Issued: September 2, 1979
Transcription, Editing and Markup: Paul Saba
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The starting point for any summation of the OC’s first year must be a brief analysis of the state of the anti-revisionist movement. Not only is the OC a part of this broader movement, but it was founded with the explicit purpose of rectifying its errors. From its very inception, the OC has focused its energies on the struggle to sum up the history of the anti-revisionist movement, identify its main errors in political line and probe their theoretical foundations. Given this, one can no better grasp the development of the OC in isolation from that of the communist movement than one can understand the part separated from the whole.
In the U.S. today there is a single anti-revisionist movement. Ideologically this movement finds its expression in the defense of the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism in the face of attacks of those who want to gut scientific socialism of its revolutionary essence in the name of modernization of the doctrine. Politically, it is expressed in its rejection of the key manifestations of revisionist politics – a peaceful parliamentary road to power, a two-stage revolution in the advanced industrialized countries, the anti-monopoly coalition, detente as the pivot of internationalism, and flunkeyism towards the CPSU and Soviet foreign policy. Organizationally it is expressed by a rejection of the Communist Party, U.S.A. as a viable instrument for the U.S. revolution and its demand that organizational efforts among Marxist-Leninists develop outside this party.
This communist movement is presently divided into two contending wings – an ultra-left wing and a Marxist-Leninist one. The ultra-left wing is characterized by its allegiance to an opportunist system of politics, manifest in four key areas. Its party-building line is rooted in voluntarism and spontaneity to the extent that the subjective desire for the Party becomes primary and objective reality secondary in the struggle to restore the vanguard. Its view of the relation of reform to revolution exaggerates the line between them in real life to the point that the “lefts” objectively urge the masses to avoid the struggle for reforms. In relation to the unfinished tasks of the bourgeois revolution, the “lefts” contrast proletarian and bourgeois democracy from a one-sided point of view to the extent that the democratic impulse of the masses is regarded as antagonistic to socialism. And the internationalism of the ultra-lefts overplays the danger of revisionism to the point that it advocates a united front with U.S. imperialism against the Soviet Union.
Opposed to the ultra-left wing is the developing Marxist-Leninist tendency. By decisively rejecting the “left” internationalism of the Chinese Communist Party and its supporters in the U.S., this tendency, which includes such diverse forces as the Guardian, El Comite-MINP, the Clubs Network and the OC, has broken with the principal manifestation of “left” opportunism in political line. Its separation from other aspects of the ultra-left line, while also significant, are much shallower, with some forces still clinging to the old “leftism”. Characterized mainly by a beginning demarcation with “left-wing” communism on the political level and the indications of a separation on the ideological plane, these forces have only begun to develop an alternative politics. Since their unity is expressed largely through their opposition to, and incipient critique of, ultra-leftism and not through the elaboration of a positive doctrine, this tendency is more appropriately described as anti-“left” than Marxist-Leninist.
Standing between the ultra-left trend and the anti-“left” tendency is a centrist current. Typified by such organizations as the Revolutionary Workers’ Headquarters (RWH) and the Proletarian Unity League (PUL), this current is characterized by its desire to identify itself as anti-“left” on the one hand and its absolute unwillingness to break with “left” internationalism on the other. Its compromised opposition to “left-wing” communism causes these forces, to assume the role of a buffer between the ultra-lefts and the anti-“lefts”. For example, the most advanced organization in this current, the PUL, has focused principally on attempting to win the emerging Marxist-Leninist forces to tactics of conciliating ultra-leftism. But since efforts for conciliation are bound to fail, the unity of the centrists with “left” internationalism will inevitably compel them in the direction of fusion with the ultra-lefts.
Some forces within the anti-“left” tendency (e.g. The Guardian and Irwin Silber and Co.) have argued that it is no longer correct to speak of a single anti-revisionist movement. While they have elaborated no rationale for this view, their argument would probably run as follows. “Left-wing” communism in our movement has been developed to the point that it finds expression on the ideological, political and organizational levels and thus assumes the position of a system of politics antagonistic to Marxism-Leninism. In terms of political significance it is roughly equivalent to revisionism or Trotskyism as an opportunist trend. This opportunist trend has been given added weight by the official incorporation of its chief exponent, the CIML, into the international ultra-left framework headed by the Communist Party of China. All of this makes it extremely unlikely that forces under the influence of “left-wing” communism will return to Marxism-Leninism.
At the same time as this ultra-left trend has been consolidating, the gulf between the ultra-lefts and the Marxist-Leninists has been growing. After breaking with the “lefts” on Angola, the Marxist-Leninists have continued to put more and more distance between themselves and the “lefts” to the point that on many concrete issues they share more unity with the revisionists forces than with the ultra-lefts. In fact, the divergence between the “lefts” and the Marxist-Leninists has grown to the point that they share so little in common that it is absurd to place them in a single communist movement.
While much of this analysis is true, it fails to reckon with the central point: has a decisive break been made with the ultra-left trend? A moments reflection will demonstrate that it has not. While the Marxist-Leninist; forces have broken with some aspects of the “left” line, the separation has not been consolidated and is, by no means, a thorough one. An all-sided analysis of modern “left-wing”-communism – identifying its principal manifestations, its theoretical foundation and its material base – has barely been initiated, and only superficially discussed. And even such an analysis would not provide the basis for a thorough break. A critique of “left-wing” communism, although necessary, is not sufficient; only the positive elaboration of scientific socialism can provide the foundation for the development of genuinely Marxist-Leninist trend.
The failure to recognize that a genuine ideological break with ultra-leftism has yet to be made has a number of severe consequences. In the first place it can easily lead to a false sense of security ideologically. Assuming that “left-wing” communism has been weeded out, our tendency could proceed to its tasks of seeding tender young shoots of Marxism-Leninism only to find them once again strangled by a resurgence of “left” opportunism. In addition, it is also quite likely to yield sectarian tactics in relation to those under the influence of ultra-leftism. Since only a thorough critique and an alternative politics would provide the basis for separating those under the influence of ultra-leftism from the consolidated opportunist, the unwarranted assumption of a systematic break is likely to lead to lumping the honest but misled anti-revisionists with the diehard ultra-leftists. Effectively, many forces who could be won to Marxism-Leninism would be read out of the communist movement, and consequently ignored.
Turning to recent events, in the last year there have been several important developments in the anti-revisionist movement. The first and most important of these is the continued deepening of the split between a mature ultra-left trend and an embryonic, but advancing, Marxist-Leninist one. Instead of narrowing, the political gulf between these two wings has widened. This is particularly true in connection to the divergence between the views of the main political current of the “lefts” and those of the Marxist-Leninists on international line. On the most recent manifestation of this divergence, the Chinese invasion of Vietnam, each side drew distinctly different conclusions, conclusions which would be likely to lead them to supporting diametrically opposite sides in the event of a conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And as the political gulf has been growing, so has the contention between the two; in fact, the struggle between them is sharp enough to force almost each and every new circle of communists to identify with one or another.
Despite this deepening split, the ultra-left system of politics retains hegemony over the bulk of anti-revisionists. This is indicated by the fact that the largest and longest-standing organizations still pay homage to ”left-wing” communism, even though a few (WVO, CPML) have attempted to moderate a few of their more extreme positions. It is indicated by the fact that these organizations still contain the largest numbers of, and the oldest, most experienced, anti-revisionists and in addition, still retain substantial credibility among many aspiring communists. It is also indicated by the influence that ultra-lefts have over the centrist forces, who, despite the fact that each successive world event puts a larger strain on their credulity, are unwilling to question “left” internationalism. And most dramatically, it is indicated by the fact that even sections of the anti-“left” tendency are still strongly influenced by “leftist” thinking.
Within the ultra-left wing the general trend has been towards consolidation around the CPML. Demonstrating the power of the Communist Party of China franchise, the Unity Committee established by this organization has been successful in not only advancing unity with the League for Revolutionary Struggle (composed of a fusion between the August Twenty-Ninth Movement and I Wor Kuen) and BACU but recently initiated a “unity-building” trip to People’s China which included, along with the above, such important center elements as the RWH and the PUL. In contrast, the CPML’s opponents are in a state of disintegration ideologically and organizationally. The Workers’ Viewpoint Organization has begun to talk about a so-called “capitalist restoration process” in China, and the RCP is shaking with ever more violent paroxyisms of infantile leftism, and the Albania supporters, small in size and still smaller in influence, see China as a budding “social-imperialist superpower”.
Relative to the anti-“lefts”, the ultra-left trend has been in decline. The consolidation process mentioned above is not accompanied by a growth in the influence of these forces. Ideologically stagnant, cadre recruitment has slowed markedly. In fact, they are presently in a position of extreme isolation on the left and in the mass movements. Repelled by the hidebound sectarianism of the “lefts”, broad sectors of genuine left persuasion refuse to engage in common work with them. And having been repeatedly urged down the primrose path of adventurism, the advanced elements in the working class and national minority movements spurn their appeals for united action.
While the “lefts” stagnate, the anti-“left” tendency continues to gain impetus. Within the communist movement, although still a minority, it has a near monopoly on dynamism; as the ultra-lefts rot ideologically, the emerging Marxist-Leninist tendency breaks new ground. In fact, it is the only sector in the entire communist movement engaged in serious theoretical work. Its organizations gain new recruits at an expanding rate. On the left it is the most respected revolutionary current, marked by its principled intervention in the popular struggles and its (for the most part) non-sectarian methods of relating to other forces. And, shunning the putsch-like tactics of the ultra-lefts, the anti-“lefts” are sinking roots into the mass movements, winning the respect of advanced fighters and in some cases exerting modest leadership.
The main force retarding the pace of anti-“left” development is the incomplete break with ultra-leftism. The tentative character of this break is illustrated in two key areas. First, is the struggle to consolidate the demarcation with “left” internationalism. While few organizations were unwilling to separate themselves from the class collaborationist “three worlds theory” many were reluctant to uphold a break with “left” internationalism as a necessary line of demarcation in the communist movement. In part, this stemmed from an over-reaction to the past sectarian practices of drawing lines of demarcation at every turn regardless of political consequences. But in the main it was rooted in a failure to appreciate the need to sharply draw the lines between ultra-leftism and Marxism-Leninism and the necessity to demand that these lines be upheld despite the fact that “good comrades” stand on the other side of the fence.
The hesitancy to demarcate sharply with “left” internationalism retarded the tendency’s progress towards a thoroughgoing critique of modern “left-wing” communism. An essential prerequisite to tendency-wide progress on such a critique was a sharp separation with the key manifestation of ultra-leftism on political line. Without such a separation genuine work on the nature of the “left” line would have proved impossible since forces unwilling to break with “left” internationalism would be bound to try to cover over the “leftism” inherent in their own views on the international situation. In fact, to have explored the roots of ultra-leftism with these forces would be like undertaking a joint probe of the theoretical foundations of revisionism with Gus Hall.
The second, and in fact more stubborn, example of ultra-leftism that is retarding the development of our tendency is the circle spirit. The circle spirit consists in the view that interests of the party-building movement as a whole are indistinguishable from the interests of one’s own circle. Implicit in this view is the perspective that one’s own circle of comrades contains the key elements for the central committee of the future vanguard. Instead of developing an approach designed to forge a leading ideological core through a merger of the best elements in a number of different circles, the narrow circle strategy is to vie for supremacy with, and eventually defeat, all the other circles and to thereby establish one’s own circle as the leading group. In essence, this strategy comes down to subordinating the interests of the whole party-building movement to the pursuit of organizational hegemony by a single small circle.
Among the anti-“lefts” the circle mentality is manifest chiefly in attempts to prevent our tendency from outgrowing the narrow circle exclusiveness so prevalent in it’s early development. Historically, the leading role in the struggle against ultra-leftism was played by a number of small circles of anti-“lefts”, each formulating its views, developing its strategy and carrying out its activities independently. By force of habit the leaders of these circles became accustomed to viewing their own circle interests as being identical to the interests of the tendency as a whole. And, in addition, experience at the hands of the ultra-lefts made them extremely hesitant about compromising their ideological independence to the slightest degree.
Unfortunately, what was justified in an earlier period is being carried over to the present stage of the tendency’s development. Present conditions demand that all circles of anti-“lefts” unite in common work designed to promote both the consolidation and the advancement of our tendency. And they also demand that each circles’ ideological individuality become subordinate to the struggle for principled ideological unity in the tendency as a whole. While most of the forces in the tendency have brought themselves in line with these conditions, a few circles are reluctant to allow the growing spirit ’of unity in the tendency to assert itself.
The failure to break with a narrow circle mentality is destructive in a number of ways. First, and most obviously, the failure of each circle to subordinate its work to the common interests of the anti-“lefts” as a whole breed needless divisions in our ranks, further strengthening the hands of the opportunists. In the face of the ideological hegemony of the “lefts” our tendency can, to put it mildly, ill’ afford any unnecessary splits.
A small circle mentality also serves to shield the remaining elements of “left” opportunism in our tendency. Faced with the rising influence of Marxism-Leninism which clearly has the upper hand among the anti-“lefts”, the exponents of “leftist” thinking will be bound to try to protect themselves from exposure by organizational means. Where entry into organized, centralized and tendency-wide debate means defining the real issues, sharpening the differences and setting the questions before the anti-“lefts” as a whole, spontaneous, decentralized and narrow circle contention leads to confusion, obfuscation and , circumscribed discussion. Where subordination to ideological struggle among all anti-“lefts” spells certain defeat, walling oneself off in a small circle holds forth the promise of continued influence. Thus, just as the exponents of Marxism-Leninism have the greatest interest in the assertion of a party spirit 1 in the tendency, the advocates of “leftism” have the most to gain from the preservation of circle forms of struggle.
And finally, the circle spirit retards the ideological consolidation of our tendency. It is certainly important that each and every anti-“left” learn to stand on their own two feet ideologically. They must acquire the ability to evaluate the genuine essence of two contending points of view, take an independent stand based on that evaluation and be prepared to defend their own point of view. But circle forms of struggle only slow this process. By placing principal emphasis on competition between organizations and conducting struggle only after “drawing their wagons in a circle”, so to speak, circle warfare fosters the isolation of the opposing view, the defense of the perspective of one’s own circle at all costs, and excessive reliance on leading elements.
The main defender of the circle spirit is the leadership of the National Network of Marxist-Leninist Clubs. Having made only a superficial break with the more extreme sectarianism of the Guardian staff majority, this leadership is, unfortunately, striving to carry over the splittist line of their predecessor. Although they have recently abandoned the old “let a thousand centers bloom” line and have committed themselves to the struggle for a single center, it is clear that the change is one of words and not deeds. In practice, the Club Network leaders refuse to unite with, and openly oppose, the only organization that has been genuinely working for a common national center – the OC.
The Club leaders, like the Guardian staff before them, have sought to cloak their opposition to a single center by playing on political differences. In particular, they aspire to exploit disagreements between themselves and the PWOC. Attempting to deceive the tendency into believing that the OC has covertly adopted the “fusion strategy”, they argue that their disagreements with this strategy prevent them from participating in the OC. When it is pointed out that the OC has not adopted this line, they insist that the PWOC is the de facto leadership of the organization and that consequently the OC’s failure to adopt this line is just a formality.
But the actual situation in the OC belies these arguments. Not only has the OC not adopted the “fusion strategy” but there are a number of organizations and individuals who have openly opposed PWOC’s views, often from a standpoint very close to that of the Club leaders. Far from accepting some second class or subordinate status to PWOC these forces are playing an active and important role in building the OC. Apparently, the Clubs leadership is of the opinion that these elements are incapable of grasping the supposed fact that the OC is proceeding according to a line in contradiction to their own.
The real barrenness of the Club leaders’ position is shown not in the actual situation in the OC but in their utter inability to provide a principled rationale for their decision to oppose the OC. Incapable of assessing the real political significance of its differences with PWOC and other leading forces in the OC, the Club leaders seek refuge in abstraction and generality to buttress their case. Instead of showing how its divergence relates to the concrete and particular tasks of building a genuine anTi-“left” tendency at this time, these leaders only relate their differences to the tasks of ”rectifying” the communist movement in general. Instead of demonstrating that its political disagreements prevent common work at this stage of the party-building process, these leaders only maintain that common work is impossible throughout the party-building process as a whole. And instead of explaining why it is necessary to fight for a separation in the tendency on the basis of its differences at this time, the Club leaders argue only that the divergence must be resolved in order to unite in a single vanguard party.
In essence, the position of the Clubs’ leadership amounts to fighting for a split in the anti-“left” tendency. The Club leaders deny this. They do not intend to cause a split, they maintain, it is just that they cannot participate in the OC at this time and think it would be better to pursue their work independently. But innocent words do not change reality. Regardless of intentions, to advocate unprincipled opposition to the only process designed to facilitate the principled unification of the entire tendency in the common pursuit of its most pressing tasks and, at the same time, to set up the Club Network as a competing center is to promote a split.
It is incumbent upon all forces genuinely concerned with the future of the tendency to take up the struggle against the circle spirit – particularly targeting the Clubs leadership as the headquarters of this bankrupt line. To fail to do so is not only to weaken our fight against the “lefts”, to give backhanded support to survivals of “left” opportunism in our tendency and to allow retardation of the process of ideological consolidation. To fail to do so is not only to be neutral in the face of a line which threatens to foster a splintering of our tendency into dozens of little circles all vying for hegemony. Objectively, it is also to abandon the struggle for a common party-building strategy in our tendency.
Having summed up the most important developments in the communist movement as a whole and our tendency in particular, we can now focus our attention on summing up the work of the OC in the last year.
In its first year of existence, the OC has gotten off to an auspicious start. Representing but one of several party-building centers of the genuine anti-“lefts,” the OC has nevertheless played the leading role in consolidating the anti-“left” tendency.
This fact is demonstrated by the OC’s initiatives in both the political and organizational spheres. Politically, the OC has led the struggle against ultra-leftism generally and the struggle for firm lines of demarcation with “left” opportunism in particular. It has been the primary exponent of the need to forge a single national center for the anti-“lefts”, the first line of the struggle against a narrow circle approach to party-building, and, in deeds, the advance guard of the struggle against localism and federationism. Organizationally, the OC has been in the forefront of evolving new methods for conducting ideological struggle, of developing an organized process open to all genuine anti-“lefts” regardless of their views on secondary questions, and of articulating an organizational form which allows for participation whether revolutionaries are members of organizations, study circles or are individuals.
The source of the OC’s leading role is the line it has pursued in both its political and organizational work. The OC has not adopted a narrow circle approach to its tasks, devoting its attention to consolidating its own limited following, winning new recruits and contending for hegemony with other anti-“left” forces. Instead it has focused on the consolidation of the tendency as a whole, the organization of as many of its political currents as possible and contention with the ultra-lefts. In short, the OC has consistently determined its intervention on the basis of the general interests of the party-building movement.
Let us examine the OC’s contribution in more detail. The OC’s role in the struggle against “left” opportunism has been a large one. Giving systematic attention to the ultra-left trend in the communist movement, the OC has not only consistently pointed to the ideological hegemony of “left-wing” communism among anti-revisionists but also illuminated the dire consequences of that hegemony. And although many anti-“lefts” have reduced the struggle against ultra-leftism to an effort to expose “class collaborationism on international line” - never being entirely certain whether this collaborationism was “left” or right in form -the OC has called for a broad struggle against “leftism” in all of its varied manifestations.
The OC has also made the central contribution to drawing lines of demarcation with “left” opportunism. Instead of just separating itself from “left-“wing” communism by leadership fiat, the OC has not only explicitly identified the main expression of the “left” line in the communist movement but consistently fought for a tendency-wide demarcation with it. It was’ the OC which pointed to the question of the main enemy of the world’s peoples as the key dividing line between ultra-leftism and Marxism-Leninism, exposed the “leftist” mentality underlying opposition to identifying the U.S. as that main enemy, outlined a principled approach to drawing lines of demarcation, and led the struggle to consolidate all genuine anti-“lefts” on the basis of this perspective.
And, who but the OC is most identified with the need to forge an anti-“left” trend among anti-revisionists? It is the OC’s predecessor which first advanced the call for such a trend and the OC itself has continued to be its most consistent exponent. Not confining itself to just an abstract propagation ’Of the need for such a trend, the OC has clarified the basis on which such a trend can be constructed (the l8 points and commitment to the struggle for a single center) and provided a concrete avenue for work in this direction (the OC itself). It is for this reason that the OC has, in the minds of many communists, come to be identified, albeit incorrectly, as the anti-“left” trend.
While mainly focusing on the need to oppose, demarcate with, and build in opposition to ultra-leftism, the OC has also been the primary force advancing the conception of an ideological center for our tendency. Here again it was the OC’s predecessors who first put this question before the communist movement, and it is the OC which has been key to the currency of this idea. Instead of capitulating to, or even worse glorifying, the potential existence of several competing centers by adopting a “let a thousand centers bloom” line, the OC has propagated the need to develop a process likely to yield a single leading center for the anti-“lefts” as a whole. In the interests of achieving this objective, the OC has demanded that all existing centers in the tendency commit themselves in principle to the struggle for a single center and, hardly less important, that they match their words with deeds.
Belated to this is the struggle waged by the OC in favor of a party spirit. Recognizing that the narrow circle approach to our tasks only weakens our struggle against ultra-leftism by fostering unnecessary disunity in our ranks, the OC has advocated a broader program of each circle guiding its activities according to the common interests of all anti-“lefts”. And recognizing that the circle spirit is most likely to develop among those forces who have been least thorough in the struggle against “left” opportunism for the simple reason that circle warfare provides them the best protection from exposure, the OC has consistently fought for a party spirit. For it is the development of a party spirit in relation to the interests of our tendency which is most likely to insure that ultra-leftism is routed.
Although it has been attacked frequently for “localism” and “federationism”, the OC has not failed to take up either in practice. The need to give precedence to the interests of national development over local needs has been emphasized consistently by the OC’s leadership. Both general and particular examples of localism have been pointed out and criticized - usually with good results. As for federationism, the OC has taken a number of important concrete steps to break down a federationist mentality. In the process of the leadership nominations which occurred at its founding conference, the OC made a great deal of progress towards establishing the principle that Steering Committee members should be elected as individuals and not as representatives of organizations. In the point l8 conferences, organizational delegations (with only two exceptions) were developed which represented minority views and every organization agreed not to bind its members to its own point of view in discussions. And the OC has committed itself to organizing discussion around a set of readings and a paper on the dangers of federationism in the next period. Thus, while the OC may be short on bluster as far as federationism and localism are concerned, it has not been as short in practice.
Organizationally, the OC has made a break with the old circle approach to ideological struggle. Instead of allowing the struggle for communist unity to be characterized by decentralization and spontaneity, the OC has advocated the centralization of the ideological struggle and an organized procedure for resolving differences. Where decentralization encourages an unnecessary and unprincipled polarization between forces with differing views, centralized struggle encourages principled struggle where the interests of communist unity are clearly present. And where spontaneity fosters confusion and unsystematic debate, organized contention between lines maximizes the potential for clarifying the main points of issue, exposing underlying issues and allowing for all participating to gauge the political significance of the divergence.
The OC has also stood for open, movement-wide, ideological struggle. Instead of allowing ideological debate to be confined to just the top levels of the movement, the OC has stood for a process of struggle which engages as broad a section of the tendency as possible. And instead of concealing differences within the confines of a particular organization, the OC has sought to open up two line struggle so as to allow for intervention by the broad forces in the communist movement.
Both the OC’s commitment to centralized struggle and to open debate were demonstrated in the process developed to decide whether point l8 should be a line of demarcation. A common process of study, preliminary written exchange of views and then organized debate was developed which allowed for uniform preparation, exposure to both sides of the argument and sharp contention between the two points of view. And the OC invited many forces outside its ranks to participate in the discussions and make contributions to resolving the differences.
Along with its groundbreaking approach to ideological struggle, the OC has also led the fight for a principled approach to building organization in the anti-“left” tendency. Instead on concentrating on building an organizational form excluding some sections of the movement who have made a genuine break with “left” opportunism, the OC has consistently advocated uniting all the genuine anti-“lefts” in a single organizational form. This has been done not because the OC is of the opinion that there are no significant differences on questions of principle between anti-“left” forces, but because it is firmly convinced that the differences that do exist do not, at this time, demand a split in our forces. Thus the OC has framed its basis of unity (expressed in the 18 points) broadly and has created no obstacle to the participation in its activities of any genuine anti-“left” force.
But the organizational form evolved by the OC is not just open to different political currents. It also allows for equal participation of all anti-“lefts” whether they are members of organizations, collectives, study groups or individuals. Insofar as the OC is concerned, the position of a single member should be taken as seriously as that of its largest organization. It has therefore tried to develop a process where all of its members participate basically as individuals and no special privileges are accorded to organizations.
In addition to the contributions elaborated above where it has played the leading role, the OC has made a number of other positive advances. It has established a functioning national steering committee which, while it got off to a rather slow start, has begun to play a more decisive role in the organization. Although failing to sufficiently elaborate the reasoning behind its actions, the SC has correctly focused on the key tasks facing the OC in its first year and generally discharged them well. It is the steering committee which has led in the development of both the political and the organizational conception of the OC and been primarily responsible for most of the main advances over the past year. For example, the SC has led the struggle for point 18, exposed the narrow circle spirit behind the present Club leadership, been the strongest advocates of breaking down localism and federationism, etc.
Recognizing the need for broad organization of ideological struggle, the OC has begun to articulate a set of local centers for the anti-“lefts”. While only functioning in two areas, these centers are designed to serve as local focal points for the various ideological debates, conference preparations, and other activities of the OC. Like the OC nationally, they are open to all genuine anti-“lefts” and allow for individuals as well as organizations to participate. The OC has only begun to summarize its initial experience with these forms, but it is clear that they have a very positive and centrally important role to play in the consolidation of the anti-“left” tendency.
The OC has also given substantial support to an independent effort of a committee of national minority Marxist-Leninists to organize a national conference addressing the special role of minority communists in party-building. While conscious that its main task in regard to building multi-nationality is to consolidate its own membership on the centrality of the struggle against racism the OC is also of the opinion that it should provide support for any efforts designed to increase the intervention of national minority communists in the party-building movement. To fail to do so would be to fail to recognize the important and special contribution these comrades have to make to the party-building process.
Along with support for the proposed national minority conference, the OC has devoted significant energies toward outreach. In addition to specific efforts designed to build the tendency in the South, a number of Steering Committee and other OC members have set up forums, organized discussions, and established liaisons – all designed to enlist new forces. These activities have resulted in a significant expansion of the OC’s base to the point where it now has several hundred members.
Convinced that all of its decisions on how to consolidate the tendency must be based on a thorough analysis, the OC has conducted, and partially completed, a survey on the state of the communist movement. While this survey shows that the tendency has important theoretical, political, organizational and tactical weaknesses, a preliminary analysis of the data collected so far leaves no doubt that the tendency has many important strengths that can be build upon.
And finally, the OC has begun to introduce some measure of regional coordination into its activities. In addition to assigning one SC member to assume responsibility for advancing the OC in each region of the country, there were a number of regional meetings held after the point l8 conferences.
In these meetings regional coordinators were identified and plans for various regional activities laid. This also represents an important step forward for the tendency.
There have been a number of important weaknesses in the OC’s work. The most decisive of these is the failure of the OC to pay sufficient attention to the task of consolidating its own political unity. While it was correct to give priority to defining the OC in relation to the ultra-lefts and to the rest of the anti-“left” tendency – neither of which are exactly unrelated to OC consolidation - this should not have led to the liquidation of the OC’s internal tasks. The study curriculum around the 18 points was not circulated until January of this year, no concrete plans for summing up this study have been made, and little was done on further developing the OC’s conception of how to forge a genuine ideological center. The SC also allowed further consolidation around point 18 to await the exchange between the minority and itself rather than making use of such materials as the Committee of Five’s paper, “Dogmatism, the Main Enemy and ’Left’ Opportunism”. In addition, little was done to deepen the discussion around the views of OC forces towards the nature of the ultra-left line in the communist movement.
A particularly important manifestation of the OC’s failure to pursue internal consolidation developed in relation to the struggle against racism. The SC did develop a statement on the political significance of the controversy concerning objective racism that developed at the OC’s founding conference, but it did nothing to follow up on that statement. And the SC also called for a program of study and discussion on the question but failed to take any steps to really develop one. In fact, apart from its support for the national minority conference, the SC’s only work around this vital question was the drafting of a single three page statement – a rather dismal [text missing in original – EROL]
Nor was the struggle waged against federationism or localism systematic enough. While concrete instances of each were criticized, and, for the most part, rectified, the SC failed to devote attention to either as ideological weaknesses. This resulted in a failure to insure that OC members understood these deviations theoretically and not just in the forms that they became manifest from time to time. In the case of federationism the effect of this was especially severe, creating much unnecessary confusion, particularly in the Southern California Local Center.
In addition, the SC failed to draft a written elaboration of its perspective on its main tasks and how it planned to discharge them. Because member organizations and individuals who did not have a direct link with the SC were unable to gain information on how the OC was advancing nationally, considerable disorientation and some frustration arose. Frequently this failure to elaborate its perspective served to enhance tendencies towards localism and relegating OC tasks to purely secondary status. And in more than one instance, it played into the hands of the unprincipled Guardian attack by creating the impression that the SC was exerting little real leadership.
An important aspect of its inattention to internal consolidation was the SC’s failure to develop educational materials. Only one SC document (the “Theses on the NNMLC”) incorporated a list of suggested background readings. And on no occasion were any discussion guides or study questions provided. In addition, many SC statements were written in an insufficiently didactic and popular style. Difficult concepts were often not well explained and the language used unnecessarily complex.
Along with the inadequate attention to internal consolidation, most of the other weaknesses in the OC’s work relate to inadequate leadership from the SC. An area’ of particular concern is the lack of systematic attention to the questions and problems relating to the construction of local centers. Instead of receiving regular and detailed guidance from the SC, the local centers tended to be given only minimal attention; they were pretty much left to fend for themselves. This not only retarded their advancement but prevented other OC forces from learning from advanced experiences where local centers were being forged – especially from the Southern California experience.
The SC also devoted insufficient attention to regional development. It was not until the spring of this year that any real consideration was given to this task by the SC, and that which was given was rather preliminary in character. The best example of the SC’s failing in this regard Is its role in attempting to expand the OC in the South. While a conference of Southern contacts was organized and some plans for outreach laid, the SC did not follow up on this work to any significant degree.
Having evaluated the OC’s strengths and weaknesses we can turn our attention to the OC’s main tasks in the next year. The first and most important of these is to continue the struggle to consolidate the anti-“left” tendency around a plan for a process conducive to forging a single leading ideological center. Although such a plan is but one aspect of an overall party-building line, at present it assumes the pivotal position in the whole tendency’s struggle for a common party-building strategy. Without this plan our tendency cannot consolidate its struggle against the vestiges of the circle spirit which still infect significant portions of the genuine anti-“lefts”. With it, the tendency will be able to proceed to organize a principled struggle to resolve the remaining differences on party-building line – the only kind of struggle that really holds forth the promise of uniting the whole anti-“left” tendency on the basis of a correct party-building strategy.
The procedure for developing such a plan is this. The Steering Committee of the OC should complete its draft of a plan. That draft should be circulated in the tendency on the broadest possible basis, especially targeting key forces who presently stand outside the OC. Forms should be established to draw as much of the tendency as possible into an extensive debate and exchange around the plan. Once this debate has begun to produce substantial unity, a series of regional conferences should be organized to deepen debate leading up to a final meeting that adopts a plan.
Second in priority to developing the plan, but proceeding simultaneously with it, the OC should take up the theoretical task of summing up the nature of modern ”left-wing” communism. An excellent foundation for this work was laid by the point 18 conferences which forced out in the open many of the prevailing assumptions that underlie the “left” line. But we must insure that the incorrectness of se assumptions is brought out in sharp relief and that the whole tendency is consolidated in opposition to them. And we must also strive for unity around an analysis of the basic forms, the theoretical foundation, and material basis of “left” opportunism.
Theoretical struggle on the nature of the ultra-left line should be preceded by substantial preparation of the tendency. This preparation should be based on a combination of study of classical and current materials on the subject and a lengthy paper presenting the analysis of one of the leading members of the OC. After this preparation a discussion process similar to the one outlined above for the draft plan should be developed.
In terms of its own consolidation process (in contrast to the tendency’s as a whole), the OC should concentrate on deepening its political unity in two areas. The first concerns completing the process initiated by the Steering Committee around the 18 points. The curriculum should be reviewed in every OC organization, study group or collective, and the proposed conferences held regionally. Following the conferences, the SC should draft a document summing up the discussion, making sure to identify the key questions for further work which will most certainly be raised.
Secondly, the OC must give special attention to strengthening its grasp on the centrality of the struggle against racism. Here again a combined process of study and discussion is in order – focusing on the historical development of racial and national oppression, the centrality of the struggle against this oppression historically and its most salient manifestations in the U.S. today. Along with study, some attempt should be made to sum up the work of OC members in anti-racist struggles, drawing out the mey lessons and attempting to create a more advanced basis for future practice.
Thirdly, the OC should expand its work around the federationist danger in its ranks. By carrying through on its commitment to generate some study and a short discussion paper, the Steering Committee can advance the general understanding of the nature and main forms of this deviation while, at the same time, avoiding the tendency to go too far in the struggle.
To supplement and enhance its internal consolidation, the SC should develop good educational materials. An education director should be appointed and charged with the responsibility of ensuring that the appropriate bibliographies, study guides and discussion questions are developed. And the entire SC must strive to publish documents and statements that are both readable and comprehensible.
Organizationally, the OC should make a strong priority of strengthening its Steering Committee. The SC must assume a much more active role in the OC than it has in the past. In order to achieve this, we must insure that the most advanced comrades in the OC assume positions on the SC. And we must also be certain that those who accept the responsibility of being on the SC are in the position to make this body’s work their main political priority. Along with promoting advanced leadership which prioritizes the OC’s tasks, it is important to devote greater attention to building the Steering Committee as a collective body. The more collective the leadership, the more the SC will be likely to champion the interests of the tendency as a whole, and the more the OC will be likely to deepen its leading role.
In addition, the OC should continue with its efforts to engage broader sections of the tendency in its activities. Outreach should concentrate on strengthening the OC’s minority composition and developing OC membership in the South and Southwest. In each of these three areas the SC should develop the appropriate special mechanisms to conduct the work.
Finally, the OC must give special attention to the task of developing local centers. These forms are vital to the generation of a non-sectarian party-building process and thus their development must receive strong leadership from the Steering Committee. In order to strengthen its ability to provide the necessary leadership, the SC should draft a paper summing up the experience of the existing local centers, identifying the main errors that were made and proposing solutions. Based on this summation, the SC should attempt to develop at least five more functioning local centers over the next year.
In our view, the above are the main political and organizational tasks facing the OC. By taking them up vigorously the OC can not only deepen the leading role it has played thus far in the development of the anti-“left” tendency but continue to make a strong and positive contribution to the reconstruction of a viable revolutionary party.