelligentsia in the armed forces)	1,550,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>9,591,000</b>

\* *Feldsher*—a medical practitioner of limited authority, primarily for first aid.



As you see, our intelligentsia now represents a substantial force of 9,600,000 persons. If we bear in mind that many of the skilled workers in our factories already have a secondary education, this figure should be considerably increased. But even 9,600,000 intellectuals and kindred groups of workers in our Soviet state constitute an imposing figure. Counting members of families, our intelligentsia now comprises about 13 to 14 per cent of the population of the U.S.S.R. (*Loud applause.*) It will make its influence felt more than ever when its cultural and technical knowledge and communist consciousness are raised to the level we desire to achieve in the very near future.

It is not difficult to realize how far behind the U.S.S.R. has left the Russia of pre-revolutionary days. I shall cite only one example, some figures showing the number and composition of the intelligentsia in the Kursk Province in 1913 and in the Kursk Region—which differs very little in size from the former Kursk Province—in 1937.

In 1913 there were 3,000 elementary and secondary school teachers in the Kursk Province; in 1937 there were 24,000 in the Kursk Region. There were 274 physicians; now there are 941. There were 636 persons belonging to the intermediate medical personnel — *feldshers* and midwives; now there are 2,357. There were 70 agronomists; now there are 2,279. On the other hand, there were 3,189 members of the clergy; now there are 859. Here there is a big drop. (*General laughter.*) Against this, there are in the present Kursk Region many intellectuals working in Party, Soviet and trade union organizations, whereas there were none such before. These facts need no commentary.

It is in the light of these facts that we must examine the program of cultural development in the Third Five-Year Plan. This program has one basic aim, namely, to make a big forward stride in the historic task of *raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineers and technicians.* To bring out the impor-

tance of this task, I would remind you of what Comrade Stalin said at the Stakhanovite conference:

“The elimination of the distinction between mental labor and manual labor can be achieved only by raising the cultural and technical level of the working class to the level of engineers and technicians. It would be absurd to think that this is unfeasible. It is entirely feasible under the Soviet system, where the productive forces of the country are freed from the fetters of capitalism, where labor is freed from the yoke of exploitation, where the working class is in power, and where the younger generation of the working class has every opportunity of obtaining an adequate technical education. There is no reason whatever to doubt that only such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class can undermine the basis of the distinction between mental labor and manual labor, that it alone can ensure the high level of productivity of labor and the abundance of articles of consumption which are necessary in order to begin the transition from socialism to communism.

“In this connection, the Stakhanov movement is significant for the fact that it contains the first beginnings, still feeble, it is true, but nevertheless the beginnings, of precisely such a rise in the cultural and technical level of the working class of our country.”

For the achievement of this huge task of abolishing the distinction between mental and manual labor, five or ten years will, of course, not be enough. Its full achievement will require several decades. But we are making good progress along this path. The Third Five-Year Plan will bring us a step closer to the accomplishment of this great aim.

As you see, the aim set in the Third Five-Year Plan of a further rapid rise in the material and cultural standard of the working people, and the satisfaction of the growing and variegated demands of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., is in harmony with the new era, the era of gradual transition from socialism to communism, on which the U.S.S.R. has entered.

The apologists of the bourgeois system

cut a poor and ridiculous figure. Reams of paper have been filled in the attempt to show that socialism means poverty and want, that socialism is worthy of barbarians and not of civilized people. Piles of books are still being published and millions of tons of newsprint wasted on the dissemination of the lie that communism means making all men equal in poverty and intellectual dearth, that communism is a long step back from modern capitalist society. These wretched fables of the bourgeois hacks have been exploded by the progress of the Soviet Union.

In vain do the bourgeoisie and its minions—the Trotskyites, fascists, Mensheviks and Social-Revolutionaries — waste so much valuable paper on this hopeless cause. Why, it is nothing short of a crime, an unpardonable waste of public wealth, of that invaluable article, paper, which is so indispensable to real culture. Today, after all that has been done in our country to increase the national prosperity and to raise the cultural standard of the working people, today, when new colossal plans are being mapped out for the production of every kind of article and product, and when wide prospects have been opened for the creation of real abundance in the U.S.S.R., today so much paper and effort can be wasted on these nursery tales about the Soviet Union only by those who burn the classics of literature and science in their public squares and whose brains are impregnated with the soot of these bonfires, or by those who no longer believe that decaying capitalism can be defended by fair means.

To us the conclusions to be drawn from all these facts are clear.

We are well aware that our Soviet system has already created all the requisites for a further rapid rise in the material and cultural standard of the working people, for the creation of an abundance of goods and products, and for the satisfaction of the rapidly growing cultural demands of the working people. Everything now depends on the growing communist consciousness of the workers, peasants and intellectuals. It is

on the success of communist education, in the broad meaning of the term—a communist education embracing the whole mass of the working people and the whole body of the Soviet intelligentsia—it is, above all, on our success in this sphere that the accomplishment of all our other tasks depends.

## V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN

The Third Five-Year Plan differs substantially from the First and Second Five-Year Plans. At that time the purpose was to lay the foundation of socialist society. Now socialist society has, in the main, been built. The Soviet Union has entered a new phase, the phase of completion of the building of classless, socialist society and of gradual transition from socialism to communism. That is the chief difference between the present and the earlier period.

The new phase entails new duties and new difficulties. We know that every undertaking, even the smallest, has its difficulties. And the huge growth in the strength of our country also presents certain difficulties. Our situation being what it is, we have to consider not only purely internal questions, but also questions that arise because of the existence of a hostile imperialist encirclement. But one need only glance at the faces of the people of our country to see that they have never been so happy as they are now, when tackling the complex and difficult tasks involved in the gradual transition from socialism to communism. (*Applause.*) This can be explained only by one thing, namely, that they are sure they will win, that they have an unshakable faith in victory!

The working people of the U.S.S.R. know exactly what has to be done next, what is the principal task of the moment. This task may be defined as follows: to initiate along the whole line competition for economic primacy with capitalism, with the economically most developed capitalist countries of Europe, and with the United States of America. This implies a struggle to overtake and

outstrip the advanced capitalist countries economically.

We might be told: "Here you are, entering into a match with the capitalist countries when you have not yet overtaken them." But that does not worry us. It is true that in the U.S.S.R. the output per head of population of such important industries as, let us say, pig iron and electric power production is less than in the United States or Germany. But, on the other hand, it is indisputable that the technical level of our industry is already higher than that of any other country of Europe, not to mention agriculture, the technical level of which is not lower than even that of America. And, what is most important, our young Soviet state has gained full strength and abounds in energy, health and unshakable unity. (*Stormy applause.*) And so we think that it is high time the young but already robust Soviet forces entered the arena of international competition for economic primacy. (*Applause.*)

This, of course, is no threat; and such peaceful competition can injure nobody. Nevertheless, it will be a trial of strength on a big scale.

It must be confessed that nobody is challenging us to competition. (*Laughter and applause.*) It may even be said that, generally speaking, we came into the world uninvited. But having come into the world, we want to uphold, and shall uphold, the cause of the October Revolution. (*Applause.*)

They may say: "We have our hands full without your competition. We have enough worries as it is." (*Laughter and applause.*) Let them! On suitable occasions we did collaborate with bourgeois countries, and think it quite expedient to do so. Nor have we any intention of refusing to do so in the future, but shall strive to extend this collaboration with our neighbors and with all other states as much as possible. However, we are going our way, and capitalism is going its way. History confronts the U.S.S.R. not only with the question of collaborating with the capitalist countries but also with the question of a competition be-

tween the two economic systems—the new and the old, between the U.S.S.R. and the principal capitalist countries—for primacy in the economic field.

We enter this competition confident in our inherent powers and sure of our victory. The picture is quite different in the capitalist camp. There they have long since lost faith in inherent powers of development. There, passions are raging over a new redivision of the world. There—some with knives in their belts, others with sword in hand—they are fighting for colonies and for a recarving of states in the interests of the stronger powers. There, they hold forth in endless speech on the subject of who was cheated, and by whom, in the division of colonial territories after the first imperialist war, on who was the robber and who the robbed in the division of spoils during the last reshuffling of colonies and in the post-war sharing up of territories in Europe. There it is no longer a question of mere threats of war. An imperialist war, involving a number of countries in Europe and Asia, is already on and has assumed vast dimensions. The danger of a new worldwide slaughter is growing, and it comes chiefly from the fascists and their sponsors.

But our people, after all, may have their own opinion in this matter. They will proceed primarily from their own experience, from the way the nations of the Soviet Union are accomplishing their economic development and steadily advancing along the road of progress, not by the seizure of colonies and the receipt of help from outside, but exclusively through the growth of the internal forces of the country. In our country a way has been found to economic development and the advancement of national cultures without the exercise of violence by one nation against another, but by the concerted effort of many nations in one common cause. Even in our country, not all the republics are equally developed in the sphere of industry and agriculture. Some are more developed in one way, others in another. But we have found a splendid means of uniting in one common effort the efforts of all the work-

ers and peasants of the multi-national Soviet Union, of uniting the efforts of different nations, of having one nation help the other and of working for one common end.

Our people might turn to the West, for example, and say: "Our experience is not a bad one. Why not take advantage of it? All these 'Axes' you know, will get severely jolted at the first big bump in the road, and may fly in pieces. But a good Union of Nations is no rickety 'axis'—it is a great thing!" This is a voice which many over there will not want to listen to, of course. But it is very importunate and, penetrating deep down among the masses, will in time return to us in a mighty proletarian echo.

What do we intend to rely on in solving the problem of "overtaking and outstripping"? We can give a simple answer to this. On planning, and, first and foremost, on the Third Five-Year Plan. But that is not enough. We have the moral and political unity of the people; we have the great mutual friendship of the nations of the Soviet Union; and the plans lend unity of purpose and unity of aim to the efforts of the entire nation, to all our work. That is why our plan, our Bolshevik plan, our Stalinist plan, is so great a force. (*Applause.*) Working to plan means knowing what has to be done and for what purpose it has to be done. In our country plans have become an indispensable organizing force. Therefore, the fulfilment of a plan once adopted has become a matter of honor for the working people of the U.S.S.R.

Thanks to the brilliant success of the First and Second Five-Year Plans, "planning" has attained worldwide popularity, and quite a number of laborious attempts have been made by capitalist countries to proclaim and boost economic plans. Take, for example, the hullabaloo raised by the German fascists over their two home-grown "Four-Year Plans"! There were demagogues who tried to make believe that they had already overcome the anarchy in the capitalist economic system, the system prevailing in

their country, and that they were already working by plan. Nevertheless, they did not venture to publish any plans—either the first or the second four-year plan. Apparently, they never existed. All that these "four-year plans" amounted to was certain measures for the accumulation of resources for a new war. And when carried into practice, the gist of their "four-year plans" amounted to the establishment of a system of barefaced exploitation of the workers and of all common people for the sake of maintaining the rule of capital, and especially for the sake of strengthening one "race," if we may call it so, the "race" so dear to the hearts of the fascists—finance capital. But the other "race," the working people, are having a hard time under the fascist "four-year plans."

For the workers, the "four-year plans" were a calamity, a new form of bondage. Compulsory labor has been introduced in the mills and factories; the working day has been increased to ten or twelve hours and more; it is forbidden to raise wages, but there is no check on the rise of prices. Nor have the fascist gentry left the other sections of the working population in peace; thousands of peasant farms have been sold under the hammer; hundreds of thousands of artisans, small tradesmen and others have been ruined. That is the true picture of the fascist "four-year plans."

In spite of all this, we are firmly convinced that the fascists will not succeed in discrediting the idea of economic planning. The success of our glorious Stalinist Five-Year Plans will find its way to the hearts of millions of working people far beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R., and fire them with the wish to have their own Bolshevik Five-Year Plans, and not the enslaving "four-year plans" of the fascist taskmasters. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*)

Capitalism, including capitalism in fascist garb, is powerless to match our planned economic system. Because of its system of private property, capitalism, including capitalism in fascist garb, is in its very essence incompatible with economic planning. Therefore, when na-

tional-economic planning began to display its miracle-working powers, capitalism had already definitely become a survival of history, a brake on history, a reactionary phenomenon of our day.

What can compare with the achievements of the planned, socialist economic system of the U.S.S.R.? We had the First Five-Year Plan: its effect was to double industrial output in four years, to increase it by 102 per cent. Then came the Second Five-Year Plan: an increase of industrial output by another 110 per cent was envisaged, but, actually, an increase of industrial output by 121 per cent, that is, two and one-fifth times as much, was achieved. Now we have a new plan, the Third Five-Year Plan. Again we are contemplating to almost double industrial output in five years, or, to be exact, to increase it by 90 per cent. There you have what the Bolsheviks call the all-conquering power of communism. (*Loud and prolonged applause.*) And to those who do not believe in communism, we may say: "Just you wait a bit, and history will utter its last word to all such doubting Thomases, to all of them lumped together." (*Laughter and applause.*)

I have had to speak of all this in order to give an idea of the state of foreign affairs in which our peaceful competition with the capitalist countries for economic primacy is now developing.

It will also be seen from the above that this competition will be transformed into a competition of a higher type, the historic competition between two social systems—capitalism and communism.

Capitalism has accumulated no little store of material and cultural values, but it is no longer able to use them even in its own interests. It has already in many respects begun to strangle progress, science, art and culture. That is a fact; but, then all the worse for capitalism. There is now somebody to take over the heritage of capitalism. Communism grows out of what capitalism has created, out of its numerous fine achievements in the sphere of economy, material life and culture. Communism reassesses all these values and achievements in its

own way—not in the interests of the "elite" of society, but in the interests of the whole people, of all mankind. We must spare no efforts to study this cultural heritage. We must know it thoroughly and profoundly. We must utilize everything produced by capitalism and the earlier history of mankind, and from the bricks made by the labor of man in the course of many centuries build a new edifice, a bright, spacious and sunlit edifice suited to the life of the people. (*Loud and general applause.*) The building of this splendid edifice of communism will demand a great deal of new energy and of talent of the people, a great deal of labor and heroism, of courage, initiative and enthusiasm. The Soviet Union—there you have an example of how to set about this work! The Bolshevik strength required for this glorious task is imparted by our Party, the Party of Lenin-Stalin. (*Loud and prolonged cheers.*) What does Comrade Stalin's report at this Congress mean? It means that the Bolshevik spirit is imparted to our cause by the work, the thoughts and words of our Stalin! (*Loud applause. Cheers for Comrade Stalin.*)

Our intelligentsia has a part of exceptional importance to play in this historic work. Men of culture, men of science and technology, the old intelligentsia and the new, our students, and our skilled workers, whose ranks are being reinforced by youth, are all needed to enable the Soviet people to cope with the great new tasks, to accomplish the main economic task that now has to be performed, successfully to fulfill the Third Five-Year Plan.

On their capacity to organize the labor of the workers and peasants, on their skill in applying their scientific knowledge to the utilization of technology and to the attainment of the utmost increase in labor productivity will depend the success of our work, the success of the competition with the other countries for economic primacy upon which the U.S.S.R. is now entering, and the success of the historic competition between communism and capitalism. Their creative efforts will be the more fertile and their achieve-

ments the more remarkable, the more consistently and deeply they delve into the essence of the fundamental modern science of society and the state—the essence of the great teachings of Marxism-Leninism, which is the basis for the growth and strength of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. We have already created so many of the requisites, so many potentialities for the further growth and full prosperity of our society, that the chief thing now is a conscious communist attitude towards our work, and especially, successful Bolshevik activity in the sphere of the ideological training of the swelling ranks of our Soviet intelligentsia.

The time has come when the work of education, the communist education of the people, assumes prime importance. This estimate of the role of communist education at the present juncture in no way detracts from the duty of which Comrade Stalin spoke, the duty of keeping our people in a state of mobilization and readiness for any and every emergency. On the contrary, only that education may be called a communist education which adds to our state of mobilization and readiness, and enhances our capacity to engage in a supreme struggle, in new battles, for the victory of communism. (*Prolonged applause.*)

The time is not far off when the Soviet Union will be in a position to say to others: "Do not lag behind the U.S.S.R. economically either, if you want to be in the forefront of humanity along the whole line and in all respects."

The banner of the Third Five-Year Plan is being taken up by millions of workers, by the many millions of the working people. The general line of our advance towards communism is laid down for us by the Party of Lenin-Stalin, by our Bolshevik Congress, by our Stalin! (*Loud and prolonged applause and cheers. All rise. Cheers for Comrades Stalin and Molotov.*)

SPEECH IN REPLY TO DISCUSSION  
MARCH 17, 1939

**C**OMRADES, the discussion at our Congress has shown that the theses

for the Third Five-Year Plan have met with the unanimous support of the delegates. (*Applause.*)

I shall deal separately with certain questions raised by comrades who have spoken here. In my reply to the discussion I want to remedy an omission on my part. In order to do so I must go into the pre-Congress discussion, its character and results.

Before the Congress the theses, as you know, were very widely discussed in the press, at Party meetings and among the masses of the people. This very active response is symptomatic of the political advance in our country resulting from the general activity of our Party, from its achievements in the political field and in economic and cultural development. Thousands of letters dealing with questions of the Third Five-Year Plan were received by *Pravda* for publication in its Discussion Sheet. A considerable number of these letters were published. In addition, many articles dealing with questions concerning the Third Five-Year Plan appeared in other publications, both central and local.

The pre-Congress discussion revealed that the theses for the Third Five-Year Plan had the full support of the Party organization and the mass of the people. All the Party conferences that preceded the Congress expressed their approval of the theses. In addition, the discussion brought out a wide variety of questions, and yielded quite a number of proposals for additions and other concrete amendments to the theses. These proposals contain much that is sound and useful. It must be said that to incorporate the majority of these proposals in the theses would inflate them too much and obscure the essentials. This of course we must avoid. But, on the other hand, quite a number of proposals made in the pre-Congress discussion were such as to merit consideration in our Five-Year Plan.

But the theses are not the plan. They only provide a basis for the plan. The plan itself is a very voluminous document. The Third Five-Year Plan runs into several folios of tables and figures.

This plan takes up a great variety of points, in the final adoption and formulation of which it will be highly important, in fact essential, to consider the proposals and amendments which were made during the pre-Congress discussion. The great activity displayed by the Party and non-Party comrades who contributed to the pre-Congress discussion will be a great help to us in the final elaboration of the Third Five-Year Plan, and we should consider some of their proposals when adopting the theses in their final formulation.

If the Congress accepts the theses before it as a basis, it will obviously have to elect a commission to discuss which additions and other amendments should be incorporated in the theses. Furthermore, the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars will have to consider a number of these proposals and amendments when they finally endorse the Five-Year Plan by branches of the national economy, territories and republics.

The questions raised during the pre-Congress discussion and at the Congress might well be divided into the following groups:

First: questions of organization to ensure plan fulfilment;

Second: major economic problems;

Third: questions concerning particular branches of the national economy;

Fourth: problems of a more general character involving questions of principle.

Bolsheviks fully realize the importance of *questions of organization* in solving economic problems. Hence it is but natural that great attention was paid to questions of organization in the discussion on the Third Five-Year Plan. Contributors to the pre-Congress discussion raised a number of important questions of organization, including proposals to organize new People's Commissariats, and new Committees under the Council of People's Commissars. For instance, we have had proposals to form a People's Commissariat of the Building Industry; to organize, apart from the People's Commissariat of Agriculture, a

special People's Commissariat for the Administration of Machine and Tractor Stations; to divide the People's Commissariat of State Farms into two People's Commissariats—one for state livestock farms and the other for state crop farms; to form a new People's Commissariat of the Automobile Industry or of Automobile Roads, and so on and so forth. A number of proposals of this kind deserve serious attention and might be accepted upon a further examination of the question.

Among these proposals there was one suggesting the formation of a special People's Commissariat of Horse Breeding. This proposal is not a sound one, in my opinion. But, on the other hand, careful attention should be paid to Comrade Budyonny's proposal that the People's Commissariat of Agriculture have a special Assistant People's Commissar, and the various agricultural bodies territorial Land Department chiefs, to supervise horse-breeding. The task of improving the breeding of horses is so important that a number of new organizational changes are indispensable here.

During the pre-Congress discussion, and here at the Congress as well, attention has been drawn to the need for better and closer coordination among the People's Commissariats in the discharge of current business. In connection with the division of the industrial People's Commissariats into smaller units, this is a very urgent matter. Speaking at the Congress, the People's Commissar of the Heavy Machinery Industry, Comrade Malshev, correctly pointed out that the Economic Council and the State Planning Commission must take into account that coordination of work among the various economic People's Commissariats must be better organized than it is at present. This was also quite correctly pointed out by Comrade M. M. Kaganovich in his speech. The formation of industrial People's Commissariats on more highly specialized lines puts them within closer reach of the establishments concerned, with very important and beneficial results.

But, on the other hand, many ques-

tions arise nowadays which cannot be solved behind the office doors of one single People's Commissariat. In view of this the Economic Council of the Council of People's Commissars must undoubtedly increase its staff and display much greater activity in coordinating the work of the People's Commissariats. This does not mean that the various People's Commissariats should make no effort themselves to coordinate their work with the work of the other People's Commissariats. It is their duty to do so, and they must not wall themselves up to suit their narrow departmental interests. This narrow departmentalism is not a rare occurrence among us, but we must strenuously combat it in our work as a form of bureaucracy. At the same time, the considerable increase in the number of industrial People's Commissariats unavoidably makes the structure of national-economic management more complicated at the top and calls for a corresponding increase in the staffs of the State Planning Commission and the Economic Council. From this the proper practical conclusions must be drawn.

Of the *various economic problems* I shall dwell upon the following: the settling of the Far East, the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly,\* the Volga-Don Canal, and the development of the oil fields in Bashkiria.

You know that the question of the economic development of the Far East has come well to the fore. Hence to organize the settling of the Far East has become a task of the highest importance. In an article contributed to the pre-Congress discussion, Comrade Donskoy rightly referred to this question as a problem of major importance to the state. And, indeed, both our Far Eastern territories must tackle this question in real earnest, and organize large settlement offices locally to meet this need. It is high time we went from words to deeds, from general proposals to specific plans and decisions, in dealing with this question.

In the discussion on the Third Five-

\* Huge iron-ore deposits in the Kursk Region, discovered through large deviation in magnetic needle.—*Ed.*

Year Plan, stress has been laid on the question of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly and the formation of an iron and steel producing district in its vicinity. Wreckers have done their share in holding up the scheme. It is time we remedied these after-effects of wrecking. We must proceed to develop energetically the iron ore deposits there, and set up an iron and steel industry in the vicinity of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly. This project has a great future in connection with the development of iron and steel production in the U.S.S.R. Comrade Doronin was right when in his speech at the Congress he demanded that this subject be given serious attention in the Third Five-Year Plan; it should be mentioned in the theses as well.

The Volga-Don Canal project has also been discussed at the Congress. This is another of the major economic tasks we must tackle in the Third Five-Year Plan period. The reason why the Volga-Don problem was held up is that a number of other problems, the construction of giant power stations, for instance, had at one time or other been lumped together with it. At the present time the State Planning Commission of the Soviet Union is finishing its work on the details of this development, and in the near future we shall revert back to it for concrete discussion. Comrade Dvinsky's raising of the question here was timely, as was his proposal to increase the output of coal in the Rostov Region, where the coal deposits are very rich.

I must also touch on the question of the oil industry in the vicinity of the Urals. Comrade Shagimardanov from Bashkiria was quite right in demanding that more attention be devoted to the Bashkir oil industry. Several years ago, at the Seventeenth Party Congress, Comrade Stalin said that we must "set to work in real earnest to organize an oil base along the western and southern slopes of the Ural mountain range." Chief among the districts he had in mind was Bashkiria.

The actual development of the oil industry in this district can be seen from the following facts. The first year in



which Bashkiria produced oil on a commercial basis was 1934. It was a matter of some 63,000 tons. The value of Bashkiria as an oil region can be gauged by the fact that the output in 1935, only twelve months later, was 406,000 tons. In other words, the output multiplied more than six times in the space of one year. In 1936, the output of oil in this district reached 968,000 tons. In other words, there was a further increase to almost two and a half times as much in the space of a year. But in 1937 the increase was not continued, the total output being only 957,000 tons of oil, while in 1938 the output was 1,145,000 tons, a by no means considerable increase.

Now compare these facts with the following figures showing the capital invested in the Bashkiria Oil Trust. Capital expenditure on this trust was as follows: 45,000,000 rubles in 1935; 59,000,000 rubles in 1936; 49,000,000 rubles in 1937; and 45,000,000 rubles in 1938. As you see, these are not heavy investments for such a big industrial undertaking. The outstanding fact here is that instead of investments increasing they decreased in the last two years, in spite of the fact that the Party has often insisted on the economic importance of this oil district to the whole country.

One is forced to conclude from the above that here our economic planning has been very remiss. If, in the present case, more attention had been paid to plans for the development of oil mining, then the plan of capital investments would have been different, would have been more ambitious. The wreckers, whose anti-Soviet handiwork this was, were detected late and so the state's interests were damaged by a delay of at least two years in the development of the Bashkiria oil fields. Let this be another lesson to us; let it teach us to improve our planning of industrial expansion and never to allow anything to retard the development of such important branches of our national economy.

I shall now turn to the separate branches of our national economy.

I shall commence with *industry*.

In the pre-Congress discussion, and

here at the Congress, stress was laid on the need for a somewhat greater development of certain branches of industry than is indicated in the theses. The paper industry and the cement industry are cases in point. Indeed, there is such a big demand for paper that we should probe again the possibility of increasing the plan for the development of the paper industry in the Third Five-Year Plan period. The same applies to the production of cement. The Third Five-Year Plan provides for such an expansion of building activities that we would do well to rediscuss the possibility of increasing the program in the case of the cement industry.

The greatest attention, before and during the Congress, has been paid to fuel, as we can well understand. Every branch of the national economy has already felt keenly the effects of the present inadequate output of fuel: the shortage of coal, the shortage of oil, and also the inadequate attention paid to fuels like peat, oil shales and sapropel coals and turf. Most earnest attention must be paid to these questions in the Third Five-Year Plan. I have not much to add to what I said in my report.

You know that we are planning big industrial developments in the vicinity of the Volga, but that until recently they were delayed owing to a shortage of fuel. Comrade Stalin specially called our attention to the need for measures to develop collieries in the vicinity of the Volga. The People's Commissariat of the Fuel Industry investigated the matter and recently made a proposal to develop the Dombarovo deposits in the Chkalov Region. Comrade Kaganovich made the necessary draft, which was sanctioned by the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars a few days ago. The following tasks have been imposed on the People's Commissariat of the Fuel Industry in this decision: to sink ten pits, with a total capacity of 1,000,000 tons, in the Dombarovo fields in 1939, six of them to be completed and opened this year; furthermore, it has been decided to sink this year four pits with a total capacity of

400,000 tons in the Poltava-Bredy and Borodino districts, and three pits with a total capacity of 300,000 tons in the Ber-Chogur fields. By the end of 1942, the capacity of the new mines to be opened in these districts should total 7,700,000 tons. This will provide a sound basis for improving the supply of fuel to the Orsk industrial district and the Volga regions, as well as to the railways involved, which at the present time are running on coal hauled all the way from the Kuznetsk and Donetz fields.

This is only one example of how persistent we must be in our approach to the problem of supplying all our economic regions with locally produced fuel. Steps must be taken in all the principal economic districts to organize local fuel industries, so as to release our railways completely from the onus of long-distance hauls of coal.

We must also discontinue a practice that still persists in the fueling of our cities. To this very day Moscow, Leningrad and other big cities are largely supplied with wood fuel carried by rail. In view of the present dimensions of industrial production in our large cities, to overload the railways with large shipments of wood fuel hauled over long distances is simply impermissible. Comrade Bogdanov, who spoke here, was quite right in his demand that we put a stop to the disgraceful practice of bringing wood fuel to Leningrad by rail from districts a thousand and more kilometers away. We cannot resign ourselves to such a state of affairs. This is an impermissible practice that has come down to us from the days when these shipments were much lighter. The widespread introduction of gas in our large cities will help us to get rid of such economic absurdities as long haul shipments of wood by rail. The sooner this is done the better.

Now a few words about *electric power*, to which enormous attention was devoted both at the Congress and during the pre-Congress discussion. This question has become so acute because the demand for electric power has left the capacity of our electric stations far be-

hind. We must stimulate energetically the construction of medium and modest-sized electric power stations, and furthermore encourage to the utmost the construction of small power stations, especially of small hydro-electric stations. In this connection it has been properly pointed out that the construction of these electric power stations will necessitate a considerable increase in the output of turbines, especially of small hydraulic turbines. It is our duty to make adequate provisions for these needs in the Third Five-Year Plan.

An important place in the Third Five-Year Plan is held by the construction of the Kuibyshev hydro-electric power station development. This great project is already well under way. Our Third Five-Year Plan must make provision for the proper utilization of the tremendous electric power which we shall derive from these power stations. We must plan industrial construction, irrigation systems and urban electric supply accordingly.

Besides this gigantic hydro-electric development, the construction of new hydro-electric stations on a smaller scale is also of great importance. Recently Comrade Stalin specially drew the attention of Comrade Pervukhin, as People's Commissar of Electric Power Stations and of the Electrical Industry, to the need for a number of hydro-electric power stations in the Donetz coal fields and the Ural districts. The Donetz coal fields are desperately in need of additional electric power. Why not make use of the Donetz River, by building one or two hydro-electric power stations, not of gigantic dimensions, but with a fair capacity? There is a shortage of electric power in Sverdlovsk and Chelyabinsk. Why not make use of the rivers Iset, Chusovaya and Mias and build hydro-electric power stations there as well? They would be a great help to the Urals in this matter. These and similar projects should be incorporated in the Third Five-Year Plan.

Now the question of *machine-building*. We must pay the most serious attention to this problem. The line we are

pursuing is to continue, on an ever increasing scale, the modernization of all our industries in point of equipment. Unless we have a further big increase in technical equipment, unless we have a constant improvement in our technical level, unless we use to the utmost the latest achievements in world engineering, Soviet economic development cannot continue at the rates which the country requires. This question was debated at length during the pre-Congress discussion and here at the Congress. We must organize the production of many new types of machinery and equipment for the various branches of our national economy. Machine-tool manufacturing, in particular, must be brought up to the mark. We must properly organize production of automatic control apparatus for the hydro-electric power stations I have mentioned, and for the textile and other industries. We must organize the production of mechanized tools, which can often be used as substitutes for more complex equipment in our factories, machine and tractor repair shops, and elsewhere. The need for the further development of machinery manufacture is greatly felt in all branches of our national economy.

But the following points must be considered too. For instance, in agriculture the main problem now is mechanization: to provide all tractors with the proper trailer implements. This we have not yet achieved by far, but achieve it we must, and that as soon as possible. But we must not forget horse-drawn implements either, as Comrade Benedictov has rightly pointed out at this Congress. Unfortunately, all too little thought has been given to this matter in recent years, and it has been unpardonably neglected.

During the pre-Congress discussion a great deal was said concerning the further development of the automobile industry, particularly the manufacture of light automobiles. The Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have already made a decision on this question. The People's Commissariat of the Medium Machinery Industry, with Comrade Likhachov at its head, will have

to work with a will if it is to cope with its new task of starting the output of light Soviet automobiles in the present year. (*Applause.*)

As regards iron and steel production, I have not much to add to what I said in my report. In the pre-Congress discussion stress was laid on the necessity for strict economy in the use of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, and rightly so. We must have better system and effect decided economies in our consumption of pig iron, steel, special steels, and especially copper and other non-ferrous metals. There is still a lot of mismanagement in this respect, and we must put a stop to it. Under this head, and on the general question of waste-abatement, I think some points must be added to the theses.

*The chemical industry.* The importance of increasing the gas supply has been indicated in the theses. Special mention should be made in the theses of the need to increase the supply of gas to cities and towns. Furthermore, attention should be drawn to the question of mineral fertilizers. There is urgent need for greater care in the handling of fertilizer. We can no longer tolerate the present enormous waste of mineral fertilizer in transit and storage. We must organize a vigorous campaign against such bad management, and at the same time must organize the production of machines for putting fertilizer into the soil. Of the various branches of the chemical industry I shall refer here only to the asbestos industry, which, as Comrade Tsalkovich has justly pointed out in the press, must be developed as quickly as possible.

Now as to the *production of articles of general consumption*. Comrade Kosygin, People's Commissar of the Textile Industry, was quite right in his speech at the Congress, in which he presented various demands for assistance to the textile industry from our other industries. It is our duty to render the utmost support to the cotton industry, so as to promote its speedy advancement. But our comrades in the textile industry must remember that success depends largely on themselves, on their own ef-

forts to improve their work, to consolidate and increase the growth in output that has already begun in our mills. It is high time that our comrades in the textile industry discarded the bad habit of not fulfilling their plans, and fell into line with those who know how to fight for fulfilment and overfulfilment of the assigned plans. Nor must we forget such things as the output of hosiery, which has been referred to in the press. We must really develop this industry on a local scale too, and put an end to the shortage of such simple things in our stores.

Lastly, our fisheries. To what has been said at the Congress I can only add that while there is every call for most earnest attention to the problem of rapidly effecting a great improvement in the main fisheries at Murmansk and in the North generally, as well as in the Caspian, the Sea of Azov, and the Far East, we must make the most of local resources, and put them under the attention and control of the local organizations. The specifications in the theses concerning the fishing industry must be amplified somewhat.

As to *agriculture*.

The pre-Congress discussion dealt largely with the further mechanization of agriculture, and in particular with the question of introducing gas generating tractors and automobiles. Furthermore, there have been legitimate calls for a decided improvement in the work of the machine and tractor repair shops. It is time these shops became regular establishments working all year round, not confined to seasonal jobs. It has been justly pointed out before the Congress, and in the speech delivered here by Comrade Benedictov, People's Commissar of Agriculture, that there is a definite need for improvement in the organization of land development. To accelerate the introduction of proper systems of crop rotation, this matter must be taken well in hand by the state and financed from the state budget.

Lastly, the question of the *collective farms*.

During the pre-Congress discussion

the opinion was expressed that we should now set about organizing model communes. A suitable reply was given to the sponsor of this proposal, indicating that he was on the wrong track. The agricultural artel will still be our main form of collective-farm husbandry in the period of the Third Five-Year Plan. We are still far from using the full potential strength of this form of collective farming for the advancement of agriculture, for the promotion of the prosperity of the collective-farm peasantry. Hence, to stress communes at the present time or, worse still, to shift the center of gravity from the agricultural artel to the commune, would be an error of policy and lead us astray. To clear up the confusion on this score caused in some people's minds by the fact that a new era has begun, an era of gradual transition from socialism to communism, it would be as well to state emphatically that the artel is still to be the principal form of the collective-farm movement.

But it is a different matter to declare that the artels must undertake a number of new tasks, such as that of further consolidating the collective farms and collective farm property, and of putting an end to the present distortions and breaches of the Rules of the Agricultural Artel with regard to the subsidiary establishments of the collective farmers. We must see to it that the collective farmer's interest in his subsidiary husbandry does not conflict with his main duty: to strengthen his collective farm and collective farm property. The dimensions of the subsidiary plots of the collective farmers and the number of cattle owned individually by them must not exceed the maximum allowed. Everything must be done to promote the further organizational and financial consolidation of the collective farms, as it is only along the line of the further organizational and financial strengthening of the collective farms that any real advancement of agriculture and any really rapid improvement in the prosperity and cultural standards of the collective-farm peasantry are possible.

We must also intensify our efforts to

improve discipline on the collective farms, as well as the educational work among the collective farmers in this direction.

Lastly, we must make wider use of the team system in collective farming. I have already dealt with these questions in my report. The theses for the Third Five-Year Plan must be amended accordingly.

As regards *transport*, not much is left for me to say. Comrade Kaganovich dwelt at length on the tasks that confront railway transportation, and particularly on the need for a considerable reinforcement of its plant and equipment. These tasks must be fully indicated in the Third Five-Year Plan. In reply to a note that has been passed up to me I must say that the construction of a new railway through the Caucasus Mountains is not of sufficient urgency to warrant inclusion in the Third Five-Year Plan. Our task now is to complete as soon as possible the construction of the Black Sea Railway, which will facilitate and expedite communications between Transcaucasia, the North Caucasus and the central districts. As regards the Kirov Railway, I must confirm that a second track will be laid from Murmansk to Soroka station. Furthermore, a new line will be run transversely from Soroka to Plesetskaya to unite the two northern lines—the Kirov Railway and the Northern Railway. This will improve communication between the north and the central districts, and will facilitate the better exploitation of the forests and other natural resources in the northern part of our European territory.

As regards *motor transport*. Proposals have been made on all sides, and rightly so, that we pay serious attention to the development of motor transport. Now that we are beginning to have a fair number of automobiles, 1,700,000 being the estimated total at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period, the question of how to make the best use of motor transport acquires great importance. Here, too, with better organization of work and the elimination of the present all-too-common inefficiency in motor transport management, much can be done to promote our economic develop-

ment. The general question of increasing state control of motor transport is to be specially discussed in the Economic Council in the near future

*The building industry.*

Many people have spoken on the need for an improvement in the manufacture of building materials. As you know, a special People's Commissariat has been formed for this purpose. A change in the structure of the building organizations has also been advocated. The problem voiced in the proposal made here by Comrade Popkov of Leningrad to put all housing construction in Leningrad under the jurisdiction of the Leningrad Soviet can hardly be decided in this simple way. But this proposal contains a grain of wisdom in that it sponsors the formation of large territorial organizations for housing construction, to the exclusion of the small departmental trusts now existing. When we form a People's Commissariat of the Building Industry—and we are on the way to it—we can be certain of a complete change in this direction, namely, the formation of substantial territorial building organizations.

In the pre-Congress discussion serious attention was given to such questions as the *training of forces* for our national economy, the training of new professional personnel, the work of our research institutes, and the progress of *technology* and *scientific research*. The tasks with which our Party is confronted in regard to our socialist intelligentsia require that all these questions be viewed from a much broader angle than has been the case hitherto. We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that we still have quite a number of problems to solve in the field of science, a field in which the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. should by rights play the leading role and set the right tone both in the theoretical work of developing Soviet science, progressive as it is, and in the practical work of coordinating the creative efforts of our scientists with the whole planned development of our national economy in the Third Five-Year Plan period. But now we can hope for much better results in this field than ever be-

fore, and this is a matter of the highest importance to the country's economic life.

In my report I dwelt on the following problems of a more *general character* which involve *questions of principle*, and which were discussed publicly prior to the Congress: The question of eliminating the contrast between town and country, the prospects of eliminating the contrast between brain work and manual labor, and also, briefly, the questions concerning the further development of the collective farms, on which I have just made some additional comments.

In the pre-Congress discussion some people expressed the opinion that the reference in the theses to the fact that the U.S.S.R. is economically still behind the leading capitalist countries might give people a wrong idea about the Soviet Union. They argued that this reference to the inadequate economic level of the U.S.S.R. does not tally with the steady improvement in the condition of the Soviet people, particularly in view of the fact that the condition of the masses, even in the economically most developed capitalist countries, is going from bad to worse under the stress of crises, unemployment and rural distress.

It must be said in reply that the theses indicate with sufficient clarity the rapid rise in the general prosperity of the U.S.S.R. and the further great advance in its general prosperity envisaged by the Third Five-Year Plan, the more so when considered in connection with the measures outlined for the further advancement of the economic level of our country. But it should be clear to us all that while indicating these points in our favor, we must by no means shut our eyes to the fact that the economic level we have achieved so far is not adequate.

We must not shut our eyes to the fact that, while we have surpassed the capitalist countries both in rate of industrial development and in technical level of production, we have yet to overtake the most highly developed capitalist countries in a number of major industries with regard to output per head of population. In view of the immensity of

our population it will take us considerable time and much effort to cover this ground. But we will cope with this task, too, in a short stretch of time, if we do not close our eyes to our shortcomings, if we are able, in Bolshevik fashion, to fire the ambition of our Party members and of all honest citizens of our country to solve the main economic task of the U.S.S.R. with the utmost dispatch.

After Comrade Stalin's report and the further development of Marxist-Leninist theory given in his profoundly scientific analysis of the question of the state and the intelligentsia, there is no need to dwell on other general questions of principle. The Party now has all its work, the solution of all its problems, in clear perspective.

All the speakers here have spoken of advances in particular branches of our national economy, in particular economic districts and republics of the U.S.S.R., and of the advance in the economic development of the country as a whole. And, indeed, steady economic, cultural and political advance in *all* branches and *all* economic districts has become a permanent feature of our country. This advance is expressed in the political, economic and cultural progress of all our republics and of the U.S.S.R. as a whole. The Third Five-Year Plan must play a great organizational role in this advance, and in the further growth of the economic strength of the whole multinational Soviet Union.

Our task is to mobilize all our forces in a Bolshevik manner *for the fulfilment of the Third Five-Year Plan*. One year, the first year of the Third Five-Year Plan period, has already elapsed. Last year we attained no little progress in our industrial development. Last year our industrial output increased by 11 per cent in comparison with the preceding year. But we must secure higher rates of industrial development if we are to fulfil our plan for the Third Five-Year Plan period. The increase for 1939 has been fixed at 20 per cent. As you see, an ambitious plan and no light task. So we have no time to lose. The Eighteenth Congress of the Party has evoked

great enthusiasm among the masses of the workers. It has served to accelerate the rate of output of our industries. It is not in all branches of industry that we are completely fulfilling the plan for this year, but a number of industries, a number of towns and districts, are already successfully coping with their tasks. The enthusiasm with which the working class ushered in our Congress had marked results already in February, and it is our duty to consolidate the ground thus gained. We must do everything to secure good plan fulfilment in 1939, so that it may be instrumental in fulfilling the whole Third Five-Year Plan. (*Applause.*)

We must work in such a way that, after the First Stalinist Five-Year Plan so gloriously fulfilled ahead of schedule, and after the Second Stalinist Five-Year Plan, which we completed with equal success, we shall be able to say with pride: We have fought like Bolsheviks to fulfil and exceed the Third Five-Year Plan, we have secured a new Bolshevik victory. And then the Third Five-Year Plan will indeed be what we intend it to be—a new Stalinist Five-Year Plan of victory in the struggle for the mighty development of the forces of the U.S.S.R. (*Loud and prolonged applause. All rise. Loud cheers.*)

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# Resolution of the Eighteenth Congress on the Third Five-Year Plan for the National Economic Development of the U. S. S. R. (1938-1942)

*Resolution on the Report of Comrade V. Molotov (adopted unanimously)*

## I. THE RESULTS OF THE SECOND FIVE-YEAR PLAN AND THE CHIEF TASKS OF THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN

**L**AS the result of the successful fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937), the *fundamental historical task* set by this plan has been accomplished in the U.S.S.R.: all exploiting classes have been abolished finally, and the causes which give rise to the exploitation of man by man and the division of society into exploiters and exploited have been completely done away with. One of the most difficult problems of the socialist revolution has been solved: the collectivization of agriculture is completed, the consolidation of the collective farm system is an irrevocable fact. In our country "the first phase of communism, socialism, has, in the main, been realized" (*Stalin*). The new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the legislative embodiment of the victory of socialism.

At the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period, 98.7 per cent of our country's productive capital, of its means of production and its buildings for production purposes, were socialist property, the property of the state, and of the cooperatives and collective farms. The socialist system of production has come to exercise undivided rule in the whole national economy of the U.S.S.R.: it comprised 99.8 per cent of the gross produc-

tion of industry, 98.6 per cent of the gross output of agriculture, including the personally owned subsidiary establishments of the collective farmers, and 100 per cent of the volume of trade.

The class structure of Soviet society has changed in accordance with the socialist reconstruction of the economy of the country. In 1937 the workers and employees engaged in the socialist economy of the U.S.S.R. represented 34.7 per cent of the total population of the country; the collective farm peasantry, together with the handicraftsmen organized in cooperatives, represented 55.5 per cent; the armed forces, students, pensioners and others, 4.2 per cent. Thus, even at that time 94.4 per cent of the population of the country was employed in socialist economy or closely bound up with it. The rest of the population: individual farmers, and handicraftsmen and artisans not organized in cooperatives, represented only 5.6 per cent of the population. This section of the population has diminished still further since then.

Socialist society in the U.S.S.R. is composed at the present time of two mutually friendly classes: workers and peasants, and between these classes as well as between them and the intelligentsia, the lines of demarcation are being effaced, are gradually disappearing. The overwhelming majority of the people in the



U.S.S.R. are active and conscious builders of classless, socialist society, of communism. The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. has achieved an inner moral and political unity of the people hitherto unprecedented anywhere, a moral and political unity of the mass of the working people under the banner and under the leadership of the Communist Party and the Soviet government. This unity not only is capable of putting an end to the remnants of the hostile classes, with their alien influences, and of defeating all hostile attacks from without, but also forms the best guarantee of the further growth and prosperity of our fatherland, a guarantee of the victory of communism in our country.

2. The chief and decisive *economic task* of the Second Five-Year Plan, the completion of the technical reconstruction of the national economy of the U.S.S.R., was essentially accomplished.

The country's technical apparatus of production was renewed in thoroughgoing fashion. In 1937 over 80 per cent of the total output of industry was supplied by new establishments built or entirely reconstructed during the First and Second Five-Year Plan periods; about 90 per cent of all tractors and harvester combines employed in agriculture were manufactured by Soviet industry during the Second Five-Year Plan period. Industry and transportation completed their share of the Second Five-Year Plan ahead of schedule. In industry the Second Five-Year Plan had been fulfilled by April 1, 1937, or in four years and three months, during which period heavy industry expanded at an especially rapid rate. The Second Five-Year Plan for railway transportation was overfulfilled in four years. The most important tasks set by the Second Five-Year Plan for agricultural output, namely, the production of grain and cotton, were also exceeded.

In comparison with 1932, the last year of the First Five-Year Plan period, industrial production had increased in 1937 by 120.6 per cent, the scheduled increase for the Second Five-Year Plan having been 114 per cent. During the

Second Five-Year Plan period, the average annual rate of growth of industrial output was 17.1 per cent as compared with 16.5 per cent specified by the plan.

Production personnel trained for all branches of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. is successfully mastering the new technique. One of the greatest victories of the Second Five-Year Plan was the training of large forces of Soviet intellectual workers so necessary for all branches of socialist construction, and the extensive promotion to executive positions in every branch of the national economy of persons taken from the ranks of the Party and non-Party Bolsheviks.

The successes scored in the mastery of the new technique have found striking expression in the Stakhanov movement. The development of socialist emulation, and of its highest form, the Stakhanov movement, has led to a great advance in the productivity of labor in industry and the other branches of the national economy. During the Second Five-Year Plan period, labor productivity in industry increased 82 per cent, as compared with the 63 per cent specified in the plan. In the same period the productivity of labor in the building industry increased 83 per cent, as compared with the 75 per cent specified in the plan. The advance of the Stakhanov movement, and the numerous magnificent examples of socialist-conscious work set by the Stakhanovite workers with their high records of labor productivity, have created the conditions necessary for a fundamental improvement of labor discipline in all our factories and offices. This is an indispensable prerequisite of high labor productivity by all working people, and the guarantee of a fresh powerful stride toward communism in the U.S.S.R.

In order to ensure the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan, it was necessary to organize the struggle against the remnants of the hostile class elements, against the hostile class influences in the country's economic, cultural and political life. For this purpose it was necessary above all to organize the struggle for the safeguarding and consolidation of socialist, that is, state and collective farm,

property against thieves and embezzlers, against all and sundry accomplices of the class enemy, and especially against such traitors to the people as the Trotskyite-Bukharinite and bourgeois-nationalist spies, diversionists and other wreckers, who have locked hands with foreign espionage services, have become the agents of fascist secret police services. Their traitorous work has caused serious damage in a number of departments of the country's national economy. The rout of these bands of spies and wreckers has cleared the way for further and even greater successes in the socialist economy of our country.

3. The task set by the Second Five-Year Plan of *improving the material conditions and raising the cultural level of the working people*, at the same time increasing national consumption 100 per cent and over, was also fulfilled.

The number of workers and employees in all branches of the national economy increased 17.6 per cent during the Second Five-Year Plan period. The average yearly wages of workers and employees for the whole of the national economy had increased 113.5 per cent, that is, had more than doubled, in 1937 as compared with 1932. The national payroll of the workers and employees rose 151 per cent instead of the 55 per cent rise scheduled in the Second Five-Year Plan, that is, it increased to two and a half times as much. The state expenditure on cultural and other public welfare services for workers and employees in town and country (out of the all-Union, Republican and local budgets) on education, public health, physical culture and social maintenance, as well as the expenditure on state social insurance, rose from 8,300,000,000 rubles in 1932 to 30,800,000,000 rubles in 1937, an increase of 270 per cent.

Besides this, the state expended 16,300,000,000 rubles during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan on improving the housing and other living conditions of the people, as well as on municipal services. The well-being of the collective farmers increased considerably during this period. Total incomes of the collec-

tive farmers rose more than 170 per cent in four years (1934-37), and the cash incomes they received for their work-day units rose 350 per cent during these years.

In 1937 the output of articles of mass consumption was more than double that of 1932. In a number of important products and manufactures for mass consumption, the output was not only doubled but trebled. State and cooperative trade more than trebled during the years of the Second Five-Year Plan, and, if collective farm sales are included, rose from 47,800,000,000 rubles in 1932 to 143,700,000,000 rubles in 1937. The non-fulfilment of the tasks set in the Second Five-Year Plan with regard to the reduction of retail prices of articles of mass consumption was more than compensated by an increase in the wages of workers and employees far above the increase provided for in the plan, and by the considerable increase in the cash incomes of the collective farms and their members.

A veritable cultural revolution was accomplished in the U.S.S.R. during the Second Five-Year Plan period. The attendance at the elementary and secondary schools rose from 21,300,000 to 29,400,000. The number of children in the fifth, sixth and seventh grades doubled, and in the eighth, ninth and tenth grades increased fifteen times. The number of students in the universities and colleges increased to 550,000. Cultural progress can be recorded in all other departments of life.

Considerable success was achieved by all the Union Republics of the U.S.S.R. in the field of industrialization and in the raising of the material and cultural level of the population, in the training of Bolshevik personnel from among the nationalities of the respective republics, and in the advancement of national culture, socialist in content. The peoples of the Soviet East made especially rapid strides in their material and cultural development.

4. As a result of the victory achieved in the fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan, and the successes scored by social-

ism, the Soviet Union has entered in the Third Five-Year Plan period upon a new era of development, the era of the *completion of the building of classless, socialist society, and of the gradual transition from socialism to communism*. In this era the communist education of the people, and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism in their minds, in the minds of the builders of communism, assume decisive importance.

The difficulties attending the fulfilment of this stupendous task must not, however, be underrated, especially not in view of the hostile capitalist encirclement of the U.S.S.R. The more so because, in spite of the successful fulfilment of the First and Second Five-Year Plans, in spite of the record rates of development achieved by our industry, in spite of the fact that in production technique Soviet industry has surpassed the foremost capitalist countries, we have not yet caught up with them *economically*.

The U.S.S.R. has become transformed into an economically independent country that provides all technical equipment needed by its national economy and national defense. In speed of development its industry holds first place in the world. While industry in the capitalist countries, after the severe economic crisis which set in at the end of 1929, could hardly reach 102.5 per cent of the 1929 level in 1937, and, beginning with the second half of that year, once more experienced a sharp drop under the blows of a new crisis, the industry of the U.S.S.R. had expanded in 1937 to 428 per cent of the 1929 level, representing a more than eight-fold increase in industrial output as compared with the pre-war figure. In 1938 the output of industry in the U.S.S.R. increased by another 11.3 per cent as compared with the previous year, reaching 477 per cent of the level of 1929, while in the capitalist countries industrial production shrank 13.5 per cent in 1938 as compared with the previous year, falling off to 90 per cent of the level of 1929.

While in the capitalist world, where development has been extremely uneven in the different countries, there has been no growth of industry on the whole dur-

ing the last ten years, but rather a noticeable decline in its output, in the Soviet Union we have had a steady and rapid expansion of industry with industrial production growing at a *rapid rate* from year to year. However, by reason of the fact that in the past our country was extremely backward economically, the *level of development* of industry in the U.S.S.R., in point of output per head of the population, is even now considerably lower than in the technically and economically most developed capitalist countries of Europe or in the United States. It is a well-known fact that in our country a considerably smaller amount of industrial products falls to each member of the population than in such countries as the United States, Britain, Germany or France.

For instance, if we compare per capita production at the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period, taking the U.S.S.R. as the basis of comparison, we arrive at the following results: *electric power*—France produced more than twice as much as the U.S.S.R., Britain not quite three times as much, Germany three and a half times as much and the U.S.A. five and a half times as much; *pig iron*—Britain and France each produced more than twice as much as the U.S.S.R., Germany two and a half times as much and the U.S.A. three times as much; *steel*—France produced not quite twice as much as the U.S.S.R., Britain and Germany each not quite three times as much, and the U.S.A. not quite four times as much; *coal*—France produced somewhat more, and the U.S.A., Britain and Germany each considerably more than the U.S.S.R.

The U.S.S.R. is still behind in the per capita production of such manufactures as textiles, paper, soap and some others.

This inadequacy of industrial production in the U.S.S.R., as compared with the technically and economically most advanced capitalist countries, must be completely overcome, in order to assure the ultimate victory of communism in its historic contest with capitalism.

5. Now that the U.S.S.R. has constituted itself a socialist state, has completed in its essentials the technical re-

construction of the national economy, and is in advance of any capitalist country of Europe with respect to level of technique of production in industry and agriculture—now we can and must squarely face and carry out in actual practice the fundamental economic task of the U.S.S.R.: *to overtake and surpass the most advanced capitalist countries of Europe and also the United States of America economically as well*, and to accomplish this task once and for all in the immediate future.

This requires a further considerable increase in the technical equipment of every branch of the national economy, and, consequently, a maximum development of machine building and of all heavy industry, a decided improvement in the whole organization and technology of production, accompanied by an extensive application of the latest achievements of science and invention. It further necessitates a numerical and, particularly, a qualitative increase in trained production personnel, and a thorough mastery of technique in industry, transportation and agriculture. Following Lenin's tenet that "the productivity of labor is, in the final analysis, the most important, the chief thing, for the victory of the new social system," we must ensure the utmost development of socialist emulation and the Stakhanov movement, a steady improvement of labor discipline in all factories and offices and on all collective farms, and a degree of labor productivity for workers, peasants and intellectuals that is worthy of socialist society.

At the same time national income and trade must grow sufficiently to enable the *national consumption to increase 50 to 100 per cent* during the years of the Third Five-Year Plan. To this end we must, in addition to effecting a great increase in the output of the heavy and defense industries, also augment the manufacture of articles of mass consumption and food-stuffs, and make possible a corresponding increase in real wages of workers and employees, and in incomes of collective farmers.

In accordance with these fundamental tasks of the Third Five-Year Plan, a

considerable rise in the cultural level of the whole mass of the working people in town and country must be achieved, and a great step forward must be taken in the historical task of *raising the cultural and technical level of the working class*, the most advanced and the guiding force of socialist society, *to the level of engineers and technicians*.

The gigantic growth of industry and of the country's entire economy under the Third Five-Year Plan, and the necessity of ensuring its further unhampered progress in line with this national plan, particularly now that the aggressive forces of imperialism in the countries surrounding the U.S.S.R. are on the increase, demand the *formation of large state reserves*, primarily in the field of fuel and electric power, in some branches of the defense industry and for the development of the transportation system. This requires proper distribution over the various regions of the country, the elimination of unproductive and long-haul shipments, and maximum local sources of supply for the chief economic centers of the country.

The Eighteenth Party Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) approves the assignment of the following tasks in the Third Five-Year Plan for the national-economic development of the U.S.S.R., which has been submitted by the State Planning Commission of the U.S.S.R. and adopted by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

## II. PLAN OF INCREASE IN OUTPUT DURING THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PERIOD

1. The *total volume of output* of industry in the U.S.S.R. in 1942, the last year of the Third Five-Year Plan period, is fixed at 184,000,000,000 rubles (in 1926-27 prices), as compared with 95,500,000,000 rubles in 1937, equivalent to a 92 per cent increase in industrial production during this period.

The average annual rate of growth of industrial production as a whole in the U.S.S.R. during the Third Five-Year Plan period is fixed at 14 per cent, the

average annual increase in the production of means of production being set at 15.7 per cent, and in the production of articles of consumption at 11.5 per cent.

2. The volume of output of *key industries* for the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period, that is, for 1942, is set as follows:

	Unit of measurement	1942	1942 in per cent of 1937
All industry (1926-27 prices).....	mill. rbls	184,000	192
Of which:			
Production of means of production.....	" "	114,500	207
Production of articles of consumption.....	" "	69,500	172
Machine building and metal-working industries (1926-27 prices) .....	" "	63,000	229
Main line locomotives (in "E" and "SU" equivalents) .....	unit	2,340	148
Freight cars (in two-axle equivalents).....	thous.	120	203
Automobiles .....	" "	400	200
Electric power .....	mill. kwh.	75,000	206
Coal .....	mill. tons	243	190
Crude oil with gas.....	" "	54	177
Peat .....	" "	49	206
Pig iron .....	" "	22	152
Steel .....	" "	28	158
Rolled steel .....	" "	21	162
Of which:			
Special steels .....	" "	5	199
Chemicals (1926-27 prices).....	mill. rbls.	14,000	237
Cement .....	mill. tons.	11	202
Merchant-timber hauled .....	mill. cu. meters	200	180
Saw mill products .....	" " "	45	156
Paper .....	thous. tons	1,500	180
Cotton fabrics .....	mill. meters	4,900	142
Woolen fabrics .....	" "	177	167
Leather footwear .....	mill. pairs	258	143
Granulated sugar .....	thous. tons	3,500	144
Canned goods (People's Commissariats of the Food, the Fish and the Meat Industries).....	mill. cans	1,800	206
Structural shapes .....	thous. tons	900	161

3. *Machine building*, the industry which occupies the key position in the technical equipment of the national economy, is to be developed in every way so as to ensure the application of modern technique to all branches of the national economy and to all arms of the service, so as to meet the present-day requirements of the state. The output of the machine-building industry is to be increased 130 per cent during the Third Five-Year Plan period, that is, considerably more than the growth of industry as a whole. The production of every kind of machine tool must be ensured, with a decided increase in the proportion of

high efficiency and special machine tools, particularly of automatics and semi-automatics. The output of metal-working machine tools is to be increased to 70,000 in 1942 as compared with 36,000 in 1937, the number of models of machine tools being increased to 800. Everything must be done to restore and modernize worn-out machine tools. The output of machine tools, especially standardized tools, must be doubled, while the output of pneumatic, electrical and other kinds of power hand tools is also to be increased.

The comparative lag in the manufacture of power machinery behind the con-

stantly growing demands of the country must be overcome. The manufacture of steam turbines is to be increased 490 per cent and that of steam boilers 420 per cent, comparing 1942 with 1937. The manufacture of medium and small power turbines of 12,000 kw. or less is to be greatly expanded, and the proportion of these motors in the total output increased. The production of powerful hydraulic turbines for the Kuibyshev hydroelectric development must be mastered.

Special attention must be paid to increasing the output of portable steam engines, stationary and marine Diesel engines, particularly of high-speed engines, and also of gas engines. All motor machinery in lumber camps and a considerable part of the tractors used in agriculture as well as of automobiles are to be changed to gas-generating types.

The lag in the production of building and road-making machinery and appliances as well as of builders' tools must be overcome. The manufacture of excavators, suction dredges and hydraulic apparatus must be increased to the utmost.

The output of complicated apparatus and equipment for the chemical industry is to be expedited, so as fully to ensure the powerful growth of this industry. We must master the production of new, technically perfected, high-speed types of spinning and weaving machinery, of looms and of equipment for knitgoods and other textile mills and for shoe factories, paying particular attention to machinery by which entire production processes are rendered automatic. We must overcome the backward state of spinning machinery manufacturing by a sixfold increase in the production of ring spindles (in the plants of the People's Commissariat of General Machinery). The manufacture of machinery for the food industry, particularly of bottling and packing machinery, is to be further developed. The sea and ocean-going fleet must be enlarged by the addition of modern vessels of every description, and the capacity of shipyards increased to an extent sufficient to ensure the domestic building of all sea and river craft required by the growing water transporta-

tion systems of the U.S.S.R. We must extend the production of automatic and remote control apparatus. Production of equipment for the iron and steel industry is likewise to be enlarged, as is that of equipment for the mechanization of laborious processes, such as moving cranes, and loading and unloading apparatus.

4. The *coal and oil* industries must be greatly expanded, as they constitute the fuel base for the whole economic development of the country. Coal mining is to be developed to the level necessary to meet all current requirements of the country and to ensure the accumulation of reserves by economic organizations and the state. The highest possible speed of output to be achieved in the coal districts of the Urals, in the Moscow coal basin, in the Far East and in Central Asia. Coal mining in these regions is to be increased as follows in the Third Five-Year Plan period: in the Urals 210 per cent, in the Moscow coal basin 270 per cent, in the Far East 170 per cent, and in Central Asia 340 per cent. During this period the output of lignite is to be increased 160 per cent. New plant is to be provided for the exploitation of local coal deposits in all regions of the country where even small deposits exist and, as they develop, locally mined fuel must replace the long-haul fuel now used by local industry, municipal services, schools, hospitals and offices. The comprehensive mechanization of coal mining is to be completed in all the coal districts of the country, and the coal mining processes are to be organized on the basis of the introduction in all coal fields of production cycle time schedules, on which the high labor productivity of the Stakhanovite miners is based.

A new oil field, the "Second Baku," is to be opened and developed in the region between the Volga and the Urals. The fulfilment of the program of oil extraction and refining is to be achieved by the rapid prospecting of the region and the introduction of efficient equipment in all branches of the oil industry.

We must widely apply turbine-driven drilling, pressure drilling, the closed method of oil extraction by which the gas

is made to yield the benzine it contains, and must also make extensive use of chemical methods in the refining of oil. The output of fuel of high octane number and of high quality oils must be forced with all energy. A system of oil pipe lines and of oil supply bases must be established, especially in the eastern districts of the U.S.S.R.

We must develop the cutting of peat for local use, especially in the Ivanovo and similar regions, so as to curtail long-haul coal shipments. Peat briquette and dehydrated peat manufacturing, and the quarrying and utilization of shales must be developed in every way.

Wide use must be made of the gasification of every kind of fuel, and of the subterranean gasification of coal. Subterranean coal gasification is to be made an independent branch of industry during the Third Five-Year Plan period. The output of gas from oil and gas deposits and from the subterranean gasification of coal is to be increased 250 per cent during this period. A number of plants for subterranean gasification of coal are to be built and put into operation in the Donetz and Moscow coal fields, and in the East of the U.S.S.R. The gas produced is to be used to generate power, and supply the chemical industry and the municipal services. In big cities, primarily Moscow and Leningrad, wood as a heating medium is to be replaced by gas heating, and, where local fuel is available, by steam heating. The utilization of coke and blast-furnace gases is to be developed by laying a system of gas mains, in the first place in the Donetz Basin.

An industry is to be established, in the East in particular, for the production of synthetic liquid fuel by the hydrogenation of hard fuel, and also for the synthetic production of liquid fuel from gas.

5. In the field of *electric power development*, the disproportion which now exists in various respects between the rapid growth of industry and the insufficient increase in the capacity of the electric power stations is to be removed, so that power plant capacity increase will not only exceed the growth of industry,

but ensure the accumulation of considerable capacity reserves. In accordance with this, the total capacity of power stations is to be increased during the Five-Year Plan period by 110 per cent. In steam power development, we must change to the building of small and medium size plants for 25,000 kilowatts and less. The penchant for huge power stations and the consequent neglect of small and medium stations must be condemned as wrong and detrimental to the economic interests of the state. The capacity of regional steam power stations is to be specially approved by the government in every case. We must introduce on a large scale the modern technique of energetics, high pressure and super-heated steam, modern turbines for central heat-and-power plans, and automatic machinery for the main production processes at the power stations and for the operation of the wires.

It is of the utmost importance that all establishments, whether they belong to industry, the municipal utilities, transportation or agriculture, must economize in the use of fuel and electric power.

6. The *chemical industry* is to be converted into a leading branch of manufacture, capable of satisfying completely the needs of the national economy and the national defense. The Third Five-Year Plan is a five-year plan stressing chemical products. The Party Congress resolves that the output of the chemical industry be increased 140 per cent, that is, considerably more than industry as a whole. The output of sulphuric and nitric acid, synthetic ammonia, artificial fiber and composition material is to be greatly increased. New branches of the synthetic manufacture of organic products (synthetic alcohol, acetic acid, etc.), are to be created by utilizing the by-products of oil refining, and the production of rubber, coke and natural gases. In all branches of the chemical industry we must effect strict adherence to technological principles and the steady introduction of the latest scientific achievements: the intensification of chemical production, the change from periodic to permanent processes, the use of high

pressures and the development of electro-chemical methods. Laborious work must be mechanized and an advance made in the introduction of automatic machinery.

7. A steady marked increase in output is to be achieved in the *iron and steel industry*, which in many respects determines the growth of all industry and of the national economy as a whole, and the increase in the production capacity of which therefore requires particular and constant attention. The Third Five-Year Plan is a five-year plan laying stress on special steels. The Congress resolves that the output of special rolled steel be doubled and that the manufacture of special steels—hard alloys, stainless, acid and heat resistant steels, tool, precision-instrument and transformer steels, and also ferro-alloys—be sharply increased. The smelting of charcoal pig iron from sulphur-free and phosphorus-free ores is to be developed on a large scale. We must do away with the specialization of rolling mills, the handiwork of the wreckers, which necessitates cross and long-haul shipments of metal, and must see to it that all the principal iron and steel producing centers of the country have locally produced rolled steel of all generally used specifications.

Metal rolling without ingots must be established on an industrial scale, and oxygen blast for smelting furnaces must be widely introduced. A second source of production and supply of dynamo transformer iron must be established. We must also master the smelting in open-hearth furnaces of ball-bearing and other kinds of high-grade steels and extend the use of this process. Another process to be mastered and widely applied in the production of low-percentage alloyed steels, using in the first place natural alloy pig iron obtained from Khalilovo and other ores. We must develop centrifugal casting in the manufacture of iron and steel tubing. In the Urals and in Siberia manganese ore mining is to be developed to an extent sufficient to warrant the discontinuance of such ore shipments from the South. In the Far East a new iron and steel industry is to be established, which shall be equipped for

a complete iron and steel production cycle so as to be able to supply locally all requirements of the machinery industry. During the Five-Year Plan period the ratio of pig iron smelted in the eastern districts is to increase from 28 per cent to 35 per cent of the country's total.

8. We must increase the output of non-ferrous metals to an extent sufficient to meet the rapidly growing requirements of the national economy and national defense. By 1942 the smelting of black copper is to show an increase of 180 per cent, and of aluminum (inclusive of silumin) not less than 300 per cent compared with 1937. A rapid increase must be achieved in the production of lead, zinc, nickel, tin, magnesium, tungsten, molybdenum and antimony. Substitutes for non-ferrous metals must be extensively used in all branches of machine building.

Energetic steps are to be taken to economize non-ferrous and ferrous metals by reducing loss in mining, concentration and smelting, by allowing less metal per unit of manufactured product, making proper use of all forms of waste in the manufacturing industries and getting out special steel for building construction.

Acid and heat-proof enamels for coating ferrous-metal apparatus, thus replacing non-ferrous metals, must be produced in much greater quantities.

9. We must put an end to the comparatively backward state of the *timber industry*. All processes in the production of timber must be extensively mechanized, and greater use made of gas generating machines and steam engines. While making full use of the advantages of the winter season for timber cutting operations, we must at the same time see to it that all-year lumber camps are also established. Lumber yards must be well stocked with air-dried wood. The paper and the wood distillation industries are to be given maximum development, as is the production of alcohol from sawdust and the waste products of paper mills.

10. The output of prefabricated units in the building industry, especially parts made of wood, concrete, reinforced con-



crete and gypsum plaster, also the output of structural shapes must be increased to the utmost. The rate of growth of output of high-grade cement, of sanitary equipment and of finishing and facing materials as well as of non-metallic minerals, especially of asbestos and asbestos products, must be increased.

11. The Congress resolves that the output of articles of general consumption be increased during the Third Five-Year Plan period by 70 per cent.

In *light industry* full use must be made of the greater raw material supply to increase the production and assortment of goods, and to improve their quality, at the same time storing up the necessary reserves of raw material. The disproportion in output between the preliminary and the spinning departments must be overcome, as must the lag of spinning behind weaving. The equipment of the entire textile industry, especially of the cotton industry, must be perfected. We must introduce high-speed, one-process scutching machines and other perfected machinery, high-stretch frames, automatic looms and apparatus controlling and regulating technological processes.

The *food industry* must considerably increase the assortment of its products, particularly of the two highest grades of products. The output of canned milk and of canned vegetables and fruits, of tomato and other juices, of fresh frozen vegetables and fruits, of factory-made ice cream, beer, wine and champagne is also to be increased.

We must take energetic measures to bring the fish industry into line with other industries. Fish catch must be increased in all fisheries, especially at Murmansk and in the Far East. Progress must also be made in the processing and canning of fish. The local organizations must expand to the utmost the fish industry serving their particular region by developing fisheries of local importance (rivers, lakes, ponds).

12. The development of *local industry* and *producers' cooperatives*, which are important sources of supply for the growing demands of the working people, must be intensified. As their present rate of

growth is to be considered inadequate, we must endeavor at least to double their output during the Third Five-Year Plan period. The selection of goods they produce must be increased and their quality improved (especially in the case of furniture, crockery and other household supplies).

Besides increasing the output of articles of general consumption, the principal task of local industry and the producers' cooperatives, we must resolutely expand the production of local fuels and building materials.

We must add greatly to the number of mechanized shoe, clothing, furniture and household goods repair shops, and other similar establishments serving the general public.

13. The plan fixed for the growth of industrial production and the further tasks assigned in the field of mastering the new technique make imperative a considerable increase in labor productivity and a substantial reduction in production costs. The Congress makes the following specifications for the Third Five-Year Plan period:

a. A 65 per cent *increase in labor productivity* in industry, which factor alone is to secure an increase of 62,000,000,000 rubles in industrial output in 1942 as compared with 1937.

b. A 10 per cent *decrease in the cost of production* in industry (in 1937 prices), which is to secure a saving to the state of 20,000,000,000 rubles in 1942 as compared with 1937.

Quality of output must be improved to the utmost in all branches of industry. We must organize a determined struggle against mismanagement, must fight to eliminate idle time and losses in production, and must lower the allowance of raw material supplies, fuel and electric power per unit of output. Production waste and low quality raw materials must be applied to useful purposes on a large scale.

We must properly organize the establishment of standards and norms, and secure their wider application in the national economy.

14. The Eighteenth Congress of the

C.P.S.U.(B.) sets the following increase in the output of *agriculture* as a whole: from 20,100,000,000 rubles in 1937 (in 1926-27 prices) to 30,500,000,000 rubles in 1942, that is, an increase of 52 per cent. The Congress specifies the following tasks for the most important branches of agriculture:

a. *Grain crops*: by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period the annual harvest must total 8,000,000,000 poods, or an average yield of 13 centners per hectare.

b. *Industrial crop* harvests in 1942: sugar beet, 282,000,000 centners, yield 235 centners per hectare; raw cotton, 32,900,000 centners, yield for irrigated cotton 19 centners per hectare; flax fiber, 8,500,000 centners, yield 4.6 centners per hectare, with an improvement in the grade of flax.

Hemp yield must be considerably increased. Special attention must be paid to increasing the production of rubber-bearing plants, and of sunflower and other oil-bearing plants, by proper organization of seed breeding, rational distribution by districts and improvement in farming methods.

c. The natural increase of *livestock* and the increase in the output of livestock products for the market must be adequate to afford a complete solution of the livestock problem in the U.S.S.R. The number of horses is to increase 35 per cent, cattle 40 per cent, hogs 100 per cent, sheep and goats 110 per cent, with particular attention to the development and consolidation of collective farm dairy and livestock departments. It is a task of prime importance to raise the productivity of livestock by improving the breed and in general effecting a radical change for the better in pedigreed stock raising, by properly districting breeds, increasing fodder areas and taking better care of the stock.

d. *Vegetable and livestock farming* must be organized in the vicinity of Moscow, Leningrad, Baku, Kharkov, Kiev, the industrial centers of the Donetz and Kuznetsk coal basins, Gorky, the cities of the Far East and of all other big cities, for the purpose of supplying these

centers of population in full with potatoes and other vegetables, and to a considerable extent with milk and meat.

e. *Choice* high-grade and improved *seeds*, from selection stations as well as of local origin, must be used exclusively in sowing grain and other cereal crops. Proper systems of crop rotation, including provision for grass sowing and bare fallow, must be introduced on collective farms and state farms, as they add greatly to the fertility of the soil and ensure a rise in yield and a reliable source of fodder for the increasing livestock.

f. We must terminate the neglect into which the work of land improvement has fallen, and must systematize land improvement operations on the collective farms; all work attached thereto is to be financed out of the state budget.

g. During the Third Five-Year Plan period the *mechanization of labor processes in all departments of agriculture* is to be completed. Trailer-implements required in agriculture must be supplied in full, with due regard to the number and types of tractors to be used. The most advanced principles of agronomy must be widely applied, and the vast practical experience of the foremost agriculturists must be utilized along scientific lines. Particular attention must be paid to the mechanization of laborious processes of work in stock breeding on state farms and collective farm dairy and livestock departments. We must widely develop the building of small collective farm hydro-electric power plants, and of electric installations using wind-power or gas-generating engines burning local fuel.

The output of machinery and apparatus to combat pests and plant diseases is to be increased.

The building of horse-drawn trailers, particularly for transportation purposes, is also to be developed, and the manufacture of simple grain cleaning machinery is to be extended.

h. The collective farms and state farms must learn to apply correctly organic and mineral fertilizer systems, paying particular attention to the proper storage and use of manure and other local fer-

tilizers and to the elimination of waste in the use of mineral fertilizers. The practice of applying lime to siliceous (podzol) soils and gypsum to alkali soils must be widely extended.

i. On the basis of the further mechanization of farming and the increasing productivity of labor, the *state farms* must be transformed in actual fact into highly efficient and highly remunerative economic units that will serve as models of organization, yield and productivity in farming. The number of head of cattle on the state farms of the People's Commissariat of State Farms must be increased, primarily by introducing stock raising on the state grain farms.

15. The Congress fixes the following increases in *freight traffic*: railways from 355,000,000,000 ton-km. in 1937 to 510,000,000,000 ton-km. in 1942; river transportation, from 33,000,000,000 ton-km. to 58,000,000,000 ton-km.; mercantile marine, from 37,000,000,000 ton-km. to 51,000,000,000 ton-km. In the transportation system the most important task is more efficient planning of freight shipments so as to reduce long-haul rail shipments, eliminate cross shipments and other uneconomic freights, and further increase the percentage of freight hauled by water craft and trucks.

In the Third Five-Year Plan period *labor productivity* is to increase 32 per cent in railway transportation and 38 per cent in waterway transportation. Loading and unloading in railway, waterway and motor transportation are to be mechanized.

16. The Congress assigns the following tasks to the railway transportation system for the Third Five-Year Plan period:

a. The number of *locomotives* is to be increased by 8,000, of which 1,500 are to be model "F.D.," 4,200 of the condenser type and 1,500 model "J.S." for passenger trains. In the near future the condenser-equipped engine must become the prevailing type of freight locomotive.

b. A total of 225,000 four-axle *freight cars* and 15,000 *passenger cars* are to be added to the rolling stock; 300,000 freight cars in use and 4,000 passenger

cars are to be provided with automatic coupling, and 200,000 freight cars in use are to be provided with automatic brakes. Locomotive and car repair shop capacity is to be extended, especially on the lines in the Urals, Central Asia, Siberia and the Far East. Shops for the repair of condenser locomotives must be established.

c. The railroad transportation system must be further reconstructed, particularly the tracks. In the Third Five-Year Plan period 11,000 km. of line must be built and opened for operation, and 8,000 km. of second track laid.

d. Railroad lines totaling 1,840 km. are to be *electrified*, primarily mountain railways and lines on which freight shipments are particularly heavy; also the larger junctions with heavy suburban traffic. We must introduce on the widest scale the automatic block system, the dispatcher signal system and auto-stop signals.

e. *Railroad station facilities* and junctions must be expanded, primarily on the lines connecting the Donetz coal basin with Krivoy Rog, Leningrad and Moscow, connecting the eastern districts of the Urals, the Northern Territory and the Murmansk Region with the central part of the U.S.S.R., and Western Siberia with Central Asia; also on the Southwestern, Western and Eastern lines.

17. The Congress sets the following tasks to be accomplished by the waterway, motor and airway transportation systems during the Third Five-Year Plan period:

a. To put an end to the lagging state of *water transportation* and increase its importance as a public carrier, particularly in the hauling of such bulk shipments as lumber, grain, coal and oil. The condition of the sea-going and river craft must be improved, modern vessels must be added and gas-generating engines installed on river craft. Ship repair yards and seaports must be built on a more extensive scale.

To take broadly conceived steps to reconstruct and increase the efficiency of the present water routes, to reconstruct

the Astrakhan-Gorky-Rybinsk-Moscow line so that by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period a deep-draft through route may be established from Astrakhan to Moscow, no draft at any point of the route to be less than 2.6 meters. We must proceed with the reconstruction of the Volga-Baltic Sea route. The total length of navigable inland waterways must be increased during the Third Five-Year Plan period from 102,000 km. to 115,000 km.

During the Third Five-Year Plan period a scheme for the comprehensive reconstruction of the Volga, Don and Dnieper Rivers must be elaborated, preparatory measures must be taken to maintain the level of the Caspian Sea, and the work of uniting the Volga and the Don must be commenced.

By the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period the *Northern Sea Route* is to become a water thoroughfare for normal navigation offering regular communication with the Far East.

b. To inaugurate regular *motor traffic* over automobile highways and freight-congested routes leading to cities, railroad stations and water transport lines. We must establish the necessary automobile repair shops, and increase the building of garages, parking places, and gasoline and service stations. Automobile traffic is to increase 360 per cent during the five-year period. The use of trailers in freight shipments by truck is to be extended as much as possible. We must build or rebuild 210,000 km. of roads, with a much greater proportion of superior tar oil, asphalt concrete and concrete roads than during the Second Five-Year Plan period.

Simultaneously, special care must be taken to maintain the present roads in proper condition by promptly attending to current repairs and necessary renewal of roadbed.

c. The civil air fleet is to concentrate its service on the principal state lines and improve the technical equipment of the trunk lines by extending and improving its ground facilities.

18. The Congress emphasizes the need for a great expansion of postal telephone

and telegraph *communication*, particularly interurban service.

We must complete the establishment of direct telephone connections between Moscow and all Republican, territorial and regional centers, and must supplement the radial system of communication with the junction system between the biggest centers of the U.S.S.R. The plan of supplying telephone service to all district centers, village Soviets, machine and tractor stations and state farms must be carried out to full completion. The number of radios must be increased 130 per cent. In a number of big cities television stations are to be installed.

19. One of the principal conditions for achieving the growth of output envisaged by the Third Five-Year Plan is the training of skilled workers and of technicians and engineers as well as extensive activity to promote the introduction of the latest technique and of scientific organization in industry. The Congress considers it necessary that the Five-Year Plan should make provision for:

a. The development of an extensive system of schools and courses for the training and retraining of skilled workers, and of masters of socialist craftsmanship.

b. The graduation of 1,400,000 technical workers of various trades, and 600,000 specially trained persons with university or college education.

### III. NEW CONSTRUCTION AND ITS DISTRIBUTION DURING THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN PERIOD

1. In accordance with the plan of growth of production, the Eighteenth Congress sets the sum total of *capital investments* in the national economy during the Third Five-Year Plan period at 192,000,000,000 rubles (in current estimate prices), as against 114,700,000,000 rubles during the Second Five-Year Plan period, of which:

a. In *industry*—111,900,000,000 rubles as against 58,600,000,000 rubles in the Second Five-Year Plan period. Of this sum, 93,900,000,000 rubles are to be in-

vested in industry producing means of production as against 49,800,000,000 rubles in the Second Five-Year Plan period, an 89 per cent increase, and 18,000,000,000 rubles in industry producing articles of general consumption, as against 8,800,000,000 rubles in the Second Five-Year Plan period, a 105 per cent increase.

b. In *transportation* — 37,300,000,000 rubles as against 20,700,000,000 rubles during the Second Five-Year Plan period, an 80 per cent increase.

c. In *agriculture* — 11,000,000,000 rubles. Of this sum, 5,200,000,000 rubles are to be invested in machine and tractor stations, 1,300,000,000 rubles for irrigation and land reclamation and 2,500,000,000 to increase the number of cattle on the state farms. The capital to be invested in agriculture by the collective farms themselves during the Third Five-Year Plan period is to total 24,000,000,000 rubles.

2. The Congress specifies that new and reconstructed establishments of a total value of 193,000,000,000 rubles (in current estimate prices) be opened for use during the Third Five-Year Plan period, as compared with 103,000,000,000 rubles during the Second Five-Year Plan period.

The Congress notes that the assigned volume of capital construction and the program of inauguration of new and reconstructed establishments ensure a further great expansion of industrial plant and equipment in the U.S.S.R., and the formation of the necessary reserve capacities in the chief branches of the national economy. *Capacity of output* is to increase as follows during the Third Five-Year Plan period: electric power plants, from 8,100,000 kw. to 17,200,000 kw.; in the coal industry, 80 per cent, bringing the capacity of the mines up to 335,000,000 tons by the end of the said period; iron and steel manufacturing (pig iron), up to 25,000,000 tons; non-ferrous metal industry—copper 140 per cent, aluminum 280 per cent; automobile industry, almost 100 per cent; cotton industry (spindles) 50 per cent.

3. The Congress is of the opinion that in *distributing new plant* under the

Third Five-Year Plan among the various districts of the U.S.S.R., the following considerations must control: We must bring the industry nearer to the respective sources of raw material and to the districts consuming their output so as to eliminate uneconomic shipments and shipments over too long distances; furthermore, we must continue the advancement of districts which were economically backward in the past. Accordingly, the Third Five-Year Plan must contain the following provisions:

a. In the *main economic districts* of the Soviet Union economic development must proceed on a comprehensive scale. We must organize their fuel supply and the production of commodities like cement, plaster of paris, chemical fertilizers, glass and mass production articles of light industry and the food industry in quantities sufficient to meet their requirements. It is of particular importance that big industrial districts, whose dependence on large incoming freight shipments has become greater with their industrial expansion and the rapid increase in urban population, be ensured local fuel supplies and the local procurement of certain products difficult to transport.

Foods used everywhere in large quantities, such as potatoes and other vegetables, dairy and meat products, flour, confectionery and beer, as well as some manufactured goods of mass consumption, such as fancy goods, products of the needle trades, furniture, bricks and lime, must be produced in sufficient quantity in each republic, territory and region.

Due control must be maintained to enforce the decisions of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) and of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. prohibiting the building of new factories and mills in Moscow and Leningrad. This prohibition should be extended to Kiev, Kharkov, Rostov-on-Don, Gorky and Sverdlovsk.

b. In *economic centers* like the Eastern districts, the Urals and the Volga area, duplicate establishments must be built during the Third Five-Year Plan period in several branches of the machine build-

ing, oil refining and chemical industries, to eliminate the element of chance in the supply of various industrial products by plants which are now sole producers.

c. Provision must be made for a more rapid increase in capital investments and the construction of new establishments in the *Eastern* and *Far Eastern* districts of the U.S.S.R. We must continue to develop in every way the iron and steel industry in these sections, for which purpose three-fourths of all blast furnaces to be built in the country during the Third Five-Year Plan period must be allocated to the Eastern districts.

A great new textile manufacturing district, which is to use cotton grown in Central Asia, must be established in the East of the U.S.S.R. In the Far East rapid rates of development must be prescribed for the coal and cement industries so that they may be able to supply all local demands.

d. The further economic and cultural advancement of the *national republics* and *regions* must be safeguarded, in harmony with the fundamental aims pursued in the distribution of productive forces under the Third Five-Year Plan.

4. The Congress considers it necessary to concentrate on the following construction projects as the most important in the Third Five-Year Plan period:

a. In the *machine building industry*, whose production program for the Third Five-Year Plan period calls for a rate of growth considerably in excess of that of industry as a whole, the building and putting into operation of new factories, particularly those manufacturing machine-tools and electric power equipment, must be greatly expanded and accelerated. We must complete three heavy machine-tool works, a milling machine plant in Gorky and an automatic lathe plant in Kiev. Building operations must be developed on a number of new plants of medium capacity for the production of grinders and gear-cutters, horizontal planers, borers, vertical boring and turning machines and automatic lathes; also on plants producing equipment for forging and press departments.

During the Third Five-Year Plan

period, four steam turbine works are to be built and opened for use—in the Sverdlovsk, Ufa, Novosibirsk and Kaluga districts. Besides these we are to begin to build a steam turbine works in the Novocherkassk district, and a hydraulic turbine works in the Kuibyshev district. The steam turbine works require the building and inauguration of boiler works, including one at Orsk, and of factories manufacturing electric power plant accessories and supplies. The mass production of wind-power motors must be organized.

The Gorky and Moscow automobile factories must be completed. We must build a light automobile factory and a number of additional automobile assembly shops (some of them in the Far East), and must develop the building of truck factories in Siberia and of a number of establishments manufacturing supplies for the automobile industry. We must also build more automobile repair shops. In the East an industry must be set up for the production of agricultural machinery and the assembly and repair of tractors. A textile machinery plant must be built in Kursk and another in Western Siberia. The Saratov ball-bearing plant must be completed and two new ball and roller-bearing plants must be constructed. A paper mill machinery plant must be built. We must begin to build a new locomotive works. Two or three heavy and medium chemical machinery works must also be constructed. We must force the construction now under way of shipyards for the building of sea-going vessels and ocean liners, and must begin to construct new yards for the building of sea and river craft.

b. In the field of *electrification*, the Congress considers that the chief part of the building program consists in increasing capacity by building new power plants of small and medium size, and in accelerating the construction of hydroelectric plants. We must develop the construction of the two Kuibyshev hydroelectric power plants, which, with their aggregate capacity of 3,400,000 kw., represent the greatest water power project in the world, and, at the same time pro-

vide a solution for the problem of irrigating the arid land of the Trans-Volga region so that it may produce stable crops, and for the problem of improving navigation over the Volga and the Kama. We must also begin the Kaluga hydro-electric power plant on the Oka River. The following water power plants, among others, must be completed and opened for operation: the Uglich, the Rybinsk, the two Chirchik, the Kanakir, the Svir No. 2, the Khram, the Niva No. 3 and the Sukhumi. Construction must be begun on the following new water power plants: the Upper Kama, the Mingichaur, the Ust-Kamenogorsk and the Gyumusha plants. We must also build small local water power plants on a vast scale: in the Ural districts, on the Tura, Ufa, Chusovaya, Belaya, Nias and other rivers; also on the Northern Donetz River and elsewhere.

In order to economize fuel, a large number of small wind power-houses must be built. Provision must be made for building 102 district steam plants of which the following are to start operations: the Kurakhovka and Nesvetai plants, several plants in Moscow and Leningrad, and the Chelyabinsk, Sumgait, Komsomolsk, Kiev, Nikolayev, Kirov-on-Chepets, Syzran, Orsk, Karaganda, Krasnoyarsk, Khabarovsk, Kuvasai and Krasnodar plants, among others. In the Ivanovo district we must build a new steam-power plant burning peat for the textile industry.

The building of high-tension networks and of substations must be promoted in every way.

The total increase in electric power capacity during the Third Five-Year Plan period is set at 9,000,000 k.w., which will create a steady reserve capacity in the industrial districts of 10 to 15 per cent.

c. In the *coal industry*, a large number of coal and lignite mines must be sunk. New coal fields must be developed, especially in the Urals, the Tatar and Bashkir Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics, Eastern Siberia, the Far East, the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, the Ukrainian, the Kirghiz and the Tadjik

Soviet Socialist Republics. The new pits are to be mainly of medium or small capacity. The sinking operations are to be expedited in every way so that they may be finished as soon as possible. The total capacity of the new coal pits to be sunk during the five-year period is set at 170,000,000 tons, of which 160,000,000 tons are to be worked by the end of the period.

In the *oil industry*, new refineries representing an aggregate capacity of 15,000,000 tons must be put into operation, in addition to cracking installations representing 4,500,000 tons of additional capacity. The paramount task of the Third Five-Year Plan period is the development of a new rich oil region between the Volga and the Urals. In this area oil refineries of a total capacity of 6,000,000 tons are to be built. The work of prospecting for and industrially surveying new oil fields—between the Volga and the Urals, in Siberia, in the Far East, in the Ukraine, in Central Asia and in the Kazakh S.S.R.—must be expanded.

In the *peat and oil shale* industry the necessary increase in capital development must be secured. Provision must be made to build factories for the artificial dehydration of peat, so as to prepare the ground for the abolition of seasonal work in peat cutting. We must build two or three coke works which should also be used for the manufacture of chemical products.

d. In the *iron and steel* industry the following plants must be completed: The Magnitogorsk plant consisting of six blast furnaces and two blooming mills, the Nizhnetagil and Petrovsk-Zabaikal factories, the Amur, Zaporozhye and Azov steel works, the Krivoy Rog iron and steel mill, the Novomoskovsk sheet-iron works, and Novo-Uralsk and Nikopol tubing mills. We must begin to build new iron and steel mills in the southern regions of the Urals (to use Khalilovo and Baikal ores) and in Eastern Siberia, also a pipe welding mill in the Urals, a tube rolling mill in Siberia and a tube foundry in the central regions. Small plants manufacturing articles for local

consumption out of metal scrap and waste must be built in the districts of Central Asia and the Transcaucasus. Not less than seventeen agglomeration belts are to be built to improve the preparing of the ore for smelting. In all plants, work consuming much manual labor is to be mechanized and automatic machinery installed on an extensive scale.

In order to improve the quality of the rolled steel, the rolling departments of all plants must be supplied with the necessary finishing equipment. During the Third Five-Year Plan period, a total of twenty blast furnaces must be built and three charcoal blast furnaces in the Urals must be reconditioned to resume operations.

We must proceed to sink pits in the district of the Kursk Magnetic Anomaly which is to become a supplementary supply base for the iron and steel industry in the central regions, and must take preliminary measures for the building of an iron and steel mill in this district.

The industrial survey of the Ata Su and Karsakpai deposits must be completed.

e. In the *non-ferrous metal* industry, the Balkhash copper smelting plant and the Middle Ural and Blyava plants must be completed. We must proceed with the construction of the Jezkazgan and the Almalyk copper smelting works, and of lead and zinc works in the Altai region. The Ural aluminum works and the aluminum works in Kandalaksha and the Kuznetsk basin must be opened for operations, while the building of other aluminum works must be commenced. The Tikhvin alumina works, the Southern Ural and the Northern nickel works are to start operations. We must begin to build a number of new plants for the manufacture of lead, zinc, tin, tungsten and molybdenum. We must put up mills for the manufacture of non-ferrous rolled products and of bi-metallic products, also for the working down of aluminum and magnesium alloys.

f. In the *chemical* industry, we must expand operations on the construction of new sulphuric acid works (using primarily the waste gases of the non-ferrous

metal industry and of power plants), of fertilizer and soda works, and of synthetic rubber and tire works; thirteen to fifteen synthetic rubber, nine tire-cord and sixteen tire works distributed all over the country are to be opened for use. We must build two synthetic liquid fuel works, two regenerator works, fifteen regenerator departments in tire works and two or three asbestos products works.

Industrial establishments capable of working up the entire crop of rubber bearing plants are to be built.

g. The shipping of *cement* from the European part of the U.S.S.R. to the eastern districts and the Central Asian republics must stop. For this purpose medium and small-sized cement works of a total capacity of 4,800,000 tons must be built in the various regions of the Far East, in Siberia, the Kazakh S.S.R., the Central Asian republics, in the Urals and elsewhere.

h. *Prospecting* must be developed to an extent sufficient to ensure raw material supplies to all industrial plants now in operation or to be constructed during the Third Five-Year Plan period, and to create in all sections of the U.S.S.R. reserves of fresh industrial supplies for consumption in subsequent years.

i. In the *timber* industry we must finish and open for operation the Solikamsk, Kondopoga, Kama, Marii, Krasnoyarsk, Solombalsk, Archangel, Lgov, Komsomolsk and Kotlass cellulose and paper mills and a newsprint mill in the Kirov district. We must expand operations on the following building projects: new cellulose and paper mills, wood-distillation, plywood and woodworking factories and works for the hydrolysis of wood. Provision must be made for the rapid development of timber cutting in the northern and northwestern districts of the European part of the U.S.S.R., in the Urals and in the Far East. Capacity must be increased in the timber sawing and wood-working industry in the north of the European part of the U.S.S.R., in Siberia and in the Far East. Lumber shipments from Siberia to the European part of the U.S.S.R. must cease.

j. In *light industry*, new cotton mills



must be opened for operation in Barnaul, Novosibirsk and in the Kuznetsk basin, while small spinning mills must be built in the old textile districts to eliminate the disproportion between spinning and weaving. We must inaugurate the second section of the Tashkent cotton mill, the spinning mill at Leninakan, the Kiev and Semipalatinsk woolen cloth mills, the rubber soles works at Kalinin and the artificial leather works at Kazan. We must intensify the building of new textile mills in the republics of Central Asia, Western Siberia and the Kazakh S.S.R., as well as the building of a number of new knitgoods and hosiery mills, of small linen goods mills, leather goods works, shoe factories, silk mills, and glass works producing bottles and jars.

k. In the *food industry*, the following establishments must be completed and opened for operation: the Orsk, Engels, Ulan Ude, Irkutsk, Khabarovsk, Sverdlovsk, Ivanovo, Nalchik, Kuibyshev, Dniepropetrovsk, Voroshilovgrad, Ashkhabad and Stalinabad meat packing plants; and sugar refineries in Elan-Koleno, Zherdyovka, Sovietskoye (Kursk Region), Alma Ata, Novo-Troitsk, Gniivan (Vinnitsa Region), Shpola (Kiev Region) and also one refinery in the Armenian S.S.R. We must build a number of new alcohol distilleries, butter factories, condensed and dried milk plants, and confectionery and tea factories. Medium-sized meat packing plants, sugar refineries, mechanized bakeries, cold storage plants, tobacco factories and soap factories must be built.

The *fish industry* must increase the number of its sea-going fishing craft and complete the following industrial establishments: fish packing plants at Kom-somolsk, Khabarovsk, Moscow and Muinak; cold storage plants at Balkhash, Mangistau, Akhtari, Sovietskaya Gavan (Soviet Haven), Petropavlovsk (Kamchatka) and twenty small cold storage plants in the Far East; shipyards at Murmansk, Nikolayevsk-on-Amur and Petropavlovsk (Kamchatka). Provision must be made for the more speedy development of fishing in the Kamchatka, Okhotsk and Ayansk districts by both the

People's Commissariat of the Fish Industry and the respective territorial and regional organizations.

l. With regard to *local industry* and the producers' cooperatives, we must expand the construction of small industrial establishments consuming local raw materials and fuel.

m. In *city development*, housing construction must be expanded and public amenities increased in urban and industrial centers. New water supply systems must be built in fifty cities, sewage systems in forty-five cities and trolley car lines in eight cities.

Much more extensive use must be made of gas as a municipal utility. The number of trolley cars must be increased by 2,900, four-axle cars of the latest design being specified for Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and other big cities of the U.S.S.R. The development of urban and inter-urban automobile transportation must be given particular attention: the number of omnibuses must be increased by 27,000, and taxicab and taxi-truck service greatly extended. Trolley-bus service is to be expanded in the big cities—Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, etc. We must accordingly increase the manufacture of trolley-buses, particularly of the double-deck type, the mass production of which must be organized.

Moscow and Leningrad must be further developed and reconstructed in accordance with the plans that have been adopted. The third subway line in Moscow must be completed.

By the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period we must finish in the main the structural work involved in the erection of the Palace of Soviets.

n. In *agriculture*, 1,500 machine and tractor stations must be established, part by building new stations and part by dividing up old stations. The necessary repair shops for tractors, combines and other agricultural machinery must be set up. On the state farms cattle sheds and other stabling facilities must be put up in sufficient quantity to ensure fully proper care of the herds.

All major irrigation and reclamation projects now under way, such as the

Vakhsh, Colchis, Nevinnomyskaya Canal and Murgab Oasis developments, must be completed. We must proceed to build the Trans-Volga irrigation system and increase agricultural plant and equipment in the drought districts.

o. *Grain elevators and warehouses* of a total capacity of over 10,000,000 tons must be added to the existing network, so that before the end of the first half of the Third Five-Year Plan period the storage of grain in sheds will be entirely discontinued.

5. For the purpose of accelerating the construction and inauguration of the new plant and its distribution among the chief economic districts of the country, the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) demands that the *mania for building giant factories* and works *be resolutely combated* and that a sweeping change be made in favor of building medium and small-sized establishments in all branches of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. In industrial construction we must prohibit the building of establishments specialized along too narrow lines, and must organize the cooperation of establishments among themselves within their respective economic districts.

The Congress calls attention to the need for the energetic application of *express methods in building*. These necessitate the development of the building industry, the strengthening to the utmost of the territorial (local) building organizations, the transformation of the building industry from a relatively backward into a foremost branch of the national economy, into an industry which is mechanized on a comprehensive scale, uses standard parts and sections and has all establishments required for this purpose.

In order that the program of building operations as outlined in the plan may be carried into execution, the Congress fixes the increase in *labor productivity* in the building industry during the Third Five-Year Plan period at 75 per cent and the reduction in production costs of building operations by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period at 12 per cent in comparison with production costs

at the end of the preceding five-year period.

#### IV. THE PLAN FOR THE FURTHER RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL STANDARD OF THE PEOPLE DURING THE THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLAN PERIOD

The fulfilment of the First and Second Five-Year Plans denoted not only a great advance in the national economy and its socialist transformation, together with a strengthening of the Soviet Union's power of defense, but also a vast rise in the material and cultural standard of the peoples of the U.S.S.R.

The Third Five-Year Plan must satisfy to a still greater extent the wants and desires of the people, their requirements of foodstuffs and manufactured goods, of housing, and cultural and other public services. The fulfilment of the Third Five-Year Plan guarantees, moreover, another big step forward toward the formation of a powerful material basis for the subsequent development of the productive forces, the welfare and culture of socialist society in the U.S.S.R. It is now not a question of abolishing unemployment and of doing away with poverty in the countryside—this we have already accomplished in full and for all time. The task now is to promote the popular welfare and culture until they reach a level in consonance with the growing demands of the Soviet people, a level that is beyond the scope of possibility for even the richest capitalist countries, a level that denotes the commencement of real florescence of the forces of socialism, the flourishing of a new culture, of socialist culture.

The Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) sets the following tasks for the Third Five-Year Plan period with regard to improving the material conditions and raising the cultural standard of the working people in town and country:

1. a. *National consumption* in the U.S.S.R. is to be increased more than 50 per cent in accordance with the expanding incomes of the workers, peasants and employees.

b. In comparison with 1937, there is to be a 21 per cent increase in the *number*

of workers and employees by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan period in all branches of the national economy, a 37 per cent increase in average wages and a 67 per cent increase in the national payroll.

c. State expenditures on *cultural and other public welfare services* for the working people of town and country, that is, expenditures on social insurance, education, public health, allowances to mothers of big families and on cultural and other public welfare services for the benefit of workers and employees, exclusive of state appropriations for housing and municipal development, are to total 53,000,000,000 rubles as against 30,800,000,000 rubles in 1937, a more than 70 per cent increase.

d. *Incomes of collective farmers* are to rise considerably as a result of the growth of labor productivity in the collective farms, and of the increasing yield of all crops and of stock raising.

e. A wide compass of measures is to be carried out to effect a substantial advance toward the realization of the historic task of raising the *cultural and technical level of the working class of the U.S.S.R.* to the level of engineers and technicians.

f. *Universal secondary education* is to be carried into effect in the cities, while in the countryside and in all national republics the introduction of universal seven-year secondary education is to be completed and the number of children receiving a ten-year schooling is to increase. In consequence the attendance at elementary and secondary schools in cities and workers' settlements is to rise from 8,600,000 to 12,400,000, and in rural localities from 20,800,000 to 27,700,000.

g. The number of students at the universities and technical colleges is to rise to 650,000, with attention during the next few years fixed mainly on improving the quality of the higher education imparted.

h. The number of moving picture theatres, clubs, libraries, houses of culture and reading rooms is to be increased; there is to be a sixfold increase in premises equipped for sound films and portable sound-film projectors.

i. There is to be a considerable expansion of the public health service and improvement in the hospital service. We must enlarge the scope of sanitary preventive measures, promote maternity aid, increase children's hospital accommodations, improve labor protection and provide the working people with greater facilities for sports and recreation. State appropriations for public health are to increase from 10,300,000,000 rubles in 1937 to 16,500,000,000 rubles in 1942. Accommodations in permanent nurseries and kindergartens are to increase from 1,800,000 in 1937 to 4,200,000 in 1942.

j. *Housing construction* in cities and workers' settlements is to be developed energetically; 35,000,000 square meters of new housing space are to be opened for occupancy during the Third Five-Year Plan period.

2. For the purpose of improving the living conditions of the people, the Third Five-Year Plan period must witness a maximum development of Soviet trade, which is to be conducted along efficient lines. Accordingly, it is specified:

a. That the volume of state and cooperative trade increase by 1942 to 206,000,000,000 rubles, as against 126,000,000,000 rubles in 1937, including a 100 per cent increase in the volume of business done by public dining rooms, restaurants, cafés and buffets.

b. That the number of retail *trade establishments* be increased 38 per cent, and that the trading organizations be provided with improved facilities in the line of cold storage, wholesale stores and warehouses, cartage and delivery of merchandise. In rapidly growing rural districts there is to be a particularly great increase in the number of stores and stands dealing in commodities of everyday use and in supplies for repairs and for building purposes in urgent demand by the peasants.

3. The Congress fixes an 80 per cent increase in the *national income* for the Third Five-Year Plan period. In connection herewith the Congress establishes that the rising incomes of the population and of the state are absolutely sufficient

to cover both the people's requirements—the national consumption — and the state's requirements for the development of the national economy, the strengthening of the country's power of defense and the formation of the necessary state reserves.

The tremendous advance of all branches of the national economy demands that all work of national-economic planning and of the organization of accounting be further improved. The main object in rearranging the work of planning is to keep an organized check on the carrying out of plans so as to prevent any disproportion arising among the several branches of the national economy, and to discover new reserves for the fulfillment of the plan; also to introduce corrections in the plans of individual branches of economy and of individual districts so as to bring them into accord with actual plan fulfillment.

The Congress stresses the necessity of improving the work of the budget and credit systems, of the stricter application of cost accounting, of combating mismanagement with greater energy, of increasing the returns from heavy industry and other branches of the national economy, of strengthening the Soviet ruble on the basis of socialist productions of an intensified development of trade, and a general improvement in the standard of living of the people.

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In order that the tasks prescribed by the Third Five-Year Plan may be carried out without fail, the Congress of the C.P.-S.U.(B.) demands of all Party, Soviet, economic and trade union organizations:

a. Live, concrete direction, efficient leadership in economic matters, those in leading positions to concentrate on the proper selection of staffs, on an actual daily check-up on how tasks assigned by the Party and the government are being carried out.

b. A proper system of wages for workers, foremen, engineers and technicians, designed to provide a material incentive for increasing labor productivity.

c. The development of socialist com-

petition and the Stakhanov movement, the enforcement in factories and offices of strict labor discipline and the securing of high labor productivity by all those employed.

In collective farm development, the tasks to be accomplished are the further strengthening of the agricultural artel in every way, both organizationally and economically; the public property of the collective farms must be developed and consolidated, the collective-farm livestock departments, and the common buildings, common emergency stores and other forms of collective property must be expanded, as this is the basis for a further advance in agriculture and the further rise in the material and cultural standards of the collective-farm peasantry.

In this connection it is necessary to fight with greater determination against violations of the Rules of the Agricultural Artel. We must not permit any increase beyond the limits allowed by law of the subsidiary establishments personally owned by the collective farmers, or of the plots of land attached to their dwelling houses for their personal use, or of the number of cattle of the individual collective farmers, as such increases lead to an infringement of the interests of the collective farm concerned and prevent the establishment of firm collective-farm discipline. It is essential to have still better discipline on the collective farms and to intensify the necessary educational work among the entire mass of the collective farmers, to increase the productivity of labor, to encourage the most efficient collective farmers, and to introduce extensively the system of working in teams on the collective farms.

In the interests of still better discipline and greater labor productivity, and of larger per capita incomes on the collective farms, and for the purpose of further developing industry, increasing the supply of commodities in the country and the influx of workers from the collective farms to the industrial establishments, the collective farms must be prevailed upon systematically to release members for work at industrial establishments,

primarily those who are little employed in collective farm work, have few work-day-units to their credit and are thus an undue burden on the collective farm.

The realization of the tasks of the Third Five-Year Plan makes it imperative that the after-effects of the counter-revolutionary wrecking activities of the Trotskyite-Bukharinite spies and agents of fascism and of foreign capital be completely wiped out and that Bolshevik vigilance be increased in the whole work of building communism. We must ever be mindful of the injunction of the Party that as long as we are surrounded by capitalist countries, the espionage services of foreign states will manage to send wreckers, diversionists, spies and assassins into our midst to damage, harm and weaken our country, to prevent the growth of communism in the U.S.S.R.

Whether or not we reach the great objectives set by the Third Five-Year Plan, so closely intertwined with the vital interests of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, depends chiefly on us, the leaders, the Communists and non-Party Bolsheviks, particularly on our ability to organize work and to improve the communist education of the people. All of us, leaders and rank-and-file workers, employees and collective farmers, are required above all to be socially-minded with regard to our duties, to work honestly and to aid those lagging in the rear so that the Third Five-Year Plan may prove a success, so that the Soviet Union may take a new giant stride along the road to the complete triumph of communism.

Under present-day conditions, when in the U.S.S.R. the socialist forms of economy, socialist property and the socialist organization of work hold undivided sway, when communist consciousness on the job, of which our state, our people and all the laboring masses are the beneficiaries, acquires paramount importance in deciding the success of our cause, the role of the Soviet intelligentsia, which has learned to work in Bolshevik fashion, to fight like Bolsheviks for greater culture and communist consciousness among the people, assumes enormous propor-

tions. Today, when the political and economic positions held by socialist society in the U.S.S.R. have been finally consolidated, the decisive factor is personnel, trained workers who have become masters of their respective crafts, the decisive factor is the Soviet cultural workers who head the mass of the working people in their great struggle for the complete triumph of communism.

In the capitalist countries the vitals of society are being gnawed deeper and deeper by a new economic crisis which throws upon the streets ever new millions of unemployed and increases the poverty and despair of the masses engaged in involuntary toil for capital. In the camp of capitalism it is the fascist countries that call the tune, the fascist countries whose rule of blood and terror at home and policy of imperialist aggression abroad have already led to a second imperialist war in which a number of countries of Europe and Asia are taking part, and which threatens to spread further. These are all indisputable signs of the intensification of the general and irremediable crisis of capitalism, of the parasitic decay of capitalism and its approaching collapse.

So much the greater is our obligation to do our duty, our duty as builders of the first socialist society, which has already succeeded once and for all in standing on its own feet politically and economically, a society full of vigor and confidence in its victory, a society which begets courage in the hearts of the laboring masses of all countries and imbues them with the firm belief that their liberation is nigh. The fulfilment of the Third Five-Year Plan will be the best testimonial of the all-conquering power of communism in its historic competitive struggle with capitalism.

It is the demand of the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) that every Bolshevik, every builder of communism devoted to the cause, do all in his power to rally the workers, collective farmers and intellectuals still more closely around the banner of the Party of Lenin and Stalin in the struggle for the success of the Third Five-Year Plan.

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# Report on Amendments to the Rules of the C. P. S. U. (B.)

March 18, 1939

BY A. A. ZHDANOV

*Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*

## INTRODUCTION

COMRADES, in his report to the Eighteenth Congress, Comrade Stalin summed up the magnificent socialist victories achieved by our Party in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan. He made an exceedingly profound and sagacious analysis of the circumstances of our victories and outlined a great program of work connected with the gradual transition of the U.S.S.R. from socialism to communism.

The victory of socialism is a triumph for our Party, a triumph for its Leninist-Stalinist leadership.

It is a victory for the policy of the Party, for its theory, its ideology and its organizational principles.

The millions of working people of our country have rallied around our Party. Its ideas, the ideas of communism, have become the banner of the Soviet people.

In order to accomplish the historic tasks involved in the building of socialism, and in order to protect the gains of victorious socialism from the surrounding capitalist world and its agents inside the U.S.S.R., the Party had to effect a radical readjustment of its political and organizational work.

By purging its ranks of the enemy scum and thus consolidating the Bolshevik unity and firmness of its ranks, and by readjusting its political and organizational work, the Party immensely enhanced its strength and power and its

ideological and organizational armament.

The Party is now stronger than ever before!

And this we owe to the leadership of Comrade Stalin! (*Stormy applause and cheers. All rise.*)

The source of our Party's strength, the source of its epoch-making victories lies in the fact that it is a party of a new type, the Leninist-Stalinist type, a party which is irreconcilable towards opportunists and towards all enemies of the working class. Our Party is the party of social revolution; it has grown up on the firm foundation of the theory of Marx-Engels-Lenin-Stalin. Its program, tactics and organizational principles are based on the granite foundation of Marxism-Leninism. In its ranks are the finest representatives of the working class, the most devoted of its sons, the most class-conscious, revolutionary, courageous and disciplined. Thanks to this, the Bolshevik Party has become the militant staff of the working class, its revolutionary vanguard, a party:

“... bold enough to lead the proletarians in the struggle for power, experienced enough to find its bearings amidst the complex conditions of a revolutionary situation, and flexible enough to steer clear of all submerged rocks in the path to its goal.” (Stalin.)

The Bolshevik Party performs its role of vanguard of the working class not

only through its consistent revolutionary and scientific program and tactics, but also through its organization. A distinguishing feature of our Party is that it has attributed exclusive importance to organization at every stage of its revolutionary activities. It has been relentless towards opportunism in matters of organization and has always devised organizational forms, and rules and laws for the government of its internal life that corresponded to the historical conditions of the Party's activities and ensured performance of its political tasks.

The organizational principles of Bolshevism are an instrument for the carrying out of a consistently revolutionary program and tactics, for a revolutionary program cannot be carried out without a firm, centralized organization. The Leninist-Stalinist organizational principles of Party structure have been embodied in the Party Rules, which define the methods of practical activity of the Party organizations, the forms of the Party structure and the rules governing its internal life. The historic mission of our Party, as the organizer and leader of the socialist revolution and of the realization of the dictatorship of the working class, determined the basic principles of its organizational structure, namely, strict centralism in the activities of the Party organizations; a conscious inner discipline; unity of purpose and unity of action; prohibition of factions and groupings; careful selection of new members of the Party; protection of the Party from the penetration of opportunist petty-bourgeois elements into its ranks; constant care to increase the activity of Party members and to develop inner-Party democracy. These principles, which are embodied in the Party Rules, constitute the unshakable foundation of the Party.

The Party has always regarded its Rules as the inviolable basis of its life and Party structure. It has always fought for the strict observance of all the provisions of the Rules. Knowing the tremendous power contained in the Bolshevik principles of organization and in their concentrated expression—the

Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.)—bourgeois henchmen and double-dealers of every kind have time and again used the great name of Party member as a screen in their attempts to undermine the Party Rules, to destroy the unity of the Party and to weaken it, with the object of paving the way for the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. The events of the past few years have shown what wide use the vile enemies of the people—the Trotsky-Bukharin and bourgeois-nationalist agents of fascism, spies and diversionists—made of violations of Party Rules for their own subversive ends. These violations—departures from the principles of democratic centralism, wholesale admissions into the Party, chaos in the conduct of Party business, etc.—were due to a blunting of Bolshevik vigilance and forgetfulness of the organizational principles of our Party. That is why departures from the Party Rules, violations of their provisions and laws, are a violation of the Leninist-Stalinist doctrine of the Party and injurious to the Party.

The Party of revolutionary Marxism determines the organizational forms and methods of its work in conformity with the concrete conditions. On these grounds, the Bolshevik Party has never converted the established forms of Party structure into a dogma, into a lifeless stereotype. As in the development of Marxist theory, so in the organizational forms laid down in its Rules, our Party bases itself on creative Marxism and enriches these organizational forms with new experience as the conditions of the class struggle develop and new political tasks arise.

Allow me to remind you of the following precepts laid down on this subject by the Tenth Party Congress in its Resolution on Party Affairs:

“1. The Party of revolutionary Marxism utterly rejects the quest for an absolutely correct form of Party organization and methods of work suited to all stages of the revolutionary process. On the contrary, the form of organization and the methods of work must be entirely determined by the specific fea-

tures of the given concrete historical situation and by the tasks directly arising from this situation.

"2. From this standpoint it is clear that, with a change in the objective conditions of the development of the revolution, any organizational form, and the methods of work corresponding to it, may become converted from forms of development of the Party into a fetter on its development; and, vice versa, an organizational form which has grown unsuitable may again become an essential, and the only expedient, form should there be a recurrence of the corresponding objective conditions.

"3. The contradiction between the requirements of a newly arising situation, on the one hand, and the established form of an organization and its methods of work, on the other, generally becomes evident before the necessity for a change of line is definitely felt. The line should be changed only when the task that gave rise to the preceding type of organization and the corresponding method of work has in general—on the whole and in the main—been accomplished."

There have been numerous instances of changes in the forms and methods of organizational activity in the history of our Party. While holding its basic and fundamental organizational principles inviolate, the Party has always established such organizational forms as facilitate the development of the content of its work, ensure the performance of its political tasks, the unity of word and deed. On this basis, the Party has repeatedly altered its Rules in conformity with changes in the situation, new tasks and the experience gained in its work. It is not by chance that big changes and turns in the political life of the country and the rise of new political tasks for our Party have been accompanied by changes in the Party Rules. I would remind you that the principal amendments to the Party Rules were made in 1922—the period of development of the New Economic Policy; in 1925—when the Party, at its Fourteenth Congress, faced the task of socialist industrialization; and in 1934—the period of the Seventeenth Party Congress, when

the Party proceeded to tackle the historic tasks of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Questions of Party work and Party structure have acquired particular significance during the past few years. The tremendous scope of the socialist transformations, the swift rate at which the Party and state are developing, and the enlistment of the millions of Soviet people in the work of socialist construction increase the demands on the Party and on its leadership.

The enhanced importance of the question of organization denotes an enhancement of the role of the vanguard of the working class, which our Party is.

At the Seventeenth Party Congress, questions of organization, of bringing organizational work into conformity with the demands of the political line, were dealt with in their full scope in the report of Comrade Stalin, the report of Comrade Kaganovich and the resolutions of the Congress.

The role of vanguard of the working class, of the advanced detachment of the working people, such as our Party is, becomes all the greater with the victory of socialism, when the U.S.S.R. has entered a new phase of development—the phase of completion of the building of classless, socialist society and of gradual transition from socialism to communism.

The past few years have been a period in which the Party has constantly armed itself and sharpened its organizational weapon. Whereas Lenin, in his remarkable work *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*, developed the organizational precepts which later became the organizational principles of the party of the new type, the Bolshevik Party, Comrade Stalin—both as regards theory, ideology and tactics, and as regards placing our whole organizational work on a scientific footing—has developed still further the organizational principles of Lenin's doctrine of the Party, has supplemented the doctrine of the Party on organization by new precepts and new laws, and has advanced the Bolshevik science of organization, thus arming the Party and the



working class for the accomplishment of the historic task of building socialism in our country. (*Applause.*)

Here I would only like to stress the tremendous importance of the interval between the Seventeenth Congress and the Eighteenth Congress of the Party as regards the enrichment of the latter's organizational experience.

Comrade Stalin has given the Party brilliant examples of creative Marxism on the subject of the organizational structure of the Party. I refer to the doctrine of the interrelation between the political line and organizational work: regarding the scientific organization of the selection, training, promotion and allocation of cadres; regarding the Bolshevik organization of the work of keeping a check on the fulfilment of decisions; regarding the Party's methods of combating enemies who have penetrated its ranks, and its methods of purging its ranks of degenerates and double-dealers; and regarding vigilance and the mastering of Bolshevism.

On all these questions Comrade Stalin has armed the Party with wise and far-sighted precepts which constitute a most valuable contribution to the treasure-store of the Bolshevik theory of organization and a guide to action.

*Why it is necessary to amend the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.)?*

The Eighteenth Party Congress has met at a time when fundamental changes have taken place in the economic life and class structure of the U.S.S.R.

There is no need for me to dwell in detail on these questions as they have been treated with exhaustive fullness and clarity in the reports of Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov.\*

The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. has ensured the dominance of the socialist economic system. The class composition of the U.S.S.R. has changed in conformity with the profound changes in the economic sphere. All exploiting elements—capitalists, mer-

chants, kulaks and profiteers—have been eliminated in the period of socialist construction. The working people of the U.S.S.R.—the workers, peasants and intellectuals—have undergone profound change in the period of socialist construction.

The class boundaries dividing the working people are being obliterated; the economic and political contradictions between workers, peasants and intellectuals are disappearing—becoming obliterated. It is this that has formed the basis for the moral and political unity of Soviet society. This moral and political unity of Soviet society has been brilliantly confirmed in the creation and complete victory of the Communist and non-Party bloc in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics.

A numerous body of non-Party Bolsheviks has grown up around the Party, consisting of advanced workers, peasants and intellectuals, active and conscious fighters in the cause of the Party and vehicles of its policy among the masses.

In view of these fundamental changes in the economic and class structure of the U.S.S.R. the time is ripe to amend the conditions of admission to the Party laid down in the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

#### ABOLITION OF THE CATEGORIES OF ADMISSION TO THE PARTY

The existing system, as prescribed in the Party Rules, of admitting new members into the Party in accordance with four different categories, depending upon the social status of the applicant, is obviously incompatible with the changes in the class structure of Soviet society resulting from the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R. The need for different categories of admission of new members and of varying probationary periods has disappeared.

The different categories of admission, depending upon the social status of the applicants for Party membership, were established, as you know, at the Eleventh Party Congress, in 1922, at the beginning

\* For both these reports, see *From Socialism to Communism in the Soviet Union*, by Joseph Stalin, and *The Soviet Union in 1942*, by V. M. Molotov.

of the New Economic Policy, with the object of making it difficult for non-proletarian elements to enter our Party. The situation at that time was entirely different from what it is now. At that time the proletariat was in part declassified. The peasants farmed individually. The exploiting classes had not yet been fully abolished. The New Economic Policy was exercising a demoralizing influence on a section of the Party members, especially its non-proletarian elements. Under those conditions, if the Party was to exercise its role of vanguard with success, such a barrier to the penetration of unstable, petty-bourgeois elements into its ranks as the establishment of different categories of admission was essential. It played a big part in strengthening our Party and in helping it to perform its historic mission.

However, in view of the victory of socialism in our country, the need for these restrictions has disappeared. These restrictions are already hindering and hampering the reinforcement of the ranks of the Party with advanced workers, peasants and intellectuals devoted to the cause of the working class. The Party can no longer adhere to its old framework, to its old standards. The need for the different categories of admission has disappeared.

To what incongruities and anomalies the existing system of admission into the Party leads in practice may be illustrated by numerous examples to be found in any Party organization.

Our best Stakhanovites, once they become foremen or directors, that is, have been promoted to executive posts because of their abilities and services, find themselves, when applying to join the Party, in the position of second-rate people.

The worker, or son of a worker, who has received an education is classed in the fourth category when applying for admission to the Party.

Take, for example, Comrade Smetanin, one of the finest Stakhanovites in Leningrad, a former laster in the Skorokhod Shoe Factory and now Assistant Peo-

ple's Commissar of Light Industry of the U.S.S.R. As one of the finest Stakhanovites, he was promoted to shop superintendent, and as a shop superintendent he was admitted to the Party as a candidate member under the second category. Then, because of his service and capabilities, he was appointed director of the factory, and when, in February, 1939, the question arose of transferring him from candidate membership to full membership, he was obliged to enter the Party under the fourth category.

Here is a man who advances and develops, yet the conditions of his admission into the Party become more complex and difficult. Comrade Smetanin, and all comrades in his position, are perplexed why admission to the Party should be made more difficult as they advance. Comrade Smetanin protested, and quite rightly: "Did I become worse," he asked, "when I was promoted from worker to shop superintendent? Did I become worse when they made me director of the factory? Why should I now have to find a larger number of 'recommenders,' with a longer Party standing, than when I was an ordinary worker?"

Or take the case of Comrade Kartashev, who spoke here bringing greetings to the Congress from Leningrad. Not a bad worker, one would think, and it was not a bad speech he made. He came to the fore as a non-Party agitator during the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Comrade Kartashev is a fitter by trade; he was a Stakhanovite, and he has now been promoted along the lines of the Engineers and Technicians Organization. When he applied for membership in the Party he was admitted under the second category. What is the sense of this? One might think the Party has to "protect" itself from men like Kartashev.

Here is another example which was cited at a conference of the Stalin District of the Stalingrad Region. Comrade Mussin, a first-class worker, who was promoted to an executive post, went back to work in the shop in order to be ad-

mitted into the Party under the first category.

Such examples could be quoted by the thousand. They give rise to a legitimate feeling of perplexity and sense of injury in comrades whose only crime is that they have been promoted. All this shows that the existing requirements of admission are antiquated and have begun to act as a hindrance to really advanced workers, peasants and intellectuals joining the Party.

You know what the practice of admission under various categories led to: people began to rack their brains trying to decide under what category to class a mechanic, foreman, and so on. Regular "rate cards" were devised to show under what category various professions should be classed. But whichever way you turn, whatever "rate cards" you devise, one thing is clear—the requirements are antiquated, they have ceased to answer the purpose for which they were introduced. These requirements of the Rules are out-of-date; they are a cracked mold, as the foundrymen say. (*Laughter.*)

These antiquated requirements are clung to by retrograde people who are not anxious for the advancement of new and young forces.

The antiquated standards furnish a pretext for the cultivation of retrograde, essentially anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist tendencies with regard to the new, Soviet intelligentsia, with regard to foremost people of the working class and the peasantry; they furnish a pretext for the cultivation of an attitude of disdain towards advanced people who because of their education or services have been promoted to leading posts.

All this goes to show that a form which was once essential has now become antiquated, a form without content. A thing of value has been transformed into its own antithesis, into a defect. The organizational form should correspond with the content; and our content will proceed along the line of bringing the classes closer together and abolishing class distinctions.

Accordingly, the theses submitted to the Congress propose to amend the exist-

ing system of admission of new members to the Party under different categories and to establish uniform conditions of admission and a uniform period of probation, irrespective of whether the applicants belong to the working class, the peasantry or the intelligentsia.

The amendments to the conditions of admission proposed in the theses are a direct result of the victory of socialism.

The theses propose to establish a one-year probationary period as candidate members for all persons joining the Party. This period is quite sufficient to enable the candidate member to become thoroughly acquainted with the rules, program and tactics of the Party and to enable the Party organization to test the personal qualities of the candidate member.

It must not be forgotten that it is the foremost people, people who have been tested in various sectors of the fight for socialism, who are now joining our Party.

As you know, admission to the Party was at one time suspended. It was not resumed until November 1, 1936. It is the active body of people that grew up around the Party when admission to its ranks was suspended who constitute the principal source of the present influx of new members into the Party.

The existing system of probationary membership suffers from very serious defects. The most serious is that the work of many Party organizations in educating candidate members is absolutely unsatisfactory, the result being what is known as "eternal probationers," people who remain candidate members for six, seven or eight years, and more. (*Animation and laughter.*) Instead of the body of candidate members serving as a living reservoir from which the Party constantly draws fresh reinforcements, it has, in the case of many organizations, become a sort of "permanent reserve."

Latterly, just before the Congress, the Party organizations have shown some improvement in the matter of advancing candidate members to full membership. But even so, there are still quite a num-

ber of candidate members whose probationary period has lasted many years. And if we bear in mind that in the sympathizers' groups, too, there are people who have been waiting for years to be accepted as candidate members, the question arises, when will they be admitted into the Party? Some four years in the sympathizers' groups, another seven or eight years as candidate members—when will they become full-fledged members of the Party? (*Animation.*) There is no need to show that this obnoxious practice arises from that formal and bureaucratic attitude to people, to Party members, which the Party has condemned.

The purpose of the proposal to establish a one-year probation period is to put a stop to this obnoxious practice and to compel Party organizations to get busy, to improve educational and organizational work among candidate members and to make the probation period something more than a mere formality.

According to the theses, all persons wishing to join the Party must obtain recommendations from three Party members who have been in the Party for at least three years and who know the applicants from having worked together with them for not less than one year.

This proposal springs from what Comrade Lenin proposed in a note to Comrade Molotov on September 15, 1921, in which he said:

“Recommendations may be given only by those who have personally observed the work of the person recommended for a period of not less than one year from having worked with him in one or another Party organization.”

This proposal should increase the responsibility of the recommender for the person he recommends.

As to the number of recommenders and their period of membership, the formulation proposed in the theses has the object of enabling members who have joined the Party in the last few years to give recommendations. This proposal is undoubtedly timely and advisable.

The ranks of the Party have been re-inforced by active and advanced people who have received a solid political education. It would be wrong to deprive these new Party members of the right to give recommendations.

Comrades, the existing system of different categories in the matter of recommendations has, as you know, created unnecessary difficulties and excessive obstacles.

You know that it is no easy matter to obtain recommendations, especially in the case of persons who join the Party under the fourth category. A man sometimes wears himself out trying to find the requisite number of recommendations. (*Animation.*)

The new system with regard to recommendations proposed in the theses would remove these restrictive and unnecessary obstacles.

The new conditions of admission into the Party provide that district committees, or city committees in towns with no district divisions, are to be the final instance to confirm the decision of a primary Party organization to admit a new member. This will place a great responsibility on our district committees and city committees for the selection and admission into the Party of really the best members among the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the intelligentsia.

The new system will facilitate the selection of the best people for the Party; it will facilitate the creation of full-blooded Party organizations, especially in the rural localities, where the number of Party organizations is particularly inadequate. There are no primary Party organizations in a large number of collective farms. The formation of strong Party organizations in the rural localities will be of great value in improving Party work in the collective farms and state farms.

#### RIGHTS OF PARTY MEMBERS

The next proposal for the amendment of the Rules is to add to the section on Party members and their duties a clause

on the rights of Party members, rights which are taken for granted but are not mentioned in the Rules.

The theses provide that the Rules should specify the following rights of Party members:

A. The right of Party members to criticize any Party worker at Party meetings;

B. The right of Party members to elect and be elected to Party organs;

C. The right of Party members to demand to be present on all occasions when decisions are adopted regarding their activities or conduct;

D. The right of Party members to address any question or statement to any Party body up to and including the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

The inclusion in the Rules of these additions regarding the rights of Party members will have a tremendous effect in increasing the activity of Party members, in heightening the responsibility of Party members for the cause of the Party, and in protecting Party members from bureaucracy.

Experience has shown that in practice the rights of Party members are often violated. There have been frequent cases of bureaucratic and hostile elements hounding and persecuting members for criticism and self-criticism. There have been frequent cases of decisions concerning the activities or conduct of Party members being adopted in their absence.

We know of quite a number of cases of hostile and bureaucratic elements forbidding Party members to address certain given statements to the higher Party bodies. Hostile elements widely cultivated the practice of setting official discipline up against and higher than Party discipline, thus demoralizing honest Party members.

The theses proceed from the premise that there is no higher discipline than Party discipline.

There have also been cases of infringement of the rights of Party members to elect and be elected.

You all remember the explanation given by the Central Committee prior to the elections of Party bodies last year

in correction of the false practice of not allowing comrades who had already been transferred from candidate membership to full membership, but had not yet received their Party cards, to take part in the election of Party bodies.

In order to illustrate the infringements of the rights of Party members that have taken place in practice, I will cite a few examples.

Comrade Sedenkov is employed in the Barricade Works in Stalingrad; he has been a member of the C.P.S.U.(B.) since 1924, and has been a worker for twenty-eight years. He repeatedly pointed to defects in the work of his shop, but the shop management and the social organization would not listen to him. Comrade Sedenkov then decided to send a statement to the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) describing certain shortcomings in the work of his shop. He handed this statement to the secretary of the shop Party organization to be transmitted to the Central Committee. Instead of complying with the request of the Party member and transmitting the letter, the bureau of the shop nucleus preferred to discuss Comrade Sedenkov's "offense" and compelled him to admit that he had made a mistake in writing to the Central Committee and to promise not to commit such "mistakes" in the future. And so the letter was never sent to the Central Committee. During the verification of Party records this incident was recalled and the Party organization of the works expelled Comrade Sedenkov from the Party for "instability." (*Animation.*)

On January 9, 1936, the Stalingrad Regional Committee endorsed the expulsion of Comrade Sedenkov. He had been so intimidated by the local Party organizations that when appealing to the Party Control Commission in 1937 he again wrote repenting his "mistakes"—so "convincing" had been the influence brought to bear on him. The Party Collegium of the Party Control Commission reinstated Comrade Sedenkov in the Party.

There was a similar case with regard to Comrade Tolstikov, director of the

Ikoretsk Machine and Tractor Station, Liskinsk District, Voronezh Region. Comrade Tolstikov sent a letter to Comrades Stalin and Molotov complaining that he was being unjustly persecuted by the secretaries of his district committee, who were themselves guilty of distortions of policy with regard to grain deliveries.

An investigation made on the spot by representatives of the Party Control Commission fully confirmed Comrade Tolstikov's statement, and the secretaries of the district committee were exposed as enemies of the people. But even after they were arrested, the district committee continued to persecute Comrade Tolstikov and secured his expulsion from the Party and even his arrest.

He lodged numerous complaints with the Voronezh Regional Committee of the Party, but they received no attention for three months, despite repeated reminders from the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). Only when the Party Control Commission again intervened, in August, 1938, was Comrade Tolstikov fully rehabilitated and penalties imposed on those guilty of persecution and tyranny.

There are frequent violations of the right of Party members to be present on all occasions when their activities or conduct are being examined. Unfortunately, expulsions of members in their absence are no rare thing in many Party organizations.

Mention of the rights of Party members in the Rules will also be of great value in respect to the observance of one of the most important precepts of Leninism, namely, that we must not only teach the masses, but learn from the masses.

At the plenum of the Central Committee held in February-March, 1937, Comrade Stalin said:

"... our experience alone, the experience of leaders, is insufficient to give correct leadership; that, consequently, it is necessary that one's experience, the experience of leaders, be supplemented by the experience of the masses, by the experience of the rank-and-file Party mem-

bers, by the experience of the working class, by the experience of the people."\*

This means that we must not weaken, still less sever, our connections with the masses even for a single minute.

Hence the necessity for a special clause in the Rules on the right of Party members to address any question or statement to any Party body, up to and including the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). State and Party questions of major importance, facts of exclusive value in the disclosure of abnormalities in Party or Soviet organizations, frequently come to light just as the result of statements made by "little people."

It has been repeatedly pointed out by Lenin and Stalin that a bureaucrat with a Party card in his pocket is the most dangerous and pernicious kind of bureaucrat, because, possessing a Party card, he imagines that he may ignore Party and Soviet laws and the needs and interests of the working people.

By inscribing the rights of Party members in the Rules we shall place in the hands of the Party a powerful weapon for combating swell-headedness, bureaucratic self-importance and conceit, and for improving the contacts between leaders and led, and, consequently, for improving the whole work of the Party and the state.

#### ABOLITION OF MASS PURGES

The theses further propose to abolish mass Party purges. Experience has shown that they now can be, and should be, dispensed with, for the following reasons:

The method of the mass purge, which was introduced at the beginning of the New Economic Policy, when capitalist elements had received a new spurt of life, in order to guard the ranks of the Party from people who had been demoralized owing to the New Economic Policy, has lost its purpose under present conditions when capitalist elements have been eliminated.

\* Joseph Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism*, p. 55. Workers Library Publishers, New York.

The point must be stressed that mass purges have played a tremendous part in strengthening the Party. If our Party now represents a far more organized force than ever before, if the Party has increased its strength by purifying its ranks of every kind of dross, this is to a large extent due to the mass purges.

However, now that the capitalist elements have been eliminated, now that Bolshevik order has been introduced in Party affairs, now that the Party has already rid itself of unreliable and dubious elements, the method of a mass purge obviously no longer conforms to the new conditions and no longer achieves its purpose.

The Party can apply the ordinary procedure to rid its ranks of people who violate its program and rules.

The objectionable feature of the mass purges is that, bearing as they do the character of a campaign, they are attended by many mistakes, primarily by the infringement of the Leninist principle of an individual approach to people.

By establishing a definite standard and measuring everybody by one criterion, the method of the mass purge encourages a formal approach and does not permit the full observance of the Party principle that Party members, people, must be treated with careful attention, and in practice it often leads to the infringement of the rights of Party members.

The result of this was that during mass purges there were numerous cases of unwarranted expulsion from the Party, and of hostile elements who had wormed their way into the Party taking advantage of the purges to persecute and ruin honest people.

Hence, now that the Party has done so much to purify its ranks, there is no necessity for the method of the mass purge. This is shown by the fact that by far the most important work of purifying the ranks of the Party of enemies of the people, traitors, treason-mongers and fascist agents was performed after the mass purges. And there is good reason for this. The new methods of subversive activities practised by hostile elements who had insinuated themselves

into the ranks of the Party were double-dealing, masking their subversive activities by an external show of agreement with the line of the Party, feigning a readiness to fight in support of its decisions. We know that the hostile elements made wide use of noisy displays, sham activity, toadying, creating an atmosphere of flattery, pompous speeches, greetings and so on, in order to deceive and lull the vigilance of certain of our leaders.

Consequently, the method of the mass purge was of very little effect and did not achieve its purpose with regard to hostile elements who had wormed their way into the Party and who masked their true character by double-dealing and deceiving the Party.

It was found that the method of the mass purge was chiefly turned against the so-called passive Party members and led to the expulsion of honest and conscientious members on the alleged grounds of passivity.

During the purge of 1933 the largest group of persons expelled from the Party comprised the so-called passive elements. It was in respect to them that most mistakes were committed by the Party organizations. It frequently happened that honest and devoted people, exemplary workers in their factories, were classed among the passive elements. Under this category were comrades who did not have some trifling and futile assignment of duty, who were tied by large families, or who several times missed attending a study circle, or who failed to answer some brainracking or pigheaded question at a political examination.

There is no need to cite instances of unwarranted expulsions on the ground of passivity. Plenty of them can be found in any organization.

Hence, with the consolidation of the Party, the need for mass purges has disappeared.

At the Plenum of the Central Committee of February-March, 1937, and the Plenum of January, 1938, the Party condemned the formal and heartlessly bureaucratic attitude to the fate of Party members, to the question of expulsion

from the Party and reinstatement in the Party. As we know, this was a practice which was made wide use of by careerist elements who had made their way into the Party and who tried to distinguish and advance themselves by expelling people from its ranks, as well as by masked enemies within the Party who endeavored, by the wholesale infliction of penalties, to ruin honest Party members and to sow unnecessary suspicion in the Party ranks. Changing his tactics, the enemy fastened on the question of vigilance and made capital out of it, endeavoring under a mask of hypocritical talk about vigilance to victimize as many honest Communists as possible with the object of fostering mutual distrust and disorganizing our ranks.

The slandering of honest people under the guise of "vigilance" is at the present time the most widespread method used to mask and screen hostile activities. If you want to discover still unexposed enemy wasps' nests look for them above all among the slanderers.

The Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in January, 1938, adopted a number of measures to put a stop to the practice of wholesale expulsions from the Party and really to ensure a differentiated approach in deciding whether members should be expelled or expelled members reinstated.

The Central Committee based itself on the well-known precept laid down by Comrade Stalin at the Plenum of the Central Committee in February-March, 1937:

"... some of our Party leaders suffer from lack of attention to people, to Party members, to workers. Furthermore, they do not study the Party members, do not know what is close to their hearts, and how they are growing, do not know workers in general. They have, therefore, not an individual approach to Party members, to Party workers. And just because they have not an individual approach when appraising Party members and Party workers, they usually act at random, either praising them wholesale, without measure, or crushing them, also wholesale, and without meas-

ure, expelling thousands and tens of thousands from the Party.

"Such leaders try, in general, to think in tens of thousands, not to worry about 'units,' about individual Party members, about their fate. They think it a mere bagatelle to expel thousands and tens of thousands of people from the Party, comforting themselves by the fact that our Party is 2,000,000 strong, and that tens of thousands of people expelled cannot change anything in the position of the Party.

"But, only people who in essence are profoundly anti-Party can have such an approach to members of the Party.

"As the result of such a heartless attitude toward people, toward Party members and Party workers, discontent and bitterness are artificially created in a section of the Party, while the Trotskyite double-dealers adroitly seize hold of such embittered comrades and skillfully drag them after themselves into the morass of Trotskyite wrecking."\*

Comrades, you have undoubtedly noticed that in the discussion of the theses on amendments to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.) by no means the least attention was paid to the question of measures to prevent the vilification of honest Party members. The Central Committee and *Pravda* have also received a large number of letters on this subject.

I will cite a few examples of hostile activities under the flag of "vigilance."

A certain Kalyakaikin was secretary of the district Party committee of Isinsk, Tambov Region. Out of a total of one hundred and seventy-five members of the Party organization, he managed in a short period to have fifty-eight expelled. Kalyakaikin acted as follows: when he had somebody expelled he at once raised the question of calling to account before the Party all Communists who had had any relations whatever with the expelled person. He operated on a sort of "belt" system. For example, Kalyakaikin had a certain Nazarov expelled from the Party. Nazarov was later arrested at the demand of the district committee. He was under remand for about seven months

\* *Ibid.*, pp. 60-61.



and was then released by the investigating authorities because the charges brought against him were not proved. But while Nazarov was in custody, his wife and seven other Communists were expelled from the Party for having had connections with him; furthermore, twenty-eight Young Communist Leaguers were expelled from the League and ten teachers, not members of the Party, were dismissed from their posts. In the end, as was to be expected, Kalyakaikin was exposed as an enemy of the people, expelled from the Party and arrested.

In the Archangel Party organization, for example, there was exposed a malicious slanderer by the name of Priluchny, who had filed statements against one hundred and forty-two Communists, not a single one of which was substantiated.

In Leningrad, an anti-Party group headed by one Napolskaya was active for a long time; this group zealously fabricated compromising material against honest Communists, sent in statements about them to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs and tried to cause the ruin of honest people. This group calumniated scores of honest people.

Gladkikh, former secretary of the district committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in Rodvino, Archangel Region, instructed every Communist to discover an enemy of the people, and announced in advance that "there will be no distortion of policy here."

Peskovska, an enemy of the people in the Kluchi district, Aktyubinsk Region, brought about the expulsion from the Party of one hundred and fifty-six Communists, or 64 per cent of the membership of the organization. In the Progress Collective Farm, in this same district, the whole Party organization, consisting of thirteen members, was expelled.

The enemies directed their main efforts to ruining honest Bolshevik cadres. Kudryavtsev, an enemy of the people, who before his exposure held an important post in one of the Ukrainian Party organizations, stated in his testimony as follows:

"We endeavored to expel as many people from the Party as possible. We expelled people when there were no grounds for expulsion. We had one aim in view—to increase the number of embittered people and thus increase the number of our allies."

It was also part of the plan of subversive activities of the enemies of the people to destroy the Party apparatus. Here is the testimony of another enemy of the people who had wormed his way by deceit into one of the regional Party committees in the Ukraine.

"In the course of five or six days I dispersed the apparatus of the regional committee, dismissed nearly every one of the departmental managers of the committee, discharged twelve or fifteen instructors and also took on a new office staff.

"I did all this on the pretense of combating enemies and purging the Regional Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (B.) of people who had lost vigilance. Having 'purged' the apparatus of the regional committee, I proceeded to disperse the city committees and district committees on the same pretext. In a very short time I dismissed fifteen secretaries and a large number of other functionaries against whom I had no compromising material whatever. I made a pretense of combating enemies, thus incensing against the Party a number of Communists who had been dismissed by me without any good reason. In addition, I demoted a number of members of our counter-revolutionary organization to lower posts, thus saving them from detection."

In some organizations the slanderers lost all sense of restraint and simply put their feet on the table.

For example, a slanderer by the name of Khanevsky was exposed in one of the districts of the Kiev Region. Not a single one of the numerous charges brought by Khanevsky against Communists was substantiated. Nevertheless, this calumniator was not in the least perturbed, and in one of his denunciatory epistles to the regional committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party (B.) he inserted the following request: "I have worn myself

out fighting the enemies, and therefore request to be sent to a health resort to rest up." (*Loud laughter.*)

In line with this was the statement made by one Nefedov, secretary of the Party committee of the Regional Land Department, at a meeting of the active members of Irkutsk. He divides Party members into three groups. "The first type is the fellow who shows a lot of activity; that means he is worth checking up; you may be certain the trail will lead to the enemy. The second type is the fellow with a 'past,' the fellow with a load on his mind. He's bound to lag—the load will tell; keep an eye on him, check up on him; this trail will also most likely lead to the enemy. And the third type is the man who works because he's got to; there too you can't go wrong—he's an enemy." (*Loud laughter.*)

A regular "theory," you see.

The "activities" of some of the slanderers became so extensive that they found it necessary to introduce a certain amount of "rationalization."

There is the case of Alexeyev, for example, a member of the Party since 1925, manager of the district Party consultation center of Irbeiskoye, Krasnoyarsk Territory. He was not much of a worker; he spent all his time writing calumnies against honest Communists and non-Party teachers. His "business" was so big that he made a list for himself with several columns: "big enemy"; "little enemy"; "wee enemy"; "tiny enemy." (*Loud laughter.*) It need hardly be said that he created an absolutely intolerable situation in the district. In the end, he was expelled from the Party as a slanderer.

This Alexeyev made me wonder where I had read of such a type, and I at last recalled Sobakevich in Gogol's *Dead Souls*. Sobakevich, you know, considered everybody a thief and swindler. When Chichikov admitted to him that the man he liked most in the provincial town was the chief of police, because of his bluntness and simplicity, Sobakevich nonchalantly remarked:

"A rascal! He'll cheat you, give you

away, and then go and dine with you! I know them all: they are all scoundrels, every one of them. A pack of thorough-going rascals from top to bottom. All Judases. There's only one decent fellow among them, that's the public prosecutor. But if the truth be told, he is a swine too." (*Laughter.*)

Apparently, some of Sobakevich's great-great-grandchildren are alive to this day, and have even managed here and there to get into the Party. We must get an iron broom and sweep our Party house clean of this garbage. (*Loud applause.*)

The refusal to be worried about human beings, the reluctance to investigate the charges brought against a man on their merits, is a malady which still ails a good many leaders of our Party organizations. There are still quite a number of people in our organizations who like to insure themselves and be on the safe side.

Expulsions from the Party on the grounds of "connections" with enemies at one time assumed very large proportions, and are still to be met with.

On these grounds honest people were expelled from the Party wholesale, their only fault being that they were brought into contact with enemies of the people by their work—"passed them on the street," so to speak.

This fashionable formula—"connections with enemies of the people"—was made wide use of by anti-Party elements to cause the ruin of honest Communists. It was employed in such a broad and vague sense as to include all sorts of things—ordinary acquaintanceship, contact with enemies at work owing to official duties, actual connections with enemies, and participation in counter-revolutionary activities—without any gradation whatever, all covered by one general formula.

A great many mistakes were made, and are still being made on these grounds.

Because of such wholesale condemnations on purely formal grounds, real out-and-out enemies of the people, first-class scoundrels, managed to escape justice.

Slanderers are active wherever they are assisted by self-insurers.

Here is an example of self-insurance of this kind. The manager and chief engineer of one of the collieries of the Sverdlovsk Coal Trust gave one of the section chiefs the following character:

"Knows his job. Chronic drinker. Quite capable of drinking with his subordinates. Has recently been fulfilling his program of output. Good organizer. Runs his section well. Does not like big jobs. Thorough conservative and opportunist with regard to output. Tries to get as light a program as possible, to work as little as he can and to earn as much as he can." (*Laughter.*)

Certain Party members have resorted to the aid of medical institutions in the effort to insure themselves. Here is a medical certificate issued to one of these citizens:

"Owing to his state of health and mind Comrade So-and-so is not fit to be used as a tool by any class enemy.

"District Psychiatrist,

"October District, City of Kiev (signature)." (*Loud laughter.*)

A sort of "biological" approach to people, to Party members, has become quite a widespread practice. This is a theory by which Communists are judged not by their own deeds, but by the deeds of their relatives, near and distant. An unsound ideology or social preferences in some great-grandmother may spoil the careers of many generations of her descendants. (*Laughter.*)

Such an attitude is absolutely alien to Marxism. We must proceed from the principle repeatedly enunciated and stressed by Comrade Stalin, namely, that the son is not answerable for his father, and that a Party member must be judged by *his own* deeds. Unfortunately, it is a widespread practice among us to judge the business and political character of a man not by his own work, but by the character of his relatives and ancestors, near and distant.

It must not be thought that the upholders of this "theory" come out into the open. Nevertheless, they steadily

work away on the quiet and judge people not by their deeds but by their genealogy.

This "biological" approach must be put a stop to. (*Loud applause.*)

There is quite a breed of people in our ranks whom I would call pseudo-moralists. They see only the bad sides of a Party member and refuse to consider and assess his whole life's career, to learn his merits and demerits. These people regard a man as something set and fixed for all time, as a lifeless and unchangeable pattern.

These people are great inventors of shibboleths and schemes which they apply to individuals to judge whether they are good or bad, whether they fit into the scheme or not. (*Laughter.*)

These people forget that our whole work of building socialism, our whole educational work, is designed to remold the minds of men. That is what our Party exists for, that is why we strove for and achieved the victory of socialism, that is why we are undertaking the tasks of communist development—to remold people, their ego. If there are some who think that remolding the minds of men does not apply to Party members, that Communists are born free of all prejudices and absolutely require no re-education, this is nothing but an idealistic and schematic view of people. This way of judging people abstractly, in accordance with a ready-made standard, instead of studying them in all their connections and manifestations, condemns one to passivity, to a pessimistic view of people. This pessimistic view looks back on the past. This way of judging people has nothing in common with Bolshevism. Its method is profoundly hostile to Bolshevism.

It seems to me that all this is a Menshevik backsliding, a peculiar form of opportunism in relation to living people, which does not try to lead people forward, to correct their defects and to re-educate them, but exaggerates, over-emphasizes their defects and does not perceive the valuable qualities in people which should be developed and encouraged in every way. If you scratch these pseudo-moralists, you will find plenty of

hypocrites and humbugs among them. You'll never cook your porridge with a lot of gravediggers like this. (*Loud applause.*)

At the same time, we must stop the practice of half-hearted rehabilitation of reinstated members. There is a fairly widespread type of Party official who to insure himself, to be on the safe side, "not to run any risks," leaves a tag or taglet attached to a rehabilitated Party member or candidate member: if a man has been expelled, and they then have to reinstate him, they give him a reprimand, though nobody knows why; if he had a reprimand, they put an admonishment in his record—for no reason at all, just as a reminder. (*Laughter.*)

A definite stop must be put to this practice of half-hearted rehabilitation. If a man deserves to be fully rehabilitated, all penalties should be expunged from his record.

These facts make it clear that the decision of the January Plenum of the Central Committee which spoke of the necessity of completely eradicating masked enemies who have wormed their way into our ranks and who strive to conceal their hostility to the Party under a disguise of hypocritical talk about vigilance, is not yet being carried out by some of the organizations with sufficient vigor.

The method of an individual approach to Party members has not yet been fully restored. Wholesale and unwarranted expulsions from the Party are still practised.

The decision of the January Plenum of the Central Committee was designed to create the maximum guarantees in combatting unwarranted expulsions, to restore completely the method of individual approach, to ensure the utmost care in matters concerning the fate of Party members.

In view of the extreme importance of this question, the Rules should be supplemented by a number of clauses to ensure an attentive approach and careful investigation of accusations brought against Party members, to protect the rights of Party members from all ar-

bitrary procedure and to abolish the resort to expulsion from the Party—which is the supreme Party penalty—for trifling misdemeanors.

We must recall what Comrade Stalin said:

"The Party has become a big and serious thing to Party members, and joining the Party or being expelled from the Party is a crucial event in a man's life.

"Whether he remains in the Party or is expelled from the Party is a matter of life and death to the ordinary Party member."

Comrade Stalin says in another place that the supreme Party penalty is expulsion from its ranks, just as the supreme penalty in the army is shooting (See Stalin, *On the Opposition.*)

The decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of February-March, 1937, and of the Plenum of the Central Committee of January, 1938, on the subject of expulsion from the Party resolve themselves to this, that *expulsions from the Party must be reduced to a minimum.* If expulsion from the Party is equivalent to the supreme penalty in the army, that is, shooting, it cannot be imposed right and left.

We must restore to their full use the measures of Party punishment laid down in the Party Rules for various offenses. You cannot judge all offenses in the same way, without discriminating between grave and unimportant. Expulsions from the Party at one time became a sort of small change in many Party organizations, while such measures of Party punishment as caution, rebuke, admonition, reprimand, strict reprimand, and final warning—all that fairly flexible scale of measures of Party influence provided for in our Rules and corresponding to various kinds and degrees of Party offenses, were forgotten.

The measures of Party education and influence laid down in the Rules must be restored to their full use.

A few words must be said on the subject of old penalties which have been withdrawn. Much has been said about this subject too at Party meetings, be-

fore the Congress. If a man has reformed and the penalty inflicted on him has been withdrawn, there is no need to be constantly recalling it, to exact revenge for old mistakes which have been corrected, to exercise moral repression on the Party member.

There are many cases like the following: a man may have committed an offense ten years ago and received a penalty; then he mends his ways and the penalty is withdrawn. Nevertheless, this penalty is unfailingly brought up every time the man comes under discussion. This does a lot of harm, from the standpoint, for example, of the right to be elected to Party bodies. We know that when candidates are discussed in elections to Party bodies, the nomination of such comrades is often rejected. That is wrong: if a man has mended his ways, why should he go about with a stain on his character all his life? It is wrong to avenge old faults. ("*Hear, hear!*")

#### MASTERING OR ACCEPTING THE PARTY PROGRAM

The theses point to the necessity of abolishing the demand contained in the Rules that new members, on joining the Party, in addition to *accepting* the program and rules of the Party and going through a specified probationary period as candidate members, must also have *mastered* the program.

In his report at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in February-March, 1937, Comrade Stalin said:

"To master the Party program one needs to be a real Marxist, a tested and theoretically trained Marxist. I do not know whether many Party members will be found by us in the Party who have already mastered our program, have become genuine Marxists, theoretically trained and tried. If we were to go further along this path, we should have to leave only intellectuals and learned people in general in the Party. Who wants such a Party? We have the Leninist formula about Party membership which is verified, has stood all tests. According to this formula, a Party member is one who *accepts* the Party program, pays

membership dues and works in one of its organizations.

"Note that Lenin's formula does not speak about *mastering* the program, but of *accepting the program*. These are two entirely different things. There is no need to prove Lenin was right here and not our Party comrades who chattered loudly about mastering the program. It is obvious by itself. If the Party took the standpoint that Party members can be only those comrades who have already mastered the program and have become theoretically trained Marxists, it would not have formed thousands of Party circles in the Party, hundreds of Party schools where the Party members are taught Marxism and are helped to master our program. It is quite clear that if the Party organizes schools and circles among the Party members, it is because it knows that the Party members have not yet succeeded in mastering the Party program, have not yet succeeded in becoming theoretically trained Marxists." \*

Mastery of the program implies the ability to explain its underlying principles. Accepting the program means subscribing to its principles, agreeing with it and being ready to defend it. It is clear that by demanding that candidates for membership should *master* the program, that is, should be able to *explain its underlying principles*, we frighten people away from the Party. There is no theoretical justification for such a demand, and in practice it has led to an incorrect attitude towards applicants for membership. Many candidate members have hesitated to apply for full membership of the Party from fear of being subjected to a political examination and, what is more, often by ignorant people. This unwarranted demand has in practice led to violations of the fundamental principles of the Party and created a vagueness and uncertainty about the status of many Party members.

Of course, comrades, this does not mean that a candidate member is forbidden to master the program during his probationary period. What we are talking about is whether there should be

\* *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

such a demand *in the Rules*. It is quite clear that by demanding that a candidate member shall have mastered the program we frighten people away from the Party.

Acceptance of the program and rules of the Party, payment of membership dues, and work in one of the Party organizations—that is what the Rules demand of a Party member. The tried and tested Leninist-Stalinist definition of a Party member stands in no need of improvement. That is why the demand in the present Party Rules about *mastering* the program should be abolished.

#### INNER-PARTY DEMOCRACY

Comrades, the turn in the political life of the country brought about by the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. faced the Party with new tasks. This turn meant the complete democratization of the electoral system, the substitution of universal suffrage for restricted suffrage, equal suffrage for not entirely equal suffrage, direct elections for indirect elections, and secret ballot for open ballot.

The new electoral system was bound to result, and actually did result, in an enhancement of the political activity of the people, in greater control by the masses over the organs of Soviet power, and in the increased responsibility of the organs of Soviet power to the people.

In order to be fully prepared for this turn in the political life of the country, the Party had to be its moving spirit, and the leading role of the Party in the forthcoming elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics had to be fully ensured. But this could be done only if the Party organizations themselves became thoroughly democratic in their everyday work, only if they fully observed the principles of democratic centralism in their inner-Party life, as the Party Rules demand, only if all the organs of the Party were elected, only if criticism and self-criticism in the Party developed to the full, only if the responsibility of the Party bodies to the members of the Party were complete,

and if the members of the Party themselves became thoroughly active.

At the February-March Plenum of the Central Committee it was established that quite a number of Party organizations were systematically violating the Party Rules and the principles of democratic centralism in their everyday work, substituting co-option for election, voting by lists for voting for individual candidates, and so forth. It was therefore first of all necessary to put a stop to the anti-democratic practices of Party organizations and to reorganize Party work on the broad lines of inner-Party democracy.

What is the essence of Bolshevik inner-Party democracy? The essence of Bolshevik inner-Party democracy, as Comrade Stalin has repeatedly told us, resolves itself to the independent initiative, the active participation of Party members in the work of Party leadership. "Inner-Party democracy means heightening the activity of the Party membership and strengthening the unity of the Party, strengthening conscious proletarian discipline within the Party"—so Comrade Stalin teaches us.

It was with this purpose in view that the Party put an end to the violations of the principles of democratic centralism which formerly prevailed in the Party, and re-established the system of electing the leading bodies of Party organizations, as laid down in the Party Rules.

The Party adopted a number of additional measures to ensure the observance of consistent democracy: it abolished the practice of co-option; it forbade voting by lists in elections of Party bodies and introduced voting for individual candidates; it ensured for all Party members the unlimited right to challenge candidates and criticize them; it introduced the secret ballot in the election of Party bodies; and it made the periodical summoning of city meetings of the Party *active*, and, in large cities, of district meetings of the Party *active*, a compulsory rule.

The Rules should reflect these new measures of the Party, for they have

been tested in practice and ensure the further development of criticism and self-criticism, increased responsibility of Party bodies to the Party membership, and greater activity of the Party membership, and have thus helped to arm the Party for the successful performance of the new tasks of political leadership.

We know that in the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republics, the Party achieved a complete victory for the Communist and non-Party bloc just because Party work was reorganized on the principles of inner-Party democracy.

The consistent application of democratic principles has had a fruitful influence on the whole life of the Party organizations. The increased activity and knowledge of Party members and their heightened sense of responsibility for the cause of the Party were epitomized in the pre-Congress discussion and in the results of the elections to Party bodies, which demonstrated that Party democracy is in full flower. (*Applause.*) This has stimulated immense new strata of Party members to take an active share in Party life.

During the elections of Party bodies in 1938 criticism of the work of poorly functioning Party bodies assumed wide proportions. This criticism revealed the unsatisfactory state of the work of a large number of committees and organizers of primary Party organizations, of district committees, city committees, regional committees and territorial committees.

Many new people were elected to leading Party bodies in the 1938 elections, a large number of them for the first time. This is the younger generation. In all, 35 per cent of the members of committees of primary Party organizations, 41 per cent of the members of district committees, 46 per cent of the members of city committees, and 60 per cent of the members of regional committees, territorial committees and Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the national republics were elected for the first time.

Reports received from local Party organizations show that over two million members and candidate members attended the discussion at Party meetings of the theses for the Eighteenth Party Congress. About one million comrades took part in the discussions at these meetings. (*Applause.*)

Comrades, our Party has never known a discussion like the one that preceded the Eighteenth Congress. It was marked by unprecedented solidarity and unity of our Party, and an exceptional growth in the activity of Party members.

Everybody who took part in the discussion made some amendment or suggestion to help the Party and to strengthen the common Party cause.

The results of the discussion bear out that inner-Party democracy is in full flower, that there is an unprecedented increase of activity and initiative among Party members.

The work performed by the Party on the basis of the well-known decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee of February-March, 1937, and of the recommendations made to the Party by Comrade Stalin at this Plenum, has borne valuable fruit. Every member feels that his contact with the Party and its work has grown stronger; every Party member has come to feel his full value as one who is bound up with the general body of the Party and responsible for the common entity. This is a most important and valuable result of the development of inner-Party democracy.

And, secondly, what is no less important and what we must note as a result of the development of the Party in the last few years, is that new relations have taken root between the leaders and the masses; the confidence of the masses in the leaders has increased tremendously, and so have their mutual contact and closeness. The masses have become accustomed to regard the leaders as their emissaries, their own kith and kin, who at the same time are responsible to the Party, to the masses, to the people. That is the second highly valuable result of the work of the Party during the past few years. (*Loud applause.*)

The *conclusion* to be drawn is that the new methods of political work of the Party, based on the consistent application of the principles of Bolshevik inner-Party democracy, have increased the strength of our Party. The Party is on the way to the complete activation of its membership, and that is an important condition for the performance of the Party as a whole and by each Communist in particular of their vanguard role among the masses, and, consequently, for further victories of socialist construction.

The Party will continue to develop and ensure inner-Party democracy as a means of increasing the activity and initiative of Party members and of cleansing the ranks of the Party of inimical dross and scum. (*Prolonged applause.*)

SELECTION OF CADRES. CHECKING THE FULFILMENT OF DECISIONS. PROMOTION OF NEW PARTY WORKERS

I shall now deal with the reorganization of the Party apparatus, the selection of cadres and the check on the fulfilment of decisions.

In his report to this Congress, Comrade Stalin gave an exhaustive definition of the importance of cadres and of their proper selection:

"The proper selection of cadres means:

"First, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the Party and the state, treasuring them, respecting them.

"Second, knowing cadres, carefully studying their individual merits and shortcomings, knowing in what post the capacities of a given worker are most likely to develop.

"Third, carefully fostering cadres, helping every promising worker to advance, not grudging time on patiently 'bothering' with such workers and accelerating their development.

"Fourth, boldly promoting new and young cadres in time, so as not to allow them to stagnate in their old posts and grow stale.

"Fifth, allocating workers to posts in such a way that each feels he is in the right place, that each may contribute to our common cause the maximum his personal capacities enable him to con-

tribute, and that the general trend of the work of allocating cadres may fully answer to the demands of the political line for the carrying out of which this allocation of cadres is designed."\*

Comrade Stalin further indicated what is the task of the Party now with regard to the proper selection of cadres:

"Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres, from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level.

"This entails putting an end to the division of the work of studying, promoting and selecting cadres among various departments and sectors, and concentrating it in one body.

"This body should be the Cadres Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and a corresponding cadres department in each of the republican territorial and regional Party organizations."\*\*

From this point of view the existing organization of the Party apparatus has proven adequate.

In accordance with the Party Rules, industrial-branch departments were set up in the regional committees, territorial committees, Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the national republics and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) to perform the practical work involved in carrying out Party resolutions and decisions and to keep a check on the way they are fulfilled by Soviet bodies, business organizations and the lower Party organizations. The idea was to concentrate in each industrial-branch department all the work relating to the given branch, namely, Party organizational work, training and allocation of cadres, mass educational work, industrial propaganda, and supervision of the way Party decisions are fulfilled by the appropriate Soviet and business organs and Party organizations.

The defect of the existing organiza-

\* Joseph Stalin, *From Socialism to Communism in the Soviet Union*, pp. 43-44. International Publishers, New York.

\*\* *Ibid.*, p. 45.



tion was that the selection of cadres, which should be directed from one center—for the selection of cadres necessitates the concentration of the entire experience and knowledge of cadres in one place, that being the art of Bolshevik leadership—was divided up among numerous industrial-branch departments. This resulted in an incorrect utilization of cadres, the absence of uniform methods of studying cadres, and, consequently, in serious defects in the selection of people. The division of the work of selecting cadres among different industrial-branch departments also resulted in artificially pigeonholing cadres under separate departments, whereas the proper selection of cadres demands skilful and flexible maneuvering.

Comrades, many of you know from experience how divided and split up the work of selecting cadres is. The regional committees and territorial committees have their industrial departments, Soviet and trading departments, educational and cultural departments, and so forth. These departments fight and contend among themselves for people. This militates against the proper study, selection and promotion of cadres.

This functional division of the work of selecting cadres makes it impossible to utilize people properly in accordance with their capacities and the demands of the work.

Experience has taught us that such an organization of the Party apparatus does not answer our requirements.

It is this that makes it necessary to create a strong cadre apparatus of the Central Committee—the Cadres Administration—which would be able properly and scientifically, as Comrade Stalin puts it, to perform the job of selecting and allocating cadres, the work of Party organizational leadership being assigned to a special Organization and Instruction Department.

The Central Committee has already adopted certain measures in the last year or two with the object of more and more centralizing in the present Leading Party Organs Department of the Central Committee the work of selecting

and promoting leading cadres not only for Party bodies but also for Soviet and business organizations and all People's Commissariats.

This reconstruction of the work of selecting, studying and allocating cadres must be carried out in the spirit of the directions given by Comrade Stalin in his report on the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) at the Eighteenth Party Congress.

I should like, further, to dwell on one more amendment to the Rules submitted by the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Party Congress. I refer to the proposal to reduce the length of Party membership required of comrades nominated to leading Party posts, such as secretaries of regional committees, city committees, district committees, etc. The Central Committee proposes to amend this clause in the Party Rules and to reduce the required length of Party membership. This proposal arises from the aim of creating suitable conditions for the promotion of new cadres to leading Party posts.

This proposal is of the highest importance from the point of view of principle and practice.

In his report to our Congress, Comrade Stalin gave a brilliant formulation of the task of promoting new cadres:

“... The thing is not whether to rely on the old cadres or on the new cadres, but to steer for a combination, a union of the old and the young cadres in one common symphony of leadership of the Party and the state.”\*

That is why we must boldly and in good time promote young cadres to leading posts.

It was precisely by promoting young cadres to leading posts boldly and in good time that our Party gained one of its most important successes—the promotion to leading state and Party posts of over 500,000 young Bolsheviks, members of the Party and people standing close to the Party.

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\* *Ibid.*, p. 45.

Mention should be made of the improvement in the quality of our leading cadres. Our Party cadres now include

quite a number of people with a higher education, people of culture, knowledge and education.

### SOME STATISTICS REGARDING LEADING PARTY CADRES

	Total	With higher, incomplete higher, or secondary education*	Workers by social status before appointment	Under 40 years of age	From 31 to 35 years of age	Party members since 1924
Secretaries of regional committees, territorial committees and Central Committees of Communist Parties of national republics.....	333	196 58.9%	175 52.6%	303 91%	177 53.2%	268 80.5%
Secretaries of district committees, city committees and area committees.....	10,902	3,115 28.6%	5,248 48.1%	10,020 92%	5,649 52.7%	10,193 93.5%
Managers of departments of regional committees, territorial committees, and Central Committees of Communist Parties of national republics .....	510	327 64.1%	231 45.3%	469 92%	263 51.6%	431 84.5%

Whereas several years ago there was a tendency to shrink from promoting educated people and young people to leading Party posts, while the wreckers put a regular stranglehold on young cadres, not allow them to rise, it is the most important achievement of the Party that, having rid itself of wreckers, it has been able to clear the way for the advancement of cadres who have grown up in recent years and to promote them to leading posts. That is a pledge of the strength and invincibility of our Party. (*Stormy applause.*)

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The work of keeping a practical check on the fulfilment of Party directions has also been unsatisfactory. This function is divided among the various industrial-branch departments. It, too, must be centralized and the character of the work of the Party Control Commission altered accordingly. The Party's control must be effective, it must prevent mistakes in good time.

\* The majority of persons with higher education graduated from university or technical college in the years 1934-38.

Proper control means not only keeping a check on the fulfilment of directions, but also testing their correctness and ascertaining whether any of them need to be replaced by others.

Comrade Stalin has repeatedly and insistently explained to us that

“... leadership does not just mean writing resolutions and issuing directions. Leadership means keeping a check on the fulfilment of directions; and not only keeping a check on the fulfilment of directions, but verifying the directions themselves, whether they are correct or mistaken. It would be absurd to think that all our directions are correct 100 per cent. That is not, and cannot be, the case, comrades. *Keeping a check on fulfilment precisely means that our workers must test in the fire of practical experience not only the fulfilment of our directions, but the correctness of the directions themselves* [my italics—A.Z.]. Shortcomings in this respect are shortcomings in our whole work of leadership.”\*

\* Joseph Stalin, “The Work of the April Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission,” 1928.

Checking up on fulfilment of decisions is a most valuable antidote to stagnation, to the gathering of rust in our work. It is a highly valuable means of preventing the activities of wreckers. Where a proper check is kept on fulfilment, there the wrecker is paralyzed.

It will now be the chief task of the Party Control Commission to improve the work of keeping a check on the fulfilment of Party instructions.

In view of this, it must be decided that the Party Control Commission shall work under the auspices of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). In that case it will be unnecessary for the Party Control Commission to be elected directly at Party congresses. The Party Control Commission should be elected at a Plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and function under the guidance and direction of the Central Committee.

#### REMEDYING THE TERRITORIAL AND POLITICAL DEFICIENCIES OF CADRES

Comrade Stalin has given us in his report a very clear and precise formulation of our tasks in the sphere of Party propaganda, in the sphere of the Marxist-Leninist education of our cadres.

He said:

“The work of regulating the composition of the Party and of bringing the leading bodies closer to the activities of the lower bodies may be organized satisfactorily; the work of promoting, selecting and allocating cadres may be organized satisfactorily; but, with all this, if our Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, if the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins to languish, if our work of raising the political and theoretical level of these cadres flags, and the cadres themselves cease on account of this to show interest in the prospect of our further progress, cease to understand the truth of our cause and are transformed into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and mechanically carrying out instructions from above—then our entire state and Party work must inevitably languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the

higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist knowledge of the workers in any branch of state or Party work, the better and more fruitful will be the work itself, and the more effective the results of the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political level of the workers, and the less they are imbued with the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow and deteriorating into paltry plodders, of their degenerating altogether.”\*

Comrade Stalin pointed out that we possess all the means and opportunities required for training our cadres ideologically and schooling them politically, and that on this nine-tenths of the fulfilment of our practical tasks will depend.

The task of remedying the theoretical and political deficiencies of our Party cadres, of arming our Party members with the theory of Marxism-Leninism and helping them to master Bolshevism demands that the work of Party propaganda and education should be raised to a proper level, in accordance with the decision of the Central Committee “On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Connection with the Publication of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*” and with the indications given on this subject by Comrade Stalin in his report at our Congress.

The task of mastering Bolshevism arises directly from the tasks of the present stage of socialist construction.

In order successfully to cope with the principal task of the Third Five-Year Plan, namely, the communist education of the people and the elimination of the survivals of capitalism in the minds of men, in order successfully to cope with the practical problems of socialist construction, and in order properly to be equipped for the struggle against the surrounding capitalist world and its agents, our cadres must be armed with theory, that is, with a knowledge of the

\* Joseph Stalin, *From Socialism to Communism in the Soviet Union*, p. 46, International Publishers, New York.

laws of social development and of the political struggle.

The basic defects of Party propaganda are enumerated in the well-known decision of the Central Committee. This decision also indicates the methods of reorganizing Party propaganda in connection with the publication of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*.

The reorganization of propaganda work has already begun. The first steps in this direction show that the publication of the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)* and the decision of the Central Committee have given a mighty impetus to the raising of the entire ideological and political work to a new level. Millions of people have begun to study Marxism-Leninism, the *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*. This is an immense achievement for our Party. About twelve million copies have been sold of the *History* in Russian (*loud applause*) and about two million copies in other languages of the nations of the U.S.S.R. It has been translated into twenty-eight foreign languages and has already been published in over 673,000 copies. It may quite definitely be said that this is the first Marxist book in all the existence of Marxism to have been disseminated so widely. (*Applause.*)

Party members have begun to study independently. The demand for Marxist-Leninist literature has grown tremendously. The attention of all Party organizations is now focused on the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism.

A certain amount of experience in new forms of work has already been gained.

Since the decision of the Central Committee the best theoreticians and propagandists in the Party have been enlisted for the oral and printed propaganda of Marxism-Leninism. A body of experienced professional propagandists is being formed.

Before the reorganization of Party propaganda there were over 112,000 propagandists in the Party. It goes without saying that there were quite a number of people among them who were

poorly fitted for the job. This number has now been considerably reduced. The Party organizations now select as propagandists people who are really fitted for the work.

The number of study circles has also diminished. For example, before the decision of the Central Committee there were over 9,000 study circles in Moscow and over 5,000 in Leningrad; now there are a little over 500 in Moscow and about 300 in Leningrad.

Independent study has now become the principal method.

Printed propaganda, which is of decisive importance in this work, is being extended.

All this, however, is only the beginning of that development of propaganda work which our Party is striving for. In this a decisive part will be played by our Bolshevik press. The demand for printed literature has grown enormously and will continue to grow.

We are on the eve of a tremendous development of all forms of propaganda work of our Party. Wide use must be made of such powerful instruments as the cinema, radio and art for propaganda purposes.

In order to be able properly to lead the work of Marxist-Leninist propaganda in Party and state, and successfully to cope with the task of remedying the theoretical and political deficiencies of Party cadres, the Central Committee needs a powerful apparatus of propaganda and agitation, in the shape of a Propaganda and Agitation Administration, in which all the work of printed and oral propaganda and agitation would be centralized.

Ideological schooling fosters in Soviet people a consciousness of the dignity of the Soviet citizen and confidence in their own strength. More impressively than ever before ring the words of Comrade Stalin that theory endows practical workers with the power of orientation, with confidence in themselves, with a perspective, with the ability not only to see events but to foresee them.

The reorganization of our Party propaganda work will ensure the flourishing progress of our theoretical work and

will even more thoroughly arm our Party ideologically. (*Stormy applause.*)

#### RECONSTRUCTION OF THE PARTY APPARATUS. ALL-UNION CONFERENCES

Comrades, the theses on amendments to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.) propose to reorganize the apparatus of the departments both in the Central Committee and in the localities.

Today, the industrial-branch departments do not know what their functions are, properly speaking; they encroach on the functions of the business organizations, compete with them, and this gives rise to a vagueness as to who is responsible for a job, or kills responsibility altogether.

The industrial-branch departments of the Central Committee should be abolished. An exception should be made in the case of the Agricultural Department, in view of the particular importance of controlling and supervising the activities of the Soviet and Party organizations in the sphere of agriculture.

The urgent task now faces the Party of strengthening organization in the collective farms, of guiding their business affairs, and of organizing work in the collective farms, state farms and machine and tractor stations. Comrade Andreyev has spoken very forcibly and convincingly of these tasks at this Congress.

In view of a certain weakness in the work of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and the People's Commissariat of State Farms, and in view of the fact that agriculture demands the exclusive attention and care of the local Party organizations, the Agricultural Departments of the Central Committee, the territorial committees and the regional committees must be preserved.

The School Department of the Central Committee should also be preserved, in view of the fact that we have no People's Commissariat of Education for the U.S.S.R., and in view of the necessity of controlling the work of public education in all the republics, territories and regions.

The following departments should be

set up in the regional committees, territorial committees and Central Committees of the Communist Parties in the national republics; cadres, propaganda and agitation, organization and instruction, and agricultural. All the other industrial-branch departments should be abolished.

The district committees and city committees should have the following departments: cadres, propaganda and agitation, and organization and instruction.

The direction of the propaganda and agitation departments and the cadre departments in the regional committees, territorial committees and Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the national republics should be entrusted to special secretaries.

Comrades, after what I have already said about our tasks in relation to the selection of cadres and the checking up on fulfilment of decisions, and in relation to propaganda work, I think there is no necessity for me to explain why such a reorganization of the apparatuses of the Central Committee and of the local Party bodies is necessary. The structure of the apparatus of the Central Committee and of the local Party organs proposed to the Eighteenth Party Congress will make it possible to strengthen Party leadership of the various branches of our work.

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With the rapid progress of the socialist economic system and the rapid political and cultural development of the workers, peasants and intellectuals, the pace of Party and state life has markedly increased. In order to be able to guide state and Party affairs, to react rapidly to new demands as they arise, and to provide timely solutions for new problems, the existing scheme of central organizations of the Party—the Party Congress and the Central Committee—should be supplemented by a new body, namely, the All-Union Party Conference. This is rendered all the more necessary by the fact that the long interval between Party congresses limits the possibility of advancing to leading

posts, and especially to the Central Committee, people who have developed in Party work, whereas a conference would provide this opportunity. The time is therefore ripe to supplement the scheme of central Party organizations—Party congress and Central Committee—by an All-Union Party Conference, to be summoned not less than once a year and to consist of representatives of the local organizations; the chief purpose of the All-Union Conference being to discuss urgent problems of Party policy.

The All-Union Party Conference should be invested with the right to replace part of the membership of the Central Committee, that is, to remove such members of the Central Committee as are unable to cope with their duties as members of that body, and to replace them by others, in the number, however, of not more than one-fifth of the membership in the Central Committee elected by the Party Congress. The Conference shall replenish the membership of the Central Committee from among the alternate members of that body elected by the Party Congress, and elect in their place a corresponding number of new alternate members.

The decisions of the Conference shall be subject to endorsement by the Central Committee, with the exception of decisions to elect new members and alternate members of the Central Committee. Decisions of Conferences endorsed by the Central Committee shall be binding on all Party organizations. The delegates to the Conference shall be elected at plenary meetings of the regional committees, territorial committees and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the national republics. Members of the Central Committee who have not been elected as delegates from local organizations shall have a voice at the Conference, but no vote.

#### THE DUTIES OF PRIMARY ORGANIZATIONS IN INDUSTRY AND IN SOVIET INSTITUTIONS

Comrades, during this period the primary organizations, which constitute

the foundation of our Party, have grown stronger, their contacts with the masses have improved, the vanguard role of the Communists has been enhanced, and Party life has risen to a higher plane. The Party organizations are taking a closer interest in the practical economic and cultural problems of socialist construction.

Experience has shown that the Party organizations have worked well wherever they have been able to combine Party political work with the fight for the fulfilment of production plans, for the improvement of the work of the state apparatus, for the mastery of new technique, for strict labor discipline, for the development of the Stakhanov movement, and for the promotion of new cadres to Party and business posts. And, vice versa, wherever the Party organizations have held aloof from production, confining their duties to propaganda and agitation, or wherever the Party organizations have taken upon themselves the unwarranted function of *directing* business affairs, assuming the duties of the business bodies and detracting from their responsibility, there the work has inevitably found itself in difficulties.

Comrade Stalin has repeatedly pointed to the necessity for a correct combination of Party political work and business work. He said as far back as 1923:

“Our industrial nuclei must be brought to take an interest in the questions arising from the course of affairs in the factories and trusts. Matters must be arranged so to enable the nuclei to keep in touch with the work of the managerial bodies of our factories and trusts, that they may be in a position to influence this work. You, as representatives of nuclei, know how great is the moral responsibility of our industrial nuclei to the non-Party masses for the course of affairs in the factories. If a nucleus is to be in a position to guide and lead the non-Party masses in its factory, if it is to be in a position to bear responsibility for the course of affairs in the factory—and that it is morally responsible to the non-Party masses for any shortcomings in the factory is unquestionable—it must be in touch with the course of affairs, it

must have the opportunity to influence them one way or another.

"It is therefore necessary that the nuclei should be drawn into the discussion of the business problems of the factory, that business conferences of representatives of the nuclei in the factories forming part of a trust should be summoned from time to time for the discussion of questions affecting the affairs of the trust. This is a sure and necessary means of enriching our Party masses with business experience and of organizing control from below."\*

I shall mention, by way of example, the experience of the Party organization at the huge Kirov Works in Leningrad. The Trotsky-Bukharin bandits who at one time had charge of this plant did it a lot of damage and reduced it to such a plight that in the middle of 1937 it was scarcely fulfilling its program 45-50 per cent in many branches.

Now the plant is being managed by new people who have risen from the ranks of its technical intelligentsia, from the ranks of its Stakhanovites and shock workers.

In the past year there has been a marked improvement in the work of the Kirov plant, and in this a big part was played by the Party organization and its committee, which succeeded in correctly combining Party political work with production work.

The experience of the Communists of the Kirov Works shows that a correct combination of Party political work and production work does not result either in violating the principle of one-man management, or in forgetting Party mass work.

What largely contributed to this was the advancement to the leadership of the Party organization of people well acquainted with the technical and business affairs of the plant, people from the shops, from the various sections of the plant, people closely connected with the whole body of workers, technicians and engineers.

The Party organization of the Kirov Works boldly rooted out the hostile ele-

ments in the plant and promoted new cadres—about five hundred of the best Stakhanovites, engineers and technicians, who are now managing the plant, and managing it not at all badly.

Paying attentive heed to the signals coming from the rank-and-file workers and office employees, the Party organization was able to contribute to the solution of a number of important business problems of the plant. The Party organization took a lively part in the reform of the wages system in the plant which had been reduced to chaos by the wreckers. Instead of one hundred different rate categories there are now only four, and hundreds of thousands of rates have been revised. This was of the greatest significance for the proper organization of labor and for the improvement of productivity of labor.

During the past six months the plant has been fulfilling its production programs without excess expenditure on wages, and the new standards of output have been greatly exceeded.

The Party committee of the Kirov Works helped the management to regulate power consumption at the plant, recommending fresh people for this job and helping to work out practical measures of improvement. As a result, the plant has successfully coped with the government program of doubling the output of tractors by the spring sowing of 1939.

Here is another example. The Yaroslavl Rubber Works had not been fulfilling its production program for seven years running. The whole country suffered from the unsatisfactory work of the Rubber Works, whose management had at one time fallen into the hands of enemies of the people.

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) helped the Bolsheviks of the Rubber Works to expose and eliminate the enemies of the people and demanded that the plant should at an early date be made one of the foremost in the country in respect to fulfilment of program. The Party organization of the Yaroslavl Rubber Works has fulfilled the demand of the Central Committee with honor. The

\* Joseph Stalin, *The Tasks of the Party*.

plant carried out its program of output of automobile tires 100 per cent in the fourth quarter of 1938; 106 per cent in January, 1939, and 108 per cent in February. Success in production was accompanied by the growth of the Party organization, the membership of which increased more in the fourth quarter of 1938 than in the preceding two years.

To what did the Party organization of the Rubber Works owe its success? To the fact that it correctly combined production work with political work. It arranged its work in such a way as to make the fulfilment of the production program a high political duty, and the whole body of employees of the works was imbued with this spirit. The Party organization distributed its Party cadres in a way that enabled it to keep in touch with what was being done in every part of the plant. Neither the district committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) nor the Party organization encroached on the functions of the plant management. On the contrary, they created the conditions to enable the management to display independence and initiative; but the Party organization kept in touch with every step of the management, and, being well informed of the state of affairs in the plant, when necessary guided, taught and assisted the management.

While vigorously criticizing the chaos and irresponsibility which the enemies of the people had fostered over a long period of time, the Party organization gave moral and political support to every executive, to every worker and office employee in the plant who worked with a will.

Scores and hundreds of examples like that of the Kirov Works and the Yaroslavl Rubber Works could be cited. The Calibre Works and the First Watch and Clock Factory in Moscow, a number of aircraft factories, a number of iron and steel works, the Svet Shaktyora Works in Kharkov, the New Sormovo Works in the Gorky Region and many other plants are also setting an example of correct combination of Party and production work in the life of the primary Party organizations.

In all the republics, territories and regions numbers of Party organizations are to be found which have succeeded in adopting a correct attitude to production questions, in instituting control over the work of their plants and in helping the management to fulfil and overfulfil the programs of output.

I also want to mention the experience of the Central Committee Party organizers in the munitions plants. Comrade Stalin attributes the greatest importance to this matter. He proposed the institution in the munitions plants of a system of Party organizers subordinated to the Central Committee, and the selection of skilled engineers, experts at their job and good Party men, for this purpose. This measure has proved its value and has yielded very good results. We now have a new type of functionary in the munitions plants, men who combine Party work with the ability to form an opinion about any particular business or technical problem.

We know that the ignorance of technical and business matters displayed by certain Party functionaries played into the hands of the wreckers. Our primary Party organizations constitute the vanguard in our factories, the flower of the personnel. We must benefit by the experience of that vanguard body which Communists represent in the factories. If you want to ascertain the state of affairs with regard to the fulfilment of an important order, or the way the director's fund is being expended, or the housing conditions of the workers, or the state of the workers' dining rooms, you must throw into the scales the whole experience of the Party organizations, you must illuminate every side of the production life of the factories with the Bolshevik searchlight. In this way we shall render real service to the whole cause of socialist economic development.

During the discussion voices were raised claiming that to grant the right of control to primary Party organizations in production units would be a blow to the principle of one-man management. It seems to me that those who think that one-man management just means com-



manding a factory without relying on the active personnel have no conception of what one-man management means.

Our Soviet, Bolshevik principle of one-man management implies the ability to direct, to organize, to select cadres, to issue correct orders, to demand a report of work done, and to eliminate irresponsibility and divided responsibility. But it also implies the ability to secure the support in this work of the Party organization, the *active* of the factory, and of its whole personnel.

It is therefore wrong to say that we can dispense with control by the primary Party organizations. Those executives who fear this kind of control are making a mistake.

In this connection, the time is ripe for precisely defining the duties of the various types of primary Party organizations and, in particular, of those in production units (factories, mills, state farms and collective farms) and those in People's Commissariats.

Party organizations of the production type should be given the right to exercise control over the state of affairs in factories, state farms and collective farms. This should result in enhancing the role and sense of responsibility of primary Party organizations in production units.

As to the Party organizations of the People's Commissariat type, inasmuch as they cannot exercise functions of control, owing to the specific conditions of their work, they should play a greater part in improving the work of the apparatus. It is their duty to draw attention to defects in their particular People's Commissariat, to note shortcomings in the work of any of the personnel, and to inform the Central Committee and the heads of the People's Commissariat of them.

Comrade Stalin defined the duties of nuclei in Soviet institutions at a meeting of the Organization Bureau of the Central Committee on March 15, 1926, when he said:

"Our nuclei in Soviet institutions must be the guardians of real Soviet order in our institutions. . . . The nuclei must see that at least elementary order, elemen-

tary responsiveness, a readiness to listen to people, and less bureaucracy are displayed in Soviet institutions, both government and business. . . . We must see to it that the nuclei in Soviet institutions live the life of the whole Party, help the Party to improve and simplify the Soviet and business apparatus and bring it closer to the people, to make it honest and economical."\*

All Party members working in a given People's Commissariat should be united in one general Party organization of that People's Commissariat. The secretary of the Party organization of a People's Commissariat should be endorsed by the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). It is hardly necessary to go into long explanations of the necessity for this latter proposal—it is self-evident.

Comrades, I have set forth the principal amendments and additions to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.) proposed in the theses.

Besides these amendments and additions, mention should be made of other additions that are prompted by the experience of the Party, such as, that regional committees and territorial committees should have four or five secretaries; that the rights of area Party organizations should be defined in the Rules; that the clauses in the Rules relating to Party organizations in the Red Army should be extended to Party organizations in the Navy. These additions, I believe, do not need explanation.

In amendment of the existing rule it is proposed henceforth to call the elected organs of primary organizations bureaus instead of committees.

The reason for this change is that committees are formed to unite several Party organizations of equal status. That is the tradition in our Party and it is an expedient one. As for the elected organs of the primary Party organizations, it is more advisable to call them bureaus to distinguish them from committees.

The Central Committee also attributes

\* See *Izvestia of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.[B.]*, No. 16-17, 1926.

great importance to granting Party organizations in factory shops the right—under certain conditions, namely, if they have not less than fifteen members—to elect a bureau. You know that, by decision of the Central Committee, shop committees were set up in the larger industrial plants. Experience has fully justified their formation.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION OF THE THESES OF THE REPORT ON "AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)"

I shall now proceed to discuss the corrections and amendments which were proposed during the discussion in the Party organizations of the theses of the report on amendments to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

A very wide discussion developed over the theses, the result of which was that the theses were approved by the vast majority of Party members and by all Party organizations. (*Stormy applause.*)

The discussion yielded a fairly large number of corrections and amendments both to the theses themselves and to a number of clauses of the existing Rules to which no amendments were proposed in the theses.

In view of the great variety of the amendments, it would be fitting to divide them into several categories.

There are a number of meaningless corrections of no practical value, as, for example, that Party organs should be elected once in five years; that secretaries of Party organizations should be elected at general meetings and not by the committees or bureaus, that is, that the secretaries should be made independent of the committees or bureaus; that the new members should be admitted into the Party at ceremonial meetings, and so on.

The uselessness of these corrections and amendments is self-evident, and there is no need to argue against them. They fall to the ground as worthless. (*Laughter and applause.*)

Secondly, there are a large number of corrections, amendments and comments

which do not relate directly to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.) but to the current work of Party organization.

Such, for example, are the proposals that at least three evenings in five be kept free of all meetings and conferences, so that comrades might rest and study theory; to institute Party days; to forbid the adoption of decisions by a canvass of opinion; that a bureau of the district committee should be elected in districts where the Party organizations are small; that the Party organizations of Machine and Tractor Stations should register tractor drivers and harvester combine operators; that Party Committees of railway junctions should be abolished and so on and so forth.

The subject of all these corrections and amendments relates, as you see, to practical Party affairs. The authors of these corrections have apparently not grasped the difference between the Rules and current Party affairs, and therefore try to squeeze into the Rules as large a number of clauses as possible, forgetting that the Rules only lay down the general framework, the basic forms of organizational activity of the Party, and that they do not preclude, but on the contrary presume, current activity by Party bodies.

The Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.) which the Eighteenth Party Congress will endorse lay down the organizational basis for the future activities of the directing Party bodies. Corrections and amendments of this kind should be submitted to the new Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) to be elected.

The third group of amendments relate directly to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.). A large number of them concern questions of formulation and should be submitted to the Rules Commission of the Eighteenth Congress which I presume the Congress will set up and instruct to draft the Rules in their final form.

As to the corrections and amendments of real importance, it is advisable to divide them into three categories: those that are unacceptable and should be rejected; those whose advisability should be aired at the Congress; and, lastly,

those that should be adopted.

I shall first deal with the unacceptable proposals.

1. There are amendments designed to preserve the categories of admission in one form or another. They include proposals of the most varied kind. They are all based on the belief of their authors that the abolition of the different categories is untimely. It is proposed to establish two or three categories: one for workers, another for peasants and intellectuals, or to set up a special category for members of the old intelligentsia, and so on. These proposals should not be adopted.

The feature of these amendments is that their authors either ignore or have failed to grasp the essence of the fundamental changes in the relations of classes that have taken place in the U.S.S.R. They either cling to the old and fail to see the new, or they are simply dead asleep and do not notice what is going on around them. (*Applause.*)

2. There are a number of amendments of a diametrically opposite type, amendments which go further than the requirements for admission to the Party proposed in the theses. Whereas the first group of amendments, as we have just seen, proposed to preserve the old conditions of admission, the second group proposes to go much further than the requirements proposed in the theses.

For example, it is proposed that the period of probationary membership should not be one year, but nine months, six months, or even three months; that the requirements regarding the length of Party membership of recommenders should be abolished; that the number of recommenders should be reduced, and so on and so forth. I think that amendments of this kind spring from the failure of certain Party members to understand the character of our Party and show that some Party members have forgotten the basic principle that the strength of our Party does not lie in abolishing the boundaries between Party and non-Party, between Party members and non-Party people, and in dissolving itself, diffusing itself among the masses,

but in the fact that, acting as a rallying ground for the foremost people of the working class, the peasantry and the intelligentsia, it does not strive for size of membership but for quality of membership, is concerned for the high title of Party member, for the staunchest of Party members and their devotion to the cause of the working class.

The authors of such amendments have the wrong idea that the Party does not intend to show any further concern for the quality of its members and is throwing its doors wide open to all who want to join it. This mistaken view has nothing in common with the Party's policy of a strictly individual selection of really foremost people for the ranks of the Party.

Do the substantial changes in the procedure of admission of new members imply that the Party is in any way relaxing the tried and tested Leninist principle of individual selection for the ranks of the Party? Not in the least.

The Central Committee and Comrade Stalin have many times made it absolutely clear that what is important for the Party is not so much the number of its members as their quality, their staunchness. Here, for example, is what Comrade Stalin said on July 6, 1921, in his report at a general meeting of the Tiflis Organization of the Georgian Communist Party:

"It should be remembered once and for all that the strength and weight of a party, and especially of the Communist Party, depends not so much on the number of its members as on their quality, their staunchness and devotion to the cause of the proletariat."

In the solemn vow Comrade Stalin made at the Second All-Union Congress of Soviets on January 26, 1924, at the time of Lenin's death, he said:

"It is not given to all to be members of such a Party. It is not given to all to withstand the stress and storm that accompanies membership in such a Party. Sons of the working class, sons of pov-

erty and struggle, sons of incredible deprivation and heroic effort—these are the ones who must first of all be members of such a Party. That is why the Leninist Party, the Communist Party, at the same time calls itself the Party of the working class.”\*

In the resolution of the Thirteenth Party Congress on “The Immediate Tasks of Party Development,” the Party pointed out that what was important when admitting new members was not formalities, but essentials. This resolution stated:

“Not only must the established formal requirements be observed when admitting a new member into the Party, but it is essential to ascertain his *real* capacity to help the Party and the organs of the proletarian dictatorship in practice.”

This principle of strict individual approach to applicants for membership of the Party is an immutable law of our Party, it is not subject to change.

In the interval between the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Party Congresses the Central Committee of the Party has repeatedly pointed to the danger of forgetting the principle of individual admission into the Party.

Alien and hostile elements have always striven to enter the ranks of the C.P. S.U.(B.) so as to use the title of Party member as a screen in their work of undermining the great cause of the working class.

The Central Committee has done immense work to combat violations of the principle of individual selection of new members of the Party.

The Central Committee has vigorously fought attempts to ignore Lenin’s precept that ours is the only Party in the world which is concerned not so much to increase the number of its members as to improve their quality.

The Central Committee of the Party has strictly warned Party organizations of the danger of distortions of policy and of repetitions of mistakes, of the danger of substituting for a careful individual selection of new members for the Party a pernicious wholesale campaign for new members, which in the past has contaminated the ranks of the C.P.S.U. (B.) with alien and hostile elements.

The verification of Party records and exchange of Party cards disclosed the extreme neglect and chaos that reigned in this respect. It is therefore clear that the principle of individually selecting for the Party the really foremost people, people really devoted to the cause of the working class, the best people of our country among the ranks of the workers, peasants and working intelligentsia, people who have been tested on various sectors of the struggle for socialism, who do not shrink from difficulties but become steeled in the fight to overcome them, was, is and will be the decisive principle of our Party in the matter of admitting new members into its ranks.

At the same time the Party is interested in creating all the conditions to enable the really foremost people to enter its ranks. The amendments to the Rules will in fact create these conditions.

3. A number of comrades propose to establish a special category for persons who have once been Party members. This seems to me unnecessary. If, while they were outside the ranks of the Party, such comrades proved that they are devoted and active workers, they can be accepted on the same terms as comrades newly entering the Party. If, however, while they were outside the ranks of the Party they did not prove their devotion, they will evidently not be accepted and nobody will give them a recommendation.

4. Further, amendments are proposed with regard to the requirement that the recommender should have known the person he recommends from having worked with him. It is proposed in the case of persons in the ranks of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army to fix the period at six months, on the

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\* Joseph Stalin, “The Lenin Heritage,” *Lenin*, p. 15. International Publishers, New York.

grounds of the specific conditions of life prevailing in the Red Army. I think we should reject this proposal. Firstly, it creates different conditions for territorial Party organizations and for army Party organizations, which is undesirable. Secondly, recommendations may be given not only by comrades who know the applicant from working with him in his present factory or institution, but by those who worked with him in other places; and, furthermore, there is no need to make the attendance of the recommender obligatory when the application for membership is being discussed. Finally, a Party organization may, if necessary, when sufficient recommendations cannot be obtained locally, make inquiries about the applicant for membership at the organizations where he previously worked, or of comrades who could recommend him from having worked with him before.

5. A number of proposals have been made to confer on shop Party meetings in large Party organizations, with over five hundred members, the right to admit members into the Party, instead of their being admitted at the General Party meeting. Proposals have also been made to grant *all* shop Party organizations the right to admit members into the Party, instead of their being admitted at the general meeting of the primary Party organization.

I think the proposal we should here adopt is as follows: large factory Party organizations of over five hundred or seven hundred members (this should be discussed at the Congress) should be allowed to form a factory committee instead of a bureau of the primary organization.

Some comrades have proposed that district committees should be formed in such factories. In my opinion this would be wrong, for we should then have two different kinds of district committees—territorial district committees and industrial district committees. In factory Party organizations with over five hundred or seven hundred members it would be advisable to form factory Party committees and to give the shop Party or-

ganizations in such large factories rights under the Rules.

As to the proposal to grant the right of admitting new members into the Party to *all* shop organizations, that is, to extend to all shop primary organizations rights under the Rules, it should be rejected, because it tends to diminish the importance of the general factory organization. It is the factory above all that is our fortress, and it would be wrong to split up the general Party organization in the factory by giving prime importance to the shop. We must not minimize the educational role of the general Party organization in the factory and the significance of the general factory Party meeting in the matter of admitting new members into the Party.

6. A number of proposals have been made to set up various new departments in Party organs. The theses of the Central Committee, as you know, aim at reducing the number of departments, and propose that the chief departments should be the Cadres Administration and the Propaganda and Agitation Administration of the Central Committee and the corresponding departments in the localities. But these comrades want just the opposite and would have the number of departments enlarged. They propose to set up new departments like a Health Department, Stakhanov Movement Department, and so on. (*Laughter.*)

This proposal should be rejected. Only in the case of one department is the matter debatable: I am referring to the proposal to set up Defense Departments, which is worth discussing at the Congress.

7. It is proposed to extend the clause concerning Party *actives* to rural organizations. I think this is also a question which the Congress should discuss, for there are arguments for and against it.

What are the arguments for? They are that in rural districts, especially large ones, it is not always convenient to call general district meetings of Communists, and that meetings of the Party *active* should be called, as in the case of the towns, to discuss current questions of Party policy. As to the arguments

against—they are that in the majority of the rural districts general meetings of the organizations can be called whenever necessary. We know that general meetings are of great educational and organizational value. Some comrades fear that the *actives* might encroach on the functions of the general Party meeting, and point out that the summoning of *actives* should not be abused. As you see, it would be advisable to air the question at the Congress.

8. It is proposed to establish secretariats, in addition to bureaus, in all regional committees and city committees. This is also a proposal which needs to be discussed at the Congress. There are arguments for and against it. The arguments for are that when the leadership has to discuss a large number of questions of organization, some supplementary body like a secretariat is required. There is no need to summon a bureau for every question, it is claimed. At a first glance, this seems a very alluring and practical proposal. But on the other hand, there are fears that the creation of secretariats might minimize the role of the bureau, the role of collective leadership! Might it not lead to a certain shifting of the center of leadership from the bureau to a narrower body, the secretariat? I think that this is also a question that requires discussion at the Congress.

9. It is proposed to reduce the length of Party membership required of leading Party officials, and some even propose not to make any length of membership a requirement when electing comrades to leading Party posts. I think this proposal is wrong, because length of membership is required not only as a formal criterion but as a testimony of a certain experience in Party work. We must not forget what Comrade Stalin said about the necessity of combining the experience of young and old Party members. Hence the proposal to amend the requirements of the Rules in respect to the length of membership of leading Party workers which is contained in the theses of the Central Committee should be sufficient to ensure the promotion of

young cadres, and to go to greater lengths in the way of reduction would be inexpedient.

10. It is proposed that the right of control should be granted to Soviet nuclei as well as production nuclei. I consider this proposal unacceptable, for it springs from a forgetfulness of the specific conditions in which the Soviet nuclei work.

To what extremes this forgetfulness may lead is shown by the case of the Party organizations in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. and the People's Commissariat of State Farms of the U.S.S.R.

These Party organizations became obsessed with the idea of controlling the activities of the heads of the People's Commissariats. They set up within the People's Commissariats what was essentially a second center, which established connections with the provincial organizations, giving them instructions, and so on. And just see what questions these Party organizations took upon themselves to discuss. The Party organization of the People's Commissariat of Agriculture discussed the state of sowing in the U.S.S.R.! (*Laughter.*) Why, this is ludicrous! As if it can judge from here how the sowing is going in the Kuban or in Central Asia. Yet it presumes to issue "directives"! It discussed preparations for the harvesting season, supply of fuel to Machine and Tractor Stations, normal financing of the Machine and Tractor Stations, and so on and so forth—that is to say, it tried to duplicate and assume the functions of the People's Commissariat. No good can come of that.

The Party organization of the People's Commissariat of State Farms discussed the state of haymaking in the eastern state farms. (*Laughter.*) What on earth can it know about this subject? Yet it, too, tried to issue "directives."

Instead of taking measures to ensure that Party and state discipline are observed and to keep a proper check on the fulfilment of government instructions, instead of interesting themselves in the state of the apparatus and the ability and political fitness of its per-

sonnel, and drawing attention to defects in the work of the People's Commissariat, they tried to assume the functions of the heads of the People's Commissariat and to direct the provincial organizations.

This is a vicious practice and should not be encouraged. It is a sample of confusion of elementary concepts regarding the duties of Soviet nuclei. It is a parody on leadership, an attempt to create a People's Commissariat within a People's Commissariat.

It is a specific feature of the Soviet nuclei that they cannot undertake functions of control over the work of the Soviet institutions as such—that is a matter for higher Party and Soviet bodies.

But this does not mean that the primary Party organizations in Soviet institutions have no opportunity of influencing affairs. On the contrary, the role of these Party organizations is an extremely important one. If the Party organization in a Soviet institution notices defects in the work of the institution in good time—for example, in relation to the examination of complaints and applications from the public, the treatment of visitors (which are matters of utmost importance in the work of Soviet institutions), labor discipline, the work of the apparatus, etc.—if the Party nucleus draws the attention of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and of the heads of the People's Commissariat to such defects, it will be performing an important function in improving the government apparatus.

11. It is proposed to sanction the formation of bureaus in primary Party organizations and in shop Party organizations with seven to ten members.

Seven members are to elect a bureau of three! This would be substituting bureau meetings for the general meetings of the Party organization, which would be wrong.

Such are the proposals and additions which directly relate to the Rules, but which in my opinion are unacceptable.

I shall now pass to the proposals which in my opinion are acceptable.

1. A number of comrades point to the necessity of revising the preamble to the Rules of the C.P.S.U.(B.) so as to make it conform with the changes in the situation in the country.

I think this proposal is a correct one and should be adopted.

2. There was a very lively exchange of opinions during the discussion over the question of the sympathizers' groups. Judging by the most prevalent opinion, the sympathizers' groups should be abolished.

Comrades point out that in view of the growth of a large non-Party *active* around the Party, and in view of the resumption of the admission of new members, the sympathizers' groups have outlived their function. Admissions into the Party do not proceed in the main by way of the sympathizers' groups. This is borne out by the fact, for example, that of the new candidate members accepted during the past two years only twenty-one per cent came from the sympathizers' groups.

Are we not bound to draw the lesson from this practical experience? I think we are.

There are a large number of organizations around the Party which connect it with the masses. I am referring to an organization like the trade union, the effect of whose work in educating its members should be to raise them to an understanding of the tasks of the Communist vanguard, that is, to a Party level, and to prepare its best people to join the Party.

Unfortunately, our trade unions do not set themselves this aim quite as much as they should; yet it is the direct duty of Communists working in trade unions to carry on educational work within them in such a way as to raise the level of the foremost, the most active people in the trade unions, to a Party level.

We have a ramified system of social organizations of various kinds—Soviets, the Young Communist League, the co-operative societies, the Chemical and Air Defense Society, etc.—each of which has a large number of active non-Party workers, the best of whom could be se-

lected for admission to the Party.

From this point of view, the sympathizers' groups narrow the field in preparing the best people among the working class, the collective farm peasantry and the intelligentsia to join the Party.

I think it would be better to accept the best, most prepared, foremost people not into sympathizers' groups but directly into the Party as candidate members. (*Hear, hear! Applause.*)

3. It is proposed that the reinstatement of persons wrongfully expelled from the Party should be announced in the press.

This is a good suggestion and should be adopted.

4. It is proposed to delete from the Rules the clause concerning the Soviet Control Commission, in view of the fact that the proposal to change the character of the work of the Party Control Commission must lead to a change in the character of the activities of the Soviet Control Commission, and that the regulations governing that body have to be confirmed by the government.

I consider the proposal a correct one, inasmuch as constitutional changes in the structure of our legislative and executive organs of Soviet government undoubtedly demand corresponding changes in the case of the Soviet Control Commission.

5. Next, there is another addition to the Rules which should be accepted. It is proposed to state in the Rules that comrades may be admitted to the Party from the age of eighteen. (*Applause.*)

6. Very important additions have been proposed designed to give a more precise definition in the Rules of a number of points concerning the Young Communist League. The question of the Young Communist League is not sufficiently reflected in our Rules, where there are three clauses relating to the League. The first provides that young people up to the age of twenty are admitted to the Party only through the Y.C.L. The second clause states that the recommendation of a district committee of the Y.C.L. is equivalent to two recommendations of

Party members; and the third clause relates to the formation of joint Party-Y.C.L. groups where there are no primary Party organizations.

These clauses in the Rules defining the relations between the Party and the Y.C.L. are no longer adequate. I think it necessary to discuss two proposals at the Congress.

The first is that Y.C.L. members who join the Party and do not belong to the "commanding" staff of the Y.C.L.—I am referring to rank-and-file members—should not be obliged to belong to the two organizations, the Party and the Y.C.L. If they are not performing important duties on leading bodies of the Y.C.L. on the instructions of the Party, it would be better if they belonged only to the Party organization. (*Applause.*)

The practice (and it is not altogether a correct one) is to begin to transfer to the Party Y.C.L. members of the age of twenty five or twenty-six, *i.e.*, chiefly over-aged Y.C.L. members. And it is now the common thing in the Y.C.L. to say: "We will first select for the Party the over-aged, and then we will tackle the younger members." The proposed addendum to the Rules that persons of the age of eighteen may be admitted to the Party will help greatly to strengthen educational work in the Y.C.L. The "twenty-year-olders" (*laughter*) are in a bad way because they are kept to "mature" in the Y.C.L. and no hurry is shown to transfer them to the Party; yet they are people in the flush of life and health and enjoy full civil rights. I think it would be inadvisable to keep these people the extra five or six years in the Y.C.L. by making it difficult for them to join the Party.

Y.C.L. members not holding leading posts in that organization should be allowed, on joining the Party, to belong to only one organization, namely, the Party organization. They will then receive their training in both educational and organizational work wholly in the Party. Why should they be under two district committees and two primary organizations? Why should they have to think about what study circle to join—Y.C.L.



or Party? I think the position of Y.C.L. members who belong to the Party should be clearly defined. A man has passed through the preparatory school of the Y.C.L., is worthy of joining the Party, and has been accepted into its ranks. Let him then work in its organization. I think this will clarify the position of Communists of Y.C.L. age and at the same time will help to improve the whole work of the Y.C.L. in educating and preparing its best people to join the Party. (*Applause.*)

Secondly, I think the time has also come to strengthen the role of the Y.C.L. in state and economic affairs, and to have this reflected in the Party rules.

Comrades, in spite of the immense importance of the Y.C.L., and in spite of the immense assistance it renders the Party, it suffers from one defect to which the attention both of the Y.C.L. and of our Party organizations should be drawn, and that is that it does not take a sufficient part in the life of the state and is too prone to confine itself to its own Y.C.L. affairs.

We must now examine the matter from another aspect: as far as the agitation and propaganda work of the Y.C.L. is concerned, it is perfectly clear, in the light of the recent decision of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), that this work will to a considerable extent be conducted by the Party. We must give the utmost help to the Y.C.L. in this respect both in the way of forces and experience. It would be unthinkable otherwise.

The internal work of the Y.C.L. is very important. But what is its purpose? It obviously must not be an aim in itself. I think the whole work of the Y.C.L. should be radically switched over to training its members to take an active part in state and Party affairs, to the performance of those important tasks of the Y.C.L. which arise from its role of *helper* of the Party.

And what does this mean practically? It means, for example, that where there is no primary Party organization, but there is a primary Y.C.L. organization, it should assume the function of an ac-

tive vehicle of the Party directions. Why should it not take part in the discussion and decision of economic questions? Let us say, for example, that there is chaos in the administration of a collective farm, that the sowing is going badly, that labor discipline is at a low level—what is to prevent the Y.C.L. organization discussing these questions? Why cannot a Y.C.L. organization take up the question of incompetent work of the management board of a collective farm and set to work to have a bad board replaced by a good one? Why cannot a Y.C.L. organization discuss the shortcomings of a village Soviet? Why cannot it, on the instructions of the Party district committee, undertake to carry out the Party's instructions and directions if they are not being attended to simply because there is no primary Party organization? I consider that the Y.C.L. organization can do this and should do it.

The Y.C.L. organizations should have the right of initiative in submitting to Party organizations big and little questions affecting state and economic affairs, questions concerning the improvement of production work in factory or collective farm, the Stakhanov movement, the state of public baths or public laundries, bad traffic regulation, disorderliness in schools, and so on—I will not enumerate all the big and little problems of our Soviet economic affairs.

Are Y.C.L. organizations paying much attention to these questions now? I affirm that they are not. If the Y.C.L. organizations set to work on these questions, and do not only discuss internal Y.C.L. affairs, do not stew in their own juice, they will enter the broad field of more active participation in all our work of socialist construction. The growth of the cadres of future Party and state workers will be greatly accelerated. The Y.C.L. members will receive a real schooling. (*Applause.*)

In view of this, I do not think that we should adopt the proposal to abolish joint Party-Y.C.L. groups, a proposal which is based on the alleged grounds that these groups have no virility. They have no virility just now because they

do not know what to do. If we put a new content into the work of the Party-Y.C.L. groups, if, for example, Communists in the rural localities, wherever there are not enough of them to form a Party organization, get together with the Y.C.L. members to discuss how to improve the affairs of the collective farm, how to improve cultural and political work, to work out a general line of conduct with regard to important political, economic and cultural affairs in their locality, such Party-Y.C.L. groups should be preserved and not abolished. (*Applause.*)

7. The next proposal is that Party cards should not be taken away from persons when expelled from the Party until the expulsion has been endorsed by the regional committee. This proposal is a correct one and should be adopted.

8. There was a proposal that plenary meetings of city committees and district committees should be held not less than once in six weeks. It would be advisable to adopt this proposal too.

9. It has been proposed, in amendment of the existing clause of the Rules, to sanction the formation of Party groups in Party organizations with less than one hundred Communists. As you know, the Rules provide for the formation of Party groups only where there are one hundred Communists and over. I think that this is also a proposal that should be accepted.

10. There is one other suggested amendment to the Rules; it is that the opinion of social organizations regarding an applicant for membership in the Party should not be demanded. I think this proposal is advisable. The recommendations of Party comrades are quite sufficient when a person applies to join the Party.

Such are the proposals and additions to the Rules which it would be advisable to adopt.

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Comrades, the discussion of the Rules has been of great benefit to the Party. It has revealed a heightened sense of responsibility in Party members for the

affairs of the Party, an increased concern of every Party member for his mother, the Party. The discussion has revealed a tremendous growth in the ideological solidarity of the members of our Party.

For its dimensions, the discussion was an absolutely unprecedented event in the life of our Party. It revealed that the Party is moving at full speed to the complete activation of its ranks, denoting a hitherto unprecedented scope of Party activity.

The U.S.S.R. has entered a new phase of development—the phase of the completion of the building of socialism and of gradual transition from socialism to communism.

This new phase of our historic cause still more enhances the role and significance of our Party.

New grand and impressive prospects are opening up before our Party; new great and complex tasks are confronting it. If it is to accomplish these tasks and perform its role of vanguard fighter in the building of a communist society, our Party must ceaselessly sharpen its organizational weapon. The Party Rules adopted by our Congress will be the Rules of the Party of victorious socialism, Rules which will arm our Party members for the successful accomplishment of the task of gradual transition to communism. (*Stormy applause.*)

Armed with the advanced theory, armed with the advanced policy, organization and ideology of the foremost class, and having rallied around itself the great and vast Soviet people, our Party is entering the fight for the gradual transition to communism. (*Stormy applause.*)

Many a time have the forces of decaying capitalism attempted to halt our victorious advance, and they will try to many a time again.

We know that difficulties await us. We realize the complexity of the new task we have taken upon ourselves. But we know both the means and conditions of our ultimate victory.

Comrade Stalin said at the Sixteenth Party Congress that our Party will be

invincible if it does not fear difficulties and knows how to shape its course. Our great Bolshevik Party is such an invincible Party. (*Stormy applause. All rise.*)

Comrades, we, the warriors in the army of the great proletarian strategists, the army of Lenin and Stalin, solidly welded around the Leninist-Stalinist Central Committee, around our teacher and leader, Comrade Stalin, will

carry forward our glory-wreathed banner, the banner of Bolshevism, to the complete victory of communism. (*Stormy applause.*)

Long live our great Party!

Long live the genius, the brain, the heart of the Bolshevik Party, of the whole Soviet people, of the whole of progressive and advanced humanity—our Stalin! (*Loud and prolonged applause and cheers. All rise.*)

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# The Central Committee of the C. P. S. U. (B.) Elected by the Eighteenth Congress

A. A. Andreyev	I. A. Likhachev	I. K. Sedin
V. M. Andrianov	M. M. Litvinov	A. I. Shakhurin
N. M. Antselovich	S. A. Lozovsky	E. A. Shchadenko
A. E. Badayev	P. M. Lubavin	M. F. Shkiriakov
M. D. Bagirov	G. M. Malenkov	N. M. Shvernik
I. A. Benedictov	V. A. Malyshev	N. A. Skvortsov
L. P. Beria	D. Z. Manuilsky	J. V. Stalin
G. A. Borkov	L. Z. Mekhlis	G. M. Stern
S. M. Budyonny	F. A. Merkulov	I. T. Tevosyan
N. A. Bulganin	V. N. Merkulov	S. K. Timoshenko
M. A. Burmistenko	N. A. Mikhailov	V. V. Vakhrushev
V. A. Donskoy	A. O. Mikoyan	B. L. Vannikov
B. A. Dvinsky	M. B. Mitin	K. E. Voroshilov
A. A. Fadeyev	V. M. Molotov	N. A. Voznesensky
L. M. Kaganovich	V. D. Nikitin	A. J. Vyshinsky
M. M. Kaganovich	K. I. Nikolayeva	E. Yaroslavsky
M. I. Kalinin	N. M. Pegov	A. I. Yefremov
N. S. Khrustchev	M. G. Pervukhin	U. Yusupov
L. R. Korniets	P. K. Ponomarenko	S. B. Zadionchenko
D. S. Korochenko	A. N. Poskrebyshv	S. E. Zakharov
A. N. Kosygin	P. N. Pospelov	R. S. Zamlyachka
G. I. Kulik	V. P. Potemkin	A. A. Zhdanov
A. A. Kuznetsov	I. V. Rogov	A. G. Zverev
N. G. Kuznetsov	A. S. Scherbakov	

## CANDIDATES OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

A. M. Alemasov	S. A. Goglidze	M. P. Kovalev
D. I. Antonov	A. F. Gorkin	S. N. Kruglov
G. A. Arutinov	G. P. Gromov	P. Ch. Kulakov
S. I. Bagayev	N. I. Gusarev	A. D. Loktionov
V. M. Bakradze	M. M. Gvishiani	I. G. Makarov
N. I. Birukov	S. P. Ignatyev	I. I. Maslennikov
I. P. Boitsov	N. G. Ignotov	K. A. Meretskov
K. N. Charkviani	A. B. Iskanderov	N. I. Nevezhin
B. N. Chernousov	K. I. Kachalin	I. F. Nikishev
A. S. Chuyarov	S. V. Kaftanov	G. N. Paltsev
V. G. Dekanozov	K. K. Kartashov	N. L. Patolichev
M. F. Denisov	I. S. Khokhlov	D. G. Pavlov
P. I. Doronin	B. Z. Kobulov	P. S. Popkov
A. A. Dubrovsky	A. G. Kolybanov	G. M. Popov
N. V. Feklenko	P. T. Komarov	V. P. Pronin
A. A. Frolkov	I. S. Konev	G. S. Rastegin

A. I. Samokhvalov	T. F. Shtykov	I. A. Vlasov
G. K. Savchenko	I. V. Smushkevich	V. V. Yartsev
P. I. Seleznev	L. A. Sosnin	V. G. Zhavoronkov
Z. T. Serduk	V. F. Starchenko	P. S. Zhemchuzhina
I. P. Sergeyeu	M. I. Starostin	V. P. Zhuravlev
F. V. Shagimardanov	I. V. Storozhev	V. P. Zotov
B. M. Shaposhnikov	G. D. Veinberg	

*A plenary session of the newly elected Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) was held on March 22, 1939, and elected the executive organs of the Central Committee as follows:*

#### POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

A. A. Andreyev	A. I. Mikoyan	CANDIDATE MEMBERS
L. M. Kaganovich	V. M. Molotov	L. P. Beria
M. I. Kalinin	J. V. Stalin	N. M. Shvernik
N. S. Khrustchev	K. E. Voroshilov	
	A. A. Zhdanov	

#### SECRETARIAT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

A. A. Andreyev	G. M. Malenkov	J. V. Stalin	A. A. Zhdanov
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#### ORGANIZATIONAL BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE

A. A. Andreyev	L. Z. Mekhlis	N. M. Shvernik
L. M. Kaganovich	N. A. Mikhailov	J. V. Stalin
G. M. Malenkov	A. S. Scherbakov	A. A. Zhdanov

The plenary session of the Central Committee elected A. A. Andreyev chairman of the Central Control Commission.





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