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From Socialist Worker, No. 96, 9 November 1968, p. 2.
Transcribed & marked up by Einde O’Callaghan for ETOL.
WHY WAS THERE a sense of let-down after October 27’s Vietnam demonstration? Why did we become aware of physical tiredness already half the way along the route?
We had a pretty successful demonstration by Richard Kuper’s definition in Socialist Worker, October 26 – we ‘maintained our structure and purpose’, we achieved the objectives we set ourselves, there were few or no arrests among those who came with us. But if our objectives do not worry the police, are they worth obtaining?
A demonstration is only the symbol of revolutionary struggle and revolutionary power – but if there have not been elements of real confrontation, how clear is the symbolism?
In past demonstrations IS has been in the thick of confrontations with the police. Each demonstration which involved collective violence brought out more people the next time.
More and more of those who took part became seriously politicised. Many would contest Kuper’s view of the demonstration of March as representing stagnation.
As our experience grew,we learned to beware of bad tactics – badly chosen streets and squares, weak sorties etc. – and of individual bravado as opposed to mass action. On July 21 we decided that the vast majority of marchers were Communist Party members, unwilling to fight, so we said ‘Let’s not get massacred now, wait for October’.
As it became clear that October really would be very large, both sides began to confuse symbol and reality. The police and press started talking of revolution, of the planned take-over of strategic buildings etc. The Maoists spoke of the need to beard imperialism in its lair – the US embassy!
Our reaction combined our earlier preoccupation with good tactics with a reassertion of the symbolic nature of demonstrations. But we heavily over-reacted, to the extent of trying to eliminate all confrontation – or rather to leave the onus for it on the police to a degree which would leave them with little incentive to challenge us at all.
We started explaining ourselves in terms reminiscent of the CP and CND. For example, we talked of opposition to individual hooliganism and concluded with unspoken opposition to mass action. We argued that we were inexperienced and the police were strong – all arguments which have always been true and will continue true until the revolution.
What we needed was to provoke a degree of confrontation in strategically favourable circumstances, and in such a way as not to alienate public opinion. Examples of this were actually proposed by our members to the Ad Hoc Committee and outvoted, e.g. the takeover of a group of streets for the conduct of a meeting. Perhaps in an East End residential area, or around the Stock Exchange.
If outvoted on these should we not have proposed others? Were we as insistent as we could have been? Could we have even threatened a boycott?
As it was, we were saddled with leading a more or less pointless walk around. We were admirably, but irrelevantly, organised for self-defence, with stewards and runners and tight-knit groups. But instead of presenting a militant alternative to Maoist adventurism, all we could do was use our organisation to physically prevent too great a diversion.
Which way from here? IS must continue to combine the politics of militant demonstrations with that of industrial struggle. On the basis of both we hope to build a revolutionary party. Let not October 27 mark the first step of a retreat from the first of these.
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Constance Lever |
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Last updated on 30 October 2020