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★ Stage of Revolution in Iran

The following "On the Stage of the Revolution" comes from a 1980 booklet entitled "Bahsee Peramun Teorie Engelab" (A Discussion Concerning the Theory of Revolution), pp. 5-10. It represents, in summary, the views of the O.C.U. on the present stage of the revolution in Iran.

Capitalist relations of production dominated Iranian society prior to the (February 1979) revolution. These relations which have often been called dependent capitalism or subordinate capitalism, are such that according to their chief characteristics fall into the category of "capitalist" relations of production (as defined by Marx). These characteristics are the purchase of labor power in the market for the purpose of its consumption in the production process, the exchange of the commodities thus obtained in the market, and the accumulation of the resulting surplus value for investment in the following cycle of production.

Obviously, this capitalism differs from capitalism in advanced European countries and the U.S. as well as from the so-called "classic" models of capitalist development which have been characteristic of European--especially British--capitalism during the 18th and 19th centuries. Moreover, these differences, which are based on both the (specific) conditions for the development of capitalism in Iran and the present stage of international capitalist (imperialist) development in no sense place Iran's relations of production outside the category of capitalism. It is also obvious that no political force can ignore the study and analysis of the above mentioned differences and their consequences regarding the program for revolution (with respect to strategy and tactics). Thus our insistence on viewing Iran as a capitalist country should not be understood as ignoring or downplaying the specific characteristics of Iranian capitalism.

In our epoch--i.e. in the era of imperialism and internationalization of capitalism--capitalist relations of production, in any corner of the world, can have existence and meaning only in (their) relation with and dependence upon international capitalism (imperialism). In other words, any illusion about the existence of independent capitalism, or an "independent" or "national" capitalist class, or the view that any capitalist society might be able to function outside the operation of the world market and its form of

value, is mere idealism and signifies a lack of knowledge about the mechanisms and laws of capitalist development. A significant and illustrative example of the above mentioned fact is Algeria's "independent" state--capitalism and its relations with--and in fact (its) dependence upon the world market.

The principle contradiction at the international level is that between labor and capital. All other contradictions (i.e. those between imperialism and dominated nations, or between the different capitalist factions, etc.) can be explained only as various aspects and reflections of the above mentioned contradiction.

In Iran under the Shah, the bourgeoisie was the ruling class. The dominant position in the political structure and the state belonged to a certain capitalist faction (the military-bureaucratic faction) which was tied (through the crown) with international monopolies and oil monopolies. Although the military-bureaucratic faction was able to force its will upon (Iran's) and other capitalist factions, prior to the revolutionary crisis of 1979 the state power (in Iran) served the interests of all bourgeois factions (with different priorities). It must be noted that prior to the 1979 revolutionary crisis--or at least since "the White Revolution" in the early 1960's up to 1978--the various bourgeois factions in Iran lived in peaceful coexistence. It was only in recent years that the "struggles" of (Iran's) liberal bourgeoisie against the Shah's regime went beyond the usual nagging and complaints.

The 1979 revolution in Iran has been a political revolution, meaning that it overthrew the ruling bourgeois faction and replaced it with a coalition of the bourgeoisie and the traditional petty-bourgeoisie (with the petty-bourgeoisie being relatively dominant). The overthrow of the monarchy and the court meant not the downfall of the bourgeoisie but the destruction of a specific form of bourgeois domination. Due to its petty-bourgeois character and leadership, the weakness of the left forces and the lack of the class organization of the workers, the political revolution of 1979 could not become the starting point of a social transformation, i.e. a transformation in the relations of production. Therefore, the existing relations of production in Iran are still capitalist. This means that no social revolution has taken place in Iran. Although Iranian capitalism has sunk into a deep crisis and been paralyzed by economic and political blows (such as expropriations, lack of security for capital, economic

blockade, mass struggles and the workers movement) production--as far as it continues--has a capitalist nature.

The participation of the traditional petty-bourgeoisie in the ruling power (especially with respect to the role of the clergy as the political representative of this social force) prevents the absolute and open rule of the bourgeoisie. However, the petty-bourgeoisie is incapable of offering an independent social alternative of its own. The religious alternative of return to the original Islam has seriously influenced the form of various ruling institutions of the Islamic Republic. But it has already proven itself unrealizable as a solution to social problems. Therefore the tendency and movement of political power in Iran is towards the establishment of capitalist power. It must be noted that the process of the establishment of bourgeois power (and hegemony over the petty-bourgeoisie) will not be direct and unilinear, but would include various ups and downs, violent collisions and peaceful coalitions. This is due to a certain "legitimacy" and mass following enjoyed by the petty-bourgeoisie--and especially by Khomeini--stemming from their role in the revolution and their relative political boldness and firmness throughout the revolutionary struggle--as compared with the historical inability and weakness of Iran's bourgeoisie in mass mobilization and political struggle. However, as long as the left's political program has not become a social alternative--capable of being put into practice by the masses--the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the backward looking and programless petty-bourgeoisie will move towards the establishment of bourgeois power (even if at the level of mobilizing the masses) who have been used to life in the "orderly" capitalist society and are thus disturbed by the existing disorderliness and chaos. The process of the establishment of the bourgeoisie's power, its stages of development and the form of its future rule will be subject to various influences including: the international situation and the position of the international bourgeoisie regarding the continuation of the present "disorderly" situation in Iran, the relative strength of the Left, the mass struggle of the toilers and nationalities, etc. In other words, whether the bourgeoisie will establish its political rule through a coup or through the step by step strengthening of Bani-Sadr and Co., the form of this (future) bourgeois rule--i.e. the usual democratic (Republican) form or open dictatorship--the extent to which the bourgeoisie will be compelled to respect the democratic rights won by the people. . .all of these will become clear in the course of class struggle. Although

the general outline of these developments can be analyzed at the present, we will not open such discussion here in this (brief) essay.

Social revolution in Iran means the beginning of the transformation of the capitalist relations of production in the direction of the socialization of the ownership of the means of production and (the establishment) of the control of the producers over social production. The beginning and successful continuation of this transformation is impossible except under the dictatorship (hegemony) of the proletariat. The dictatorship (hegemony) of the proletariat means the establishment of a socialist regime. And the social revolution which aims at the destruction of capitalism, and hence at the establishment of the dictatorship (hegemony) of the proletariat, is a socialist social revolution. The beginning of such a revolution is the starting point of the socialist transition period.

The fact that the social revolution in Iran will be socialist does not necessarily mean that the future rising by the Iranian people will be led by the proletariat and bring that class to power. Proletariat rule might be preceded by one or several other political revolutions that could bring various bourgeois or petty-bourgeois strata (or coalitions of the two) to power. It is the relative class capacity and the relation of forces in society which will determine the path to the future and the character of the coming political revolutions (or counterrevolutionary coups). Obviously, the tactics of the proletariat in these (future) political revolutions can not be determined today. However, as a general principle which has been confirmed by the past history of the international proletarian movement as well as by the theories of class struggle, we know that in order for the proletariat to develop and move these political revolutions toward its own social revolution, the working class must maintain its political and theoretical independence and draw clear lines of demarcation between itself and the bourgeoisie and petty-bourgeoisie. It is only thus that cooperation and coordination (of struggle) with certain factions of the petty-bourgeoisie can serve the sharpening and strengthening of the proletarian struggle. Otherwise, it would be the working class that will serve the struggle of other strata.

★ Class Rule in Iran

The following is an edited translation of the article, "Class Rule: Iran One Year After the Uprising," that appeared in "Raha", no. 22, February 1980. The article analyzes political developments relevant to an understanding of the nature and policies of the "Islamic Republic." Implicit in the analysis is the O.C.U.'s view of the uprising of 1979, the role of different forces in the class struggles that followed, and the nature and responsibilities of the Iranian left. An explicit discussion of these and other issues are to be found in other works by the organisation. Unfortunately, the article analyzes events up to the election of Bani Sadr to the Presidency in February of 1980. We hope to bring this analysis up to date in our future issues. We feel however that the perspective presented is sufficiently developed to be useful in explaining later events and developments.

In order to analyze the regime's actions during the past year, we must examine the causes and circumstances under which the Bazargan government and cabinet were formed. Here we are referring to "regime" and "government" and "cabinet" because we believe the present "state" in Iran cannot and does not have any fundamental difference with the state of two or ten years ago. Capitalist states will appear in different forms until the establishment of socialism. Thus, it is necessary to identify these forms and hence avoid making every change for a change in the nature of the state.

We believe the present "state" in Iran cannot and does not differ fundamentally with the state of two or even ten years ago. In the recent political revolution the nature of the state, as a capitalist state, did not change, but its form did, from that of the Shah's regime to that of the Islamic regime. The Bazargan government, the rule of the "Revolutionary Council"¹ and the Bani Sadr government are all different expressions of the same form (the Islamic regime), each representing a temporary need and each playing its role in creating a specific set of relations.

It is important to see what were the needs which demanded such forms. In Paris, after Ayatollah Khomeini realized the gravity of the Shah's situation and the possibility of his fall, he delivered his famous speech, saying: "the Shah must go." Ending the monarchy

was not yet the issue for him or his associates. But "the Shah must go" naturally implied another question: "Who must come?" Here was the point of difference between the various forces who were all in favor of removing the Shah but had different intentions on the replacement of authority. Thus the question of "who must come?" was avoided by Khomeini until the prominence of the clergy was established (and in demonstrations was manifested by the call for the "Islamic Republic"). This period of silence, however, did not prevent each force from trying within its own limitations and goals to find an answer to the question of "who must come?".

In the past we have discussed how the inner contradictions of world capitalism, its underestimation of the depths of the popular movement and its other errors in confronting the ever-increasing struggle of the masses, as well as the rapid radicalization of the movement, obliterated many possibilities of the ruling class. As a result many, like Mr. Amini (former Prime Minister, in the early sixties), and other first-class representatives of the private bourgeoisie, were discredited even before they could be tried. The Shah's regime, forced to turn to "second-classers," out of desperation appealed to some of the "National Front" leaders--Sanjabi, Bazargan, Sadighi and Bakhtiar. Sadighi became a casualty of the internal conflicts of the National Front (and was disavowed by the Front). Sanjabi, who only a few months earlier had requested reforms from the Shah in an open letter to the Shah, traveled to Paris but could not obtain Khomeini's blessing.²

Bakhtiar came to power and his demise is well known, but what is not well known is the fact that at the beginning he had the full understanding and cooperation of his former colleagues. If there were any differences, they concerned tactics, not substance. Perhaps many also do not know that Mr. Bakhtiar, through Mr. Nazih (who became Bazargan's oil minister and is now a fugitive), was in constant contact with Mr. Khomeini as well as Bazargan and Dariush Fourouhar (a right-wing member of the National Front) and Khomeini's representative in Iran (Ayatollah Motahari and Ayatollah Beheshti).³ After Bakhtiar became unacceptable to the masses, his colleague, consultant and close friend, Bazargan, was chosen as Prime Minister by Khomeini even though he had never said one word about dethroning the Shah or against the monarchy. Millions of people, unaware of the events behind the scenes, marched to support him as if they

were supporting a revolutionary against a reactionary.

Bazargan promptly showed that he was a natural follower of Bakhtiar's path: Bakhtiar was allowed to escape from Iran; General Gharabaghi, both the Shah and Bakhtiar's chief of staff, became his military advisor; the reconstruction of the army and SAVAK began; and aided by the remnants of the Shah's regime, he began attacking the "left." Even in the speech after his resignation, he presented the "leftists" as the main cause of anarchy and the failure to solve social problems. Considering the sustained revolutionary attitude of the masses, no bourgeois regime could be basically different.

Role of the Bazargan Government

Radicalization of the movement was a grave threat to world capitalism as well as Iranian capitalism as part of it. That this threat had to be neutralized was understood by all those claiming authority after the revolution. This is why the U.S. and the first class representatives of the private sector capitalists (who were then the direct agents of the U.S.) as well as the leaders of the movement (who were just as fearful of the left) agreed so quickly on the appointment of Bazargan. As Bazargan and his partners were secretly consulting with American officials like Brzezinski, what could be the theme of their cooperation other than the "threat" from the left?⁴ Other than preserving the army and preventing the radicalization of the masses? It is natural that the Khomeini-Bazargan regime, which represented the collaboration of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie, from the beginning considered suppression of the left to be its primary task.

The record of the regime in the first months reflects this. It is composed of a series of attempts to suppress the revolutionary movement and induce the myth that "the revolution has succeeded, so now put your arms down and go back to your homes." The regime's attempt to disarm the people right after the revolution, when everyday tens of revolutionaries and guards (pasdars) were still being killed by SAVAK agents, only shows the treacherous intentions of the regime as well as its fear of the armed masses. Armed masses were a guarantee for the continuation of the revolution. The order for disarmament given to the people, as opposed to that directed toward the remnants of the regime and the SAVAK agents (who naturally would

not have obeyed the order anyway), was precisely meant for those people who during the occupation of the army bases had wrested control out of the hands of the leaders and thus complicated their joint plans with imperialism. Thus, it was critical that these arms be taken away from the people. This became the first step towards guaranteeing the continuation of the new regime.

The second step was to extinguish the fire in places where, due to special conditions, the revolution still raged. The killing of Turks in Turkoman Sahra, the massacre in the oil province of Khuzistan and the attack on Kurdistan are examples of the regime's attempts to destroy the revolutionary centers. They also reflect the fears of the rulers that those flames could spread to other places in Iran. The flames of the fire had to be extinguished; in trying to do so, the new regime was so blood-thirsty that its methods can only be compared to those of the Shah's repression.

Another directly related step taken at the same time was the attack on progressive and militant forces in other parts of Iran and the imposition of censorship. Newspapers which could, by simply giving the news and breaking the wall of censorship constructed by the "Voice of the Islamic Republic," expose the new regime's conspiracies, were shut down. The regime, however, did not take this step alone. In fact, some of the progressive organizations, due to deep misconceptions in their thought, came to the regime's aid at the time when it was shutting down the newspapers with particularly obvious hypocrisy.⁵ This move reached its climax when the regime closed "Ayandigan," the only mass daily newspaper which did not walk hand-in-hand with the regime.

Now the regime could freely begin the reconstruction of capitalism. Bankrupt companies were "nationalized." The burden of bankruptcy was lifted from the shoulders of capitalists and placed on the backs of the people. A vile and well-known tactic that has been used over and over again by world capitalism was this time shoved down the people's throats as a "great victory." And again, it is amazing that a number of left forces at first fell for this ruse.

This action of the regime coincided with hints that the capitalists would be recalled to Iran. But, Bazargan and the rest of capitalism's footmen who supported this idea acted a little too quickly. Their error was that they thought that things had calmed down

enough for the first class representatives of capital to return unmolested. A part of the people may have had trouble understanding why capital would desire the nationalization of the companies. Some of the people may have thought that the difference between the bearded face of Bazargan and the cleanly shaven one of Bakhtiar represented a difference in substance. But these same people would never accept the face of Bakhtiar again. For the time being the fugitive capitalist could still put his capital to work using other means, but he himself, his person, was not popular or acceptable.

The failure to distinguish the difference between capital as an abstraction and a capitalist in particular, and the different reflection of these two in the mind of the people tripped up Bazargan's government. It was too late. The "cat was out of the bag," and this became an opportunity for the petty bourgeoisie to settle scores.

The petty bourgeoisie--or here it is better to say the clergy--formed a coalition with Bazargan knowing he and his group were representing capital. In fact, not only knowing this but because of this they cooperated with him. The clergy were completely aware of the class character of Bazargan & Co. as well as their ties to America. They hardly disapproved of this situation; indeed it was consistent with their interests. Bazargan & Co. were the best guarantee for starting the wheels of the country's economy turning and the best opposition to the left. They were a godsend. They were acceptable as long as the clergy needed them, and as long as they didn't seek the major share in political power.

But, as soon as the clergy thought that it had established its domination and saw its rivals becoming over-ambitious, it became necessary for them to flex their muscles. Here a new toy--"the students following the line of Imam"--appeared on the scene and "discovered" that Bazargan & Co. had dealings with America! The Imam's line found millions of supporters overnight. "Imam line" organizations sprang up everywhere like mushrooms. Hysteria spread, the true anti-imperialist emotion of the people was manipulated and a second "revolution" bigger than the first began. But, it stayed limited to the streets in front of the "spy den." In other places there was not even a ripple. The secret treaties and agreements with America were left untouched. The list of the names of spies and American agents was not exposed (except here and there and then only as the

election conspiracies necessitated). The "discovered" documents remained in control and to the benefit of one particular gang.

While it was possible for the Imam's line to stun its rivals temporarily, it was foolish to ignore the rival's source of power. One can never forget hard realities for long. What are these realities in the context of Iranian society today?

The principle and determining force behind the development of any society is its productive relations. Iranian society is a capitalist society. Capital rules over Iran. Capital has its own particular laws. Capital which is non-god-fearing as well as Islamic capital; Mullah capital as well as non-mullah capital; the capital of bearded Bazargan as well as the capital of a "tagoot"⁶ Bakhtiar; the capital of a haji bazaari and that of the Zionist are in the end, all capital. They all seek capitalist productive relations. They are all based on the accumulation of surplus value, that is, exploitation. Small capital, middle capital, big capital--these are not different entities. There are not hundreds of different kinds of capital. Whoever says this is playing at deception. Consciously or unconsciously he is a spokesman for capitalism. The extent to which "small" or "large" capitalists are servants or masters of capital depends on how much capital they possess. The hope of the "small" ones is to become "large," and the hope of the "large" ones is to grow larger. This is the law of capitalism. This principle goes further than the "Aba" (religious coat) or cloak and is more determining than the hat or the turban, one which gathers the Jew, the Christian, the Moslem, and the atheists around one god who sits on a real throne if not a divine one. This is what rules the capitalist order and this is what turns its globe. Mr. Khomeini believes that this is not so. Mr. Beheshti claims that this is not so. But objective movement does not depend on the Imam's beliefs or Mr. Beheshti's claims.

This is why at that moment when Beheshti thought he was a winner, he was deluding himself, and when the Imam thought that he had run the competition out the door, the window was still left open. The struggle became anti-imperialist--a few American spies were caught, a few liberals were exposed. We did not see Bazargan's face for awhile. Mr. Amir Entezam was arrested. But once the dust had settled Mr. Bani Sadr, the candidate of the western social democrats, came out of the ballot boxes with the "decided majority vote of the

people." What a glorious second "revolution"--from Bazargan to Bani Sadr!

The Parties of Power

A year ago, during the uprising, the religious leadership had no organ for ruling other than the religious hierarchy. This was not a fault but a virtue. The religious community like other stratas were struggling against the Shah during this time. The traditional hierarchy was enough to regulate this struggle: it did not have problems of "party politics" like those presented by the Islamic Republic Party which caused some to be in power and some out of power. But precisely with the victory of the uprising, some of Mr. Khomeini's more experienced colleagues used the opportunity to form the "people's Islamic Republic Party" and created the foundation for their power. This party was able to appear as the most effective organ for exercising power in the political arena throughout the country, and in reality it became the Islamic "Rastakhiz" party (the so-called "Resurgence" party of the Shah).⁷ But the all encompassing party contained its own problems and much sooner than the covetous architects could have imagined, it fell into a combination of contradictions. Shortly after the creation of this party, the Moslem People's Republic party was formed by Ayatollah Shariatmadari and then every week parties from this or that unit of power or this or that religious center were formed.⁸ The existing factions within the Islamic Republic Party and the centers of power small and large outside the party, on the one hand, and the exposure of the nature of some of the party's powerful figures on the other caused an unstable situation for it despite its power. Each covetous leader was trying to monopolize tens of positions for his own limited gang to such an extent that others could not tolerate it.

The situation of this party recently recalls the worst days of the Rastakhiz Party of the Shah: a den for intrigue and gang fights, a center for division of power and its spoils. This could not but arouse the envy of others who were thirsty for power. But these competitors, until they themselves could establish a base and gain the implicit permission of the Imam, could do nothing.

At this point events came to the rescue. "The followers of the Imam's line" became a base for all those thirsty for power but who had been until now left out. These people, by directly aligning themselves with the Imam, went over the head of the Islamic Republic Party. But at this point the Imam's own wishes and not the

intentions of his followers became the determining factor. Immediately after the revolution the Imam welcomed the formation of the Islamic Republic Party because he himself did not have an organization and saw the necessity for an all encompassing party that would be a unifying force. But after awhile he realized that it was not an all encompassing party and could not be. Even more, the leaders of this party tried to use him for their own purposes and even tried to trick him.

The "follower's of the Imam's line" gave the Imam the best opportunity to form his own party. A party whose leaders would be dominated by the Imam, indeed would be his own theological students, who would have no existence separate from him--people like Ahmad Agha (Khomeini's son) or Mosavi Khoeini (the person who led the seizure of the hostages according to the Western press) who neither had a high position in the religious hierarchy nor were accepted by the small leadership gang of the Islamic Republic Party. It was only in this manner that they could become the party of the country's powerful.

A short time after the formation of the "follower's of the Imam's line" party, the fortunes of the Islamic Republic Party fell to such an extent that rumors were spreading everywhere that Beheshti had been arrested. The Islamic Republic Party was sure that its candidate, Jalalehdin Farsi, would win the presidency. But by disqualifying Farsi, the Imam tripped up the Islamic party so badly that it fell flat on its face. The Islamic Republic Party had to witness the victory of its rival in misery. But with all this the followers of the Imam's line have not been able to organize themselves, and they still remain a political rather than an organizational force. This is due to their own excesses, their total dependence on the Imam, and the Imam's illness.

It is certain that the Islamic Republic Party will not sit by idly. By using its size and organization it will try to reverse the tide. But we believe that this party will not be able to regain its old power and will remain as only one of the power blocks, sharing power with the Bani Sadr government in compromise and squabble.

We therefore see that the parties of power are everything except parties. These are spontaneously generated groups formed by the powerful and those thirsty for power which exist as long as the

division of power is under consideration, but which come and go with the wind. These parties resemble the Rastakhiz party in form, essence and activities. Parties by decree.

The fate of the Moslem People's Republic Party with its two to three million members (!) will show the future fate of the Islamic Republic Party with god knows how many millions of opportunists around it. These are not like serious parties. As centers for plotting, they are very serious and will remain so as long as plots and not movements are the determining factor.

Other parties of power also deserve some attention. The present national front is really the old second national front.⁹ Although it has done nothing, by staying in the "respectable opposition" it hopes to have better fortunes in the future. Especially since the exposure of the "liberals" has not affected it directly it can still propagandize its "national and independent" position.¹⁰ This is attractive since its old opposition, the third national front (Bakhtiar, Bazargan, and Fourouhar) is having a lot of difficulties.¹¹ Bakhtiar of course has been discredited. Bazargan and his relationship with the United States has been exposed. Fourouhar so far has been exceptionally immune due to his subservient character which has won him the favor of the powerful. But while his reputation is not worse than the other two, it certainly is not better. In an interview with the New York Times before the revolution, he advised the United States to compromise or there would be a revolution in Iran (!!) This was his message to American officials. If he does not watch himself, despite the fact that he was discredited in the election (defeat is not an adequate word) his documents (i.e. his past record) will also be exposed.¹² It will be shown that the vertices of the old triangle (the Iran Party of Bakhtiar, the liberation movement of Bazargan and the Nation Party of Fourouhar) has had a common focal point of unity, but this focal point is not internal to the triangle but somewhere external.

Future Possibilities

The election of Bani Sadr to the Presidency by such a high percentage of the vote (according to him the highest percentage in history) shows that despite the existing battle and fragmentation (of political power), there exists a hidden center of power that has its

own rules and regulations. This hidden center does not become hysterical, nor does it shift with the "Imam line." Nor does it become terrified by the superficial power of the Islamic Republic Party. And finally, it isn't disoriented by a slap in the face to the "liberals." Mr. Bani Sadr, regardless of how much he really knows of what is going on, wants people to believe that the difference between him and Mr. Habibi, for example, is so great that even the peasant in the most isolated corner of Iran realizes that he is preferable.¹³ The Moslem people (leaving aside for now the tagooti votes for Madani), regardless of their ties to this or that party or this or that center, have put aside everything and with a forceful majority elected this rising star.¹⁴ The "committee" leaders have spontaneously overturned the orders of the Islamic Republic Party; the officials of the "Reconstruction Holy Front" have suddenly turned their backs on Mr. Beheshti; the Pasdaran (revolutionary guards) have revolted; the people of Qom have rebelled against the venerable Modaressin (religious scholars); the tribes have not listened to the Khans; the lambs have tricked their shepherds; and a thousand other miracles have occurred until the people have replaced the lion and sun (symbol of the Shah) with a sun before which all other suns are but a dark star.

Very good. This is an image which Mr. Bani Sadr would like others to accept. But not all the people are children who were born yesterday and neither are we. We are more inclined to accept one "miracle" instead of the thirty or forty other miracles: the "secret hand" behind Mr. Bani-Sadr.

One miracle or thirty or forty miracles, the result is that among all the confidants, Mr. Bani Sadr was the closest person to the "liberals" afflicted with the "exposing anger" directed at their economic and political policies. So if two years ago we considered Mr. Bazargan the second-class representative of capitalism, do we have the right to consider Mr. Bani Sadr the third-class representative of capitalism today? We believe we do have that right. Our claim is based both upon the "unification economy" of Mr. Bani Sadr and also on his future plans, which will undoubtedly stem from the unadhesive "embellishments" of his Islamic theories. Under the present conditions, Mr. Bani Sadr is the expression of an internal current: capitalism.

We therefore predict that he and his cabinet will persistently attempt to rebuild the capitalist economy, put back to work the tech-

nicians who are ready to serve, expand the relations with the "healthy" faction of world capitalism, i.e. according to him, Europe and Japan. (In our terms the non-military factions of world capitalism—Europe directly and America through the channels of the markets they share.) Interest free loans and other such nonsense will prove to be a total deception. Naked capitalism will rule except for certain instances of liberal or social democratic reforms, where the oil revenues will be used to compensate for losses due to such pretensions as the housing bank. It will take some time before this nakedness will be self-evident. In other words, if the troublemakers don't completely tie Mr. Bani Sadr's hands, they will at least limit his movement. The first troublemaker is the remaining revolutionary demands of the masses and the existence and activities of the left. These in any case have always been a thorn in the side of capitalism and we therefore will not specifically discuss them here. But the second troublemaker is particular to Iran and an explanation about it is necessary.

After the beginning of the spread of capitalist relations, the Iranian clergy moved gradually toward the breaking of their caste limits. We saw the external expression of this in the split among different factions of the clergy who took contradictory positions in the constitutional revolution and afterwards. This split occurred along the axis of a faction of the clergy associated with relations of precapitalism (feudals, merchants, not the petty bourgeoisie) and a faction belonging to the bourgeoisie and the growing petty bourgeoisie. With the destruction of feudalism and the transformation of merchants into petty bourgeoisie on the one hand and the growing daily dependence of the indigenous bourgeoisie on world imperialism on the other, this split gradually changed and new splits appeared in the clergy caste. Today there appears two distinct factions in the clergy. One faction is mainly dependent on the petty bourgeoisie (the traditional petty bourgeoisie and the merchants who were changing) and another faction which is inspired by different stratas of the bourgeoisie.

Because the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie are profoundly linked to one another in that capital is the origin and aim of both, the battles between them must be seen as only battles within capital's front and nothing more than that. One must also recognize that besides sharing a common interest in the reproduction of capital, they also share the benefits of respecting religion and its hierarchy.

In this respect one should not bypass history by conceiving the caste of the clergy to have already completely broken apart, nor on the other hand should one fall behind history and still view the clergy as a solid caste as many leftist organizations insist upon. We must see phenomena as they are not as we want them to be according to our preconceived theories. The petty bourgeoisie has been the most active part of the movement. At the present time the clergy has the largest base among the people and since it relies on the petty bourgeoisie, the clergy has also the most power at present. Keeping in mind that the petty bourgeoisie is ignorant of the dynamic of history and of its own fate and that it is not conscious of the fact that it has no other alternative but capitalism, it does believe that it can fight capitalism here and there. Thus, we will witness resistance, struggle and ruptures between these idealists and their leaders with the passage of events and the economic development of society. In the meantime, Mr. Bani Sadr will feel the effect of these "inconveniences" directly and deeply. This battle will shape many future events. Even though it lacks the genuineness of the leftist struggle with the ruling powers, under these specific historical conditions, its short-run effect will not be any less.

It would seem that were the left to understand this situation, one of the outcomes of this battle could in fact be the disappearance of the illusions of a part of the petty bourgeoisie and its subsequent move towards the left. That is, if the left were to stand up for its leftist positions, it could contribute to the dissolution of the illusions of the radical petty bourgeoisie.

But the significant part of Iran's left, instead of drawing the petty bourgeoisie towards itself, has in fact moved towards the petty bourgeoisie and thus contributed to its strength and illusions. An important example of this was the support given by the larger part of the left to Massoud Rajavi's program and campaign for the Presidency.¹⁵ Today we cannot believe there is any sincere communist who would deny that the role that this part of the left played made the Organization of the Mujahedin more important than it had been and gave it more credit than it had had at the expense of remaining behind and trailing the petty bourgeoisie. This part of the left told the people that the future alternative was that of Massoud Rajavi. Their "conditional" explanations could only be worthwhile for their own supporters. The message that the people-at-large received was that Massoud Rajavi is the candidate representing the revolutionary generation. "We are

all behind him." It is not surprising that as a result, many who were in doubt as to their sympathies towards the Mujahedin or other leftist organizations moved even closer to the Mujahedin. This is how we "teach" the people.

In any case, we don't have the opportunity here to discuss this issue in depth. We raised it as a reminder that unfortunately the main part of the left in Iran is living for the moment, acting day by day pragmatically. It lacks a correct practice. If the situation stays the same, the left will not be able to present an alternative. In future developments, even perhaps in the next political revolution, the left will remain a supporter of this or that force instead of being a possibility itself--unless of course a "miracle" happens. And as we said earlier, we do believe in "miracles"; perhaps thistime the people will work the miracle by surpassing the left. This miracle may happen because the people move according to an objective reality while the left organizations are caught in the reflection of that reality.

FOOTNOTES

1. The revolutionary council was formed during the downfall of the Shah's regime. It consisted of handpicked religious supporters of Khomeini. The majority were mullahs and they ruled the country with Khomeini's blessing until the election of the parliament was completed and a cabinet supported by Islamic Republic Party was formed.
2. This open letter was signed by Sanjabi, Farouhar and Bakhtiar in late 1977. Sanjabi completely supported Khomeini when he was in Paris but his lack of religious background hindered his being chosen as the top man. His complete submission to Khomeini made him ineffectual as an independent leader in the future.
3. Beheshti left Iran after the 1963 massacre and was in charge of the Mosque in Hamburg Germany. This mosque was supported by the Shah's regime. In spite of the anti-Shah stand of the moslem students in Germany, he refused to take any stand against repression in Iran. Motahari was gunned down after the revolution by an islamic group whose literature claims to be an anti-imperialist anti-reactionary clerical line.
4. In late October 1979, right before the takeover of the American Embassy in Teheran, Bazargan, Yazdi and Chamron met with Brezezinski in Algier.
5. The people took to the streets in protest of the newspaper closings and great confrontations took place when the phalangists attacked these demonstrations. Some left organizations such as

the Fedayees who had the largest following at the time boycotted this protest in spite of the anti-dictatorial character of these protests. The alleged reason for the boycott was that the particular newspaper Ayandegan which enjoyed the largest distribution of any newspaper at that time was liberal. In fact, Ayandegan was not the spokesman for the liberals but from a democratic angle was consistently exposing the "liberal bourgeoisie" and the military establishment. The Fedayees did not consider the fact that although this newspaper was liberal in nature, it was being attacked by reactionary forces which were advancing oppression.

6. "Tagoot" is a word used after the revolution to refer to the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie who were connected with the Shah's regime. Understanding the use of such words serves an important function in understanding the nature of the ruling elite after the revolution. To conceal the exploiting nature of the possessing classes and their relation with the exploited toiling people, tagoot, name of a biblical ruler is used to express the enemy and the word "needy" is used to describe the toiling people.
7. On February 26, 1975, the Shah proclaimed Iran a one party state with the formation of this party and the dissolution of all other parties. Despite every effort, including intimidation and mandatory membership drives, the regime was not able to legitimize this party or make it an effective political tool against the opposition.
8. During the Shah's regime, Shariatmadari occupied a major center of religious authority and leadership. He was officially recognized by the regime and actively cooperated with it. With the intensification of unrest and opposition, particularly after Qom 1978, he cautiously opposed "violence" and "anarchy" but never directly criticized the Shah or U.S. imperialism. Differing with Khomeini on the question of the role of the clergy in politics, he briefly challenged Khomeini but along with his "Moslem People's Republican Party" was quickly silenced when Khomeini threatened to expose his past.
9. The first national front was formed in 1949 by Dr. Mossadegh and represented a loose coalition of political forces in favor of nationalization of oil. Under the leadership of Mossadegh, the Front led the anti-imperialist-democratic struggles of 1949-1953. With Mossadegh's arrest and imprisonment and the terror that followed the 1953 CIA coup, many members of the Front formed the "Resistance Movement." After a few years, this movement collapsed and it was not until the 1960's--during the political-economic crisis at that time--that some of the original Front members created the Second National Front. Distinctive features of the Second Front was its reformism and parliamentarianism. Some of the major individuals identified with it included Sanjabi, Bazargan, Forouhar, Bakhtiar, and Sadighi. There was friction within the Front on organizational matters. In 1963, several leaders

- of Bazargan's own organization were persecuted on charges of complicity in the June 5th Uprising. From house arrest, Mossadegh felt this was partially a result of the internal organizational problems of the Front. He called for a re-organization of the Front as a loose coalition of organizations rather than a single united body. This led to the formation of the Third National Front. This Front, like the Second however, was never capable of recapturing the leadership of the anti-imperialist-democratic movement that the original Front had enjoyed under Mossadegh. The O.C.U. has discussed the development and problems of National Front more fully in "Che nabayad Kard?" (What is Not to Be Done?), yet to appear in English.
10. Although the Islamic fundamentalists have still not succeeded in directly discrediting the National Front, they waged a full scale attack on "nationalists" and "nationalism" in which Khomeini also took part and not only attacked the Front but also Mossadegh. The Front, however, has lost its credibility due to its own ineptitude and incompetence.
 11. See above footnote 9.
 12. Since the parliamentary elections and his party's defeat, Forouhar has resigned from government and kept a low profile.
 13. Habibi, an old acquaintance of Bani-Sadr before and during their years abroad, has had questionable relations with Ehsan Naraghi, who in turn was connected with the C.I.A. After the revolution, he appeared as a member and spokesman of the Revolutionary Council and was Minister of Culture and Higher Education. During the Presidential Elections, after Farsi was disqualified, he became the Islamic Republican Party candidate. Today, he is a member of Parliament from Teheran. Of interest is that Bazargan's "Freedom Movement" supported Habibi's election to parliament.
 14. Admiral Madani was an Admiral in the Shah's Navy. After the revolution, he took on the post of Governor of Khuzistan and is personally responsible for the bloody massacre of the people of Khuzistan during the summer of 1979. He also ran for President in 1980. He was forced to resign his post as Governor in 1980 after he became a "victim" of the "Anti-nationalist" campaigns (see footnote 10).
 15. Rajavi was the Presidential candidate of the Organization of the Mujahedin of Iran. The Mujahedin, is an Islamic organization influenced by socialist ideas with wide support amongst the petty-bourgeoisie. It was formed in 1965 and began armed struggle in 1971, following the battle at Siahkal. Since the revolution, it has alternated between supporting different groups in power, never taking a clear stand against the "Islamic Republic" regime despite being considered to be in the opposition and under heavy attack by the regime.

★ Iran-Iraq War

The following is a summary of articles on the Iran-Iraq war that appeared in Raha'i, nos. 48-52, October-November 1980.

In this article we would like to examine some of the roots of the Iran-Iraq war and its prolongation. This will require us to briefly consider the nature of the Iranian and Iraqi societies as well as the roles played by other countries in the region and by the world powers. Finally we hope to develop some implications of the war and its possible future course for Iraq and especially Iran.

A major force in Iraq and the rest of the Arab world is the Baath party. Its slogans for Pan-Arabism, freedom and socialism are shared by many forces in the Arab world, particularly the large Arab petty bourgeoisie. The appeal of Pan-Arabism is so strong that even interference of one Arab regime in the affairs of another is often not labeled as foreign interference; thus the Arab world appears to be united. On the other hand Arab powers have, historically, competed with one another, each making its own special claims. In addition, different Arab regimes are dependent on different world powers.

These factors--unity, competition and dependence--often overshadow the "appearance" of class struggle. The "most reactionary" and the "most progressive" suddenly are allies. Saudi Arabia signs a friendship treaty with Democratic Yemen and the Palestinian movement embraces the reactionary sheikdoms. Even within the Arab countries the line between progressive and reactionary forces is very confusing at times.

Another principle among the Arab petty bourgeoisie, stemming from its class origin, is anti-communism. This is best exemplified by the anti-communist campaigns of Nasser and Qadafi.

Iraqi-Baath Party

In Iraq the Baath Party has its own peculiarities and problems in a heterogeneous society including Kurds and both the Sunni and Shiite sects of Islam. Several problems confront the regime: the Sunnis are a minority versus the Shiites; many Kurds refuse to

submit to Baath rule; sectarian conflicts divide the Baath party itself; and more important is the contradiction between the party and the army, which to some extent reflects the contradiction between the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie. The regime's response to these problems has been unimaginable repression. Only fascistic tactics and oil money have allowed the regime to survive. Of course, we must mention the complicity and miscalculations of other forces such as the Communist Party of Iraq and Iraq's Democratic Kurdish Party.

In the recent past Iraq has claimed leadership of the radical Arab regimes. Of course this was easier with 1000 kilometers separating it from Israel. The death of Nasser and the decline of Nasserism, especially after Sadat's "White coup d'etat," opened the way for Iraq's ambitions; these were furthered by the entanglement of Syria in Lebanon and the Egyptian-Libyan border conflict.

Saudi Arabia is the other party contesting for hegemony in the Arab world. The Saudis, with endless oil money and political stability, are the strongest financial and political Arab power, but because of their ultra-right positions and the country's small population, they could not take a leading role within Arab petty bourgeois radicalism.

After 1973, Iraq was the only one who could play the role, but first the Iraqi regime had to deal with its internal enemy (the Kurds) and external competitor (Iran). The Kurdish movement was defeated after the 1975 Algiers' Treaty and the external competition (the Shah and his army) were defeated by the heroic people of Iran. Thus the way was prepared for Iraq's leadership of the "Arab nation," but after the Camp David agreement, other Arab rivals (Syria and Libya) emerged as strong contenders.

The Importance of the Algiers Treaty

Bumedian of Algeria mediated between Iraq and Iran on the issues of the Kurds and the Shat-al-Arab waterway and the Persian Gulf. The result was the Algiers Treaty. Item 2 states that "the water boundaries of the two countries" (i.e. the Shat-al-Arab) "will be based on the Talweg line" (the line along the deepest part of the channel). Item 3 states that "the two countries will observe mutual security and trust along the common borders." Iraq stopped

supporting the Ahwaz Liberation Front and jailed its members. What happened to the Kurds is well known. In other words the Kurdish and Arab peoples paid the price for the Algiers Treaty.

The Iraqi Bourgeoisie

Oil capital helped create a new bourgeoisie from the ranks of the ruling petty bourgeoisie. The Iraqi bourgeoisie, which was enjoying billions of petrodollars and five billion dollars yearly trade with the United States, couldn't allow the ambitions of the petty bourgeoisie to remain unchecked. The traditional bourgeoisie, through its stronghold in the army, used the issue of territorial losses (a result of the Algiers Treaty) as an example of petty bourgeois incompetence. Saddam had to show that he was no longer petty bourgeois, and he had to prove it to the army. In order to satisfy the army the most modern equipment was purchased (from the Soviets and later on France), and the salaries of the military personnel were markedly increased.

The petrodollar was turning Iraq more and more into a consumer, Western dependent society. At the same time the gap between rich and poor was widening, and dissatisfaction among the working people was increasing. Internal problems were rising and military adventure seemed the only way out.

The war against Iran was a chance for Iraq's bourgeoisie to extend the army's role in the internal politics of Iraq and also to resist the pressures imposed on Iraq after unification of Syria and Libya, which would have meant closer ties with the Soviet block. Thus under the bourgeoisie Baath Pan-Arabism, instead of following an anti-Israeli, pro-Soviet line, choose an anti-Persian, pro-American direction.

On the Iranian side, the suppression of the Kurdish and Arab peoples, the war in Kurdistan, the relative paralysis of the imperial (now Islamic) army, and Iran's propaganda on "exporting the revolution" and its attempts to assert its dominance over the Persian Gulf all played a role in provoking Iraq. The propaganda directed at Iraq's majority Shiites was especially irritating for the Baath regime. The relative immobilization of the Iranian army acted as an invitation.

Each of the other regimes in the region had its own vested interest in the Iran-Iraq conflict. For example, Saudi Arabia, which is militarily weak yet in competition with Iran, considers Iraqi military might as a guarantee for Arab interests in the Gulf, especially since the Saudis had their own conflicts with the Islamic regime.

The major world powers also had many interests in the conflict. Indeed it is unlikely that a war was possible without their approval. It is difficult to detail the interests of the world powers or to pinpoint one consideration so great as to trigger the war. For the moment, let us mention that the complete cut off of Iranian and Iraqi oil exports provided the means to deal with the "oil glut" confronting the oil companies.

Consequences of the Outbreak of Hostilities

The outbreak of hostilities has serious potential consequences for the regimes of Iran and Iraq. If Iraq, despite the heavy Iranian resistance and prolongation of the war, can continue its advances in Khuzistan and strengthen its positions, then it can turn the balance of war in her favor. The Iranian regime, without oil revenues or other income or financial resource and lacking fresh military supplies, would not be able to sustain its war effort. The economic hardship would be more profound in Iran than in Iraq. On the other hand, Iraq's military opportunity was based on a quick victory. Its size, population and above all lack of internal homogeneity work against a victory in a longer war, which the Islamic Republic considers to be its only chance. If unforeseen events don't change the picture, the Islamic Republic is confident of winning or at least containing Iraq. This explains Iran's refusal to accept a ceasefire or mediation. A ceasefire now means conceding defeat, increased public dissatisfaction and increased chance of a coup d'etat, while prolongation of the war means prolongation of the Islamic regime.

For the Iraqi regime, a quick victory was supposed to bring increased internal stability and eventual hegemony in the Gulf. Now the regime may face serious challenges from the army and dissatisfied masses. If Saddam is forced to retreat and compromise, the army will pose a critical threat. However, in either event Iraq's move towards the west is irreversible and one way or another the

present war will play the same role for Iraq as the 1973 war did for Egypt, meaning that Saddam (with the approval of the bourgeoisie and the military) will move towards the west and end his half-hearted relationship with the Soviet Union.

For Iran the result of the battle is even more important than it is for Iraq. Many assume that the need to strengthen the army will in turn strengthen Bani Sadr and the bourgeois wing. This, however, may be shortlived and affected by many other possibilities. Of course, the nationalistic sentiments will for the time being strengthen the ruling bourgeoisie's hand. The war will also postpone open confrontation between different groups of the ruling elite. But this is only temporary. The Islamic Republic will be stronger in case of a victory, to the advantage of the dominant wing, but this requires the continuation of the war.

The regime and its various factions are pursuing special objectives. The regime wants to mobilize the toiling masses and further their illusions about the Islamic Republic. The clergy wants to reduce the threat from the army by relying on the role of the masses in future confrontations. The army, by using the "people" and their determination in the fighting, hopes to hide its own shortcomings in the war; by cooperating with the people, it cleanses itself of its past and prepares for the future. The future for the army might even mean full control of state power. Thus the army is fighting on two fronts, militarily against Iraq and internally against its clerical allies. This explains why Bani Sadr is spending his time on the battle fronts, leaving the daily state affairs to Prime Minister Rajai and the Islamic Republic Party.

Despite its importance, however, the regime runs the war effort with its usual incompetence. With the enormous arsenal inherited from the Shah it surrenders 20,000 kilometers of Iran to the "infidel enemy." Despite the heightened religious and national sentiments of the people, the regime still is not able to supply food to the front line troops! A combination of the Shah's rotten bureaucracy, the ignorance and short-sightedness of the reactionary mullahs and the megalomania of Bani Sadr (the Supreme Commander) has produced this drastic show of incompetence.

Yet this war, as the ruling body has declared, will be the major battle of the Islamic Republic in the next few years. The regime knows that victory (the recovery of the occupied territory or at least an effective long-term resistance against Iraq) will mean its own survival and regional and international recognition. Otherwise defeat will herald doom. The presence of mullahs on the battlefields demonstrates the importance the clergy attaches to the war. Like the army, the clergy is engaged in military war against the Baathist "infidels" and political war against the groups challenging the regime. This effort expresses itself in the creation of the Supreme Defense Council, increased control over radio and television, more emphasis on the hostage issue, and increased publicity of the role of the Revolutionary Guards (as opposed to the regular army).

One result of the war is already apparent. Under pressure from the bourgeoisie and the army, Iraq is moving towards alignment with the west. Not only did Iraq support the defeated counter-revolutionaries (the Bakhtiar-Oveisi gang) but by reconciling with the Saudis and asking Jordan's help, it showed its future intentions. These signals were promptly reciprocated by the United States: Jordan's dictator was sent by his masters to Iraq's aid and AWACS planes were sent to Saudi Arabia.

These moves affected the regimes in the region as well as the Soviets. Syria and Libya were neutral at the beginning of the conflict. Syria even allowed Iraqi oil to be shipped through the Syrian controlled pipeline. But once the Iraqi international orientation was apparent, Syria and Libya sided with Iran, not militarily or financially, but politically. Colonel Qaddafi directly condemned Iraq and Assad indirectly did so through the Al Baath paper.

The Soviets also reacted, first with the friendship treaty with Syria, then by condemning the aggressor (i.e. indirectly Iraq), and eventually by offering arms to Iran. North Korea played the emissary role for the Soviets by selling small arms to Iran. Even Moscow radio, which had supported Saddam's anti-imperialism until the beginning of the war, chose silence on Iraq's political positions (which spared the pro-Soviet Iranian Tudeh Party from considerable embarrassment). On the other hand, Moscow is moving cautiously. Reagan's electoral victory, the probable demise of Salt II, the question of who will rule Iran after the war and the extreme anti-Soviet line of the Ayatollahs compel Moscow to choose

its steps cautiously and day-by-day. The Soviets offer arms to Iran and at the same time continue arms shipments to Iraq.

The White House has been cautious to show enthusiasm over Iraq's leap towards the West. Carter expresses concern over "Iran's territorial integrity" and hints at the delivery of military spare parts. At the same time he sends AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia and instructs Jordan to help Iraq. Later on Carter suggested that a "unified, strong Iran is in our national interests." After this change in U.S. position, Sadat condemned Iraq and Jordan and declared that the Islamic Republic was the only legitimate government of Iran. The pro-American Ayatollah Khomeini of Iraq broke his silence and condemned the Iraqi invasion.

These moves appear contradictory, but the real contradiction is in the war situation. The United States is placing its hopes in the armies of both Iran and Iraq. There are two main reasons behind the U.S. position. First, Iraq's regime is inexorably moving toward the west, and therefore presents no problem for U.S. imperialism. On the other hand, with an unstable regime Iran could move towards the Soviet Union. Thus, American policy is also based on neutralizing Soviet plans and encouraging Iranian rulers to move closer to the United States.

War and Oil Interests

An important effect of the war for the entire world has been the cutoff of Iranian and Iraqi oil exports. Before the war, even with Iranian oil production reduced to a trickle, the western nations had built up a surplus inventory of oil, resulting in downward pressure on oil prices. The removal of all Iranian and Iraqi oil from the world market put an end to the "oil glut." Oil prices started moving upward again; hence the value of Alaskan oil, North Sea oil and oil held in inventory by the oil companies took a giant step upward. This will, in general, aid U.S. capital vis-a-vis west European and Japanese competition. Furthermore, it is easy to see who will be called in to rebuild the ruined oil facilities of both Iran and Iraq.

Another consideration is the losses suffered by the non-industrial nations. Since the 1973 oil embargo and during the recent economic strains they have been the real losers because their real

energy crisis has slowed their development. Indeed, imperialism has managed to maintain and widen the gap between the underdeveloped and industrial nations, while those who have the oil end up under imperialist domination. Their revenues pour into the imperialists' pockets to buy military equipment. If they build any industry, it will be destroyed by each other's bomber planes. The net result is the total transfer of oil wealth to the imperialists.

Who Is Fighting? Is It A People's War?

The Iranian authorities claim that the war is between the Iraqi government and the "people's" forces of Iran. The regime's propaganda tries hard to picture "the official armed forces" as something like Vietnamese heroes. But the truth is that except for people's committees initiated by progressive forces, all other institutions involved in the "defense" are official government organs. Thus this is a war between Iran's official armed forces and Iraq's official armed forces.

The great importance of recognizing the war as a classic one between armies of ruling classes is its implications on the "limitations" of such a war. A classic war between small countries which are dependent on military technology, necessarily is a war which in its initiation, subsequent course and termination is in line with the policies of the countries exporting the technology. This is so obvious that even Iran's fundamentalist rulers started to flatter the "infidel" Kim Il Sung to get small arms.

A Question of War and Revolution

Whether the war will bring about a revolution or further stabilize the Islamic Republic remains to be seen. Many factors, above all the outcome of the war, the position of revolutionary and progressive organizations and the economic crisis, will shape the future changes. What is very apparent, however, is that if the regime of the Islamic Republic does stabilize, then unprecedented repression will make it very difficult for progressive and revolutionary organizations to function on a larger scale. The establishment of a new Department of Anti-rumor Activities

under the direction of former SAVAK officers, widespread attacks on progressive bookstores and newsstands, the promotion of an hysterical atmosphere in the "fight against the enemy's fifth column," and the arrest of progressives are but the dawn of the forthcoming repression, which, if successful, will require new methods of struggle for persistent revolutionary forces.

The hostage issue, of course, has limited the maneuverability of both the United States and Iran. Carter was only able to satisfy at most two of the Iranian's demands. Until the hostage issue is resolved Carter and Reagan will, for political reasons, be severely constrained in attempting to steer Iran in a pro-West direction. The Islamic Republic also faces difficulties in coming to terms with America, such as the presence of unsatisfied groups within the ruling body. But the most important and difficult problem is how to satisfy the masses, whose anti-imperialist sentiments were used by the clergy to consolidate its power. Any compromise could add considerably to the disillusionment and dissatisfaction of the people. Finally, the last problem for the Iranian regime is to convince U.S. capitalists that the Islamic Republic is worthy of support from U.S. capitalism. Attacking the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party and extending the scope of anti-Soviet propaganda as well as suppression of the Progressive forces were all done at least in part to achieve this objective.

Let us recapitulate. The basic goals of Iraq's foreign policy in this war were hegemony over the Persian Gulf and the Arab world, the weakening or overthrow of Iran's regime and closer ties to the west. Iraq was counting on a quick victory. As a result of the prolonged war: Iraq failed to gain leadership of the Arab world and left the group of radical Arab states; Iraq's domination over the Persian Gulf faces severe obstacles, including Iran's navy; Iraq's leap towards the west, though an established reality, is still far from completed; the Soviets achieved an unsteady foothold in Iran, though the two nations are far from signing a friendship treaty.

Once the hostilities began and Iraq enjoyed its initial, partial successes, the Iranian regime, both the clergy and the army-Bani Sadr wing, had no choice but to prolong the war in the hope of eventually turning the tide. Of course the failure to achieve

victory could topple either regime. We have seen that this is not a just and inevitable war, but a war against the people of the region. No matter what will happen militarily, the peoples of the region will be the losers, while the world powers will be the winners, with U.S. imperialism and the oil cartels taking the lion's share. However, given the situation in Iran and the experience of the February 1979 revolution, the possibility remains that war can give birth to another revolution.

What Will Be the Outcome of the War?

With American support and subsequent relations and shipment of arms, the Islamic Republic's armed forces can gain more. On the other hand, the United States is now against the extension and continuation of the war. They have achieved their objectives and now are afraid of the growth of the left in Iran and instability in the region. They may exert pressure on Iraq through Saudi Arabia and Jordan to end the war. Also the major European allies, especially France, share U.S. concern over a prolonged war and can put pressure on Iraq as well. The Islamic conference and General Zia's effort are all but reflections of these concerns.

In summary, the war proved that imperialism is the final winner and the masses of both nations the losers. Though with American support Iran's military position will be strengthened and this will prolong the regime's survival, in the final analysis this will expose the regime of the Islamic Republic to the masses and ruin its prestige more than ever before.

★ Short History of O.C.U.

The following is taken from "Dar Tadaroke Engelabe Socialistee" (In Preparation for the Socialist Revolution), a small book published by the O.C.U. in 1979. It gives a short introduction to the organisation, by the organisation itself.

In 1970, some small communist circles of Iranians who had been active in the anti-imperialist struggles in Middle Eastern countries joined together and formed the Communist Unity Group (CUG). This group began to prepare for transferring its activities to Iran by seeking contact with the revolutionaries inside that country.

Initial contact was established with the Organization of the Iranian Peoples' Fedae Guerrillas (OIPFG). It was agreed that the two organizations should coordinate their activities while continuing a process of theoretical elucidation. During this period, which lasted three years, the OIPFG and the CUG carried out a series of joint actions, among which were the following:

Participation in the armed struggles of Oman's National Liberation Movement; close political and military collaboration with Palestinian revolutionary organizations; participation in the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 and the Lebanese civil war of 1974-75 (in the southern front against Israel); military and political training of Iranian revolutionaries; and general revolutionary propaganda work through radio broadcasts and the publication of over 40 books and pamphlets concerning the Iranian revolutionary movement.

The CUG had also established contact with the Organization of the Iranian Peoples' Mujahiddin, and despite theoretical differences cooperated with that progressive Islamic organization.

In 1975, conflicting theoretical positions between the CUG and the OIPFG reached a critical point. The CUG opposed what it considered the OIPFG's Maoist-Stalinist positions and its insistence that military actions had to be the main form of communist struggle against the Shah's dictatorship. Meanwhile the OIPFG had come under a violent wave of attacks by the Iranian military and police and most of its members, including the leadership, were murdered in clashes. This situation caused the CUG to lose its contact with the OIPFG, as

well as with its own membership in Iran.

When the ties with Iran were reestablished, the CUG began a new stage in its struggle, this time as the Organization of Communist Unity (OCU) and independent of the OIPFG.

During the 1978-79 revolution, the OCU members in the Middle Eastern countries returned to Iran and joined their comrades in the struggle for the overthrow of the Shah's regime. The OCU views the fall of the monarchy as a political revolution and considers the present Iranian regime as a counterrevolutionary coalition of bourgeois and petit-bourgeois forces which stand in the way of the social revolution in Iran.

The following points are a summary of the OCU's ideological and political positions:

1. The world view of the OCU is that of scientific communism.
2. There can be no real freedom in class societies. Only in classless society can real human freedom and creativity be achieved.
3. Capitalism is an international system. Monopoly capitalism wages its economic, political, and social oppression upon the masses of the people and workers of the entire world. The international socialist revolution is the only means for destruction of capitalist oppression and exploitation. Since the proletariat is the historically progressive class in capitalist society, only its direct rule can lead to the ultimate freedom of human society.
4. The common interests of the world proletariat stem from the fact that the workers of the world are under the exploitative rule of international capitalism with no exception and regardless of their race, nationality, culture, religion, and language. Proletarian internationalism is among the principle theoretical positions of our--and every other--communist organization.
5. Iran is a capitalist country. The basic contradiction in our society is that between labor and capital; and the basic class war is that between the working class and other toilers against the bourgeois class and world imperialism. Therefore the only social revolution that can end exploitation and change class relations in a fundamental way in favor of the working class and popular masses is a socialist revolution.
6. History of the world, since the dissolution of primitive communal societies, has proven that no ruling class would ever peacefully surrender its position and interests to other classes. Thus

the use of class violence is the only means for the toiling masses, in Iran as well as internationally, to liberate themselves from exploitation and oppression.

7. While imperialism and the ruling class maintain their domination through the use of military power, revolutionary struggle in the preparatory stage, as well as in the actual carrying out, of the socialist revolution can only take the form of politico-military struggle.

8. Revisionism in its various manifestations, such as reformism, parliamentarism, etc., has led to deviations and defeats of the international working class movement. Communists must struggle against those groups, parties, and states that advocate revisionist ideas of class collaboration.

Among other deviations in the communist movement are Maoism, Trotskyism, and Stalinism. The Communist Unity Organization wages a specific and all sided struggle against these deviations.

9. In our view, proletarian internationalism means solidarity with the workers of all countries and complete independence from all powers, including the states, which proclaim themselves to be the representatives of the workers. This means independence from all governments, a critical approach towards the policies of all governments, and condemnation of the nature and policies of the so-called 'socialist states' that take positions contrary to the interests of the peoples of the world and make deals with imperialism and its puppet regimes.

We do not recognize any world center or 'home land' for socialism and fight the hegemonism and national chauvinism that attempts to present itself as socialism.

Objectives of the Communist Unity Organization:

1. Ultimate objective: to take part in the building of the communist party in order to achieve the socialist revolution and to struggle for the maintenance of a society free from class oppression.

2. Interim objective: participation in the class struggle of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie, advancement of the theoretical level of the movement, and struggle for building in Iran of the politico-military revolutionary organization that can serve the communist world view.



Manuchehr Hamedi

Manuchehr Hamedi is one of the founders of an Iranian communist group which later came to be known as "Communist Unity Group." During the Iranian Revolution of February, 1979, the group continued its struggle as the Organization of Communist Unity. Hamedi's struggle against the Shah's dictatorial regime dates back to the period following the 1953 CIA-sponsored coup d'etat. At that time he had joined the National Resistance Movement formed from several pro Mossadegh organizations and individuals opposing the Shah's regime.

In 1959 Hamedi went to Europe and used all his efforts to organize and extend his struggle against the puppet regime in Iran. He was one of the leaders of the Iranian National Front Abroad (a progressive democratic organization). Manucher was also one of the founders and pioneers of the Confederation of Iranian Students - National Union (CISNU).

Hamedi was a student of the Dentistry School in West Germany but could not finish the school because of his full time political activity. Due to his extensive struggle against the Shah's regime and its imperialist masters, Manuchehr's Iranian passport was confiscated by the Iranian consulate and he was frequently prosecuted by West German police. Only the worldwide support of Iranian students and the international support of progressive and antifascist organizations and individuals prevented his deportation from West Germany.

Years of political struggle against imperialism and dictatorship led Hamedi to the conclusion that Marxism is the only means to the liberation of the toiling masses from exploitation and oppression. He co-founded an Iranian communist group outside Iran to prepare conditions for joining the revolutionaries from inside Iran. Together with some other members of the group Hamedi went to the Middle East. As an international duty he participated in the revolutionary struggle of the Palestinian people. The group waged some of its political struggle through the Iranian National Front in the Middle East. During the struggle in the Middle East the group came in contact with the Iranian revolutionaries from inside Iran, including the Organization of the Iranian People's Fedayee Guerillas (OIPFG). The group and OIPFG started a process of unification. During this process (that was later terminated because of ideological differences) in November, 1974 Hamedi was sent to Iran to take part in the revolutionary struggle inside, side by side with the fedayee. Hamedi was active underground until the spring of 1976. In the Shah's regime's barbarian raids of March and April of that year on OIPFG many revolutionaries, including Manuchehr Hamedi, were martyred. Only after the February 1979 revolution did it become known with certainty that during those 1976 raids Hamedi had been murdered by the regime.