Conspectus of Feuerbach’s Book
Exposition, Analysis and Critique
of the Philosophy of Leibnitz

In the brilliant exposition of Leibnitz
some especially outstanding passages should
be mentioned (this is not easy, for the
whole—i.e., the first part (§ 1-13) is out-
standing), and then the supplements
of 1847.

P. 27—The feature that distinguishes Leib-

nitz from Spinoza: in Leibnitz there
is, in addition to the concept of sub-
stance, the concept of force
“and indeed of active force...” the prin-
ciple of “self-activity” (29)—

p. 32: “Spinoza’s essence is unity, that of

Leibnitz is difference, distinction.”

p. 34: The philosophy of Spinoza is a tele-

scope, that of Leibnitz a micro-
scope.^[1]

“Spinoza’s world is an achromatic lens
of divinity, a medium through which we
see nothing but the colourless celestial
light of the single substance; Leibnitz’s
world is a many-faceted crystal, a dia-
mond, which by its specific nature mul-
tiplies the simple light of the substance
into an infinitely varied wealth of colours
and darkens it.” (Sic!)

p. 40: “Consequently, for Leibnitz, corpo-

real substance is no longer, as for Des-
cartes, a merely extended dead mass
brought into motion from outside, but
as substance it has within it an active
force, a never-resting, principle of activ-
ity.”

The monad is the principle of Leibnitz’s
philosophy. Individuality, movement, soul
(of a special kind). Not dead atoms, but
the living, mobile monads, reflecting the
whole world in themselves, possessing (va-
guely) the capacity of sensuous representa-
tion (souls of a certain kind)—such are
the “ultimate elements” (p. 45).

Each monad is different from the others.
 

...“It would be ... quite contradictory
to the beauty, order and reason of nature
if the principle of life or of its own internal
actions were to be linked only with a small
or special part of matter” (Leibnitz—
p. 45).

“Hence the whole of nature is full of
souls, as the ancient philosophers already
correctly recognised, or at any rate of
beings analogous to souls. For, by means
of the microscope, one finds that there are
a multitude of living beings not visible
to the naked eye, and that there are more
souls than grains of sand and atoms” (Leib-
nitz—p. 45).

Qualities of monads: Vorstellung,^[3] Re-
präsentation.

“Sensuous representation itself, however,
is nothing more than the representation
(reproduction in the mind and presenta-
tion) of the complex or the external, i.e.,
of multiplicity in the simple”... or ...
“the transitory state, which contains and
reproduces multiplicity in unity or simple
substance” (p. 49, Leibnitz)—verworrene^[4]
(p. 50) (confuse,^[5] p. 52) Vorstellung in
the monads (man also has many uncon-
scious, verworrene, feelings, etc.).

Every monad is “a world for itself, each
is a self-sufficient unity” (Leibnitz,
p. 55).

“A mixture of vague conceptions, the
senses are no more than that, matter is no
more than that” (Leibnitz, p. 58).... “Hence
matter is the bond of the monads” (ibi-
dem)....

“Absolute reality, lies only in the mo-
nads and their conceptions” (Leibnitz,
p. 60). Matter is only a phenomenon.

“Clarity is only spirit” (p. 62)... matter,
however, is “unclearness and unfreedom.”
(64)

Space “in itself is something ideal”
(Leibnitz, pp. 70-71).

...“The material principle of the diver-
sity of matter is motion....” (72)

“Similarly— Newton and his adherents
to the contrary—there is no empty space
in material nature. The air pump by no
means proves the presence of a vacuum
for the glass has pores through which
all kinds of fine matter can penetrate”
(Leibnitz, 76-77)....

“Matter is a phenomenon” (Leibnitz, 78).
“The Being-for-itself of the monads is
their soul, their Being-for-others is
matter” (Feuerbach, 78). The human
soul—the central, higher monad, en-
telechy,^[6] etc., etc.

“Hence every body is affected by every-
thing that goes on in the universe” (Leib-
nitz, 83).

“The monad represents the whole uni-
verse” (Leibnitz, 83).

“The monad, despite its indivisibility,
possesses a complex impulse, i.e., a mul-
tiplicity of sensuous representations, which

individually strive for their special changes
and which, by virtue of their essential
connection with all other things, at the
same time are found within it....” “Individ-
uality contains the infinite within it, as
it were, in the germ” (Leibnitz, 84).

“Everything in nature is analogical”
(Leibnitz, 86).

“In general, there is nothing absolutely

discrete in nature; all opposites, all bound-
aries of space and time, and kind, vanish
in the face of the absolute continuity, the
infinite interconnection of the universe“
(Feuerbach, 87).

“Owing to its peculiar nature, consisting
solely of nerves and not of flesh and blood,
the monad is influenced and affected by
everything that takes place in the world....”
Nevertheless “it is only a spectator of the
world drama, not an actor. Therein lies
the chief defect of the monads” (Feuer-
bach, 90).

The conformity of soul and body is a
harmonie préétablie^[7] by God.

“The soul is a kind of spiritual automa-
ton” (Leibnitz, 98). (And Leibnitz himself
said once that the transition from Occa-
sionalism^[9] to his philosophy is an easy
one, Feuerbach, 100.) But in Leibnitz this
is deduced from the “nature of the soul”....
(101)

In his Theodicée^[10] (§ 17) Leibnitz
essentially repeats the ontological argu-
ment^[11] for the existence of God.

In his Nouveaux essais sur l’entend-
ement,^[12] Leibnitz criticised Locke’s emp-
iricism,— saying nihil est in intellectu, etc.,
nisi intellectus ipse^[13] (!) (152).

(Feuerbach in the first edition also ideal-
istically criticises Locke.^[14])

The principle of “necessary truths” lies
“within us” (Leibnitz, 148).

The ideas of substance, change, etc., lie
within us (Leibnitz, 150).

“To be determined towards the best
through reason is the highest degree of free-
dom” (Leibnitz, 154).

“The philosophy of Leibnitz is idealism”
(Feuerbach, 160), etc., etc.

...“The cheerful, lively polytheism of
Leibnitz’s monadology passed into the se-
vere, but for that reason more spiritual
and intense monotheism of ‘transcendental
idealism’” (Feuerbach, 188).

|Pp. 188-220: supplements of 1847|

P. 188: “Idealistic, a priori philosophy....”

“But, of course, what for man is a pos-
teriori is for a philosopher a priori; for
when man has gathered experiences and
has embraced them in general concepts,
then he is, of course, in a position to make

‘synthetic judgments a priori.’ Hence what
for an earlier time is a matter of experience
is for a later time a matter of reason....
Thus, earlier, electricity and magnetism
were only empirical, i.e., here accidental,
properties perceived only in particular
bodies, whereas now, as the result of compre-
hensive observations, they are recognised
to be properties of all bodies, essential
properties of a body.... Hence the history
of mankind is the sole standpoint that
yields a positive answer to the problem
of the origin of ideas....” (191-192)

The soul is not wax, it is no tabula
rasa^[15].... “The creation of a sensuous re-
presentation requires the addition of some-
thing distinct from the object, hence it
would be sheer folly for me to seek to
derive this distinct element, which is the
basis of the real essence of the sensuous
representation, from the object. But what
is this then? The form of universality; for
even the individual idea or sensuous re-
presentation is, as Leibnitz remarked, at
least in comparison with the real individual
object, originally universal, i.e., in this
case undetermined, wiping out differences,
destructive. Sensuousness is massive, uncrit-
ical, luxurious; but the idea, the sensuous
representation, is restricted solely to the
universal and necessary.” (192)

“The basic thought, therefore, of the Nou-
veaux essais sur l’entendement humain is

already, as in Der Kritik der reinen Ver-
nunft, that universality, and the ne-

cessity which is inseparable from it,
express the essence belonging to the under-
standing or apperceiving being, and there-
fore cannot come from the senses, or
from experience, i.e., from outside....”
(193)

This idea occurs already among the Car-
tesians—Feuerbach quotes Clauberg,
1652.^[16]

“Undoubtedly this axiom” (that the whole
is greater than the part) “owes its certainty
not to induction, but to the understand-
ing, for the latter has no other aim and
vocation than to generalise the data of
the senses, in order to save us the tedious
trouble of repetition, to anticipate, replace,
spare, sensuous experience and perception.
But does the understanding do this by
itself, without a basis for it being pres-
ent in sense-perception? Is then the individ-
ual case shown me by the senses an individ-
ual case in abstracto? Is it not a qualita-
tively determined case? But does not

this quality, however, contain so much
as an identity of the individual cases that
is perceptible by the senses?... Do the

senses show me only leaves and not also
trees?... Is there no feeling of identity,
likeness and difference? Is there no differ-
ence for my senses between black and
white, day and night, wood and iron?...
Are not the senses the unconditional affir-
mation of what is? Consequently, is not
the highest law of thought, the law of
identity, also a law of sensuousness; indeed,
does not this law of thought rest on the
truth of sense-perception?”... (193-194)

Leibnitz in Nouveaux essais: “Generality
consists in the resemblance to each other
of individual things, and this resemblance
is a reality” (Book III, Chapter 3, § 12).
“But is this resemblance then not sensuous
truth? Do not the beings which the un-
derstanding refers to a single class, a single
genus, affect also my senses in an identical,
equal manner?... Is there for my sexual
sense—a sense which theoretically also
is of the greatest importance, although
in the theory of the senses it is usually
left out of account—no difference between
an animal and a human female? What
then is the difference between the faculty
of understanding and that of sensuous per-

ception or sensation? The senses present
the thing, but the understanding adds the
name to it. There is nothing in the under-

standing that is not in sensuous perception,
but what is found in the sensuous perception
in fact is in the understanding only in

name. The understanding is the highest
being, the ruler of the world, but only in
name, not in fact. What, however, is a
name? It is a mark of difference, a striking

characteristic, which I make the character,
the representative, of the object in order
thereby to represent it to myself in its
totality” (195).

...“The senses tell me just as well as
the understanding that the whole is greater
than the part; but they tell me so not by
words, but by examples, for instance, that
the finger is smaller than the hand....
(196-197)

...“Hence the certainty that the whole
is greater than the part indubitably does
not depend on the senses. But on what
then? On the word: the whole. The state-
ment that the whole is greater than the
part says absolutely nothing more than
the word ‘whole’ itself says.... (497)

...“Leibnitz, on the other hand, as an
idealist or spiritualist, makes the means
into an end, the denial of sensuousness
into the essence of the mind.... (198)

...“That which is conscious of itself exists
and is, and is called soul. We are, there-
fore, certain of the existence of our soul
before we are certain of the existence of
our body. Of course, consciousness is pri-
mary, but it is only primary for me, it is
not primary in itself. In the sense of my con-
sciousness, I am, because I am conscious;
but in the sense of my life I am conscious,
because I am. Which of these two is right?
The body, i.e., nature, or consciousness,
i.e., I? I, of course, for how could I admit
myself wrong? But can I then in fact sepa-
rate consciousness from my body and think
by myself?... (201)

...“The world is the object of the senses
and the object of thought. (204)

“In a sensuous object, man distinguishes
the essence as it really is, as an object
of sense-perception, from the essence of
it in thought, abstracted from sensuous-
ness. The former he calls the existence
or also the individual, the latter the es-
sence or the genus. The latter is defined
by him as necessary and eternal—because,
although a sensuous object may have van-
ished from the sensible world, it still
remains as an object of thought or sensuous
representation—but existence as accidental
and transitory.... (205)

...“Leibnitz is half-Christian, he is a
theist, or Christian and a naturalist. He

limits the goodness and power of God by
wisdom, by the understanding; but this
understanding is nothing but a cabinet

of natural objects, it is only the idea of
the interconnection of nature, of the uni-
verse; hence he limits his theism by na-
turalism; he affirms and defends theism
by that which abolishes it....“ (215)

P. 274 (from the supplement of 1847):
     “How much has been said of the decep-
tion of the senses, how little of the decep-
tion of speech, from which, however, thought
is inseparable! Yet how clumsy is the
betrayal of the senses, how subtle that
of language! How long have I been led by
the nose by the universality of reason, the
universality of Fichte’s and Hegel’s Ego,
until finally, with the support of my
five senses, I recognised for the salvation
of my soul that all the difficulties and
mysteries of the logos, in the sense of rea-
son, find their solution in the meaning of
the word! For that reason Haym’s state-
ment ‘the critique of reason must become
the criticism of language’ is for me in a theo-
retical respect a soul-inspired statement.—
As regards, however, the contradiction be-
tween me as a perceiving, personal being
and me as a thinking being, it reduces
itself in the sense of this note and the dis-
sertation quoted” (of Feuerbach himself)^[17]
“to the sharp contradiction: in sensation
I am individual, in thinking I am univer-
sal. However, in sensation I am not less
universal than I am individual in thinking.
Concordance in thinking is based only on
concordance in sensation.” (274)

...“All human communion rests on the
assumption of the likeness of sensation
in human beings.” (274)

Spinoza and Herbart (1836).^[18] P. 400
ff.^[19] A defence of Spinoza against the
banal attacks of the “moralist” Herbart.

The objectivism of Spinoza, etc., is
stressed. NB.

Verhältnis zu Hegel (1840 and später).
S. 417 ff.^[20]

From the notes:
     “What is a dialectic that is in contradic-
tion to natural origin and development?
What is its necessity?...” (431)

Herr von Schelling (1843). Letter to
Marx (434 ff.). According to the rough
draft. Castigation of Schelling.^[21]