With over ten organizations empowered to arrest and torture the people, the south Viet Nam administration is well-known as a ‘police regime’. But, from early 1959, this police regime became extremely despotic. The ruling circles advocated a tightening of the surveillance on patriots, and first of all, former resistance members. For this purpose, they mainly applied the following measures:
In addition to the existing functions of ‘member in charge of the police’, the south Viet Nam administration has created within communal councils the posts of ‘member in charge of political affairs’, ‘member in charge of information’ and ‘member in charge of the youth’ to take up the ‘security work’. Thus, at the communal level, besides the ‘member in charge of the police’ and the ‘special secret agents posted in the village’, there are many other agents entrusted with the task of keeping a vigilant watch over the people. Besides, the authorities have been actively training communal police agents. According to official documents published by them, up to the end of 1959, the Security Training Centre at Vung Tau trained 860 members in charge of the police for the communes.
In each province, besides the deputy-chief in charge of administrative affairs, there is another deputy responsible for ‘internal security’. The number of provinces placed under the authority of south Viet Nam army officers is increasing; in other words, the administrative apparatus is being more and more ‘militarised’. To mention only the figures for 1959, 39 new officers on active service have been appointed to administrative posts in the 38 provinces of south Viet Nam. According to still incomplete data, by the end of 1960, in the south Viet Nam administrative apparatus there were 14 chiefs of province, 22 deputy-chiefs, and 67 chiefs of district chosen from among officers on active service.
The network of ‘inter-families’ is an organization set up by the south Viet Nam authorities for surveillance purposes. Families are obliged not only to declare the number of their members, the names and surnames as well as the profession of the latter, and of visitors as well, but also regularly to write down on the front wall of their houses the numbers of persons who are in or out, they are organized into groups of five headed by a chief of group appointed by the administration; groups are organized into inter-groups. Thus, a real network envelopes the entire population of the towns, and the situation of each family at any time is closely followed up. The establishment of the network of ‘inter-families’ has been speeded up since early 1959. For instance, Saigon city with its 41 quarters is to be organized into 850 inter-groups including 10,687 ‘inter-families’. According to official documents published by the south Viet Nam administration, by the end of May, 1960, 6,040 ‘inter-families’ had been set up in Saigon, making 56 per cent of the planned total.
Another measure actively applied by the authorities in the ‘maintenance of order’ is the use of hooligans. In an attempt to deceive public opinion, their propaganda (the Cach Mang Quoc Gia for instance...) labels them as ‘persons who entertain boiling hatred of the communists’. They are appointed to ‘communal’ councils. A number of them committed such horrible crimes that the local population gave them the nickname of ‘Ac on’ (cruel notables). Chased out of the villages, many such agents did not dare to come back. It is precisely this popular indignation which prevented the Ngo Dinh Diem administration from appointing its ‘Ac on’ to all communal councils. Up to the end of December, 1959, the percentage of ‘Ac on’, who were members of communal councils amounted to only 10 per cent.
The same elements are widely resorted to in the operations of reprisals launched against former resistance regions. They are gathered together into a special armed organization dubbed ‘commando detachment’. This organization is precisely what the Cach Mang Quoc Gia while outlining its ‘radiating tactics’ called ‘the mobile groups specializing in guerilla, encirclements and raids’ (1). These units have been trained by the U.S. adviser of M.A.A.G. in the Commando Training Centre at Nha Trang. Trained and encouraged by the U.S.-Diem clique, the commandos behave as beasts. They no longer had anything in common with man. During a mopping-up operation launched in Ca Mau region, one of them publicly boasted to be ‘the most cruel man in Indo-China’. Perhaps he wanted to say that he was even more cruel than the commando ‘Hum-Xam’ (literally: grey tiger) commanded by Captain Vandenberg in the recent war of aggression against Viet Nam.
Along with the establishment and the consolidation of the surveillance network, the south Viet Nam authorities proclaimed a so-called ‘policy of the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam towards former resistance members’ (2).
For the purposes of this policy, the south Viet Nam ruling circles drew a distinction between:
- former resistance members ‘recognized as such’
- former resistance members ‘not recognized as such’.
Former resistance members who were ‘not recognized as such’ were classified into the category of ‘Viet Cong saboteurs’.
This differentiation constituted in itself a flagrant violation of Article 14 (c) of the Geneva Agreement concerning Viet Nam. Firstly, people who are not ‘recognized as former resistance members’ are, first of all, former resistance members. Secondly, Article 14 (c) must obviously be applied to all persons who collaborated in any way with one of the parties during the war, irrespective of political affiliation, social origin and religious creed. Discrimination to any extent or under any form whatsoever is completely at variance with Article 14 (c) of the Geneva Agreement.
Nevertheless, the south Viet Nam administration established a differentiation of former resistance members to classify them into the category of ‘Viet Cong saboteurs’. The ‘policy towards former resistance members’ clearly stipulates:
“The Government of the Republic of Viet Nam (i.e. south Viet Nam) is determined to punish the Viet Cong saboteurs. For this purpose, the National Assembly passed and the President promulgated law 10-59 on May 6, 1959.”
Therefore the differentiation of ‘former resistance members’ under this policy was precisely designed to persecute them, and to “punish them with determination”.
The so-called ‘policy towards former resistance members’ was part of the ruling circles’ manœuvres aimed at arresting, torturing, jailing, deporting, and massacring mercilessly former resistance members in south Viet Nam. In practice, basing themselves on it, and relying in particular on the services of security and secret information the communal authorities worked out lists of persons to be arrested or murdered secretly during operations involving the regular army, militia forces, or ‘commandos’.
These facts brought to light the meaning of the sentence deliberated vague: “Census registers are to be duly established in villages and districts”. Such was the wording used by the Cach Mang Quoc Gia when it outlined the things to be done by the authorities before carrying into effect the ‘radiating tactics’.
In short, the consolidation of the security services as well as the so-called ‘policy towards former resistance members’ in south Viet Nam were but manœuvres to tighten the watch over former resistance members, and to carry out reprisals against them.
(1) Cach Mang Quoc Gia (Saigon), March 6, 1959 issue.
(2) This policy was announced on August 25, 1959.
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