Source: International Socialist Review, April, 1910. Vol. X, No. 10.
Transcription and Markup: Bill Wright for the Marxists Internet Archive, September, 2022
The talk of a Labor Party would not down. Notwithstanding the assurances recently given us by persons presumably in a position to know that there is no Labor Party in sight, the discussion still continues both within and without the party. And for very good reasons: it represents the general feeling of unrest now prevailing in the labor movement of this country. In my articles on the “Political Situation in the United States and the Socialist Party.” (The New York Call, October 24 and 31, 1909.)[a] I have shown that the political situation in this country has become so acute, owing to the ruthless war carried on by the capitalist class through the judicial department of our government against every manifestation of independence on the part of the working class and every measure of amelioration which it may wring from its masters, that the time has come for a strong revolutionary movement embracing the entire working class, or at least that portion thereof which is organized into trades-unions and who are directly and immediately affected by the intolerable tyranny of our courts. I have there also endeavored to point out wherein our methods of propaganda have failed until now, and that it is incumbent upon the Socialist Party to point the way and take the lead in this revolutionary movement, on pain of losing a great opportunity of becoming the leader of a united and revolutionary working class.
I must now add that the failure of the Socialist Party until now to rise to the occasion and develop the activity demanded by the situation is beginning to avenge itself, and that this talk of a labor party is one of the manifestations of our avenging Nemesis. It is highly significant in this connection that within a short month of the most solemn assurances given us by our most “practical statesmen” that there is no labor party in sight, a prominent Socialist offered a resolution in the New York Central Federated Union calling upon Gompers to organize such a party and that that eminently conservative body adopted this resolution unanimously. Also, that the immediate occasion which called forth the resolution was the quarter-million verdict rendered against the Hatters Union as a result of one of the very acts of judicial tyranny mentioned in my said articles.
It was under the leadership of these “practical statesmen” that our party has for years pursued this very “practical” policy, begun under De Leon, of ignoring the real needs of the working class of this country and the problems confronting the labor movement, as they shaped themselves under the actual political conditions of this country, which prescribe the conditions under which the economic struggle of the workers shall be carried on, until the party has become something apart from the labor movement. It is under their leadership that the party is now wasting its energies in small change or chasing after rainbows, attempting, in New York, to square the circle by formulating a workingmen's compensation act that will stand the test of “constitutionality,” and elsewhere to pull society out of the quagmire by its own boot-straps by devising the clever scheme of nationalizing the railroads on the accumulated dividends of a few shares of stock which the nation will purchase from the capitalists. And it is under their guidance that we are now to eschew the discussion of the problems of a labor party on the specious ground that they are purely “academic.” Such a course would have the advantage of saving some nerve-racking work, and the convenience of comfortably sitting on the fence as long as possible, which seems to be the “practical” results some of our leaders are anxious to achieve. To those, however, who look with open eyes on what is going on around them, and are ready to assume responsibility and to do their duty in the work of educating and organizing the working class, the labor party presents a real and immediate, nay, a pressing problem. It should therefore receive careful attention at the hands of all thoughtful Socialists, and have a full and all-sided discussion.
It is with this in view that the following is here offered for the consideration of our readers. As the problem is many-sided and could not be adequately treated in its entirety within the limits of a short article, I shall only discuss here one phase of the question— that of the probabilities of the success of such a party in achieving the purpose for which it would be created; leaving untouched the question of the price to be paid for such success, as well as whether other and incidental good might result from its organization. These and other phases of the problem will have to be treated separately.
In order that the discussion may proceed intelligently we must first answer the question: What is a Labor Party? Every Socialist party is supposed to be a labor party. But what those who speak of the organization of a labor party as distinguished from a Socialist party have in mind is a party limited in its scope in two ways: First, by eliminating the ultimate Socialist ideal, the co-operative commonwealth, and confining its propaganda to present-day problems; and, second, by eliminating “general” questions and confining itself specifically to the special problems of the industrial proletariat and particularly that portion thereof which is organized into trade-unions. The prototype of such a party is the British Labor Party, as its “labor” members view it. Historically as well as logically it is an attempt to carry out by means of a political party of their own the program and demands of the most enlightened trade-unions, unhampered by any entangling alliance with Socialist principles and tactics. Its aim is to unite in its organization the entire industrial proletariat, irrespective of “political” or “social” belief, on a program of its own “immediate demands;” and to carry that program through by the aid of bourgeois radicals who are “friendly disposed” towards the “reasonable demands of labor” and such bourgeois political parties as may need its aid in Parliament and are ready to pay its price in the way of “labor legislation.”
It is of the very essence of such a party that it must not be “revolutionary.” First, because its aim is not to overthrow any existing order, but to meet the needs of “labor” under the present system. Second, because it would then fail to reach the more conservative elements of the working class. And third, because it would thereby alienate the sympathies of the bourgeois radicals, and (and this is the most important consideration) it would make it impossible for any bourgeois political party to grant any of its demands. Its strength must lie wholly in its parliamentary position. Its chief effort must therefore be to unite so many voters as to place each of the other parties (in so-called two-party countries) or at least one of them in a parliamentary minority so as to throw it into an alliance with the labor party as the only means of obtaining power.
In order to succeed in such an effort any “revolutionary” spirit which it may develop must be curbed at both ends: On the one hand no section of the electorate which could be appealed to with success should be neglected, and therefore only the most obvious and pressing demands, and such as would not offend the “inherent conservatism” of the masses, should be put forth before the electorate. On the other hand its demands and methods of agitation must be such that a respectable bourgeois party could enter into a parliamentary alliance with it without betraying the interests of its own constituents and without alienating its own more conservative voters by a compromising alliance with dangerous agitators. A failure to appreciate the latter circumstance might lead to a combination of the two bourgeois parties or, where only one is in a minority, even to the sacrifice by that one of its desire for power on the altar of its “principles,” which comes to the same thing.
For the same reasons the demands of such a party must be strictly “economic.” They must also be “practical,” and under no circumstances may it permit itself to indulge in “theories” or “abstractions.” In fact it must be so “practical” as to have no “abstract” principles, either social, political, or otherwise, so that it may unite on its practical program, both at the polls and Parliament, people of the most divergent “principles.”
It would seem at first blush that this is just the party for this country. For where in the world are parties inclined to be more “practical” than in this country? Where are “theories” and “abstract” principles more readily set aside in order to serve some immediate necessity, whether political or otherwise? And yet, on second thought it will be found that there are insurmountable difficulties in the way of such a party. Difficulties which make its practical success, the achievement of the particular purposes which it sets before itself, an impossibility, and its failure a foregone conclusion.
In the first place the conditions of bourgeois party life in this country are unfavorable to such a party. The first condition of the success of such a party is the presence of a radical bourgeois party willing to ally itself with such a labor party, as is the case in England, for instance. This presupposes a real difference in the principles or policy of the old parties, the one being conservative and the other progressive, so that the progressive party, or at least a dominant radical element therein, feels itself more related in principle and policy to the labor party than to its bourgeois antagonist. But there is no such party in this country, and there is no prospect of there being one in the near future. The party-constellation in this country is in many ways peculiar, and puzzling to those unfamiliar with the history of parties in this country and with the real workings of our governmental machinery. And even the well-informed would find it a hard task to tell the real, present-day, difference between the Republican and Democratic parties. This is due to the fact that our parties are really not parties in the ordinary sense of the word, but composites or federations of parties necessitated by our electoral and governmental system. Notwithstanding this it is usually assumed by those favoring the organization of a labor party that such a party could carry through its program with the assistance of the Democratic Party. No particular reason can be assigned for this expectation except the fact that the Democratic Party is now in a minority and therefore an “opposition” party, and that it is believed not to be “trustified” quite as much as the Republican Party, a circumstance which in its turn is supposed to be due to the fact that the Democratic Party is opposed to the “protective tariff,” the “mother of trusts.” Such alleged radical movements within the Democratic Party as the Hearst movement also had something to do with fostering this belief.
And yet, such belief is quite unjustified. If there is any difference between the Republican and Democratic parties it is surely not to the advantage of the Democratic Party. In fact, of the two, the Democratic Party is the more reactionary and the more unsuited to become the ally of any real labor party or to in any way further a progressive policy of social and labor legislation, as I have pointed out some time ago in a series of articles specially devoted to that question. (“The Political Situation in the United States and the Democratic Party,” [Die] Neue Zeit, 1906-7, Nos. 44, 45, 46).
I shall, therefore, not go into details here, but merely recapitulate the conclusions and cite some examples. The Democratic Party as it is at present constituted is unalterably opposed to all those demands of labor which necessarily form the basis of a labor party. First, because its dominant group, the southern millionaires and other lesser dignitaries of capital, and their allies, the “small men” of capital in the middle-west and elsewhere, are among the worst exploiters of labor, still abiding in the more or less primitive stages of capitalistic exploitations of labor with all that that implies. They are the natural foes of all labor legislation, including any legal restriction of the work-day even for women and children, factory-laws, employer liability laws, etc., etc. Second, because the Democratic Party is by tradition and “on principle” opposed to any national system of labor legislation as violative of the “strict-constructionist” principle of interpreting our Constitution, “state-sovereignty,” “home-rule,” and other sacred articles of the Democratic creed handed down from Jefferson. But a national system of labor legislation is absolutely essential to the progress of the labor movement of this country and would have to be made the corner-stone of the program of any real labor party.
The most shameful exploitation of child labor is as much a “domestic institution” of the Democratic South now, as slavery used to be before the civil war. It can only be effectually put an end to through congressional legislation. But this is bitterly fought “on principle,” by all Democrats, even the very “radical.” The same is true of peonage, of railway employers’ liability laws, of national mining inspection laws; etc., etc. Even the injunction as a weapon in the warfare against labor, particularly as used to prevent boycotting, and the extension of the Sherman Anti-Trust law against the unions for the same purpose, which are now being made the immediate occasion for the agitation in favor of the organization of a labor party, are needed more by the “small” and “middle” men (read, Capitalists) affiliated with the Democratic Party than by the trust-magnates of the Republican Party. It is the small and middle capitalist-manufacturers that are afraid of a boycott by the labor-unions. The steel trust isn't. Nor are the other big trusts.
It is therefore no mere chance that Hearst went out of his way to publicly approve the anti-boycotting decisions of the Supreme Court. He was merely seeing to it that the “Democratic faith” was “kept pure,” and incidentally trying hard to square himself with those portions of the Democratic Party's following which forms its real backbone.
As to whether or not the Republican Party could, if driven into a hopeless minority, be compelled to form an alliance with a labor party is problematical. Both English and American precedent could be cited in favor of such a conclusion. The contingency is, however, almost as remote as that of the entire disappearance of the present parties and their complete reorganization on entirely new lines corresponding more closely to modern industrial divisions and currents of social and political thought, and is therefore out of the range of “practical politics.”
This is not, however, the only, and not even the chief obstacle to the success of a labor party in the United States. That lies in the absence of democratic government in this country. The first pre-requisite of a labor party, as well as of Socialist ministerialism, is true parliamentary government, based on real democracy. The success of the British Labor Party was made possible by the fact that the Liberal Party needed, or expected to need, the assistance of the labor party to form that majority of the House of Commons which in Great Britain is absolutely necessary in order to carry on the government. It is of the essence of the government in old “monarchical England” that every act of the government should be approved of the people as represented by the majority of the men elected by the people to Parliament. The government must at all times enjoy the “confidence” of the people, and it is therefore at all times amenable to the will of the majority of the House of Commons. It can at any moment be turned out of office by a vote of lack of confidence on the part of a majority of the House of Commons; and every deliberate defeat of any ministerial legislative proposition, or any vote of censure or dissatisfaction with any executive act of the government by that House is considered proof of a lack of confidence on the part of the people, and must be followed by the resignation of the “government,” that is of the ministry which carries on the government on behalf of the House of Commons, unless it wants to appeal from the representatives of the people to the people itself. The latter is not a “prerogative of the Crown,” as it is sometimes represented to be by American writers who take advantage of the inherited jargon of English politics to keep their countrymen in ignorance of the rapid strides of democracy abroad and of the defects of their own antiquated system of government. On the contrary it is a necessary complement of representative democracy, like the initiative and referendum under other circumstances.
The fact that “the government” must at all times have behind it a majority of the elected representatives of the people gives small parliamentary groups, which have the “balance of power,” immense parliamentary influence, for they can at any time “turn out the government” by refusing to vote for legislative proposals or to approve of its executive acts. This in turn gives these groups great power even if they do not hold the balance of power absolutely, if the condition of parties is such, or is likely to become such, that a combination may be formed by small groups which would leave the government without the necessary majority.
Take the situation in England to-day, the labor party is in a position to obtain its demands or at least some of them, because it is in a position where its support is a matter of life and death to the present Liberal ministry and indispensable to the Liberal Party generally. Mr. Asquith cannot “carry on His Majesty's Government” without the support of the Irish Nationalists and the Laborites. He will therefore have to come to terms with both and grant their demands, unless their demands are so high for him that he would rather risk a new election with the chance of having to turn the government over to the Conservatives. Of course, he could enter into a pact with the Irish Nationalists only by which these would stand by him through thick and thin, and then he could defy the Laborites. But this would not be wise politics on his part. To begin with, his party, and particularly its most radical wing, is committed to a friendly attitude towards the Labor Party by ante-election pledges made in anticipation of that party's present parliamentary position, which was by no means unexpected at that time. Secondly, the price of such a pact would be too high and extremely distasteful to him as well as a large portion of his following, and particularly the electorate, who are by no means ready to go the limit of the Irish demands, so that at the next election, with the active hostility of the Labor Party and the dissatisfaction with his Irish policy the results would probably be such that the Liberal Party could not retain power at any cost.
Sound and far-sighted policy therefore demands of him a parliamentary alliance with the Labor Party. And as the demands of the Labor Party are likely to be moderate, and the radical wing of his own party is in sympathy with some system at least of progressive labor legislation, the elements of and reasons for a compromise are present, and the Labor Party will get its most urgent demands. Mr. Asquith will have so much more reason for granting these demands, as this would in turn help him to arrive at a compromise with the Irish Nationalists who would under these circumstances, probably give him their support, or at least friendly neutrality, for a good deal less than the realization of their full program, rather than risk a dissolution from which they could gain absolutely nothing no matter how the new elections go. It is this that makes the Britsh Labor Party, or at least made it until now, an efficient engine to carry out its own moderate demands.
Now take a similar situation in this country. Let us suppose that a labor party has been organized, and that it succeeded in electing some 25 or 30 men to the House of Representatives. Let us also suppose that the numerical strength of the other parties is such that the laborites have the absolute balance of power, (a position better than that of the British Labor Party to-day). What would happen then? Why, just nothing.
Of course, the election of 25 or 30 men on a real independent labor party ticket might move both old parties to do something in order to prevent the growth of the class consciousness of the working class which would thus manifest itself. But this would not be the result of the parliamentary power of the group, nor of its “practical” or “moderate” demands. It would be the result of the awakening independence of the working class, and the practical results would probably be in inverse ratio to the group's “practicalness” and moderation, and in direct proportion to the revolutionary spirit and determination which the party that elected them would exhibit. And that is, of course, another story. But an admittedly non-revolutionary labor party, would, by its mere parliamentary strength or skill, accomplish absolutely nothing or next to nothing.
And for very good reasons: Such a parliamentary group could offer nothing to the old parties as the price of carrying through its program; its alliance would not be sought by either of them, unless it could be had gratis. Such a group, as far as sheer parliamentary influence is concerned, could stay in the house for ever afterwards without making it worth anybody's while to pay it anything for its support, which is the basis of success of such a party. The party out of power, that is the one that would not have the President and the majority of the Senate, could, of course, pay nothing, even if it wanted to. And the party in power wouldn't pay anything, because it need not have its support in order to carry on the government. Our parties, even much more than the English and other European parties, are particularly anxious about “carrying on the government.” For in Europe it simply means carrying on the business of the propertied classes, whereas here it means, in addition, the keeping of the great army of job holders in place, with an honest administration, and the utilization of the great sources of graft, with a corrupt one. But all this has nothing to do with our House. It is the President, with the assistance of the Senate, that does the “governing,” and it is the presidency that is being fought for here at our great national elections, and that is the real prize coveted by the old political parties.
In a pinch they can get along without any legislation at all. In fact, the conservative parties would be glad to get along without legislation. An ideal condition for one of the old political parties in this country is to have the President and Senate without the House of Representatives; this would give it all the power it wants without the responsibility of carrying out some legislative program which every party must, of course, promise before election. The reason why they do not purposely work to effect such a state of affairs is that at present with only two parties in the field it is rather hard to obtain the presidency while losing the House. But being placed in a minority by a labor party, which would under our electoral system not involve the loss of the presidency, would worry one of our old parties very little, if it would not, indeed, be welcome. There would be absolutely no motive compelling one of these parties to enter into an alliance with the labor party whereby it would be compelled to carry out the program of the latter or any appreciable part of it.
By reason of the separation of the “government” from the legislature, making as it does the “governor” absolutely independent of and irresponsible to the people or its representatives, our legislators have in general come to play a very miserable role in our political life. It is this that makes the “Administration” (that is practically the President), that great and dreaded engine of power before which every mere legislator bows trembling. It is this which has made our Senate, contrary to the experience of all democratic countries, so much more powerful than the House of Representatives, in fact reduced the House to virtual impotence. Because of the share that it has in the executive government, the Senate was enabled to maintain some independent existence while the House bows submissively to the dictates of the “Administration,” even under present conditions when a rupture might become dangerous to the party in power. It is this, finally, that has reduced the individual member of the House to the most degrading insignificance and powerlessness, and created that much talked-of and wondered-at “House machine,” which laughs at all the “revolts” of the so-called insurgents. In a real parliamentary government every member of Parliament wields a real power all the time. And a threat of revolt on the part of a considerable number of the majority party would bring to its knees the strongest “House Machine,” because it would involve the loss of all power by the entire party.
It goes without saying that the presence of a small independent group in a House in which individual members are absolutely powerless, and in a governmental system in which that particular House plays so insignificant a part, cannot possibly accomplish that which a similar group could manage to accomplish in a House wherein every member counts, and in a government wherein their House is the only one that counts.
In this connection it is very significant that the British Labor Party, which always insisted on “economic” demands only, and refused to be drawn in to “political” issues has now suddenly changed its policy and put forth as its first demand the abolition of the power of the House of Lords, the “curbing” of the Lords, a traditional “political” demand of the Liberal Party, which the Liberal Party is, however now presumably willing to shelve or compromise; and Chairman Barnes even went to the extent of threatening to break with the Liberal Party and perhaps force a dissolution on that account. The Labor Party evidently appreciates that its entire success depends on the undisputed supremacy of the House of Commons. It is therefore a matter of life and death to it that this supremacy be maintained and further assured, whereas the Liberal Party might be satisfied with some kind of a “reformed” House of Lords wherein it could hope to compete with the Conservative Party, but in which the Labor Party could gain no foothold.
Another circumstance to which attention must be called, and which is also the result of the lack of parliamentary government is this: The condition of our parties already alluded to is such that even if the leaders of one of the old parties should enter into an alliance with the Labor Party and should be sincerely desirous of carrying out their agreement, they would be unable to do so. As a counterpart to the powerlessness of the individual member of the House to accomplish anything, we have the powerlessness of the party leaders to compel obedience in their following, which is the necessary condition of every well-regulated parliamentary government. Lack of influence on the real course of events breeds in the members a sense of irresponsibility. To this must be added our peculiar electoral system (which is itself only possible in a country where there is no real parliamentary government) by which each member's tenure of office depends entirely on the good-will of the electors of the electoral district in which he resides. Ordinarily this makes him the mere retainer of the local political boss, who has his own private ends to serve and cares very little for party pledges, and even at best it makes him dependent on, and therefore subservient to, the local business interests. The party chiefs, nay, not even the whole party outside of his district, can either reward him if his “constituency” goes back upon him, (except, of course, by giving him a job), nor punish him, if his “constituency” stands by him.
Hence the remarkable spectacle of party lines being “broken” even on the supposedly most sacred articles of party faith and most hotly contested party issues, of which our legislative history, particularly congressional history, is full. Hence also the many broken pledges of our parties, which must not always be ascribed to the corruption and faithlessness of our politicians. Or rather, this corruption and faithlessness is only possible because of these political conditions, and would disappear under real democratic parliamentary government.
The most formidable obstacle, however, to the success of a labor party in this country is the fact that a mere legislative success would be insufficient to carry its program into execution. As shown in my articles on the “Political Situation in the United States and the Socialist Party,” the real legislative power is vested in this country not in Congress or the State legislatures, but in the courts, principally in the Supreme Court of the United States. In consequence, a success such as was achieved by the British Labor Party, that is the placing upon the statute books those of its proposals which it wants to become law, even if achieved through some miraculous combination of circumstances by an American Labor Party, would be barren of any real results. In fact it would leave the working class just where it was when it started out to organize the labor party, for the Supreme Court would undoubtedly declare each and every important measure which the labor party would succeed in forcing upon the statute books as “unconstitutional.” Indeed, it has already declared most of them, and not only the most radical of them either, “unconstitutional” in advance.
That the mere presence of a group of laborites in Congress would not cause the Supreme Court to reverse itself and adopt in the future a different “interpretation” of the Constitution is quite clear to those who have carefully studied the history of that august judicial tribunal. Whether the Supreme Court will ever be brought to do that by fear of a revolt of the working class, or whether it will not sooner “end” than “mend,” is hard to foretell. But one thing can be foretold with absolute confidence, and that is, that the Supreme Court will never “mend” unless the alternative “end” is placed before it in signs that it can not mistake.
It would therefore be absurd for a labor party in this country to waste any energy on getting any labor legislation passed unless it at the same time took steps to prevent these laws being declared “unconstitutional.” It would have to start out by demanding the “curbing” of the Supreme Court, the abolition of its power to declare laws “unconstitutional.” And it would have to back up this demand by such a show of determination to use the entire resources of the working class and all the weapons and ammunition at its command in an endeavor to enforce this demand, as to carry the conviction to the entire capitalist class, including the Supreme Court, that it must “end” or “mend.”
In other words, in order to do something practical it would have to begin by being revolutionary. And there goes the dream of a “practical,” “safe and sane,” American Labor Party. . . .
[a.] These two articles were printed in the Sunday Call, an expanded separate subscription from the more news-focused Daily Call, and as a result they have never been scanned before.
Last updated on 4 August 2023