

BOLSHEVIK MESSAGE



No. 14

PAPER OF THE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF IRAN—THE COMMITTEE ABROAD

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STOP THE EXECUTION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS IN IRAN!

Since last July, the Islamic regime in Iran has begun a new wave of mass execution of political prisoners. Thousands of prisoners have been executed so far. Nobody as yet knows the exact figures. The regime has kept quiet about the number and the identity of the victims. But accounts by the families of the executed prisoners and other reports speak of a bloodbath in the prisons. There is no doubt that the regime is set on a mass extermination of the political prisoners. A large number of our imprisoned comrades are among those executed. The CPI committees, in their special announcements, have revealed the identity of some of the fallen Party members and sympathizers.

The killings are still continuing and the lives of thousands of other prisoners are at great risk. If unhindered, this regime will continue to carry out its bloody plans to the full. The resistance in Iran against the Islamic Republic should be complemented with a world-wide pressure upon the regime to force it to stop its campaign of mass murder.

Our comrades in different countries have staged and/or participated in various protest actions and demonstrations against the executions and in defence of the political prisoners. In this issue of the Bolshevik Message we carry the text of two leaflets by the CPI committee abroad in connection with the latest wave of executions.

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SHARPVILLE 6, EVIN 1000

Remember the Sharpsville Six the six militants sentenced to death in the Apartheid courts? They are alive, thanks to the efforts of millions of people who wanted them to live. That Sharpsville Six lives is evidence that humanity is alive. In Iran today thousands of political prisoners have been massacred and thousands more are awaiting death. No hearings exist. These people have in some cases been in prison for up to 7 years. These are people who are being shot because of their beliefs. These are people who will not become Moslems by force, who will not worship a despot.

If the scale of the campaign to save the Sharpsville Six forced the most conservative governments of the world to make a move, today the dream of massive investments in post-war Iran has driven even the most hypocritical of them to silence. But you should not keep quiet. Do not say it is of no use. If everybody had despaired, if everyone had kept quiet, the Sharpsville Six would not be alive. If you make a move to save the lives of political prisoners in Iran, if you protest against the policies of your government in relation to the Islamic Republic, if you demand the economic boycott of the Islamic Republic from
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SAVE THE LIVES OF THE POLITICAL PRISONERS!

There is no drought in Iraq; no earthquake has struck. But thousands have been killed, and thousands more are awaiting death. In Iran, it is the barrage of bullets that is causing death; not the tremours of the earth but the convulsions of a reactionary and despotic state in an effort to consolidate itself. The death of thousands of human beings in Iran is not due to a natural disaster which perhaps can be avoided. It is, on the contrary, the deliberate plan of the leaders of a state that has based itself on repression and killing for ten long years.

The Islamic Republic regime in Iran which through its ten-year existence has been a symbol of medieval savagery and the denial of all democratic and human rights, has stepped up its crimes in the past few months, putting thousands of political prisoners to death.

How many thousands of people have been killed in these past months? Nobody knows and nobody can know. No figures are exact. Under the dark repression that is killing in this way, no precise facts and figures may be obtained. The Iranian regime has kept its mouth shut. But fathers and mothers, husbands and wives are looking in the mass graves for the mutilated bodies of their dear ones. Three thousand killed, must be the most conservative estimate.

If the campaign to save the lives of human beings in the face of natural catastrophes is a most justified and humane effort, the campaign to save human life against the Islamic Republic is doubly important. If no such effort exists, if in the face of what is going on in Iran, the governments and the mass media have kept quiet, then this can only be explained by the economic and political interests of these states.

But you should not remain silent. You should not look on passively. You should take steps to save the lives of thousands of human beings. It is not financial contributions that is needed; no blankets or coats; no meat or medicines. It is enough to demand that thousands of people in Iran should stay alive and to articulate this demand. Protest against the massacre of political prisoners in Iran. Ask your government to exert economic and political pressure on the Islamic Republic, and demand the release of political prisoners.

Helping to save the lives of human beings in Iran, not in the face of earthquakes or droughts, but against the brutality of a reactionary regime is a real effort to save human life. You who take action to save those who may be alive under the rubble, should not allow those already alive to be buried in Iran.

Communist Party of Iran
Committee Abroad
15/12/1988

Resolution about: THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN & THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

[The following is the translation of the resolution approved by the Central Committee in September 1988. It has been taken from issue 42 of the central organ, Komunist.]

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A: THE TERMINATION OF THE WAR AND THE DEFEAT OF PAN-ISLAMISM

I) The Islamic Republic regime's successive failures in carrying through its war and Pan-Islamic policies and its acceptance of the United Nations resolution 598 have brought this regime and the Iranian society as a whole to the brink of a new historical development. With the defeat of this policy, seen as the key to the establishment and expansion of this current in the region, the several-year efforts of the Pan-Islamic current headed by the Islamic regime in Iran to assert itself and gain recognition as a suitable regional alternative for overcoming the governmental crisis of the bourgeoisie in the region have definitely failed, and the certain course of decline of the Pan-Islamic current in Iran and the region has begun.

II) The Islamic Republic regime's submission to ending the war is in fact a clear result of the weakening and deadlock of the regime's Pan-Islamic policies and the most significant indicator of their failure. The factors and trends which have been decisive in undermining the Pan-Islamic current and driving it to a deadlock are as follows:

1- The severe economic hardships, the political repression, and the cultural reaction under the decade-long rule of the Islamic Republic regime and the disclosures about the close relations between the Islamic current and U.S. imperialism were among those factors which prevented this current from winning significant following among the masses in the Middle East. The regime's deceitful propaganda of "anti-imperialism" and "defending the poor" was exposed in the face of the reality of the lives of workers and toilers in Iran

and the true political role of the regime in the region, thus defeating the policy of "exporting the Islamic revolution".

2- The significant turn in Soviet foreign policy and the retreats by the USSR internationally, under the pressure of the domestic economic situation, has created the possibility of a period of scaling down of tensions and the concluding of international accords between East and West over the main areas of crisis. These accords, of which a principal component is creating political stability in the Middle East and in the Persian Gulf area, have restricted the field for the assertion of the Islamic current, led by the Islamic regime in Iran, as a regional power.

3- Arab nationalism mobilized in the face of the ideological, political, and, eventually, military offensive of the Pan-Islamic current, practically showing that it enjoys sufficient power to neutralize the encroachments of Pan-Islamism in the region. This point clearly seen in the support that the majority of the Arab states gave to Iraq against the Islamic Republic - demonstrated to the U.S. and the West-European imperialist powers the undesirability and incapability of the Pan-Islamic current to turn into a governmental alternative for the bourgeoisie in the region, thus limiting the support of these states to the Iranian regime.

4- The Islamic Republic failed to unite the bourgeoisie under its banner. It smashed the revolution but was unable to establish the political stability which the bourgeoisie needed to restart capital investment and accumulation. The continuation of workers' protests and resistance against the regime's policies, the persistence of the armed movement in Kurdistan, the people's and especially women's defiance of the regime's reactionary policies and laws, the existence of deep differences in the regime over the economic model to be adopted, and finally the long and destructive Iran-Iraq war, were some of the most important factors which prevented the

Islamic Republic from establishing the necessary economic security and political stability in Iran for capital accumulation and the unification of the bourgeoisie under its banner.

5- All through the life of the Islamic Republic regime the economic situation deteriorated. OPEC's dwindling role, the flight of capitals, the huge cost of the war, and the economic isolation of the regime sharply reduced national production and income. This situation on the one hand accelerated the growth of mass discontent with the regime, and on the other hand tightened the grips on the regime economically, making it impossible for it to carry on with its war policy. In the past one year the grave economic situation of the Islamic regime, for which there seemed to be no prospect of improvement under the international isolation which the regime was experiencing, had made the prospect of a mass uprising in Iran and the outbreak of a revolutionary situation highly probable. Such a possibility was greatly worrying for the Islamic regime, and for the Iranian bourgeoisie and imperialist powers who lacked any plausible alternative with which to replace the Islamic regime. Thus, all-round efforts were launched by the imperialist powers and some factions inside the regime to bring the war to an end and save the Islamic Republic from dead end and crisis.

III) The defeat of the Islamic Republic's war policy and its submission to ending the war is essentially the political dead end of Pan-Islamism and the loss of all prospect of its political advance and expansion in the region. This political dead end and the understability for the bourgeoisie - in Iran, in the region, or internationally - of politically spreading Pan-Islamism in the region, effectively brought the war too to a dead end. The imperialist powers, particularly the U.S.A., actively worked to prevent the military victory of any one side, to hinder radical changes in the political geography and the power balance in the region, and maintain the stability of the Iranian and Iraqi states. The Iranian regime tried for a period to continue with its policy of war, despite the absence of any political or military perspective for its advance. In the end it was defeated in the face of the political and military realities. The most important factor drawing the Islamic regime to surrender and its submission to the termination of the war at this particular juncture, was the

rise in the level of mass resistance to the regime's war policy and the regime's fear of the escalation of mass protests, in the face of the increasing hardships caused by the war. This had reached such an extent that the regime practically failed to provide the necessary man-power and finance to implement its military plans and suffered decisive defeats and set-backs at the fronts. In the last months of the war the desertion of soldiers and Baseej [War Mobilization] forces intensified the morale within the armed forces fell sharply, and the regime came to face the prospect of a serious military disruption. The probability of Khomeini's death in the near future and the fact that in the absence of Khomeini, deciding on ending the war, against a background of in-fighting within the regime, would be much more difficult, forced the regime to resort to a sharp turn in its policy and accept ceasefire and peace.

B: THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN IRAN AFTER THE END OF THE WAR

I) Iranian society is faced with its deepest economic, social, and political crisis. The total economic disintegration, paralysis of big production, the calamities and ravages of the eight-year war, the appearance of signs of war fatigue in all aspects of the social and economic life, mass poverty, scarcity, unemployment, the bankruptcy of the bourgeois state and the deepening crisis of the Islamic Republic, have all made the conditions in Iran such that neither from the viewpoint of the bourgeoisie, nor of the working class can they be considered viable. To effect changes in the present situation is an objective and vital necessity which drives the various classes into a period of activity and political and social confrontation.

II) So long as there does not exist a defined and developed bourgeois political and governmental alternative to the Islamic Republic, and as long as any attempt at replacing the Islamic regime poses the prospect of revolutionary crisis and the activation of large masses of the toiling people against the bourgeoisie, the various sections of the Iranian bourgeoisie and the imperialist powers will essentially try to strengthen the Islamic Republic and bring about their required changes and reforms in this regime. This policy includes the following orientations:

1- Isolation of the Pan-Islamic current in the government as far as definitely driving

it out of positions of power; putting an end to the Pan-Islamic propaganda and provocations of the Iranian regime; reinforcing the Rafsanjani faction in the leadership of the Islamic Republic.

2- Promoting nationalism as the official ideology of the state in Iran; drawing and mobilizing the official or tacit political support of the bourgeois-nationalist currents inside and outside Iran for the non-Pan-Islamic faction of the Iranian state; the employment by the regime of standard bourgeois methods and institutions in economic administration and exercise of political control and repression.

3-Increasing the regime's stability; large investments and economic and technical assistance for the economic reconstruction of Iran and the alleviation of the present economic crisis.

4-Improving and consolidating the political and economic relations of Iran with the USA and Western Europe; making the Iranian regime committed to accepted international norms and relations between bourgeois states.

5-Relaxing the policy of state-controlled economy; providing the necessary concessions and guarantees for [the operation of] private capital aimed at inducing the Iranian bourgeoisie in the process of economic reconstruction, easing the present economic strains, and providing a greater freedom of action and a bigger role for politicians and factions supporting private capitalism.

III) These orientations make up the principal points of the political platform of the Iranian bourgeoisie and imperialism for averting a revolutionary crisis. From the standpoint of the bourgeoisie, the Islamic Republic has to give in to these processes if it is to avoid a downfall. Certain factions in the regime, in particular the Rafsanjani faction, have taken up the banner of these developments in the government. The defeat of Pan-Islamism on a regional scale this itself being an indicator of the progress of these processes - also enhances its course of isolation and decline in Iran itself. The essential conflict within the state at the present moment is the conflict to drive out the Pan-Islamic current from the main organs of power and turn the Islamic Republic into a standard bourgeois regime; a regime capable of normalizing and improving its political and economic relations with the USA and, generally, with the western imperialist bloc, and of uniting the Iranian bourgeoisie under its banner for a round of capital accumulation

and for the economic reconstruction of Iranian capitalism. This process requires fundamental changes in the Islamic regime which will no doubt heighten the internal disputes of the government. The ending of the war has put the Pan-Islamic current in a weaker position. However, the resistance of this current has not yet been broken. The decisive battles between the factions are yet to come. The prospect that, particularly in the event of Khomeini's death, the Pan-Islamic current might resort to violent measures to maintain its status or that the attempts of the present dominant faction to break the resistance of the Pan-Islamic current might take on violent forms, is by no means an unlikely one.

IV) With the cessation of the war, the struggle of the working class and deprived masses to achieve the demands and rights long trampled on under the pretext of the war, intensifies and assumes an increasingly offensive character. Considering the mass hatred felt towards the Islamic Republic regime and the severe political and cultural repression that the regime has imposed on the lives of the people, the mass protests enjoy the potential of rapidly taking on acute forms and turning into protests against the very rule of the regime. The degree to which the crisis of the government deepens, the protests by the masses will acquire a more offensive and political character. The overthrow of the regime is the demand of broad masses of the people and the formation of a mass movement to overthrow the regime is an actual possibility. In the struggle to form a mass movement with such an objective, the obstacles hindering the growth of this movement under the new conditions must be born in mind. The chief factors in this regard are as follows:

1-In the long course of the war the society has been greatly exhausted, and in certain social strata, in particular among the petty-bourgeoisie, conservative tendencies and inclinations towards order and stability have grown.

2-The move of capital for a period of economic reconstruction and the need of the working class and other toiling strata for an immediate improvement in their standard of living, strengthens the tendency to wait and give the regime time to implement its economic policies to get the production going, increase employment and repair the devastations caused by the long course of the war.

3-Despite all the existing differences in the ranks of the bourgeoisie and the dissatisfaction of the various sections of the bour-

DOWN WITH THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC REGIME!

geists with the Islamic regime, in every direct confrontation between the workers and the regime and in every issue concerning constitutional revision, the bourgeoisie will mobilize untidely in support of the regime; any internal differences in the ranks of the bourgeoisie will be overshadowed by the confrontation of capital and labour.

4-In the past several years the working class has suffered many set-backs and at this very moment does not have the necessary political and organisational preparedness to enter a direct struggle over political power. The harsh economic situation has intensified the competition in the ranks of the workers, and working-class organisations are at the very early stages of their formation. The working-class alternative for political power has not yet been sufficiently posed and is not sufficiently known. These defects which can be rapidly overcome in the event of a rise in the workers' protest movement and with the communists' active intervention, in the early stages pose serious obstacles to the resurgence of a revolutionary movement by the working class.

5- The requirement for the formation of a popular movement to overthrow the regime is that a relatively clearer picture of what may take its place exists in the society, and that the alternative which should replace it is to some degree developed. The experience of the suppression of the 1979 revolution by the Islamic regime and the hardships that this regime has imposed on the masses in the name of the revolution, has made the various social strata - despite the mass hatred which exists towards the regime - more cautious for entering a fight for fundamental changes, without a prior re-alignment and a class settling of accounts.

V) The prospect of a period of reconstruction, the plans for massive foreign investment in various branches of production, and the possibility of a rapid increase in production and employment, given the unused capacities of the present industries, means that it is practically feasible to ease the economic tension in the short run. Despite the fact that the Islamic Republic will still resist in the face of workers' basic demands, and probably, using the excuse of reconstruction, even try to impose harsher conditions on the workers, the very rise in employment, etc, following a general economic recovery, can lead to some improvements in the overall condition of the working class. This situation on the one hand increases the wait-and-see mentality in the ranks of the class in

the short term, giving the regime a greater opportunity for manoeuvre and for winning time in the face of the workers' movement. But on the other hand, it also strengthens the grounds for workers' economic struggles, reduces the competition in workers' ranks, and creates much greater possibilities for extending the workers' movement and raising the combative power of the working class.

VI) The Iranian society, from a class point of view, has become sharply polarized. This is a decisive advance in the class relationships, facilitating the work of organisation of the socialist movement of the working class and the independent mobilization of workers. This also ties the future of the political situation essentially to the capacity and power of the working class to assert itself actively in the field of political struggle, put forward a revolutionary alternative in the society, and mobilize all the forces of revolutionary democracy against the Islamic regime and in opposition to all the forces and parties of the bourgeoisie.

VII) Thus, with the ending of the war, Iranian society enters a period of deep political and social crisis, political conflicts and class confrontations and alignments over fundamental economic and political problems. The chief features of this period are as follows:

1-The deepening of the crisis of the government and the heightening of the internal struggles of the regime; major changes in the groupings and alliances inside and outside the government, weakening the Pan-Islamic current. Other factors being favourable, in particular in the event of an upsurge in the protest movement, the crisis of the government can lead to the re-opening of the question of political power and the emergence of a revolutionary crisis.

2-The protest movement and the economic struggles of the working class will increase, obtaining an offensive character; the economic regeneration will, on the whole, put the working class in a better position for protests and exerting pressure.

3-The mass protest actions against the regime's repressive policies and for achieving basic welfare and democratic rights will increase.

4-Although the regime will try to stop the growth of protest movements by stepping up the repression, the government's internal crisis and the pressure of the demands by the

people will in the medium term reduce its capacity in confronting the mass protests.

5-The bourgeois parties and forces of the opposition will intensify their hostility to the workers' and communist movement and will all the more openly display their enmity with revolution and legitimate popular movements.

C: THE OUTLINES OF THE POLICY OF THE CPI IN THE PRESENT SITUATION

Under the present changing circumstances, the CPI sets its prime task forming a socialist workers' movement and strengthening, preparing and mobilizing the working class as an independent force in the political field. The 1979 revolution and the ten-year period since then has been the period of the creation of the basis and requirements of the political independence of the working class and the consolidation of the socialist rank of workers. The CPI regards the present conditions a stage in the progress of this vital and determining trend and will make use of all the possibilities and opportunities which the present crisis of the bourgeoisie provides for the workers' movement, to further the achievement of this fundamental aim of the working class. The CPI stresses that not only the cause of workers' revolution but any real improvement in the lives of the working-class masses requires the manifestation of workers as an independent political force, with its own independent policies, slogans, organisations and political alternative. This is the real indicator of the progress of the movement and the necessary condition for a revolutionary upsurge, the overthrowing of the Islamic Republic regime and the establishment of a revolutionary state for the realization of toilers' basic demands.

In line with this policy, the CPI puts the following measures on its immediate agenda and calls on communist workers for the rapid realization of these measures:

I) Ever-wider agitation of the necessity of overthrowing the Islamic Republic regime by the power of the working and toiling masses; agitation of the necessity of setting up a workers' state as the only real way of ending the hardships of the masses; struggling against the mood of waiting and giving the regime time, which is advocated, in the name of reconstruction, by various sections of the bourgeoisie and their political parties, both in power and in opposition; endeavouring to prevent the working class from being dragged behind the various factions of the regime or the non-worker parties of the opposition.

II) Strengthening the workers' movement and workers' socialist rank; trying so that the working class comes out of this period as a more united and more organised force, with material gains in building mass and party organisations, and with a strengthened bond with communism. This is the most determining criterion for the advance of the working class in this period and the guarantee for its future progress. Under the present conditions the following tasks are of vital significance:

1-Promoting the general-assembly movement as the basic form for workers' organisation and protest. General assemblies not only have the capacity of rapidly providing the minimum necessary organisation and unity in the workers' current struggles, but from the viewpoint of resisting the regime's pressure and adapting to the progress of the workers' movement at every step, are the most suitable means of struggle for workers. The next period must be the period of blossoming and authority of the workers' general-assembly movement.

2-Working to build a revolutionary socialist workers' leadership able to keep the mass of the workers united and independent in the current struggles and in the future political battles; drawing the workers' direct leaders and activists to a communist perspective and the policies of the Party, strengthening and extending the political and practical relation of the Party with these leaders, and creating greater consensus and unity of action among them, in particular over the key slogans of the workers' movement; preparing the workers' leaders for building workers' nation-wide organisations, as and when the political situation and the balance of class forces makes the taking of such steps possible.

3-Working for the organisation and extension of workers' economic struggles in order to bring about immediate improvements in the economic situation of workers and to raise the combative capacity of the working class. Workers must be called upon to intensify the struggle to achieve the demands and rights which have been trampled on and try to make the workers' movement take up an offensive character. General and vital working-class demands which play a key role in the unification of the ranks of the labour movement must be put on the agenda of the struggle of the greatest masses of workers. The CPI and communist workers realise the definite effort by various sections of the workers to improve their situation. At the same time we place the struggle for those demands at the

top of our agenda which directly serve to reduce the poverty and hunger of the whole class, provide better conditions for workers' struggles, and generalize and unify the workers' movement. The most important of these demands are as follows:

*Immediate rise in workers' wages and bonuses.

*Payment of unemployment benefit to all those ready for work.

*Reinstatement of all workers made redundant and sacked; the release and reinstatement of all imprisoned workers.

*Reduction of the weekly work to a maximum of 40 hours.

*Dissolution of the Islamic Councils and Islamic Societies and all of the regime's anti-workers' institutions in the factories.

*Unconditional freedom of strike and organization.

III) Working to turn the working class and the workers' movement into the leader and standard-bearer of democratic demands and struggles in the society, bringing the working class to the forefront of protest against the repression and reaction which the Islamic regime has imposed upon the lives of the masses. Workers' organisations and leaders must be the consistent defenders and spokesmen of the demands of the entire oppressed masses. The working class should be at the head of the struggle for the realization of demands, the most important of which include:

*All-round political freedoms; freedom of organisation, expression, belief.

*The release of all political prisoners.

*Complete equality of women and men in all social rights; the immediate revoking of all the restrictive regulations imposed against women.

*Complete separation of religion from the state and education.

*An end to the military suppression of the people of Kurdistan; recognition of the Kurdish people's right to self-determination on the basis of a referendum by the Kurdish population.

*The dismantling of militarism and giving compensation for the damages and losses incurred by the people as a result of the war.

*Immediate supply of basic essentials at low prices.

*Ending the persecution of, and the restrictions imposed on, all those who refused to join up and fight in the war.

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The end of the war has once again brought the antagonistic interests and perspective of the bourgeoisie and the working class in conflict with each other in the clearest way. The future developments in Iran have above all become dependent on the conscious practicing at all cost to prevent the deepening of the existing political crisis and the outbreak of a revolutionary situation. Both in Iran and on a world scale the bourgeoisie has mobilized to overcome the crisis of the Islamic regime and with certain changes and adjustments in it once again consolidate and employ it, against the wish of the toiling people, as a regime of bourgeois stability and order and for the reconstruction of capitalism in Iran. For the working class and toiling masses this stability and reconstruction will mean nothing but the continuation of bourgeois exploitation, despotism and reaction. In contrast, the working class must open the perspective of workers' state, liberty and equality before the society, come forward as a united and organized force and the leader of mass struggle for economic equality and political freedom, and uproot the Islamic regime and the whole rule of capital in Iran.

The Communist Party of Iran, while taking advantage of the present weaknesses and reverses of the crisis-stricken bourgeoisie in Iran and its state in order to win improvements in the condition of the working class—however minor and partial these may be—considers its essential task preparing the working class to accomplish its fundamental and epoch-making mission, the workers' communist revolution.

Central Committee of the
Communist Party of Iran
Sep. 1988

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KURDISTAN AFTER THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR

Interview with comrade Ebrahim Alizadeh

[The following interview has been translated from issue 43 (Sep. 88) of our central organ, *Komunist*]

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Q: Comrade Ebrahim, the termination of the Iran-Iraq war, which is about to become official, is surely a turning point of great importance in the Iranian situation. As we all know, the Islamic Republic finally gave up its official policy of the continuation of the war and ended the war from an openly weak position. The end of the war was, therefore, at the same time an official politico-ideological defeat for the Islamic Republic. Before discussing the question of Kurdistan, let us talk about the reasons for the acceptance of the Security Council resolution 598 on the part of the Islamic Republic regime, and also about the implications of the end of the war for the political situation in Iran in general and the Islamic Republic's position in particular.

A: First I would like to express my best wishes to the listeners and thank you for this interview. Before answering your question, I should say that these days workers, toilers and all the honourable people of Iran and Iraq are quite rightly sharing the joy of the end of this devastating and inhuman war. The end of this race of slaughter and devastation is itself a victory for the working people. We share in this joy and are pleased that the war is over. I would also like to extend our sympathy and condolences to the bereaved families and victims of this war, whether those forcibly dragged into the minefields as human-waves, or those whose towns and villages were burnt to ground, and those who lost their homes in the bombings.

The Islamic Republic gave in to Resolution 598 when it was on the way to a complete collapse. As they themselves admitted, accepting the cease-fire and ending the war was the only way to save the very existence of the Islamic Republic regime. It was, in fact, the only choice at hand which they had to make, although it was like taking poison.

The regime was totally bankrupt, economically and financially. Not only was it unable to satisfy the basic needs of the people, but could not even provide food and ammunition to

the war fronts. The people's protest struggles against the war had already begun in the big cities. Resistance to the burdens of the war and opposition to the continuation of the war was rapidly growing among the people. The Islamic Republic was aware that an escalation of the people's protests and struggles would go much further than the demand for an end to the war, seriously threatening its very existence. It knew that the continuation of those struggles could well put an end to the war as well as to the Islamic Republic regime.

The spread of workers' protests and strikes in the industrial centres and the major factories was also posing a serious threat to the Islamic Republic. That is why it resorted to arresting many of the popular and active leaders of the workers' movements. The protest actions of the workers and toilers against the war, as well as their refusal to go to the war fronts, represented a most serious threat. So, not only the Islamic Republic but also its legal opposition, Bazargan and the like, cast about to find a way out.

The disputes within the government apparatus and among the various movements, the *Resalat* faction and all the other opponents who had recently been driven out of the Assembly and from the various administrative offices, were at the point of regrouping their forces. All the facts were indicating that the opponents could no longer be overcome by intimidation, harassment or cover by provocations from Khomeini. The dimensions of the dispute over the government's economic plans, over the continuation of the war, over the fusion of the army and the Pasdaran [the paramilitary guards] and so on, had reached such a level that it was leading to actual sabotage in the day-to-day running of the state affairs.

By the passing of each day another dark page of murder and slaughter was added to the record of this regime, and in the world public opinion, the regime and Khomeini were facing an increasing hatred. Western powers, particularly the USA, while actually drawing closer to the Islamic Republic, were also stepping up diplomatic and military pressures on it to end the war. They were anxiously trying to force the Islamic Republic to accept the Security Council resolution, before the revolutionary struggles and protests

VICTORY TO THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE!

of the exhausted masses make it do so.

At the same time the regime's armed fronts in the fronts were steadily losing numbers. Refusal to go to the fronts was widely spreading. The daily propaganda cries of the regime about sending large groups of volunteers to the fronts were in fact efforts to cover that fact. The supply of ammunition and other military necessities for the fronts had nearly diminished. The soldiers and Pasdaran had not only lost their fighting and offensive spirit, but could not even resist the attacks and were easily giving up and retreating. Under such circumstances all the factions of the Islamic Republic, from top to bottom, generally recognized the fact that they had no opportunity to reinforce themselves, they would lose control and their collapse would be a matter of course. For this reason, they conceded defeat in the war so as to be able to free themselves from the grips of the potential problems and dangers which were threatening their very existence.

Accepting cease-fire and submitting to defeat was a bitter moment and a deadly blow to the Islamic Republic. The defeat in the war was above all the defeat of the alternative put by the Islamic Republic to the imperialist powers for overcoming the governmental and political crisis of the Iranian bourgeoisie. It was, in fact, the defeat of Pan-Islamism, an alternative which was supposed to restore security and stability for the capitalist governments of the region, saving them from the danger of workers' and communist revolution. The signs of the deadlock and failure of the Islamic Republic had emerged in Lebanon and Iraq, which the Islamic Republic had set its hopes on, before the acceptance of the cease-fire. But the Iran-Iraq war was, in fact, that crucial arena in which the death knell of the Pan-Islamic current was definitely sounded.

The Islamic Republic regime has now demonstrated its inability not only in offering a governmental model to the capitalist region, but also in unifying the confused and crisis-ridden ranks of the Iranian bourgeoisie.

Before the end of the war, the Islamic Republic was using the war as a pretext to impose unprecedented pressure, poverty and destitution upon the people. But now it has lost this excuse. The people of Iran will no longer easily give in to such pressures. They will strive to cast off these burdens. As a result of this war, a large number of border towns and villages have been destroyed; thousands of houses and residential buildings in the cities have been ruined by bombs and rockets. Now that the war is over, people want to go back to their homes; they want their ruined houses and shelters to be rebuilt. Tens of thousands of workers who were

laid off under the pretext of the war and sent to the war fronts, now want to return from the fronts immediately and go back to their jobs. The working people are exhausted by the high cost of living. They demand that this heavy burden be taken off their backs and that basic necessities be available to the people at low prices.

All along the eight-year war the Islamic Republic suffocated any cry for liberty. People want this repression to be ended and political liberties to be secured.

People will now strongly protest to recruitment for the army, and military mobilization, under whatever pretext. The law-fighting in the regime with each side blaming the other for the failures, will heighten.

These are the problems facing the Islamic Republic, at a time when this regime is more than ever incapable of resolving them.

It is obvious that such a situation could not last for long. Signs of impotence and weakness are now and more appearing in the regime. The very acceptance of cease-fire and submission to defeat was an attempt to slow down the pace of this weakening.

The regime, emerging defeated from an eight-year war and financially and economically bankrupt, is not able to satisfy the growing needs and demands of the masses. Moreover, the means employed by it so far to get out of such difficulties are now old and worn-out. It has, therefore, set its eyes on the assistance and cooperation of the imperialists.

Under such circumstances, the spread of political struggles and popular protests against the Islamic Republic is a serious and promising possibility for our country. We shall consciously try to influence the course of growth of these struggles and protests, and try to make them all the more extensive.

Q: You said that the Islamic Republic has to pursue its policies under a critical situation in our country. How does this situation affect the position of the Islamic Republic in Kurdistan?

A: In Kurdistan the Islamic regime is facing a people who have resisted its policies for nine years, and on many occasions even forced it to retreat. The regime is facing an armed struggle, against which it has been forced to station thousands of military bases and partitions all over Kurdistan; it hopes to safeguard its rule in Kurdistan by relying on such a military force. But its rule has been continually challenged and defied by political and protest struggles and by the armed struggle.

The defeat in the Iran-Iraq war and the situation the Islamic Republic will be facing domestically following the end of the war,

will diminish the capacities of its armed forces and all of its ruling organs in carrying on with the suppressions. At present, the regime has concentrated large military forces in Kurdistan. The major part of this force has been stationed in Kurdistan under the excuse of war with Iraq, but practically it is employed against the just struggles of the Kurdish people. People of Kurdistan will be rightly protesting in this period as they have always done, asking why there should be a military base in every corner of the streets, on every hill, in every village, and on every road; why should the Kurdish people be faced with the most hated armed forces and mercenaries of the regime in every neighbourhood and every work-place? Who has asked them to bring so many forces to Kurdistan and take peace and security away from the people? The people of Iran will ask the Islamic Republic for how much longer their children have to die in another front, in another war; a war which is waged against the struggles of the Kurdish toilers whose only fault has been to reject the rule of the imperialists, a rule which in the ten years of its rule has turned the whole of Iran into a real hell for the Iranian people; a regime which has brought nothing but death and ruin for the working masses. The soldiers in the armed forces must ask, and will no doubt do so, for how much longer they should remain in the service of the policies of a regime in whose ideology and mentality human life and human dignity has no value whatsoever, a regime which considers them as tools to be sacrificed in the service of its reactionary rule. To be sure, following the end of the war, desertions, disobedience, disruption, and low morale in the regime's armed forces in the front of its counter-revolutionary war against the people of Kurdistan will become all the more common. All of what I pointed out briefly will bring about more favourable conditions and a better balance of forces in the struggle of the Kurdish toilers against the Islamic Republic. Do the capacities of the people in the struggle in Kurdistan can be more effectively employed in all fronts, from the struggle against unemployment and high prices down to the workers' struggle to improve the working conditions and their standard of living, and the struggle for the expulsion of the suppressive forces of the Islamic Republic from Kurdistan, and so on. Today, when the Iran-Iraq war is over, the possibility of continuing and reinforcing these struggles has increased.

Q: From what you said it can be concluded that the Kurdish people is in a much more favourable position to struggle for its just demands against the Islamic Republic. What is Komala's policy for encouraging this struggle?

A: It is central to our work to pursue an all-sided political, economic and military struggle in Kurdistan. We, therefore, try to encourage every protest and every struggle for basic rights; from strike actions in small workshops to strikes in big industries or in a state sector; from the protest action of the people of a neighbourhood to have electricity, water, proper streets and other public services to the protest action of the people of a city against the lack and scarcity of basic essentials; from the protest action of the people of a village against the presence of the regime's military base in the village to the protest actions of the people of Kurdistan to get the hands of the army, the Pasdaran and all the suppressive forces of the regime, off their life; and in short, for every small day-to-day action to larger, more organised and generalized movements. Komala will strive to guide the protest actions of the masses everywhere and in all fronts. It will encourage all these actions and by putting forward common and unifying slogans and demands, will make it possible for these movements to become broader and acquire a greater mass character.

In this period, Komala will try to raise the confidence of the working masses in their own power by advancing and bringing to victory all their struggles, however small and limited they may be, step by step raising the courage of the masses to protest and express their discontent. It shall work to bring workers' demands for better living conditions, such as higher wages, shorter working days, unemployment benefit, housing, etc., to the forefront of the demands of the protesting masses. At the same time Komala appeals to all class-conscious workers to step up to step up their struggles for all those demands which can mobilize the greatest number of workers and toilers, and which can promote their combative morale. A future upturn in the mass movement in Kurdistan presupposes the active participation of the Kurdish toilers in the struggle by their own independent organisations.

Komala calls upon the people of Kurdistan to step up their protest against the presence of the armed forces and military bases of the Islamic Republic in Kurdistan, to demand their withdrawal and to call for an end to their intervention in the life of the Kurdish people. Komala calls upon everyone to struggle for political freedoms, freedom of organisation, strike and all other political activities.

We shall strive to make these struggles as organised as possible and so that the workers and toilers may come out of these struggles more united and more experienced. The armed struggle of the Komala Peshmarga force will also be conducted in the same direction and

in accordance with these struggles.

Q: You said that the advance of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan presupposes the conscious participation of the working masses. What are the most important tasks before the vanguard workers in this connection?

A: Vanguard and influential workers who lead workers' actions are, in the coming period, above all duty-bound to work consistently and tirelessly to raise the degree of organisation of the workers. If the workers of Kurdistan are to become the indisputable leaders of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan, if they are to become the principal driving force of this movement, they should take part in these struggles with greater organisation. We, therefore, ask all these comrade workers to look at this period as a time of making the workers of Kurdistan more organised, and to do so promptly and consistently under Komala's policies and guidance.

It is also important that the revolutionary and conscious workers become known and reliable figures in the Kurdish movement. This goal will not be achieved but by actively taking part in workers' actions and in all protest movements for rights in Kurdistan. For this reason, these comrades should make common cause with any mass struggle for the demands of the oppressed people. They should take the lead in such struggles, try to guide and strengthen them, and strive to turn those demands and slogans which concern the vast majority of workers and toilers into the banner of these struggles.

Q: Comrade Ebrahim, the armed struggle is one front of the revolutionary movement and of the struggle of the toiling masses. With the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the creation of certain limitations in the use of the border areas, people are concerned that this new situation may confront us with more difficulties and limitations in our military activities. Basically, how will the activities of the armed forces of Komala be pursued under the new conditions, in accordance with our strategy for the victory of the movement in Kurdistan?

A: To answer this question I can only point out the outlines of our basic policies and orientations and the practical measures based on them in the new situation.

First, the Iran-Iraq war has brought about untold sufferings for the Kurdish people. Above all, one must talk about the pressures, hardships and deprivations that the war itself imposed upon the people and even upon their struggle. The cease-fire, in fact, puts an end to most of the limitations which had

been increasingly hindering the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan in the last eight years. The lifting of these pressures and hardships would mean, above all, the opening up of new fronts of struggle for the mass movement. On the other hand, as pointed out earlier, the profound political, economic and social crisis the Islamic Republic is entangled in has greatly diminished its capacities and strength in handling the problems it is faced with. The mass movement in Kurdistan has, therefore, a favourable chance to advance further and extend the struggle against the Islamic Republic. The limitations you pointed out are not the limitations of the mass movement in Kurdistan, but are certain organisational problems we have in one field of our work. What we have to do is, while trying to work, to seriously make overcome these problems, to seriously make preparation for the coming mass movement and political development whose objective socio-political grounds are more than ever provided. We should hasten the progress of such a development by our conscious practice.

Second, our strategy for the victory of the Kurdish movement has not been based on taking advantage of regional conflicts. Quite the contrary, this struggle has essentially relied on the movement and the efforts of the toiling people for freedom, and on the class movement in Kurdistan; it has drawn and draws its strength from the support of the vast masses of Kurdish toilers. The existence of these differences and of regional conflicts only shows us under what conditions our struggle—a struggle rooted in the objective and real needs of the working masses in Kurdistan and based on a conscious programme and politics—is being carried out; what special possibilities these conditions create for us; or even what obstacles and limitations they place on our way. In the past eight years, the Iran-Iraq war has been, in practice, part of the conditions of work of our Peshmarga force. Now, with the end of this war and the lessening of hostilities between Iran and Iraq, new conditions have developed for the Peshmarga force. Therefore, the question for us really is how we can adapt our plan of activities in this field to the new circumstances.

We have frequently emphasized the fact that the strength of the Kurdish movement, its advance and victory, whether at the present period or in any other period, is dependent on to what extent the masses of workers and toilers, as the main and determining force in our struggle, have turned to a direct struggle in the various fronts for the realization of their demands and the goals of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan. It is a fact that up to now the more the toilers of Kurdistan have participated in the struggle, the more the enemy has been forced to retreat, and the more the people have become sur-

of victory. So, here too it should be stressed that overcoming limitations which arise in the activities of the Peshmarga force with the ending of the Iran-Iraq war will be only one of the results of the advance of the mass movement of workers and toilers of Kurdistan. This movement already exists, but it should become stronger, more comprehensive, and more generalized; and this is our job.

Third, the new situation in the border areas will surely affect the manner of the military operations, the military objectives and the priorities of the Peshmarga force, and in general, our military policy. The truth is that at present the armed struggle of the Peshmarga force of Komala is carried on with the unsparring support of the militant people of Kurdistan. This support has always kept a hopeful perspective open in this field of our activities.

And finally, in your question you referred to the apprehension of the people over the future of the activities of the Peshmarga force. I must say that apprehension and anxiety exists among large sections of the Kurdish people; it is a fact, and we, for our part, shall try to deal with it in various ways, showing to the people that with the end of the Iran-Iraq war the Kurdish movement can, and must, prepare for new advances. However, our natural expectation from people who are worried is that they put greater efforts into their work. Anyone who is worried about limitations created in the work of the Peshmarga force, should think of taking part more effectively and actively in the political and revolutionary struggles in Kurdistan for which several fields have opened up. We call upon the militant and freedom-loving people of Kurdistan to rally more than ever before under Komala's policies and slogans against the Islamic Republic, and put this reactionary and wounded enemy under pressure. Komala has always relied on the support of the working people of Kurdistan, and no doubt under the new conditions, too, it will overcome the problems of its organizational activities in the military and open field, by relying on this same force.

* * *

Today, August 19, is the anniversary of the offensive of the Islamic Republic regime on Kurdistan, the anniversary of the declaration of holy war by Khomeini against the militant people of Kurdistan. Employing massive forces and resources, particularly taking advantage of the favourable situation provided by the extension of the Iran-Iraq war to the Kurdish border areas, the Islamic Republic turned Kurdistan into a heavily militarized zone. But the reality is that no military advance by the Islamic Republic was made

without a tenacious resistance against it. Every moment of this resistance enriched the revolutionary struggle in Kurdistan. Thanks to this prolonged resistance in the past ten years, such a balance of forces was created in Kurdistan that many of the Islamic Republic's policies and laws were practically breached by the militant people of Kurdistan. Although, under the pressure of military occupation, the revolutionaries in Kurdistan, having to progress under harsher conditions, the truth is that today, after nine years of activity and struggle in Kurdistan, the working masses have won an unquestionable political, organisational and social role in this movement. Working-class and communist traditions have been strengthened in the heart of the revolutionary movement; in spite of years of non-stop efforts by the Islamic Republic, the use of huge financial and propaganda resources, and the backing of a massive military force, the Islamic reaction has not been able to obtain any social base in Kurdistan. No social force, supporting the Islamic Republic, has emerged in Kurdistan. Today, this regime is more isolated than ever.

Moreover, the goals of the revolutionary struggle have become clearer. The toiling masses are aware of their rights and have more expectations from their life and their struggle. The aims of this struggle have gone beyond the narrow nationalist and traditional limits and have turned into clear demands and slogans for the majority of the working masses. In short, during nine years of struggle against the Islamic Republic, the toiling masses have achieved many valuable and irrevocable gains that will no doubt serve as a secure base for advancing towards a promising future and towards emancipation.

Let us today, on the ninth anniversary of the steadfast and proudfest mass resistance in Kurdistan, renew our pledge to safeguard, strengthen and advance these gains. Let us make this day the day of expressing public hatred to the suppressive war of the Islamic Republic against the people, and the official occupation of Kurdistan. Let us demonstrate our solidarity by an all-out and united stoppage in all sectors of work and activity on this day.

Resolution about : Our Strategy in the Kurdish Movement

[The following resolution, adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Kurdistan Organisation of the Communist Party of Iran - Komala (held in May 1988), has been translated from issue 41 of our central organ.]

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A: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1-Our activity in the [Iranian] Kurdistan is part of the general activities of the Communist Party of Iran for the organisation and victory of workers' revolution and the establishment of workers' state on a nation-wide scale. From this viewpoint, the general policy and the methods of activity of the Party in the organisation of communist revolution and the mobilization of the working class as the chief motive force and the leader of every revolutionary development, also govern the work of our party organisation in Kurdistan.

2-For various reasons, including, especially, the national oppression in Kurdistan and the resistance and struggle against it, the tradition of armed struggle, and the communists' success in turning into an effective political force, the political situation in Kurdistan after the 1979 revolution has followed a course different from the rest of Iran. Here, against the offensive bourgeois-Islamic reaction, an armed resistance movement was formed which had the backing of broad masses. This armed movement, initially called the resistance movement and at a later stage the revolutionary movement of the Kurdish people, on the one hand prevented the absolute domination of the bourgeois-Islamic reaction in Kurdistan, facilitating the protest actions and democratic struggles of the masses, and on the other hand imparted greater prominence to the demand for the abolition of national oppression, in the form of autonomy, as the common call of the forces of resistance against the Islamic Republic regime.

Thus, whether from the viewpoint of the balance of class forces or the existing political situation and the methods of revolutionary and mass struggle, the working class and communism in Kurdistan is faced with a particular situation, and hence with particular tasks. On top of these tasks lies the

leadership of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan and the turning of this movement into a lever for the extension and strengthening of the communist struggle of the working class.

3-No doubt, there is an intimate connection between the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan and the struggle in Iran. Particularly with regard to its recent history, this movement has sprung up in the context of a nation-wide revolution. Any advance of this movement and any upsurge on a national scale will have mutually strengthening effects.

Moreover, with regard to the fact that, economically and politically, Kurdistan is an organic part of the Iranian society, the development of a major gap between the progress of the revolution nationally and that in Kurdistan is improbable. The most probable and at the same time the most favourable situation, is the re-union of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan with a nation-wide political upsurge. Nevertheless, considering the particularities of the revolutionary struggle in Kurdistan and the fact that there is a concrete movement in progress there, the CPI and the Party's Kurdistan organisation, Komala, which has been the major factor in the formation and progress of a broad armed resistance against the Islamic regime, should outline and put forward its strategy for the advance of this movement.

B: THE BASES OF OUR STRATEGY IN KURDISTAN

Our strategy in Kurdistan is based on the following:

1-The working class and the toilers of towns and villages make up the chief motive force of the revolutionary movement in Kurdistan. The progress and victory of this movement is directly dependent upon the degree of growth of the socialist and independent movement of the working class, the unification of workers through their communist party, and the leadership of the protest and revolutionary movement by this class.

2-Cities form the principal centres of political protest actions by the masses and the axis of the revolutionary movement. The mass

political movement in the rural areas is a corollary of the political movement in the cities.

3-The necessary condition for the advance of the revolutionary movement is the breaking of the workers and toilers from the perspective, ideals and politics of the bourgeois parties in Kurdistan and the strengthening of communism against nationalism on a social scale.

4-The victory of the revolutionary movement is only possible under the conditions of a mass political rising in Kurdistan. Distinguishing between revolutionary and non-revolutionary conditions and the different tasks resulting from each of these situations for the communists and the workers' movement is a main basis for working out the proletarian strategy in this movement.

5-Considering the profound economic and political contradictions of the regime, the hardships arising from the Iran-Iraq war, and the deep resentment felt towards the regime by the people across the country, the development of a political crisis, instability in the regime, and a political upsurge, is a real possibility. Under such conditions, particularly in Kurdistan, where communism and Komala constitute an effective social force, it is quite feasible to accelerate the political upsurge through the Party's conscious and planned practice.

6-Only an all-round economic, political and military struggle can put the Islamic Republic in Kurdistan under pressure and pave the way for a mass rising against the very existence of the regime in Kurdistan. The merging of these forms of struggle in a coherent policy of pressure and protest against the regime is central to our present tasks in Kurdistan.

7-The final form of the victory of the revolutionary movement will be a combination of urban uprising - in the wake of a mass upsurge and protest - the advance of our expanded military forces, the driving out of the oppressive forces of the regime from Kurdistan, and the taking of control by the insurrectionary masses and the toilers' armed forces led by Komala.

8-The collapse and disintegration of the forces and institutions of the central government and their retreat will not mark the end of the matter. Victory will only be complete with the establishment of mass organs of power in towns and villages and the

organisation of a power structure in Kurdistan. This new power will immediately implement the revolutionary demands and programmes of workers. The necessary condition for the realization of this perspective is not only overcoming the forces of the central government, but also preventing the attempts of the bourgeois parties in Kurdistan at replacing the [amalgamated] institutions of power of the central government with the above-people organs of the local bourgeoisie.

9-The final guarantee for a lasting victory is the decisive smashing of the power of the bourgeoisie at a national level. A Kurdistan in which the revolutionary movement has broken the power of the central government, cannot rely but on a nation-wide revolution in Iran for safeguarding her gains. For us, victory in Kurdistan is a link in the realization of the workers' nation-wide strategy in Iran.

C: THE OUTLINE OF THE DIFFERENT STAGES IN THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT

Some of the initial objectives which the communists in every revolutionary movement must achieve, were attained in Kurdistan in the years after the 1979 revolution. As a communist force, Komala already enjoys the support of the majority of the wage-earning workers and a broad section of the toilers in Kurdistan, and has more or less turned into the vanguard party organisation and the leader of the workers. Our agitation and activity has promoted the workers' class awareness of their interests; it has given greater clarity to the democratic demands of the people and has established a much clearer picture of the content and aims of the present movement among them. The armed struggle, despite the set-backs and limitations that have been imposed on it, has been recognized as a valid form of struggle, both for the present and for the foreseeable future. It has played an important role in preventing the total domination of bourgeois-Islamic reaction in Kurdistan. The Kurdish bourgeoisie, whether from the viewpoint of its social influence and perspective, or with regard to its political, practical, and organisational power, has been severely weakened in the face of the socialist alternative of workers and the socialist tradition of struggle for which Komala is the representative in the whole of Kurdistan. Communism and the tradition of struggling through the Communist Party is currently overcoming the bourgeois-nationalist tradition which was the hallmark of the previous struggles.

WORKERS OF THE WORLD UNITE !

Proceeding on the basis of the gains achieved so far and the points above concerning our strategy in Kurdistan, a definite policy covering a specific period is placed on our agenda.

In general, three distinct phases may be defined in the activities of the Party in Kurdistan. The first is the period prior to a mass rising, i.e., the present one; the second is the period of the start of the mass protest movement and the eve of a revolutionary escalation; and the third is the period of political upsurge and of the final offensive.

This classification into periods has important implications for the character of our tasks. And in each of these periods particular tasks and orientations are placed on our agenda.

I) Our main tasks in the present period (before a mass upsurge)

1-Strengthening the relation between communism and the class; organising the working class and drawing it to the scene; stepping up the different forms of class protest; turning communists into a social force and the Kurdistan Organisation of the Party into the organisation of the immediate leaders and activists of the workers' movement.

2-Building mass organisations of workers and toilers capable of struggling and keeping and extending the unity of the working masses in the context of the present balance of forces.

3-Combining the main forms of struggle (economic, political and military) in a policy of applying all-sided and coordinated pressure on the central government; turning Komala into the leader of the people's protest actions; turning communist leaders into influential leaders throughout Kurdistan.

4-Maintaining the strength and power of the communist armed force, expanding it as far as it is possible in this period, maintaining and consolidating the ideological and political firmness of this force.

5-Raising our political and military capabilities with regard to the central government; constantly improving our balance of political and military strength with regard to the local bourgeoisie and its parties.

6-Politically isolating the bourgeois parties; weakening the nationalist perspective in favour of the socialist and the revolutionary-democratic perspective.

7-Preparing the mass leaders and communist agitators for the work of educating and leading the toilers under the present condi-

tions, as well as leading the broad mass movement under the conditions of a revolutionary escalation.

8-Promoting working-class and democratic demands and ideals across the society; raising workers' capacity and preparedness for taking the lead of the protest movement and ruling through councils in future.

II) Our main tasks on the eve of the political upsurge

1-Rapidly expanding our armed forces through the creation of mass military organisations linked to Komala.

2-Advancing militarily and creating liberated zones.

3-Organising mass protests in the cities; making preparations for urban insurrection with the support of the revolutionary armed forces.

4-Creating the initial forms of organs of mass power both in the cities and in the rural areas.

5-Making preparations for arming the workers and toilers in the cities.

6-Isolating the compromising bourgeois currents, making them follow the advanced section of the revolutionary struggle (neutralizing coalition, wheeling and dealing, etc).

7-Forsing a popular leadership for the insurrection; (Party leaders going beyond Party responsibilities and turning into elements of mass revolutionary power).

III) Our main tasks in the period of political upsurge, insurrection and the final offensive

1-Disintegrating and repelling the army of the central government by an urban insurrection and by the advance of the Party and mass armed forces; the capture of the cities.

2-Setting up council [soviet] power in the cities and rural areas; preventing the local bourgeoisie from replacing the [dismantled] organs of the central government with its own above-people institutions and functionaries.

3-Formally proclaiming the legitimacy of the rule of the people's councils; ensuring the legality of this rule by the armed people's militia.

4-Universal arming and the organising of a mass militia by the communist armed force;

cont. p.19

Resolution about :

The assessment of the situation of the KDP* and our attitude towards it

[The following resolution, adopted by the Sixth Congress of the Kurdistan Organisation of the Communist Party of Iran - Komala (held in May 1988), has been translated from Issue 41 of our central organ.]

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A: THE GENERAL CAUSES OF THE CRISIS OF THE KDP CURRENT

1-Rooted in the position of the Kurdish nation as an oppressed nation and as a bourgeois form of protest against it, nationalism in Kurdistan has for long functioned as a basis for the formation and growth of different political parties and currents in the Kurdish society, in opposition to the central governments. Just as nationalism, historically, has served as the ideological means of the bourgeoisie for securing the interests of the different sections of this class, so Kurdish nationalism, in a more limited dimension, has played the same role.

Since many years ago, the Kurdistan Democratic Party has been the main representative of the nationalist current in Iranian Kurdistan. From the viewpoint of its class character, this party is the party of the bourgeoisie, and from the viewpoint of its social ideal, it is a party seeking autonomy. For the Kurdish bourgeoisie, autonomy implies securing a political and state backing - in the form of participation in local government - for its capital and capital accumulation.

2-The social influence of the KDP and its existence as a political current is the result of the survival of national oppression and of the existence of the traditions of struggle, and of the tendency to struggle, against this oppression.

On the other hand, the disintegration of the old social relations, the domination and expansion of capitalist relations, and the growth of a vast wage-earning working class,

in the past few decades, constituted that immense socio-economic development which inevitably and eventually profoundly influenced the political trends in the society and brought forth new demands.

This situation has created the social possibility of the posing and prevalence of the socialist and democratic ideals of the working class as the banner of mass protest against the central government and against the bourgeoisie in Kurdistan; it has undermined the bases of Kurdish nationalism, and thereby created the material grounds for the decline of this tendency, along with its political party.

3-The above basic reality has, in recent years, with the continuation of the revolutionary struggle in Kurdistan, decisively affected the fate and development of the political forces. While for Komala the ideal of socialism and economic equality has become central to its agitation, to the expansion of its influence and attraction of new forces, the KDP has drawn its inspiration from the remnants of the constantly diminishing illusions of the people towards nationalism and nationalist leaders, from the occasional weaknesses of the central government, and from regional conflicts.

By fighting for welfare and economic demands of workers and the toiling strata of society, by confronting backward traditions and superstitions, by supporting the revolutionary struggles of the rural working masses, by struggling against women's oppression, and by enlightening and awakening the masses, Komala has greatly widened its social influence. The KDP, in contrast, in the face of the growing influence of working-class and socialist ideas and politics, has increasingly tried to deny the domination of capitalism and the existence of the working class in Kurdistan. It has thus tried to safeguard capitalism, which is the cause of all inequalities, including national oppression, from the offensive of the masses. In the course of the acute class struggle going on between these tendencies, the KDP, confronting Komala, has more than ever appealed to the residues of backward traditions, superstitions and reactionary prejudices. But the political consciousness, maturity and expecta-

*The Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iranian Kurdistan. In early 1988 it suffered a major split, separating into two factions. The faction led by Chasemlou has retained the old name; the second faction calls itself "KDP-Revolutionary Leadership" - Note by BM.

one of the masses of workers and toilers today is at such a level that such resorts cannot remain effective for long. Thus the KDP, as a current which stubbornly resists the new realities in the Kurdistan society, has inevitably sunk into greater isolation, deeper political desperation and greater political hostility towards the communist current.

4-It is in response to this degeneration and political confusion and crisis that the KDP resorts to its final means in confronting Komala, i.e., an all-out military confrontation. The war with Komala was for the KDP the continuation of its permanent policy of hindering the growth of class-consciousness and organisation of workers and preventing the toiling masses from becoming aware of their basic rights. Unable to tapede the growth of the working-class and communist alternative among the masses by political means, the KDP tried to halt it by war and by violent means; it tried to restore its lost status by the force of arms.

The policy of Komala in this war has been to defend the independent proletarian organisation in Kurdistan to secure and consolidate the political and social gains of the communist current. For Komala, victory in this war meant neutralizing the counter-revolutionary policy of the KDP and overcoming the hindrances that the party of the bourgeoisie was placing in the way of the consciousness and organisation of working people and the extension of communist activity.

After three and a half years of war, the KDP was not able to force Komala to retreat from its political and class positions. On the contrary, the KDP itself became politically isolated; it came to realize its impotence and failure in achieving its reactionary goals, and demoralized this in the eyes of everyone, despite its wishes. At present, from the viewpoint of its practical strength, the KDP has reached such a position that it is not able to create any serious disruption and disturbance in the activities of Komala.

B: THE PRESENT CRISIS OF THE KDP & OUR ATTITUDE TOWARDS IT

1)Rooted in the factors mentioned above, the internal confusion and crisis of the KDP has continuously deepened in the past few years. And, recently, after the Eighth Congress, and in the wake of numerous resignations, purges and minor break-ups, this led to a full-blown split, practically splitting it into two sections. The causes of this recent split may be summed up as follows:

1-The KDP has been driven into a profound political desperation and confusion as a

result of the weakening of its social basis, the growth of a revolutionary socialist current relying on the new driving forces of the revolutionary struggle in Kurdistan, the general weakening of the tradition of nationalist struggle in the face of the socialist tradition, and the KDP's alienation from the social problems and class demands which form the basis of the revolutionary movement in the recent period. The KDP is increasingly losing its influence among the toiling and poor strata in Kurdistan; its practical dimensions are shrinking to the actual level of the class power and capacity of the Kurdish bourgeoisie in present-day Kurdistan.

2-The defeat of the KDP's war policy against Komala and the confirmation of the fact that the KDP is not only unable to prevent the development of the working-class and communist alternative in Kurdistan but is going to be driven, in the face of this alternative, to the fringes of the political struggle, is adding to the crisis and practical desperation of this party.

3-The military advances of the Islamic Republic have restricted the field of military activity for the KDP, i.e., the main form of expression of this party. The prospect of extending its activity or even maintaining its present dimensions, has become bleaker, and it is unable to come up with a clear line to get out of this situation.

4-This situation has gradually made the KDP incapable of maintaining political and practical unity among the various factions of the Kurdish bourgeoisie. These tendencies which differ from one another particularly depending on their closeness to the different international camps (USSR, Social-Democracy, etc.), the degree of their reliance on Kurdish nationalism, and the manner and kind of their alliances with the political forces in Iran, are, in the vacuum created by this political crisis and lack of perspective and the absence of a unifying policy, once again becoming active, along with a heightening of disputes among them.

5-And finally, under such conditions, a section of the cadres and leaders of the KDP find the courage to voice their dissatisfaction in the form of protest to Ghasemlou's leadership who traditionally has had an established authority in the party. Ghasemlou's inflexibility towards the opponents, on the one hand, and the assumption that there exist favourable factors outside the party for a split, on the other, allowed the opposition to make an organised split.

1)The split by the oppositionists was not made on the basis of an essentially distinct

political platform. From the platform of this current it can be seen that:

Firstly, all the existing tendencies in the KDP are, by and large, also present in the new faction; and secondly, this document has been drawn up more for the purpose of attracting new forces and creating a favourable climate for this current among the other political parties, than of raising the banner of defined and distinct political viewpoints. In this sense, the recent split does not as yet signify a programmatic break with the KDP. The emphases in this faction's statement on the necessity of drawing closer to the so-called socialist camp, though pointing to the existence of a pro-Soviet tendency in this current, does not mean that the dispute over this question in any of the two KDP factions has been settled.

1)Komala's policy regarding the various factions of this party must be based on the following principles:

1-The general orientation in the activity of Komala in the past ten years, i.e., isolating the KDP, turning the workers' and communist current in Kurdistan into the main current of struggle and protest, and promoting the nationalist tradition in favour of the socialist tradition in the toiling people's struggles, must be unambiguously continued. The present state of the KDP should be seen as a point in the course of complete dispelling of illusions among workers and toilers regarding this party and its traditions; our activity should be aimed consistently at continuing the political and class struggle for accelerating this process.

2-Class truths regarding the nature of the KDP as a social current should be clearly agitated as before. This split should not soften our class criticism of this current.

3-Concerning the civil war in Kurdistan, our position is the declaration of unilateral cease-fire to both currents and the establishing of defined political relations with any current which accepts cease-fire.

4-At the same time as the unilateral declaration of cease-fire, we should maintain our military preparedness and vigilance, and, in particular, in the event of the Ghasemlou faction explicitly insisting on continuing the war, we should regard the possibility of military actions against our forces as completely serious and probable. The KDP should be steted of any military adventure against Komala, and in the event that such acts are committed, this faction should receive the resolute response we deem appropriate.

5-Our agitations against the KDP should essen-

tially address the toiling masses and be conducted from the standpoint of making them aware of their interests, of clarifying the tasks and the perspective of the movement as held out by Komala, and of showing how parties like the KDP are alienated from the basic ideals and demands of the working people in Kurdistan. Komala should carry out its agitations and act with full knowledge of its position and responsibilities as the representative of workers and toilers and the leader and organiser of the revolution in Kurdistan, including the struggle for the elimination of national oppression.

6-On the question of national oppression and the issue of autonomy - the common objective demanded by both Komala and the KDP - and also regarding the struggle against the Islamic Republic, we may resort to united actions, if such are deemed useful and appropriate.

At the same time, the degree to which any of the KDP factions adopts a more peaceful attitude towards Komala, or recognises the workers' and democratic demands and policies, we may establish closer practical relations with it. □

from p.16
placing the militia under the authority of people's councils.

5-Declaring the welfare, economic, political and cultural demands and programmes of workers, including the workers' plan for the abolition of national oppression, as the laws in force in Kurdistan; the taking over of executive, judicial and legislative powers by the councils.

6-The organising of social administration by the councils and council rule.

7- . . .

your government, if you demand that the embassy of the Islamic Republic in your country be closed, if you do not allow the Islamic regime's hangmen to be received with diplomatic respect in your country, then you have taken important steps for saving the lives of thousands of people. Saving the lives of the Sharpville Six was not an inaccessible dream. Saving the lives of thousands of political prisoners in Evin prison is no more accessible. Communist Party of Iran-
the Committee Abroad
15/12/1988

From the introduction to the bulletin : MARXISM & THE QUESTION

OF THE SOVIET UNION

[The following is part of the editor's introduction to the 2nd issue of our bulletin Marxism & the Question of the Soviet Union (Nov. 1986). This bulletin is published as a supplement to our theoretical organ and is available in Persian. So far, three issues of the bulletin have been published and a number of the articles have been translated into English. The articles published in Bolshevik Message include: "Introductory Theses on the Question of Soviet Union", by Hamid Taghvaei (BM no.8), "Notes on: 'Socialism & the Analysis of Soviet Union'", by Iraj Azarin (BM no.9), "Marginal Notes on the Recent Sweezy-Bettelheim Debates", by Mansoor Hekmat (BM no.10), "Trotsky & the Critique of the Socio-Economic Relations and the State in the Soviet Union", by Farhad Besharat (BM no.11) and "A Critique of Mandel's Theses on Transitional Societies", by Hamid Taghvaei (BM no.13). Further articles from the three issues of the bulletin will be published in later issues of Bolshevik Message].

* * *

From the viewpoint of the movement of the working class against capitalism, the analysis and solution of the diverse problems necessitated by the examination of the question of the Soviet Union is possible only through a single and consistent view of socialism. No doubt the mere recognition of the production relations in the Soviet Union as capitalist and the nature of the Soviet party and state as bourgeois, etc, indicates a rejection of the dominant revisionist view of socialism. But this does not as yet indicate a distinct and consistent outlook. The attempt to explain the various aspects of the Soviet question, before being concerned with an examination of the refinements or further aspects of the problem, should be directed to elaborating a consistent outlook on socialism; an outlook which has the capacity of dealing with all these issues. In the same way, in confronting the other critical schools of the Soviet question we should not initially seek our distinction in the different answers that we provide to the various issues involved in the problem; just as identical positions on this or that particular feature do not necessarily signify common viewpoints. For instance, Tony Cliff,

Martin Nicolaus and Charles Bettelheim all three share the common viewpoint of regarding the Soviet production relations as capitalist. But Tony Cliff, faithful to the Trotskyist tradition, sees the non-occurrence of world revolution as the final cause of the defeat. Martin Nicolaus resorts to the Chinese interpretation of the Khruschev "coup d'etat" of 1956. And Charles Bettelheim - in his latest positions - regards the October Revolution a revolution for the development of capitalism from the beginning. (Similar instances can also be mentioned regarding the specification of the moment of the irreversible defeat of the proletariat in the Soviet Union). At the same time, the point is that identical viewpoints on the diverse features of the Soviet question reveal their class nature and practical implication for the workers' movement only in the context of the general outlooks that they represent. Only so far as they reflect distinct outlooks, will different positions have different results for the struggle of the working class. Isolated and atomized answers, even to important problems of the Soviet question, on their own, remain limited to an organisational demarcation, with no distinct socialist perspective for the working class. In the critical analysis of the various aspects of the question of the Soviet Union, our outlook should simultaneously put forward its distinct perspective of workers' revolution and socialist society for the working class, providing it with a firmer resolution and a greater preparedness in the advance towards the social revolution.

The triumph of the bourgeoisie in the Soviet Union in the name of socialism and communism has left such deep destructive effects on the working-class movement, and has produced such non-Marxist and non-worker theoretical models and practical traditions that in every step of their attempts to form an independent current of workers' communism, revolutionary Marxists are confronting with the barrier of their harmful effects and consequences. The critique and examination of the Soviet question will at the same time enable us to get to know and reject wider bourgeois theoretical and practical traditions which with the defeat of the proletariat in the Soviet Union are now identified with the communist and the workers' movement.

In our internal discussions, the point of departure for the assessment of the Soviet question has been the explanation of the background and causes of the defeat of the proletariat in the Soviet Union in attaining socialism, following the victorious October Revolution. The concrete historical consideration of this issue, dealing with the common critical viewpoints on the Soviet Union, and a re-examination of the fundamental problems of the theory of socialism have formed the various aspects of the activities of the Party comrades and working-groups in this regard. The concrete historical knowledge of the conditions and problems facing the Russian proletariat and the Bolshevik Party suffices to demolish many of the mythical interpretations which the Soviet, Chinese, Trotskyist, etc, teachings are trying to develop. (In the publication of this bulletin we have also tried to render it an educational and informational character). A deeper look into the common critical outlooks on the Soviet Union, reveals the coincidence of the theoretical basis of these views with that of the views of their "comrades" opponents, showing the inconsistent and non-socialist nature of their criticisms. (The presentation of the views of prominent and original critics of the Soviet Union, as well as the critical assessment of their views, has been another aim in the publication of this bulletin). Both these aspects inevitably take the discussion into more basic problems in socialist theory. The recognition of the key issues in the history of development of the revolution in the Soviet Union, the appraisal of the alternatives and practical assessments of the Bolshevik Party, as well as the analyses and alternatives put forward by their past and present critics, requires a reexamination of the various conceptions of socialism dominant in the communist movement and in the various interpretations of "Marxism". Thus the internal views and discussions of our Party have been focused on the crucial points of a socialist analysis of the Soviet Union. The most important of these include: proletarian internationalism, the place of world revolution in socialism, the role of the state, and the economic content of the socialist revolution. In these two issues of the bulletin one can find different views on the place of each of these key issues in the analysis of the defeat of the proletariat in the Soviet Union, and, generally, regarding the explanation of socialism. As can be seen from the material published in this issue, clarity on the economic content of the socialist revolution and, on this basis, assessment of its nature as a class focal point are other views, has become a chief focal point for our debates. Our discussions on the economic content of socialism will be published in the future issues of the bulletin and in the theoretical organ Bolshevik-Sovyalist.

Iraj Azarin Nov.13, 1986

PUBLICATIONS OF THE CPI

Komunist is the central organ of the CPI, published in Persian. The following issues have been published since July 1988:

Komunist No.41, July 1988

- * Another crime, another excuse for the Islamic regime! [On the shooting down of the passenger aircraft by the USA in the Gulf]. R.Moghaddam
- * Forward to the holding of workers' general assemblies! K.Davar
- * Interview with comrade Ebrahim Alizadeh about the Sixth Congress of Komala
- * Resolutions of the Sixth Congress of Komala
- * Resolution by workers of Sanandaj in their May Day meeting of 1988
- * Strike at Zamyad factory
- * Translation of two articles by Engels (Social Classes: Necessary & Unnecessary; Trade Unions)
- ...

Komunist No.42, August 1988

- * Statement by the CPI central committee about cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war
- * Resolution by the CPI central committee about: The political situation in Iran and the consequences of the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war
- * On the May Day meeting in Sanandaj (Interview with comrade Asad Golchini)
- * Why should the money-less have to live like creatures? (A CPI Radio broadcast)
- * Demonstration in Isfahan
- * The question of wage-rises & the regime's excuses (A CPI radio broadcast)
- * Inaugural Address of the International Workingmen's Association
- * Communique of the 12th plenum of the central committee
- * Call by the Komala central committee for general stoppage in Kurdistan (On the 9th anniversary of the regime's offensive on Kurdistan)
- ...

Komunist No.43, September 1988

- * The class struggle has not ended. K.Davar
- * The First Conference of the Party Organisation Abroad
- * A look at the situation of Afghan refugees in Iran. S.Shahabi
- * Kurdistan after the Iran-Iraq war (Interview with comrade Ebrahim Alizadeh)

- * Strike by brick-yard workers
 - * A report from Pars-Electric factory
 - * The International Workingmen's Association.
- F.Besharat
- * The Rules of the IWA
- ...

Komonist No.44, October 1988

- * The war's termination & the regime's crisis. N.Javid
 - * Statement by the central committee: A new wave of torture and executions in the Islamic Republic prisons
 - * Wages must be raised at once! K.Davar
 - * Rah-e-Kargar & the split in the KDP: One step forward, two steps back. A.Mohtadi
 - * Statement by Komala central committee: Protest against mass executions!
 - * The communique of the 3rd plenum of Komala central committee.
 - * On the IWA (part 3)
- ...

Komonist No.45, November 1988

- * Don't join the army, even after the war! K.Davar
 - * Old-age workers & the question of pension. F.Besharat
 - * About our organisational policy (Interview with comrade Hamid Taghvaee)
 - * A look back at the Isfahan steel-workers' strike (A CPI radio broadcast)
 - * Remembering the Chit-e-Ray textile workers' strike
 - * On the IWA (part 4)
- ...

OTHER PUBLICATIONS:

PISHRO (Vanguard); organ of the Kurdistan Organisation of the CPI (Komala)

PAYAM (Message); biweekly paper of the Voice of the Iranian Revolution (The radio of the Kurdistan Organisation)

BESOOY-E-SOSYALISM (Towards Socialism); the theoretical-political publication of the CPI

MARXISM & THE QUESTION OF THE SOVIET UNION (Bulletin of Views & Debates); supplement to the theoretical organ

RESANEH - the newsletter of the CPI Committee Abroad

REPORT - the biweekly newsletter in English of the Committee Abroad.

CORRECTION

We regret that the following errors took place in the last issue:

*The name of the author of the article "A Critique of Mandel's Transitional Societies", comrade Hamid Taghvaee, was left out of the end of the article.

*The title of the Central Committee resolution and the interview regarding workers' organisations was not entirely correct. It should have read: "Mass Organisations of the Working Class".

NEWS FROM IRAN & KURDISTAN

is covered in the Report - the newsletter in English of the Communist Party of Iran-the Committee Abroad. Report is also available in French, German and Swedish. To order it, please write to any of our addresses.

ADDRESSES OF THE CPI - THE COMMITTEE ABROAD

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