V A Lektorsky 1980
1. See, e.g., B. M. Kedrov, Lenin and the Dialectics of the Natural Science of the 20th Century, Moscow, 1971 (in Russian).
2. See P. S. Dyshleviy Materialist Dialectics and Physical Relativism, Kiev, 1972, pp. 22-23 (in Russian).
3. Niels Bohr , “Quantum Physics and Philosophy. Causality and Complementarity,” Philosophy in the Mid-Century. A Survey, ed. by Raymond Klibansky, La Nuova Italia Editrice, Firenze, 1958, p. 311.
4. V. A. Fok, Quantum Physics and the Structure of Matter, Leningrad, 1965, p. 11 (in Russian).
5. Stephen Cole Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, NorthHolland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1952, p. 48.
6. Ibid., p. 51.
7. See Mathema tisches Zeitschrift, No. 10, 1921.
8. See W. V. 0. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York, 1969.
9. See N. Chomsky, Cartesian Linguistics, New York, 1966; idem, “Recent Contributions to the Theory of Innate Ideas,” Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III, Dordrecht, 1967.
10. See Th. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago, 1970.
11. Lenin’s Theory of Reflection and Modern Science in 3 Vols, Sofia, 1973 (ed. by T. Pavlov); S. L. Rubinstein, Being and Consciousness, Moscow, 1957; idem, “Man and the World “ ‘ in Problems of General Psychology, Moscow, 1976; P. V. Kopnin Dialectics as Logic, Kiev, 1961; idem, Introduction into Marxist Epistemology, Kiev, 1966; idem, Dialectics, Logic, Science, Moscow, 1973; idem, Dialectics as Logic and Epistemology, Moscow, 1973; B. M. Kedrov, The Unity of Dialectics, Logic, and Epistemology, Moscow, 1963; idem ‘ Lenin and the Dialectics of Natural Science in the 20th Century; idem, From the Laboratory of Lenin’s Thought, Moscow, 1972; E. V. Ilyenkov On Idols and Ideals Moscow, 1968; idem, Dialectical Logic, Moscow, 1974; A. M’. Korshunov ‘ The Theory of Reflection and Creativity, Moscow, 1971; idem, Cognition and Activity, Moscow, 1967; A. M. Korshunov, V. V. Mantatov, The Theory of Reflection and the Heuristic Role of Signs, Moscow, 1974; V. S. Tyukhtin, On the Nature of the Image (Psychical Reflection in the Light of Cybernetic Ideas), Moscow, 1963; idem, Reflection, Systems, Cybernetics: The Theory of Reflection in the Light of Cybernetics and the Systems Approach, Moscow, 1972; A. G. Spirkin, The Origin of Consciousness, Moscow, 1960; idem, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, Moscow, 1972; V. I. Shinkaruk, The Unity of Dialectics, Logic, and Epistemology. An Introduction into Dialectical Logic, Kiev, 1977; Zh. M. Abdildin, A. S. Balgimbayev, The Dialectics of the Subject’s Activeness in Scientific Cognition, Alma-Ata, 1977; L. K. Naumenko, Monism as a Principle of Dialectical Logic, Alma-Ata, 1968; N. V. Duchenko, The Problem of the Object in the Marxist-Leninist Epistemology, Precis of a doctoral dissertation, Kiev, 1970; A. P. Sheptulin, A System of the Categories of Dialectics, Moscow, 1967; F. T. Arkhiptsev, “The Topical Aspects of the Relationship Between Subject and Object,” The Methodological Aspects of the Study of the Biosphere, Moscow, 1975; V. F. Kuzmin, The Objective and the Subjective (Analysis of the Process of Cognition), Moscow, 1976; Z. M. Orudzhev, Dialectics as a System, Moscow, 1973; V. N. Tipukhin, The Logical Formation of the Subject, Omsk, 1971; V. S. Bibler, Thinking as Creativity, (Introduction into the Logic of Mental Dialogue), Moscow, 1975; K. N. Lyubutin, The Problem of the Subject and Object in Classical German and Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, Sverdlovsk, 1973; A. S. Karmin, I. A. Maizel, “On the Analysis of the Subject-Object Relation in Scientific Cognition,” Problems in Epistemology and the Methodology of. Scientific Research, Leningrad, 1969; Yu. F. Kukhalov, “On the Correlation of the Subjective and the Objective in the Cognitive Image,” Voprosy filosoffi, No. 5, 1961; The Problem of the Subject and Object in the History of Philosophy and in Modern Science (ed. by B. Ya. Pakhomov), Voronezh, 1974; Sychov N. L, The Objective and the Subjective in Scientific Cognition, Rostov-on-the-Don, 1974; V. S. Shvyrev, E. G. Yudin, The Worldview Evaluation of Science: Critique of the Bourgeois Conceptions of Scientism and Antiscientism, Moscow, 1973; D. P. Gorsky, Problems in the General Methodology of Sciences and Dialectical Logic, Moscow, 1966 (all in Russian); E. V. Ilyenkov, The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marxs “Capital,” Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982; F. T. Mikhailov, The Riddle of the Self, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1980, etc.
12. M. E. Omelyanovsky, “On Physical Reality,” Voprosy filosoffi, No. 10, 197 1; idem, “The Objective and the Subjective in Quantum Theory,” Voprosy filosoffi, No. 6, 1974; idem, “Philosophical Debate in modern Physics Around the Problem of the Objective and the Subjective,” Voprosy filosoffi, No. 2, 1976; P. S. Dyshleviy, Materialist Dialectics and Physical Relativism; idem, “The Dialectics of the Correlation of the Object and Subject of Cognition in Modem Physics,” Voprosy filosoffi, No. 6, 1969; V. V. Bazhan, P. S. Dyshleviy et al., Dialectical Materialism and the Problem of Reality in Modern Physics, Kiev, 1974; V. S. Stepin, L. M. Tomilchik, The Practical Nature of Cognition and the Methodological Problems of Modem Physics, Minsk, 1970; V. S. Stepin, The Formation of Scientific Theory, Minsk, 1976; idem, “The Problem of Subject and Object in Experimental Science,” Voprosy filosoffi, No. 1, 1970; V. V. Kazyutinsky, G. N. Naan, “Epistemology and the Problems of Modern Astronomy,” Problems in Epistemology, Issue 1, Moscow, 1969; L. G. Antipenko, The Problem of Physical Reality. Logico-Epistemological Analysis, Moscow, 1973; V. P. Mitt, The Conception of Complementarity and the Problem of the Objectiveness of Physical Knowledge, Tallinn, 1977; V. I. Kuptsov, “The Problem of Reality of Macroscopic Spontaneous Fluctuations,” Man, Creativity, Science, Moscow, 1967 (all in Russian); M. E. Omelyanovsky, Dialectics in Modern Physics, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, and other works.
13. S. L. Rubinstein, The Principles and Paths of the Development of Psychology, Moscow, 1959; idem, Problems of General Psychology; A. N. Leontyev, Activity. Consciousness. Personality, Moscow. 1975; P. Ya. Galperin, “The Development of Studies in the Formation of Mental Actions,” Psychological Science in the USSR, Vol. 1, Moscow, 1959; idem, “Towards the Study of the Child’s Intellectual Development% Voprosy psikhologii, No. 1, 1969; idem, Introduction into Psychology, Moscow, 1976; V. V. Davydov, Types of Generalisation in Learning, Moscow, 1972; idem “Analysis of the Structure of the Cognitive Act% Doklady APN RSFSR, No. 2, 1960; idem, “The Categories of Logic and Pedagogics,” Problems in Dialectical Logic: Materials for a Symposium, Alma-Ata, 1968; A. R. Luriya, On the Historical Development of Cognitive Processes: An Experimental-Psychological Study, Moscow, 1974; A. V. Zaporozhets, L. A. Venger, V. P. Zinchenko, A. G. Ruzskaya, Perception and Action, Moscow, 1967; Ye. V. Shorokhova, The Problem of Consciousness in Philosophy and Natural Science, Moscow, 1961; K. A. Abulkhanova, On the Subject of Psychical Activity, Moscow, 1973; idem, The Dialectics of Human Life: The Correlation of the Philosophical, Methodological, and Concrete Scientific Approaches to the Problem of the Individual, Moscow, 1977; A. V. Brushlinsky, A Cultural-Historical Theory of Thinking (Philosophical Problems of Psychology), Moscow, 1968; M. S. Rogovin, Introduction into Psychology, Moscow, 1969; M. S. Rogovin, A. B. Solovyov, L. P. Urvantsev, Sh. Sh. Shotemor, “The Structure of the Psyche and the Problem of Cognition,” Voprosy filosofii, No. 4, 1977 (all in Russian); A. N. Leontyev, Problems of the Development of the Mind, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981; A. 1, Meshcheryakov, Awakening to Life. Forming Behaviour and the Mind in Deaf-Blind Children, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979, and other works.
14. V. A. Lektorsky, The Problem of the Subject and Object in Classical and Modern Bourgeois Philosophy, Moscow, 1965; idem, “The Subject-Object Problem in Epistemology% Voprosy filosoffi, No. 5, 1964; idem, “The Principles of Reproduction of the Object in Knowledge% Voprosy filosoffi, No. 4, 1967; idem, “Lenin’s Conception of the Dialectics of Subject and Object, Kommunist, No. 6, 1967; idem, “The Unity of the Empirical and Theoretical in Scientific Cognition,” Dialectics as Epistemology. Problems in Scientific Method, Moscow, 1964; the articles on “Experience,” “Object% “Subject,” “Subjective,” Epistemology” in the Philosophical Encyclopedia, Moscow, Vol. 4, 1967, Vol. 5, 1970; idem, “Materialist Dialectics as the Methodological Basis of Scientific Cognition,” Kommunist, No. 7, 1971, (jointly with P. V. Kopnin); idem “The Methodological Analysis of Science (Types and Levels)% Philosophy, Methodology, Science, Moscow, 1972 (jointly with V. S. Shvyrev), idem, “Philosophy and the Scientific Method” Philosophy in the Modern World. Philosophy and Science, Moscow’, 1972; idem, “On the Subjective and the Objective,” Some Problems of Dialectics, Issue VII, Moscow, 1973; idem, “The Problem of the Subject and Object in the Epistemology of Hegel and Marx% The Philosophy of Hegel and Modern Times, Moscow, 1973; idem, “Lenin’s Development of Dialectics as Logic and Epistemology,” The History of Marxist Dialectics: The Leninist Stage, Moscow, 1973 (jointly with A. Kh. Kasymjanov); idem, “Philosophy, Science, ‘The Philosophy f Science’ “, Voprosy filosoffi, No. 4, 197 3; idem, “Philosophy and Science in the Light of the Scientific and Technological Revolution” Man-Science-Technology, Moscow, 1973, and other works. 15 The history of the formulation and discussion of the problem of subject and object is considered in our works The Problem of the Subject and Object in Classical and modern Bourgeois Philosophy; “Epistemology,” Philosophical Encyclopedia, Vol. 5.
1. J. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, The Harvester Press, Sussex, 1978, p. 288.
2. For a critique of representationism see also S. L. Rubinstein, Being and Consciousness, p. 34; A. N. Leontyev, Activity. Consciousness. Personality, pp. 60, 130; idem, “The Image and the Model,” Voprosy psikhologii, No. 2, 1970; V. A. Lektorsky, The Problem of the Subject and Object in Classical and modern Bourgeois Philosophy, pp. 84-94; A. V. Brushlinsky, “On Some Methods of Modelling in ychology,” Methodological and Theoretical Problems of Psychology, Moscow, 1969, pp. 148-254; A. M. Korshunov, The Theory of Reflection and Creativity, Moscow, 1971 pp 89-118; idem, “The Problem of Correlation of the So-Called Primary and Secondary Properties,” Man, Creativity, Science. Philosophical Problems, Moscow , 1967 (all in Russian); F. T. Mikhailov, The Riddle of the Self.
3. Bertrand Russell, Human Knowledge. Its Scope and Limits, George Allen and Unwin LTD, London, 1951, p. 245.
4. Jean Piaget, The Psychology of Intelligence, Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, London, 1947, p. 4.
5. Ibid., p. 8.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., p. 9.
8. Ibid., p. 10.
9. Ibid., p. 11.
10. In outlining the stages in intellect formation we draw mostly on the work by J. Piaget, B. Inhelder “Die Psychologic der fruhen Kindheit. Die geistige Entwicklung von der Geburt bis zum 7. Lebensjahr,” Handbuch der Psychologie, Hrsg. D. und R. Katz, Basel-Stuttgart, 1960, pp. 275-314.
11. Ibid., p. 285.
12. See Jean Piaget, Introduction a I'epistemologie genetique, Vols. I-III, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1950.
13. See Jean Piaget, “The Role of Action in the Formation of Thinking,” Voprosy psikhologii, No. 6, 1965, p. 43 (in Russian).
14. Max Born, Physics in My Generation, Pergamon Press, London, 1956, p. 163.
15. Ibid., p. 157.
16. For a more detailed discussion of invariance as an indicator of objective knowledge see S. L. Rubinstein, Being and Consciousness, pp. 125-126; M. E. Omelyanovsky, V. L Lenin and the Philosophical Problems of Modern Physics, Moscow, 1958; idem, “Dialectical Materialism as the Methodological Basis of modern Physics” Filosofskiye nauki, No. 1, 1965; V. A. Lektorsky, The Problem ‘of the Subject and Object in Classical and Modem Bourgeois Philosophy, pp. 66-84; idem, “On the Subjective and the Objective% Some Problems of Dialectics, Issue VII; V. S. Tyukhtin, Reflection, Systems, Cybernetics..., pp. 107-112 (all in Russian).
17. See Jean Piaget Introduction a 1'epistemologie genetique, Vol. I.
18. See L. Apostel, B. Mandelbrot et J. Piaget, Logique et equilibre, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1957, p. 44.
19. Jean Piaget, Introduction a I'epistemologie genetique, Vol. II, p. 42.
20. P. W. Bridgman, The Logic of modern Physics, The Macmillan Co any, New York, 1954, p. 1.
21. Ibid p. 5.
22. Ibid p . 5,6.
23. Ibid p 10.
24. A. Cornelius Benjamin, Opera tionism, Charles C. Thomas, Publisher, Springfield, 1955, p. 67.
25. P. W. Bridgman, “Some General Principles of Operational Analysis,” Psychological Review, Vol. 52, No. 5. September 1945, p. 248.
26. “From the operational point of view it is meaningless to attempt to separate ‘nature’ from ‘knowledge of nature’.” W. Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics, p. 62.)
27. P. W. Bridgman, The Nature of Physical Theory, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1936, pp. 13-149 15.
28. P. W. Bridgman, The Intelligent Individual and Society, The Macmillan Company, New York, 1938, p. 80.
29. See V. Lenzen, “Operational Theory in Elementary Physics,” American Physical Teacher, Vol. 7, 1939, p. 367.
30. “The Present State of Operationalism% The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 79 No. 4, October 1954, pp. 209-231.
31. Adolf Grunbaum, “Operationism and Relativity% The Scientific Monthly, Vol. 79, No. 4, October 1954, p. 230.
32. D. P. Gorsky, “On the Kinds of Definitions and Their Significance in Science,” Problems in the Logic of Scientific Cognition, Moscow, 1964, p. 308 (in Russian).
33. V. S. Shvyrev, “Some Problems in the Logico-Methodological Analysis of the Relation Between the Theoretical and Empirical Levels of Scientific Cognition% Problems in the Logic of Scientific Cognition, p. 74 (in Russian).
34. Rene Descartes, Oeuvres et lettres, Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Francaise, Paris, 1937, pp. 97-98.
35. Ibid., p. 97.
36. Ibid., p. 96.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid., p. 213.
39. Ibid., p. 161.
40. Ibid. p. 162.
41. Ibid.: p. 163.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid. p. 167.
44. Ibid. p. 435.
45. Ibid. p. 436.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid., p. 171.
49. Ibid., p. 174.
50. Ibid., p. 169.
51. Ibid., p. 214.
52. Ibid., p. 216.
53. Ibid., p. 453.
54. Quoted from R. J. Hirst, The Problems of Perception, George Allen and Unwin LTD, London, 1959, p. 28.
55. Ibid., pp. 67-68.
56. Ibid., p. 85.
57. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
58. Ibid., p. 102.
59. See Edmund Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik, Academia Verlagsbuchhandlung, Prague, 1939, pp. 12-13.
60. Quoted from Z. M. Kakabadze, The Problem of ‘Existential Crisis- and Edmund Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology, Tbilisi, 1966, p. 76 (in Russian).
61. See Quentin Lauer, Phenomenologie de Husserl, Presses universitaires de France, Paris, 1955, pp. 188, 315; Joseph Kockelmans, Edmund Husserl’s Phenomenological Psychology, Duquesm University Press, Pittsburgh, 1967, pp. 225-231, 260, 261.
62. For an analysis of the problem of the subject and object in Fichte’s philosophy see also A. M. Deborin, “Dialectics in Fichte,” Marx and Engels Archives, Book 3, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927; V. F. Asmus, Essays on the History of Dialectics in the Philosophy of the New Times, Moscow-Leningrad, 1930; T. I. Oizerman, The Philosophy of Fichte, Moscow, 1962; M. Bur, Fichte, Moscow, 1965; K. N. Lyubutin, The Problem of the Subject and Object in Classical German and Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, pp. 35-47 (all in Russian).
63. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaftslehre, Fritz Eckardt Verlag, Leipzig, 1911, p. 8.
64. Ibid., p. 10.
65. Ibid., p. 17.
66. Ibid., p. 16.
67. Ibid., p. 104.
68. Ibid., p. 105.
69. For an analysis of Kant’s epistemology see also the following works: Yu. M. Borodai, Imagination and Epistemology, Moscow, 1966; The Philosophy of Kant and Modern Times (ed. by T. I. Oizerman), Moscow, 1974; Critical Essays on Kant’s Philosophy (ed. by M. A. Bulatov), Kiev, 1975; T. I. Oizerman, The Philosophy of Kant, Moscow, 1974; V. F. Asmus, Immanuel Kant, Moscow, 1973; V. 1. Shinkaruk, The Epistemology, Logic, and Dialectics of Kant, Kiev, 1974; Zh. M. Abdildin, The Dialectics of Kant, Alma-Ata, 1974; N V. Motroshilova, “Husserl and Kant: the Problem of ‘Transcendental Philosophy’, in: The Philosophy of Kant and Modern Times, Moscow, 1974, 1. S. Narsky, Kant, Moscow, 1976 (all in Russian).
70. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, G. Bell and Sons LTD., London, 1930, P. 13.
71. Ibid. p. 83.
72. Ibid.: p. 86.
73. Ibid., pp. 168-169.
74. Ibid., P. 168.
75. Ibid., P. 166.
76. Ibid. pp. 167-168.
77. Ibid.; p. 169.
78. Ibid., pp. 84-85.
79. Ibid., p. 249.
80. Ibid., P. 96.
81. One may get the impression that what has been said here is inapplicable at least to the Kantian conception of “Pure mathematics.” The latter is considered in the Critique of Pure Reason as a science whose subject-matter is determined by the apriori sense forms--space and time. That means that, from the Kantian standpoint, the speculative elements play a fundamental role in mathematical knowledge. However, mathematics as a science assumes, according to Kant, application of the logical categories of reason to the pure apriori sense forms. Kant’s conception of mathematics is thus different from Husserl’s. It is the latter rather than the former that underlies that modern trend in the substantiation of mathematics that became known as intuitionism.
82. Quoted in Z. M. Kakabadze The Problem of “Existential Crisis” and Edmund Husserl'’s Transcendental Phenomenology, p. 87.
83. Ibid., p. 90.
84. For an analysis of Sartre’s philosophical conception see V. N. Kuznetsov, Jean-Paul Sartre and Existentialism, Moscow, 1969; G. Ya. Streltsova, A Critique of the Existentialist Conception of Dialectics (Analysis of the Philosophical Views of J.-P Sartre), Moscow, 1974; M. A. Kissel, The Philosophical Evolution of J.-P. Sartre, Leningrad, 1976; L.I.Filippov, The Philosophical Anthropology of Jean-Paul Sartre, Moscow, 1977 (all in Russian).
85. See J.-P. Sartre, L'etre et le neant. Essai d'ontologie phenomenologique Librairie Gallimard, Paris, 1943, pp. 372, 388, 390.
86. Ibid., pp. 332-333.
87. Ibid., pp. 198-202.
88. Ibid., pp. 342-343.
89. Ibid., pp. 220-240.
90. See Jean Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, The New American Library, Inc., New York, 1974; Jean Piaget , “Pensée egocentrique et pensée sociocentrique,” Cahiers internationaux de sociologie, Vol. X, 1951, pp. 34-49; Jean Piaget, Comments on Vygotsky’s Critical Remarks Concerning “The Language and Thought of the Child,” Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, Cambridge, 1962; V. A. Lektorsky, V. N. Sadovsky, “The Genesis and Structure of Intellectual Activity in the Conceptions of Jean Piaget,” The Main Directions in the Study of the Psychology of Thought in the Capitalist Countries, Moscow, 1966 (in Russian).
91. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1974, p. 59.
92. See L. S. Vygotsky, “The Problems of Speech and Thought in the Theory of J. Piaget” in Jean Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, Moscow-Leningrad, 1932, pp. 3-54; L. S. Vygotsky, Selected Psychological Studies, Moscow, 1956; idem, The Development of the Higher Psychical Functions, Moscow, 1960 (all in Russian).
93. See Jean Piaget, Comments on Vygotsky’s Critical Remarks Concerning “The Language and Thought of the Child.”
94. Jean Piaget, “Pensee egocentrique et pensee sociocentrique% Op. cit. p. 37.
95. See A. J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, Macmillan & Co. LTD., London, 1956, pp. 47, 48, 50-52.
1. S. L. Rubinstein, Problems of General Psychology, Moscow, 1976, p. 253.
2. A. M. Korshunov, The Theory of Reflection and Creativity, p. 20 n Russian).
3. See V. D. Glezer, Zuckermann I. L, Information and Vision, Moscow-Leningrad, 1961, p. 89
4. See A. V. Zaporozhets, L. A. (in Russian). Venger, V. P. Zinchenko, A. G. Ruzskaya, Perception and Action, Moscow, 1967, p. 55 (in Russian).
5. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. I, Moscow 1974, p. 77.
6. Quoted from J. Piaget, B. Inhelder, La genese des structures logiques elementaires, Paris, 1951.
7. V. S. Tyukhtin, On the Nature of the Image, Moscow 1963, pp. 40, 50 (in Russian).
8. See E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, N.Y., 1961, p. 363.
9. J. Gibson, The Perception of the Visual World, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1950, pp. 26, 27.
10. Ibid., p. 42.
11. See A. N. Leontyev, “On the Ways of Studying Perception”; V. V. Stolin, “A Study in the Generation of the Visual Spatial Image”; A. D. Logvinenko, “Perceptual Activity under Inversion of the Retinal Image”; A. A. Puzyrei, “Sense-Formation in the Processes of Perceptual Activity,” in Perception and Activity (in Russian).
12. J. Ruskin, The Elements of Drawing, note to para 4; quoted from E. H. Gombrich, Art and Illusion, p. 296.
13. See A. D. Logvinenko, “Perceptual Activity under Inversion of the Retinal Image,” in Perception and Activity, pp. 252-256.
14. See N. Yu. Vergiles, V. P. Zinchenko, “The Problem of the Adequacy of the Image (with Reference to Visual Perception),” Voprosy filosofii, 1967, No. 4 (all in Russian).
15. See ibid., p. 65.
16. See V. I. Lenin, “Conspectus of Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic,” Collected Works, Vol. 38, Moscow 1972, p. 171.
17. V. 1. Lenin, “Conspectus of Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic,” Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 195.
18. For a description of the experiments with the Ames chairs see E. H. Gombrich, op. cit, pp. 248-49.
19. E. H. Gombrich, op. cit., p. 249.
20. Karl Marx, “Theses on Feuerbach,” in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 5, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1976, p. 3.
21. Karl Marx, “Randglossen zu Adolph Wagners Lehrbuch der politischen Okonomie,” Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Werke, Band 19, Dietz Verlag, Berlin 1962, pp. 362-63.
22. V. 1. Lenin, “Conspectus of Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic,” Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 213.
23. V. I. Lenin, “Once Again on the Trade Unions, the Current Situation and the Mistakes of Trotsky and Bukharin,” Collected Works, Vol. 32, Moscow 1975, p. 94.
24. J. Piaget, La construction du reel chez l'enfant, Neuchatel-Paris 1937; cited from A. V. Zaporozhets et al., Perception and Action, pp. 163-165.
25. A. M. Korshunov, The Theory of Reflection and Creativity, p. 78.
26. See N. Yu. Vergiles, V. P. Zinchenko, “The Problem of the Ade. quacy of the Image,” Voprosy filosoffi, 1967, No. 4, p. 57.
27. For a philosophical analysis of the Marxist principle of objectrelated activity see: A. M. Korshunov, Cognition and Activity; A. P. Ogurtsov, “Practice as a Philosophical Problem,” Voprosy filosofii, 1967, No. 7; V. A. Lektorsky, “The Principle of ObjectRelated Activity and Marxist Epistemology,” Ergonomics. The Methodological Problems of Studying Activity, Trudy VNIITE Vol. 10, Moscow, 1976; V. S. Shvyrev, “The Tasks of Studying the Category of Activity as a Theoretical Concept,” op. cit.; E. G. Yudin, “The Concept of Activity as a Methodological Problem,” op. cit.; N. N. Trubnikov, On the Categories of “Goal,” “Means,” and “Result,” Moscow, 1968; M. A. Bulatov Activity and the Structure of Philosophical Knowledge, Kiev, 1976; V. P. Ivanov, Human Activity-Cognition-Art, Kiev, 1977; A. 1. Yatsenko, Goal-Setting and Ideals, Kiev, 1977 (all in Russian).
For a discussion of the significance of the category of object-oriented activity for psychological theory see: S. L. Rubinstein, Being and Consciousness, Moscow, 1957; idem, The Principles and Ways of the Development of Psychology. On the Place of the Psychical in the Universal Interconnection of the Phenomena of the Material World, Moscow, 1959; A. N. Leontyev, Activity. Consciousness. Personality, Moscow 1975; M. S. Rogovin, A. V. Solovyov, L. P. Urvantsev, Sh. Sh. Shotemor, “The Structures of the Psyche and the Problem of Cognition,” Voprosy filosoffi, 1977, No. 4 (all in Russian).
28. See E. V. Ilyenkov, Dialectical Logic, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1977.
29. See A. V. Zaporozhets et al., Perception and Action, pp. 265, 285.
30. See A Source Book of Gestalt Psychology, Keagan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co. Ltd., London, 1938, pp. 48, 50, 52-54.
31. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” in: Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Vol. 3, Moscow, 1975 pp 300 302.
32. Cf. le, following arguments of Spinoza about the essence of the circle. A circle may be “defined as a figure, such that all straight lines drawn from the centre to the circumference are equal” (B. Spi noza, How to Improve Your Mind, Philosophical Library, Inc. N.Y., 1956, pp. 79, 80). But this definition, Spinoza believes, “does not in the least explain the essence of a circle, but solely one of its properties” (ibid.), and a derivative, secondary property at that. That is merely a nominal definition. A real definition must e ress the proximate cause of a thing, and that in Spinoza ‘ s view is the same as specifying the mode of constructing the thing. The circle in this case will “be defined as follows: the figure described by any line where one end is fixed and the other free” (ibid.).
33. See G. Bachelard, L'activité rationaliste de la physique contemporaine, Presses universitaries de France, Paris 1951, p. 90.
34. See L. S. Vygotsky, The Development of the Higher Psychical Functions, Moscow 1960 (in Russian).
35. See A. N. Leontyev, Problems of the Development of the Mind, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1981; idem, Activity. Consciousness. Personality (in Russian).
36. See A. R. Luriya, On the Historical Development of the Cognitive Processes. An Experimental-Psychological Study, Moscow 1974 (in Russian).
37. See P. Ya. Galperin, The Development of the Studies in the Formation of Mental Actions; idem, “On the Study of the Child’s Intellectual Development,” Voprosy psichologii, 1969, No. 1; idem, Introduction into Psychology, Moscow, 1976.
38. See A. V. Zaporozhets, The Development of Arbitrary Movements, Moscow, 1960 (in Russian).
39. See V. V. Davydov, Types of Generalisation in Learning, Moscow, 1972; idem, “Analysis of the Structure of the Cognitive Act,” Doklady APN RSFSR, 1960, No. 2; idem, “The Categories of Logic and Pedagogics,” in Problems of Dialectical Logic, Alma-Ata, 1968 (in Russian).
40. See N. Yu. Vergiles, V. P. Zinchenko, “The Problem of the Adequacy of Images,” Voprosy filosofii, 1967, No. 4; A. V. Zaporozhets et al., Perception and Action.
41. See A. N. Leontyev, Activity. Consciousness. Personality, p. 95.
42. Ibid., pp. 97-98.
43. See M. S. Rogovin, Problems in the Theory of Memory, pp. 78-79.
44. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844” in: Karl Marx, Frederick En els, Collected Works Vol. 3, p. 302.
45. See A. I. Meshcheryakov, Awakening to Life,; G. S. Gurgenidze, E. V. Ilyenkov, “Outstanding Progress of Soviet Science” Voprosy filosoffi, 1975, No. 6, pp. 69-79; E. V. Ilyenkov, “Personality Formation: on the Results of a Scientific Experiment,” Kommunist, 1977, No. 2.
46. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1944,” p. 298.
47. G. Maxwell, “The Ontological Status of Theoretical Entities” Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1962, p. 10.
48. W. Heisenberg, Der Teil und das Ganze. Gesprache im Umkreis der A omphysik, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, Munich, 19 7 1, pp. 92, 9 3.
49. Th. S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, pp. 111-135.
50. Ibid., pp. 28-29.
51. Ibid., pp. 132-135.
52. M. Hesse, “Is There an Independent Observation Language?,” The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories. Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, ed. by R. G. Colodny, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970, p. 47.
53. F. Suppe, “The Search for Philosophic Understanding of Scientific Theories,” The Structure of Scientific Theories, University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1974, pp. 104-109.
See also V. A. Lektorsky, “Positivism,” Philosophical Encyclopedia, Moscow, 1967, Vol. 4; idem “From Positivism to Neopositivism,” Bourgeois Philosophy in the 20th Century, Moscow, 1974; V. S. Shvyrev, Neopositivism and the Problems of Empirical Substantiation of Science; 1. S. Narsky, Essays in the History of Positivism, Moscow, 1960 (all in Russian).
54. V. I. I.Lenin, “To A. N. Potresov,” Collected Works, Vol. 34, Moscow, 1977, p. 34.
55. See e.g. B. S. Gryaznov, “Theory and Its World,” B. S. Gryaznov et al., Theory and Its Object, Moscow, 1973, pp. 5-38.
56. On Marx’s method in Capital see M. M. Rozental, The Dialectics of Marxs “Capital,” Moscow, 1967; V. P. Kuzmin, The Systems Principle in Marxs Theory and Methodology, Moscow, 1976; The History of Marxist Dialectics from the Origin of Marxism to the Leninist Stage (ed. by M. M. Rozental), Moscow, 1971, (all in Russian); E. V. Ilyenkov, The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marxs “Capital,” Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1982.
57. Dudley Shapere formulates the following features inherent in the real objects with which scientific theoretical thinking is concerned and which are absent in the idealised objects:
(1) If object A exists really, it can interact with other real objects, in particular macroscopic ones (which is not true of idealised objects);
(2) To say that “A exists” implies that A may have properties which have not yet been discovered;
(3) A real object A may be ascribed properties which it does not actually have, but which may subsequently come to light (it would obviously be meaningless to refer the features formulated in points (2 and (3) to idealised objects);
(4) If A actually exists, there may be different and even competing theories about it (as is actually the case with the electron); A thus acquires what amounts to a theory-transcendent status.
See D. Shapere, “Notes toward a Post -Positivistic Interpretation of Science,” The Legacy of Logical Positivism, ed. by P. Achinstein and S. F. Barker, Baltimore, 1969, pp. 155, 156.
Also: D. Shapere, “Scientific Theories and Their Domains” The Structure of Scientific Theories, pp. 567-569. We shall point out in this connection, that the so-called abstract objects studied in mathematics (numbers, sets, functions etc.) express certain relations between real objects and not real objects existing in space and time.
58. G. Maxwell, “Theories, Perception, and Structural Realism% The Nature and Function of Scientific Theories, University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970, pp. 3-34.
59. “Other forms of intuition, besides those of space and time, other forms of understanding besides the discursive forms of thought, or of cognition, we can neither imagine nor make intelligible to ourselves; and even if we could, they would still not belong to experience, which is the only mode of cognition by which objects are presented to us. Whether other perceptions besides those which belong to the total of our possible experience, and consequently whether some other sphere of matter exists, the understanding has no power to decide, its proper occupation being with the synthesis of that which is given” (1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, London, G. Bell and Sons, LTD, 1930, pp. 171-72).
60. Th. S. Kuhn, op. cit., p. 102.
61. Ibid., p. 111.
62. True, in his “ Postscript- 19 69” Kuhn gives a less rigid formulation of the thesis about the existence of a gap between different paradigms. Taking into account that the everyday world, language, and most of the world of science are shared by members of different scientific communities, Kuhn now believes it possible to translate from the language of one paradigm into the language of another using the common vocabulary of everyday life.
63. B. L. Whorf, Tanguage, Thought, and Reality. Selected Writings, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1966, pp. 27, 213, 214.
64. See Vasilyev S. A., A Philosophical Analysis of the Hypothesis of Linguistic Relativity, Kiev, 1974, p. 21 (in Russian).
65. B. L. Whorf, op. cit., p. 215.
66. See V. V. Tselishchev, Logical Truth and Empiricism, Novosibirsk, 1974, p. 13 (in Russian).
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid., p. 16.
69. W. V. Quine, “Notes on Existence and Necessity.” In: The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. XL, No. 5, March 4, 1943, p. 118.
70. W. V. Quine, Word and Object, New York and London, 1960, pp. 29-57.
71. See W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, 1969, p. 671
72. Ibid., p. 50.
73. The conception of ontological relativity points to the absurdity of arguments, current in modern American and British epistemological literature, concerning the possibility of the existence of a language (and consequently of reason and of a world picture) in beings which we ordinarily do not regard as sentient (e.g., tulips). The authors of these arguments substantiate their positions by assuming that the language to which they refer may be so different from ours that we cannot understand its meaning, the more so that the behaviour of the carriers of this language has nothing in common with human behaviour. We can even fail to guess that we are dealing with a language, these authors say. Situations of this kind are possible in their view in man’s contacts with sentient extraterrestrials: the latter do not have to be similar to man in appearance, they may behave in a manner completely strange to us and communicate in a manner quite different from ours. In this case we shall not recognise them as reasonable beings. Generally speaking, we may be surrounded by a mass of sentient beings, these authors believe, whose presence we do not even suspect and whose world is completely impervious to us. Quine sweeps aside all these arguments pointing out that there are no experimental data for their refutation or confirmation: our experience carries in itself the object scheme of world dissection which is accepted in our language. Here Quine’s position is reminiscent of Kant. See A. C. Genova , “Kant and Alternative Frameworks and Possible Worlds,” Akten des 4. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Mainz, 6-10 April, 1974, Tell 11. 2: Sektionen, Berlin-N.Y., pp. 834-841; R. Rorty, “The World Well Lost.” In: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXIX, No. 19, October 26, 1972, pp. 649-665.
74. S. A. Vasilyev, A Philosophical Analysis of the Hypothesis of Lingusitic Relativity, p. 96 (in Russian).
75. N Chomsky, a major modern proponent of the theory of generative grammars, uses the existence of language universals and the irreducibility of language to verbal behaviour as a basis for reviving the Cartesian conception of innate ideas. In reality, the universality of the primary semantic field, expressed through different language means in different languages, is determined by the community of the substantive structure of practical activity characteristic of the users of different national languages.
76. See N. Chomsky, Syntactic Structures, ‘s-Gravenhage, Mouton, 1957.
77. See A. N. Leontyev, Activity. Consciousness. Personality, pp. 140-158.
78. S. A. Vasilyev, A Philosophical Analysis of the Hypothesis of Linguistic Relativity, p. 45.
79. The possibilities and ways of experimental research into the effect of different language systems on the nature of perception are discussed in M. Cole, S. Scribner, Culture and Thought: Psychological Introduction, N.Y. 1974.
80. M. Bunge, Philosophy of Physics, Dordrecht, 1973, pp. 181-182.
81. See Th. S. Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 202-204.
82. G. Holton, “On the Role of Themata in Scientific Thought” Science, 25 April, 1975, Vol. 188, No. 4186, pp. 328-334. For an’ analysis of continuous lines in the development of science see Contradictions in the Development of Natural Science (ed. by B. M. Kedrov), Moscow, 1965; V. S. Stepin, The Formation of a Scientific Theory, Minsk, 1976; V. S. Bibler, Thinking as Creativity; A. V. Akhutin, The History of the Principles of Physical Experiment, Moscow, 1967 (all in Russian).
83. See V. A. Lektorsky, “V. 1. Lenin and the Principles of Dialectical Logic,” Leninism as the Philosophy of the Modern Epoch, Moscow, 1969; idem, “The Development of Epistemology in F. Engels’s Book Anti-Duhring,” F. Engels’s “Anti-Duhring” and the modern Times, Moscow, 1978; V. A. Lektorsky, Kh. Safari, “On the Logic of the Development of Theoretical Knowledge,” Problemy mira i sotsializma, 1976, No. 12 (all in Russian).
84. “The sign nature of verbal language has that advantage over the language of gestures that it permits to perform any changes or transformations with ideal objects implemented in verbal material. Verbal language, as compared to gesture language, is a more plastic material; one may reproduce in it all the properties and laws of the objective world with great precision and differentiation, and these properties may not coincide with those forms which are reproduced in gestures. As a crude analogy, one may consider plasticine (the word) and stone (gestures). Plasticine can precisely assume all kinds of intricate forms, while stone offers no such possibility. But the trouble is that the plasticity of the word must be handled very carefully, for it may produce properties that do not exist in the objective world.” (S.A. Sirotkin, “What Is Thought Better Armed With-Gesture or Word?,” Voprosy filosofii, 1977, No. 6, p. 101).
85. See E. H. Gombrich, op. cit.
86. “Knowledge is not identical to any psychical act, it implies man’s singling out of himself from the surrounding world in the process of its realisation” (P. V. Kopnin, Introduction to Marxist Epistemology, Kiev, 1966, p. 46, in Russian). “Animals are not aware of their knowledge while man is: he knows that he knows, that it is he who knows, and what he knows” (A. G. Spirkin, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, Moscow, 1972, p. 142, in Russian).
87. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” p. 276.
88. See Keith Gunderson, “Asymmetries and Mind-Body Perplexities.” In: Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. IV, ed. by Michael Radner and Stephen Winokur, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1970, pp. 273-309.
89. It was the formulation of this paradox and the search for ways of its logical solution that stimulated the development of dialectics on an idealistic basis first in Fichte and later in Schelling and Hegel.
90. Imre Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations. The Logic of Mathematical Discovery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976, p. 56.
91. Imre Lakatos thus analyses one of the stages in the history of proofs of the stereometric theorem: “If you did make conscious assumptions, they were that a) removing a face always leaves a connected network and b) any non-triangular face can be dissected into triangles by diagonals. While they were in your subconscious they were listed as trivially true-the cylinder however made them somersault into your conscious list as trivially false” (Ibid., p. 46).
92. Ibid., 45.
93. See Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958 . Tacit knowledge’... is learned by doing science rather than by acquiring rules for doing W’ (Th. S. Kuhn The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970, p. 191).
94. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD, London, 1949, pp. 151, 153.
95. Gilbert Ryle, The Concept of Mind, Hutchinson’s University Library, London, 1951, pp. 186, 195-198.
96. Imre Lakatos, Op. cit., p. 56.
S. A. Yanovskaya points to the “importance of achievements in the area of increasing logical rigour for obtaining new results in mathematics, for solving its most difficult problems, for constructing novel and revolutionary trends in science. Suffice it to recall that the greatest achievements in calculus in the 19th century were due to the increased precision of the basic concepts of calculus attained in several debates-those of real and complex number, limit, continuum, function. It may now be said that the image of modern mathematics, and computer mathematics in the first place, is increasingly determined by greater rigour and precision introduced in the concept of algorithm (and the equivalent concept of recursive or computable function) in the development of the philosophical and logical foundations of mathematics and the logical theory of mathematical proof...” (S. A. Yanovskaya, “On Mathematical Rigour,” Voprosy filosofii, 1966, No. 3, pp. 41, 42, 43).
97. Noting the impossibility of reducing one conceptual system to another , Quine believes that the classical epistemological problem of substantiating knowledge is a pseudoproblem. See e.g., Willard V. Quine , “Epistemology Naturalized.” In: The Psychology of Knowing, ed. by Joseph R. Royce and W. W. Rozeboom, Gordon and Breach, New York, 1972, pp. 9-23. In Lakatos’s view, “background knowledge is where we assume that we know everything but in fact know nothing” (Imre Ladatos, op. cit., p. 45). Popper, Feyerabend, and Kuhn also regard the problem of substantiating knowledge as meaningless.
98. Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge. Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy, pp. 63-65.
99. Stephen Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, North-Holland Publishing Co., Amsterdam, 1952, p. 48.
100. “We all know about ourselves such things and so many of them that no one will ever learn about them through any objective methods” (A. G. Spirkin, Consciousness and Self-Consciousness, p. 155).
101. See e.g. Thomas S. Kuhn, Op. cit.; S. R. Mikulinsky, M. G. Yaroshevsky, “The Socio-Psychological Aspects of Scientific Activity,” Voprosy filosofii, 1972, No. 12; John M. Ziman, Public Knowledge. An Essay Concerning the Social Dimension of Science, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1968.
102. Karl R. Popper, Objective Knowledge. An Evolutionary Approach, Oxford at the Clarendon Press, 1979, pp. 106, 107-108.
103. Ibid., p. 115.
104. V. I. Lenin, “Conspectus of Hegel’s Book The Science of Logic,” Collected Works, Vol. 38, 1972, p. 202.
105. For a discussion of collective and individual subjects see also P. V. Kopnin, Introduction into Marxist Epistemology, pp. 58-65; idem, Dialectics as the Logic and Epistemology of Cognition, pp. 106-117; V. A. Lektorsky, The Problem of the Subject and Object in Classical and modern Bourgeois Philosophy, pp. 100-113 (all in Russian).
106. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” pp. 276-277.
107. For an analysis of the Hegelian conception of subject and object see also T. 1. Oizerman, Hegel’s Philosophy, Moscow, 1956; K. S. Bakradze, The System and Method of Hegel’s Philosophy, Tbilisi, 1958; V. I. Shinkaruk, Hegel’s Logic, Dialectics, and Epistemology, Kiev, 1964; B. M. Kedrov, V. I. Lenin and Hegel’s Dialectics, Moscow, 1975; V. A. Lektorsky, “The Subject-Object Problem in the Epistemology of Hegel and Marx.” In: The Philosophy of Hegel and Modern Times; K. N. Lyubutin, The Problem of the Subject and the Object in German Classical and Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, pp. 56-57; A. S. Bogomolov, “The Philosophy of Hegel and the Modern Times,” Kommunist, 1970, No. 14; M. K. Marnardashvili, The Forms and Content of Thinking, Moscow, 1968; M. A. Bulatov, Lenin’s Analysis of German Classical Philosophy, Kiev, 1974 (all in Russian); E. V. Ilyenkov, Dialectical Logic.
108. G. W. F. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1964, p. 142.
109. “In this respect education consists, if it is considered from the standpoint of the individual, in that he gains that which is available, absorbs his inorganic nature and takes possession of W’ (Ibid., p. 27).
110. Ibid., p. 72.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid., pp. 72-73.
113. Ibid., pp. 73-74.
114. Ibid., p. 74.
115. In Hegel’s view, the philosophy of Kant and Fichte “did not attain the level of concept or spirit as it is in and for itself but only that of spirit as it is in relation to another” (G. W. F. Hegel, Enzyklopadie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse, Akademie-Verlag, Berlin, 1975, p. 345).
116. G. W. F. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, p. 21.
117. Ibid., p. 75.
118. Karl Marx, “Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” pp. 333-334.
119. V. 1. Lenin, “Conspectus of Hegel’s Book Lectures on the History of Philosophy,” Collected Works, Vol. 38, p. 278.
120. See Willard V, Quine, “Epistemology Naturalized,” The Psychology of Knowing, pp. 9-23.
121. See Jean Piaget, Sagesse et illusions de la philosophie, Presse Universitaires de France, Paris, 1965; idem, Epistemologie des sciences de l'homme, Gallimard, Paris, 1970; idem, Psychology and Epistemology, Grossman, New York, 197 1.
122. L. Wittgenstein, Op. cit., p. 77.
123. See e.g., Peter F. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense. An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, Methuen, London, 1973; Barry Stroud, “Transcendental Arguments,” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LXV, No. 9, May 2, 1968, pp. 24 1-256.
124. See e.g., V. A. Lektorsky, “Analytical Philosophy Today,” Voprosy filosofii, No. 1, 1972; M. S. Kozlova, Philosophy and Language, Moscow, 1972; A. S. Bogomolov, English Bourgeois Philosophy of the 20th Century, Moscow, 1973 (all in Russian).
125. See Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, 1972, pp. 49-72.
126. But they are accepted and even reduced to an absurdity by Paul Feyerabend, a disciple of Popper who his proposed a substantiation of “anarchism” in epistemology. See Paul Feyerabend, Against Method. Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, NLB, London,1975.
127. See Karl R. Popper, Op. cit., p. 52.