A great difficulty facing our Party at that time was how to deal with the Allied troops who were coming in to disarm the Japanese army. It was reported that Chiang Kai-shek would send a very large army into the North. Basing itself on the resolution of the Party’s National Conference at Tan Trao, the Standing Bureau of the Party Central Committee had discussed the tactics to use in dealing with Chiang’s men.
We were well aware of the Kuomintang’s designs. They were implacable enemies of the revolution. We had to be vigilant and guard against any attempt by them to overthrow us and replace us by their agents. However, we had to seek a compromise with them, move skilfully and avoid clashes. The new revolutionary power needed time to build up and strengthen its forces. The slogan set forth was “Chinese and Vietnamese are friends”.
It was not at all easy to implement this policy toward the Chiang clique. Educated by the Party, our people had long been aware that our real friends were the Chinese Red Army. Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang troops were the enemy of the Chinese people and revolution. They were also the enemy of the Vietnamese people and revolution and our people had a deep hatred for them. Chiang’s army was also well known for its piratical character. It was certain that after entering our country they would commit acts that might provoke indignation and clashes. The Standing Bureau of the Party Central Committee had to send envoys to the northern provinces to help the local leaders explain the Party’s views to the cadres and people before the arrival of the Chiang troops.
After the capitulation of the Japanese, Ha Ung Kham (Ho Yin Chin) Chief of Staff of the Chinese Kuomintang Army, a notorious anti-Communist, urged Lu Han to bring his troops into North Viet Nam as soon as possible. The plan for the entry of Chinese troops into Viet Nam had been prepared long before. The Kuomintang militarists had believed that it would be a very good opportunity for them to annex North Viet Nam and had expected that at least they would be able to establish a puppet administration north of the 16th parallel which would obey their orders.
They had got ready the cards in their hand, consisting in their Vietnamese agents in China, such as Nguyen Hai Than, Vu Hong Khanh, Nguyen Tuong Tam, etc. Those belonged to two organizations: the Viet Nam Cach Mang Dong Minh Hoi (Viet Nam Revolutionary Alliance) and the Viet Nam Quoc Dan Dang (Viet Nam Nationalist Party). They had been living in exile for a long time and did not possess any links with the revolutionary movement in the country. They styled themselves Vietnamese patriots devoted to nationalism, but were in fact a group of reactionaries trying to feather their own nests by relying on the Chinese Kuomintang and the Chiang troops. As the latter marched into Viet Nam from two directions, they followed them in two groups.
Because of sloppy organization, insufficient transport means, absence of logistical units, and the pressganging which accompanied their march, the Chiang troops were moving at a slow pace.
From Yunnan, the 93rd corps of Lu Han’s First Army was to follow the Red River up to Hanoi but by the end of August they had only reached Lao Cai. From Kwangsi the 62nd corps of the Kuomintang central troops, headed by General Tieu Van (Siao Wen) was to reach Hanoi through Lang Son and Cao Bang provinces but they crossed the border only in early September.
Two other corps, the 52nd of the Chiang central troops and the 60th of the Yunnan forces would follow and go to Haiphong, Vinh and Da Nang.
All told, 180,000 Chiang troops were to enter North Viet Nam. The Yunnan forces were disease-ridden and poorly trained. The Central troops were stronger and better organized. All four corps were put under the command of General Lu Han. Tieu Van, one of Truong Phat Khue’s (Chang Fa Kwei) assistants, a veteran Viet Nam watcher, was entrusted by the Kuomintang militarists with political manipulations in North Viet Nam. It was at Lang Son on his arrival with the 62nd corps that Nguyen Hai Than learnt that the Provisional Government of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam had made its appearance before a million people in Hanoi. The command of the 62nd corps wanted to disarm our armed forces in Lang Son and Cao Bang but the latter wouldn’t let them. Then they ordered their troops to occupy the Liberation Army’s barracks while followers of the Revolutionary Alliance (Viet Nam Cach Mang Dong Minh Hoi) backed by the Chiang troops, occupied the offices of the provincial People’s Committee.
To avoid major clashes, the Administrative Committee, mass organizations and armed forces of Lang Son province moved out to the surrounding areas. The people immediately carried out the slogan: “Empty houses and empty gardens”. Lang Son town was deserted.
Unable to muster enough people to hold even a small rally for Nguyen Hai Than, the Revolutionary Alliance gang had leaflets printed and scattered all over the empty town of Lang Son protesting against the Viet Minh’s establishment of the provisional Government and making 13 charges against the Ho Chi Minh Government.
Meanwhile the Nationalist Party headed by Vu Hong Khanh and Nguyen Tuong Tam were following the 93rd corps into Viet Nam. Relying on the Chiang troops they attempted to overthrow the people’s power in the localities they passed through. They set up offices, assembled reactionaries and harassed, looted and murdered the people. Long Van’s (Lung Yun) undisciplined troops were no different from their henchmen and acted like bandits.
Clashes between our armed forces and the Chiang troops took place in some regions where the necessary instructions from the Government had not yet been received.
In order to avoid such confrontations with the Chiang troops, administrative offices and army units were ordered to move out of some towns and provincial capitals in the border region and along the Lao Cai—Hanoi railways.
In the first half of September nearly 200,000 Chiang troops swept over the North like a plague. With them were their agents, mad with frustration at the failure of their schemes. Faced with powerful revolutionary forces and a State with a firm political basis and wholehearted popular support these henchmen of the Kuomintang became even more brazen and exposed themselves all the more as traitors with no roots in the nation and dependent on foreign reactionary troops.
On September 11, General Lu Han flew to Hanoi.
A few days later long communiqués appeared everywhere. The Kuomintang troops acted as if they had come to a country without any administration. They arrogated to themselves the right to keep order in the capital. They fixed the exchange rates of Kuomintang banknotes which had long ago lost all value. They even made announcements on traffic regulations.
A few days after Lu Han’s arrival, Alessandri also appeared in Hanoi. How did this general, the former commander of the French Foreign Legionaries in Tonkin, who had fled with his troops to Kunming following the Japanese coup of March 9, manage to turn up here? On this score Chiang-French collusion needed to be elucidated.