

MIKHAIL GORBACHEV'S ADDRESS

on the results of the visits to
Great Britain, the Federal Republic
of Germany and France, and on
participation in the meeting of the
Political Consultative Committee
of the Warsaw Treaty member states

Moscow
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August 1, 1989

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**Address
at the first session of the
USSR Supreme Soviet on the
results of the visits to Great
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The idea of reporting to the Supreme Soviet on our latest foreign-policy steps came from the deputies. It was first voiced during a session of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. I think such initiatives shall become regular practice—more than that—an obligatory one. Now, I want to offer you my first address of this kind.

I do not think it is necessary for me to cover all the issues discussed during my visits to Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and France. I will touch upon the most major of them. The three visits provide enough material for that.

To begin with, new thinking and new underlying principles of our foreign policy form the starting point for the Soviet Union in all international affairs. Now that the Congress of People's Deputies has approved them, they have the status of law. They are a component part of the Congress' resolution.

I'm sure you'll agree with me when I say that the new foreign policy is inseparably linked with perestroika within the Soviet Union. Our entire foreign-policy activities are based on it. You undoubtedly noticed that our foreign policy was supported both in the course of the election campaign and by the Congress, even though it was not the subject of an extensive discussion.

Naturally, attention was focused on home issues. But unless we want to leave these home issues unsolved, we must not allow them to distract us from the importance of foreign policy. It is within the power of foreign policy not only to reduce the danger of war, enhance

our country's security, and create an image of the Soviet Union abroad that will be in our interests, but also to improve the conditions for implementing our domestic plans and making decisions as regards the economy, the social sphere, and cultural and ideological issues that will speed up our progress on the road of perestroika and guarantee the kind of changes we want. Now that the Soviet Union is dealing with tremendous revolutionary tasks aimed at revitalizing the country, we need favourable external conditions more than ever.

Thus the community of vital interests of the **entire Soviet nation** is concentrated in foreign policy. That is why it demands constant attention and great effort on the part of all state bodies and the public—the entire people. Foreign policy is an area that must be tackled in earnest.

It is often said and even written that we are paying more attention to, and putting greater effort in, international affairs than they deserve. As I see it, comrade deputies, we can't afford to spare any efforts here. Even less can we put **domestic and foreign** policies at odds with one another. Admittedly, we are easily carried away by our daily cares and the complex situation of today cannot but affect us. Yet we should never underestimate the impact our international activities are having on the restructuring drive at home. Even if there are countries which, clinging closer to their old dogmas, can afford to isolate themselves from global developments, the Soviet Union is not among them. Otherwise we would be inevitably doomed to lagging behind in science, technology and economic development. We'd never raise our living standards nor solve other home issues, some of which are urgent and some are long overdue for solution. We'd eventually lose all hope of retaining our global role, which means everything to us—not merely our prestige; our place in the world's development, in the overall progress of the human race, has been shaped by historical conditions. The world will never develop into a civilization of the 21st century if our country remains the way it has been these long last decades and if perestroika fails. Thus, the impetuses for change are given not only by our internal

requirements, but by the ever-changing world in which we all live.

Such is the context in which we should regard our foreign policy, including the recent visits to the three major European states and the Bucharest meeting with our socialist allies.

I want to stress once more that the press covered these major international events, and I hope that those who wanted information were able to get it. So I don't have to describe what they were about, to adhere to the chronology of the events and go into a lot of detail. I just want to concentrate on general evaluations and conclusions. I should also like to share with you my basic impressions of those visits and meetings.

First, **about the visits to Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and France.** These countries—from economic, political and military points of view—are among the world's foremost powers. Two of them have nuclear weapons and are permanent members of the UN Security Council. The Federal Republic of Germany is the site of a vast NATO potential, both nuclear and conventional. All three have tremendous influence over European and global politics.

I made my visits at a significant moment in world developments, one might say, at the turning point, at a time when profound changes are under way in the socialist countries. The background for these visits was formed by fundamental political processes linked with the Final Document adopted in Vienna last January, the negotiations on conventional arms and armed forces in Europe which have been started, and the resumption, after a break, of foreign-political activities by the US Administration and, consequently, by NATO.

There was another factor giving import to the visits precisely at this time. Western Europe is realizing more and more how essential it is to achieve mutual understanding and cooperation with the Soviet Union. It is willing to discuss all issues with due consideration for existing realities and the balance of interests. It is willing to surmount confrontational barriers.

The negotiations with the British, West German and

French leadership and meetings with members of the public, with regular people, confirmed our opinion that Europe is no longer the Europe of several years ago. As I compare my latest contacts with those at the same level in the recent past, I see how quickly the Soviet Union's relations with the Western world are changing: there is greater mutual trust and even frankness, more clarity, more openness and confidence in Europe's future and that of the whole world. Our relations are gaining ever more profound content—and that is what is most important. We could see this in London, everywhere in the Federal Republic of Germany, in Paris and in Strasbourg, where, one may say, all the countries of Western Europe were represented. The meetings were influenced by another simple, but essential factor: with each passing year we have come to know each other better. Personal contacts are tremendously significant in modern politics—everyone has come to realize this now—and the three countries are taking this factor into account as part and parcel of the European process.

This new quality of summits and other political meetings differs from country to country, but no country has taken a step backward.

The public mood had a tremendous effect on the atmosphere of the visits. I can say it was the mood of the broad public, to use the Soviet cliché: now it is no longer an exaggeration. We rejoiced at the wonderful reception given to us by the citizens of all three countries. Their behaviour and the ways they expressed their feelings varied from place to place, of course, yet the general impression was always the same—that a barrier which had separated us for years had now fallen at last. This feeling was especially strong in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Interest, empathy and benevolence—such was the range of feelings displayed. There was no hostility or prejudice. This is the impression I got and I want you to know about it. This impression alone is more significant than many of the political decisions and agreements we signed. We saw for ourselves how vast the potential of goodneighbourly attitudes is, which can actually prompt

history to make a sharp turn, both in Europe and outside of it.

All this is connected with the growing realization of the international significance of the Soviet Union's perestroika. The elections of People's Deputies, the Congress of People's Deputies, and the first session of the new Supreme Soviet had a huge impact on the opinion of our country abroad. The work under way in the Kremlin is convincing even the most sceptical minds that the Soviet Union's reform is deep-rooted and of great scope, that our nation is serious about what it has undertaken, and is approaching it in a truly constructive way. We felt that the close and universal attention on the part of the world public towards our country was not idle interest and that it was a result of the realization that the modern world won't be what it should be without a prosperous Soviet Union.

There is another reason for this interest. The whole of Europe strongly feels that the nuclear threat is receding into the past. The newly-born hope that the world can still be saved, and that East-West relations can be normal and civilized is gradually becoming a conviction. The West European public sees the fact that the oppressive fear caused by the threat of war is gone primarily as being to the credit of the Soviet Union, to its perestroika and new thinking.

To sum this all up, we witnessed the fruit of a major change in the public mood in many countries. This was strongly felt during our visits and it is a crucial factor of current global developments.

As to the political dialogues and negotiations in the three capitals, they revolved around the present global situation and prospects for the solution of world problems, including regional problems and those pertaining to the world economy; still others concerned security and disarmament, all-European development and bilateral relations at the time of perestroika in the Soviet Union. The same range of issues came up in my meetings with scholars. We examined all these questions in their interrelation, just like they are in real life.

On the philosophical plane, we found there to be profound understanding of our analyses and

evaluations—an understanding which, in our view, reflected the objective situation, i.e. the growing rapprochement in the contemporary world, the community of destinies of Europe and all humanity.

Although views and opinions can differ, their similarity was evident on such conceptual questions having a direct bearing on global politics as the total inacceptability and absurdity of settling inter-state issues and contradictions by force of arms; the primacy of universal human values; the right to freedom of choice; the necessity to reduce armament levels and eliminate military confrontation; the necessity for the East and the West to adjust economically and to join efforts for the solution of ecological problems; the relationship between politics and ethics; the impact of humanitarian and cultural factors on politics and the importance of direct contacts between citizens of different countries.

The range of issues under discussion and the level of mutual understanding revealed in such discussions testify to the fact that new thinking is making its way into international politics. Now it is not only a philosophy, but a practical policy.

The joint statement signed in Bonn has vital significance in this sense. This is the first document ever in which two major European countries representing different socio-economic systems and opposing blocs together set forth the goals of their policies on the basis of philosophical evaluations of global changes. This is an epoch-making document in another respect: expressing the will of both nations, it sums up the course of their relations during postwar period, which was by no means a primrose path, and envisages active and many-sided cooperation based on mutual confidence, equality and profit.

The points of debate that did arise during the London, Bonn and Parisian talks mainly concerned the role of nuclear arsenals. However, there were many shades in the positions and arguments. The British leadership, for one, has something of a fixed idea about nuclear deterrence. The Federal Republic of Germany, being on the line of nuclear confrontation, which makes nuclear arms especially dangerous for it, is gravely

concerned about its position. France defends its specific position within NATO and the "purely political" designation of its nuclear potential. And all three make reference to their allied duties.

The Soviet Union is opposed to the strategy of nuclear deterrence, believing that it threatens to reduce the value of conventional arms cuts to naught and that it runs counter to the elimination of European military confrontation—a goal which, it seems, encounters no objections. To spur the Vienna talks on, the Soviet Union offered practical details on its idea of gradual disarmament, and reinforced this with an expression of readiness to unilaterally further reduce the number of its European-based missiles if we see that NATO countries are willing to start negotiations with us on tactical nuclear weapons.

Many Soviet people are asking themselves, some of them bluntly and in public, a question which I therefore feel obliged to answer. This question is: what if we are going too far and making unjustified concessions?

Drawing on Lenin's lessons, I say with deep conviction: only reasonable compromise will bring the world to peace and normal international relations. The global community—at least, as we see it—is ready for such a compromise, and practical experience confirms that we are right. The world must give up the enemy image, and it can do so. I may put it even stronger: it will inevitably do so. So when we come across obviously outdated insinuations, which are also deplorably out of place, about "enemies" praising us, we can only say with regret that people who say so have learned nothing and understood nothing in the four years of perestroika.

Closing our eyes to the fact that the West is willing to meet us halfway in disarmament will bring us to a simplistic view of things. The INF Treaty, with its universally recognized historic import, is being scrupulously carried out. The United States has not increased its military budgets over the last three years. Congressmen are battling over the issue of financing several different military programmes. America pulled many nuclear warheads out of Europe, imposed a moratorium on the production of plutonium and tritium for military

purposes, and cut tank production programmes. All of the West German-owned Pershing-1A missiles have been destroyed. President Bush's and NATO's responses to the Soviet proposal on reducing European-based conventional arsenals are sure to bring the final solution of the problem closer.

One may say that the second round of the Vienna talks on all those issues has been successful. The parties were eager to meet each other halfway and so did much towards reaching agreement on banning chemical weapons.

These are truly very significant things. We should not underestimate them. Not that I mean to say that American and NATO military-political activities boil down to this. Other aspects of their activities, which threaten peace, are obvious. Suffice it to mention some points in the NATO Brussels Declaration.

Yet these emergent processes have a new quality about them which holds new prospects and new criteria for the relations between the two systems.

This point was borne out by the discussions of **Europe's development** I had during the three visits. These were substantial and comprehensive discussions, full of profound content. The positive attitudes to the idea of Europe as a common home we all share were reflected in the joint Soviet-West German statement, in the pronouncements of President Mitterrand and in the constructive response to my Strasbourg address.

The dialogue on European issues is growing ever more productive, and its potential increases as the West more fully realizes that attempts to destabilize the socialist countries using their sweeping changes are unacceptable and even pernicious for the West itself. I also feel obliged to stress (and discussions during my visits prove this) that ever more people in the West have come to realize that perestroika's success does not mean that Soviet society is slipping back towards capitalism, and that our nation is relying on its own values, as it has previously done, in its effort to renew socialism. As was said to the world in Strasbourg, a victorious perestroika will put the global community face to face with a renewed socialist state—and I stress both the word “re-

newed" and the word "socialist". Judging by ample indications, the West increasingly sympathizes with this point. Hostile speculations on the matter are dying down. It is difficult for some to accept these conclusions—yet international public opinion is gradually adopting them.

I think we have every reason to say that the three visits have brought the ideas of a European home closer together. They have become more tangible.

I think it is too early now to fully appreciate our delegation's visit to Strasbourg. Figuratively speaking, we visited Western Europe in all its present unity. Strasbourg is one of the centres of West European integration in the economic, political, parliamentary, legal, cultural and other spheres. My address to the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe began a dialogue at the highest level with a political organization which unites 23 countries and is most representative of Western Europe. It is also the oldest of its kind: last May it celebrated its 40th anniversary. Apart from that body, Strasbourg is the seat of the European Parliament which unites 12 countries. Its members were also invited to our meeting.

I admit that the reception we were accorded there, the response to the ideas we outlined in our statements and talks, and the willingness to discuss with us practical, specific aspects concerning the problems of Europe's development—all this came as a surprise of sorts to our delegation. We can, therefore, state with satisfaction that Strasbourg became for us convincing proof of the viability and promise of the European process.

The Council of Europe can become one of the pillars of the European home and a body in which to work jointly on important initiatives. We should scrutinize not only the declaration we have been given, but also the Council of Europe's conventions concerning culture, education, ecology, television, etc. and decide which of these we can join. Certainly it is time we in the Supreme Soviet began establishing permanent ties with both the Council of Europe and the European

Parliament, particularly as they have extended invitations.

In connection with European affairs, our interlocutors asked us repeatedly and at length about **Soviet-American relations**. Our position in this respect cannot be any clearer. Like the rest of our views, it is based on political realism. The United States of America cannot help being a factor in the European process, and it would be primitive or, frankly speaking, even absurd to underestimate this fact, let alone to build plans along these lines. Therefore, it would be both in our own and in universal interests to build our relations with that country in such a manner as to help the East and the West adapt to a new, peaceful European order and to strengthen the security of each and every country while they fulfil their inalienable right to choose their own socio-economic order.

We rely on these criteria to evaluate President Bush's recent visits to Poland and Hungary. This is an understandable event, provided, however, that, as I have already noted, the temptation is held in check to take advantage of the complex processes of transformation in countries with a different social system in an attempt to force them to leave the path they have chosen. A practice such as this would definitely have an adverse effect on all Europe.

During the visits we felt once again that the Europeans were interested in seeing Soviet-American relations further improve and, above all, in seeing the talks on the 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms succeed. We have been most attentive to these ideas from our interlocutors, which in effect correspond to our own wishes.

Now let me draw some conclusions, including practical ones, from the results of the visits to the three major European countries.

First, the economic side. I believe that the summit meetings and other talks in Great Britain, West Germany and France have provided an unprecedented foundation for mutually beneficial cooperation. A record number of agreements has been signed: 12 in Bonn and 22 in Paris. Certainly, quantity is not the

main criterion here, yet this fact is quite indicative.

It is also important that we met with the most authoritative representatives of the business community who, although they are quite critical of our current potential in foreign economic markets, we believe, have constructive attitudes, are apt to look ahead and are ready to jointly seek the most acceptable forms of cooperation, acting with the pragmatism and determination characteristic of businessmen. Incidentally, during those meetings we heard complaints that some Soviet agencies were slow or constantly tied up in red tape. This criticism was often quite justified when we considered specific problems.

In light of this and the importance for us to solve outstanding problems without delay, the appropriate Supreme Soviet committees and chamber commissions should become involved in this issue in one way or another.

The bulk of the signed agreements concern the economy, science and technology. The task is to make them work for the economic reform, to create real incentives providing for the development of direct economic ties, including those with small and medium-sized companies, and enabling joint ventures producing goods which our consumers sorely need to operate efficiently. There are plans to cooperate with French companies in agribusiness and in forestry. West German and Italian companies will help us modernize our light industry. There are new openings for cooperation in advanced fields such as heavy space platforms, aircraft construction, high-speed rail transport, telecommunications, a new generation of television, etc. We expect a great deal from the establishment of economic and industrial centres in Leningrad and in West Germany. By the way, it is something of a paradox that earlier we believed that when implementing our new international policies, our most formidable difficulties would be in the field of human rights and arms reduction. We saw the economic sphere as a simple field in which we were more knowledgeable. Now, we think it is probably the other way around. Let's be truthful: the difficulties in this field are connected not only with the barriers the West has raised

(such barriers do indeed continue to exist), but also with our inertia, our lagging behind in the development of our economic thinking during perestroika and, to put it bluntly, our inability to work on the world market, incompetence, prejudice and, at times, pure and simple laziness.

When we asked the embassies for their opinions about the work of our delegations over the last two years, they were very critical, especially concerning the delegations' low level of competence and the absence of programmes for these trips. Referring to the embassies' opinions, one can also say that many delegation members go abroad at state expense simply to expand their cultural luggage and sightsee. This is such a grave thing that it cannot continue: I believe that the matter should be discussed at the USSR Supreme Soviet, and the floor should be given to both those who represent our economy and our ambassadors.

I would especially like to point to an agreement on training personnel for economic activities. Several hundred experts have already gone or are going to West Germany, France and Britain to take courses in business management and become Soviet managers. However, not everything is fine here either. Ambassador Kvitsinsky reports that sometimes the wrong people are selected to take these courses, and when abroad, they don't concentrate on what is expected of them, which surprises their professors.

Politically, the importance of the visits to Western Europe, for all the particularities of each visit, can be reduced to several common denominators. What has been accomplished most likely amounts to a decisive weakening of the ideological barriers on the way to a new, peaceful Europe. We share a greater mutual confidence on the state level. The "humanization" of our relations with countries which have a social system different from ours creates a favourable public opinion and encourages millions of Europeans to bolster the peace process on the continent.

In this context the quality of the cultural and, generally speaking, human links takes on even greater importance. For a long time there were plans to build

cultural centres in each other's countries. Today their construction has been decided upon. The very atmosphere of the visits, their intellectual content, the participation of many Soviet intellectuals, and the signed agreements create new possibilities for scientists, artists, men of letters and artistic unions to play their role as envoys plenipotentiary of perestroika in a more thorough and bold fashion and to form, together with their Western colleagues, the spiritual and moral foundations for a peaceful order in Europe, creating, so to say, a different European environment.

I would call the agreements on contacts between young people, exchanges of schoolchildren and teachers and their stays with families an investment in the future. Although such exchanges existed previously, they involved a handful of people. Now thousands will participate.

I consider the fact that military contacts between the USSR and the NATO countries are being resumed is essential. These involve defence ministers, general staffs, individual units, military schools, etc. Mutual understanding or even simply an acquaintance with each other along these lines is, as you understand, a special element for improving trust and the transparency of military activities. Two or three years ago this would be seen as incredible and undesirable. But this practice now helps form an atmosphere in which one can act with greater assurance when reducing defence spending although, to be sure, there is a need to remember that parity should be maintained.

In the course of the visits it was agreed upon to stimulate parliamentary contacts. Their political importance is self-evident in our times, and this will increase. It is, therefore, all the more important to rid ourselves of formalism and the practice of turning international exchanges into excursions. Incidentally, foreign parliamentary experience may contain many useful things for our democratic institutions and the elaboration of the rules of the work of the Supreme Soviet itself.

We visited the Federal Republic of Germany and France shortly before the **summit of seven leading capitalist countries** which was held in Paris. I used this

occasion to send a message to President Mitterrand, expressing the Soviet leadership's views concerning the key problems of the world economy. The message dealt primarily with the following.

The inevitable process of the internationalization of the world economy today calls for a new level of multilateral economic relations. Observing the efforts of the Seven to coordinate macro-economic policy, we arrive at the conclusion that there are possibilities to ensure a greater predictability of economic processes. This is an important prerequisite for general economic security and also concerns a very disturbing tendency in the development of contemporary civilization, to which we belong.

Our perestroika is inseverable from a full-scale participation in the international division of labour. We need this, but the rest of the world also stands to benefit from it. The laws of modern economic evolution connected with the world's increased interdependence destroy the insurmountable barriers between the different economic systems. Although each of them preserves its specifics, they need each other, and this need will be ever greater in the future. Incidentally, they use similar instruments for regulation. In the future, this may also mean a link-up of the mechanisms of macro-economic coordination. The Paris meeting was informed of our readiness to discuss all these issues.

It stands to reason that quite a few differences still remain. Nevertheless, we see common ground and similarities in the approaches to such problems as the settlement of the Third World's foreign debt, and we favour the development of and assistance to the search for decisions acceptable to both creditors and debtors, to donor-nations and recipient countries.

The ensuring of the steady development of the world economy also presupposes the creation of reliable ecological stabilizers and calls for a high degree of coordination to overcome the global ecological threat.

In the concluding resolutions of the session of the Seven in Paris, we, for our part, saw a number of new and positive points, in any case, compared with the past. Certain headway has been made.

Generally speaking, not only in the message but also in talks with Western leaders, we have always tried to bring home the idea that no Three or Seven or any other such number for that matter is in a position to decide the destiny of the whole world and it cannot decide on behalf of the peoples. We favour an international approach to examining global problems which concern all countries and every sector of civilization. The right instrument for this is precisely the United Nations, which has long awaited the moment to start playing this role.

Speaking about the West European direction of our policy as a whole, one can draw the conclusion that the world has started changing. And this is ever more noticeable. Some like it more, others like it less. Still others do not like it at all. And we know this, too. Such people are to be found both in America and in the West European countries. Some help to promote the changes, while others impede them. Some people are sticking to a wait-and-see policy, having not yet made their choice.

It is important, however, that West European leaders, and probably most Europeans, realize that it is not only possible but also necessary to build a new Europe. There is growing awareness that there is no alternative to this, that Europe should move forward, proceeding from the existing realities, and not backwards, to the times fraught with war.

Quite a few complex tasks have yet to be fulfilled and intricate knots untangled on the road to a period of peace. Now and again there are sudden waves, or sometimes even the Cold War winds start blowing. The people at NATO apparently think it useful to arrange them, now jointly, now severally. And we have felt them quite recently in certain speeches and declarations. Therefore, one should be attentive and take care that the new, normal, so to speak, human "face" that Europe is already acquiring does not catch cold. I would put it this way: one should not miss the chance being offered and pursue an active policy to promote the developing processes, both in the European direction and in world politics as a whole. And, of course, one

should not detach oneself from the realities, but act taking them into consideration.

One can generally say that, as Lenin put it, the peaceful coexistence of different European states is turning into a reality, and no one can ignore it.

Comrade Deputies, the major foreign-policy actions which I am informing you about today have their own and very important dimension **within the framework of our allied relations**. We flew from Strasbourg directly to Bucharest to attend the meeting of the Political Consultative Committee.

The Bucharest meeting was no ordinary one. This was both because it was held at a particularly crucial stage in the life of the socialist community and because of the character of exchanges of opinions that took place there. The documents passed in Bucharest constitute an integral programme of action on the way to a safe and peaceful Europe. They show that the socialist states are reacting adequately to the challenges of the times. This is a product of collective work, and each state has made its own contribution.

The meeting responded constructively to the proposals of the Brussels session of NATO and stated that they in a sense met the Warsaw Treaty initiatives for reductions in conventional armaments and armed forces halfway. The meeting demonstrated an awareness of the need to transform our alliance from a military-political organization into a politico-military one, taking due account of the new realities in Europe and the world. This will promote the move towards the objective announced by the socialist states: preparations through the all-European process for the disbandment of WTO and NATO. Until conditions for this are ripe, we shall develop relations between the blocs on a non-confrontational basis.

The supreme forum of our alliance was largely new in essence and was marked by frankness and originality in the analysis of events. Were there differences of opinion, a divergence of points of view? Of course, there were. We do not see anything bad in that. The times of showcase unanimity are over. With all the diversity of approaches, and with the domestic and foreign policies

of the Warsaw Treaty member states having their own specific features, the meeting of the PCC was an impressive demonstration of the mutual political commitment to understanding and cooperation. That is what really matters. It was reaffirmed that the allied nations agree on the most cardinal international issues of the world process. In fact, that is what allowed them to easily reach agreement on a generally common policy at the present stage.

The outcome of the Bucharest meeting was generally welcomed by West European ruling circles. This is unusual, but it is consistent with the new spirit of state-to-state relations in Europe.

Our allies supported the proposal for convening a second all-European summit conference like the one in Helsinki in 1975. This would make it possible to look into Europe's future and identify the prospects for the European process as it moves into the next century.

The Bucharest meeting came as further evidence that a new type of relations is being established in the socialist community, relations based on the principles of full equality, independence and self-reliance. Now it is clear to all that there are no universal socialist models and no one has the monopoly on the truth. Each people determines the future of its own country and chooses its own form of society. There must be no interference from outside, no matter what the pretext, and there must be no attempts to impose one's views on another country's policies.

This was the first time that the PCC meeting, particularly the meeting between the heads of the delegations, gave such careful consideration to the profound changes taking place in the community countries. The fundamental aspects of the modern understanding of socialism and ways of its renewal were broached. A larger-scale discussion was launched by the allied countries on how to make their economic cooperation more dynamic and effective in new conditions. They agreed to resume in the near future the in-depth exchange of opinions on this subject started in Bucharest, making it lengthier and more specific. This is likewise a sign of the times,

reflecting the imperatives of world trends towards integration.

Concern over the future of socialism, the understanding of the crucial nature of this juncture, and the general desire for the processes of renewal to be successful—everything combined to have a major influence on the work of the meeting.

It is blatantly obvious that its outcome, as indeed the situation in Europe as a whole, presupposes the need to renew the Supreme Soviet's relations with the parliaments of the allied nations.

In fact, the spirit of the Bucharest meeting, combined with the results of the summits in Cuba and China, allows us to say that our relations with the socialist countries are taking on an increasingly integral character as a factor of the favourable processes in today's inter-related world—given that our specific relations with each of the countries are being maintained or even intensified.

I'm taking advantage of the occasion to emphasize once again the international significance of the normalization of our relations with the People's Republic of China. The Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR valued that development very highly.

Incidentally, both in Bonn and in Paris I was persistently questioned about our reaction to the events in Beijing. I think it would be right and proper to give the gist of my answers. The process of change which is taking place in such a country as China is a phenomenon of worldwide significance. We, naturally, wish the Chinese people well on their way along the road of reform, on the way they have chosen themselves. This process may involve painful occurrences and conflicts. We have made our attitude to the tragedy which took place in Beijing very clear. We regret that it happened that way. We would like to see the most pressing problems resolved through political dialogue between the government and the people. That is our way of thinking. This is the method we have chosen. But every nation has to deal with its problems on its own. This is our resolute and, I think, irreversible stand.

It is our firm intention to make consistent and full

use of the results of the visit to the People's Republic of China, doing everything we can to promote cooperation for mutual benefit in various areas, including those which are scientifically and technically advanced. In fact, work is already being done in this respect. Recently, on the occasion of the Days of Chinese Science and Technology in the USSR, a government delegation, led by Member of the State Council Song Jian, came to the Soviet Union. The other day, Member of the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee, Vice-Premier of the State Council Tian Jiyun visited Moscow. He headed the Chinese side on the commission for trade and economic, scientific and technological cooperation. There are plans to develop inter-Party ties.

I'm positive that the new stage in Sino-Soviet dialogue is in the interests of both our peoples, the interests of the Asia-Pacific region and of the entire international community—by virtue of the significance of our dialogue and our relations.

* * *

Comrades,

Our foreign policy has demonstrated a certain degree of effectiveness because, as I see it, it has sound scientific foundations and is responsive to the challenges of the times and the needs of our society and the world in which we live.

Our basic choice, being based on a new way of thinking, is **correct**. The task now is to build up our foreign-policy "capital", making consistent and the utmost use of its dividends for the benefit of the Soviet people and universal security and progress.

Unflagging compliance with the agreements and accords we have signed and strict observance of the spirit and letter of the Congress of People's Deputies' resolution and its message to the peoples of the world are of crucial importance in this sense. The Supreme Soviet and its committees and commissions, and the highest body of power, the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, are to exercise effective parliamentary constitutional supervision to ensure that words are matched

by deeds and to prevent our basic political principles, which occasionally get lost in the administrative and bureaucratic morass, from being negated by our government departments or other bodies, through their instructions, actions or inaction.

We are going to complete the work to bring Soviet law in full conformity with our Vienna commitments, with the declarations we voted for at the UN, and with other international documents we have signed. The Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and the Foreign Ministry were right to decide to hold a special hearing on the implementation of the Vienna Concluding Document. There is obviously a possibility of finding some common format for monitoring compliance with agreements at the inter-parliamentary level too. That would provide extra guarantees of compliance by all parties. It would be worth thinking about such an initiative and what sort of mechanism could be used for the purpose.

I have said on previous occasions that the new way of thinking is, in effect, the ideology and concept of perestroika in general, not only in relation to foreign policy. The results of our activities on the international scene only emphasize the effectiveness of the new outlook. And this leads us all to believe that before long our new thinking could produce better results in domestic matters, too. The sooner we get rid of the stereotypes of the past, the more boldly we shall tackle political, economic and social issues from the point of view of new thinking, the faster society will advance, with perestroika beginning to bear tangibly real fruit.

Every one of us—in the Supreme Soviet, the government, the Party leadership, and every Soviet citizen wherever he or she may live and work—should remember this: what does harm to perestroika within the country, or discredits it, has an adverse effect on the international standing of the Soviet state as well, thereby crippling our chances of pursuing our foreign policy aimed at settling our home tasks and making perestroika itself a success.

The favourable processes in the world have not yet become irreversible. At the same time, never before has

the world had such bright prospects for moving into a peaceful period of mankind's development. And never before has this depended so much on us, comrades, on the sense of responsibility of each and every one of us for the cause of perestroika.

* * *

Mikhail Gorbachev answered questions from the Deputies.

Question: This may seem like a naive question, but does the West realize that, with so many nuclear power plants, any attack on the Soviet Union would be fatal for the whole of Europe? I am asking this because my voters ask me a quite different question, namely: Aren't there too many armaments when we have so many nuclear bombs, nuclear power plants on our territory?

Answer: I should have foreseen such a question in my introductory remarks. I think, comrades, they obviously realize this. In my opinion, this stimulates a realistic policy.

Question: Do you think, Mikhail Sergeyeovich, that the countries of the socialist community could make greater use of Western Europe's experience of cultural, scientific, political and economic integration in promoting their own integration processes? I am asking this question because there are developments and practices I can neither understand nor accept, such as, for instance, the customs restrictions which are constantly being increased between certain socialist nations, and some other things. I would like to know your opinion on this issue.

Answer: This is one of the most interesting questions. I think that, in communicating with the peoples of Europe and the world, our experience, our views and our policy in one way or another influence other countries. On the other hand, we can say that we also feel a certain influence. I don't wish to give a purely diplomatic answer. The experience we are acquiring in this sphere helps us to cope with the current problems of this very important, crucial stage in the development of our

country. Using the accumulated world experience, we can elaborate more balanced approaches. In spite of the differences in the social choice, in systems, traditions and other specifics—psychology, etc.—there are many things that are important and common to all of us, and they show that we are all following in the wake of human civilization. We should boldly use its achievements not only in economics but also in social policy, not to mention science and technology. I think in all these spheres there are things that can be used to our advantage at this stage of perestroika, when we are searching for and finding new mechanisms of the functioning of society and ways of improving the life of the people. We are not making any discovery, we are just remembering what Lenin taught us: “You can become a Communist only when you enrich your mind with a knowledge of all the treasures created by mankind.” Communism did not appear at the edge of the road to civilization; it appeared in its central lane, thanks to the emergence in the arena of such a force as the working class. Communism is absorbing the achievements of previous systems. Today, interacting with them, it will continue to take in all that suits its interests. I think we should get rid of old stereotypes but remain loyal, at the same time, to our own values, our choice and political goals, acting within the framework of socialism and improving and renewing it.

I have answered your question in a general form. But I think this discussion can be continued.

Question: I think your speech is an excellent first step towards tutoring People’s Deputies in foreign policy. In this connection, I would like to ask your opinion about the activities of Soviet journalists writing on international affairs. Don’t you think—as it seems to me and this is why I am asking you this—that the way they view our foreign policy actions is rather lopsided, narrow, superficial and, at times, even euphoric? Their Western colleagues tend to take a more analytical approach subjecting each of our foreign policy actions and each of our agreements to thorough scrutiny. The same cannot be said of Soviet journalists. Under present-day

conditions such an attitude, I think, is also essential for us, Deputies.

Answer: I would say euphoria is more typical of Western journalism than of our own. I read all reprints from the foreign press—they have so much to say. As regards our own journalists, they are very careful with their words and sometimes they even contrive not to see things. But then, this is only human. I'm not asking that Soviet journalists begin competing with their Western colleagues in this respect. I even think that our journalists who write on foreign affairs are professionally stronger than their journalist colleagues specializing in other areas. They are most capable. It seems to me that perestroika has already taken them to a new level, and their judgements have become much more interesting and thought-provoking, bringing our public to a better understanding of the essence of our foreign policy and our initiatives and involving it in the discussion of international issues on which different opinions clash the world over. These judgements are also helping people appreciate the significance and depth of the radical turn which has taken place in our foreign policy at the current stage. Summing up, I would say that they are on the right track, and I think this will produce positive results.

Question: Mikhail Sergeevich, you have mentioned the fact that a stereotyped image exists that we have gone too far along the road of disarmament. I personally think we have gone so far in building up arms that we will have to retreat a long way. You have mentioned the West's positive experience and the debates in the US Congress on arms spending. You will, of course, know along with many other people that the Americans are greatly concerned about their new military programmes. It is very prestigious, for instance, to have a bomber like the "Stealth". But, if you don't mind me saying so, going all that way for the sake of prestige, and spending so much money on a "toy" only to reject it later, like we ourselves did with many systems which turned out to be absolutely unnecessary for us in the final count? As the Chairman of the Defence Council, don't you think it is time to discuss our military programmes proceeding

from the real military danger that exists today? That's my first question. I have one more. You have introduced the concept of morality into the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Our resolution—the resolution of the Congress—mentions for the first time the moral aspect of the Soviet Union's foreign policy. Here is my question: There is a phrase in the Soviet-Iranian declaration that “the Soviet side agrees to cooperate with the Iranian side in strengthening its defence capability”. We haven't commented on this phrase anywhere, though you, yourself, realize perfectly that it has provoked many questions and much criticism, to put it mildly, and continues to do so.

Answer: I can judge by the reaction of the hall, which almost burst into applause, that the Deputies here have understood your questions. You have actually suggested an answer to them by the way you put them. I must say the following: we are now elaborating the question of a Defence Council which we all will have to endorse at our autumn session. Then we will be able to discuss these subjects more thoroughly. I can only add that the things you have asked about have been worrying the Soviet leadership for a long time now. Our concern over the rivalry that exists in increasingly new military programmes, based on the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, was one of the things that prompted us to consider new attitudes. It was also one of the imperatives that made us realize the need for a new policy and a new way of thinking. Having raised this question on a theoretical plane, we also had to think about politics. When we finally received the response of our partners in talks (let's not call them adversaries), we found it necessary to start elaborating a new military doctrine—a doctrine based on defence. This, in turn, led us to the need for making considerable changes in the entire profile of our armed forces. All this covers the problems you have mentioned.

So, our Army is destined for deep change. It should be what the situation calls for—an army capable of protecting this country and ensuring its security. In other words, we need a technically and professionally modern army. We have resolutely embarked on the

course of reducing many programmes. Dozens of them have already been curtailed. So, the process is on. But I want to say once again: This process will develop in a way that will ensure the most important thing—security, reliable security for this country. As for the rest, practically speaking, we will need more detailed discussion in the corresponding committee of the Supreme Soviet. When we discuss the formation of the Defence Council at a closed session of this committee, many more details of this problem will have to be gone over. I assure you that there is a lot we have to tell you, and I hope you will have a lot to say and ask.

Now regarding the question of morality, arising in connection with the well-known final document dealing with the meeting in the Soviet Union with Iranian President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. I don't think a policy which is addressed to the world community and calls for rebuilding relations on common sense, cooperation and nuclear arms reduction, completely gets rid of the issue of security. What it does is to put things in a different perspective. However, as far as security is concerned, a specific armament level always exists, sufficient for the purposes of defence. We do sell arms, though less and less, to socialist and other countries. In this particular case a neighbour is involved, with whom we want to develop normal relations. It has turned to us with certain requests for arms supplies to ensure its security. We've taken the known steps. I don't think they contradict our idea of responsibility for the development of international relations in keeping with our own times and towards international normalization and the strengthening, not only the preservation, of peace.

Question: Mikhail Sergeevich, at the UN session you advanced the very interesting idea of setting up an ecological security council. How exactly could this idea be put into effect in Europe in view of our requirement for ecology-related contacts and the requirements common to all Europe?

Answer: I believe it's here in Europe that this idea can most promptly be realized. The formation of a special scientific centre at the USSR Academy of Sciences, for example, caused great interest in Europe,

where support for the idea and even willingness to cooperate have been expressed. The Europeans will need an ecological centre in the very near future. This desire has keynoted all our meetings with leading figures and representatives of the scientific community and the public. I believe it is in Europe more than anywhere else that the idea of ecological cooperation can be brought to fruition.

Question: Esteemed Chairman, as far as I remember you have mentioned, albeit briefly, the possibility of borrowing money from abroad, stating what conditions were involved and how much. Meanwhile, during the break I had a heavy conversation with the finance minister, and it almost became a quarrel. He refuses to disclose how much void money, unbacked by commodities, is being issued daily. This minister, in fact, is capable of destroying all that the Supreme Soviet can do for democratization by emitting 100 million void rubles. I get the impression that the entire financial sphere of our life is being hidden from us and is all out of control.

Answer: The matter you speak of was the key feature at the Congress and in the Supreme Soviet and continues to be the main theme today. The government is doing serious work. On Wednesday Comrade Maslyukov will, following Deputies' requests, report the government's thoughts considering the urgent steps that need to be taken for economic normalization. He is to supply the Deputies with information for consideration during the recess.

You may continue your dispute with the finance minister tomorrow after putting your questions to Comrade Maslyukov.

What I want to say is that by taking credits we are taking on a very great responsibility. I want to emphasize here that it is important not to confuse two things. One is how, and how many credits, we take and whether we size them up with our capabilities. The other thing is how these credits should be used. These two points are essential. As for the volume of credits, we proceed from our basic political principle. It's like this: we must cooperate, take and use credits as all countries do, and we also must repay them. It's up to us to decide.

But, we must make sure that all decisions concerning the Soviet Union are taken in no other place than Moscow. Some countries which have taken credits find themselves in a situation where they are being told how to manage their economy and also how to run their country. I think this is not for us. Such is our principled and basic standpoint. This is open to discussion, if anybody thinks differently. My own opinion is what I've just said. Our country's leadership and our people will, I think, never allow us to get into a foreign policy situation, including credit, where somebody in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or elsewhere is taking the decisions for us. This is out of the question.

Question: Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich, it was noted at the Congress that our international affairs have been developing for the better at a much faster rate than the situation inside the country. Can we, People's Deputies, expect more rapid improvement of the situation inside the country through your thinking?

Answer: Through our thinking, I would say. I also invite everyone not to suspect each other. Let us look for joint solutions using our thinking to things we have felt are necessary to accomplish these past few days. During the election campaign the people gave their strong support to the policy of perestroika, they carried out the campaign in a critical spirit, at the same time raising big demands. Where today's situation is concerned this was manifest in the miners' strikes, in their raising the question of how we should act while implementing the plans of perestroika in the economic sphere. This is our main concern now, I think.

I don't think the Supreme Soviet should panic. It must keep its head—which is exactly what it is doing. We must pool all our intellectual forces and our creative abilities to work out approaches in the economy that will help us solve the tasks demanded of us, particularly when trying to solve financial and market matters. At the same time we must plan ahead and lay the groundwork to enable our economy to become more dynamic and efficient. This is part of our plan. Comrade Maslyukov will report to us tomorrow regarding some urgent matters in this sphere. The rest will be prepared

by the middle of September so that as soon as the Deputies return to Moscow they will be able to join—through the committees and commissions—in the discussion of all questions.

We must bear in mind at all times that behind us is a country with a huge economy, and that ours is a great responsibility. And if anyone thinks that there are simple and easy solutions, I can assure them that such solutions do not exist. And we must pool all our resources and unite in our efforts to find these answers, rather than trying to corner each other, as is sometimes the case with us at this stage of the work of the Supreme Soviet and at the Congress.

I can see that some are making insinuations, overtly or covertly, and trying to call into question the President of the Supreme Soviet's activity. They allege that he is trying to unite things that cannot be united, to put together things that cannot be put together, to couple the right wing with the left wing, and so on. All these are sheer inventions which are not very serious and which point to a lack of in-depth analysis and responsibility. I am confident that we shall unite all the creative forces in the Supreme Soviet in our quest for solutions and answers and in order to work out those solutions which the people expect from us. This is the line that we must take. Yet if we start squabbling in an authoritative body such as this, it will be a disgrace for the Supreme Soviet and our people will never forgive us.

In conclusion, Deputy **Davlatnazar Khudonazarov** said: Mikhail Sergeevich, you have spoken of inter-parliamentary ties and said that we have expanded them. There is something I would like to say. Regrettably, our library and ourselves, in general, have very few books on that subject, not to mention the fact that different people on different commissions possess scattered information. It is very important for us to have a place where we can have access to information so that we can be well prepared. Apart from everything else, we have to state almost daily that we want to know in greater detail how this or that is done in other countries' parliaments. That is why I would like to see the information that research institutes and the

Academy of Sciences possess brought together here in our library.

Mikhail Gorbachev said that he considered this proposal to be most valid and something that should be implemented.

**ВЫСТУПЛЕНИЕ М. С. ГОРБАЧЕВА
НА ПЕРВОЙ СЕССИИ ВЕРХОВНОГО СОВЕТА СССР
по итогам визитов в Великобританию,
Федеративную Республику Германию и во Францию
и об участии в совещании ПКК
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