Since the International Commission assumed the responsibility of supervising and controlling the implementation of the Geneva Agreements concerning Viet Nam, it has instituted, in terms of Article 37 of the Agreement on the Cessation of hostilities in Viet Nam, the practice of investigations both documentary and on the spot to bring violations to light. But since that very day, whenever the Commission decided to carry out investigations into any case in south Viet Nam, the authorities there always tried by every means to hamper and sabotage the enquiries. They refused to produce witnesses and documents required by the Commission, imposed restrictions on the investigation teams’ movements, committed violent actions against the V.P.A. liaison officers, and even the Commission’s teams, threatened the witnesses, and took reprisals against them. They went so far as to stage investigations by false teams with a view to finding out which witnesses would speak against them, and what they would say; by so doing, they aimed at persecuting such witnesses before the arrival of the true team of the Commission. Besides, they attempted to annul the validity of Article 14 (c) of the Geneva Agreement concerning Viet Nam by limiting it within the 300-day period; such interpretation was a brazen distortion of the Geneva Agreements, and was rejected by the International Commission.
Nothing is more illustrative than to let the International Commission itself point out the south Viet Nam authorities’ manœuvres to restrict and hinder its activities in this field.
— With regard to the investigation by Mobile Team 24 into the reprisals against Mr. Tran Het at Ky Lam commune, Dien Ban district, Quang Nam province, the Commission concluded that:
“1. French liaison officer expressed inability to produce witnesses.
2. Chief of province refused to give guarantee that no reprisals would be taken against witnesses. Some local authorities refused to give evidence.
3. Security of V.P.A. liaison officers threatened.
Demonstration against team and V.P.A. liaison officers.
Withdrawn by the Commission due to lack of co-operation of local authorities and lack of security arrangement for the team and V.P.A. liaison officers without completing all of its tasks.”
(Ref. Fourth Interim Report of the International Commission in Viet Nam to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, appendix V, paragraph 33).
— With regard to the investigation by Mobile Team 26 into the burying alive of Mr. Vo Luong (Binh Dinh province) the Commission gave the following finding:
“Due to lack of security arrangements, team stayed in Nha Trang and went daily to the scene of the incident. There were demonstrations against the team and the presence of V.P.A. liaison officers.”
(Ref. Fourth Interim Report, appendix V, paragraph 35).
— With regard to the investigation by Mobile Team 57 into acts of reprisals perpetrated in Quang Tri, the Commission recorded the following:
“Not enough security arrangements on first day of investigation. An angry crowd surrounded the team but the team managed to get away.”
(Ref. Fourth Interim Report, appendix V, paragraph 37).
— With regard to the investigation by Mobile Team 61 in Tam Ky (Quang Nam province), the Commission recorded that:
“From the date the Commission asked for concurrence to the date the team was recalled, there was a total delay of 97 days. Team unable to make any investigation.”
(Ref. Fourth Interim Report, appendix V, paragraph 38).
— With regard to the investigation by Mobile Team F. 29 (Cap St Jacques) into arrests and reprisals denounced by the inhabitants of Hiep Hoa, the Commission recorded that:
“A number of witnesses prevented by soldiers from appearing before the team.”
(Ref. Fourth Interim Report, appendix V, paragraph 25, heading: ‘Mobile elements of fixed team’).
The International Commission has been meeting with ever-increasing difficulties in the supervision and control of the implementation of Article 14 (c) in south Viet Nam:
“In the Sixth Interim Report, the Commission had informed the Co-Chairmen of its difficulties in the supervision of the implementation by the parties of the provisions of Article 14 (c). Those difficulties have persisted and increased as the Commission has not received the necessary assistance and co-operation from the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam and has, therefore, not been able to supervise the implementation of Article 14 (c) in accordance with the Geneva Agreement.”
(Ref. IC letter No IC-ADM-VI-DI-57 dated April 11, 1957, to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference).
“The difficulties with regard to supervision and control of the execution of Article 14 (c) in the Republic of Viet Nam mentioned in the Sixth Interim Report, have persisted and increased.’
(Ref. Seventh Interim Report of the International Commission to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, chapter III, paragraph 19).
During the period under report there was no change in the stand of the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam with regard to Article 14 (c), as mentioned in the Seventh Interim Report.”
(Ref. Eighth Interim Report of the International Commission to the co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, chapter III, paragraph 14).
During the period under report there was no change in the stand of the Government of the Republic of Viet Nam with regard to Article 14 (c) as reported to the Co-Chairmen separately and as mentioned in paragraph 19 of the Seventh Interim Report.”
(Ref. Ninth Interim Report of the International Commission to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, chapter III, paragraph 11) (1).
Despite such restrictions and hindrances by the south Viet Nam administration, after investigations into a small number of cases, the International Commission recorded that in 42 cases (involving 2,749 persons arrested, wounded, or murdered) the south Viet Nam administration had taken reprisals against former resistance members, thereby seriously violating Article 14 (c) of the Geneva Agreement.
Such a situation has only increased the south Viet Nam administration’s apprehension about the International Commission’s investigations; that is why, since mid 1956, it has not allowed any team of the Commission to investigate into cases of terror and reprisal in south Viet Nam. At present, the following teams, the despatch of which has been decided by the Commission, are still unable to go to south Viet Nam to carry out their missions:
— Mobile Team 90: murder of one, arrest of 23 and detention of 14 former resistance members, in Huong Tra district, Thua Thien province.
— Mobile Team 93: massacre at Huong Dien (Huong Hoa district), reprisals against former resistance members at Huong Hoa district, and massacre at A Luoi (Phong Dien district) resulting in 31 adults and two children killed. All these localities belong to Quang Tri province.
— Mobile Team 105: enquiries into a number of concentration camps in Thua Thien province (Dai Loc, Pho Trach, Cho Niu, Con Ong Cai, Dong Hy, and Trach Hoa).
— Mobile Team 117: burying alive of 21 former resistance members at Cho Duoc, reprisals against 44 persons in Tan Luu and An Tra villages, murder of six former resistance members in Thang Binh districts. All these localities belong to Quang Nam province.
— Mobile Team 121: arrest and detention of eight former resistance members in the prisons of Cap St Jacques and Xuyen Moc (Baria province).
— Mobile Team 122: arrest of three former resistance members in Saigon.
— Mobile Team 123: murder of Professor Nguyen Thi Dieu.
— Mobile Team 87: cases of reprisals in the Demilitarized Zone.
— Mobile Team 85: arrest and torturing of 79 former resistance members in Hong Ngu district, Chau Doc province.
— Mobile Team 104: massacre of three families of former resistance members at Gia Rai (Bac Lieu province).
A number of teams were withdrawn without completing their enquiries owing to difficulties encountered in south Viet Nam: Mobile Teams 24, 61; in particular Mobile Team 103 had to give up its enquiries on the massacre in Duy Xuyen, Quang Nam province.
In spite of all attempts to hinder the enquiries by the International Commission, and to annul the validity of Article 14 (c) with a view to evading its binding force, the south Viet Nam authorities have been strongly condemned by public opinion and so far, the validity of Article 14 (c) continues to be recognized. Therefore they raised the question of so-called ‘subversive activities’ and repeatedly tried to bring pressure to bear on the International Commission so that the latter recognized this question as attracting the Geneva Agreements (although there is no relevant provision in the Geneva Agreements). By so doing, they aim at interpreting reprisals against former resistance members as ‘punitive measures’ against ‘subversive activities’, thus using the question of ‘subversive activities’ to annul the validity of Article 14 (c), and at the same time, to slander the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam.
(1) Fourth Interim Report covering the period from April 11, 1955, to August 10, 1955.
Sixth Interim Report covering the period from December 11, 1955, to July 31, 1956.
Seventh Interim Report covering the period from August 1, 1956, to April 30, 1957.
Eighth Interim Report covering the period from May 1, 1957, to April 30, 1958.
Ninth Interim Report covering the period from May 1, 1958, to January 31, 1959.
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