Unforgettable Days

Võ Nguyên Giáp


Part Two
III


“The revolutionary boat is gliding forward through the reefs.” The statement expressed in the directive on “Situation and Policy” dated March 3 had been proved entirely accurate by what had happened. With the March 6 Agreement, the revolution again came to a turning point. Right after the signing of the Agreement, the Party Bureau met to evaluate the situation and work out new policies.

What causes had led the French to give up the declaration of March 24, 1945 by De Gaulle and sign this Agreement?

First of all it was the strength of our people’s unity and struggle. This was the most decisive factor. Our fight against the Japanese in previous years, the great August general uprising and the heroic resistance in the South during the past six months had led the enemy to realize this new force. Confronted with a whole nation rising up in arms to seize power and fight resolutely for the defence of independence and freedom, even colonialist generals like Leclerc had to think twice before embarking on new military adventures. On the other hand, the difficulties facing French imperialism should be taken into account. The French bourgeoisie had been weakened during the years of the Second World War. Internally they had to deal with the mounting movement of the democratic forces. In Indochina, contradictions between the French and the Chiang clique had tended to diminish on the whole, but still caused misgivings to the French. Such a situation had forced the French to seek a new arrangement with us for the time being.

The March 6 Agreement was only an initial success for us. Negotiations were still going on between us and the French. What were the tasks of the whole Party and people at the present time?

France had not recognized the independence of the Indochinese countries. The national liberation revolution in these countries had not been completed. The goal of the Vietnamese revolution in this stage was still the complete liberation of the motherland, national reunification and consolidation of the Democratic Republic. If the country was to be completely liberated, colonialism had to be opposed. Now that the French government had signed the Preliminary agreement, the situation was somewhat different. As regards tactics, we had to determine the concrete enemy at the time so as to spearhead our attacks on him.

Three months earlier, in the directive “Resistance and National Reconstruction” of November 25, 1945, the Party Central Committee, after giving an analysis of the situation, had pointed out that our main enemy was the French colonialist aggressors. In the new situation, the Party Bureau pointed out that our concrete and immediate enemy at that moment was the French reactionaries. These reactionaries were doing their utmost to destroy the democratic movement in France. They intended to join hands with US and British imperialism to encircle the Soviet Union. They still had plans to re-impose colonialist rule on Indochina. At the moment, they were undermining Viet Nam’s unification and opposing our people’s struggle for complete independence.

After the French had decided to use force to occupy Nam Bo we put forward the policy of establishing a national united front against the French colonialist aggressors. In the new situation, the Front should spearhead its struggle against the French reactionaries.

A number of new slogans were put forward: “Association and equality with the new France”, “Let the peoples of Viet Nam and France unite to oppose the French reactionaries.”

In the military field, we had to maintain and strengthen our force to guard against every eventuality. At the same time we should intensify the struggle on other fronts: political, economic and cultural.

Proceeding from the above tactical reorientation, the Bureau forecast possible developments and set forth various tasks.

It was necessary to explain to the people, widely and deeply, that the signing of the Preliminary Agreement was a correct decision and a success for us. It was also necessary to combat both the idea that the signing was the end of all difficulties and the tendency to slow down preparations for the fight.

We had to guard ourselves against any treachery by the French colonialists. They might refuse to carry out their commitments or distort the contents of the Agreement. It might so happen that, after the landing and stationing of French troops in a number of bases, the colonialists would seek pretexts to attack us in an attempt to overthrow the people’s power. To defend the fruits of the revolution was a basic question of utmost importance. The Bureau stressed that preparations for a protracted resistance war should be continued. In places where French troops were to be stationed, we should keep calm and set up liaison committees to settle problems involving both sides. We should quickly organize and educate the local people so that they would heighten their vigilance, while stepping up propaganda work among French troops so that they would understand the just struggle of our people.

Dealing with the Chiang clique at that time also required great adroitness. The March 6 Agreement has placed them before a new conjuncture. They would realize that they could not maintain their interests in Indochina as before. We should oppose their scheme to prolong their occupation of this country and turn Indochina into a territory under international trusteeship.

Reactionaries in the country were plotting new schemes and new tricks. They were trying hard to distort the significance of the Agreement. They sought to provoke incidents to give the French colonialists a pretext to encroach on our position or denounce what they had signed. The Nationalists in the pay of Chiang wanted to stage a counter-revolutionary putsch. As they were alarmed at the prospect of being left behind by the Chiang clique, we should try to divide their ranks, winning those who had been led astray over to our side. The pro-French traitors might become active and collaborate with the French to undermine our struggle for independence. We should find effective means to prevent them from doing harm to the common cause.

The Bureau pointed out the French colonialists’ dark designs regarding the question of Nam Bo.

They would hold that the March 6 Agreement was applicable only to Bac Bo and a large part of Trung Bo. They would step up the comedy of “demanding self-government” and try to set up a puppet government in Nam Bo with a view to continuing the division of our country and placing us before a fait accompli.

With regard to the referendum in Nam Bo stipulated in the Agreement, they would seek to delay it for a time so that they could suppress the resistance movement and strengthen the forces of the puppet troops and government. In a referendum conducted under the bayonets of the aggressors, our compatriots would not be free to voice their aspirations.

The French would take advantage of the confusion before the ceasefire agreement was fully put into effect in Nam Bo to encroach upon our military positions and attack our political stand. They would try to dishearten our compatriots and create favourable conditions for the reactionaries’ activities.

Our policy was to resolutely demand that the French carry out the ceasefire agreement strictly and recognize the legal status of the Viet Minh in the areas under temporary French occupation pending a formal treaty between us and France. In occupied cities, there would be a strong movement of political struggle for national unification.

The signing of the Preliminary Agreement had brought about a period of detente. We should take the greatest advantage of this valuable time to consolidate and develop our forces in every field as a basis for the long struggle to come.

The above points were set forth in the directive “Make peace in order to advance” by the Standing Bureau of the Central Committee, dated March 9, 1946. The directive concluded:

“Dear comrades,

The Fatherland is facing a difficult time. But the revolutionary boat is gliding forward through the reefs. We have made peace with France to gain time, to preserve our force, to maintain our position so as to advance quickly towards complete independence.”

 


 

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