As has been revealed by the Cach Mang Quoc Gia, this is regarded by the south Viet Nam ruling circles as ‘the biggest work in the year’.
In accordance with the scheduled plan:
a) South Viet Nam was divided into several zones which were in their turn subdivided into operational sectors
In 1959 and 1960, the south Viet Nam administration divided south Viet Nam into several zones for the purpose of the repression: West and East Nam Bo, the Plain of Reeds (Nam Bo); the provinces of the High Plateaus, the Western part of Quang Tri, Thua Thien, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai provinces (Trung Bo), etc. Each zone which included one or several provinces was divided into several operational sectors under the authority of the chief of the province, with special sectors being established at key points. As early as at the beginning of 1959, the south Viet Nam ruling circles declared: “If we have enough forces and troops, we shall carry out the plan simultaneously throughout the country. Otherwise, we shall delimit a few particular zones...” That is why after the division of the territory into sectors, the ‘radiating tactics’ were applied sometimes in one sector, sometimes simultaneously in several sectors. Operations of reprisals succeeded one another without interruption in East and West Nam Bo, in the Plain of Reeds, in Quang Ngai, Pleiku, Kontum, etc.
b) The south Viet Nam authorities “combined all military and paramilitary forces into a single bloc operating together under a common plan, and actively working under the leadership of a central body”
During the operations of reprisals launched against former resistance members, the south Viet Nam authorities have mobilized the regular army: the infantry, the paratroops, the artillery, the marines, the air force, the Navy and the commandos. Mention should also be made of other armed organizations such as the militia, the civil guard, the police and the organizations of the ‘Cong Dan Vu’. In important zones, ‘delegates of the Government’ have been appointed with full powers to make use of the military forces, the police and the civil guard within the area under their authority, for instance, late Tang Van Chi in East Nam Bo, Nguyen Van Vang in West Nam Bo, Ngo Dinh Can in Trung Bo, etc. Each mopping-up operation involved 10,000 to 15,000, and sometimes 20,000 men, counting only regular troops. General Myers, deputy-chief of M.A.A.G., revealed part of the truth on the participation of the Ngo Dinh Diem regular forces in the operations of reprisals when he said:
“The major part of the Army and a considerable part of the Navy were involved in non-coordinated operations... If I remember well, out of 10 divisions, six were thrown into the fighting, 13 local regiments were put into action to a greater or lesser extent, over half of the logistic services participated in the operations, with the support of the entire river forces of the Navy” (1).
In practice, the following units participated in the mopping-up operations launched by the regular army in 1959 and 1960:
- The 1st division commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Nguyen Duc Thang.
- The 2nd division commanded by Colonel Duong Ngoc Lam.
- The 5th division commanded by Colonel Nguyen Van Chuan.
- The 7th division commanded by Colonel Huynh Van Cao.
- The 21st division commanded by Colonel Tran Thien Khiem.
- The 22nd division commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Nguyen Huu Tri.
- The 23rd division commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Tran Thanh Phong.
c) And persons labelled Viet Cong were ‘wiped out just as in a state of war’
1. The south Viet Nam armed forces carried out mopping-up operations sector by sector
It may be said that all hamlets have been the scenes of repeated raids. A number of areas were mopped up with unimaginable violence. For instance, in May 1959, Long My district (Can Tho) was subjected to 800 operations involving from one group to three battalions (not counting 100 commando operations). In Tay Ninh and Quang Ngai provinces, scores of raids were launched against a number of localities such as Soc Ky, Trai Bi, the districts of Tra Bong, Ba To and Son Ha.
2. The people were massacred by all means, irrespective of age or sex
Generally speaking, rifles, automatic weapons, and guns have been used everywhere in mopping-up operations. But subsequently, and especially since the operation launched in the eastern part of Bien Hoa, the south Viet Nam authorities have used military planes to drop explosive, incendiary, and even napalm bombs. In the first half of 1959, only Ta Lai, Cao Lanh, and Moc Hoa were air-bombed, but since the end of 1959, the number of areas strafed and bombed by military planes has been increasing... In October, November and December 1960 alone, more than 90 localities in 16 provinces of south Viet Nam were subjected to air raids: Ca Mau, Chau Doc, Tra Vinh (Vinh Binh), Phong Thanh (Kien Phong), Sa Dec, Rach Gia, Moc Hoa (Kien Tuong), Kontum, Pleiku, Bien Hoa, My Tho, Bac Lieu, Can Tho, Ben Tre, Quang Nam, Quang Ngai... The persons who could escape from the bombs, but not from the agents of the ‘Cong Dan Vu’ and the commandos, were atrociously tortured, beheaded and disembowelled. Entire villages were razed to the ground, and all inhabitants who fell into the authorities’ hands were killed. Such was the case in Da Ban hamlet, Binh Dinh (province): all houses and crops were burnt down; 31 persons (including 12 children and 14 women) who could not run away, were locked up in a house, and burnt alive. In Kon Ma Ha village (High Plateaus) not a single house was left standing after an air-raid.
It is worth mentioning that troops have been encouraged by the authorities to commit all these horrible crimes.
The delegate of the ‘government’ or the chief of staff, the Assistant Secretary for Defence or Ngo Dinh Diem himself were present wherever fierce operations were carried out. During the mopping-up operations launched in the eastern part of Bien Hoa in early 1959, Ngo Dinh Diem came in person to confer medals on individuals and commando-units who had recorded ‘achievements’. In the massacre at Long Phu island, when urged by Father Le Huu Phuoc from Rach Trang church not to kill innocent people, the officer commanding the operation gave the following reply: “We are acting on President Ngo’s orders. Approach him, please, if you like.”
3. The people’s property and crops were plundered or destroyed
Paddy, rice, fowls and pigs were not only taken away, but also burnt or killed. Other property was also plundered. What was not taken away was burnt down or destroyed. Crops were destroyed, trees cut down, and fruit gathered. In the mopping-up operation launched in the western districts of Quang Ngai province, local people lost hundreds of tons of paddy, and hundreds of tons of cinnamon (cinnamon is produced in great quantity in this region). These lootings and destructions are by no means to be considered as isolated acts committed by a number of officers and men. Ordered by the authorities, they were part of the plan for mopping-up operations to deprive the people of their means to earn a living, and to drive them into a cul de sac with a view to facilitating the recruitment, either by force or by persuasion, of manpower and soldiers, and compelling the people to come to ‘agricultural settlements’.
The persons labelled ‘Viet Cong’ were not only treated just as in a ‘state of war’. In fact, at certain moments, their situation was even worse than during hostilities because war is not in itself an excuse for ferocious massacres of innocent people.
(1) Times of Viet Nam (Saigon), October 3, 1959 issue.
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