During the clashes in Haiphong, we captured from the enemy an important circular dated April 10, 1946. The French military commanders were instructed as soon as they were posted to a locality to draw up a security plan for its protection and, above all, a plan for moving forces about the town. These initial plans were to be completed, at the earliest possible opportunity, by a study of various measures aimed at gradually transforming the purely military operational plan into a “scenario for a coup d’Etat”. They should also gather information about the organizations in the town and about our local leaders, their backgrounds, habits, lodgings... and keep them under close and constant watch.
At the same time, disguised special force detachments were to be formed, which would, on order, kidnap or liquidate our men... This secret document revealed the insidious schemes of the French reactionaries and laid their foul behaviour up to now bare.
The attack on Haiphong port, the second largest city in North Viet Nam, by Valluy’s army marked a new stage in the French invasion. Dark clouds were looming up portending a widespread war. On the following days, one incident was quickly succeeded by another, like a chain reaction.
Future historians will dig into those events, make a thorough analysis of the enemy’s objectives and actions and prove beyond doubt our Party’s clear-sighted line as well as its practical and well-timed directives and highlight the ardent patriotism of our people and army and their preparations for a great resistance war. I have no intention of assuming the historian’s role. I will just make a review of the main developments, which are commonly known, and from this background, bring out Uncle Ho’s activities in December 1946, the last month of this greatly significant period.
Morlière’s note, delivered to us on November 28, which evidently bore the character of an ultimatum put forward by the High Command of the French Expeditionary Corps, was unacceptable. And Morlière rejected all negotiations.
Early in December, Sainteny arrived in Hanoi. He went to the Bac Bo palace to pay his respects to President Ho. For the whole of Sainteny’s stay in France, the post of High Commissioner had been in the hands of the military for d’Argenlieu was unwilling to work with those who had been directly involved in the signing of the March 6 Agreement. It was Moutet’s decision in November to send Sainteny back to Indochina. He had been kept in Saigon for a time before being allowed to go on to Hanoi.
President Ho stated that we would stand strictly by the stipulations agreed upon in the September 14 Modus Vivendi. He demanded the return of the French forces to the position they had held before the hostilities. Sainteny promised to send an urgent report home and to inform us of the French government’s latest decisions as soon as he received them.
The French army began to intensify its provocative actions in Hanoi. Bands of red capped Foreign Legionaries roamed Trang Tien Street, looting shops, tearing up the press publications and photos displayed in the Information Centre and even on one occasion snatching off the Vietnamese flag on the wall. French motorcycle patrols rode recklessly through crowded streets. They deliberately brought on road accidents and needled our traffic police. A running jeep suddenly halted. Black-bereted soldiers jumped down, grabbed a passer-by and hauled him up on the car which then rushed into their berracks... the kidnappings which had ended with the repatriation of the Chiang troops were now resumed by the French forces. French soldiers even fired from the upper storeys of their houses on passing trams. French armoured cars rumbled in the streets night and day. Fierce clashes could break out any time.
On December 7, the French army in Haiphong launched a new offensive to force their way to Do Son. They met with a stiff counter attack from us and had to pull back.
On December 8, the French illegally increased their strength in Hai Duong on the Hanoi-Haiphong road.
On December 9, the French illegally landed 800 Foreign Legionaries in Da Nang. President Ho sent a note of protest to d’Argenlieu and the French government.
On December 12, French soldiers attacked our army in Tien Yen and Dinh Lap. In the Northeast the fighting spread.
On December 13, a big French cruiser called at Da Nang.
On December 14, 400 more Foreign Legionairies were sent as reinforcements to Haiphong.
On December 15, AFP reported that a large contingent of French soldiers in Algeria was being rushed to Marseilles to board ships for Indochina.
In view of the way the situation was developing, our Party had foreseen the inevitability of a widespread war. While doing our best to promote the possibility of reconciliation, we stepped up the preparations which had already been started for a protracted national war which would be waged on every front.
On December 7, a correspondent of the newspaper Paris-Saigon had an interview with President Ho. In this, President Ho said: “My compatriots and I sincerely desire peace. We don’t want war and I know that the French people don’t want war either. But if a war is forced on us, we shall fight. The fight will be atrocious, but the Vietnamese people would rather endure all than lose their freedom.”
The French reactionaries’ belligerence in Son La, Lang Son, Haiphong, Kien An had given rise to a movement of protest throughout the country, from North to South. On behalf of its 9 million members, the Viet Minh National Committee sent an open letter to President Ho and the government, urging them to defend national sovereignty resolutely and expressing their readiness to sacrifice their lives to safeguard every inch of the fatherland. Mass organizations of youth, women, teachers... issued appeals calling for their members’ active contribution to the efforts of the entire people to smash the French army’s scheme of aggression.
Such slogans as “The entire people participate in the resistance”, “Ready to wage a long war of resistance”, “Active preparations for the resistance war”, “Resistance means life ; non-resistance death” ... appeared daily in the newspaper Cuu Quoc (National Salvation). Defence committees composed of representatives of the army, civilians and administration were set up in various zones, provinces and towns (later, these became Resistance Committees). Masses of cables from the people in all corners of the country flooded into the capital city, expressing absolute confidence in President Ho and the government and a determination to fight to the end for the defence of the independence and freedom of the fatherland.
Old persons and children began to evacuate Hanoi and other towns garrisoned by French soldiers, in case the enemy suddenly attacked.
By this time, our army had considerably expanded. The National Defence Guard had been strengthened and reorganized into the National Army of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. The first artillery unit had been founded.
In mid-October, our Party had convened a National Military Conference. It had made a thorough analysis of the military situation in the whole country and taken several important decisions in order to heighten the quality and combativeness of the armed forces.
The Party network within the army had been completed before that, the Party Central Committee had set up the Central Military Committee to give leadership to the various armed forces. Now, alongside the establishment of the base areas, Party Committees of the various military zones were formed. More members and cadres from the Party were assigned to work in the army. The system of commander and political officer, both of them sharing the leadership of the unit, was applied throughout the army. There was a political commissar for every military zone, a political officer for every unit from regiment down to platoon level. Organs for political work were also established from the highest to the lowest levels. After some time, Comrade Van Tien Dung was put in charge of political work in the army.
Our Party assumed exclusive leadership of the armed forces and directly led the army. The local Party organizations were leaders of their regional armed forces.
Militia and guerilla forces were consolidated. These had grown considerably and now numbered nearly one million members. The building of fortified villages was pushed forward.
The army and militia forces would be drilling day and night, striving to improve their combat skills and preparing themselves to face any eventuality in the event of an early war.
We had at once drawn experience from the battles fought in Nam Bo, and above all, from the recent engagements in Haiphong and Lang Son, with a view to mapping out a general plan of resistance and directing the war preparations in various regions. We had also planned the destruction of roads and bridges, and the implementation of a “scorched earth” policy. If the enemy widened the war we were determined to leave them nothing.
Many former French factories and workshops were transformed into arms manufacturing plants. Conscious of being new masters of the country, the workers, together with technicians, mostly from the French schools of practical technology, set out energetically to repair damaged rifles and artillery pieces. We also began to manufacture a quantity of the weapons needed for the infantry, ammunition, grenades, mines, anti-tank bombs...
On President Ho’s instructions, the Viet Bac base area had continued to be consolidated. Now, many of our factories and stores were being gradually moved there. He sent Comrade Sao Do (Red Star)1 back to Viet Bac to prepare for the evacuation of the Party and government leading organs whenever necessary.
One day, after a meeting of the government council, when everybody had left, Uncle Ho asked me:
“How long can Hanoi be held, if the enemy widens the war in the North?”
I replied:
“Possibly for a month.”
He again asked:
“What about the other towns?”
“We can hold them more easily.”
“And the countryside?”
“We can surely hold the countryside...”
He pondered for a while and said:
“We shall return to Tan Trao.”
(1) Nguyen Luong Bang.