Fellow Countrymen,
On the second of September 1945, in the presence of half a million compatriots of the capital, and others listening throughout the country on the radio, the first PROVISIONAL DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT OF VIET NAM presented itself to the nation. On that occasion, President HO CHI MINH solemnly proclaimed to the world the right to freedom and independence of the VietNam Republic.
Since then, one year has passed, one year of fighting and reconstruction. Since then, the world has made new strides forward. In Asia, the disarmament of the Japanese has been completed. China has restored her capital at Nankin; Korea has obtained a Provisional Government of her own; the Philippines have won independence; India has set up her first Provisional Government; Indonesia is still fighting valiantly in the same cause. The European nations are engaged in the task of consolidating Democracy. Meanwhile the UNO is meeting and the Peace Conference is going on. These are some striking factors of the postwar period in the general world movement for the establishment of democracy and peace.
In the present state of the world, the problem of liberation of colonies or semi-colonies has become a most important one. The great nations must consider and solve this problem either by mutual agreement with the natives of the colonies or by repression. That it so say the policy of the dominant powers may be either liberal or reactionnary; it is impossible to conceive that they should not consider the rising tide of democracy all over the world and the growing struggle for independence on the part of all oppressive nations.
In this complex state of affairs, the Great War has come to an end but so far peace has by no means been restored everywhere. Fascism has been crushed but many nations which from the beginning shared in the fight against Fascist aggression are still far from being liberated. The struggle for democracy and independence is not only political but military as well. In these circumstances the Republic of VietNam is still fighting for independence and simultaneously rebuilding its national economy.
In order that we shall be able more clearly to understand the principles of action which have brought us the successes of last year, I shall set forth to you
It is most important and urgent for us after our Declaration of Independence to protect the freedom and democratic rights of our people. We fought the Japanese aggression alone for several years. We have from the start consistently aligned ourselves in the ranks of those nations who have always opposed aggression. Our provisional Government still maintains the same policy of friendship and cooperation with all the Allies.
In regard to China, when her troops occupied Northern VietNam down to the 16th latitude, our Provisional Government as much as possible maintained the same friendly relations with them. It contributed to their communications, conveyance, revictualling, and facilitated the disarmament of the Japanese troops. The Chinese troops on their part proved themselves worthy of this assistance and always respected our Government. Indeed President CHIANG had many a time declared himself a sympathiser with the liberation movement of VietNam. The Sino-VietNam diplomatic ties based from time immemorial on similar geographic, economic, and cultural factors indeed became even faster. To-day our Government and people sincerely thank President Chiang, the leader of 450 million of Chinese people, together with General LU HAN and all top-ranking officers and officials of the Chinese occupation forces.
In the Southern part of our country, from the 16th latitude down, the British forces which undertook the task of disarming the Japanese soldiers were, at the very beginning, welcomed by our Government, and afterwards, in spite of all that happened* our Government continued to maintain a most conciliatory attitude. I believe the British authorities recognize this.
However, on September 23rd last year war burst out in Nam-bo.** The incidents in this war, no VietNamese can ever forget. They constitute a bloody yet glorious period in our struggle for national independence but at the same time, as an eminent Frenchman has admitted, they do not in the least redound to the credit or glory of France. I am sure that all French people who have the interests of freedom and peace close at heart will endorse that opinion.
In Nambo, we were not so well prepared politically or militarily. Politically since the savage French reprisals back in 1940, the national movement in Nambo had not as yet been completely reconstituted in spite of the efforts of our patriots. And militarily, the larger part of our southern army had just begun to be set up with lack of arms, lack of officers, lack of experience, and lack of troops, barely 2/10ths of those in Bacbo and Trungbo.
Strategically, Nambo is a flat region of ricefields, convenient for a mechanized army but not at all adapted for guerilla tactics. Even under such unfavourable conditions, our troops while fighting were still being organized, and our military staffs were still going on with the work of training. At the same time, we went on unifying our army and our political forces in general, eradicating all regional spirit and all other symptoms of disunion.
Thus, under the direct leadership of the Committee of War and the People’s Committee of Nambo, with its Regional Committee, the determined resistance of Nambo rendered abortive the military schemes of several French generals who had been victorious on European or African fronts. The heroic resistance of the citizens of Saigon and Nbatrang as well as our guerilla forces and “irregulars” in Nambo will, for ever, serve as shining examples of the bravery and spirit of self-sacrifice of the children of Viet Nam.
The foregoing successes are due to the following facts:
we are fighting in a just cause for the defence of our country;
our troops have learnt to practice guerilla tactics, to change the pitched battle strategy into mobile operations, and to understand the importance of the “terre brulee” (scorched earth tactics);
our struggle has the full spiritual and material support of the whole nation;
and last but not least we have the splendid leadership of President HO CHI MINH in whom the whole people have implicit faith and confidence.
So, the struggle for Independence which started in Bacbo, continues in Nambo. Our future destiny demands that the entire nation sacrifice their all for their ancestral land and fight together till we have forged together such a firm and united national mind that no force will be able to break it.
When Nambo was fighting, the whole nation warmly supported it. The Provisional Government planned for a long drawn-out struggle, training up officers and troops, reorganizing the fighting forces, increasing production of weapons, amassing and keeping in reserve foodstuffs for the army and consolidating “self defence” and “irregular” organizations. The fighting spirit of the people was exalted to its highest pitch. Regional Resistance Committees were established throughout Bacbo and Trungbo of VietNam.
On March 2nd 1946, the National Assembly held its first and extraordinary session, and immediately adjourned in order to allow its representatives to return home to prepare for resistance. The Coalition Government of Resistance was formed. The National Committee of Resistance was set up. The tide of resistance reached its highest point throughout the whole country in view of the threatened spread of the war from Nambo to Bacbo and Trungbo.
The Preliminary Agreement* equitably adjusted the demands on both sides. It was advantageous to France for though at that time the Sino-French Agreement had been signed permitting the replacement of Chinese occupation forces by the French, yet the political and military future of France in the Far-East would still have been hanging in the balance if hostilities had extended to Trungbo and Bacbo. The Preliminary Agreement was advantageous to us too. The French recognition of the Republic of VietNam marked a success for us in the international sphere. In addition, by averting war, we were now enabled to concentrate our energies on the tasks of peaceful reconstruction.
The Preliminary Agreement also recognized the Sino-French settlement already referred to. Our delicate relations with France had moved on from the military to the diplomatic plane, with corresponding adjustments in our policy.
Since the Preliminary Agreement was signed, six months have passed away, during which time the VietNam-French accord has borne some results. It paved the way successfully for the interview of Halong Bay, the friendly visit by the delegation of our National Assembly to the French Government and people, the Preliminary Conference of Dalat and the present negotiations at Fontainebleau. As a result of our first delegation sent by our National Assembly to Paris, French opinion began to discern the truth about new VietNam. As an outcome of the Franco-VietNam conference of Dalat where the view-points of both sides were set forth both frankly and sincerely, the way was open for resumption of definite negotiations in France.
In spite of all these preliminary efforts, even while all the negotiations detailed above were going on, the hostilities, far from ending in Nambo, were extended still further to the Highlands of Trungbo. Such puppet bodies like the “CochinChina Consultative Council” and the “Republic of Free CochinChina” were set up by the French in Nambo to be followed after by the setting up of yet another French puppet body, the so-called Federal Conference of Dalat. Such proceedings, contrary to the spirit of the Preliminary Agreement, should never even have been thought of. Leave alone the provocative French acts which happened simultaneously in Bacbo despite the more peaceful atmosphere prevailing there.
All these factors greatly hindered the attempt at rapprochement between France and VietNam and were the cause partly of the interruption of the negotiations in Fontainebleau.
To-day, having an opportunity to review the past French-VietNam relations, we do not hesitate to declare that, while the whole French-VietNam problem could have been settled by diplomacy, to attempt to decide points between the two nations by violence as in Nambo, as elsewhere, is a short-sighted policy counter to the fundamental interests of both nations. Such a policy is doomed to failure.
The facts of the last six months have proved this contention. Our national forces and “irregulars” in Nambo far from being annihilated are becoming stronger, more experienced and more cohesive. The inhabitants of Nambo, despite aerial bombing, machine-gunning, shelling, concentration camps and extermination goals not only refuse to submit to violence but band themselves together side by side with our troops, proclaiming themselves more faithful than ever to our Democratic Government and to their Fatherland. Out of 21 provinces in Nambo, 20 still retain their own People’s Committees under the control of the “People’s Head Committee” of Nambo. Facts prove that Nambo is always VietNam and can never be otherwise.
In the present state of Franco-VietNam relations, although we may not be too optimistic, we still hope that the responsible French authorities over here will consider the situation with clearsightedness, in the light of the fundamental interests of both nations, and will be fair enough to respect the Preliminary Agreement. Under such conditions only, can a lasting cooperation between the two nations be realized. We also hope that they will understand our fundamental political stand in Fontainebleau, that it is legitimate and that the French Government will, in agreement with our delegates, resolve all the fundamental differences between the two nations, so that the interrupted negotiations may be resumed.* Only thus, can be dispelled the suspicion throughout the country that the French Government is purposely dragging out the Conference at Fontainebleau in order to gain time for a “fait accompli”.
* Occupation by force of Saigon by the French backed by British bayonets on Sept 23rd, 1945.
** See map of VIETNAM page 10 (Editor’s note).
* Signed between France and VietNam representatives at Hanoi on March 6th 1946 (Editor’s note)
* A provisional Agreement has been reached on Sept. 14, 1946 between President HO CHI MINH and Mr. Marius Moutet, French Minister of Colonies. The negotiations are scheduled to be resumed only on January 1947. See also foot note, page 21. (Editor’s note)