

BOLSHEVIK MESSAGE



No. 7

PAPER OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAN—THE COMMITTEE ABROAD MARCH 87

Reagan's secret diplomacy & the position of the Islamic Republic

The following article has been translated from issue no.29 (Dec.86) of Komonist, the central organ of the CPI.

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The disclosure of the confidential diplomatic contacts between the Islamic Republic regime and the officials of the Reagan administration and of the arms shipments to Iran by the USA and Israel during at least the last one and a half years, took place against a background of intensified disputes and in-fightings within the Islamic government. The disclosure has, in turn, once again brought these disputes into the open at a new level, with new pretexts and fightings means, and is further aggravating them.

The disclosures owe their emergence to the intense rivalries and conflicts within the government during the last few months, whose climax came, one to two months ago, with the kidnapping of the Syrian diplomat in Tehran, the arrest of Mehdi Hashemi and his band, the dissolution of the organisation of "Mojahedin of Islamic Revolution", the sulking and later reconciliation of Ayatollah Montazeri and the latter's resignation before Khomeini. Mehdi Hashemi, who is a close aid to Montazeri and



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Some questions and answers on the struggle of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Nicaragua

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China: ten years after Mao

The following article has been translated from issue no.13 (Sep.86) of Pishro ("Vanguard"), the organ of the Kurdistan Organisation of the CPI-Komala. It was originally broadcast by the Radio Voice of the CPI.

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September 9 marks the 10th anniversary of the death of Mao Tse Tung, the leader of the Chinese Revolution and the chairman of the Chinese Communist Party. In the ten years after Mao's death, China has gone through such developments which have turned Mao and the line he represented into the past or, more precisely, into the history of China.

During these ten years not only has the enthusiasm of the "Cultural Revolution", as a "new flight into the Chinese Revolution", died down, but the period is now being recalled in terms of the "revolt of the youth", "the period of insanity, disorder and agitation".

Economically, in the present-day China, capitalism is unfolding itself all the more explicitly in its classical form, and private property is receiving new legal guarantees. The statesmen and economists criticize the limitations of planned production, and private initiatives receive encouragement and sanctification. The village Communes, i.e., the collective ownership and activity of those who worked the land, disintegrate and the land falls into the private ownership of the small landowners.

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WORKERS OF THE WORLD, UNITE !

the head of the bureau of "Islamic Liberation Movements" - i.e., in fact, the counter-revolutionary and terrorist operations of the Hezbollah* in the Lebanon and other regions, and which belongs to an extremist pan-Islamic line - was arrested by the ruling wing of the Islamic Republic on charges of treason, murder and kidnapping (The kidnapping of the Syrian diplomat has been linked to him). Replying to a letter by Keyshahri - the Information Minister - who was enquiring about how to deal with Mehdi Hashemi and his band, Khomeini personally demanded that Mehdi Hashemi and his "deviations" be "killed" and whoever spreads "rumours" be dealt with utmost resoluteness. It has now become clear that Mehdi Hashemi and his group who were engaged in bitter internal rivalries with the regime, and who were opposed to the policy of exchanging the American hostages for military equipment, as well as to the recent policy on the war, namely, the procrastination of the Great Offensive in favour of trying to politically exploit the present situation and come to a deal over it (the plan opted by Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Syrtani), and who evidently was fully aware of the diplomatic contacts with the U.S. government and the Israeli-American arms deliveries, set out to make disclosures about the affair and strongly attacked the ruling line for its "compromise with the USA". The accusation of "spreading rumours" concerns this same disclosure.

Meanwhile, the Lebanese newspaper, "Al Shara", which apparently received the information from the supporters of this line in Lebanon, published the report about the arms deal affair and Mc Farland's trip to Iran. Thus the matter went out of the frame-work of internal conflicts in Iran, making it increasingly difficult for the Islamic Republic to keep its silence. As the American magazine, Newsweek, put it, had it not been for the domestic disputes and conflicts of the Iranian regime, the case of the American arms shipments to Iran may never have been disclosed.

At any rate, the Islamic regime's ruling wing's reaction to these exposures was, on the one hand, to come down heavily on Mehdi Hashemi and, on the other, to make public the American connection and demagogically try to distort and justify it. The first time Rafsanjani talked about the matter, he spoke of a number of hand-guns having been sent, together with a cake-like key, as a gift to the heads of the Islamic Republic. Only when the news of the arms sales had been taken up by almost all the world's media, did Khamenei* speak, not of hand-guns, but of military equipment which Iran had a right to and which the U.S. government must deliver to the Islamic Republic. The Islamic regime's radio repeatedly quotes the world press about the crisis in the U.S. foreign

* The Party of God-Tr.

* Islamic regime's president-Tr.

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policy and the discredit of the Reagan administration has not been due to the arms deliveries to Iran! What the heads of the Islamic Republic have so far seriously refused to face and answer are questions such as the continued relations and repeated arms deals with the U.S. from at least one and a half years ago, the existence of Israeli mediators and generally the mediating role of the Israeli state, the connection between this issue and the release of the U.S. hostages in Lebanon, the continued export of weapons from Israel to Iran, and so on. Although one day someone called Mc Farland visited Iran, received a negative reply and then left, with the matter closing here.

The effects that this scandal has had in aggravating the internal conflicts and contradictions of the Islamic regime have already become clear. Khomeini in his first speech after these events, on the occasion of the Unity Week, while defending the policy of the government and the dominant faction and describing the scandal as a victory more important than the previous ones and a sign of America's impotence and weakness, also strongly and explicitly admitted that he himself had been aware of the secret relations and arms deals. He attacked also a group of djalis deputies - who in a sharply - worded letter had called for censure on the foreign minister, regarding the recent policies calling their protests more virulent than those of the Radio Israel against the Islamic Republic. A few days later, it was the turn of the pro-government deputies to write a letter in reply to the opponents, strongly attacking them and approving of the government policies. Now that the scandal has broken out, the stronger side, namely the Rafsanjani-Cabinet faction which had the initiative of the policy and which appeared to have temporarily united the oppositionist factions (or at least hushed them up) in beating down and smashing the Hashemi band, has been met by a new and powerful wave of opposition. The opponents, without necessarily opposing the essence of the policy, have found in this affair a weapon with which to strike the government.

But beyond the reports concerning this scandal and behind the great sensation surrounding it, we must answer the question which is of prime importance to revolutionary workers, that is, what is the real meaning and cause of this secret diplomacy, and what is its place in the U.S. strategy towards Iran, the present position of the Islamic Republic and the future political life of the regime?

In the first days of the disclosure of the affair, the U.S. was trying to justify the secret shipment of weapons and equipment to Iran in terms of the release of the U.S. hostages in the Lebanon. And it was precisely this point which formed most of the criticism of the bourgeois circles and press in Europe and America of Reagan's policy. But the very beginning it was apparent that the release of the

hostages could not have been the main objective of this policy. The hostages' release could only have formed an outfit and a cover for the main aim or in any case its decorative and non-strategic part. The English journal, "Economist", the spokesman of the right wing of imperialist bourgeoisie, even before the wave of oppositions and criticism of Reagan's policy had got under way and Reagan had explained in his first television interview the reasons for his actions, clearly formulated the aim of this policy, and in an article entitled "The Hostages' Price" wrote: "It is a mistake to pay ransom, unless the payment is linked to another, wider goal". And in explaining and approving of this "wider goal", it went on:

"The sending of arms offers America a means of influencing the Gulf combats. If America is now pulling on that lever... by letting weapons go to Iran, it should be doing so in the service of its larger geopolitical interests in the region, not just to free a group of hostages..." (The Economist, 8-13 Nov. 86)

The Economist reproaches Reagan for having blown up the hostages' issue and writes:

"It would make sense if the United States were saying something like this to itself. Yes, we have decided to supply arms to the Iranians because we believe it is in our interests to use this method of influencing the shape of the Iranian regime that will follow Ayatollah Khomeini's death. But we also have a duty to try to release our hostages in Lebanon. We are swapping the hostages for weapons; we are making release of the hostages a condition for giving Iran the weapons it needs, something we wanted to do anyway to create a friendlier Iran..." (Ibid.)

The same argument (though not as explicitly, but more covertly and blended with propaganda intentions) was stated by Reagan a few days later in his first speech. And gradually as the wave of criticism over the policy of "dealing with terrorism" heated up, he denied explicitly the deal and the release of hostages. Instead he attributed the matter to the general strategy of the USA towards Iran and to gaining the necessary influence to affect the internal developments of the Islamic Republic. He spoke also of "trying to strengthen the moderate elements within the Iranian regime".

It is notable that the bourgeois-imperialist critiques of Reagan's policy, from the press to the politicians and Senate deputies, all complain and accuse that they have damaged the so-called elements within the Iranian regime". It is notable that the bourgeois-imperialist critiques of Reagan's policy, from the press to the politicians and Senate deputies, all complain and accuse that they have damaged the so-called elements within the Iranian regime". It is notable that the bourgeois-imperialist critiques of Reagan's policy, from the press to the politicians and Senate deputies, all complain and accuse that they have damaged the so-called elements within the Iranian regime".

his administration was agreed on the objectives of this policy, but that there were disagreements over the ways in which they were to be adopted. As the Washington Post put it: "Reagan utilized the channel which had been created for state strategic purposes with Iran, for the short-term goal of freeing the hostages".

Thus the aim of the U.S.A. in holding secret diplomacy with Iran and the place of this diplomacy in the strategy of U.S. imperialism towards Iran is clear. It is a long time since the imperialist policy-makers have begun the work of shaping an "Iran after Khomeini" which would be able to meet the long-term interests of imperialism in Iran and the region, i.e., confronting revolution and communism and preventing Russian influence. A manifest turning point in the adoption of this policy by western imperialism was the visit by Genscher (the West German foreign minister) to Iran about two years ago and his overt statements and proposals that Iran is a big country with an important position in the region; that the West must try to have official links with the Islamic Republic and gain an influence in it in a "friendly" manner, and that there exist "realistic" elements and forces within Iran. These views fundamentally contradict the arguments used by Reagan in justifying and explaining the basis of his secret diplomacy with Iran.

The interdependence and the diplomatic dealing and wheeling between the Islamic Republic and the imperialist states in the class nature of this regime and the existence of common class interests between them. The nature of the Islamic Republic and the bourgeois-imperialist character of its policies and practice have not in the least bit differed from the past. Secret dealings with the imperialists also are not new things for the Islamic Republic. Its initial accession to power and its continued hold onto power have been through such dealings. But what has changed is the position of the Islamic Republic in the world period. And it is this factor which gives a special place to the secret diplomacy of the U.S.A., the diplomatic deals and the secret sale of arms. The particular position which the Islamic Republic is experiencing in its recent period of life is warning enough for the imperialism.

The Islamic regime has been under a deepening economic, financial, political and military crisis. Especially during the last year the sharp fall in the price of oil in the world market and the reduction of Iran's ability in refining and exporting oil, as a result of the blocking of oil refineries and installations, have been turning points in the aggravation of Iran's economic situation, and have confronted it by an unprecedented financial crisis. This has in turn provoked far-reaching effects in all the economic, social and political spheres of Iran and led to an overall economic disintegration and to the stoppage of a large sector of production. All these, plus the war's deadlock,

the intense in-fightings inside the regime and the probability of Khomeini's death, have placed the Islamic Republic in an infinitely grave and fragile position. Furthermore, none of the factions of the bourgeois opposition that are trusted by America, at the moment enjoys the necessary requirements and pre-requisites to replace the Islamic Republic. Any severe measures shaking the foundations of the Islamic Republic could, besides the limitations involved in their execution, enflame a mass rising and the re-emergence of a revolutionary situation. Something which the imperialists are afraid of more than anything else. In other words the imperialists still do not possess a better alternative capable of realizing the smooth and trouble-free transfer of political power in Iran. This is itself one of the elements constituting the particular position of the Islamic Republic.

Therefore the whole endeavour of the U.S. in the present period is directed at preventing the "premature" collapse of the Islamic regime, influencing the course of internal developments inside the regime, before the time runs out, building up connecting links and suitable relations and leverage for the future situation of the present situation to the future situation of the bourgeois government (in particular after Khomeini's death), moderating or eliminating those features of pan-Islamic policy which result in the destabilization of the present situation in the region - thus acting against the U.S. and imperialism as a whole - and generally fitting the Islamic regime of Iran, her policies and internal developments, into the framework of a picture acceptable to the needs and interests of imperialism.

It should be mentioned that besides the bourgeois-imperialist actions of pan-Islamism and its counter-revolutionary role in the service of capital and reaction, parts of its policies are executed by the destabilization of the existing situation, pulling the ground from under the feet of traditional pro-western states, the extension of the Islamic state through war, and the disruption of the general balance in the region. What Reagan conceives as the "strategic importance of the Islamic Republic" and "its important role in the region" and which the Islamic regime's officials make a noise about as their victory and a sign of their strength, in fact represents efforts by the U.S. in complicity with a strong wing of the Islamic state for carrying out a process of "absorption" to accommodate the Islamic regime and its regional politics within a suitable framework and limitation for American interests and strategy.

This is the main deal around which has been shaping all the recent relations between the Islamic Republic and the U.S. Compared to this, the arms deal and the hostages' release can only have the function of a joining link or a suitable posture by the two sides. Only within such a framework do the other recent events and

developments concerning Iran find their place. Events and developments such as the booting down of the Mehdi Hashemi band, the present plan of the Iranian regime for the political exploitation of the concentration of forces [in the war fronts] and political bargaining over the war (aimed at convincing the U.S.A. and the West for taking measures to bring about changes in the Iraqi government in return for the Islamic Republic withdrawing its aim of bringing an Islamic government to power in Iraq and ending the war), changes in Saudi Arabia's oil policy and its consensus with the Islamic Republic's policy of limiting production in order to raise its price, and even the French government's agreement to return Iran's one-million Dollar funds following the expulsion of Mojahedin's leader from Paris.

The question as to how this process will proceed after the recent disclosures, whether the faction in question in the Islamic regime will exploit the publicization of the relations to continue the recent policy under the title of "victory of the Islamic regime" and the "driving of the U.S. into despair and surrender", or the Iranian regime will intensify its anti-American propaganda and outfit, fan even more the pan-Islamic policies in the region, and turn to a re-extension of the war, to kidnapping and so on, is something which depends on various factors, and one cannot answer it at the present moment. But one thing is certain, and that is, the Islamic Republic is, in any case, in a far worse situation for adopting any policy.

The condition of the "sick man" is too grave for it to be healed by Reagan's secret diplomacy and arms supplies. The Islamic Republic, with its grave economic, financial and political crisis, with its increasing and exhausting in-fightings and a war in deadlock, is on the edge of the cliff, and the oppressed and revengeful masses are only awaiting the emergence of a fissure to overthrow the whole of this hellish apparatus.

Abdollah Mohtadi
26 Nov. 1986



Poster produced by the Kurdistan Organisation of the EPK-Komala. The text reads: Why is this war continuing? The Islamic Republic for its survival needs to step up this war. Let us rise against the war!

from p.1

China: ten years after Mao

The factories increasingly employ the traditional methods of bourgeois management in order to intensify exploitation and boost labour productivity. And in the scene of international relations, foreign investments receive great encouragement. The changes here, in particular, are such that the 1 000 million Chinese market is seen by certain experts of imperialist economy as one of the most effective factors and possibilities for overcoming the present world economic crisis.

In the political aspect, during this period the last democratic gains have been taken back. The political movements have given way to the reshuffling of statesmen. The wall posters have disappeared. The Chinese state now seems more powerful than ever and the official state institutions and organs exercise uncontested authority.

In its international political relations, China officially defends the most reactionary bourgeois and imperialist currents. The "ping-pong Diplomacy" has, in its conclusion, developed into a reactionary foreign policy in all respects. Establishing active relations with the Islamic Republic and bringing itself into political harmony with it, helping its bankrupt economy and giving it military aid is just one example of this reactionary international policy. Perhaps a significant step towards transforming China's foreign policy image is the desire to end the uneasiness in the mutual relations with the Soviet Union which has been expressed recently. The period of "negative balance" in the East-West relations came to an end with the "Three Worlds" theory, and with the establishing of cordial relations with the Soviet Union the remainder of this theory itself is losing credit.

The developments, of which we have here mentioned only a part, have no doubt been accompanied by changes in the ideological super-structure of China. Ten years after Mao's death, although his mausoleum remains untouched in Peking's Peace Square, the criticism of his views, his line and policies, is a sign of the reticence of the Chinese statesmen in putting an end to the "Mao era" and of the beginning of a new era in the politico-economic life of China.

The closest allies of Mao who in the continuation of his views wanted to draw revolutionary conclusions, are still in gaol. Politically, this should be taken as the all-time distancing of the present rulers of China from those views and conclusions. Teng Shio Ping, the first man in the present real echelon of state power in China, once showed such frankness in expressing this ideological transformation and this distancing from the past, that he said that Marxism was no longer of any use for China. Although Teng Shio Ping later retracted his statement, it is a fact that the theory of workers' revolution and workers' rule is not only of no use,



Mao proclaims the people's Republic of China, Peking, October 1, 1949.

from the viewpoint of the bourgeois and for the purpose of consolidating the bourgeois economic and political system but is also a hindrance. The last ten-year efforts of the Chinese statesmen, too, have been directed to shedding these Marxist adornments and embellishments from an explicitly bourgeois ideology.

A brief review of the history of the social developments in China shows the necessity of the changes in the last decade.

The Chinese revolution of 1949 was a bourgeois-democratic revolution which on account of its anti-imperialist and anti-feudal character was to provide the necessary political and economic preconditions for the development of capitalism in China. Such a revolution, which from the viewpoint of the interests of the working class could only be seen as the realisation of more favourable conditions for the socialist revolution of the working class, was conceived of by the peasants who were the motive force of this revolution, as an end to all hardships and miseries and the beginning of eternal happiness.

Just as the democratic republics resulting from the bourgeois revolutions of the eighteenth century were conceived of as the harbinger of the era of happiness for mankind, so the people's democratic republic arising from the Chinese democratic revolution was supposed to bring about popular rule, popular liberation and happiness for all. This unreal, idealized, picture of a bourgeois democratic republic in the 20th century was called New Democracy, and against a background of the historical defeat of all the clearly bourgeois ideologies, it was blended with the anti-imperialist, nationalist and bourgeois-democratic interpretations of Marxism. The "Mao Tse Tung Thought" and the theory of the Chinese democratic revolution constitute the theory of the idealization of the people's democratic republic for all the social

classes and a beacon for the revolution of the revolting poor peasants.

But the historical reality was not so. The working class had not obtained any significant and decisive gain from this revolution. For the Chinese bourgeoisie the creation of an "Independent", "blossoming" and "industrial" China meant more than the extension and intensification of the exploitation of workers and the expropriation of the petty land-owners who had acquired land.

The development of capitalism in China after the 1949 Revolution was possible in two forms. First the free and classical development of capitalism, the market economy, anarchy of production - with all its accompanying social consequences and results, i.e., extensive poverty and destitution of masses of workers and toilers. Second, state-capitalism, that is, the pattern provided by Russia, and which entailed the creation of a large bureaucracy and the imposition of political repression, together with relative improvements in the material life of the poor. The first form would draw China towards union with and dependence on western imperialism. And the second called for unity and solidarity with the Russian state. After the Chinese Revolution, the Mao Tse Tung thought, with its petty-bourgeois nationalism and democratism, represented a theoretical striving for creating an industrial and independent China, while holding aloof from both these alternatives and remaining independent of both the imperialist camps. Politically, Mao's view on the "correct solution of the contradictions inside the people's camp" represents an unsuccessful attempt to skip over the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In practical and economic terms, China's great leap forward which was founded on building a peasant socialism, ended in defeat. China's break with Russia in the early 60s gave an impetus to the goal of creating an independent and blossoming China relying on the expansion of the Chinese petty-bourgeoisie. But a 20-year effort to found a special economy distinct from both state-capitalism and classical private capitalism ended up in economic chaos, failure of the projected

aims and the gradual defeat of the schemes. The Cultural Revolution, in the second half of the 60s, represented the last efforts of petty-bourgeois radicalism in the face of the defeat of this utopian ideal and its refusal to accept the inescapable results of capitalist development in China. But the proletarian solution to the economic contradictions and the social and political crisis of that period was not - the Cultural Revolution but a socialist revolution whose first measure would be the seizure of political power by the proletariat. However, the workers' revolution did not take place, the "Cultural Revolution" suffered defeat, and in its place a theory corresponding to the requirements of the development of capitalism in China was advanced. The "Three Worlds theory" was a reply to this necessity.

The domestic implication of this "theory", i.e., its application with regard to the internal affairs of China, was that "The white cat is not different from a black cat; a good cat is one which catches mice". This was bourgeois pragmatism expressed in the particular political language of China and represented a forsaking of every form of revolutionary idealism. At any rate, with the reliance of the Chinese bourgeoisie and state on the "Three Worlds Theory" and the greater homogeneity which the state achieved, the period of economic chaos, as well as the atmosphere which allowed the struggle from below the mass struggles - the possibility of extensive and open expression, came to an end. The "Cultural Revolution" and the political ferment died down and the way to capitalist development was opened with greater force.

This is the development of capitalism in China which has brought along its corresponding political and ideological changes; and with each step that it takes forward, it displays its character all the more overtly and explicitly.

In the course of such development and on the way to expand the interests of the Chinese bourgeoisie, Mao's thought which represented the attempt to avoid capitalistic development in its present form, was considered, from the viewpoint of the statement of the Chinese bourgeoisie, as an ideological barrier and a politico-ideological barrier which would have to be cleared out of the way. In the period of accelerated capitalist development, and for such a purpose, other people and other ideas and views are needed. China's mature bourgeoisie now required a mature state, mature statesmen and a mature and homogeneous political Party. The events of the last decade after Mao's death clearly display this greater comprehensive maturity of the Chinese bourgeoisie.

The Chinese bourgeoisie's proclamation to world capital has been the intensification of the exploitation of the Chinese working class, the stepping-up of political repression, and the consolidation of state authority, along

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Introducing the bulletin "Marxism & the Question of Soviet Union" Issue no. 2

The 2nd issue of "Marxism & the Question of Soviet Union, Bulletin of Views and Debates" was published in November 86. To inform the readers of Bolshevik Message of the contents of this issue of bulletin we are here quoting parts of the Editor's Note on the articles and documents contained in the bulletin:

"The first article of this issue is a Party debate which here is published under the title of "Vital Issues in the Analysis of the Proletariat's Defeat in S.U.". This debate is in fact part of the discussions which took place in an internal Party seminar ... Out of the speeches of the ten comrades on this subject we have only taken the contributions of comrades Gholam Keshavarz, Mansoor Hekmat and Parviz P. Three major themes can be distinguished in this debate: first, the viewpoint concerning the internal discussions of the Bolshevik Party in the 20s, second, the possibility of building socialism in one country; and third, workers' council democracy and its connection with the transformation of the economic base. The first theme of the discussion is accompanied by the agreement of the debating sides that the thesis of "socialism in one country", put forward by the Stalin faction, was in fact a theoretical cover for the capitalist industrialization of S.U. after the NEP period. In this connection the stands of the various factions of the Bolshevik Party at that juncture are also mentioned. But the point in dispute is what the principled communist position should have been regarding this situation. The different replies given by the comrades to this question make up the second theme of the discussion. The third theme of the discussion is what question objectively was the key issue in the '20s. Can the fact that the debates among the different factions in the Bolshevik Party centred on the question of economic programme point to the vital significance of this question? Should not the issue of workers' democracy and democratization of the state structure have been put in the core of a communist alternative? After these questions the debate extends to the relation between workers' democracy and the transformation of the economic base of society ...

In this issue we carry an article by the "Organisation for a Marxist-Leninist Workers' Party" ... The "Notes on Socialism and Analysis of S.U." is a brief critique of the above article ...

The article "A brief introduction of the NEP" by comrade Nasrin Julaly briefly describes, in the industrial and agricultural area, the main points of the "New Economic Policy", adopted by the Bolshevik state in 1921, and the latter's ebbs and flows in the

'20s up till the adoption of the programme for the five-year industrialization and the collectivization of agriculture ... The articles "Concerning a number of assessments of the NEP" and "A critical review of the Bolsheviks' economic policy" by comrade Traj Farzad and Salah Taha, contain useful information regarding the various aspects of the economic policy of the Bolsheviks, the social and ideological grounds for the adoption of these policies, and the theoretical basis of the different stands and assessments in that period ...

"The preliminary theses on the question of S.U.", though, as comrade Hamid Taghvae states in the introduction, are not comprehensive, endeavour to formulate, from a definite standpoint, the most important orientations in the attitude to the question of S.U. and the main points of the positions towards it, in the form of an analytical system. The article also outlines its demarcation lines with the other critical schools of S.U.

Mandel's Theses, as comrade Taghvae points out in the beginning of his critique of them, possess a particular importance for the Trotskyist viewpoint, especially the 4th International ... These theses today form a vital part of the Trotskyist theory. Starting from this same point, comrade Taghvae shows in his article "The problem of S.U. and Trotskyism's deadend" that such an attempt by Mandel is as bold as it is unscientific and non-Marxist.

The article "In the critique of Mystical Socialism" by comrade Traj Azariz criticizes the Chinese notion of socialism, in the light of examining Charles Bettelheim's theory of transitional periods ... Although the Chinese criticism has nowadays lost its popularity, many radical viewpoints critical of S.U. still suffer from its methodological and ideological influences. For this reason, in addition to the above article, an article by Ralph Miliband entitled "Bettelheim and the Russian experience" (criticizing the first volume of "Class struggles in Russia") has also been translated for this issue ...

Another section of this issue of the bulletin has been devoted to historical documents about the Bolshevik Party. In the first issue of the Bulletin six documents on the internal opposition of the Bolshevik Party in the '20s were translated. In the present issue we are publishing 13 translated documents on the internal debates of the Bolshevik party in the '20s ...

In an explanatory article on the internal debates in the Bolshevik Party, comrade Jafar Resa has concisely reviewed the course of the discussions and pointed out the particular place of each of the supplemented documents in the context of the debates ..."



New men to lead the enhanced capitalist development in China: Deng Xiaoping launches a rural 'modernization project'.

Communists & the Petty-Bourgeois Practice (1)

The following article is the translation of the first part of a speech by comrade M. Klement in the 1st Congress of the "Unity of Communist Militants" in Moscow, 1932. It contains discussions on the question of style of work. The UCM was one of the organizations which constituted the CPI in Sep. '33. The question of style of work formed the major topic on the agenda of the Congress and was the subject of extensive discussions. The text of the speech was later published in UCM's theoretical-political organ (No. 6, August '33), from which the present translation has been made. The second part of this article will be published in the next issue of Bolshevik Message.

I will try to summarize the discussions of the congress so far concerning style of work. I will offer the final formulation that concludes the discussions on this topic. After such general formulation we can move to explain and solve individual problems and complications, resulting from a populist style of work. First, however, I will explain how we arrived at this final formulation and why this is the main key to the critical evaluation of our past style of work.

We have been facing the problem of style of work for over a year, in the beginning it posed itself as practical contradictions between our goals and our activities concerning propaganda, agitation and organizational work. There were numerous organizational problems and shortcomings. Most of them had already been brought up in this meeting. I do not intend to go over them in detail. We have observed that our influence in the everyday matters of the proletarian struggle is little. We have noticed that our propaganda and agitation work has not advanced at all. Our comrades were not being educated, nor were they advancing systematically and purposefully, even specific lines of work. There were a few signs and instances. Overall, we concluded that our organizational work was not based on a communist theory of organization. Unlike our previous goals, our organizational approach was not a truly communist one. Therefore we started a serious search for, and understanding of, the cause of various problems of organization.

Once the discussion of the issue of style of work began, we all criticized and condemned our old conventional methods such as the "concrete" method. We had already asked for their replacement with communist methods. In various forms and expressions, we all contrasted populist and communist styles of work. The fundamental question is: how, however, clear the difference between the two was, and how deep the difference was being understood by the participants in this Congress. We had to ask ourselves: Was our understanding of the distinction deep enough at the beginning to permit us to move directly to the more practical and more concrete aspects of the subject and to examine our practice in specific areas? Or was the common understanding at a level that necessitated further and more abstract analysis in order to get to the roots of the problem? Were we to move our discussion toward practical problems, or did we need to concentrate on the theoretical aspects of the problem? Was our admiration that we had had a petty-bourgeois method the deepest possible theoretical expression of the problem? Did the fact of our having had a theoretical link that would permit us to return to concrete practical facts? (An abstract link such as the abstract social necessary labor that Marx arrives at in his analysis of value,

and based on it re-analyzes the value and price of commodities) have we theoretically dug the foundation deep enough to build upon it more and more concrete bricks? Our early discussions revealed that our theoretical analysis of the problem is not deep enough to permit us to differentiate analyses, and direction and content of the discussions to details of the petty-bourgeois method, even the tendency to look at new problems with the same old methodology, were indications of the fact that our understanding of the problem is not radical and fundamental. We asked for nothing less than a complete class departure from those petty-bourgeois methods. This in criticizing these methods, we need a basic thesis or formulation which would reflect the departure at the most radical level and permit us to criticize concrete symptoms of these methods on a unified basis. This would enable us to define the communist alternative positively.

Therefore, all the different formulations that were being offered the root of the discussion as "the complete and fundamental formulation" would reveal their inadequacy, once they were analyzed and criticized in the light of this. Even those who were introducing them would quickly realize their shortcomings. What were these unclear and inadequate formulations?

One formulation argued that the main critique of our past style of work should be basically a critique of our anarcho-syndicalism. Only by criticizing this anarcho-syndicalism can we arrive at proper methods. The first and most obvious shortcoming of this formulation was its total inability to explain the passivity and practical inertia of a populist organization in relation to the working class and the workers' movement. It entirely ignored the fact that in essence, populist style of the working class and making this class the major subject of organizational work had not been a characteristic of our organization.

Another formulation, "priority of organization over ideology and policy", or simply, "organizationalism" was indeed, as a lead of populist style, as proved not only at the level of the populist organizations of the "Third Trend", but even within the "Unity of Communist Militants". However, when we look back at our past organizational practice, in comparison to the goals that we had set, it seems no more than simple frolics in the struggle. The leading, dead-end, of populist style of work is its inability to matter to security and continuity to the issue of training of cadres, to propaganda, agitation and organizational work, to the methods used in these organizations, etc. These methods had revealed their inadequacy in failing to advance our comprehensive tasks.

For a while this topic became a pivotal issue in our discussions. Some of the arguments implied that the question of style of work should be looked upon from the angle of the structure of organization and the way in which energy should be allocated to the various parts of the organization. This would reduce the question of style of work to a question of organizational rules, in the sense that apparently our shortcoming has been a lack of rules. The fundamental question, however, we were said not to have based our organization on the cells in the working places of the workers.

Another formulation argued that the spontaneous actions of certain social strata and organizational actions (members of the struggle to act) based on the potency of the numbers of the organization, the spontaneous actions of the populist organization's treatment of the issue of tactics. They were presented by some comrades as fundamental deviations, and thus were implicitly considered as pivotal to the question of style of work.

Another formulation argued that there was no place for communist routine work of our own. It was argued that because here the communist routine work on the one hand and tactics on the other were mixed and confused. It seemed very difficult to identify the problems. But this formulation at this level was too general and unclear, and thus it left room for very different interpretations. To some comrades, choosing tactics was part of the routine communist work. In this sense the contrast between tactical tasks and the routine work would be meaningless. In contrast, in order to

distinguish the routine communist (party) work from tactics, some others would reduce the routine work to mere propaganda for socialism. Tactics would be reduced to the work of the non-propaganda activities of our political work. Routine work would therefore be labeled "passive political work", and titled and abandoned. The main question that arose in the year, in discussing the interrelationship of the routine work and tactics some important issues were brought up and discussed, although not systematically, in the context of communist work? It is the subject of tactics? What is the movement? How about the working class or is it the workers' movement? How about the social struggle and the participation relationship between the socialist struggle and the participation in an actual non-socialist production, from the point of view of organization and style of work? What are the continuous tasks of a communist organization and how tactics should be used as a result of our continuous work? How should tactics be used by a communist organization by virtue of our tactical struggle or as a result of our continuous work? How should tactics be used by workers to communist propagating communist views within the working class, and establishing workers' committee organizations units are considered "populist" political work? Are communists revolutionaries only on the basis of their tactical struggle?

These are all important questions, and are very relevant to the issue of communist practical methods. A correct formulation of the crux of the problem of style of work must be able to provide answers to these questions. But due to the absence of such a formulation, all these questions were discussed unsystematically in the past few days. They were certain elements of the discussion of populist style of work but no one was able to present these parts and elements as a consistent critical system. The most obvious and fundamental formulation, the deepest roots of the problem. In a talk with comrade Taghiyev T. Yashar before the start of the discussion on this topic, I suggested we should not put any limits or conditions on the Congress by introducing a preliminary formulation. When in the beginning Comrade Taghiyev put more emphasis on organizationalism and the detachment of the organization from the class, for my part, talked more of the communist "identity in practice." I pointed out that the issue of style of work was as important an issue as that of the programme.

Why do we have to consider the question of communist practical methods? First of all, the actual results of the dead-end of populist style, as proved not only at the level of the populist organizations of the "Third Trend", but even within the "Unity of Communist Militants". However, when we look back at our past organizational practice, in comparison to the goals that we had set, it seems no more than simple frolics in the struggle. The leading, dead-end, of populist style of work is its inability to matter to security and continuity to the issue of training of cadres, to propaganda, agitation and organizational work, to the methods used in these organizations, etc. These methods had revealed their inadequacy in failing to advance our comprehensive tasks.

Secondly, there was a Communist Party programme to consider. We could not treat it in a cursory manner. A Communist Party programme requires practical methods compatible with those of a Communist Party. Some comrades argued that the programme of the Unity of Communist Militants to an analytical text, a document to be used for propaganda and agitation. The programme was a programme, however, it was not a programme. The Party itself, and nothing less than the organization of a social revolution. The fact that we named our programme the Communist Party programme was not enough. We must endeavour to arrive at communist methods. We cannot cause the Communist Party programme to materialize by using the prevalent petty-bourgeois practices. From the historical perspective, in the course of our movement, we first had to defeat the petty-bourgeois on theoretical grounds in order to be able to distinguish our own style of work from theirs, which was to be adopted. This was already achieved by the Communist Party Programme. Now we had to put it into practice. This in our own words, we were to arrive at the Communist Party Programme. In other words, we had arrived at the Communist Party programme and now faced the question of how to practice it. We were to choose a method. One of the topics of the method started, I mentioned that we lacked those proper practical methods that are inseparable supplements of our Communist programme.

Our specific means to realize these goals are both parts of a system. Our means and goals are equally significant and distinguishable. They are both basic to the system. Therefore any discussion of style of work should focus on the fact that this specific class character has not been proved. Only by concrete practice can we be sure that the existing means that belong to other classes. We have been trying in vain to realize communist goals by using petty-bourgeois means, while communist methods are part of our identity itself.

It seems that all comrades agree that the Communist Party is, and will be, foremost, a certain materialized traditions of struggle in the working class movement. To the extent that these traditions exist, the party can also be said to exist. Obviously, these traditions are reflected in the concrete goals only. They are also materialized in the live communist struggle in the cadres, in the organizations and in the proven methods of action. It is the revolution that is the reason for the importance of communist methods of practice in the struggle for the foundation of the Party. Once these traditions are set up into practice, the Communist Party will become the basis of the communists' work, then a party is a Communist Party. Even if it is very weak, has lost all its cells of activists under the pressure of the police, or it has lost its best cadres in a long war, it is nonetheless capable of rapidly rebuilding itself under favorable conditions.

What we are witnessing today however is not a weak party; rather, it is a complete departure from the party concept. Bolshevism was the last party formation in the transition of the proletarian revolution. After the complete vacuum separates us from our partisan struggle in the distant past in the Bolshevik Party and other parties following the revolution. We are now in a complete vacuum, strengthening a weak party. Our task is the complete restoration of a real Communist Party. Why do I say that a wide gap and a complete vacuum separates us from the experiences of Bolshevism? Because the traditions of the Bolshevik partisan struggle have not been preserved. They have not been continued by individuals, nor have they been continued by organizations and their codes of conduct. Therefore both at a theoretical level, i.e., that of goals and policies, and at a practical level, i.e., that of methods, we have lost our party practice, the gap and the vacuum have been completed.

We did not integrate the traditions of our movement naturally. We have not been able to continue the existing Bolshevik Party or trend. We had to set ourselves the task of reviving Bolshevism both from the theoretical and practical points of view. We have to create a new trend. We have mentioned that the Communist Party programme is the essence of our struggle for reviving Bolshevism at the theoretical level. However, we have not been able to create a party trend nor to retreat to the extent that enables us to force a party trend around a communist platform. In our own words, we have not been able to create a party trend. It is indeed a Communist Party programme saved from the ravages of revisionism. It is a document of our theoretical and practical work. It is a document of our movement, international as well as indigenous. What remains, therefore, is the question of our practical methods. We cannot stop at the Communist Party programme. We must revitalize Bolshevism by merely relying on a communist programme. Without a complete departure from practical methods which are the Communist Party programme, we cannot establish the Communist Party and continue the struggle in the Communist Party. We must realize that today in Iran we are, with respect to practice and practical methods, as far from communism as the main-line party of the communists movement is today. We must go with respect to theory. Our Congress in its week-long discussions has taken a decisive step toward the advancement of our Communist Party programme. We have been relying on Leninist theory of organization. Going over this theory, we realize that we have not said anything new. The important thing we have to do is to provide our own theory of our own class against the "new" theories and formulations of other classes. All these discussions have been a necessity for us to realize that the practice we have been following at our programme, we notice that the Leninist theory of organization has been outlined clearly in Article Eight. But the practice we have forgotten it. We have repeated it but bypassed it.

From P.20

rights, anti-war movements, the fight against radical and anti-immigrant policies, a bourgeois and attack them from a left-sounding stand. They claim the struggle for these rights is a barrier to the advance of the socialist struggle and find these two as being mutually exclusive. Their view is equally wrong in the practical field (i.e.), it leaves the workers without any real defence against the onslaught of the bourgeoisie). They fail to understand that in order to strengthen and advance their struggle for socialism, the workers, more than anybody else, need these rights and hence should take part in such struggles.

The revolutionary Marxists, being the defenders of both the historic and immediate interests of the workers, have to combat both these tendencies and define the correct course and attitude that the workers' struggle should take in this respect. Below we briefly refer to some points concerning this argument:

1-Communist activity, propaganda and organization among the workers should not be forgotten or put aside, under any pretext, including the necessity to intervene in the movements for democratic rights. Communist work is the raison d'être of the communist organisation. The tactical considerations, repression, junctural setbacks or successes only affect the degree and form of this struggle and not its substance or necessity. No non-socialist movement should hinder this fundamental activity of the communists.

2-The more the freedom and democratic rights of the people are, the better will be the conditions for the workers' struggle for socialist revolution. Wherever such rights are attacked by the bourgeoisie, communists must encourage the workers to defend these rights, mobilise as powerful a movement as possible against such attacks, and themselves be in the forefront of such struggles. If in the imperialist-dominated countries the workers and people have to fight bloody struggles in order to gain such rights, in the metropolises workers must defend the existing rights and try to expand and extend them.

3-In the struggle for these rights other political organisations and social strata may join with partial or vacillating interests. Communists and workers can have joint actions with them, without forgetting, for a single moment, their own independent interests and aims.

4-The laws to curb and limit the democratic rights are manufactured in the parliament, used by the judges in courts to sentence those who break them and are put to force by repressive organs like the police. The struggle for the presentation and expansion of these rights, once it gains any significance and effective power, will normally be faced with attacks on the part of the "democratic" institutions and organs of the bourgeoisie. The Parliament, courts, the police and the army will line up against it*. This will be the end of the road for the legalists and polite oppositionists. The

movement's further advance to achieve its aims will necessarily be linked with a relentless exposure of the legalist organisations and tendencies. In the final analysis, the balance of class and social forces determines what is legal or illegal. Let us remember that the British miners, in their historic strike, every day broke the infamous law of "secondary picketing", defended their right to picket and made this law of the bourgeoisie useless. And while this was going on, Messrs Kinnock and Hattersly - leaders of the Labour Party as well as the TUC leaders, were most energetically dissociating themselves from the "law breakers" and condemning the miners!

The more powerful the struggle by the working-class for democratic rights is, the better will be the chance to protect and extend them. This is part of the course of the workers' struggles in the metropolises to change the existing defensive mood, to put the burden of the crisis on the bourgeoisie's shoulders, and to advance the workers' fight for socialism. However, we refrain from taking part in these struggles is certainly not a revolutionary Marxist.

Farhad Besharat

Dec. '86

* Those who have forgotten historical experiences, will surely remember the treatment that miners in Britain received from such institutions in their year-long heroic struggle. The present happenings in France provide another example.

From P. 6

With wide-spread purges in the Party and state and the refining of the official state ideology of the remnants of petty-bourgeois democracy and revolutionism inherent in Mao's thought. This process began in Mao's life-time and has now reached maturity, ten years after Mao's death, with the open critique of his views and the rejection of the methods and traditions identified with his name.

The Chinese bourgeoisie will continue this process. And as can be seen from the enthusiasm and eagerness overtly shown by the international bourgeoisie, it too supports this process and has laid great hopes on the exploitation of hundreds of millions of Chinese workers. Ten years after Mao's death, the world working class has more than ever been freed from the petty-bourgeois ideals of popular governments, liberation of the whole people and an idealized bourgeois republic. In the follow-up to these developments the Chinese proletariat, too, has ahead of it reliance on class force, a resolute and unvacillating class struggle against the bourgeoisie and the setting-up of workers' state and proletarian socialism.

Some question and answers on the struggle of the Marxist-Leninist Party of Nicaragua

- prepared by a member of the staff of The Workers' Advocate, newspaper of the MLP,USA,October 1986

Marxist-Leninist Party of Nicaragua (previously known as MAP-ML) is a communist organisation in Nicaragua. The activities of this party to organise the Nicaraguan workers and toilers independently and for their own interests, their exposure of the petty-bourgeois nature of the Sandinista government's policies and their firm stand against the counter-revolutionary contra forces and the U.S. military threats, makes them an important political force in the arena of class struggle in Nicaragua. Due to the shortage of available material in English about this party, we have made an interview with the comrades of the Marxist-

Leninist party of U.S.A., which has close relations with the MLP-N and for several years has been campaigning to build up international support for Nicaraguan workers and the MLP-N in U.S.A. and abroad. The questions have been answered by a comrade from the editorial board of the "Workers' Advocate", the central organ of the MLP-USA. We thank the MLP-USA comrades for their reply to our questions and hope that the readers of BM will find this interview informative and interesting.

CPI-the Committee Abroad
Dec. '86

a) What has been the MLP of Nicaragua's analysis of Nicaraguan society and its attitude to the bourgeoisie in the struggle both against Somoza and today?

The MLPN (formerly known as MAP/ML) holds that Nicaragua, although not highly developed, is a capitalist society. Both in the city and countryside capitalist relations of production predominate. The big landlords are mainly capitalist landlords who mostly exploit agricultural wage labor. Much of the remnants of pre-capitalist relations were swept aside by the capitalist development of the 1960's.

The revolution of 1979 released an upsurge among the workers, agricultural laborers, and poor peasants who seized factories and lands, and many of the most important enterprises were put under workers' control. The Nicaraguan comrades point out that the revolution profoundly shook the structures of capitalism. And since that time, the Sandinista government has devoted itself to repairing capitalist relations, rebuilding capitalism under the signboard of "mixed economy" (a typically capitalist mix of state-run enterprises, private capitalist and landlord enterprises, and small producer cooperatives). The economic reforms of the Sandinista regime have been quite moderate: a partial land reform distributing lands of the Somoza clan and of some of the landlords who have fled to join the contras and some fallow lands; the nationalization of the banks and much of the enterprises of the Somozistas and contra leaders. But the majority of the economy remains in the hands of the old owners, and much of the mainly new state sector remains under the old management.

As to the attitude towards the bourgeoisie in the struggle, from its birth in the early 1970's MAP did not accept the idea of an alliance with the bourgeois opposition. This was a feature that clearly separated MAP from both the pro-Soviet revisionists (the Socialist Party and the Communist Party) and the FSLN. Both the SF and the CP tried to tie the workers' movement to the coattails of the Conservative Party opposition. (The Liberal Party was the party of the Somoza dictatorship and the main party of the bourgeois liberal opposition became the Conservatives). For its part, while the FSLN went from fiasco to fiasco with its Guevarist foco-ism, it also attempted to realize a coalition with the bourgeois opposition. Meanwhile

MAP followed the path of organizing the working class and the other toilers as an independent force against the exploiting classes and the dictatorship.

In one form or another, both the revisionists and the Sandinistas argued that Nicaragua was a pre-capitalist, semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. And according to their theorizing this also meant that the working class was too weak to attempt a revolution without an alliance with the so-called "national bourgeoisie" and without going through a process of so-national capitalist development. MAP fought against these speculations about the so-called "national bourgeoisie," stressing that it was the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie itself -- not some pre-capitalist semi-feudal lords -- that was the social base of the dictatorship and of the U.S. imperialist domination. It held the perspective that it was the proletariat which was capable of rallying all the toilers around itself for the destruction of the dictatorship, imperialist domination, and capitalist exploitation in Nicaragua.

The attitude towards the bourgeoisie became an extremely sharp contradiction in the days of the insurrection when the question of the new power was being posed. The workers and poor peasants were fighting on the barricades. But the FSLN leaders were busily negotiating in Costa Rica with some of the biggest chiefs of Nicaraguan capitalism for the formation of the new government. (President Carter's State Department envoy William Bowdler took a direct part in these negotiations.) MAP opposed the attempts to form a coalition government with the bourgeoisie, and through its daily paper *El Pueblo* questioned these negotiations. Its slogan was "Workers and Peasants to Power!" which became one of the most popular slogans of the masses in the insurrection.

The FSLN began to receive considerable material and other assistance from the bourgeois opposition and from neighboring capitalist governments (Panama, Venezuela, etc.). This assistance played a big part in allowing the FSLN to eventually gain control of what had been to a great extent a spontaneous insurrection of the workers and poor. Thus, the FSLN-bourgeois coalition government came to power. And one of its first orders of business was suppressing the independent initiative of the masses. The organized proletarian contingent of MAP/ML bore the brunt of this suppression as it was considered a particularly dangerous threat to the coalition with the bourgeoisie.

Today the bourgeois members of the government have long ago resigned to join the counterrevolution. (The big capitalists Arturo Cruz and Alfonso Robelo are now contra leaders, and Violeta Chamorro is the owner of the *La Prensa* newspaper, voice of the internal bourgeois reaction.) Nonetheless, under the signboards of "National Unity," "Political Pluralism," and "Mixed Economy", the FSLN continues to strive to win over the "patriotic bourgeoisie" to an alliance.

For its part, the MLPN continues to fight against any such alliance. Its analysis is that the social base of the counterrevolution is not just a handful of traitors or elements misled by the CIA, but the bourgeoisie. And its daily agitation in defense of the revolution is linked to the need to deepen the class struggle against the capitalists and landlords towards the workers and poor peasants coming to power.

b) In the context of the struggle against U.S. intervention, what is the MLPN's policy towards the Sandinistas?

The MLPN characterizes the FSLN government as petty bourgeois. It analyses that the FSLN is following a reformist policy guided by petty

bourgeois nationalist, social-democratic and revisionist ideas, and that this policy is heading towards the institutionalization of a bourgeois liberal regime and the consolidation of capitalism. At the same time, as a party which came to power in the revolution and which continues to confront the U.S.-backed aggression, the FSLN still enjoys the confidence of a large section of the masses. The Nicaraguan comrades have analyzed that a revolutionary situation still prevails in Nicaragua and the situation remains in flux. It cannot yet be said for certain how the revolution will go forward: whether it will be deepened through a transformation of power through an intense struggle against the capitalist counterrevolution, imperialist aggression and reformism; or whether a new revolution will be needed; or whether developments such as a full-scale U.S. invasion will determine some other course.

Thus, the MLPN is confronted with complex tactical considerations. The guiding idea of the MLPN's tactics is the organization and mobilization of the working class and the other exploited toilers in defense of their independent class interests and to deepen the revolution towards the triumph of the proletarian revolution and socialism. In this context the MLPN does not give appeals for direct confrontation with or for the overthrow of the FSLN regime. Rather, its agitation on the Sandinistas focuses on exposing their reformist, bureaucratic and compromising policy as undermining the gains of the revolution, weakening the struggle against the capitalist counterrevolution, and demobilizing the masses in the face of the CIA-contra war. And it shows how a proletarian policy is needed to defend the interests of the working masses and to strengthen the resistance to the U.S. aggression.

This struggle between the FSLN and the MLPN takes place among the masses on all the burning questions of the day: For "mixed economy" and subsidies and prerogatives to the entrepreneurs; or for defending the interests of the workers at the cost of the exploiters. For disbanding the militias in favor of the bureaucratized regular army; or for building the worker and peasant militias and working to ensure that the proletariat has its political impact on all the tasks of military defense. For negotiating the gains of the revolution with the bourgeois opposition and the Contadora regimes and the U.S. State Department; or for defending and expanding these gains in struggle against both the local exploiters and the pressures of the regional (Contadora) bourgeoisie and U.S. imperialism.

Finally, it should be pointed out that the MLPN distinguishes between the reformist leadership of the FSLN and the revolutionary-minded workers, peasants and soldiers at the base of the FSLN. The Nicaraguan comrades follow the line of carrying their work to wherever the masses are in struggle. Thus, they have work within the FSLN-led trade unions, the CDS neighborhood committees (Committees of Sandinista Defense), the Sandinista army and military reserve, etc.

c) What is the legal status of the MLPN and under what conditions of repression, etc. does the party work?

The fiercest repression against the Marxist-Leninists came in the first year of the revolution under the FSLN-bourgeois junta. Three days after the triumph of the revolution, the FSLN demanded the disarming of MAP/ML's militias (the MILPAS or Popular Anti-Somocista Militias). MAP/ML had no choice but to accept this disarming or face a civil war that they were surely not strong enough to win -- a civil war which would have been disastrous for the revolution, especially for the proletarian forces. Then MAP/ML's daily newspaper *El Pueblo* was shut down, its equipment confiscated, and its editors imprisoned. Over a hundred organizers of MAP/ML's Workers

Front trade union center were also jailed as the FSLN sent the army into work places to break up the workers' control movement and drive out the Workers Front unions.

But with the rupture of its coalition with the bourgeoisie and the growing pressure from the reactionaries, the FSLN managed to open up the situation for the masses and for MAP/ML as it sought a counter-balance on the left. Today the MLPN has a certain room to act, although it is pretty limited and fragile. It has no political prisoners; but its supporters are frequently arrested and held overnight "to remind them what prison looks like," as the Nicaraguan comrades put it. Its paper *Prensa Proletaria* is legally registered; but it faces censorship, compelling the party to also make use of unapproved leaflets, etc. The government still refuses to return the equipment for EL Pueblo and puts obstacles in the way of the MLPN getting much needed printing materials. The MLPN has won two seats in the National Assembly; but unlike the bourgeois parties, the MLPN's parliamentary privileges are very tentative (for example, the FSLN and the bourgeois parties have passed a law directed at the left that bars the smaller parties from proposing legislation). The Workers Front trade union center has started to once again organize unions (although only at a small fraction of its previous scale); but, even though the Ministry of Labor recognizes the CIA-backed right-wing unions, it refuses to give official recognition to Workers Front unions. In fact, it is in the work places, the historic strongholds of the MAP/ML, that it faces the most severe repression. The management and the FSLN-led unions jointly blacklist and fire workers thought to be sympathetic to the Marxist-Leninists, and they carry a forceful campaign to isolate the Workers Front organizers as "ultra-left provocateurs", etc. etc. Therefore much of the Party's work in the work centers is through underground "committees of workers struggle."

d) What is the MLPN's view of the Soviet Union today?

The MLPN considers that the present-day Soviet Union is revisionist, and it opposes the influence of Soviet revisionism on the world revolutionary movement. The agitation of the MLPN includes Soviet revisionism as one of the forces striving to suppress the revolution in Central America through its support for the regional Contadora group of pro-imperialist and reactionary regimes.

e) What is the MLPN's attitude to the Islamic Republic of Iran?

The MLPN denounces the Khomeini dictatorship in Iran. While we are not aware of any official views of the MLPN on the specific path for the struggle in Iran, individual representatives have expressed strong skepticism about the bourgeois opposition of the Bani Sadr-type, and interest in the independent revolutionary struggle of the working class and toilers.

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Contributions received

The CPI wishes to acknowledge the receipt of the following financial contributions for the months of July and August 1986. The contributions of the comrades from Denmark for the period March to June 86 are also mentioned here.

JULY		AUGUST	
Code/Name	Amount	Code/Name	Amount
AW	100	AW	100
Charvis	200	B	200
Parviz 1.	200	Parvaneh	100
Asghar S.	100	U.S.A.	\$
Nader	100	Udooz	100
Ariz	100	S	100
Foad	100	M	50
9th Jan.	400	GH	20
France	Frc.	M	15
AMA	50	F	15
MMA	50	Z	30
DN	160	LA	222
M-100	50	DM	60
SH-001	150	Hanan Sh.	50
F-1-1	50	H. Chicago	50
S-40	50	Ramin	50
J-50	238.7	Britain	£
P-12	50	SR	1
M	70	AL	1
Nader	9.2	AL	1.22
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Supporters in	100	L-100	6
Mainz	35	L-101	0.65
		L-102	6
		L-103	6

The following are the contributions from the comrades of Denmark, March to June 86:

MARCH		JUNE	
Code/Name	Amount	Code/Name	Amount
Ariz	100	Shahzad	100
Solmaz	100	Fardad	50
Shovan	50	Shovan	50
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S-1917	200	Udooz	100
Udooz	100	Ariz	100
Shahla Sh.	50	Foad	100
Solmaz	50	SJ	100
Mukher-1	100	9th Jan.	400
S.J.	100	Foad	100
Ariz	100	Musaviran	
Solmaz	100	1 letter from	
		Gertner USA-	Timora 700
		Sumar USA-	100
		Bank USA-	\$ 50
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		Foad USA-May 86	\$ 100
		Payson (Sweden)	\$ 100
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
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COMMUNISTS and the
PEASANT MOVEMENT after the
IMPERIALIST SOLUTION
of the AGRARIAN QUESTION
IN IRAN



PROGRAMME
OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAN

Approved by
the Working Congress of the Communist Party of Iran
November 1981

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the Working Congress of the Communist Party of Iran
November 1981

PUBLICATIONS OF THE CPI

"KOMONIST" is the central organ of the CPI published in Farsi. The following issues appeared recently:

Komonist No. 27, August 86

- Concerning the discussions of the Party's 2nd Congress (An interview with comrade Mansoor Hekmat) - part two
- The basis of Party's work abroad. M. Hekmat
- Pan-Islamic reaction: imperialism's defensive barrier. J. Shafiee
- Guidelines concerning correspondence with the Party.

Komonist No. 28, October 86

- Our organisational policy among the workers. M. Hekmat
- The present situation: pan-Islamism & War. N. Javid
- On the basis of our international relations. F. Besharat
- Lessons from the methods used to implement the redundancy policy in the Fiat factory. N. Javid
- Report on the life and work of women domestic carpet weavers in Kurdistan. A. Kamgoyan
- Communique of the 7th central committee plenum of the party.

Komonist No. 29, December 86

- Reagan's secret diplomacy and the position of the Islamic Republic. A. Mohtadi
- Concerning the discussions of the Party's 2nd congress (Interview with comrade M. Hekmat) - final part
- Working class and circle-form organisation. R. Moghadam
- A look at the recent developments in South Africa. A. Majedi
- Struggle against the Labour Bill & the unity of the tendencies within the working class. R. Moghadam



"PISHRO" (in Farsi) is the organ of the Kurdistan Organisation of the CPI-Komala. The following issues appeared recently:

Pishro No. 13, September 86

- A look at the present political situation in Kurdistan. Poya
- China: ten years after Mao's death.
- Fedaiiien (Majority): the growling of the bourgeoisie
- Education costs must be paid for by the regime, not the people.
- Message to the striking print-workers in Britain (Reprint of the message of the CPI-the Committee Abroad)
- 41st anniversary of the bombing of Hiroshima and Nakazaki
- The brick-kiln workers' struggle and our tasks. Vahid Tavakkoli

Pishro No. 14, December 86

- The Islamic Republic's attempts to infiltrate the mass movements. K. Modarresi
- The recent events in the U.S.-Iran relations & the position of the Islamic Republic.
- Two years of KDP's war-mongering.
- Let us defeat the regime's new drive for compulsory arming. F. Babamiry
- Bourgeoisie and the decisive battle of the Islamic Republic.
- Revolutionary movement in South Africa (Interview with a South African workers' leader)

"PISHRO" (in Kurdish) is the organ of the Kurdistan Organisation of the CPI-Komala. The following issues appeared recently:

Pishro No. 19, July 86

- State in the revolutionary periods. M. Hekmat

Pishro No. 20, August 86

- Concerning the discussions of the Party's 2nd Congress (Interview with Comrade M. Hekmat)
- The impasse of dictatorships. H. Farzad
- Summary of the discussions of the Fifth Congress of the Kurdistan Organisation of the CPI-Komala.
- **Marxism & the Question of Soviet Union - Bulletin of views and debates - is published as a supplement to the theoretical organ of the CPI, Bourse-e-Sosyalism. The 2nd issue appeared in Nov. 86 and contains the following articles:**

- The pivotal issues in the analysis of the proletariat's defeat in Soviet Union (Proceedings of an internal Party debate). G. Ke-havira, M. Hekmat, Parviz P.
- Socialism & the analysis of S.U. (To reach socialism we need a Marxist-Leninist analysis of S.U.)-translation of two parts of an article by the "Organisation for a Marxist-Leninist Workers' Party" (ISA)
- Notes on "Socialism & the analysis of S.U." I. Azarin
- Brief introduction of the NEP (1921-29). N. Jalaly

- Concerning a number of assessments of the NEP. I. Farzad
- A critical review of the economic policy of the Bolsheviks (1918-23). S. Izady
- Preliminary theses on the question of S.U. H. Taghvae
- Ten theses on the socio-economic laws governing the society in transition from capitalism to socialism. Ernest Mandel
- The problem of S.U. & Trotskyism's deadend (Critique of Mandel's theses on transitional societies). H. Taghvae
- Criticism of Mystical Socialism (Bettelheim's "transitional periods"). I. Azarin
- Bettelheim & the Russian Experience. Ralph Miliband
- An explanation of the internal debates of the Bolshevik Party (1922-29), plus documents. J. Resa

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL ACTIVITY OF THE ASSOCIATIONS OF SUPPORTERS OF THE CPI ABROAD

From the very beginning of our activity abroad we have tried to encourage our members and supporters to participate, according to their ability, in the class-struggle in the country they live in, to become familiar with the workers' and communist movement in that country and develop fraternal relations with non-Iranian communist and workers' organisations. We have also encouraged our comrades to have publications in the language of the country of their residence. This attitude towards communist activity in exile has, and will be, one of the demarcations of our Party's method of work with that of the nationalist and petty-bourgeois socialist organisations*.

At the same time we would like to inform all the readers of Bolshevik Message and the non-Iranian organisations and individuals, that the associations of our supporters in any country are themselves responsible for their publications and activities, and cannot make any political commitment or representation on behalf of our Party.

The political and theoretical positions of the CPI are expressed in the party papers, organs and radio; and when and where official representation of our party is needed, we will introduce to the organisation/individual concerned the comrades who are assigned by the party to such tasks.

In order to contact the CPI you may write to the CPI-the Committee Abroad at the following addresses.

Communist Party of Iran
- the Committee Abroad
Dec. 1986

BM Box 3004
London WC1N 3XX or
ENGLAND

OIS, Box 50040
104 05 STOCKHOLM
SWEDEN

* The basis of our party's activity abroad has been comprehensively explained in the article "Basis of Our Method of Activity Abroad" by comrade M. Hekmat in Komonist no. 27 - the central organ of our Party. We hope that the English translation of this article will be published soon.

MARXISM & THE QUESTION
OF SOVIET UNION -
BULLETIN OF VIEWS AND
DEBATES - ISSUE NO.2
(276 PAGES)



The fight for democratic rights in the Metropols

Today it is becoming more and more difficult to find any bourgeois government which does not, in one way or another, try to limit or trample upon the democratic rights of the workers and people in general. If suppression of the free speech, political and mass organisations of workers and toilers, national minorities, women, etc. are the normal content of bourgeois rule in the dominated and Third-World countries, in the last decade this has, gradually, become a major part of the bourgeois policy in the metropolitan countries as well.

In Britain the government of Mrs. Thatcher attacks the trade-union rights, workers' wages, the unemployment and social benefit, recalls the Victorian family values and steps up police vigilance and interference in the public and private life of the people. In the U.S.A. Mr. Reagan unleashes the most brutal attacks on the working-class and its industrial and democratic rights, propagates the most reactionary attitudes towards women and their right to abortion; and all-out anti-communist and ultra-reactionary "super-Americanism" of the Rambo type is generated and financed by the bourgeoisie. In France, the government adopts more anti-foreign and anti-immigrant policies, calls upon the workers to be "flexible" for the sake of more profits for the capitalists, and now intends to "reform" the educational system - which undoubtedly would mean less educational opportunities for the children of the working-class and more reactionary discipline for the students. The list is endless.

The class struggle is intensifying almost everywhere and in order to quell the working-class and impose more severe conditions of exploitation on it, the bourgeoisie of the "democratic metropols" finds it necessary to further limit, and in some aspects abolish, the democratic rights which have been won in the course of decades of struggle.

Generally speaking, and ironically, the bourgeois governments conduct all these policies under the slogan of defending "democracy" or "parliamentary democracy" or the "free world", etc. They claim that the basis for the existence of these rights is the parliament, law and order by the police and state, and above all the "free enterprise". And since the workers, and the people in general, are raising their voice against the daily-increasing miseries that the capitalist crisis has imposed on them, and are gradually calling to question the existing order of affairs, so they claim that for the sake of safeguarding the basis of "democracy" - i.e., the suitable conditions for exploiting and controlling the workers and the oppressed - the freedom of speech, political activity, industrial protests, women's rights, etc. should be limited or even abolished.

These policies, obviously, necessitate an all-sided opposition and defence by the workers and every dissident individual in these countries. We have seen many protest movements and struggles in this field in the last decade. The year-long struggle of the print workers in Britain for trade-union rights and more recently the protest by the French students are just two examples.

There are two main wrong tendencies in the left and communist organisations in the metropols on the approach to these rights and the struggles for them.

a) The first and more influential one is the right and parliamentarist tendency which is represented by almost all the Socialist, Euro-Communist and Stalinist Parties, as well as by their assorted, more radical, appendages. In one way or another they do not like such policies of the governments, or pretend so, and try to oppose them. But since they want to confine the opposition to these policies within the same frame-work which the bourgeoisie defines - i.e., parliamentary and legal - their opposition either proves useless; or, in some cases, when faced with a radical movement of the masses, sides with the bourgeois order of the day. When such parties gain access to all or part of the governmental apparatus, by the very logic of their parliamentary, reformist and bourgeois nature, end up in applying similar policies themselves. The working-class and people in metropols, under the influence of such parties, have lost many of their democratic rights in the recent years.

The anti-immigrant demands of the French Communist Party a few years ago, and the consistent policies of the Labour Party in Britain together with its radical appendages, in the last 6 years, to confine any protest movement within a legal frame-work, which has resulted in the restriction of many democratic rights in Britain are two contemporary evidences to prove this claim.

b) The Left approach, which does not enjoy any mass influence at the moment, but which is able to impress and render passive some of the conscious workers and militants who break away from the reformist organisations. This tendency generally argues that since capitalism has reached its decadent phase in our epoch, and since the fight for democratic rights in itself does not question the very existence of capitalism and is not immediately socialist, it is of no use, or even worse, reactionary. Workers and communists should not take part in such struggles. The Left Communists are one of the staunchest defenders of this approach. They regard the economic struggle of the workers, the right to express one's written or spoken view, the right to trade-union organisation, women's